compactum: Grice on the compactness theorem, a theorem for
first-order logic: if every finite subset of a given infinite theory T is
consistent, then the whole theory is consistent. The result is an immediate
consequence of the completeness theorem, for if the theory were not consistent,
a contradiction, say ‘P and not-P’, would be provable from it. But the proof,
being a finitary object, would use only finitely many axioms from T, so this
finite subset of T would be inconsistent. This proof of the compactness theorem
is very general, showing that any language that has a sound and complete system
of inference, where each rule allows only finitely many premises, satisfies the
theorem. This is important because the theorem immediately implies that many
familiar mathematical notions are not expressible in the language in question,
notions like those of a finite set or a well-ordering relation. The
compactness theorem is important for other reasons as
well. It is the most frequently applied result in the study of first-order
model theory and has inspired interesting developments within set theory and
its foundations by generating a search for infinitary languages that obey some
analog of the theorem.
Grice’s complementary class, the class of all things
not in a given class. For example, if C is the class of all red things, then
its complementary class is the class containing everything that is not red.
This latter class includes even non-colored things, like numbers and the class
C itself. Often, the context will determine a less inclusive complementary
class. If B 0 A, then the complement of B with respect to A is A B. For example, if A is the class of physical
objects, and B is the class of red physical objects, then the complement of B
with respect to A is the class of non-red physical objects.
completum – incompletum: Grice on completeness, a
property that something typically, a set
of axioms, a logic, a theory, a set of well-formed formulas, a language, or a
set of connectives has when it is strong
enough in some desirable respect. 1 A set of axioms is complete for the logic L
if every theorem of L is provable using those axioms. 2 A logic L has weak
semantical completeness if every valid sentence of the language of L is a
theorem of L. L has strong semantical completeness or is deductively complete
if for every set G of sentences, every logical consequence of G is deducible
from G using L. A propositional logic L is Halldén-complete if whenever A 7 B
is a theorem of L, where A and B share no variables, either A or B is a theorem
of L. And L is Post-complete if L is consistent but no stronger logic for the
same language is consistent. Reference to the “completeness” of a logic,
without further qualification, is almost invariably to either weak or strong
semantical completeness. One curious exception: second-order logic is often
said to be “incomplete,” where what is meant is that it is not axiomatizable. 3
A theory T is negation-complete often simply complete if for every sentence A
of the lancommon notions completeness 162
162 guage of T, either A or its negation is provable in T. And T is
omega-complete if whenever it is provable in T that a property f / holds of
each natural number 0, 1, . . . , it is also provable that every number has f.
Generalizing on this, any set G of well-formed formulas might be called omega
complete if vA[v] is deducible from G whenever A[t] is deducible from G for all
terms t, where A[t] is the result of replacing all free occurrences of v in
A[v] by t. 4 A language L is expressively complete if each of a given class of
items is expressible in L. Usually, the class in question is the class of
twovalued truth-functions. The propositional language whose sole connectives
are - and 7 is thus said to be expressively or functionally complete, while
that built up using 7 alone is not, since classical negation is not expressible
therein. Here one might also say that the set {-,7} is expressively or
functionally complete, while {7} is not.
completion: Grice speaks of ‘complete’ and ‘incomplete. Consider
“Fido is shaggy.” That’s complete. “Fido” is incomplete – like pig. “is shaggy”
is incomplete. This is Grice’s Platonism, hardly the nominalism that Bennett
abuses Grice with! For the rational pirot (not the parrot) has access to a
theory of complete --. When lecturing on Peirce, Grice referred to Russell’s
excellent idea of improving on Peirce. “Don’t ask for the meaning of ‘red,’ ask
for the meaning of ‘x is red.” Cf. Plato, “Don’t try to see horseness, try to
see ‘x is a horse. Don’t be stupid.” Now “x is red” is a bit incomplete. Surely
it can be rendered by the complete, “Something, je-ne-sais-quoi, to use Hume’s
vulgarism, is red.” So, to have an act of referring without an act of
predicating is incomplete. But still useful for philosophical analysis.
complexum: versus the ‘simplex.’ Grice starts with the simplex.
All he needs is a handwave to ascribe ‘the emissor communicates that he knows
the route.’ The proposition which is being transmitted HAS to be complex:
Subject, “The emissor”, copula, “is,” ‘predicate: “a knower of the route.”Grice
allows for the syntactically unstructured handwave to be ‘ambiguous’ so that the
intention on the emissor’s part involves his belief that the emissee will take
this rather than that proposition as being transmitted: Second complex:
“Subject: Emissor, copula: is, predicate: about to leave the emissee.”Vide the
altogether nice girl, and the one-at-a-time sailor. The topic is essential in
seeing Grice within the British empiricist tradition. Empiricists always loved
a simplex, like ‘red.’ In his notes on ‘Meaning’ and “Peirce,’ Grice notes that
for a ‘simplex’ like “red,” the best way to deal with it is via a Russellian
function, ‘x is red.’ The opposite of ‘simplex’ is of course a ‘complexum.’ hile
Grice does have an essay on the ‘complexum,’ he is mostly being jocular. His
dissection of the proposition proceds by considering ‘the a,’ and its
denotatum, or reference, and ‘is the b,’ which involves then the predication.
This is Grice’s shaggy-dog story. Once we have ‘the dog is shaggy,’ we have a
‘complexum,’ and we can say that the utterer means, by uttering ‘Fido is
shaggy,’ that the dog is hairy-coated. Simple, right? It’s the jocular in
Grice. He is joking on philosophers who look at those representative of the
linguistic turn, and ask, “So what do you have to say about reference and
predication,’ and Grice comes up with an extra-ordinary analysis of what is to
believe that the dog is hairy-coat, and communicating it. In fact, the
‘communicating’ is secondary. Once Grice has gone to metabolitical extension of
‘mean’ to apply to the expression, communication becomes secondary in that it has
to be understood in what Grice calls the ‘atenuated’ usage involving this or
that ‘readiness’ to have this or that procedure, basic or resultant, in one’s
repertoire! Bealer is one of Grices most brilliant tutees in the New World. The
Grice collection contains a full f. of correspondence with Bealer. Bealer
refers to Grice in his influential Clarendon essay on content. Bealer is
concerned with how pragmatic inference may intrude in the ascription of a
psychological, or souly, state, attitude, or stance. Bealer loves to quote from
Grice on definite descriptions in Russell and in the vernacular, the implicaturum
being that Russell is impenetrable! Bealers mentor is Grices close collaborator
Myro, so he knows what he is talking about. Grice explored the matter of
subperception at Oxford only with G. J. Warnock.
Grice’s complexe significabile plural: -- Grice used to
say jocularly that he wasn’t commited to propositions; only to propositional
complexes -- complexe significabilia, also called complexum significabile, in
medieval philosophy, what is signified only by a complexum a statement or
declarative sentence, by a that-clause, or by a dictum an accusative !
infinitive construction, as in: ‘I want him to go’. It is analogous to the
modern proposition. The doctrine seems to have originated with Adam de Wodeham
in the early fourteenth century, but is usually associated with Gregory of
Rimini slightly later. Complexe significabilia do not fall under any of the
Aristotelian categories, and so do not “exist” in the ordinary way. Still, they
are somehow real. For before creation nothing existed except God, but even then
God knew that the world was going to exist. The object of this knowledge cannot
have been God himself since God is necessary, but the world’s existence is
contingent, and yet did not “exist” before creation. Nevertheless, it was real
enough to be an object of knowledge. Some authors who maintained such a view
held that these entities were not only signifiable in a complex way by a
statement, but were themselves complex in their inner structure; the term
‘complexum significabile’ is unique to their theories. The theory of complexe
significabilia was vehemently criticized by late medieval nominalists. Refs.: The main reference is in ‘Reply to
Richards.’ But there is “Sentence semantics and propositional complexes,” c.
9-f. 12, BANC.
possibile – “what is actual is not also possible – grave
mistake!” – H. P. Grice. compossible, capable of existing or occurring
together. E.g., two individuals are compossible provided the existence of one
of them is compatible with the existence of the other. In terms of possible
worlds, things are compossible provided there is some possible world to which
all of them belong; otherwise they are incompossible. Not all possibilities are
compossible. E.g., the extinction of life on earth by the year 3000 is
possible; so is its continuation until the year 10,000; but since it is
impossible that both of these things should happen, they are not compossible.
Leibniz held that any non-actualized possibility must be incompossible with
what is actual.
intensio -- comprehension, as applied to a term, the set of
attributes implied by a term. The comprehension of ‘square’, e.g., includes
being four-sided, having equal sides, and being a plane figure, among other
attributes. The comprehension of a term is contrasted with its extension, which
is the set of individuals to which the term applies. The distinction between
the extension and the comprehension of a term was introduced in the Port-Royal
Logic by Arnauld and Pierre Nicole in 1662. Current practice is to use the
expression ‘intension’ rather than ‘comprehension’. Both expressions, however,
are inherently somewhat vague.
iron-age physics: Grice on Russellian compresence, an unanalyzable
relation in terms of which Russell, in his later writings especially in Human
Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, 8, took concrete particular objects to be
analyzable. Concrete particular objects are analyzable in terms of complexes of
qualities all of whose members are compresent. Although this relation can be
defined only ostensively, Russell states that it appears in psychology as
“simultaneity in one experience” and in physics as “overlapping in space-time.”
Complete complexes of compresence are complexes of qualities having the
following two properties: 1 all members of the complex are compresent; 2 given
anything not a member of the complex, there is at least one member of the
complex with which it is not compresent. He argues that there is strong
empirical evidence that no two complete complexes have all their qualities in
common. Finally, space-time pointinstants are analyzed as complete complexes of
compresence. Concrete particulars, on the other hand, are analyzed as series of
incomplete complexes of compresence related by certain causal laws.
Grice’s
computatio sive logica --
computability, roughly, the possibility of computation on a Turing machine. The
first convincing general definition, A. N. Turing’s 6, has been proved
equivalent to the known plausible alternatives, so that the concept of
computability is generally recognized as an absolute one. Turing’s definition
referred to computations by imaginary tape-processing machines that we now know
to be capable of computing the same functions whether simple sums and products
or highly complex, esoteric functions that modern digital computing machines
could compute if provided with sufficient storage capacity. In the form ‘Any
function that is computable at all is computable on a Turing machine’, this
absoluteness claim is called Turing’s thesis. A comparable claim for Alonzo
Church’s 5 concept of lcomputability is called Church’s thesis. Similar theses
are enunciated for Markov algorithms, for S. C. Kleene’s notion of general
recursiveness, etc. It has been proved that the same functions are computable
in all of these ways. There is no hope of proving any of those theses, for such
a proof would require a definition of ‘computable’ a definition that would simply be a further
item in the list, the subject of a further thesis. But since computations of
new kinds might be recognizable as genuine in particular cases, Turing’s thesis
and its equivalents, if false, might be decisively refuted by discovery of a
particular function, a way of computing it, and a proof that no Turing machine
can compute it. The halting problem for say Turing machines is the problem of
devising a Turing machine that computes the function hm, n % 1 or 0 depending
on whether or not Turing machine number m ever halts, once started with the
number n on its tape. This problem is unsolvable, for a machine that computed h
could be modified to compute a function gn, which is undefined the machine goes
into an endless loop when hn, n % 1, and otherwise agrees with hn, n. But this
modified machine Turing machine number
k, say would have contradictory
properties: started with k on its tape, it would eventually halt if and only if
it does not. Turing proved unsolvability of the decision problem for logic the
problem of devising a Turing machine that, applied to argument number n in
logical notation, correctly classifies it as valid or invalid by reducing the
halting problem to the decision problem, i.e., showing how any solution to the
latter could be used to solve the former problem, which we know to be
unsolvable. computer theory, the theory
of the design, uses, powers, and limits of modern electronic digital computers.
It has important bearings on philosophy, as may be seen from the many philosophical
references herein. Modern computers are a radically new kind of machine, for
they are active physical realizations of formal languages of logic and
arithmetic. Computers employ sophisticated languages, and they have reasoning
powers many orders of magnitude greater than those of any prior machines.
Because they are far superior to humans in many important tasks, they have
produced a revolution in society that is as profound as the industrial
revolution and is advancing much more rapidly. Furthermore, computers
themselves are evolving rapidly. When a computer is augmented with devices for
sensing and acting, it becomes a powerful control system, or a robot. To
understand the implications of computers for philosophy, one should imagine a
robot that has basic goals and volitions built into it, including conflicting
goals and competing desires. This concept first appeared in Karel C v apek’s
play Rossum’s Universal Robots 0, where the word ‘robot’ originated. A computer
has two aspects, hardware and programming languages. The theory of each is relevant
to philosophy. The software and hardware aspects of a computer are somewhat
analogous to the human mind and body. This analogy is especially strong if we
follow Peirce and consider all information processing in nature and in human
organisms, not just the conscious use of language. Evolution has produced a
succession of levels of sign usage and information processing: self-copying
chemicals, self-reproducing cells, genetic programs directing the production of
organic forms, chemical and neuronal signals in organisms, unconscious human
information processing, ordinary languages, and technical languages. But each
level evolved gradually from its predecessors, so that the line between body
and mind is vague. The hardware of a computer is typically organized into three
general blocks: memory, processor arithmetic unit and control, and various
inputoutput devices for communication between machine and environment. The
memory stores the data to be processed as well as the program that directs the
processing. The processor has an arithmetic-logic unit for transforming data,
and a control for executing the program. Memory, processor, and input-output
communicate to each other through a fast switching system. The memory and
processor are constructed from registers, adders, switches, cables, and various
other building blocks. These in turn are composed of electronic components:
transistors, resistors, and wires. The input and output devices employ
mechanical and electromechanical technologies as well as electronics. Some
input-output devices also serve as auxiliary memories; floppy disks and
magnetic tapes are examples. For theoretical purposes it is useful to imagine
that the computer has an indefinitely expandable storage tape. So imagined, a
computer is a physical realization of a Turing machine. The idea of an
indefinitely expandable memory is similar to the logician’s concept of an
axiomatic formal language that has an unlimited number of proofs and theorems.
The software of a modern electronic computer is written in a hierarchy of
programming languages. The higher-level languages are designed for use by human
programmers, operators, and maintenance personnel. The “machine language” is
the basic hardware language, interpreted and executed by the control. Its words
are sequences of binary digits or bits. Programs written in intermediate-level
languages are used by the computer to translate the languages employed by human
users into the machine language for execution. A programming language has
instructional means for carrying out three kinds of operations: data operations
and transfers, transfers of control from one part of the program to the other,
and program self-modification. Von Neumann designed the first modern
programming language. A programming language is general purpose, and an
electronic computer that executes it can in principle carry out any algorithm
or effective procedure, including the simulation of any other computer. Thus
the modern electronic computer is a practical realization of the abstract concept
of a universal Turing machine. What can actually be computed in practice
depends, of course, on the state of computer technology and its resources. It
is common for computers at many different spatial locations to be
interconnected into complex networks by telephone, radio, and satellite
communication systems. Insofar as users in one part of the network can control
other parts, either legitimately or illegitimately e.g., by means of a
“computer virus”, a global network of computers is really a global computer.
Such vast computers greatly increase societal interdependence, a fact of
importance for social philosophy. The theory of computers has two branches,
corresponding to the hardware and software aspects of computers. The
fundamental concept of hardware theory is that of a finite automaton, which may
be expressed either as an idealized logical network of simple computer
primitives, or as the corresponding temporal system of input, output, and
internal states. A finite automaton may be specified as a logical net of
truth-functional switches and simple memory elements, connected to one another
by computer theory computer theory idealized wires. These elements function
synchronously, each wire being in a binary state 0 or 1 at each moment of time
t % 0, 1, 2, . . . . Each switching element or “gate” executes a simple
truth-functional operation not, or, and, nor, not-and, etc. and is imagined to
operate instantaneously compare the notions of sentential connective and truth
table. A memory element flip-flop, binary counter, unit delay line preserves
its input bit for one or more time-steps. A well-formed net of switches and
memory elements may not have cycles through switches only, but it typically has
feedback cycles through memory elements. The wires of a logical net are of
three kinds: input, internal, and output. Correspondingly, at each moment of
time a logical net has an input state, an internal state, and an output state.
A logical net or automaton need not have any input wires, in which case it is a
closed system. The complete history of a logical net is described by a
deterministic law: at each moment of time t, the input and internal states of
the net determine its output state and its next internal state. This leads to
the second definition of ‘finite automaton’: it is a deterministic finite-state
system characterized by two tables. The transition table gives the next
internal state produced by each pair of input and internal states. The output
table gives the output state produced by each input state and internal state.
The state analysis approach to computer hardware is of practical value only for
systems with a few elements e.g., a binary-coded decimal counter, because the
number of states increases as a power of the number of elements. Such a rapid rate
of increase of complexity with size is called the combinatorial explosion, and
it applies to many discrete systems. However, the state approach to finite
automata does yield abstract models of law-governed systems that are of
interest to logic and philosophy. A correctly operating digital computer is a
finite automaton. Alan Turing defined the finite part of what we now call a
Turing machine in terms of states. It seems doubtful that a human organism has
more computing power than a finite automaton. A closed finite automaton
illustrates Nietzsche’s law of eternal return. Since a finite automaton has a
finite number of internal states, at least one of its internal states must
occur infinitely many times in any infinite state history. And since a closed finite
automaton is deterministic and has no inputs, a repeated state must be followed
by the same sequence of states each time it occurs. Hence the history of a
closed finite automaton is periodic, as in the law of eternal return. Idealized
neurons are sometimes used as the primitive elements of logical nets, and it is
plausible that for any brain and central nervous system there is a logical
network that behaves the same and performs the same functions. This shows the
close relation of finite automata to the brain and central nervous system. The
switches and memory elements of a finite automaton may be made probabilistic,
yielding a probabilistic automaton. These automata are models of
indeterministic systems. Von Neumann showed how to extend deterministic logical
nets to systems that contain selfreproducing automata. This is a very basic
logical design relevant to the nature of life. The part of computer programming
theory most relevant to philosophy contains the answer to Leibniz’s conjecture
concerning his characteristica universalis and calculus ratiocinator. He held
that “all our reasoning is nothing but the joining and substitution of
characters, whether these characters be words or symbols or pictures.” He
thought therefore that one could construct a universal, arithmetic language
with two properties of great philosophical importance. First, every atomic
concept would be represented by a prime number. Second, the truth-value of any
logically true-or-false statement expressed in the characteristica universalis
could be calculated arithmetically, and so any rational dispute could be
resolved by calculation. Leibniz expected to do the computation by hand with
the help of a calculating machine; today we would do it on an electronic
computer. However, we know now that Leibniz’s proposed language cannot exist,
for no computer or computer program can calculate the truth-value of every
logically true-orfalse statement given to it. This fact follows from a logical
theorem about the limits of what computer programs can do. Let E be a modern
electronic computer with an indefinitely expandable memory, so that E has the
power of a universal Turing machine. And let L be any formal language in which
every arithmetic statement can be expressed, and which is consistent. Leibniz’s
proposed characteristica universalis would be such a language. Now a computer
that is operating correctly is an active formal language, carrying out the
instructions of its program deductively. Accordingly, Gödel’s incompleteness
theorems for formal arithmetic apply to computer E. It follows from these
theorems that no program can enable computer E to decide of an arbitrary
statecomputer theory computer theory 166
166 ment of L whether or not that statement is true. More strongly,
there cannot even be a program that will enable E to enumerate the truths of
language L one after another. Therefore Leibniz’s characteristica universalis
cannot exist. Electronic computers are the first active or “live” mathematical
systems. They are the latest addition to a long historical series of
mathematical tools for inquiry: geometry, algebra, calculus and differential
equations, probability and statistics, and modern mathematics. The most
effective use of computer programs is to instruct computers in tasks for which
they are superior to humans. Computers are being designed and programmed to
cooperate with humans so that the calculation, storage, and judgment
capabilities of the two are synthesized. The powers of such humancomputer
combines will increase at an exponential rate as computers continue to become
faster, more powerful, and easier to use, while at the same time becoming
smaller and cheaper. The social implications of this are very important. The
modern electronic computer is a new tool for the logic of discovery Peirce’s
abduction. An inquirer or inquirers operating a computer interactively can use
it as a universal simulator, dynamically modeling systems that are too complex
to study by traditional mathematical methods, including non-linear systems.
Simulation is used to explain known empirical results, and also to develop new
hypotheses to be tested by observation. Computer models and simulations are
unique in several ways: complexity, dynamism, controllability, and visual
presentability. These properties make them important new tools for modeling and
thereby relevant to some important philosophical problems. A humancomputer
combine is especially suited for the study of complex holistic and hierarchical
systems with feedback cf. cybernetics, including adaptive goal-directed
systems. A hierarchical-feedback system is a dynamic structure organized into
several levels, with the compounds of one level being the atoms or building
blocks of the next higher level, and with cyclic paths of influence operating
both on and between levels. For example, a complex human institution has
several levels, and the people in it are themselves hierarchical organizations
of selfcopying chemicals, cells, organs, and such systems as the pulmonary and
the central nervous system. The behaviors of these systems are in general much
more complex than, e.g., the behaviors of traditional systems of mechanics.
Contrast an organism, society, or ecology with our planetary system as
characterized by Kepler and Newton. Simple formulas ellipses describe the
orbits of the planets. More basically, the planetary system is stable in the
sense that a small perturbation of it produces a relatively small variation in
its subsequent history. In contrast, a small change in the state of a holistic
hierarchical feedback system often amplifies into a very large difference in
behavior, a concern of chaos theory. For this reason it is helpful to model
such systems on a computer and run sample histories. The operator searches for
representative cases, interesting phenomena, and general principles of
operation. The humancomputer method of inquiry should be a useful tool for the
study of biological evolution, the actual historical development of complex
adaptive goal-directed systems. Evolution is a logical and communication
process as well as a physical and chemical process. But evolution is
statistical rather than deterministic, because a single temporal state of the
system results in a probabilistic distribution of histories, rather than in a
single history. The genetic operators of mutation and crossover, e.g., are
probabilistic operators. But though it is stochastic, evolution cannot be
understood in terms of limiting relative frequencies, for the important
developments are the repeated emergence of new phenomena, and there may be no
evolutionary convergence toward a final state or limit. Rather, to understand
evolution the investigator must simulate the statistical spectra of histories
covering critical stages of the process. Many important evolutionary phenomena
should be studied by using simulation along with observation and experiment.
Evolution has produced a succession of levels of organization: selfcopying
chemicals, self-reproducing cells, communities of cells, simple organisms,
haploid sexual reproduction, diploid sexuality with genetic dominance and
recessiveness, organisms composed of organs, societies of organisms, humans,
and societies of humans. Most of these systems are complex hierarchical
feedback systems, and it is of interest to understand how they emerged from
earlier systems. Also, the interaction of competition and cooperation at all
stages of evolution is an important subject, of relevance to social philosophy
and ethics. Some basic epistemological and metaphysical concepts enter into
computer modeling. A model is a well-developed concept of its object,
representing characteristics like structure and funccomputer theory computer
theory 167 167 tion. A model is similar
to its object in important respects, but simpler; in mathematical terminology,
a model is homomorphic to its object but not isomorphic to it. However, it is
often useful to think of a model as isomorphic to an embedded subsystem of the
system it models. For example, a gas is a complicated system of microstates of
particles, but these microstates can be grouped into macrostates, each with a
pressure, volume, and temperature satisfying the gas law PV % kT. The
derivation of this law from the detailed mechanics of the gas is a reduction of
the embedded subsystem to the underlying system. In many cases it is adequate
to work with the simpler embedded subsystem, but in other cases one must work
with the more complex but complete underlying system. The law of an embedded
subsystem may be different in kind from the law of the underlying system.
Consider, e.g., a machine tossing a coin randomly. The sequence of tosses obeys
a simple probability law, while the complex underlying mechanical system is
deterministic. The random sequence of tosses is a probabilistic system embedded
in a deterministic system, and a mathematical account of this embedding
relation constitutes a reduction of the probabilistic system to a deterministic
system. Compare the compatibilist’s claim that free choice can be embedded in a
deterministic system. Compare also a pseudorandom sequence, which is a
deterministic sequence with adequate randomness for a given finite simulation.
Note finally that the probabilistic system of quantum mechanics underlies the
deterministic system of mechanics. The ways in which models are used by
goaldirected systems to solve problems and adapt to their environments are
currently being modeled by humancomputer combines. Since computer software can
be converted into hardware, successful simulations of adaptive uses of models
could be incorporated into the design of a robot. Human intentionality involves
the use of a model of oneself in relation to others and the environment. A
problem-solving robot using such a model would constitute an important step
toward a robot with full human powers. These considerations lead to the central
thesis of the philosophy of logical mechanism: a finite deterministic automaton
can perform all human functions. This seems plausible in principle and is
treated in detail in Merrilee Salmon, ed., The Philosophy of Logical Mechanism:
Essays in Honor of Arthur W. Burks,0. A digital computer has reasoning and
memory powers. Robots have sensory inputs for collecting information from the
environment, and they have moving and acting devices. To obtain a robot with
human powers, one would need to put these abilities under the direction of a
system of desires, purposes, and goals. Logical mechanism is a form of
mechanism or materialism, but differs from traditional forms of these doctrines
in its reliance on the logical powers of computers and the logical nature of
evolution and its products. The modern computer is a kind of complex
hierarchical physical system, a system with memory, processor, and control that
employs a hierarchy of programming languages. Humans are complex hierarchical
systems designed by evolution with
structural levels of chemicals, cells, organs, and systems e.g., circulatory,
neural, immune and linguistic levels of genes, enzymes, neural signals, and
immune recognition. Traditional materialists did not have this model of a
computer nor the contemporary understanding of evolution, and never gave an
adequate account of logic and reasoning and such phenomena as goaldirectedness
and self-modeling.
conatum: Aristotle
distinguishes three types of living beings: vegetables, φυτά, which possess
only the ability to nourish themselves τὸ θϱεπτιϰόν; animals, ζαῷ, which
possess the faculty of sensing τὸ αἰσθητιϰόν, which opens onto that of
desiring, τὸ ὀϱεϰτιϰόν, to orektikon, (desdideratum); and man and — he says—any
other similar or superior being, who possess in addition the ability to think,
“τὸ διανοητιϰόν τε ϰαὶ νοῦς.” -- De An., 414a 29-b.orme, the technical Stoic
definition of πάθος, viz. as a particular kind of conation, or
impulse (ορμή). ... 4 ' This definition (amorem ipsum conatum amicitiae
faeiendae ex ... emotion and moral self-management in Galen's philosophical psychology', ..cōnātum ,
i, usu. in plur.: cōnāta ,
ōrum, n., v. conor.. The term is used by an the
Wilde Reader at Oxford, that Grice once followed – until he became a
neo-Prichardian instead.(philosophy) The power or act which directs or impels to
effort of any kind, whether muscular or psychical. quotations 1899, George
Frederick Stout, A Manual of Psychology, page
234:Any pleasing
sense-experience, when it has once taken place, will, on subsequent occasions,
give rise to a conation,
when its conditions are only partially repeated...
conceptus: Grice obviously uses Frege’s notion of a ‘concept.’ One of
Grice’s metaphysical routines is meant to produce a logical construction of a
concept or generate a new concept. Aware of the act/product distinction, Grice
distinguishes between the conceptum, or concept, and the conception, or
conceptio. Grice allows that ‘not’ may be a ‘concept,’ so he is not tied to the
‘equine’ idea by Frege of the ‘horse.’ Since an agent can fail to conceive that
his neighbour’s three-year old is an adult, Grice accepts that ‘conceives’ may
take a ‘that’-clause. In ‘ordinary’ language, one does not seem to refer, say,
to the concept that e = mc2, but that may be a failure or ‘ordinary’ language.
In the canonical cat-on-the-mat, we have Grice conceiving that the cat is on
the mat, and also having at least four concepts: the concept of ‘cat,’ the
concept of ‘mat,’ the concept of ‘being on,’ and the concept of the cat being
on the mat. Griceian
Meinongianism -- conceivability, capability of being conceived or imagined.
Thus, golden mountains are conceivable; round squares, inconceivable. As
Descartes pointed out, the sort of imaginability required is not the ability to
form mental images. Chiliagons, Cartesian minds, and God are all conceivable,
though none of these can be pictured “in the mind’s eye.” Historical references
include Anselm’s definition of God as “a being than which none greater can be
conceived” and Descartes’s argument for dualism from the conceivability of
disembodied existence. Several of Hume’s arguments rest upon the maxim that
whatever is conceivable is possible. He argued, e.g., that an event can occur
without a cause, since this is conceivable, and his critique of induction
relies on the inference from the conceivability of a change in the course of
nature to its possibility. In response, Reid maintained that to conceive is
merely to understand the meaning of a proposition. Reid argued that
impossibilities are conceivable, since we must be able to understand
falsehoods. Many simply equate conceivability with possibility, so that to say
something is conceivable or inconceivable just is to say that it is possible or
impossible. Such usage is controversial, since conceivability is broadly an
epistemological notion concerning what can be thought, whereas possibility is a
metaphysical notion concerning how things can be. The same controversy can
arise regarding the compossible, or co-possible, where two states of affairs
are compossible provided it is possible that they both obtain, and two
propositions are compossible provided their conjunction is possible.
Alternatively, two things are compossible if and only if there is a possible
world containing both. Leibniz held that two things are compossible provided
they can be ascribed to the same possible world without contradiction. “There
are many possible universes, each collection of compossibles making one of
them.” Others have argued that non-contradiction is sufficient for neither
possibility nor compossibility. The claim that something is inconceivable is
usually meant to suggest more than merely an inability to conceive. It is to
say that trying to conceive results in a phenomenally distinctive mental
repugnance, e.g. when one attempts to conceive of an object that is red and
green all over at once. On this usage the inconceivable might be equated with
what one can “just see” to be impossible. There are two related usages of
‘conceivable’: 1 not inconceivable in the sense just described; and 2 such that
one can “just see” that the thing in question is possible. Goldbach’s
conjecture would seem a clear example of something conceivable in the first
sense, but not the second. Grice was also interested in conceptualism as an
answer to the problem of the universale. conceptualism, the view that there are
no universals and that the supposed classificatory function of universals is
actually served by particular concepts in the mind. A universal is a property
that can be instantiated by more than one individual thing or particular at the
same time; e.g., the shape of this , if identical with the shape of the next ,
will be one property instantiated by two distinct individual things at the same
time. If viewed as located where the s are, then it would be immanent. If
viewed as not having spatiotemporal location itself, but only bearing a
connection, usually called instantiation or exemplification, to things that
have such location, then the shape of this
would be transcendent and presumably would exist even if exemplified by
nothing, as Plato seems to have held. The conceptualist rejects both views by
holding that universals are merely concepts. Most generally, a concept may be
understood as a principle of classification, something that can guide us in
determining whether an entity belongs in a given class or does not. Of course,
properties understood as universals satisfy, trivially, this definition and
thus may be called concepts, as indeed they were by Frege. But the conceptualistic
substantive views of concepts are that concepts are 1 mental representations,
often called ideas, serving their classificatory function presumably by
resembling the entities to be classified; or 2 brain states that serve the same
function but presumably not by resemblance; or 3 general words adjectives,
common nouns, verbs or uses of such words, an entity’s belonging to a certain
class being determined by the applicability to the entity of the appropriate
word; or 4 abilities to classify correctly, whether or not with the aid of an
item belonging under 1, 2, or 3. The traditional conceptualist holds 1.
Defenders of 3 would be more properly called nominalists. In whichever way
concepts are understood, and regardless of whether conceptualism is true, they are
obviously essential to our understanding and knowledge of anything, even at the
most basic level of cognition, namely, recognition. The classic work on the
topic is Thinking and Experience 4 by H. H. Price, who held 4.
conditionalis: The conditional is of special interest to Grice because
his ‘impilcature’ has a conditional form. In other words, ‘implicaturum’ is a
variant on ‘implication,’ and the conditionalis has been called ‘implication’ –
‘even a material one, versus a formal one by Whitehead and Russell. So it is of
special philosophical interest. Since Grice’s overarching interest is
rationality, ‘conditionalis’ features in the passage from premise to
conclusion, deemed tautological: the ‘associated conditional” of a valid piece
of reasoning. “This is an interesting Latinism,” as Grice puts it. For those in
the know, it’s supposed to translate ‘hypothetical,’ that Grice also uses. But
literally, the transliteration of ‘hypothetica’ is ‘sub-positio,’ i.e.
‘suppositio,’ so infamous in the Dark Ages! So one has to be careful. For some
reason, Boethius disliked ‘suppositio,’ and preferred to add to the Latinate
philosophical vocabulary, with ‘conditionalis,’ the hypothetical, versus the
categoric, become the ‘conditionale.’ And the standard was not the Diodoran,
but the Philonian, also known, after Whitehead, as the ‘implicatio materialis.’
While this sounds scholastic, it isn’t. Cicero may have used ‘implicatio
materialis.’ But Whitehead’s and Russell’s motivation is a different one. They
start with the ‘material’, by which they mean a proposition WITH A TRUTH VALUE.
For implication that does not have this restriction, they introduce ‘implicatio
formalis,’ or ‘formal implication.’ In their adverbial ways, it goes p formally
implies q. trictly, propositio conditionalis:
vel substitutive, versus propositio praedicativa in Apuleius. Classical Latin condicio was
confused in Late Latin with conditio "a making," from conditus,
past participle of condere "to put together." The sense
evolution in Latin apparently was from "stipulation" to
"situation, mode of being."
Grice lists ‘if’ as the third binary functor in his response to Strawson. The
relations between “if” and “⊃” have already, but only in part,
been discussed. 1 The sign “⊃” is called the Material Implication
sign a name I shall consider later. Its meaning is given by the rule that any
statement of the form ‘p⊃q’ is false in the case in which the first of its constituent
statements is true and the second false, and is true in every other case
considered in the system; i. e., the falsity of the first constituent statement
or the truth of the second are, equally, sufficient conditions of the truth of
a statement of material implication ; the combination of truth in the first
with falsity in the second is the single, necessary and sufficient, condition
(1 Ch. 2, S. 7) of its falsity. The standard or primary -- the importance of
this qualifying phrase can scarcely be overemphasized. There are uses of “if …
then … ” which do not answer to the
description given here,, or to any other descriptions given in this chapter
-- use of an “if … then …” sentence,
on the other hand, we saw to be in circumstances where, not knowing whether
some statement which could be made by the use of a sentence corresponding in a
certain way to the first clause of the hypothetical is true or not, or
believing it to be false, we nevertheless consider that a step in reasoning
from that statement to a statement related in a similar way to the second
clause would be a sound or reasonable step ; the second statement also being
one of whose truth we are in doubt, or which we believe to be false. Even in
such circumstances as these we may sometimes hesitate to apply the word ‘true’
to hypothetical statements (i.e., statements which could be made by the use of
“if ... then …,” in its standard significance), preferring to call them
reasonable or well-founded ; but if we apply ‘true’ to them at all, it will be
in such circumstances as these. Now one of the sufficient conditions of the
truth of a statement of material implication may very well be fulfilled without
the conditions for the truth, or reasonableness, of the corresponding
hypothetical statement being fulfilled ; i.e., a statement of the form ‘p⊃q’ does not entail the corresponding statement of the form
“if p then q.” But if we are prepared to accept the hypothetical statement, we
must in consistency be prepared to deny the conjunction of the statement
corresponding to the first clause of the sentence used to make the hypothetical
statement with the negation of the statement corresponding to its second clause
; i.e., a statement of the form “if p then q” does entail the corresponding statement
of the form ‘p⊃q.’ The force of “corresponding” needs elucidation. Consider
the three following very ordinary specimens of hypothetical sentences. If the
Germans had invaded England in 1940, they would have won the war. If Jones were
in charge, half the staff would have been dismissed. If it rains, the match will
be cancelled. The sentences which could be used to make statements
corresponding in the required sense to the subordinate clauses can be
ascertained by considering what it is that the speaker of each hypothetical
sentence must (in general) be assumed either to be in doubt about or to believe
to be not the case. Thus, for (1) to (8), the corresponding pairs of sentences
are as follows. The Germans invaded England in 1940; they won the war. Jones is
in charge; half the staff has been dismissed. It will rain; the match will be
cancelled. Sentences which could be used to make the statements of material
implication corresponding to the hypothetical statements made by these
sentences can now be framed from these pairs of sentences as follows. The Germans
invaded England in 1940 ⊃ they won the war. Jones is in charge ⊃ half the staff has been, dismissed. It will rain ⊃ the match will be cancelled. The very fact that these
verbal modifications are necessary, in order to obtain from the clauses of the
hypothetical sentence the clauses of the corresponding material implication
sentence is itself a symptom of the radical difference between hypothetical
statements and truth-functional statements. Some detailed differences are also
evident from these examples. The falsity of a statement made by the use of ‘The
Germans invaded England in 1940’ or ‘Jones is in charge’ is a sufficient
condition of the truth of the corresponding statements made by the use of (Ml)
and (M2) ; but not, of course, of the corresponding statements made by the use
of (1) and (2). Otherwise, there would normally be no point in using sentences
like (1) and (2) at all; for these sentences would normally carry – but not
necessarily: one may use the pluperfect or the imperfect subjunctive when one
is simply working out the consequences of an hypothesis which one may be
prepared eventually to accept -- in the tense or mood of the verb, an
implication of the utterer's belief in the falsity of the statements
corresponding to the clauses of the hypothetical. It is not raining is
sufficient to verify a statement made by the use of (MS), but not a
statement made by the use of (3). Its not raining Is also sufficient to verify
a statement made by the use of “It will rain ⊃
the match will not be cancelled.” The formulae ‘p revise ⊃q’ and ‘q revise⊃
q' are consistent with one another, and the joint assertion of corresponding
statements of these forms is equivalent to the assertion of the corresponding
statement of the form * *-~p. But “If it rains, the match will be cancelled” is
inconsistent with “If it rains, the match will not be cancelled,” and their
joint assertion in the same context is self-contradictory. Suppose we call the
statement corresponding to the first clause of a sentence used to make a
hypothetical statement the antecedent of the hypothetical statement; and the
statement corresponding to the second clause, its consequent. It is sometimes
fancied that whereas the futility of identifying conditional statements with
material implications is obvious in those cases where the implication of the
falsity of the antecedent is normally carried by the mood or tense of the verb
(e.g., (I) or (2)), there is something to be said for at least a partial
identification in cases where no such implication is involved, i.e., where the
possibility of the truth of both antecedent and consequent is left open (e.g.,
(3). In cases of the first kind (‘unfulfilled’ or ‘subjunctive’ conditionals)
our attention is directed only to the last two lines of the truth-tables for *
p ⊃ q ', where the antecedent has the truth-value, falsity; and
the suggestion that ‘~p’ entails ‘if p, then q’ is felt to be obviously wrong.
But in cases of the second kind we may inspect also the first two lines, for
the possibility of the antecedent's being fulfilled is left open; and the
suggestion that ‘p . q’ entails ‘if p, then q’ is not felt to be obviously
wrong. This is an illusion, though engendered by a reality. The fulfilment of
both antecedent and consequent of a hypothetical statement does not show that
the man who made the hypothetical statement was right; for the consequent might
be fulfilled as a result of factors unconnected with, or in spite of, rather
than because of, the fulfilment of the antecedent. We should be prepared to say
that the man who made the hypothetical statement was right only if we were also
prepared to say that the fulfilment of the antecedent was, at least in part,
the explanation of the fulfilment of the consequent. The reality behind the
illusion is complex : en. 3 it is, partly, the fact that, in many cases, the
fulfilment of both antecedent and consequent may provide confirmation for the
view that the existence of states of affairs like those described by the
antecedent is a good reason for expecting states of affairs like those
described by the consequent ; and it is, partly, the fact that a man whosays,
for example, 4 If it rains, the match will be cancelled * makes a prediction
(viz.. that the match will be cancelled) under a proviso (viz., that it rains),
and that the cancellation of the match because of the rain therefore leads us
to say, not only that the reasonableness of the prediction was confirmed, but
also that the prediction itself was confirmed. Because a statement of the form
“p⊃q” does not entail the corresponding statement of the form '
if p, then q ' (in its standard employment), we shall expect to find, and have
found, a divergence between the rules for '⊃'
and the rules for ' if J (in its standard employment). Because ‘if p, then q’
does entail ‘p⊃q,’ we shall also expect to find some degree of parallelism
between the rules; for whatever is entailed by ‘p "3 q’ will be entailed
by ‘if p, then q,’ though not everything which entails ‘p⊃q’ will entail ‘if p, then q.’ Indeed, we find further
parallels than those which follow simply from the facts that ‘if p, then q’
entails ‘p⊃q’ and that entailment is transitive. To laws (19)-(23)
inclusive we find no parallels for ‘if.’ But for (15) (p⊃j).JJ⊃? (16) (P ⊃q).~qZ)~p (17) p'⊃q s ~q1)~p (18) (?⊃j).(?
⊃r) ⊃ (p⊃r) we find that, with certain reservations, 1 the following
parallel laws hold good : (1 The reservations are important. It is, e. g.,
often impossible to apply entailment-rule (iii) directly without obtaining
incorrect or absurd results. Some modification of the structure of the clauses
of the hypothetical is commonly necessary. But formal logic gives us no guide
as to which modifications are required. If we apply rule (iii) to our specimen
hypothetical sentences, without modifying at all the tenses or moods of the
individual clauses, we obtain expressions which are scarcely English. If we
preserve as nearly as possible the tense-mood structure, in the simplest way
consistent with grammatical requirements, we obtain the sentences : If the
Germans had not won the war, they would not have invaded England in
1940.) If half the staff had not been dismissed, Jones would not be in
charge. If the match is not cancelled, it will not rain. But these sentences,
so far from being logically equivalent to the originals, have in each case a
quite different sense. It is possible, at least in some such cases, to frame
sentences of more or less the appropriate pattern for which one can imagine a
use and which do stand in the required logical relationship to the original
sentences (e.g., ‘If it is not the case that half the staff has been dismissed,
then Jones can't be in charge;’ or ‘If the Germans did not win the war, it's
only because they did not invade England in 1940;’ or even (should historical
evidence become improbably scanty), ‘If the Germans did not win the war, it
can't be true that they invaded England in 1940’). These changes reflect
differences in the circumstances in which one might use these, as opposed to
the original, sentences. Thus the sentence beginning ‘If Jones were in charge
…’ would normally, though not necessarily, be used by a man who antecedently
knows that Jones is not in charge : the sentence beginning ‘If it's not the
case that half the staff has been dismissed …’ by a man who is working towards
the conclusion that Jones is not in charge. To say that the sentences are
nevertheless logically equivalent is to point to the fact that the grounds for
accepting either, would, in different circumstances, have been grounds for accepting
the soundness of the move from ‘Jones is in charge’ to ‘Half the staff has been
dismissed.’) (i) (if p, then q; and p)^q
(ii) (if p, then qt and not-g) Dnot-j? (iii) (if p, then f) ⊃ (if not-0, then not-j?) (iv) (if p, then f ; and iff, then
r) ⊃(if j>, then r) (One must remember that calling the
formulae (i)-(iv) is the same as saying that, e.g., in the case of (iii), c if
p, then q ' entails 4 if not-g, then not-j> '.) And similarly we find that,
for some steps which would be invalid for 4 if ', there are corresponding steps
that would be invalid for “⊃,” e. g. (p^q).q :. p are invalid inference-patterns,
and so are if p, then q ; and q /. p if p, then ; and not-j? /. not-f .The
formal analogy here may be described by saying that neither * p 13 q ' nor * if
j?, then q * is a simply convertible formula. We have found many laws (e.g.,
(19)-(23)) which hold for “⊃” and not for “if.” As an example of
a law which holds for “if,” but not for
“⊃,” we may give the analytic formula “ ~[(if p, then q) * (if
p, then not-g)]’. The corresponding formula 4 ~[(P 3 ?) * (j? 3 ~?}]’ is not
analytic, but (el (28)) is equivalent to the contingent formula ‘~~p.’ The
rules to the effect that formulae such as (19)-{23) are analytic are sometimes
referred to as ‘paradoxes of implication.’ This is a misnomer. If ‘⊃’ is taken as identical either with ‘entails’ or, more
widely, with ‘if ... then …’ in its
standard use, the rules are not paradoxical, but simply incorrect. If ‘⊃’ is given the meaning it has in the system of truth functions,
the rules are not paradoxical, but simple and platitudinous consequences of the
meaning given to the symbol. Throughout this section, I have spoken of a
‘primary or standard’ use of “if … then …,” or “if,” of which the main
characteristics were: that for each hypothetical statement made by this use of
“if,” there could be made just one statement which would be the antecedent of
the hypothetical and just one statement which would be its consequent; that the
hypothetical statement is acceptable (true, reasonable) if the antecedent
statement, if made or accepted, would, in the circumstances, be a good ground
or reason for accepting the consequent statement; and that the making of the
hypothetical statement carries the implication either of uncertainty about, or
of disbelief in, the fulfilment of both antecedent and consequent. (1 Not all
uses of * if ', however, exhibit all these characteristics. In particular,
there is a use which has an equal claim to rank as standard and which is
closely connected with the use described, but which does not exhibit the first
characteristic and for which the description of the remainder must consequently
be modified. I have in mind what are sometimes called 'variable' or 'general’
hypothetical : e.g., ‘lf ice is left in the sun, it melts,’ ‘If the side of a
triangle is produced, the exterior angle is equal to the sum of the two
interior and opposite angles ' ; ' If a child is very strictly disciplined in
the nursery, it will develop aggressive tendencies in adult life,’ and so on.
To a statement made by the use of a sentence such as these there corresponds no
single pair of statements which are, respectively, its antecedent and
consequent. On the other 1 There is much more than this to be said about this
way of using ‘if;’ in particular, about the meaning of the question whether the
antecedent would be a good ground or reason for accepting the consequent and
about the exact way in which this question is related to the question of
whether the hypothetical is true {acceptable, reasonable) or not hand, for
every such statement there is an indefinite number of non-general hypothetical
statements which might be called exemplifications, applications, of the
variable hypothetical; e.g., a statement made by the use of the sentence ‘If
this piece of ice is left in the sun, it will melt.’ To the subject of variable
hypothetical I may return later. 1 Two relatively uncommon uses of ‘if’ may be
illustrated respectively by the sentences ‘If he felt embarrassed, he showed no
signs of it’ and ‘If he has passed his exam, I’m a Dutchman (I'll eat my hat,
&c.)’ The sufficient and necessary condition of the truth of a statement
made by the first is that the man referred to showed no sign of embarrassment.
Consequently, such a statement cannot be treated either as a standard
hypothetical or as a material implication. Examples of the second kind are
sometimes erroneously treated as evidence that ‘if’ does, after all, behave
somewhat as ‘⊃’ behaves. The evidence for this is, presumably, the facts
(i) that there is no connexion between antecedent and consequent; (ii) that the
consequent is obviously not (or not to be) fulfilled ; (iii) that the intention
of the speaker is plainly to give emphatic expression to the conviction that
the antecedent is not fulfilled either ; and (iv) the fact that “(p ⊃ q) . ~q” entails “~p.” But this is a strange piece of
logic. For, on any possible interpretation, “if p then q” has, in respect of
(iv), the same logical powers as ‘p⊃q;’
and it is just these logical powers that we are jokingly (or fantastically)
exploiting. It is the absence of connexion referred to in (i) that makes it a
quirk, a verbal flourish, an odd use of ‘if.’ If hypothetical statements were
material implications, the statements would be not a quirkish oddity, but a
linguistic sobriety and a simple truth. Finally, we may note that ‘if’ can be employed not simply in making
statements, but in, e.g., making provisional announcements of intention (e.g.,
‘If it rains, I shall stay at home’) which, like unconditional announcements of
intention, we do not call true or false but describe in some other way. If the
man who utters the quoted sentence leaves home in spite of the rain, we do not
say that what he said was false, though we might say that he lied (never really
intended to stay in) ; or that he changed his mind. There are further uses of
‘if’ which I shall not discuss. 1 v. ch. 7, I. The safest way to read the
material implication sign is, perhaps, ‘not both … and not …’ The material
equivalence sign ‘≡’ has the meaning given by the
following definition : p q =df=⊃/'(p⊃ff).(sOj)'
and the phrase with which it is sometimes identified, viz., ‘if and only if,’
has the meaning given by the following definition: ‘p if and only if q’ =df ‘if
p then g, and if q then p.’ Consequently, the objections which hold against the
identification of ‘p⊃q” with ‘if p then q’ hold with double force against the
identification of “p≡q’ with ‘p if and only if q.’ ‘If’
is of particular interest to Grice. The interest in the ‘if’ is double in
Grice. In doxastic contexts, he needs it for his analysis of ‘intending’
against an ‘if’-based dispositional (i.e. subjective-conditional) analysis. He
is of course, later interested in how Strawson misinterpreted the ‘indicative’
conditional! It is later when he starts to focus on the ‘buletic’ mode marker,
that he wants to reach to Paton’s categorical (i.e. non-hypothetical)
imperative. And in so doing, he has to face the criticism of those Oxonian
philosophers who were sceptical about the very idea of a conditional buletic
(‘conditional command – what kind of a command is that?’. Grice would refere to
the protasis, or antecedent, as a relativiser – where we go again to the
‘absolutum’-‘relativum’ distinction. The conditional is also paramount in
Grice’s criticism of Ryle, where the keyword would rather be ‘disposition.’
Then ther eis the conditional and disposition. Grice is a philosophical
psychologist. Does that make sense? So are Austin (Other Minds), Hampshire
(Dispositions), Pears (Problems in philosophical psychology) and Urmson
(Parentheticals). They are ALL against Ryle’s silly analysis in terms of
single-track disposition" vs. "many-track disposition," and
"semi-disposition." If I hum and walk, I can either hum or walk. But
if I heed mindfully, while an IN-direct sensing may guide me to YOUR soul, a
DIRECT sensing guides me to MY soul. When Ogden consider attacks to meaning,
theres what he calls the psychological, which he ascribes to Locke Grices
attitude towards Ryle is difficult to assess. His most favourable assessment
comes from Retrospective epilogue, but then he is referring to Ryle’s fairy
godmother. Initially, he mentions Ryle as a philosopher engaged in, and
possibly dedicated to the practice of the prevailing Oxonian methodology, i.e.
ordinary-language philosophy. Initially, then, Grice enlists Ryle in
the regiment of ordinary-language philosophers. After introducing Athenian
dialectic and Oxonian dialectic, Grice traces some parallelisms, which should
not surprise. It is tempting to suppose that Oxonian dialectic reproduces some
ideas of Athenian dialectic. It would actually be surprising if there
were no parallels. Ryle was, after all, a skilled and enthusiastic student of
Grecian philosophy. Interestingly, Grice then has Ryles fairy godmother as
proposing the idea that, far from being a basis for rejecting the
analytic-synthetic distinction, opposition that there are initially two
distinct bundles of statements, bearing the labels analytic and synthetic,
lying around in the world of thought waiting to be noticed, provides us with
the key to making the analytic-synthetic distinction acceptable. The
essay has a verificationist ring to it. Recall Ayer and the
verificationists trying to hold water with concepts like fragile and the
problem of counterfactual conditionals vis-a-vis observational and
theoretical concepts. Grices essay has two parts: one on disposition as
such, and the second, the application to a type of psychological
disposition, which would be phenomenalist in a way, or verificationist, in
that it derives from introspection of, shall we say, empirical
phenomena. Grice is going to analyse, I want a sandwich. One person
wrote in his manuscript, there is something with the way Grice goes to work.
Still. Grice says that I want a sandwich (or I will that I eat a sandwich)
is problematic, for analysis, in that it seems to refer to experience that is
essentially private and unverifiable. An analysis of intending that p in terms
of being disposed that p is satisfied solves this. Smith wants a sandwich, or
he wills that he eats a sandwich, much as Toby needs nuts, if Smith opens the
fridge and gets one. Smith is disposed to act such that p is satisfied.
This Grice opposes to the ‘special-episode’ analysis of intending that p. An
utterance like I want a sandwich iff by uttering the utterance, the utterer is
describing this or that private experience, this or that private
sensation. This or that sensation may take the form of a highly specific
souly sate, like what Grice calls a sandwich-wanting-feeling. But then, if
he is not happy with the privacy special-episode analysis, Grice is also
dismissive of Ryles behaviourism in The concept of mind, fresh from
the press, which would describe the utterance in terms purely of this or that observable
response, or behavioural output, provided this or that sensory input. Grice
became friendlier with functionalism after Lewis taught him how. The
problem or crunch is with the first person. Surely, Grice claims, one does not
need to wait to observe oneself heading for the fridge before one is in a
position to know that he is hungry. Grice poses a problem for the
protocol-reporter. You see or observe someone else, Smith, that Smith wants a
sandwich, or wills that he eats a sandwich. You ask for evidence. But when it
is the agent himself who wants the sandwich, or wills that he eats a
sandwich, Grice melodramatically puts it, I am not in the
audience, not even in the front row of the stalls; I am on the
stage. Genial, as you will agree. Grice then goes on to offer an
analysis of intend, his basic and target attitude, which he has just used to
analyse and rephrase Peirces mean and which does relies on this or that piece
of dispositional evidence, without divorcing itself completely from the privileged
status or access of first-person introspective knowledge. In “Uncertainty,”
Grice weakens his reductive analysis of intending that, from neo-Stoutian,
based on certainty, or assurance, to neo-Prichardian, based on predicting. All
very Oxonian: Stout was the sometime Wilde reader in mental philosophy (a post
usually held by a psychologist, rather than a philosopher ‒ Stouts favourite
philosopher is psychologist James! ‒ and Prichard was Cliftonian and the proper
White chair of moral philosophy. And while in “Uncertainty” he allows that
willing that may receive a physicalist treatment, qua state, hell later turn a
functionalist, discussed under ‘soul, below, in his “Method in
philosophical psychology (from the banal to the bizarre” (henceforth, “Method”),
in the Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association,
repr. in “Conception.” Grice can easily relate to Hamsphires "Thought and
Action," a most influential essay in the Oxonian scene. Rather than Ryle!
And Grice actually addresses further topics on intention drawing on Hampshire,
Hart, and his joint collaboration with Pears. Refs.: The main reference is
Grice’s early essay on disposition and intention, The H. P. Grice. Refs.: The
main published source is Essay 4 in WOW, but there are essays on ‘ifs and
cans,’ so ‘if’ is a good keyword, on ‘entailment,’ and for the connection with
‘intending,’ ‘disposition and intention,’ BANC.
confirmatum – disconfirmatum
-- confirmation, an evidential relation between evidence and any statement
especially a scientific hypothesis that this evidence supports. It is essential
to distinguish two distinct, and fundamentally different, meanings of the term:
1 the incremental sense, in which a piece of evidence contributes at least some
degree of support to the hypothesis in question
e.g., finding a fingerprint of the suspect at the scene of the crime
lends some weight to the hypothesis that the suspect is guilty; and 2 the
absolute sense, in which a body of evidence provides strong support for the
hypothesis in question e.g., a case
presented by a prosecutor making it practically certain that the suspect is
guilty. If one thinks of confirmation in terms of probability, then evidence
that increases the probability of a hypothesis confirms it incrementally, whereas
evidence that renders a hypothesis highly probable confirms it absolutely. In
each of the two foregoing senses one can distinguish three types of
confirmation: i qualitative, ii quantitative, and iii comparative. i Both
examples in the preceding paragraph illustrate qualitative confirmation, for no
numerical values of the degree of confirmation were mentioned. ii If a gambler,
upon learning that an opponent holds a certain card, asserts that her chance of
winning has increased from 2 /3 to ¾, the claim is an instance of quantitative
incremental confirmation. If a physician states that, on the basis of an X-ray,
the probability that the patient has tuberculosis is .95, that claim
exemplifies quantitative absolute confirmation. In the incremental sense, any
case of quantitative confirmation involves a difference between two probability
values; in the absolute sense, any case of quantitative confirmation involves
only one probability value. iii Comparative confirmation in the incremental
sense would be illustrated if an investigator said that possession of the
murder weapon weighs more heavily against the suspect than does the fingerprint
found at the scene of the crime. Comparative confirmation in the absolute sense
would occur if a prosecutor claimed to have strong cases against two suspects
thought to be involved in a crime, but that the case against one is stronger
than that against the other. Even given recognition of the foregoing six
varieties of confirmation, there is still considerable controversy regarding
its analysis. Some authors claim that quantitative confirmation does not exist;
only qualitative and/or comparative confirmation are possible. Some authors
maintain that confirmation has nothing to do with probability, whereas others known as Bayesians analyze confirmation explicitly in terms of
Bayes’s theorem in the mathematical calculus of probability. Among those who
offer probabilistic analyses there are differences as to which interpretation
of probability is suitable in this context. Popper advocates a concept of
corroboration that differs fundamentally from confirmation. Many real or
apparent paradoxes of confirmation have been posed; the most famous is the
paradox of the ravens. It is plausible to suppose that ‘All ravens are black’
can be incrementally confirmed by the observation of one of its instances,
namely, a black crow. However, ‘All ravens are black’ is logically equivalent
to ‘All non-black things are non-ravens.’ By parity of reasoning, an instance
of this statement, namely, any nonblack non-raven e.g., a white shoe, should
incrementally confirm it. Moreover, the equivalence condition whatever confirms a hypothesis must equally
confirm any statement logically equivalent to it seems eminently reasonable. The result
appears to facilitate indoor ornithology, for the observation of a white shoe
would seem to confirm incrementally the hypothesis that all ravens are black.
Many attempted resolutions of this paradox can be found in the literature.
conjunctum: One has to be careful because the scholastic vocabulary
also misleadingly has ‘copulatum’ for this. The ‘copulatum’ should be
restricted to other usages, which Grice elaborates on ‘izzing’ and hazing.
traditional parlance, one ‘pars orationis.’ Aulus Gellius writes; “What the Greeks call
“sympleplegmenon” we call conjunctum or copulatum, copulative sentence. For
example. The Stoic copulative sentence — sumpleplegmenon axioma — is translated
by “conjunctum” or “copulatum,” for example: „P. Scipio, son of Paulus, was a
consul twice and was given the honour of triumph and also performed the
function of censor and was the colleague of L. Mummius during his censorship”.
Here, Aulus Gellius made a noteworthy remark, referring to the value of truth
of the composing propositions ■ (a Stoic problem). In keeping with the Stoics,
he wrote: “If one element of the copulative sentence is false, even if all the
other elements are true, the copulative sentence is false” (“in omni aiitem
conjuncto si unum est mendacium etiamsi, caetera vera sunt, totum esse
mendacium dicitur”). In the identification of ‘and’ with ‘Λ’
there is already a considerable
distortion of the facts. ‘And’ can perform many jobs which ‘Λ’ cannot perform. It can, for instance, be used to couple
nouns (“Tom and William arrived”), or adjectives (“He was hungry and thirsty”),
or adverbs (“He walked slowly and painfully”); while ' . ' can be used only to
couple expressions which could appear as separate sentences. One might be
tempted to say that sentences in which “and” coupled words or phrases, were
short for sentences in which “and” couples clauses; e.g., that “He was hungry
and thirsty” was short for “He was hungry and he was thirsty.” But this is
simply false. We do not say, of anyone who uses sentences like “Tom and William
arrived,” that he is speaking elliptically, or using abbreviations. On the
contrary, it is one of the functions of “and,” to which there is no counterpart
In the case of “.,” to form plural subjects or compound predicates. Of course
it is true of many statements of the forms “x and y” are/* or ' x is /and g \
that they are logically equivalent to corresponding statements of the"
form * x Is /and yisf'oT^x is /and x is g \ But, first, this is a fact about
the use, in certain contexts, of “and,”
to which there corresponds no rule for the use of * . '. And, second, there are
countless contexts for which such an equivalence does not hold; e.g. “Tom and
Mary made friends” is not equivalent to “Tom made friends and Mary made
friends.” They mean, usually, quite different things. But notice that one could
say “Tom and Mary made friends; but not with one another.” The implication of
mutuality in the first phrase is not so strong but that it can be rejected
without self-contradiction; but it is strong enough to make the rejection a
slight shock, a literary effect. Nor does such an equivalence hold if we
replace “made friends” by “met yesterday,” “were conversing,” “got married,” or
“were playing chess.” Even “Tom and William arrived” does not mean the same as
“Tom arrived and William arrived;” for the first suggests “together” and the second
an order of arrival. It might be conceded that “and” has functions which “ .”
has not (e.g., may carry in certain contexts an implication of mutuality which
‘.’ does not), and yet claimed that the
rules which hold for “and,” where it is used to couple clauses, are the same as
the rules which hold for “.” Even this is not true. By law (11), " p , q '
is logically equivalent to * q . p ' ; but “They got married and had a child”
or “He set to work and found a job” are by no means logically equivalent to “They
had a child and got married” or “He found a job and set to work.” One might try
to avoid these difficulties by regarding ‘.’ as having the function, not of '
and ', but of what it looks like, namely a full stop. We should then have to
desist from talking of statements of the forms ' p .q\ * p . J . r * &CM
and talk of sets-of-statements of these forms instead. But this would not
avoid all, though it would avoid some, of the difficulties. Even in a passage
of prose consisting of several indicative sentences, the order of the sentences
may be in general vital to the sense, and in particular, relevant (in a way
ruled out by law (II)) to the truth-conditions of a set-of-statements made by
such a passage. The fact is that, in general, in ordinary speech and writing,
clauses and sentences do not contribute to the truthconditions of things said
by the use of sentences and paragraphs in which they occur, in any such simple
way as that pictured by the truth-tables for the binary connectives (' D ' * .
', 4 v ', 35 ') of the system, but in far more subtle, various, and complex
ways. But it is precisely the simplicity of the way in which, by the definition
of a truth-function, clauses joined by these connectives contribute to the
truth-conditions of sentences resulting from the junctions, which makes
possible the stylized, mechanical neatness of the logical system. It will not
do to reproach the logician for his divorce from linguistic realities, any more
than it will do to reproach the abstract painter for not being a
representational artist; but one may justly reproach him if he claims to be a
representational artist. An abstract painting may be, recognizably, a painting
of something. And the identification of “.” with ‘and,’ or with a full stop, is
not a simple mistake. There is a great deal of point in comparing them. The
interpretation of, and rules for, “.”define a minimal linguistic operation,
which we might call ‘simple conjunction’ and roughly describe as the joining
together of two (or more) statements in the process of asserting them both (or
all). And this is a part of what we often do with ' and ', and with the full
stop. But we do not string together at random any assertions we consider true;
we bring them together, in spoken or written sentences or paragraphs, only when
there is some further reason for the rapprochement, e.g., when they record
successive episodes in a single narrative. And that for the sake of which we
conjoin may confer upon the sentences embodying the conjunction logical
features at variance with the rules for “.” Thus we have seen that a statement
of the form “p and q” may carry an implication of temporal order incompatible
with that carried by the corresponding statement of the form “q and p.” This is
not to deny that statements corresponding to these, but of the forms ‘pΛq’ and ‘qΛp’would
be, if made, logically equivalent; for such statements would carry no
implications, and therefore no incompatible implications, of temporal order.
Nor is it to deny the point, and merit, of the comparison; the statement of the
form ‘pΛq’ means at least a part of what is
meant by the corresponding statement of the form ‘p and q.’ We might say: the form ‘p q’ is an abstraction from the
different uses of the form ‘p and q.’ Simple conjunction is a minimal element in
colloquial conjunction. We may speak of ‘. ‘ as the conjunctive sign; and read
it, for simplicity's sake, as “and” or “both … and … “I have already remarked
that the divergence between the meanings given to the truth-functional
constants and the meanings of the ordinary conjunctions with which they are
commonly identified is at a minimum in the cases of ' ~ ' and ‘.’ We have seen,
as well, that the remaining constants of the system can be defined in terms of
these two. Other interdefinitions are equally possible. But since ^’ and ‘.’ are more nearly identifiable with ‘not’ and
‘and’ than any other constant with any other English word, I prefer to
emphasize the definability of the remaining constants in terms of ‘ .’ and ‘~.’
It is useful to remember that every rule or law of the system can be expressed
in terms of negation and simple conjunction. The system might, indeed, be
called the System of Negation and Conjunction. Grice lists ‘and’ as the first
binary functor in his response to Strawson. Grice’s conversationalist
hypothesis applies to this central ‘connective.’ Interestingly, in his essay on
Aristotle, and discussing, “French poet,” Grice distinguishes between
conjunction and adjunction. “French” is adjuncted to ‘poet,’ unlike ‘fat’ in ‘fat
philosopher.’ And Grice:substructural
logics, metainference, implicaturum. Grice explores some of the issues regarding
pragmatic enrichment and substructural logics with a special focus on the first
dyadic truth-functor, ‘and.’ In particular, attention is given to a
sub-structural “rule” pertaining to the commutativeness of conjunction,
applying a framework that sees Grice as clarifying the extra material that must
be taken into account, and which will referred to as the ‘implicaturum.’ Grice
is thus presented as defending a “classical-logical” rule that assigns
commutativeness to conjunction while accounting for Strawson-type alleged
counterexamples to the effect that some utterances of the schema “p and q”
hardly allow for a ‘commutative’ “inference” (“Therefore, q and p”). How to
proceed conservatively while allowing room for pluralism? Embracing the
“classical-logical” syntactic introduction-cum-elimination and semantic
interpretation of “and,” the approach by Cook Wilson in “Statement and
inference” to the inferential métier of “and” is assessed. If Grice grants that
there is some degree of artificiality in speaking of the meaning or sense of
“and,” the polemic brings us to the realm of ‘pragmatic inference,’ now
contrasted to a ‘logical inference.’ The endorsement by Grice of an
‘impoverished’ reading of conjunction appears conservative vis-à-vis not just
Strawson’s ‘informalist’ picture but indeed the formalist frameworks of
relevant, linear, and ordered logic. An external practical decision à la Carnap
is in order, that allows for an enriched, stronger, reading, if not in terms of
a conventional implicaturum, as Strawson suggests. A ‘classical-logic’ reading
in terms of a conversational implicaturum agrees with Grice’s ‘Bootstrap,’ a
methodological principle constraining the meta-language/object-language divide.
Keywords: conjunction, pragmatic
enrichment, H. Paul Grice, Bootstrap. “[I]n recent years, my disposition to
resort to formalism has markedly diminished. This retreat may well have been
accelerated when, of all people, Hilary Putnam remarked to me that I was too
formal!”H.P. Grice, ‘Prejudices and predilections; which become, the life and
opinions of Paul Grice,’ in Grandy & Warner, 1986:61 Keywords:
metainference, substructural logics, classical logic, conjunction, H. Paul
Grice, pragmatic inference; Rudolf Carnap, bootstrap, modernism, formalism,
neotraditionalism, informalism, pragmatics, inference, implicaturum,
extensional conjunction, intensional conjunction, multiplicative conjunction,
additive conjunction. Grice’s approach consistent with Rudolf Carnap’s logical
pluralism that allows room for the account put forward by H. Paul Grice in
connection with a specific meta-inference (or second-order “… yields …”) as it
may help us take an ‘external’ practical decision as to how to recapture a
structural ‘rule’ of classical logic. The attempt involves a reconsideration,
with a special focus on the sub-structural classical logic rules for
conjunction of Grice’s ultimately metaphilosophical motivation in the opening
paragraphs to “Logic and Conversation.” Grice explores stick the first dyadic truth-functor Grice lists. In
fact, it’s the first alleged divergence, between “p and q” and “p. . q” that
Grice had quotes in “Prolegomena” to motivate his audience, and the example he
brings up vis-à-vis an ‘alleged’ “linguistic offence” (a paradox?) that an
utterer may incur by uttering “He got into bed and took his clothes off, but I
don’t mean to suggest he did it in that order” (Grice 1981:186). Implicatura are
cancellable. In the present scheme, which justifies substructural logics, this
amounts to any ‘intensional’ reading of a connective (e. g. ‘and’) being
susceptible of being turned or ‘trans-formed’
into
the correlative extensional one in light of the cancelling clause, which brings
new information to the addressee A. This is hardly problematic if we consider
that sub-structural logics do not aim to capture the ‘semantics’ of a
logical constant, and that the sub-structural logical ‘enrichment’ is relevant,
rather, for the constant’s ‘inferential role.’Neither is it problematic that
the fact that the ‘inferential role’ of a logical constant (such as ‘and’) may
change (allowing this ‘trans-formation’ from classical-logical extensional to
sub-structural logical intension, given new information which will be used by
the addressee A to ‘work out’ the utterer U’s meaning. The obvious, but worthemphasizing, entailment in Grice’s
assertion about the “mistake” shared by Formalism and Informalism is that
FORMALISM (as per the standard presentations of ‘classical logic’) does commit
a mistake! Re-capturing the FORMALISM of classical logic is hardly as direct in
the Griceian programme as one would assume. Grice’s ultimate meta-philosophical
motivation, though, seems to be more in agreement with FORMALISM. Formalism can
repair the mistake, Grice thinks, not by allowing a change in the assigning of
an ‘interpretation’ rule of an empoverished “and” (““p and q” is 1 iff both p
and q are 1, 0 otherwise.” (Cfr. Pap: “Obviously, I cannot prove that
“(p and q) ≡ (q and p)” is tautologous (and that
therefore “He got into bed and took off his clothes’ iff ‘he took of his
clothes and got into bed,’) unless I first
construct an adequate truth-table defining the use of “and.”
But surely one of the points of constructing such a table is to ‘reproduce’ or
capture’ the meaning of ‘and’ in a natural language! The proposal seems
circular!) and a deductive ‘syntactics’ rule,
involving the Gentzen-type elimination of ‘and’ (“ “p and q” yields “p”; and
its reciprocal, “ “p and q” yields “q”.” To avoid commiting the mistake,
formalism must recognise the conversational implicaturum ceteris paribus
derived from some constraint of rational co-operation (in particular, the
desideratum or conversational maxim, “be orderly!”) and allow for some
syntactical scope device to make the implicaturum obvious, an ‘explicatum,’
almost (without the need to reinforce “and” into “and then”). In Grice’s
examples, it may not even be a VIOLATION, but a FLOUT, of a conversational
maxim or desideratum, within the observance of an overarching co-operation
principle (A violation goes unnoticed; a flout is a rhetorical device. Cfr.
Quintilian’s observation that Homer would often use “p & q” with the implicaturum
“but not in that order” left to the bard’s audience to work out). Grice’s attempt
is to recapture “classical-logic” “and,” however pragmatically ‘enriched,’
shares some features with other sub-structural logics, since we have allowed
for a syntactical tweak of the ‘inference’ rules; which we do via the
pragmatist (rather than pragmatic) ‘implicatural’ approach to logic,
highlighting one pragmatic aspect of a logic without CUT. Grice grants that “p and q” should read “p .
q” “when [“p . q” is] interpreted in the classical two-valued way.” His wording
is thus consistent with OTHER ways (notably relevant logic, linear and ordered
logic). Grice seems to have as one of his ‘unspeakable truths’ things like “He
got into bed and took his clothes off,” “said of a man who proceeds otherwise.”
After mentioning “and” “interpreted in the classical
two-valued way,” Grice dedicates a full
paragraph to explore the classical logic’s manifesto. The idea is to
provide a SYSTEM that will give us an algorithm to decide which formulae are
theorems. The ‘logical consequence’ (or “… yields …”) relation is given a
precise definition.Grice
notes that “some logicians [whom he does not mention] may at some time have
wanted to claim that there are in fact no such divergences [between “p and q”
and “p . q”]; but such claims, if made at all, have been somewhat rashly made,
and those suspected of making them have been subjected to some pretty rough
handling.” “Those who concede that such
divergences [do] exist” are the formalists. “An outline of a not
uncharacteristic FORMALIST position may be given as follows,” Grice notes. We
proceed to number the thesis since it sheds light on what makes a
sub-structural logic sub-structural“Insofar as logicians are concerned with the
formulation of very general patterns of VALID INFERENCE (“… yields…”) the
formal device (“p . q”) possesses a decisive advantage over their natural
counterpart (“p and q.”) For it will be possible to construct in terms of the
formal device (“p . q”) a system of very general formulas, a considerable
number of which can be regarded as, or are closely related to, a pattern of
inferences the expression of which involves the device.”“Such a system may
consist of a certain set of simple formulas that MUST BE ACCEPTABLE if the
device has the MEANING (or sense) that has been ASSIGNED to it, and an
indefinite number of further formulas, many of them less obviously acceptable
(“q . p”), each of which can be shown to be acceptable if the members of the
original set are acceptable.”“We have, thus, a way of handling dubiously
acceptable patterns of inference (“q. p,” therefore, “p. q”) and if, as is
sometimes possible, we can apply A DECISION PROCEDURE, we have an even better
way.”“Furthermore, from a PHILOSOPHICAL point of view, the possession by the
natural counterpart (“p and q”) of that element in their meaning (or sense),
which they do NOT share with the corresponding formal device, is to be regarded
as an IMPERFECTION; the element in question is an undesirable excrescence. For
the presence of this element has the result that the CONCEPT within which it
appears cannot be precisely/clearly defined, and that at least SOME statements
involving it cannot, in some circumstances, be assigned a definite TRUTH VALUE;
and the indefiniteness of this concept is not only objectionable in itself but
leaves open the way to METAPHYSICS: we cannot be certain that the
natural-language expression (“p and q”) is METAPHYSICALLY ‘LOADED.’”“For these
reasons, the expression, as used in natural speech (“p and q”), CANNOT be
regarded as finally acceptable, and may tum out to be, finally, not fully
intelligible.” “The proper course is to conceive and begin to construct an
IDEAL language, incorporating the formal device (“p . q”), the sentences of
which will be clear, determinate in TRUTH-VALUE, and certifiably FREE FROM
METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS.”“The foundations of SCIENCE will now be
PHILOSOPHICALLY SECURE, since the statements of the scientist will be
EXPRESSIBLE (though not necessarily actually expressed) within this ideal
language.”What kind of enrichment are we talking
about? It may be understood as a third conjunct ptn-l & qtn
& (tn > tn-l) FIRST
CONJUNCT + SECOND CONJUNCT + “TEMPORAL SUCCESSION” p AND THEN q To
buttress the buttressing of ‘and,’ Grice uses ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ for other
operators like ‘disjunction – and his rationale for the Modified Occam’s razor
would be: “A STRONGER SENSE for a truth-functional dyadic operator SHOULD NOT
BE POSTULATED when A WEAK (or minimal) SENSE does, provided we add the
CANCELLABLE IMPLICATURUM.” Grice SIMPLIFIES semantics, but there’s no free
lunch, since he now has to explain how the IMPLICATURUM arises. Let’s revise the way “and,” the first ‘dyadic’ device in
“Logic and Conversation,” is invoked by Grice in “Prolegomena.” “He got into
bed and took his clothes off,” “said of a someone who took his clothes off and
got into bed.” Cfr. theorems ∧I
= ` ∀ φ ψ• [φ; ψ] |= φ ∧
ψ ∧E = ` ∀
φ ψ• ([φ ∧ ψ] |= φ) ∧ ([φ ∧
ψ] |= ψ)We have: He got into bed and took his clothes off (Grice, 1989:9). He took his clothes off and got into bed (Grice, 1989:9). He got into bed and took his clothes off but I don’t want to
suggest that he did those things in that order (Grice, 1981:186). He first took his clothes off and then got into bed (Grice
1989:9). In invoking Strawson’s Introduction to Logical Theory, is Grice being
fair? Strawson had noted, provocatively: “[The formula] “p . q’ is
logically equivalent to ‘q . p’; but [the English] ‘They got married and had a
child’ or ‘He set to work and found a job’ are by no means logically equivalent
to ‘They had a child and got married’ or ‘He found a job and set to work.’”How
easier things would have gone should Strawson have used the adjective
‘pragmatic’ that he mentions later in his treatise in connection with Grice. Strawson
is sticking with the truth-functionality and thinking of ‘equivalence’ in terms
of ‘iff’ – but his remark may be rephrased as involving a notion of
‘inference.’ In terms of LOGICAL INFERENCE, the premise “He got into bed and
took his clothes off” YIELDS “He took off his clothes and got into bed,” even
if that does NOT ‘yield’ in terms of ceteris paribus PRAGMATIC inference. It
would have pleased Grice to read the
above as: “[The formula] “p . q’ is
equivalentL to ‘q . p’; but [the English] ‘They got married and had
a child’ or ‘He set to work and found a job’ are by no means equivalentP
to ‘They had a child and got married’ or ‘He found a job and set to work.’” By appealing to a desideratum of rational co-operative
discourse, “be orderly,” Grice thinks he can restore “and” to its
truth-functional sense, while granting that the re-inforced “then” (or an
alleged extra sense of “temporal succession,” as he has it in “Prolegomena”) is
merely and naturally (if cancellable on occasion) conversationally implicated
(even if under a generalised way) under the assumption that the addressee A
will recognise that the utterer U is observing the desideratum, and is being
orderly. But witness variants to the cancellation (3) above. There is an indifferent,
indeterminate form: He got into bed and took off his clothes, though I don’t
mean to imply that he did that in that order.versus the less indeterminate He
got into bed and took his clothes off, but not in that order. +> i.e. in the
reverse one.Postulating a pragmatic desideratum allows Grice to keep any
standard sub-structural classical rule for “and” and “&” (as s he does when
he goes more formalist in “Vacuous Names,” his tribute to Quine).How are to
interpret the Grice/Strawson ‘rivalry’ in meta-inference? Using Frege’s
assertion “⊦LK” as our operator to read “… yields…” we have:p & q ⊦LK q & p and q & p ⊦LK p & q. In
“Prolegomena,” then, Grice introduces:“B. Examples involve an area of special
interest to me [since he was appointed logic tutor at St. John’s], namely
that of expressions which are candidates for being natural analogues to logical
constants and which may, or may not, ‘diverge’ in meaning [not use] from the
related constants (considered as elements in a classical logic, standardly
interpreted). It has, for example, been suggested that because it would be
incorrect or inappropriate [or misleading, even false?] to say “He got into bed
and took off his clothes” of [someone] who first took off his clothes and then
got into bed, it is part of the meaning [or sense] or part of one meaning
[sub-sense] of “and” to convey temporal succession” (Grice 1989:8). The
explanation in terms of a reference to “be orderly” is mentioned in
“Presupposition and conversational implicaturum” (Grice 1981:186). Grice notes: “It
has been suggested by [an informalist like] Strawson, in [An] Introduction to
Logical Theory [by changing the title of Strawson’s essay, Grice seems to be
implicating that Strawson need not sound pretentious] that there is a
divergence between the ordinary use or meaning of ‘and’ and the conjunction
sign [“.”] of propositional or predicate calculus because “He took off his
clothes and got into to bed” does not seem to have the same meaning as “He got
into bed and took off his clothes.”” Grice goes on: “[Strawson’s] suggestion here is, of course, that, in order properly
to represent the ordinary use of [the
word] “and,” one would have to allow a special sense (or sub-sense) for [the word] “and” which contained
some reference to the idea that what was
mentioned before [the word] “and” was temporally prior to what was mentioned
after it, and that, on that supposition,
one could deal with this case.”Grice goes on: “[Contra Strawson,] I want to
suggest in reply that it is not necessary
[call him an Occamist, minimalist] if one operates on some general principle
[such as M. O. R., or Modified Occam’s Razor] of keeping down, as far as possible, the number of special sense
[sic] of words that one has to invoke, to give countenance to the
alleged divergence of meaning.” The
constraint is not an arbitrary assignation of sense, but a rational one derived
from the nature of conversation:“It is just that there is a general supposition
[which would be sub-sidiary to the general maxim of Manner or ‘Modus’ (‘be
perspicuous! [sic]’) that one presents one's material in an orderly manner and, if what one is engaged upon is a narration (if
one is talking about events), then the
most orderly manner for a narration of events is an order that corresponds to the order in which they took
place.”Grice concludes: “So, the meaning of the expression ‘He took off his
clothes and he got into bed” and the
corresponding expression with a [classical] logician's constant
"&" [when given a standard two-valued interpretation] (i.e. “He took his clothes off & he got into
bed") would be exactly the same.”Grice’s
indifference with what type of formalism to adopt is obvious: “And, indeed, if
anybody actually used in ordinary speech the "&" as a piece of vocabulary instead of as a formal(ist)
device, and used it to connect together sentences of this type, they would collect just the same
[generalised conversational] implicatura as the ordinary English sentences have without any extra explanation
of the meaning of the word ‘and’.” It is
then that Grice goes on to test the ‘cancellability,’ producing the
typical Gricean idiom, above:He took his
clothes off and got into bed but I don't mean to suggest that he did those
things in that order. Grice goes on: “I
should say that I did suggest, in [my essay] on implicaturum, two sorts of tests by which one might hope to identify a conversational implicaturum.
[...] I did not mean to suggest that these tests were final, only that they
were useful. One test was the possibility of cancellation; that is to say,
could one without [classical] logical absurdity [when we have a standard
two-valued interpretation], attach a cancellation clause. For instance, could I
say (9)?” Grice: “If that is not a linguistic offense [and ‘false’], or does
not seem to be, then, so far as it goes, it is an indication that what one has
here is a conversational implicaturum, and that the original [alleged meaning,
sense, or] suggestion of temporal succession [is] not part of the conventional
meaning of the sentence.” Grice (1981, p. 186). Formalising the temporal succession
is never enough but it may help, and (9) becomes (10):p & q and ptn-l &
qtn where “tn-l” is a temporal index
for a time prior to “tn”. It is interesting to note that Chomsky, of all
people, in 1966, a year before Grice’s William James lectures, in Aspects of
the theory of syntax refers to “A [sic] P. Grice” as propounding that temporal
succession be considered implicaturum (Since this pre-dates the William James
lectures by a year, it was via the seminars at Oxford that reached Chomsky at
MIT via some of Grice’s tutees).Let us revise Urmson’s wording in his treatment
of the ‘clothes’ example, to check if Grice is being influenced by Urmson’s
presentation of the problem to attack Strawson. Urmson notes: “In
formal[ist] logic, the connective[…] ‘and’ [is] always given a minimum
[empoverished] meaning, as [I] have done above, such that any complex
[molecular sentence] formed by the use of [it] alone is [always] a
truth-function of its constituents.”Urmson goes on to sound almost like
Strawson, whose Introduction to Logical Theory he credits. Urmson notes: “In
ordinary discourse the connective[… ‘and]] often [has] a *richer* meaning.”Urmson
must be credited, with this use of ‘richer’ as the father of pragmatic
enRICHment!Urmson goes on: “Thus ‘He took his clothes off and got into bed’
implies temporal succession and has a different meaning from [the impoverished,
unreinforced] ‘He got into bed and took off his clothes.’” Urmson does not play
with Grice’s reinforcement: “He first got into bed and then took his clothes
off.’ Urmson goes on, however, in his concluding remark, to side with Grice
versus Strawson, as he should! Urmson notes: “[Formal(ist) l]ogicians would
justify their use of the minimum [impoverished, unreinforced, weak] meaning by
pointing out that it is the common element in all our uses [or every use] of
‘and.’” (Urmson, 1956:9-10). The
commutativeness of ‘and’ in the examples he gives is rejected by Strawson. How
does Strawson reflect this in his sub-structural rule for ‘and’?
As Humberstone puts it, “It
is possible to define a version of the calculus, which defines most of the
syntax of the logical operators by means of axioms, and which uses only one
inference rule.”Axioms: Let φ, χ and ψ stand for
well-formed formulae. The wff's themselves would not contain any Greek letters,
but only capital Roman letters, connective operators, and parentheses. The
axioms include:ANDFIRST-CONJUNCT: φ ∧ χ → φ and ANDSECOND-CONJUNCT:
φ ∧ χ → χ. Our (13) and (14) correspond to
Gentzen’s “conjunction elimination” (or (& -), as Grice has it in “Vacuous
Names.”). The relation between (13) and
(14) reflects the commutativity of the conjunction operator. Cfr. Cohen 1971: “Another conversational maxim of Grice's,
“be orderly”, is intended to govern such matters as the
formalist can show that it was not appropriate to postulate a special non-commutative temporal
conjunction.”“The locus classicus for complaints of this nature being Strawson (1952).”
Note that the commutative “and” is derived from Grice’s elimination of
conjunction, “p & q ⊦
p” and “p & q ⊦ q
-- as used by Grice in his system Q.Also note that the truth-evaluation would
be for Grice ‘semantic,’ rather than ‘syntactic’ as the commutative (understood
as part of elimination). Grice has it as: If phi and psi are formulae, “φ and ”
is 1 iff both φ and ψ are true, 0 otherwise. Grice grants
that however “baffling” (or misleading) would be to utter or assert (7)
if no one has doubts about the
temporal order of the reported the events, due to the expectation that the
utterer is observing the conversational maxim “be orderly” subsumed under the
conversational category of ‘Modus’ (‘be perspicuous! [sic]” – cfr. his earlier
desideratum of conversational clarity). Relevant logic (which was emerging by
the time Grice was delivering his William James lectures) introduces two
different formal signs for ‘conjunction’: the truth-functional conjunction
relevant logicians call ‘extensional’ conjunction, and they represent by (13).
Non-truth-functional conjunction is represented by ‘X’ and termed fusion or
‘intensional’ conjunction:
p ^ q versus p X q.
The truth-table for Strawson’s enriched uses of
“and” is not the standard one, since we require the additional condition that
“p predates q,” or that one conjunct predates the other. Playing with structural and substructural logical rules is
something Carnap would love perhaps more than Grice, and why not, Strawson?
They liked to play with ‘deviant’ logics. For Carnap, the choice of a logic is
a pragmatic ‘external’ decision – vide his principle of tolerance and the
rather extensive bibliography on Carnap as a logic pluralist. For Grice,
classical logic is a choice guided by his respect for ordinary language, WHILE
attempting to PROVOKE the Oxonian establishment by rallying to the defense of
an under-dogma and play the ‘skilful heretic’ (turning a heterodoxy into
dogma). Strawson is usually more difficult to classify! In his contribution to
Grandy & Warner (1986), he grants that Grice’s theory may be ‘more
beautiful,’ and more importantly, seems to suggest that his view be seen as
endorsing Grice’s account of a CONVENTIONAL implicaturum (For Strawson, ‘if’
(used for unasserted antecedent and consequence) conventionally implicates the
same inferrability condition that ‘so’ does for asserted equivalents. The
aim is to allow for a logically pluralist thesis, almost alla Carnap about the
‘inferential role’ of a logical constant such as ‘and’, which embraces
‘classical,’ (or ‘formalist,’ or ‘modernist’), relevant, linear and ordered
logic. PLURALISM (versus MONISM) has it that, for any logical constant c (such as “and”), “c” has more
than one *correct* inferential “role.” The pluralist thesis depends on a
specific interpretation of the vocabulary of sub-structural logics. According
to this specific interpretation, a classical logic captures the literal, or
EXPLICIT, explicatum, or truth-functional or truth-conditonal meaning, or what
Grice would have as ‘dictiveness’ of a logical constant. A sub-structural logic
(relevant logic, linear and ordered logic), on the other hand, encodes a
pragmatically,” i.e. not SEMANTICALLY, “-enriched sense” of a logical constant
such as “and.” Is this against the spirit of Grice’s overall thesis as
formulated in his “M. O. R.,” Modified Occam’s Razor, “Senses [of ‘and’] are
not to be multiplied beyond necessity”? But it’s precisely Grice’s Occamism (as
Neale calls it) that is being put into question. At Oxford, at the time, EVERYBODY (except
Grice!) was an informalist. He is coming to the defense of Russell, Oxford’s
underdog! (underdogma!). Plus, it’s important to understand the INFORMALISM
that Grice is attacking – Oxford’s ORTHO-doxy – seriously. Grice is being the
‘skilful HERETIC,’ in the words of his successor as Tutorial Fellow at Oxford,
G. P. Baker. We may proceed by four stages.
First, introduce the philosophical motivation for the pluralist thesis.
It sounds good to be a PLURALIST. Strawson was not. He was an informalist.
Grice was not, he was a post-modernist. But surely we not assuming that one
would want to eat the cake and have it! Second, introduce the calculus for the
different (or ‘deviant,’ as Haack prefers) logics endorsed in the pluralist
thesis – classical itself, relevant, linear and ordered logic. Third, shows how
the different “behaviours” of an item of logical vocabulary (such as “and”) of
each of these logics (and they all have variants for ‘conjunction.’ In the case
of ‘relevant’ logic, beyond Grice’s “&,” or classical conjunction, there is
“extensional conjunction,” FORMALISED as “p X q”, or fusion, and “INTENSIONAL
conjunction,” formalized by “p O q”. These can be, not semantically
(truth-functionally, or truth-conditional, or at the level of the EXPLICATUM),
but pragmatically interpreted (at the level of the IMPLICATURUM). Fourth, shows
how the *different* (or ‘deviant,’ or pluralist), or alternative inferential
“roles” (that justifies PLURALISM) that *two* sub-structural logics (say,
Grice’s classical “&” the Strawson’s informalist “and”) attribute to a
logical constant “c” can co-exist – hence pluralism. A particular version of
logical “pluralism” can be argued from the plurality of at least *two*
alterative equally legitimate formalisations of the logical vocabulary, such as
the first dyadic truth-functor, or connective, “and,” which is symbolized by Grice
as “&,” NOT formalized by Strawson (he sticks with “and”) and FORMALISED by
relevant logicians as ‘extensional’ truth-functional conjunction (fision, p X
a) and intentional non-truth-functional conjunction (p O q). In particular, it can be argued that the
apparent “rivalry” between classical logic (what Grice has as Modernism, but he
himself is a post-modernist) and relevant logic (but consider Grice on
Strawson’s “Neo-Traditionalism,” first called INFORMALISM by Grice) can be
resolved, given that both logics capture and formalise normative and legitimate
alternative senses of ‘logical consequence.’ A revision of
the second paragraph to “Logic and Conversation” should do here. We can
distinguish between two operators for “… yields …”: ├ and ├: “A1, A2, … An├MODERNISM/FORMALISM-PAUL B” and “A1, A2, … An├NEO-TRADITIONALISM/INFORMALISM-PETER
B. As Paoli has it: “[U]pholding weakening amounts to failing to
take at face value the [slightly Griceian] expression ‘assertable on the basis
of’.’”Paoli goes on:“If I am in a
position to assert [the conclusion q, “He took his clothes off and got into
bed”] on the basis of the information provided by [the premise p, “He got into
bed and took his clothes off”], I need NOT be in a position to assert the
conclusion P [“He took his clothes off and got into bed”] on the basis of both
p (“He got into bed and took off his clothes” and an extra premise C - where C
is just an idle assumption (“The events took place in the order reported”) ,
irrelevant to my conclusion.”Can we regard Strawson as holding that
UNFORMALISED “and” is an INTENSIONAL CONJUNCTION? Another option is to see
Strawson as holding that the UNFORMALISED “and” can be BOTH truth-functional
and NON-truth-functional (for which case, the use of a different expression,
“and THEN,” is preferred). The Gricean theory of implicaturum is capable of
explaining this mismatch (bewtween “and” and “&”).Grice argues that the
[truth-conditional, truth-functional] semantics [DICTUM or EXPLICATUM, not IMPLICATURUM
– cfr. his retrospective epilogue for his view on DICTIVENESS] of “and”
corresponds [or is identical, hence the name of ‘identity’ thesis versus
‘divergence’ thesis] to the classical “∧,” & of Russell/Whitehead,
and Quine, and Suppes, and that the [truth-functional semantics of “if [p,]
[q]” corresponds to the classical p ⊃ q.” There is scope
for any theory capable of resolving or [as Grice would have it] denying the
apparent disagreement [or ‘rivalry’] among two or more logics.” What Grice does
is DENY THE APPARENT DISAGREEMENT. It’s
best to keep ‘rivalry’ for the fight of two ‘warring camps’ like FORMALISM and
INFORMALISM, and stick with ‘disagreement’ or ‘divergence’ with reference to
specific constants. For Strawson, being a thorough-bred Oxonian, who perhaps
never read the Iliad in Greek – he was Grice’s PPE student – the RIVALRY is not
between TWO different formalisations, but between the ‘brusque’ formalisation
of the FORMALISTS (that murder his English!) and NO FORMALISATION at all. Grice
calls this ‘neo-traditionalist,’ perhaps implicating that the
‘neo-traditionalists’ WOULD accept some level of formalisation (Aristotle did!)
ONLY ONE FORMALISATION, the Modernism. INFORMALISM or Neo-Traditionalism aims
to do WITHOUT formalisation, if that means using anything, but, say, “and” and
“and then”. Talk of SENSES helps. Strawson may say that “and” has a SENSE which
differs from “&,” seeing that he would find “He drank the poison and died,
though I do not mean to imply in that order” is a CONTRADICTION. That is why
Strawson is an ‘ordinary-LANGUAGE philosopher,” and not a logician! (Or should
we say, an ‘ordinary-language logician’? His “Introduction to Logical Theory”
was the mandatory reading vademecum for GENERATIONS of Oxonians that had to
undergo a logic course to get their M. A. Lit. Hum.Then there’s what we can
call “the Gricean picture,” only it’s not too clear who painted it!We may agree
that there is an apparent “mismatch,” as opposed to a perfect “match” that
Grice would love! Grice thought with Russell that grammar is a pretty good
guide to logical form. If the utterer says “and” and NOT “and then,” there is
no need to postulate a further SENSE to ‘and.’Russell would criticize
Strawson’s attempt to reject modernist “&” as a surrogate for “and” as
Strawson’s attempt to regress to a stone-age metaphysics. Grice actually at
this point, defended Strawson: “stone-age PHYSICS!” And this relates to “…
yields…” and Frege’s assertion “/-“ as ‘Conclusion follows from Premise’ where
‘Premise yields Conclusion’ seems more natural in that we preserve the order
from premise to conclusion. We shouldn’t underestimate one crucial feature of
an implicaturum: its cancellability, on which Grice expands quite a bit in
1981: “He got into bed and took his clothes off, although I don’t intend to
suggest, in any shape or form, that he proceed to do those things in the order
I’ve just reported!”The lack of any [fixed, rigid, intolerant] structural rule
implies that AN INSTANCE I1 of the a logical constant (such as “and”) that
*violate* any of Grice’s conversational maxim (here “be orderly!”) associated
with the relevant structural rule [here we may think of ADDITION AND
SIMPLIFICATION as two axioms derived from the Gentzen-type elimination of
“and”, or the ‘interpretation’ of ‘p & q’ as 1 iff both p and q are 1, but
0 otherwise] and for which the derived conversational implicaturum is false
[“He went to bed and took his clothes off, but not in that order!”] should be
distinguished from ANY INSTANCE I2 that does NOT violate the relevant maxim (“be
orderly”) and for which the conversational IMPLICATURUM (“tn > tn-l”) is
true.” We may nitpick here.Grice would rather prefer, ‘when the IMPLICATURUM
applies.” An implicaturum is by definition cancellable (This is clear when
Grice expands in the excursus “A causal theory of perception.” “I would hardly
be said to have IMPLIED that Smith is hopeless in philosophy should I utter,
“He has beautiful handwriting; I don’t mean to imply he is hopeless in
philosophy,” “even if that is precisely what my addressee ends up thinking!”When
it comes to “and,” we are on clearer ground. The kinds of “and”-implicaturums
may be captured by a distinction of two ‘uses’ of conjunctions in a single
substructural system S that does WITHOUT a ‘structural rule’ such as exchange,
contraction or both. Read, relies, very UNLIKE Strawson, on wo FORMALISATIONS
besides “and” (for surely English “and” does have a ‘form,’ too, pace Strawson)
in Relevant Logic: “p ^ q” and “p X q.” “p
^ q” and “p X q” have each a different inferential role. If the reason the
UTTERER has to assert it – via the DICTUM or EXPLICATUM [we avoid ‘assert’
seeing that we want logical constants to trade on ‘imperative contexts,’ too –
Grice, “touch the beast and it will bite you!” -- is the utterer’s belief that
Smith took his clothes AND THEN got into bed, it would be illegitimate,
unwarranted, stupid, otiose, incorrect, inappropriate, to infer that Smith did
not do these two things in that order upon discovering that he in fact DID
those things in the order reported. The
very discovery that Smith did the things in the order reported would “just
spoil” or unwarrant the derivation that would justify our use of “… yields …”
(¬A ¬(A u B) A ¬B”). As Read notes, we have ADJUNCTION
‘p and q’ follows from p and q – or p and q yields ‘p and q.’ And we have SIMPLIFICATION:
p and q follow from ‘p and q,’ or ‘p and q’ yields p, and ‘p and q’ yields q.”
Stephen Read: “From adjunction and simplification we can infer, by
transitivity, that q follows from p and q, and so by the Deduction Equivalence,
‘if p, q’ follows from q.’” “However, […] this has the unacceptable consequence
that ‘if’ is truth-functional.” “How can
this consequence be avoided?” “Many options are open.” “We can reject the
transitivity of entailment, the deduction equivalence, adjunction, or
simplification. Each has been tried; and each seems contrary to intuition.” “We
are again in the paradoxical situation that each of these conceptions seems
intuitively soundly based; yet their combination appears to lead to something
unacceptable.” “Are we nonetheless forced to reject one of these plausible
principles?” “Fortunately, there is a fifth option.” Read: “There is a familiar
truth-functional conjunction, expressed by ‘p and q’, which entails each of p
and q, and so for the falsity (Grice’s 0) of which the falsity of either
conjunct suffices, and the truth of both for the truth of the whole.” “But
there is also a NON-truth-functional conjunction, a SENSE of ‘p and q’ whose
falsity supports the inference from p to ‘~q’.” “These two SENSES of
‘conjunction’ cannot be the same, for, if the ground for asserting ‘not-(p and
q)’ (e.g. “It is not the case that he got into bed and took off his clothes”) is
simply that ‘p’ is false, to learn that p is true, far from enabling one to
proceed to ‘~q’, undercuts the warrant for asserting ‘~(p & q)’ in the
first place.” “In this sense, ‘~(p & q)’ is weaker than both ‘~p’ and ‘~q’,
and does not, even with the addition of p, entail ‘~q’, even though one
possible ground for asserting ‘~(p & q))’, viz ‘~q’, clearly does.” Stephen
Read: “The intensional sense of ‘and’ is often referred to as fusion; I will
use the symbol ‘×’ for it. Others write ‘◦.’”We add some relevant observations
by a palaeo-Griceian: Ryle. Ryle often felt
himself to be an outsider. His remarks on “and” are however illuminating in the
context of our discussion of meta-inference in substructural logic.Ryle writes:
“I have spoken as if our ordinary ‘and’ […] [is] identical with the logical
constant with which the formal logician operates.”“But this is not true.”“The
logician’s ‘and’ […] [is] not our familiar civilian term[…].”“It is [a]
conscript term, in uniform and under military discipline, with memories,
indeed, of [its] previous more free and easy civilian life, though it is not
leaving that life now.”“If you hear on good authority that she took arsenic and
fell ill you will reject the rumour that she fell ill and took arsenic.”“This
familiar use of ‘and’ carries with it the temporal notion expressed by ‘and
subsequently’ and even the causal notion expressed by ‘and in
consequence.’”“The logician’s conscript ‘and’ does only its appointed duty – a
duty in which ‘she took arsenic and fell ill’ is an absolute paraphrase of ‘she
fell ill and took arsenic.’ This might be call the minimal force of ‘and.’”
(Ryle,, 1954:118). When we speaks of PRAGMATIC enrichment, we obviously
don’t mean SEMANTIC enrichment. There is a distinction, obviously, between the ‘pragmatic
enrichment’ dimension, as to whether the ‘enriched’ content is IMPLICATED or,
to use a neologism, ‘EX-plicated.’ Or cf. as Kent Bach would prefer,
“IMPLICITATED” (vide his “Implciture.”) Commutative
law: p & q iff q & p. “Axiom AND-1” and “Axiom AND-2” correspond
to "conjunction elimination". The relation between “AND-1” and
“AND-2” reflects the commutativity of the conjunction operator. A VERY IMPORTANT POINT to consider is Grice’s
distinction between ‘logical inference’ and ‘pragmatic inference.’ He does so
in “Retrospective Epilogue” in 1987. “A few years after the appearance of […]
Introduction to Logical Theory, I was devoting much attention to what might be
loosely called the distinction between logical and pragmatic inferences. …
represented as being a matter not of logical but of pragmatic import.” (Grice
1987:374).Could he be jocular? He is emphasizing the historical role of his
research. He mentions FORMALISM and INFORMALISM and notes that his own interest
in maxims or desiderata of rational discourse arose from his interest to
distinguish between matters of “logical inference” from those of “pragmatic
inference.” Is Grice multiplying ‘inference’ beyond necessity? It would seem
so. So it’s best to try to reformulate his proposal, in agreement with logical
pluralism.By ‘logical inference’ Grice must mean ‘practical/alethic
satisfactoriness-based inference,’ notably the syntactics and semantics
(‘interpretative’) modules of his own System Q. By ‘pragmatic inference’ he
must mean a third module, the pragmatic module, with his desiderata. We may say
that for Grice ‘logical inference’ is deductive (and inductive), while
‘pragmatic inference’ is abductive. Let us apply this to the ‘clothes off’
exampleThe Utterer said: “Smith got into bed and took his clothes off, but I’m
reporting the events in no particular order.” The ‘logical inference’ allows to
treat ‘and’ as “&.” The ‘pragmatic inference’ allows the addressee to
wonder what the utterer is meaning! Cf. Terres on “⊢k” for “logical inference” and “⊢r,” “⊢l,” and “⊢o,” for pragmatic inference, and where the
subscripts “k,” “r,” “l” and “o” stand for ‘classical,’ ‘relevant,’ ‘linear’
and ‘ordered’ logic respectively, with each of the three sub-structural
notions of “follows from” or “… yields …”
require the pragmatic enrichment
of a logical constant, that ‘classical logical’ inference may retain the
‘impoverished’ version (Terres, 2019, Inquiry, p. 13). Grice himself
mentions this normative dimension: “I would like to be able to
think of the standard type of conversational practice not merely
as something that all or most do IN FACT follow but as something that it is REASONABLE
for us to follow, that we SHOULD NOT abandon.”Grice, 1989a, p.48]However, the
fact that we should observe the conversational maxims may not yet be a reason
for endorsing the allegedly ‘deviant’
inferential role of a logical constant in the three sub-structural logics under
examination.The legitimacy of the ‘deviant’ ‘inferential role’ of each constant
in each sub-structural logic emerges, rather from at least two sources.A first
source is a requirement for logic (or reasoning) to be normative: that its
truth-bearers [or satisfactoriness-bearers, to allow for ‘imperative’-mode
inferences) are related to what Grice calls ‘psychological attitudes’ of
‘belief’ (indicative-mode inference) and ‘desire’ (imperative-mode inference)
(Grice, 1975, cfr. Terres, Inquiry, 2019, p. 13). As Steinberg puts it:“Presumably,
if logic is normative for thinking or reasoning, its normative force will stem,
at least in part, from the fact that truth bearers which act as the relata of
our consequence relation and the bearers of other logical properties are
identical to (or at least are very closely related in some other way) to the
objects of thinking or reasoning: the contents of one’s mental states or acts
such as the content of one’s beliefs or inferences, for example.”[Steinberger,
2017a – and cf. Loar’s similar approach when construing Grice’s maxims as
‘empirical generalisations’ of ‘functional states’ for a less committed view of
the embedding of logical and pragmatic inference within the scope of psychological-attitude
ascriptions). A second source for the legitimacy of the ‘deviant’ inferential
role is the fact that the pragmatic enrichment of the logical vocabulary (both
a constant and ‘… yields …) is part, or a ‘rational-construction,’ of our
psychological representation of certain utterances involving the natural
counterparts of those constants. This may NOT involve a new sense of ‘and’ which is
with what Grice is fighting. While the relevant literature emphasizes “reasons
to assert” (vide Table on p. 9, Terres, 2019), it is worth pointing out that
the model should be applicable to what we might broadly construe as ‘deontic’
reasoning (e.g. Grice on “Arrest the intruder!” in Grice 1989, and more
generally his practical syllogisms in Grice 2001). We seem to associate
“assert” with ‘indicative-mode’ versions only of premise and conclusion.
“Reasons to express” or “reasons to make it explicit” may serve as a
generalization to cover both “indicative-mode” and “imperative-mode” versions
of the inferences to hand. When Grice says that, contra Strawson, he wants to
see things in terms of ‘pragmatic inference,’ not ‘logical inference,’ is he
pulling himself up by his own bootstraps? Let us clarify.When thinking of what META-language need be used to
formulate both Grice’s final account vis-à-vis Strawson’s, it is relevant to
mention that Grice once invoked what he called the “Bootstrap” principle. In
the course of considering a ‘fine distinction’ in various levels of conceptual
priority, slightly out of the blue, he adds – this is from “Prejudices and
predilections, which become, the life and opinions of Paul Grice,” so expect
some informality, and willingness to amuse: “It is perhaps reasonable to regard
such fine distinctions as indispensable if we are to succeed in the business of
pulling ourselves up by our own bootstraps,” Grice writes. And then trust him
to add: “In this connection, it will be relevant for me to say that I once
invented (though I did not establish its validity) a principle which I labelled
as ‘Bootstrap.’” Trust him to call with a good title. “The principle,” Grice
goes on, “laid down that, when one is introducing some primitive concept [such
as conjunction] of a theory [or calculus or system] formulated in an
object-language [G1], one has freedom to use any concept from a
battery of concepts expressible in the meta-language [System G2],
subject to the condition that a *counterpart* of such a concept [say,
‘conjunction’] is sub-sequently definable, or otherwise derivable, in the
object-language [System G1].”Grice concludes by emphasizing the
point of the manoeuvre: “So, the more
economically one introduces a primitive object-language concept, the less of a
task one leaves oneself for the morrow.” [Grice 1986]. With
uncharacteristic humbleness, Grice notes that while he was able to formulate
and label “Bootstrap,” he never cared to establish its ‘validity.’ We hope we
have! “Q. E. D.,” as they say! Cf. Terres, 2019, Inquiry, p. 17: In conclusion,
the pragmatic interpretation of substructural logics may be a new and
interesting research field for the logical pluralist who wishes to endorse
classical and/or substructural logics, but also for the logical monist who aims
to interpret their divergence with a pluralist logician. The possibility is
also open of an interesting dialogue between philosophical logicians and
philosophers of language as they explore the pragmatic contributions of a logical
constant to the meaning of a complete utterance, given that a substructural
logic encodes what has been discussed by philosophers of language, the enriched
‘explicatum’ of the logical constant. And Grice. References: Werner Abraham, ‘A linguistic approach to metaphor.’ in
Abraham, Ut videam: contributions to an understanding of linguistics. Jeffrey C. Beall
and Greg Restall. ‘Logical consequence,’ in Edward N. Zalta, editor, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 2009 edition, 2009. Rudolf Carnap, 1942. Introduction to Semantics.
L.J. Cohen, 1971. Grice on the logical particles
of natural language, in Bar-Hillel, Pragmatics of Natural language, repr. in
Cohen, Language and knowledge.L.J. Cohen, 1977. ‘Can the conversationalist
hypothesis be defended?’ Philosophical Studies, repr. in Cohen, Logic and
knowledge. Davidson, Donald and J. Hintikka (1969). Words and objections:
essays on the work of W. V. Quine. Dordrecht: Reidel. Bart Geurts, Quantity implicaturums.Bart
Geurts and Nausicaa Pouscoulous. Embedded implicaturums?!? Semantics and
pragmatics, 2:4–1, 2009.Jean-Yves Girard. Linear logic: its syntax and
semantics. London Mathematical Society Lecture Note Series, pp. 1–42, 1995.H.P.
Grice. 1967a. ‘Prolegomena,’ in Studies in the Way of Words.H.P. Grice. 1967b.
Logic and conversation. Studies in the Way of Words, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, pages 22–40, 1989.H.P. Grice. 1967c. ‘Indicative conditionals.
Studies in the Way of Words, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, pages
58–85, 1989.H.P. Grice. 1969. ‘Vacuous Names,’
in Words and objections: essays on the work of W. V. Quine, edited by Donald
Davidson and Jaako Hintikka, Dordrecht: Reidel. H.P. Grice, 1981.
‘Presupposition and conversational implicaturum,’ in Paul Cole, Radical Pragmatics,
New York, Academic Press. H.P.
Grice, 1986. ‘Reply to Richards,’ in Philosophical Grounds of Rationality:
Intentions, Categories, Ends, ed. by Richard Grandy and Richard Warner, Oxford:
The Clarendon Press.H.P. Grice. 2001. Aspects of reason, being the John Locke
Lectures delivered at Oxford, Oxford: Clarendon. H.P. Grice, n.d. ‘Entailment,’
The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library, University of
California, Berkeley. Loar, B. F. Meaning and mind.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mates, Benson, Elementary Logic. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.George Myro, 1986. ‘Time and identity,’ in Richard Grandy and
Richard Warner, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality: Intentions, Categories,
Ends. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Francesco Paoli, Substructural logic. Arthur
Pap. 1949. ‘Are all necessary propositions analytic?’, repr. in The limits of
logical empiricism.Peacocke, Christopher A. B. (1976), What is a logical
constant? The Journal of Philosophy.Quine, W. V. O. 1969. ‘Reply to H. P. Grice,’
in Davidson and Hintikka, Words and objections: esssays on the work of W. V.
Quine. Dordrecht: Reidel. Stephen Read, A philosophical approach to inference. A.Rieger, A simple
theory of conditionals. Analysis, 2006.Robert
van Rooij. 2010. ‘Conversational implicaturums,’Gilbert Ryle. 1954. ‘Formal and Informal logic,’ in Dilemmas,
The Tarner Lectures 1953. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 8. Florian Steinberger. The normative status
of logic. In Edward N. Zalta, editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, spring 2017 edition, 2017.P. F. Strawson (1952). Introduction to Logical Theory.
London: Methuen.P. F. Strawson (1986). ‘‘If’ and ‘⊃’’
R. Grandy and R. O. Warner, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality, Intentions,
Categories, Ends, repr. in his “Entity and Identity, and Other Essays. Oxford:
Clarendon PressJ.O. Urmson. Philosophical analysis: its development between the
two world wars. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956. R. C. S. Walker. “Conversational
implicaturum,”
in S. W. Blackburn, Meaning, reference, and necessity. Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1975, pp. 133-81A. N. Whitehead and B. A. W. Russell, 1913.
Principia Mathematica. Cambridge University Press.
Conjunctum -- conjunction, the logical operation on a pair of
propositions that is typically indicated by the coordinating conjunction ‘and’.
The truth table for conjunction is Besides ‘and’, other coordinating
conjunctions, including ‘but’, ‘however’, ‘moreover’, and ‘although’, can
indicate logical conjunction, as can the semicolon ‘;’ and the comma ‘,’. conjunction elimination. 1 The argument form
‘A and B; therefore, A or B’ and arguments of this form. 2 The rule of
inference that permits one to infer either conjunct from a conjunction. This is
also known as the rule of simplification or 8-elimination. conjunction introduction. 1 The argument form
‘A, B; therefore, A and B’ and arguments of this form. 2 The rule of inference
that permits one to infer a conjunction from its two conjuncts. This is also
known as the rule of conjunction introduction, 8-introduction, or adjunction. Conjunctum
-- Why Grice used inverse V as symbol for “and” Conjunctum -- De Morgan, A.
prolific British mathematician, logician, and philosopher of mathematics and
logic. He is remembered chiefly for several lasting contributions to logic and
philosophy of logic, including discovery and deployment of the concept of
universe of discourse, the cofounding of relational logic, adaptation of what
are now known as De Morgan’s laws, and several terminological innovations
including the expression ‘mathematical induction’. His main logical works, the
monograph Formal Logic 1847 and the series of articles “On the Syllogism”
184662, demonstrate wide historical and philosophical learning, synoptic
vision, penetrating originality, and disarming objectivity. His relational
logic treated a wide variety of inferences involving propositions whose logical
forms were significantly more complex than those treated in the traditional
framework stemming from Aristotle, e.g. ‘If every doctor is a teacher, then
every ancestor of a doctor is an ancestor of a teacher’. De Morgan’s conception
of the infinite variety of logical forms of propositions vastly widens that of
his predecessors and even that of his able contemporaries such as Boole,
Hamilton, Mill, and Whately. De Morgan did as much as any of his contemporaries
toward the creation of modern mathematical logic. -- De Morgan’s laws, the logical principles -
A 8 B S - A 7 - B, - A 7 B S - A 8 - B, - -A 8 - B S A 7 B, and - - A 7 - B S A
8 B, though the term is occasionally used to cover only the first two. Refs.The main published source is “Studies in the Way of
Words” (henceforth, “WOW”), I (especially Essays 1 and 4), “Presupposition and
conversational implicaturum,” in P. Cole, and the two sets on ‘Logic and
conversation,’ in The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
connectum -- connected, said
of a relation R where, for any two distinct elements x and y of the domain,
either xRy or yRx. R is said to be strongly connected if, for any two elements
x and y, either xRy or yRx, even if x and y are identical. Given the domain of
positive integers, for instance, the relation ‹ is connected, since for any two
distinct numbers a and b, either a ‹ b or b ‹ a. ‹ is not strongly connected,
however, since if a % b we do not have either a ‹ b or b ‹ a. The relation o,
however, is Confucius connected 174 174
strongly connected, since either a o b or b o a for any two numbers, including
the case where a % b. An example of a relation that is not connected is the
subset relation 0, since it is not true that for any two sets A and B, either A
0 B or B 0 A. connectionism, an approach
to modeling cognitive systems which utilizes networks of simple processing units
that are inspired by the basic structure of the nervous system. Other names for
this approach are neural network modeling and parallel distributed processing.
Connectionism was pioneered in the period 065 by researchers such as Frank
Rosenblatt and Oliver Selfridge. Interest in using such networks diminished
during the 0s because of limitations encountered by existing networks and the
growing attractiveness of the computer model of the mind according to which the
mind stores symbols in memory and registers and performs computations upon
them. Connectionist models enjoyed a renaissance in the 0s, partly as the
result of the discovery of means of overcoming earlier limitations e.g.,
development of the back-propagation learning algorithm by David Rumelhart, Geoffrey
Hinton, and Ronald Williams, and of the Boltzmann-machine learning algorithm by
David Ackley, Geoffrey Hinton, and Terrence Sejnowski, and partly as
limitations encountered with the computer model rekindled interest in
alternatives. Researchers employing connectionist-type nets are found in a
variety of disciplines including psychology, artificial intelligence,
neuroscience, and physics. There are often major differences in the endeavors
of these researchers: psychologists and artificial intelligence researchers are
interested in using these nets to model cognitive behavior, whereas
neuroscientists often use them to model processing in particular neural
systems. A connectionist system consists of a set of processing units that can
take on activation values. These units are connected so that particular units
can excite or inhibit others. The activation of any particular unit will be
determined by one or more of the following: inputs from outside the system, the
excitations or inhibitions supplied by other units, and the previous activation
of the unit. There are a variety of different architectures invoked in
connectionist systems. In feedforward nets units are clustered into layers and
connections pass activations in a unidirectional manner from a layer of input
units to a layer of output units, possibly passing through one or more layers
of hidden units along the way. In these systems processing requires one pass of
processing through the network. Interactive nets exhibit no directionality of
processing: a given unit may excite or inhibit another unit, and it, or another
unit influenced by it, might excite or inhibit the first unit. A number of
processing cycles will ensue after an input has been given to some or all of
the units until eventually the network settles into one state, or cycles
through a small set of such states. One of the most attractive features of
connectionist networks is their ability to learn. This is accomplished by
adjusting the weights connecting the various units of the system, thereby
altering the manner in which the network responds to inputs. To illustrate the
basic process of connectionist learning, consider a feedforward network with
just two layers of units and one layer of connections. One learning procedure
commonly referred to as the delta rule first requires the network to respond,
using current weights, to an input. The activations on the units of the second
layer are then compared to a set of target activations, and detected
differences are used to adjust the weights coming from active input units. Such
a procedure gradually reduces the difference between the actual response and
the target response. In order to construe such networks as cognitive models it
is necessary to interpret the input and output units. Localist interpretations
treat individual input and output units as representing concepts such as those
found in natural language. Distributed interpretations correlate only patterns
of activation of a number of units with ordinary language concepts. Sometimes
but not always distributed models will interpret individual units as
corresponding to microfeatures. In one interesting variation on distributed
representation, known as coarse coding, each symbol will be assigned to a
different subset of the units of the system, and the symbol will be viewed as
active only if a predefined number of the assigned units are active. A number
of features of connectionist nets make them particularly attractive for
modeling cognitive phenomena in addition to their ability to learn from
experience. They are extremely efficient at pattern-recognition tasks and often
generalize very well from training inputs to similar test inputs. They can
often recover complete patterns from partial inputs, making them good models
for content-addressable memory. Interactive networks are particularly useful in
modeling cognitive tasks in which multiple constraints must be satisfied
simultaneously, or in which the goal is to satisfy competing constraints as
well as possible. In a natural manner they can override some constraints on a
problem when it is not possible to satisfy all, thus treating the constraints
as soft. While the cognitive connectionist models are not intended to model
actual neural processing, they suggest how cognitive processes can be realized
in neural hardware. They also exhibit a feature demonstrated by the brain but
difficult to achieve in symbolic systems: their performance degrades gracefully
as units or connections are disabled or the capacity of the network is
exceeded, rather than crashing. Serious challenges have been raised to the
usefulness of connectionism as a tool for modeling cognition. Many of these
challenges have come from theorists who have focused on the complexities of
language, especially the systematicity exhibited in language. Jerry Fodor and
Zenon Pylyshyn, for example, have emphasized the manner in which the meaning of
complex sentences is built up compositionally from the meaning of components,
and argue both that compositionality applies to thought generally and that it
requires a symbolic system. Therefore, they maintain, while cognitive systems
might be implemented in connectionist nets, these nets do not characterize the
architecture of the cognitive system itself, which must have capacities for
symbol storage and manipulation. Connectionists have developed a variety of
responses to these objections, including emphasizing the importance of
cognitive functions such as pattern recognition, which have not been as
successfully modeled by symbolic systems; challenging the need for symbol
processing in accounting for linguistic behavior; and designing more complex
connectionist architectures, such as recurrent networks, capable of responding
to or producing systematic structures.
connotatum – intension --
connotation. 1 The ideas and associations brought to mind by an expression used
in contrast with ‘denotation’ and ‘meaning’. 2 In a technical use, the
properties jointly necessary and sufficient for the correct application of the
expression in question.
sequentia: consequentia --
consequentialism, the doctrine that the moral rightness of an act is determined
solely by the goodness of the act’s consequences. Prominent consequentialists
include J. S. Mill, Moore, and Sidgwick. Maximizing versions of
consequentialism the most common
sort hold that an act is morally right
if and only if it produces the best consequences of those acts available to the
agent. Satisficing consequentialism holds that an act is morally right if and
only if it produces enough good consequences on balance. Consequentialist
theories are often contrasted with deontological ones, such as Kant’s, which
hold that the rightness of an act is determined at least in part by something
other than the goodness of the act’s consequences. A few versions of
consequentialism are agentrelative: that is, they give each agent different
aims, so that different agents’ aims may conflict. For instance, egoistic
consequentialism holds that the moral rightness of an act for an agent depends
solely on the goodness of its consequences for him or her. However, the vast
majority of consequentialist theories have been agent-neutral and
consequentialism is often defined in a more restrictive way so that
agentrelative versions do not count as consequentialist. A doctrine is
agent-neutral when it gives to each agent the same ultimate aims, so that
different agents’ aims cannot conflict. For instance, utilitarianism holds that
an act is morally right if and only if it produces more happiness for the
sentient beings it affects than any other act available to the agent. This
gives each agent the same ultimate aim, and so is agent-neutral.
Consequentialist theories differ over what features of acts they hold to
determine their goodness. Utilitarian versions hold that the only consequences
of an act relevant to its goodness are its effects on the happiness of sentient
beings. But some consequentialists hold that the promotion of other things
matters too achievement, autonomy,
knowledge, or fairness, for instance. Thus utilitarianism, as a maximizing,
agent-neutral, happiness-based view is only one of a broad range of
consequentialist theories. consequentia
mirabilis, the logical principle that if a statement follows from its own
negation it must be true. Strict consequentia mirabilis is the principle that
if a statement follows logically from its own negation it is logically true.
The principle is often connected with the paradoxes of strict implication,
according to which any statement follows from a contradiction. Since the negation
of a tautology is a contradiction, every tautology follows from its own
negation. However, if every expression of the form ‘if p then q’ implies ‘not-p
or q’ they need not be equivalent, then from ‘if not-p then p’ we can derive
‘not-not-p or p’ and by the principles of double negation and repetition derive
p. Since all of these rules are unexceptionable the principle of consequentia
mirabilis is also unexceptionable. It is, however, somewhat counterintuitive,
hence the name ‘the astonishing implication’, which goes back to its medieval
discoverers or rediscoverers.
consistens: in traditional
Aristotelian logic, a semantic notion: two or more statements are called
consistent if they are simultaneously true under some interpretation cf., e.g.,
W. S. Jevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic, 1870. In modern logic there is a
syntactic definition that also fits complex e.g., mathematical theories
developed since Frege’s Begriffsschrift 1879: a set of statements is called
consistent with respect to a certain logical calculus, if no formula ‘P &
P’ is derivable from those statements by the rules of the calculus; i.e., the
theory is free from contradictions. If these definitions are equivalent for a
logic, we have a significant fact, as the equivalence amounts to the
completeness of its system of rules. The first such completeness theorem was
obtained for sentential or propositional logic by Paul Bernays in 8 in his
Habilitationsschrift that was partially published as Axiomatische Untersuchung
des Aussagen-Kalküls der “Principia Mathematica,” 6 and, independently, by Emil
Post in Introduction to a General Theory of Elementary Propositions, 1; the
completeness of predicate logic was proved by Gödel in Die Vollständigkeit der
Axiome des logischen Funktionenkalküls, 0. The crucial step in such proofs
shows that syntactic consistency implies semantic consistency. Cantor applied
the notion of consistency to sets. In a well-known letter to Dedekind 9 he
distinguished between an inconsistent and a consistent multiplicity; the former
is such “that the assumption that all of its elements ‘are together’ leads to a
contradiction,” whereas the elements of the latter “can be thought of without
contradiction as ‘being together.’ “ Cantor had conveyed these distinctions and
their motivation by letter to Hilbert in 7 see W. Purkert and H. J. Ilgauds,
Georg Cantor, 7. Hilbert pointed out explicitly in 4 that Cantor had not given
a rigorous criterion for distinguishing between consistent and inconsistent
multiplicities. Already in his Über den Zahlbegriff 9 Hilbert had suggested a
remedy by giving consistency proofs for suitable axiomatic systems; e.g., to
give the proof of the “existence of the totality of real numbers or in the terminology of G. Cantor the proof of the fact that the system of real
numbers is a consistent complete set” by establishing the consistency of an
axiomatic characterization of the reals
in modern terminology, of the theory of complete, ordered fields. And he
claimed, somewhat indeterminately, that this could be done “by a suitable
modification of familiar methods.” After 4, Hilbert pursued a new way of giving
consistency proofs. This novel way of proceeding, still aiming for the same
goal, was to make use of the formalization of the theory at hand. However, in the
formulation of Hilbert’s Program during the 0s the point of consistency proofs
was no longer to guarantee the existence of suitable sets, but rather to
establish the instrumental usefulness of strong mathematical theories T, like
axiomatic set theory, relative to finitist mathematics. That focus rested on
the observation that the statement formulating the syntactic consistency of T
is equivalent to the reflection principle Pra, ‘s’ P s; here Pr is the finitist
proof predicate for T, s is a finitistically meaningful statement, and ‘s’ its
translation into the language of T. If one could establish finitistically the
consistency of T, one could be sure on
finitist grounds that T is a reliable
instrument for the proof of finitist statements. There are many examples of
significant relative consistency proofs: i non-Euclidean geometry relative to
Euclidean, Euclidean geometry relative to analysis; ii set theory with the
axiom of choice relative to set theory without the axiom of choice, set theory
with the negation of the axiom of choice relative to set theory; iii classical
arithmetic relative to intuitionistic arithmetic, subsystems of classical
analysis relative to intuitionistic theories of constructive ordinals. The
mathematical significance of relative consistency proofs is often brought out
by sharpening them to establish conservative extension results; the latter may
then ensure, e.g., that the theories have the same class of provably total
functions. The initial motivation for such arguments is, however, frequently
philosophical: one wants to guarantee the coherence of the original theory on
an epistemologically distinguished basis.
the english
constitution:
an example Grice gives of a ‘vacuous
name’ -- constitution, a relation between concrete particulars including
objects and events and their parts, according to which at some time t, a
concrete particular is said to be constituted by the sum of its parts without
necessarily being identical with that sum. For instance, at some specific time
t, Mt. Everest is constituted by the various chunks of rock and other matter
that form Everest at t, though at t Everest would still have been Everest even
if, contrary to fact, some particular rock that is part of the sum had been
absent. Hence, although Mt. Everest is not identical to the sum of its material
parts at t, it is constituted by them. The relation of constitution figures
importantly in recent attempts to articulate and defend metaphysical
physicalism naturalism. To capture the idea that all that exists is ultimately
physical, we may say that at the lowest level of reality, there are only
microphysical phenomena, governed by the laws of microphysics, and that all
other objects and events are ultimately constituted by objects and events at
the microphysical level.
contactum -- syntactics: (From syn- and tassein, from PIE, cognate with
‘tact,’ to touch) -- Being the gentleman
he was, Grice takes a cavlier attitude to ‘syntax’ as something that someone
else must give to him, and right he is. The philosopher should concern with
more important issues. Usually Grice uses ‘unstructured’ to mean ‘syntactically
unstructured,’ such as a handwave. With
a handwave, an emissor can rationally explicate and implicate. vide compositum
– Strictly, compositum translates Grecian synthesis, rather than syntax – which
is better phrased as Latin ‘contactum. Or better combinatum – syntaxis , is, f., = σύνταξις, I.the connection of words, Prisc. 17, 1, 1. When Grice uses ‘unsructured’ he
sometimes expands this into ‘syntactically unstructured.’ Since syntax need not
be linguistic, this is an interesting semiotic perspective by Grice. He is
allowing for compositionality in a semotic system with a comibinatory other
than the first, second, and third articulation. The Latinate is ‘contactum.’
Morris thought he was being bright when he proposed ‘syntactics,’ “long for
syntax,” he wrote. syntax, περὶ τῆς ς. τῶν λεγομένων, title of work by Chrysipp., Stoic.2.6, cf. Plu.2.731f (pl.);
“τὴν ς. τῶν ὀνομάτων” Gal.16.736, cf. 720; περὶ συντάξεως, title of work by A.D.; but also, compound forms, Id.Conj.214.7; ποιεῖσθαι μετά τινος τὴν ς. ib.221.19; also, rule
for combination of sounds or letters, τὸ χ (in δέγμενος）“ εἰς γ μετεβλήθη, τῆς ς. οὕτως ἀπαιτούσης” EM252.45, cf. Luc.Jud. Voc.3; also, connected speech, ἐν τῇ ς. ἐγκλιτέον Sch.Il.16.85.Grice’s presupposition is that a
‘syntactics’ is not enough for a system to be a ‘communication-system’. Nothing
is communicated. With the syntagma, there is no communicatum. Grice loved two
devices of the syntactic kind: subscripts and square brackets (for the
assignment of common-ground status). Grice is a conservative
(dissenting rationalist) when it comes to syntax and semantics. He hardly uses
pragmatics albeit in a loose way (pragmatic import, pragmatic inference), but
was aware of Morriss triangle. Syntax is presented along the lines of
Gentzen, i.e. a system of natural deduction in terms of inference rules of
introduction and elimination for each formal device. Semantics pertains
rather to Witterss truth-values, i.e. the assignment of a satisfactory-valuation:
the true and the good. A syntactic approach to Grice’s System does not require
value-assignment. The system is constructed alla Gentzen with introduction and
elimination rules which are regarded as syntactic in nature. One can easily
check that the rules statedabove adequately characterise the meaning of
classical conjunction which is true iff both conjuncts are true. Hence the
syntactic deducibility relation coincides with the semantic relation of /=
or logical consequence (or entailment). Refs.: The most direct source is “Vacuous
names,” but the keyword ‘syntax’ is helpful. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
context: while Grice jocularly echoes Firth with his ‘context
of utterance,’ he thought the theory of context was ‘totally lacking in context.’
H. P. Grice, “The general theory of context,” -- contextualism, the view that
inferential justification always takes place against a background of beliefs
that are themselves in no way evidentially supported. The view has not often
been defended by name, but Dewey, Popper, Austin, and Vitters are arguably
among its notable exponents. As this list perhaps suggests, contextualism is
closely related to the “relevant alternatives” conception of justification,
according to which claims to knowledge are justified not by ruling out any and
every logically possible way in which what is asserted might be false or
inadequately grounded, but by excluding certain especially relevant
alternatives or epistemic shortcomings, these varying from one context of inquiry
to another. Formally, contextualism resembles foundationalism. But it differs
from traditional, or substantive, foundationalism in two crucial respects.
First, foundationalism insists that basic beliefs be self-justifying or
intrinsically credible. True, for contemporary foundationalists, this intrinsic
credibility need not amount to incorrigibility, as earlier theorists tended to
suppose: but some degree of intrinsic credibility is indispensable for basic
beliefs. Second, substantive foundational theories confine intrinsic
credibility, hence the status of being epistemologically basic, to beliefs of
some fairly narrowly specified kinds. By contrast, contextualists reject all
forms of the doctrine of intrinsic credibility, and in consequence place no restrictions
on the kinds of beliefs that can, in appropriate circumstances, function as
contextually basic. They regard this as a strength of their position, since
explaining and defending attributions of intrinsic credibility has always been
the foundationalist’s main problem. Contextualism is also distinct from the
coherence theory of justification, foundationalism’s traditional rival.
Coherence theorists are as suspicious as contextualists of the
foundationalist’s specified kinds of basic beliefs. But coherentists react by
proposing a radically holistic model of inferential justification, according to
which a belief becomes justified through incorporation into a suitably coherent
overall system of beliefs or “total view.” There are many well-known problems with
this approach: the criteria of coherence have never been very clearly
articulated; it is not clear what satisfying such criteria has to do with
making our beliefs likely to be true; and since it is doubtful whether anyone
has a very clear picture of his system of beliefs as a whole, to insist that
justification involves comparing the merits of competing total views seems to
subject ordinary justificatory practices to severe idealization. Contextualism,
in virtue of its formal affinity with foundationalism, claims to avoid all such
problems. Foundationalists and coherentists are apt to respond that
contextualism reaps these benefits by failing to show how genuinely epistemic
justification is possible. Contextualism, they charge, is finally indistinguishable
from the skeptical view that “justification” depends on unwarranted
assumptions. Even if, in context, these are pragmatically acceptable,
epistemically speaking they are still just assumptions. This objection raises
the question whether contextualists mean to answer the same questions as more
traditional theorists, or answer them in the same way. Traditional theories of
justification are framed so as to respond to highly general skeptical
questions e.g., are we justified in any
of our beliefs about the external world? It may be that contextualist theories
are or should be advanced, not as direct answers to skepticism, but in
conjunction with attempts to diagnose or dissolve traditional skeptical
problems. Contextualists need to show how and why traditional demands for
“global” justification misfire, if they do. If traditional skeptical problems
are taken at face value, it is doubtful whether contextualism can answer
them.
continental
breakfast:
Grice enjoyed a continental breakfast at Oxford, and an English breakfast in
Rome – As for ‘continental’ “philosophy,” Grice applied it to the gradually
changing spectrum of philosophical views that in the twentieth century
developed in Continental Europe and that are notably different from the various
forms of analytic philosophy that during the same period flourished at Oxford.
Immediately after World War II the expression “philosophie continentale” was
more or less synonymous with ‘phenomenology’. The latter term, already used
earlier in G. idealism, received a completely new meaning in the work of
Husserl. Later on “phainomenologie” was also applied, often with substantial
changes in meaning, to the thought of a great number of other Continental
philosophers such as Scheler, Alexander Pfander, Hedwig Conrad-Martius, and
Nicolai Hartmann. For Husserl the aim of philosophy is to prepare humankind for
a genuinely philosophical form of life, in and through which each human being
gives him- or herself a rule through reason. Since the Renaissance, many
philosophers have tried in vain to materialize this aim. In Husserl’s view, the
reason was that philosophers failed to use the proper philosophical method.
Husserl’s phenomenology was meant to provide philosophy with the method needed.
Among those deeply influenced by Husserl’s ideas the so-called existentialists
must be mentioned first. If ‘existentialism’ is construed strictly, it refers
mainly to the philosophy of Sartre and Beauvoir. In a very broad sense
‘existentialism’ refers to the ideas of an entire group of thinkers influenced
methodologically by Husserl and in content by Marcel, Heidegger, Sartre, or
Merleau-Ponty, and one may go and include S. N. Hampshire into the bargain. In
this case one often speaks of existential phenomenology. When Heidegger’s
philosophy became better known at Oxford, ‘continental philosophy’ received
again a new meaning. From Heidegger’s first publication, Being and Time 7, it
was clear that his conception of phenomenology differs from that of Husserl in
several important respects. That is why he qualified the term and spoke of
hermeneutic phenomenology and clarified the expression by examining the
“original” meaning of the Grecian words from which the term was formed. In his
view phenomenology must try “to let that which shows itself be seen from itself
in the very way in which it shows itself from itself.” Heidegger applied the
method first to the mode of being of man with the aim of approaching the
question concerning the meaning of being itself through this phenomenological
interpretation. Of those who took their point of departure from Heidegger, but
also tried to go beyond him, Gadamer and Ricoeur must be mentioned. The
structuralist movement in France added another connotation to ‘Continental
philosophy’. The term structuralism above all refers to an activity, a way of
knowing, speaking, and acting that extends over a number of distinguished
domains of human activity: linguistics, aesthetics, anthropology, psychology,
psychoanalysis, mathematics, philosophy of science, and philosophy itself.
Structuralism, which became a fashion in Paris and later in Western Europe
generally, reached its high point on the Continent between 0 and 0. It was
inspired by ideas first formulated by Russian formalism 626 and Czech
structuralism 640, but also by ideas derived from the works of Marx and Freud.
In France Foucault, Barthes, Althusser, and Derrida were the leading figures.
Structuralism is not a new philosophical movement; it must be characterized by
structuralist activity, which is meant to evoke ever new objects. This can be
done in a constructive and a reconstructive manner, but these two ways of
evoking objects can never be separated. One finds the constructive aspect
primarily in structuralist aesthetics and linguistics, whereas the reconstructive
aspect is more apparent in philosophical reflections upon the structuralist
activity. Influenced by Nietzschean ideas, structuralism later developed in a
number of directions, including poststructuralism; in this context the works of
Gilles Deleuze, Lyotard, Irigaray, and Kristeva must be mentioned. After 0
‘Continental philosophy’ received again a new connotation: deconstruction. At
first deconstruction presented itself as a reaction against philosophical
hermeneutics, even though both deconstruction and hermeneutics claim their
origin in Heidegger’s reinterpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology. The leading
philosopher of the movement is Derrida, who at first tried to think along
phenomenological and structuralist lines. Derrida formulated his “final” view
in a linguistic form that is both complex and suggestive. It is not easy in a
few sentences to state what deconstruction is. Generally speaking one can say
that what is being deconstructed is texts; they are deconstructed to show that
there are conflicting conceptions of meaning and implication in every text so
that it is never possible definitively to show what a text really means.
Derrida’s own deconstructive work is concerned mainly with philosophical texts,
whereas others apply the “method” predominantly to literary texts. What
according to Derrida distinguished philosophy is its reluctance to face the
fact that it, too, is a product of linguistic and rhetorical figures.
Deconstruction is here that process of close reading that focuses on those
elements where philosophers in their work try to erase all knowledge of its own
linguistic and rhetorical dimensions. It has been said that if construction
typifies modern thinking, then deconstruction is the mode of thinking that
radically tries to overcome modernity. Yet this view is simplistic, since one
also deconstructs Plato and many other thinkers and philosophers of the
premodern age. People concerned with social and political philosophy who have
sought affiliation with Continental philosophy often appeal to the so-called
critical theory of the Frankfurt School in general, and to Habermas’s theory of
communicative action in particular. Habermas’s view, like the position of the
Frankfurt School in general, is philosophically eclectic. It tries to bring into
harmony ideas derived from Kant, G. idealism, and Marx, as well as ideas from
the sociology of knowledge and the social sciences. Habermas believes that his
theory makes it possible to develop a communication community without
alienation that is guided by reason in such a way that the community can stand
freely in regard to the objectively given reality. Critics have pointed out
that in order to make this theory work Habermas must substantiate a number of
assumptions that until now he has not been able to justify.
Grice’s
contingency planning
-- “What is actual is not also possible” “What is necessary is not also
contingent” -- contingent, neither impossible nor necessary; i.e., both
possible and non-necessary. The modal property of being contingent is attributable
to a proposition, state of affairs, event, or
more debatably an object. Muddles
about the relationship between this and other modal properties have abounded
ever since Aristotle, who initially conflated contingency with possibility but
later realized that something that is possible may also be necessary, whereas
something that is contingent cannot be necessary. Even today many philosophers
are not clear about the “opposition” between contingency and necessity,
mistakenly supposing them to be contradictory notions probably because within
the domain of true propositions the contingent and the necessary are indeed
both exclusive and exhaustive of one another. But the contradictory of
‘necessary’ is ‘non-necessary’; that of ‘contingent’ is ‘non-contingent’, as
the following extended modal square of opposition shows: These
logico-syntactical relationships are preserved through various semantical
interpretations, such as those involving: a the logical modalities proposition
P is logically contingent just when P is neither a logical truth nor a logical
falsehood; b the causal or physical modalities state of affairs or event E is
physically contingent just when E is neither physically necessary nor
physically impossible; and c the deontic modalities act A is morally
indeterminate just when A is neither morally obligatory nor morally forbidden.
In none of these cases does ‘contingent’ mean ‘dependent,’ as in the phrase ‘is
contingent upon’. Yet just such a notion of contingency seems to feature
prominently in certain formulations of the cosmological argument, all created
objects being said to be contingent beings and God alone to be a necessary or
non-contingent being. Conceptual clarity is not furthered by assimilating this
sense of ‘contingent’ to the others.
contrapositum: the immediate
logical operation on any categorical proposition that is accomplished by first
forming the complements of both the subject term and the predicate term of that
proposition and then interchanging these complemented terms. Thus,
contraposition applied to the categorical proposition ‘All cats are felines’
yields ‘All non-felines are non-cats’, where ‘nonfeline’ and ‘non-cat’ are,
respectively, the complements or complementary terms of ‘feline’ and ‘cat’. The
result of applying contraposition to a categorical proposition is said to be
the contrapositive of that proposition.
contraries, any pair of propositions that cannot both be true but can
both be false; derivatively, any pair of properties that cannot both apply to a
thing but that can both fail to apply to a thing. Thus the propositions ‘This
object is red all over’ and ‘This object is green all over’ are contraries, as
are the properties of being red all over and being green all over.
Traditionally, it was considered that the categorical A-proposition ‘All S’s
are P’s’ and the categorical E-proposition ‘No S’s are P’s’ were contraries;
but according to De Morgan and most subsequent logicians, these two
propositions are both true when there are no S’s at all, so that modern
logicians do not usually regard the categorical A- and E-propositions as being
true contraries. contravalid,
designating a proposition P in a logical system such that every proposition in
the system is a consequence of P. In most of the typical and familiar logical
systems, contravalidity coincides with self-contradictoriness.
voluntary
and rational control
– the power structure of the soul -- Grice’s intersubjective conversational
control, -- for Grice only what is under one’s control is communicated – spots
mean measles only metaphorically, the spots don’t communicate measles. An
involuntary cry does not ‘mean.’ Only a simulated cry of pain is a vehicle by
which an emissor may mean that he is in pain. an apparently causal phenomenon
closely akin to power and important for such topics as intentional action,
freedom, and moral responsibility. Depending upon the control you had over the
event, your finding a friend’s stolen car may or may not be an intentional
action, a free action, or an action for which you deserve moral credit. Control
seems to be a causal phenomenon. Try to imagine controlling a car, say, without
causing anything. If you cause nothing, you have no effect on the car, and one
does not control a thing on which one has no effect. But control need not be
causally deterministic. Even if a genuine randomizer in your car’s steering
mechanism gives you only a 99 percent chance of making turns you try to make,
you still have considerable control in that sphere. Some philosophers claim
that we have no control over anything if causal determinism is true. That claim
is false. When you drive your car, you normally are in control of its speed and
direction, even if our world happens to be deterministic.
conversational
avowal: The phrase is a Ryleism, but
Grice liked it. Grice’s point is with corrigibility or lack thereof. He recalls
his tutorials with Strawson. “I want you to bring me a paper on Friday.” “You
mean The Telegraph?” “You know what I mean.”
“But perhaps you don’t.” Grice’s favourite conversational avowal,
mentioned by Grice, is a declaration of an intention.. Grice starts using the
phrase ‘conversational avowal’ after exploring Ryle’s rather cursory
exploration of them in The Concept of Mind. This is interesting because in
general Grice is an anti-ryleist. The verb is of course ‘to avow,’ which
is ultimately a Latinate from ‘advocare.’ A processes or event of the soul is,
on the official view, supposed to be played out in a private theatre. Such an
event is known directly by the man who has them either through the faculty of
introspection or the ‘phosphorescence’ of consciousness. The subject is,
on this view, incorrigible—his avowals of the state of his soul cannot be
corrected by others—and he is infallible—he cannot be wrong about which states
he is in. The official doctrine mistakenly construes an avowals or a
report of such an episode as issuing from a special sort of observation or
perception of shadowy existents. We should consider some differences
between two sorts of 'conversational' avowals: (i) I feel a tickle and (ii) I
feel ill. If a man feels a tickle, he has a tickle, and if he has a tickle, he
feels it. But if he feels ill, he may not be ill, and if he is ill, he may
not feel ill. Doubtless a man’s feeling ill is some evidence for his being
ill. But feeling a tickle is not evidence for his having a tickle, any more
than striking a blow is evidence for the occurrence of a blow. In ‘feel a
tickle’ and ‘strike a blow’, ‘tickle’ and ‘blow’ are cognate accusatives to the
verbs ‘feel’ and ‘strike’. The verb and its accusative are two expressions
for the same thing, as are the verbs and their accusatives in ‘I dreamt a
dream’ and ‘I asked a question’. But ‘ill’ and ‘capable of climbing the tree’
are not cognate accusatives to the verb ‘to feel.' So they are not in grammar
bound to signify feelings, as ‘tickle’ is in grammar bound to signify a
feeling. Another purely grammatical point shows the same thing. It is
indifferent whether I say ‘I feel a tickle’ or ‘I have a tickle’; but ‘I have .
. .’ cannot be completed by ‘. . . ill’, (cf. ‘I have an illness’), ‘. . .
capable of climbing the tree’, (cf. I have a capability to climb that tree’) ‘.
. . happy’ (cf. ‘I have a feeling of happiness’ or ‘I have happiness in my
life’) or ‘. . . discontented’ (cf. ‘I have a feeling of strong discontent
towards behaviourism’). If we try to restore the verbal parallel by bringing in
the appropriate abstract nouns, we find a further incongruity; ‘I feel
happiness’(I feel as though I am experiencing happiness), ‘I feel illness’ (I
feel as though I do have an illness’) or ‘I feel ability to climb the tree’ (I
feel that I am endowed with the capability to climb that tree), if they mean
anything, they do not mean at all what a man means by uttering ‘I feel happy,’
or ‘I feel ill,’ or ‘I feel capable of climbing the tree’. On the other
hand, besides these differences between the different uses of ‘I feel . . .’
there are important CONVERSATIONAL analogies as well. If a man says that
he has a tickle, his co-conversationalist does not ask for his evidence, or
requires him to make quite sure. Announcing a tickle is not proclaiming the
results of an investigation. A tickle is not something established by
careful witnessing, or something inferred from a clue, nor do we praise for his
powers of observation or reasoning a man who let us know that he feels tickles,
tweaks and flutters. Just the same is true of avowals of moods. If a man
makes a conversational contribution, such as‘I feel bored’, or ‘I feel depressed’,
his co-conversationalist does not usually ask him for his evidence, or request
him to make sure. The co-conversationalist may accuse the man of shamming to
him or to himself, but the co-conversationalist does not accuse him of having
been careless in his observations or rash in his inferences, since a
co-conversationalist would not usually think that his conversational avowal is
a report of an observation or a conclusion. He has not been a good or a
bad detective; he has not been a detective at all. Nothing would surprise us
more than to hear him say ‘I feel depressed’ in the alert and judicious tone of
voice of a detective, a microscopist, or a diagnostician, though this tone of
voice is perfectly congruous with the NON-AVOWAL past-tense ‘I WAS feeling depressed’
or the NON-AVOWAL third-person report, ‘HE feels depressed’. If the avowal is
to do its conversational job, it must be said in a depressed tone of voice. The
conversational avowal must be blurted out to a sympathizer, not reported to an
investigator. Avowing ‘I feel depressed’ is doing one of the things, viz. one
CONVERSATIONAL thing, that depression is the mood to do. It is not a piece of
scientific premiss-providing, but a piece of ‘conversational moping.’That is
why, if the co-conversationalist is suspicious, he does not ask ‘Fact or
fiction?’, ‘True or false?’, ‘Reliable or unreliable?’, but ‘Sincere or
shammed?’ The CONVERSATIONAL avowal of moods requires not acumen, but
openness. It comes from the heart, not from the head. It is not
discovery, but voluntary non-concealment. Of course people have to learn how to
use avowal expressions appropriately and they may not learn these lessons very
well. They learn them from ordinary discussions of the moods of others and from
such more fruitful sources as novels and the theatre. They learn from the same
sources how to cheat both other people and themselves by making a sham
conversational avowal in the proper tone of voice and with the other proper
histrionic accompaniments. If we now raise the question ‘How does a man find
out what mood he is in?’ one can answer that if, as may not be the case, he
finds it out at all, he finds it out very much as we find it out. As we have
seen, he does not groan ‘I feel bored’ because he has found out that he is
bored, any more than the sleepy man yawns because he has found out that he is
sleepy. Rather, somewhat as the sleepy man finds out that he is sleepy by
finding, among other things, that he keeps on yawning, so the bored man finds
out that he is bored, if he does find this out, by finding that among other
things he glumly says to others and to himself ‘I feel bored’ and ‘How bored I
feel’. Such a blurted avowal is not merely one fairly reliable index among
others. It is the first and the best index, since being worded and voluntarily
uttered, it is meant to be heard and it is meant to be understood. It calls for
no sleuth-work.In some respects a conversational avowal of a moods, like ‘I
feel cheerful,’ more closely resemble announcements of sensations like ‘I feel
a tickle’ than they resemble utterances like ‘I feel better’ or ‘I feel capable
of climbing the tree’. Just as it would be absurd to say ‘I feel a tickle but
maybe I haven’t one’, so, in ordinary cases, it would be absurd to say ‘I feel
cheerful but maybe I am not’. But there would be no absurdity in saying ‘I FEEL
better but, to judge by the doctor’s attitude, perhaps I am WORSE’, or ‘I do
FEEL as if I am capable of climbing the tree but maybe I cannot climb it.’This
difference can be brought out in another way. Sometimes it is natural to say ‘I
feel AS IF I could eat a horse’, or ‘I feel AS IF my temperature has returned
to normal’. But, more more immediate conversational avowals, it would seldom if
ever be natural to say ‘I feel AS IF I were in the dumps’, or ‘I feel AS IF I
were bored’, any more than it would be natural to say ‘I feel AS IF I had a
pain’. Not much would be gained by discussing at length why we use ‘feel’ in
these different ways. There are hosts of other ways in which it is also used. I
can say ‘I felt a lump in the mattress’, ‘I felt cold’, ‘I felt queer’, ‘I felt
my jaw-muscles stiffen’, ‘I felt my gorge rise’, ‘I felt my chin with my
thumb’, ‘I felt in vain for the lever’, ‘I felt as if something important was
about to happen’, ‘I felt that there was a flaw somewhere in the argument’, ‘I
felt quite at home’, ‘I felt that he was angry’. A feature common to most
of these uses of ‘feel’ is that the utterer does not want further questions to
be put. They would be either unanswerable questions, or unaskable questions.
That he felt it is enough to settle some debates.That he merely felt it is
enough to show that debates should not even begin. Names of moods, then, are
not the names of feelings. But to be in a particular mood is to be in the mood,
among other things, to feel certain sorts of feelings in certain sorts of
situations. To be in a lazy mood, is, among other things, to tend to have
sensations of lassitude in the limbs when jobs have to be done, to have cosy
feelings of relaxation when the deck-chair is resumed, not to have electricity
feelings when the game begins, and so forth. But we are not thinking
primarily of these feelings when we say that we feel lazy; in fact, we seldom
pay much heed to sensations of these kinds, save when they are abnormally
acute. Is a name of a mood a name
of an emotion? The only tolerable reply is that of course they are, in that
some people some of the time use ‘emotion’. But then we must add that in this
usage an emotion is not something that can be segregated from thinking,
daydreaming, voluntarily doing things, grimacing or feeling pangs and itches.
To have the emotion, in this usage, which we ordinarily refer to as ‘being
bored’, is to be in the mood to think certain sorts of thoughts, and not to
think other sorts, to yawn and not to chuckle, to converse with stilted
politeness, and not to talk with animation, to feel flaccid and not to feel
resilient. Boredom is not some unique distinguishable ingredient, scene or
feature of all that its victim is doing and undergoing. Rather it is the
temporary complexion of that totality. It is not like a gust, a sunbeam, a
shower or the temperature; it is like the morning’s weather. An unstudied
conversational utterance may embody an explicit interest phrase, or a conversational
avowal, such as ‘I want it’, ‘I hope so’, ‘That’s what I intend’, ‘I quite
dislike it’, ‘Surely I am depressed’, ‘I do wonder, too’, ‘I guess so’ and ‘I
am feeling hungry.’The surface grammar (if not logical form) makes it tempting
to misconstrue all the utterances as a description. But in its primary
employment such a conversational avowal as ‘I want it’ is not used to convey
information.‘I want it’ is used to make a request or demand. ‘I want it’ is no
more meant as a contribution to general knowledge than ‘please’. For a
co-conversationalist to respond with the tag ‘Do you?’ or worse, as Grice’s
tutee, with ‘*how* do you *know* that you want it?’ is glaringly inappropriate.
Nor, in their primary employment, are conversational avowals such as ‘I hate
it’ or ‘That’s what I I intend’ used for the purpose of telling one’s addressee
facts about the utterer; or else we should not be surprised to hear them
uttered in the cool, informative tones of voice in which one says ‘HE hates it’
and ‘That’s what he intends’. We expect a conversational avowal, on the
contrary, to be spoken in a revolted and a resolute tone of voice respectively.
It is an utterances of a man in a revolted and resolute frame of mind. A
conversational avowal is a thing said in detestation and resolution and not a
thing said in order to advance biographical knowledge about detestations and
resolutions. A man who notices the unstudied utterances of the utterer,
who may or may not be himself, is, if his interest in the utterer has the appropriate
direction, especially well situated to pass comments upon the qualities and
frames of mind of its author.‘avowal’ as a philosophical lexeme may not invite
an immediate correlate in the Graeco-Roman, ultimately Grecian, tradition.
‘Confessio’ springs to mind, but this is not what Grice is thinking about. He
is more concerned with issues of privileged access and incorrigibility, or
corrigibility, rather, as per the alleged immediacy of a first-person report of
the form, “I feel that …” . Grice does use ‘avowal’ often especially in the
early stages, when the logical scepticism about incorrigibility comes under
attack. Just to be different, Grice is interested in the corrigibility of the
avowal. The issue is of some importance in his account of the act of
communication, and how one can disimplicate what one means. Grice loves to play
with his tutee doubting as to whether he means that p or q. Except at Oxford,
the whole thing has a ridiculous ring to it. I want you to bring me a paper by
Friday. You mean the newspaper? You very well know what I mean. But perhaps you
do not. Are you sure you mean a philosophy paper when you utter, ‘I want you to
bring a paper by Friday’? As Grice notes, in case of self-deception and
egcrateia, it may well be that the utterer does not know what he desires, if
not what he intends, if anything. Freud and Foucault run galore. The topic will
interest a collaborator of Grice’s, Pears, with his concept of ‘motivated
irrationality.’ Grice likes to discuss a category mistake. I may be
categorically mistaken but I am not categorically confused. Now when it comes
to avowal-avowal, it is only natural that if he is interested in Aristotle on
‘hedone,’ Grice would be interested in Aristotle on ‘lupe.’ This is very
philosophical, as Urmson agrees. Can one ‘fake’ pain? Why would one fake pain?
Oddly, this is for Grice the origin of language. Is pleasure just the absence
of pain? Liddell and Soctt have “λύπη” and render it as pain of body, oἡδον;
also, sad plight or condition, but also pain of mind, grief; “ά; δῆγμα δὲ λύπης
οὐδὲν ἐφ᾽ ἧπαρ προσικνεῖται; τί γὰρ καλὸν ζῆν βίοτον, ὃς λύπας φέρει; ἐρωτικὴ
λ.’ λύπας προσβάλλειν;” “λ. φέρειν τινί; oχαρά.” Oddly, Grice goes back to pain
in Princeton, since it is explored by Smart in his identity thesis. Take
pain. Surely, Grice tells the Princetonians, it sounds harsh, to echo Berkeley,
to say that it is the brain of Smith being in this or that a state which is
justified by insufficient evidence; whereas it surely sounds less harsh that it
is the C-fibres that constitute his ‘pain,’ which he can thereby fake. Grice
distinguishes between a complete unstructured utterance token – “Ouch” – versus
a complete syntactically structured erotetic utterance of the type, “Are you in
pain?”. At the Jowett, Corpus Barnes has read Ogden and says ‘Ouch’ (‘Oh’)
bears an ‘emotional’ or ‘emotive’ communicatum provided there is an intention
there somewhere. Otherwise, no communicatum occurs. But if there is an
intention, the ‘Oh’ can always be a fake. Grice distinguishes between a ‘fake’
and a ‘sneak.’ If U intends A to perceive ‘Oh’ as a fake, U means that he is in
pain. If there is a sneaky intention behind the utterance, which U does NOT
intend his A to recognise, there is no communicatum. Grice criticises emotivism
as rushing ahead to analyse a nuance before exploring what sort of a nuance it
is. Surely there is more to the allegedly ‘pseudo-descriptive’ ‘x is good,’
than U meaning that U emotionally approves of x. In his ‘myth,’ Grice uses pain
magisterially as an excellent example for a privileged-access allegedly
incorrigible avowal, and stage 0 in his creature progression. By uttering
‘Oh!,’ under voluntary control, Barnes means, iconically, that he is in pain.
Pain fall under the broader keyword: emotion, as anger does. Cf. Aristotle on
the emotion in De An., Rhet., and Eth. Nich. Knowing that at Oxford, if you are
a classicist, you are not a philosopher, Grice never explores the Stoic, say,
approach to pain, or lack thereof (“Which is good, since Walter Pater did it for
me!”). Refs.: “Can I have a pain in my tail?” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS
90/135c, The Bancroft Library, The University of California, Berkeley.
conversational benevolence: In Grice it’s not benevolence per se but as a force in a
two-force model, with self-love on the other side. The fact that he later
subsumed everything under ONE concept: that of co-operation (first helpfulness)
testifies that he is placing more conceptual strength on ‘benevolence’ than
‘self love.’ But the self-love’ remains in all the caveats and provisos that
Grice keeps guarding his claims with: ‘ceteris paribus,’ ‘provided there’s not
much effort involved,’ ‘if no unnecessary trouble arises,’ and so on. It’s
never benevolence simpliciter or tout court. When it comes to co-operation, the
self-love remains: the mutual goal of that co-operation is in the active and
the passive voice – You expect me to be helpful as much as I expect you to be
helpful. We are in this together. The active/passive voice formulation is
emphatic in Grice: informing AND BEING INFORMED; influencing AND BEING
INFLUENCED. The self-love goes: I won’t inform you unless you’ll inform me. I
won’t influence you unless you influence me. The ‘influence’ bit does not seem
to cooperative. But the ‘inform’ side does. By ‘inform,’ the idea is that the
psi-transmission concerns a true belief. “I’ll be truthful if you will.” This
is the sort of thing that Nietzsche found repugnant and identified with the
golden rule was totally immoral. – It was felt by Russell to be immoral enough
that he cared to mention in a letter to The Times about how abusive Nietzsche
can be – yet what a gem “Beyond good and evil” still is! In the hypocritical
milieu that Grice expects his tuttees know they are engaged in, Grice does not
find Nietzsche pointing to a repugnant fact, but a practical, even jocular way
of taking meta-ethics in a light way. There is nothing other-oriented about
benevolence. What Grice needs is conversational ALTRUISM, or helpfulness –
‘cooperation’ has the advantage, with the ‘co-’, of avoiding the ‘mutuality’
aspect, which is crucial (“What’s the good of helping you – I’m not your
servant! – if thou art not going to help me!” It may be said that when Butler
uses ‘benevolentia’ he means others. “It is usually understood that one is
benevolent towards oneself, if that makes sense.” Grice writes. Then there’s
Smith promising Jones a job – and the problem that comes with it. For Grice, if
Smith promised a job to Jones, and Jones never gets it – “that’s Jones’s
problem.” So we need to distinguish beneficentia and benevolentia. The opposite
is malevolentia and maleficientia. Usually Grice states his maxims as
PROHIBITIONS: “Do not say what you believe to be false” being the wittiest! So,
he might just as well have appealed to or invoked a principle of absence of
conversational ill-will. Grice uses ‘conversational benevolence’ narrowly, to
refer to the assumption that conversationalists will agree to make a
contribution appropriate to the shared purposes of the exhcnage. It contrasts
with the limiting conversational self-love, which is again taken narrowly to
indicate that conversationalists are assumed to be conversationally
‘benevolent,’ in the interpretation above, provided doing that does not get
them into unnecessary trouble. The type of rationality that Grice sees in
conversational is one that sees conversation as ‘rational co-operation.’ So it
is obvious that he has to invoke some level of benevolence. When tutoring his
rather egoistic tutees he had to be careful, so he hastened to add a principle
of conversational self-love. It was different when lecturing outside a
tutorial! In fact ‘benevolence’ here is best understood as ‘altruism’. So, if
there is a principle of conversational egoism, there is a correlative principle
of conversational altruism. If Grice uses ‘self-love,’ there is nothing about
‘love,’ in ‘benevolence.’ Butler may have used ‘other-love’! Even if of course
we must start with the Grecians! We must not forget that Plato and Aristotle
despised "autophilia", the complacency and self-satisfaction making
it into the opposite of "epimeleia heautou” in Plato’s Alcibiades.
Similarly, to criticize Socratic ethics as a form of egoism in opposition to a
selfless care of others is inappropriate. Neither a self-interested seeker of
wisdom nor a dangerous teacher of self-love, Socrates, as the master of
epimeleia heautou, is the hinge between the care of self and others. One has to
be careful here. A folk-etymological connection between ‘foam’ may not be
needed – when the Romans had to deal with Grecian ‘aphrodite.’ This requires
that we look for another linguistic botany for Grecian ‘self-love’ that Grice
opposes to ‘benevolentia.’ Hesiod derives Aphrodite from “ἀφρός,” ‘sea-foam,’ interpreting
the name as "risen from the foam", but most modern scholars regard
this as a spurious folk etymology. Early modern scholars of classical mythology
attempted to argue that Aphrodite's name was of Griceain or Indo-European
origin, but these efforts have now been mostly abandoned. Aphrodite's name is
generally accepted to be of non-Greek, probably Semitic, origin, but its exact
derivation cannot be determined. Scholars in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, accepting Hesiod's "foam" etymology as genuine,
analyzed the second part of Aphrodite's name as -odítē "wanderer" or -dítē
"bright". Janda, also accepting Hesiod's etymology, has argued in
favor of the latter of these interpretations and claims the story of a birth
from the foam as an Indo-European mytheme. Similarly, an Indo-European compound
abʰor-, very" and dʰei- "to shine" have been proposed, also
referring to Eos. Other have argued that these hypotheses are unlikely since
Aphrodite's attributes are entirely different from those of both Eos and the
Vedic deity Ushas.A number of improbable non-Greek etymologies have also been
suggested. One Semitic etymology compares Aphrodite to the Assyrian ‘barīrītu,’
the name of a female demon that appears in Middle Babylonian and Late
Babylonian texts. Hammarström looks to Etruscan, comparing eprϑni
"lord", an Etruscan honorific loaned into Greek as πρύτανις.This
would make the theonym in origin an honorific, "the lady".Most
scholars reject this etymology as implausible, especially since Aphrodite
actually appears in Etruscan in the borrowed form Apru (from Greek Aphrō, clipped
form of Aphrodite). The medieval Etymologicum Magnum offers a highly contrived
etymology, deriving Aphrodite from the compound habrodíaitos (ἁβροδίαιτος),
"she who lives delicately", from habrós and díaita. The alteration
from b to ph is explained as a "familiar" characteristic of Greek
"obvious from the Macedonians". It is much easier with the Romans. Lewis and Short have ‘ămor,’ old form “ămŏs,”
“like honos, labos, colos, etc.’ obviously from ‘amare,’ and which they render
as ‘love,’ as in Grice’s “conversational self-love.” Your tutor will reprimand
you if you spend too much linguistic botany on ‘eros.’ “Go straight to
‘philos.’” But no. There are philosophical usages of ‘eros,’ especially when it
comes to the Grecian philosophers Grice is interested in: Aristotle reading
Plato, which becomes Ariskant reading Plathegel. So, Liddell and Scott have
“ἔρως” which of course is from a verb, or two: “ἕραμαι,” “ἐράω,” and which they
render as “love, mostly of the sexual passion, ““θηλυκρατὴς ἔ.,” “ἐρῶσ᾽ ἔρωτ᾽
ἔκδημον,” “ἔ. τινός love for one, S.Tr.433, “παίδων” E. Ion67, and “generally,
love of a thing, desire for it,” ““πατρῴας γῆς” “δεινὸς εὐκλείας ἔ.” “ἔχειν
ἔμφυτον ἔρωτα περί τι” Plato, Lg. 782e ; “πρὸς τοὺς λόγους” (love of law),
“ἔρωτα σχὼν τῆς Ἑλλάδος τύραννος γενέσθαι” Hdt.5.32 ; ἔ. ἔχει με c. inf.,
A.Supp.521 ; “θανόντι κείνῳ συνθανεῖν ἔρως μ᾽ ἔχει” S.Fr.953 ; “αὐτοῖς ἦν ἔρως
θρόνους ἐᾶσθαι” Id.OC367 ; ἔ. ἐμπίπτει μοι c. inf., A.Ag.341, cf. Th.6.24 ; εἰς
ἔρωτά τινος ἀφικέσθαι, ἐλθεῖν, Antiph.212.3,Anaxil.21.5 : pl., loves, amours,
“ἀλλοτρίων” Pi.N.3.30 ; “οὐχ ὅσιοι ἔ.” E.Hipp.765 (lyr.) ; “ἔρωτες ἐμᾶς πόλεως”
Ar.Av.1316 (lyr.), etc. ; of dolphins, “πρὸς παῖδας” Arist.HA631a10 :
generally, desires, S.Ant.617 (lyr.). 2. object of love or desire, “ἀπρόσικτοι
ἔρωτες” Pi.N.11.48, cf. Luc.Tim.14. 3. passionate joy, S.Aj.693 (lyr.); the god
of love, Anacr.65, Parm.13, E.Hipp.525 (lyr.), etc.“Έ. ἀνίκατε μάχαν” S.Ant.781
(lyr.) : in pl., Simon.184.3, etc. III. at Nicaea, a funeral wreath, EM379.54.
IV. name of the κλῆρος Ἀφροδίτης, Cat.Cod.Astr.1.168 ; = third κλῆρος,
Paul.Al.K.3; one of the τόποι, Vett.Val.69.16. And they’ll point to you that
the Romans had ‘amor’ AND ‘cupidus’ (which they meant as a transliteration of
epithumia). If for Kant and Grice it is the intention that matters, ill-will
counts. If Smith does not want Jones have a job, Smith has ill-will towards
Jones. This is all Kant and Grice need to call Smith a bad person. It means it
is the ill-will that causes Joness not having a job. A conceptual elucidation.
Interesting from a historical point of view seeing that Grice had introduced a
principle of conversational benevolence (i.e. conversational goodwill) pretty
early. Malevolentia was over-used by Cicero, translating the Grecian. Grice
judges that if Jones fails to get the job that benevolent Smith promised, Smith
may still be deemed, for Kant, if not Aristotle, to have given him the
job. A similar elucidation was carried by Urmson with his idea of
supererogation (heroism and sainthood). For a hero or saint, someones goodwill
but not be good enough! Which does not mean it is ill, either! Conversational
benevolence -- Self-love Philosophical theology -- Edwards, J., philosopher and
theologian. He was educated at Yale, preached in New York City, and in 1729
assumed a Congregational pastorate in Northampton, Massachusetts, where he
became a leader in the Great Awakening. Because of a dispute with his
parishioners over qualifications for communion, he was forced to leave in 1750.
In 1751, he took charge of congregations in Stockbridge, a frontier town sixty
miles to the west. He was elected third president of Princeton in 1757 but died
shortly after inauguration. Edwards deeply influenced Congregational and
Presbyterian theology in America for over a century, but had little impact on
philosophy. Interest in him revived in the middle of the twentieth century,
first among literary scholars and theologians and later among philosophers.
While most of Edwards’s published work defends the Puritan version of Calvinist
orthodoxy, his notebooks reveal an interest in philosophical problems for their
own sake. Although he was indebted to Continental rationalists like
Malebranche, to the Cambridge Platonists, and especially to Locke, his own
contributions are sophisticated and original. The doctrine of God’s absolute
sovereignty is explicated by occasionalism, a subjective idealism similar to
Berkeley’s, and phenomenalism. According to Edwards, what are “vulgarly” called
causal relations are mere constant conjunctions. True causes necessitate their
effects. Since God’s will alone meets this condition, God is the only true
cause. He is also the only true substance. Physical objects are collections of
ideas of color, shape, and other “corporeal” qualities. Finite minds are series
of “thoughts” or “perceptions.” Any substance underlying perceptions, thoughts,
and “corporeal ideas” must be something that “subsists by itself, stands
underneath, and keeps up” physical and mental qualities. As the only thing that
does so, God is the only real substance. As the only true cause and the only
real substance, God is “in effect being in general.” God creates to communicate
his glory. Since God’s internal glory is constituted by his infinite knowledge
of, love of, and delight in himself as the highest good, his “communication ad
extra” consists in the knowledge of, love of, and joy in himself which he
bestows upon creatures. The essence of God’s internal and external glory is
“holiness” or “true benevolence,” a disinterested love of being in general
i.e., of God and the beings dependent on him. Holiness constitutes “true
beauty,” a divine splendor or radiance of which “secondary” ordinary beauty is
an imperfect image. God is thus supremely beautiful and the world is suffused
with his loveliness. Vindications of Calvinist conceptions of sin and grace are
found in Freedom of the Will 1754 and Original Sin 1758. The former includes
sophisticated defenses of theological determinism and compatibilism. The latter
contains arguments for occasionalism and interesting discussions of identity.
Edwards thinks that natural laws determine kinds or species, and kinds or
species determine criteria of identity. Since the laws of nature depend on
God’s “arbitrary” decision, God establishes criteria of identity. He can thus,
e.g., constitute Adam and his posterity as “one thing.” Edwards’s religious
epistemology is developed in A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections 1746
and On the Nature of True Virtue 1765. The conversion experience involves the
acquisition of a “new sense of the heart.” Its core is the mind’s apprehension
of a “new simple idea,” the idea of “true beauty.” This idea is needed to
properly understand theological truths. True Virtue also provides the fullest
account of Edwards’s ethics a moral
sense theory that identifies virtue with benevolence. Although indebted to
contemporaries like Hutcheson, Edwards criticizes their attempts to construct
ethics on secular foundations. True benevolence embraces being in general.
Since God is, in effect, being in general, its essence is the love of God. A
love restricted to family, nation, humanity, or other “private systems” is a
form of self-love. Refs.: The source is Grice’s seminar in the first set on
‘Logic and conversation.’ The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
conversational
category:
used jocularly by Grice. But can it be used non-jocularly? How can the concept
of ‘category,’ literally, apply to what Grice says it applies, so that we have,
assuming Kant is using ‘quantity,’ ‘quality,’ ‘relation’ and ‘mode,’ as
SUPRA-categories (functions, strictly) for his twelve categories? Let’s revise,
the quantity applies to the quantification (in Frege’s terms) or what Boethius
applied to Aristotle’s posotes – and there are three categories involved, but
the three deal with the ‘quantum: ‘every,’ ‘some,’ and ‘one.’ ‘some’ Russell would
call an indefinite. Strictly, if Grice wants to have a category of
conversational quantity – it should relate to the ‘form’ of the ‘conversational
move.’ “Every nice girl loves a sailor” would be the one with most ‘quantity.’
Grice sees a problem there, and would have that rather translated as ‘The
altogether nice girl loves the one-at-a-time sailor.’ But that would be the
most conversational move displaying ‘most quantity.’ (It can be argued it
isn’t). When it comes to the category of conversational quality, the three
categories by Kant under the ‘function’ of qualitas involves the well known
trio, the affirmative, the negative, and the infinite. In terms of the
‘quality’ of a conversational move, it may be argued that a move in negative
form (as in Grice, “I’m not hearing any noise,” “That pillar box is not blue”
seem to provide ‘less’ quality than the affirmative counterparts. But as in
quantity, it is not sure Kant has some ordering in mind. It seems he does. It
seems he ascribes more value to the first category in each of the four
functions. When it comes to the category of conversational relation, the
connection with Kant could be done. Since this involves the categoric, the
hypothetic, and the disjunctive. So here we may think that a conversational move
will be either a categoric response – A: Mrs Smith is a wind bag. B: The
weather has been delightful. Or a hypothetical. A: Mrs Smith is a wind bag. B:
If that’s what you think. Or a dijunctive: Mrs. Smith is a wind bag. B: Or she
is not. When it comes, lastly, to the category of conversational mode, we have
just three strict categories under this ‘function’ in Kant, which relate to the
strength of the copula: ‘must be,’ must not be’ and ‘may.’ A conversational
move that states a necessity would be the expected move. “You must do it.”
Impossibility involves negation, so it is more problematic. And ‘may be’ is an
open conversational move. So there IS a way to justify the use of
‘conversational category’ to apply to the four functions that Kant decides the Aristotelian
categories may subsumed into. He knows that Kant has TWELVE categories, but he
keeps lecturing the Harvardites about Kant having FOUR categories. On top, he
finds ‘modus’ boring, and, turned a manierist, changes the idiom. This is what
Austin called a ‘philosophical hack’ searching for some para-philosophy! One
has to be careful here. Grice does speak of this or that ‘conversational
category.’ Seeing that he is ‘echoing,’ as he puts it, Ariskant, we migt just
as well have an entry for each of the four. These would be the category of
conversational quantity, the category of conversational quality, the category
of conversational relation, and the category of conversational modality. Note
that in this rephrasing Grice applies ‘conversational’ directly to the
category. As Boethius pointed out (and Grice loved to read Minio-Paullelo’s
edition of Boethus’s commentary on the Categories), the motivation by Aristotle
to posit this or that category was expository. A mind cannot know a multitude
of things, so we have to ‘reduce’ things. It is important to note that while
‘quantitas,’ ‘qualitas’ ‘relatio’ and ‘modus’ are used by Kant, he actually
augments the number of categories. These four would be supra-categories. The
sub-categories, or categories themselves turn out to be twelve. Kant proposed
12 categories: unity, plurality, and totality for concept of quantity; reality,
negation, and limitation, for the concept of quality; inherence and
subsistence, cause and effect, and community for the concept of relation; and
possibility-impossibility, existence-nonexistence, and necessity and
contingency. Kategorien sind nach Kant apriorisch und unmittelbar gegeben.
Sie sind Werkzeuge des Urteilens und Werkzeuge des Denkens. Als solche dienen
sie nur der Anwendung und haben keine Existenz. Sie bestehen somit nur im
menschlichen Verstand. Sie sind nicht an Erfahrung gebunden.[5] Durch ihre
Unmittelbarkeit sind sie auch nicht an Zeichen gebunden.[6] Kants
erkenntnistheoretisches Ziel ist es, über die Bedingungen der Geltungskraft von
Urteilen Auskunft zu geben. Ohne diese Auskunft können zwar vielerlei Urteile
gefällt werden, sie müssen dann allerdings als „systematische Doktrin(en)“
bezeichnet werden.[7] Kant
kritisiert damit das rein analytische Denken der Wissenschaft als falsch und
stellt ihm die Notwendigkeit des synthetisierenden Denkens gegenüber.[8] Kant begründet
die Geltungskraft mit dem Transzendentalen Subjekt.[9] Das
Transzendentalsubjekt ist dabei ein reiner Reflexionsbegriff, welcher das
synthetisierende Dritte darstellt (wie in späteren Philosophien Geist (Hegel),
Wille, Macht, Sprache und Wert (Marx)), das nicht durch die Sinne wahrnehmbar
ist. Kant sucht hier die Antwort auf die Frage, wie der Mensch als
vernunftbegabtes Wesen konstituiert werden kann, nicht in der Analyse, sondern
in einer Synthesis.[10]Bei Immanuel Kant, der somit als
bedeutender Erneuerer der bis dahin „vorkritischen“ Kategorienlehre gilt,
finden sich zwölf „Kategorien der reinen Vernunft“. Für Kant sind diese
Kategorien Verstandesbegriffe,
nicht aber Ausdruck des tatsächlichen Seins der Dinge an sich.
Damit wandelt sich die ontologische Sichtweise
der Tradition in eine erkenntnistheoretische Betrachtung,
weshalb Kants „kritische“ Philosophie (seit der Kritik der
reinen Vernunft) oft auch als „Kopernikanische
Wende in der Philosophie“ bezeichnet wird.Quantität, Qualität, Relation und Modalität sind
die vier grundlegenden Urteilsfunktionen des Verstandes, nach denen die
Kategorien gebildet werden. Demnach sind z. B. der Urteilsfunktion „Quantität“
die Kategorien bzw. Urteile „Einheit“, „Vielheit“ und „Allheit“ untergeordnet,
und der Urteilsfunktion „Relation“ die Urteile der „Ursache“ und der „Wirkung“.Siehe auch: Kritik der
reinen Vernunft und Transzendentale
AnalytikBereits bei Friedrich
Adolf Trendelenburg findet man den Hinweis auf
die verbreitete Kritik, dass Kant die den Kategorien zugrunde liegenden
Urteilsformen nicht systematisch hergeleitet und damit als notwendig begründet
hat. Einer der Kritikpunkte ist dabei, dass die Kategorien sich teilweise auf
Anschauungen (Einzelheit, Realität, Dasein), teilweise auf Abstraktionen wie
Zusammenfassen, Begrenzen oder Begründen (Vielheit, Allheit, Negation,
Limitation, Möglichkeit, Notwendigkeit) beziehen.
conversational
compact:
conversational pact in Grice’s conversational quasi-contractualism, contractarianism,
a family of moral and political theories that make use of the idea of a social
contract. Traditionally English philosophers such as Hobbes and Locke used the
social contract idea to justify certain conceptions of the state. In the
twentieth century philosophers such as G. R. Grice, H. P. Grice, and John Rawls
have used the social contract notion (‘quasi-contractualism’ in Grice’s sense) to
define and defend moral conceptions both conceptions of political justice and
individual morality, often but not always doing so in addition to developing
social contract theories of the state. The term ‘contractarian’ most often
applies to this second type of theory. There are two kinds of moral argument
that the contract image has spawned, the first rooted in Hobbes and the second
rooted in Kant. Hobbesians start by insisting that what is valuable is what a
person desires or prefers, not what he ought to desire or prefer for no such
prescriptively powerful object exists; and rational action is action that
achieves or maximizes the satisfaction of desires or preferences. They go on to
insist that moral action is rational for a person to perform if and only if
such action advances the satisfaction of his desires or preferences. And they
argue that because moral action leads to peaceful and harmonious living
conducive to the satisfaction of almost everyone’s desires or preferences,
moral actions are rational for almost everyone and thus “mutually agreeable.”
But Hobbesians believe that, to ensure that no cooperative person becomes the
prey of immoral aggressors, moral actions must be the conventional norms in a
community, so that each person can expect that if she behaves cooperatively,
others will do so too. These conventions constitute the institution of morality
in a society. So the Hobbesian moral theory is committed to the idea that
morality is a human-made institution, which is justified only to the extent
that it effectively furthers human interests. Hobbesians explain the existence
of morality in society by appealing to the convention-creating activities of
human beings, while arguing that the justification of morality in any human
society depends upon how well its moral conventions serve individuals’ desires
or preferences. By considering “what we could agree to” if we reappraised and
redid the cooperative conventions in our society, we can determine the extent
to which our present conventions are “mutually agreeable” and so rational for
us to accept and act on. Thus, Hobbesians invoke both actual agreements or
rather, conventions and hypothetical agreements which involve considering what
conventions would be “mutually agreeable” at different points in their theory;
the former are what they believe our moral life consists in; the latter are
what they believe our moral life should consist in i.e., what our actual moral life should
model. So the notion of the contract does not do justificational work by itself
in the Hobbesian moral theory: this term is used only metaphorically. What we
“could agree to” has moral force for the Hobbesians not because make-believe
promises in hypothetical worlds have any binding force but because this sort of
agreement is a device that merely reveals how the agreed-upon outcome is
rational for all of us. In particular, thinking about “what we could all agree
to” allows us to construct a deduction of practical reason to determine what
policies are mutually advantageous. The second kind of contractarian theory is
derived from the moral theorizing of Kant. In his later writings Kant proposed
that the “idea” of the “Original Contract” could be used to determine what
policies for a society would be just. When Kant asks “What could people agree
to?,” he is not trying to justify actions or policies by invoking, in any
literal sense, the consent of the people. Only the consent of real people can
be legitimating, and Kant talks about hypothetical agreements made by hypothetical
people. But he does believe these make-believe agreements have moral force for
us because the process by which these people reach agreement is morally
revealing. Kant’s contracting process has been further developed by subsequent
philosophers, such as Rawls, who concentrates on defining the hypothetical
people who are supposed to make this agreement so that their reasoning will not
be tarnished by immorality, injustice, or prejudice, thus ensuring that the
outcome of their joint deliberations will be morally sound. Those
contractarians who disagree with Rawls define the contracting parties in
different ways, thereby getting different results. The Kantians’ social
contract is therefore a device used in their theorizing to reveal what is just
or what is moral. So like Hobbesians, their contract talk is really just a way
of reasoning that allows us to work out conceptual answers to moral problems.
But whereas the Hobbesians’ use of contract language expresses the fact that,
on their view, morality is a human invention which if it is well invented ought
to be mutually advantageous, the Kantians’ use of the contract language is
meant to show that moral principles and conceptions are provable theorems
derived from a morally revealing and authoritative reasoning process or “moral
proof procedure” that makes use of the social contract idea. Both kinds of
contractarian theory are individualistic, in the sense that they assume that
moral and political policies must be justified with respect to, and answer the
needs of, individuals. Accordingly, these theories have been criticized by
communitarian philosophers, who argue that moral and political policies can and
should be decided on the basis of what is best for a community. They are also
attacked by utilitarian theorists, whose criterion of morality is the
maximization of the utility of the community, and not the mutual satisfaction
of the needs or preferences of individuals. Contractarians respond that whereas
utilitarianism fails to take seriously the distinction between persons,
contractarian theories make moral and political policies answerable to the
legitimate interests and needs of individuals, which, contra the
communitarians, they take to be the starting point of moral theorizing.
conversational co-öperation: Grice is perfectly right that ‘helpfulness’ does not
‘equate’ cooperation. His earlier principle of conversational helpfulness
becomes the principle of conversational co-operation.Tthere is a distinction
between mutual help and cooperation. First, the Romans never knew. Their
‘servants’ were ‘help’ – and this remains in the British usage of ‘civil
servant,’ one who helps. Some philosophical tutees by Hare were often reminded,
in the midst of their presenting their essays, “Excuse me for interrupting, Smith,
but have you considered a career in the civil service?” Then some Romans found
Christianism fashionable, and they were set to translate the Bible. So when
this Hebrew concept appeared, they turned it into ad-judicatum, which was
translated by Wycliff as ‘help.’ Now ‘operatio’ is quite a different animal.
It’s the ‘opus’ of the Romans, who also had ‘labor.’ Surely to ‘co-laborate’ is
to ‘co-operate.’ There is an idea that ‘operate,’ can be more otiose, in the
view of Rogers Albritton. “He is operating the violin,” was his favourite
utterance. “Possibly his opus 5.” The fact that English needs a hyphen and an
umlaut does not make it very ‘ordinary’ in Austin’s description. Grice is more
interested in the conceptualization of this, notably as it relates to rationality.
Can cooperation NOT be rational? For most libertarians, cooperation IS
“irrational,” rather. But Grice points is subtler. He is concerned with an
emissor communicating that p. The least thing he deserves is a rational
recipient. “Otherwise I might just as well scream to the walls!” Used by Grice
WOW:368 – previously, ‘rational cooperation’ – what cooperation is not
rational? Grice says that if Smith promised Jones a job; Jones doesn’t get it.
Smith must be DEEMED to have given the job to Jones. It’s the intention, as
Kant shows, the pure motive, that matters. Ditto for communication. If
Blackburn draws a skull, he communicates that there is danger. If his addressee
fails to recognise the emissor’s intention the emissor will still be deemed to
have communicated that there is danger. So communication does NOT require
co-operation. His analysis of “emissor communicates that p” is not one of
“emissor successfully communicates that p,” because “communicates” reduces to
“intends” not to ‘fulfilled intention.’ Cooperation enters when we go beyond
ONE act of communication. To communicate is to give information and to
influence another, and it is also to receive information and to be influenced
by another. When these communicative objectives are made explicit, helpfulness
or cooperation becomes essential. He uses ‘converational cooperation” and
“supreme principle of conversational cooperation” (369). He uses ‘supreme
conversational principle” of “cooperativeness” (369), to avoid seeing the
conversational imperatives as an unorganized heap of conversational
obligations. Another variant is Grice’s use of “principle of conversational
co-operation.” He also uses “principle of conversational rational
co-operation.” Note that irrational or non-rational co-operation is not an
oxymoron. Another expression is conversational cooperative rationality. So
Grice was amused that you can just as well refer to ‘cooperative rationality”
or “rational cooperation,” “a category shift if ever there was one.”
conversational explicitum: To be explicit is bad manners at Oxford if not in Paris or
MIT. The thing is to imply! Englishmen are best at implying – their love for
understatement is unequalled in the world. Grice needs the explicatio, or
explicit. Because the mistake the philosopher makes is at the level of the
implicatio, as Nowell-Smith, and C. K. Grant had noted. It is not OBVIOUSLY at
the explicit level. Grice was never interested in the explicit level, and takes
a very cavalier attitude to it. “This brief indication of my use of say leaves
it open whether a man who says (today) Harold Wilson is a great man and another
who says (also today) The British Prime Minister is a great man would, if each
knew that the two singular terms had the same reference, have said the same thing.
But whatever decision is made about this question, the apparatus that I am
about to provide will be capable of accounting for any implicaturums that might
depend on the presence of one rather than another of these singular terms in
the sentence uttered. Such implicaturums would merely be related to different
maxims.”Rephrase: “A brief indication of my use of ‘the explicit’ leaves it
open whether a man who states (today), ‘Harold Wilson is a great man’ thereby
stating that Wilson is a great man, and another who states (also today),‘The
British Prime Minister is a great man,’ viz. that the Prime Minister is a great
mand, would, if each singular term, ‘the Prime Minister’ and ‘Wilson’ has the
same denotatum (co-relata) have put forward in an explicit fashion the same
propositional complex, and have stated the same thing. On the face of it, it
would seem they have not. But cf. ‘Wilson will be the prime minister’ versus
‘Wilson shall be the prime minister.’ Again, a subtler question arises as to
whether the first emissor who has stated that Wilson will be the next prime
minster and the other one who has stated that Wilson *shall* be the next prime
minster, have both but forward the same proposition. If the futurm indicatum is
ENTAILED by the futurum intentionale, the question is easy to settle. Whatever
methodological decision or stipulation I end up making about the ‘explicitum,’ the
apparatus that I rely on is capable of accounting for any implicaturum that might
depend on the presence of this or that singular term in the utterance. Such an implicaturum
would merely be related to a different conversational maxims. Urmson has
elaborated on this, “Mrs. Smith’s husband just passed by.” “You mean the
postman! Why did you use such contrived ‘signular term’?” If the emissor draws
a skull what he explicitly conveys is that this is a skull. This is the
EPLICITUM. If he communicates that there is danger, that’s via some further
reasoning. That associates a skull with death. Grice’s example is Grice
displaying his bandaged leg. Strictly, he communicates that he has a bandaged
leg. Second, that his leg is bandaged (the bandage may be fake). And third,
that he cannot play cricket. It all started in Oxford when they started to use
‘imply’ in a sense other than the ‘logical’ one. This got Grice immersed in a
deep exploration of types of ‘implication.’ There is the implicaturum, and the
implicitum, both from ‘implico.’ As correlative there is the explicatio, which
yields both the explicatum and the explicitum. Grice has under the desideratum
of conversational clarity that a conversationalist is assumed to make the point
of his conversational contribution ‘explicit.’ So in his polemic with G. A.
Paul, Grice knows that the ‘doubt-or-denial’ condition will be at the level NOT
of the explicitum or explicatum. Surely an implicaturum can be CANCELLED
explicitly. Grice uses ‘contextual’ or ‘explicit,’ here but grants that the
‘contextual’ may be subsumed under the ‘explicit.’ It is when the sub-perceptual utterance is
copulated with the formulation of the explicatum of the implicaturum that Grice
shows G. A. Paul that the statement is still ‘true,’ and which Grice sees as a
reivindication of the causal theory of perception. In the twenty or so examples
of philosophical mistakes, both in “Causal” and “Prolegomena,” all the mistakes
can be rendered back to the ‘explicatum’ versus ‘implicaturum’ distinction.
Unfortunately, each requires a philosophical background to draw all the
‘implications,’ and Grice has been read by people without a philosophical
background who go on to criticise him for ignoring things where he never had
focused his attention on. His priority is to deal with these philosophical
mistakes. He also expects the philosopher to come up with a general
methodological statement. Grice distinguishes between the conversational
explicitum and the conversational explicatum. Grice plays with ‘explicit’ and
‘implicit’ at various places. He often uses ‘explicit’and ‘implicit’
adverbially: the utterer explicitly conveys that p versus the utterer
implicitly conveys that p (hints that p, suggests that p, indicates that p,
implicates that p, implies that p). Grice regards that both dimensions form
part of the total act of signification, accepting as a neutral variant, that
the utterer has signified that p.
conversational game: In a conversational game, you don’t say “The pillar box
seems red” if you know it IS red. So, philosophers at Oxford (like Austin,
Strawson, Hare, Hampshire, and Hart) are all victims of ignoring the rules of
the game, and just not understanding that a game is being played. the expression is used by Grice
systematically. He speaks of players making the conversational move in the
conversational game following the conversational rule, v. rational choice
conversational
haggle
-- bargaining theory, the branch of game theory that treats agreements, e.g.,
wage agreements between labor and management. In the simplest bargaining
problems there are two bargainers. They can jointly realize various outcomes,
including the outcome that occurs if they fail to reach an agreement, i.e. if
they fail to help each other or co-operate. Each bargainer assigns a certain
amount of utility to each outcome. The question is, what outcome will they
realise if each conversationalist is rational? Methods of solving bargaining
problems are controversial. The best-known proposals are Grice’s and Nash’s and
Kalai and Smorodinsky’s. Grice proposes that if you want to get a true answer
to your question, you should give a true answer to you co-conversationalist’s
question (“ceteris paribus”). Nash proposes maximizing the product of utility
gains with respect to the disagreement point. Kalai and Smorodinsky propose
maximsiing utility gains with respect to the disagreement point, subject to the
constraint that the ratio of utility gains equals the ratio of greatest
possible gains. These three methods of selecting an outcome have been
axiomatically characterized. For each method, there are certain axioms of
outcome selection such that that method alone satisfies the axioms. The axioms
incorporate principles of rationality from cooperative game theory. They focus
on features of outcomes rather than bargaining strategies. For example, one
axiom requires that the outcome selected be Pareto-optimal, i.e., be an outcome
such that no alternative is better for one of the bargainers and not worse for
the other. A bargaining problem may become more complicated in several ways.
First, there may be more than two bargainers (“Suppose Austin joins in.”). If
unanimity is not required for beneficial agreements, splinter groups or co-alitions
may form. Second, the protocol for offers, counte-roffers (“Where does C live?”
“Why do you want to know?”) etc., may be relevant. Then principles of *non-cooperative*
but competitive game theory concerning war strategies (“l’art de la guerre”) are
needed to justify this or that solution. Third, the context of a bargaining
problem may be relevant. For instance, opportunities for side payments,
differences in bargaining power, and interpersonal comparisons of utility may
influence the solution. Fourth, simplifying assumptions, such as the assumption
that bargainers have complete information about their bargaining situation, may
be discarded. Bargaining theory is part of the philosophical study of
rationality. It is also important in ethics as a foundation for contractarian
theories of morality and for certain theories of distributive justice.
conversational helpfulness. It’s not clear if ‘helpfulness’ has a Graeco-Roman
counterpart! The Grecians and the Romans could be VERY individualistic! – adiuvare,
(adiuare, old for adiūverare), iūtus, āre,” which Lewis and Short render as “to
help, assist, aid, support, further, sustain. “fortīs fortuna adiuvat, T.:
maerorem orationis meae lacrimis suis: suā sponte eos, N.: pennis adiutus
amoris, O.: in his causis: alqm ad percipiendam virtutem: si quid te adiuero,
poet ap. C.: ut alqd consequamur, adiuvisti: multum eorum opinionem adiuvabat,
quod, etc., Cs.—With ellips. of obj, to be of assistance, help: ad verum
probandum: non multum, Cs.: quam ad rem humilitas adiuvat, is convenient,
Cs.—Supin. acc.: Nectanebin adiutum profectus, N.—P. pass.: adiutus a
Demosthene, N.—Fig.: clamore militem, cheer, L.: adiuvat hoc quoque, this too
is useful, H.: curā adiuvat illam (formam), sets off his beauty, O. Grice is right that ‘cooperation’ does NOT equate
‘helpfulness’ and he appropriately changes
his earlier principle of conversational helpfulness to a principle of
conversational co-operation. Was there a Graeco-Roman equivalent for
Anglo-Saxon ‘help’? helpmeet (n.) a ghost word from the 1611 translation of the
Bible, where it originally was a two-word noun-adjective phrase translating
Latin adjutorium simile sibi [Genesis ii.18] as "an help meet for
him," and meaning literally "a helper like himself." See help
(n.) + meet (adj.). By 1670s it was hyphenated help-meet and mistaken as a
modified noun. Compare helpmate. The original Hebrew is 'ezer keneghdo. Related
entries & more aid (v.) "to
assist, help," c. 1400, from Old French aidier "help, assist"
(Modern French aider), from Latin adiutare, frequentative of adiuvare (past
participle adiutus) "to give help to," from ad "to" (see
ad-) + iuvare "to help, assist, give strength, support, sustain,"
which is from a PIE source perhaps related to the root of iuvenis "young
person" (see young (adj.)). Related: Aided; aiding. Related entries &
more succor (n.) c. 1200, socour,
earlier socours "aid, help," from Anglo-French succors "help,
aid," Old French socors, sucurres "aid, help, assistance"
(Modern French secours), from Medieval Latin succursus "help,
assistance," from past participle of Latin succurrere "run to help,
hasten to the aid of," from assimilated form of sub "up to" (see
sub-) + currere "to run" (from PIE root *kers- "to run").
Final -s mistaken in English as a plural inflection and dropped late 13c.
Meaning "one who aids or helps" is from c. 1300. There is a fashion
in which to help is to cooperate, but co-operate, strictly, requires operation
by A and operation by B. We do use cooperate loosely. “She is very
cooperative.” “Help” seems less formal. One can help without ever engaging or
honouring the other’s goal. I can help you buy a house, say. So the principle
of conversational cooperation is stricter and narrower than the principle of
conversational helpfulness. Cooperation involves reciprocity and mutuality in a
way that helpfulness does not. That’s why Grice needs to emphasise that there
is an expectation of MUTUAL helpfulness. One is expected to be helpful, and one
expects the other to be helpful. Grice was doubtful about the implicaturum of
‘co-operative,’ – after all, who at Oxford wants a ‘co-operative.’ It sounds
anti-Oxonian. So Grice elaborates on ‘helping others’ and ‘assuming others will
help you’ in the event that we ‘are doing something together.’ Does this equate
cooperation, he wonders. Just in case, he uses ‘helpfulness’ as a variant.
There are other concepts he plays with, notably ‘altruism,’ and ‘benevolence,’
or other-love.’Helpfulness is Grice’s favourite virtue. Grice is clear that
reciprocity is essential here. One exhibits helpfulness and expects helpfulness
from his conversational partner. He dedicates a set of seven lectures to it,
entitled as follows. Lecture 1, Prolegomena; Lecture 2: Logic and Conversation;
Lecture 3: Further notes on logic and conversation; Lecture 4: Indicative
conditionals; Lecture 5: Us meaning and intentions; Lecture 6: Us meaning,
sentence-meaning, and word-meaning; and Lecture 7: Some models for implicaturum.
I hope they dont expect me to lecture on James! Grice admired James, but
not vice versa. Grice entitled the set as being Logic and Conversation.
That is the title, also, of the second lecture. Grice keeps those titles seeing
that it was way the whole set of lectures were frequently cited, and that the
second lecture had been published under that title in Davidson and
Harman, The Logic of Grammar. The content of each lecture is
indicated below. In the first, Grice manages to quote from
Witters. In the last, he didnt! The original set consisted of
seven lectures. To wit: Prolegomena, Logic and conversation, Further notes on
logic and conversation, Indicative Conditionals, Us meaning and intentions, Us
meaning, sentence-meaning, and word meaning, and Some models for implicaturum.
They were pretty successful at Oxford. While the notion of an implicaturum had
been introduced by Grice at Oxford, even in connection with a principle of
conversational helpfulness, he takes the occasion now to explore the type of
rationality involved. Observation of the principle of conversational
helpfulness is rational (reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who
cares about the two central goals to conversation (give/receive information,
influence/be influened) is expected to have an interest in participating in a
conversation that is only going to be profitable given that it is conducted
along the lines set by the principle of conversational helpfulness. In
Prolegomena he lists Austin, Strawson, Hare, Hart, and himself, as victims of a
disregard for the implicaturum. In the third lecture he introduces his razor,
Senses are not to be muliplied beyond necessity. In Indicative conditionals he
tackles Strawson on if as not representing the horse-shoe of Whitehead and Russell.
The next two lectures on the meaning by the utterer and intentions, and meaning
by the utterer, sentence-meaning, and word-meaning refine his earlier, more
austere, account of this particularly Peirceian phenomenon. He concludes the
lectures with an exploration on the relevance of the implicaturum to philosophical
psychology. Grice was well aware that many philosophers had become
enamoured with the s. and would love to give it a continuous perusal. The set
is indeed grandiose. It starts with a Prolegomena to set the scene: He notably
quotes himself in it, which helps, but also Strawson, which sort of justifies
the general title. In the second lecture, Logic and Conversation, he expands on
the principle of conversational helpfulness and the explicitum/implicaturum
distinction – all very rationalist! The third lecture is otiose in that he
makes fun of Ockham: Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. The
fourth lecture, on Indicative conditionals, is indeed on MOST of the formal
devices he had mentioned on Lecture II, notably the functors (rather than the quantifiers
and the iota operator, with which he deals in Presupposition and conversational
implicaturum, since, as he notes, they refer to reference). This lecture is the
centrepiece of the set. In the fifth lecture, he plays with mean, and discovers
that it is attached to the implicaturum or the implicitum. In the sixth
lecture, he becomes a nominalist, to use Bennetts phrase, as he deals with dog
and shaggy in terms of this or that resultant procedure. Dont ask me what they
are! Finally, in “Some models for implicaturum,” he attacks the charge of
circularity, and refers to nineteenth-century explorations on the idea of
thought without language alla Wundt. I dont think a set of James lectures had
even been so comprehensive! Conversational helpfulness. This is Grice at his
methodological best. He was aware that the type of philosophying he was about
to criticise wass a bit dated, but whats wrong with being old-fashioned? While
this may be seen as a development of his views on implicaturum at that seminal
Oxford seminar, it may also be seen as Grice popularising the views for a
New-World, non-Oxonian audience. A discussion of Oxonian philosophers of
the play group of Grice, notably Austin, Hare, Hart, and Strawson. He adds
himself for good measure (“Causal theory”). Philosophers, even at Oxford, have
to be careful with the attention that is due to general principles of
discourse. Grice quotes philosophers of an earlier generation, such as Ryle,
and some interpreters or practitioners of Oxonian analysis, such as Benjamin
and Searle. He even manages to quote from Witterss Philosophical
investigations, on seeing a banana as a banana. There are further items in the
Grice collection that address Austins manoeuvre, Austin on ifs and cans, Ifs
and cans, : conditional, power. Two of Grices favourites. He opposed
Strawsons view on if. Grice thought that if was the horseshoe of Whitehead and
Russell, provided we add an implicaturum to an entailment. The can is
merely dispositional, if not alla Ryle, alla Grice! Ifs and cans, intention,
disposition. Austin had brought the topic to the fore as an exploration of
free will. Pears had noted that conversational implicaturum may account for the
conditional perfection (if yields iff). Cf. Ayers on Austin on if and can.
Recall that for Grice the most idiomatic way to express a disposition is with
the Subjectsive mode, the if, and the can ‒ The ice can break. Cf. the mistake:
It is not the case that what you must do, you can do. The can-may distinction
is one Grice played with too. As with will and shall, the attachment of one
mode to one of the lexemes is pretty arbitrary and not etymologically justified
‒ pace Fowler on it being a privilege of this or that Southern Englishman as
Fowler is. If he calls it Prolegomena, he is being jocular. Philosophers Mistakes
would have been too provocative. Benjamin, or rather Broad, erred, and so did
Ryle, and Ludwig Witters, and my friends, Austin (the mater that wobbled), and
in order of seniority, Hart (I heard him defend this about carefully – stopping
at every door in case a dog comes out at breakneck speed), Hare (To say good is
to approve), and Strawson (“Logical theory”: To utter if p, q is to implicate
some inferrability, To say true! is to endorse – Analysis). If he ends with
Searle, he is being jocular. He quotes Searle from an essay in British
philosophy in Lecture I, and from an essay in Philosophy in America in Lecture
V. He loved Searle, and expands on the Texas oilmens club example! We may think
of Grice as a linguistic botanizer or a meta-linguistic botanizer: his hobby
was to collect philosophers mistakes, and he catalogued them. In Causal theory
he produces his first list of seven. The pillar box seems red to me. One cannot
see a dagger as a dagger. Moore didnt know that the objects before him were his
own hands. What is actual is not also possible. For someone to be called
responsible, his action should be condemnable. A cause must be given only of
something abnormal or unusual (cf. ætiology). If you know it, you dont believe
it. In the Prolegomena, the taxonomy is more complicated. Examples A (the use
of an expression, by Austin, Benjamin, Grice, Hart, Ryle, Wittgenstein),
Examples B (Strawson on and, or, and especially if), and Examples C (Strawson
on true and Hare on good – the performative theories). But even if his taxonomy
is more complicated, he makes it more SO by giving other examples as he goes on
to discuss how to assess the philosophical mistake. Cf. his elaboration on
trying, I saw Mrs. Smith cashing a cheque, Trying to cash a cheque, you mean.
Or cf. his remarks on remember, and There is an analogy here with a case by
Wittgenstein. In summary, he wants to say. Its the philosopher who makes his
big mistake. He has detected, as Grice has it, some conversational nuance. Now
he wants to exploit it. But before rushing ahead to exploit the conversational
nuance he has detected, or identified, or collected in his exercise of
linguistic botanising, the philosopher should let us know with clarity what
type of a nuance it is. For Grice wants to know that the nuance depends on a
general principle (of goal-directed behaviour in general, and most likely
rational) governing discourse – that participants in a conversation should be
aware of, and not on some minutiæ that has been identified by the philosopher
making the mistake, unsystematically, and merely descriptively, and
taxonomically, but without ONE drop of explanatory adequacy. The fact that he
directs this to his junior Strawson is the sad thing. The rest are all Grices
seniors! The point is of philosophical interest, rather than other. And he
keeps citing philosophers, Tarski or Ramsey, in the third James leture, to
elaborate the point about true in Prolegomena. He never seems interested in
anything but an item being of philosophical interest, even if that means HIS
and MINE! On top, he is being Oxonian: Only at Oxford my colleagues were so
obsessed, as it has never been seen anywhere else, about the nuances of
conversation. Only they were all making a big mistake in having no clue as to
what the underlying theory of conversation as rational co-operation would
simplify things for them – and how! If I introduce the explicatum as a
concession, I shall hope I will be pardoned! Is Grices intention epagogic, or
diagogic in Prolegomena? Is he trying to educate Strawson, or just delighting
in proving Strawson wrong? We think the former. The fact that he quotes himself
shows that Grice is concerned with something he still sees, and for the rest of
his life will see, as a valid philosophical problem. If philosophy generated no
problems it would be dead. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Whence I took helpfulness,’; the
main sources are the two sets on ‘logic and conversation.’ There are good
paraphrases in other essays when he summarises his own views, as he did at
Urbana. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
conversational imperative: Grice is loose in the use of ‘imperative.’ It obviously
has to do with the will in command mode! -- The problem with ‘command’ is that
for Habermas, it springs from ‘power,’ and we need to have it sprung from
‘auctoritas,’ rather – the voice of reason, that is – “Impero” gives also
pre-pare. “Imperare, prepare, etc. What was the Greek for ‘imperative mode’? προστακτική
prostaktike. προσ-τακτικός , ή, όν, A.of or for
commanding, imperative, imperious, τὸ π. [ἡ ψυχή], opp. τὸ ὑπηρετικόν (of the
body), Arist.Top.128b19; “π. τινῶν” Corn.ND16; “λόγος” Plu.2.1037f;
Προστακτικός (sc. λόγος), title of work by Protagoras, D.L.9.55; “βραχυλογία”
Plu.Phoc.5; also of persons, “ἄρχων” Max.Tyr.13.2 (Sup.). II. Gramm., ἡ -κὴ
ἔγκλισις the imperative mood, D.T.638.7, A.D.Synt.31.20; π. ἐκφορὰ τῶν ῥημάτων
ib.69.20; “τὸ π. σχῆμα” Anon.Fig.24; also “τὸ -κόν” D.L. 7.66,67, Ps.-Plu.Vit.Hom.53.
Adv. “-κῶς” in the imperative mood, D.H.4.18, Sch.Ar.Av.1163.Grice became
famous for his ‘maxims,’ which in Nowell-Smith’s view they are more like rules
of etiquette for sylish conversation. As such, many had been proposed. But
Grice proposes them AS A PHILOSOPHER would, and ONLY TO REBUFF the mistake made
by this or that philosopher who would rather EXPLAIN the phenomenon in terms
OTHER than involving as PART OF THE DATA, i. e. as a datum (as he says) or
assumption, that there are these ‘assumptions,’ which guide behaviour. Grice is
having in mind Kant’s “Imperativ.” He also uses ‘conversational objective.” In
most versions that Grice provides of the ‘general expectations’ of rational
discourse, he chooses the obvious imperative form. On occasion he does use
‘imperative.’ Grice is vague as to the term of choice for this or that
‘expectation.’ According to Strawson, Grice even once used ‘conversational
rule,’ and he does use ‘conversational rule of the conversational game of
making this or that conversational move.’ Notably, he also uses ‘conversational
principle,’ and ‘conversational desideratum.’ And ‘maxim’! And ‘conversational
directive (371), and ‘conversational obligation’ (369). By ‘conversational
maxim,’ he means ‘conversational maxim.’ He uses ‘conversational sub-maxim’
very occasionally. He rather uses ‘conversational super-maxim.’ He uses
‘immanuel,’ and he uses ‘conversational immanuel.’ It is worth noting that the
choice of word influences the exegesis. Loar takes these things to be ‘empirical
generalisations over functional states’! And Grice agrees that there is a dull,
empiricist way, in which these things can be seen as things people conform to.
There is a quasi-contractualist approach to: things people convene on. And
there is an Ariskantian approach: things people SHOULD abide by. Surely Grice
is not requiring that the conversationalists ARE explicitly or consciously
AWARE of these things. There is a principle of effort of economical reason to
cope with that!
conversational implicaturum. Grice plays with the ambiguity of ‘implication’ as a
logical term, and ‘implicitness’ as a rhetorical one. He wants to make a
distinction between ‘dicere,’ to convey explicitly that p, and to convey
implicitly, or ‘imply’ (always applied to the emissor) that q. A joke. Surely
if he is going to use ‘implicaturum’ in Roman, this would be ‘implicaturum
conversationale,’ if there were such thing. And there were! The Roman is formed
from cum- plus ‘verso.’ So there’s Roman ‘conversatio.’ And –alis, ale is a
productive suffix. Or implicitum. Grice
is being philosophical and sticking with ‘implicatio’ as used by logicians.
Implicitum does not have much of a philosophical pedigree. But even
‘implicatio’ was not THAT used, ‘consequentia’ was preferred, as in ‘non
sequitur, and seguitur, quod demonstrandumm erat. Strawson criticism of ‘the,’
only tentative by Grice, unlike ‘if,’ so forgivable! See common-ground status. Grice
loved an implicaturum. The use of ‘conversational’ by Grice is NEVER emphatic.
In his detailed, even fastidious, taxonomy of ‘implication,’ he decisively does
not want to have a mere conventional implicaturum (as in “She was poor but she
was honest”) as conversational. Not even a “Thank you”, generated by the maxim
“be polite.” That would be an implicaturum which is nonconventional and yet NOT
conversational, because ‘be polite’ is NOT a conversational maxim (moral,
aesthetic, and social maxims are not). And an implicaturum. An elaboration of
his Oxonian seminar on Logic and conversation. Theres a principle of
conversational helpfulness, which includes a desideratum of conversational
candour and a desideratum of conversational clarity, and the sub-principle of
conversational self-interest clashing with the sub-principle of conversational
benevolence. The whole point of the manoeuvre is to provide a rational basis
for a conversational implicaturum, as his term of art goes. Observation of the
principle of conversational helpfulness is rational/reasonable along the
following lines: anyone who is interested in the two goals conversation is
supposed to serve ‒ give/receive information, influence/be influenced ‒ should
only care to enter a conversation that will be only profitable under the
assumption that it is conducted in accordance with the principle of
conversational helfpulness, and attending desiderata and sub-principles. Grice
takes special care in listing tests for the proof that an implicaturum is
conversational in this rather technical usage: a conversational implicaturum is
rationally calculable (it is the content of a psychological state, attitude or
stance that the addressee assigns to the utterer on condition that he is being
helpful), non-detachable, indeterminate, and very cancellable, thus never part
of the sense and never an entailment of this or that piece of philosophical
vocabulary, in Davidson and Harman, the logic of Grammar, also in Cole and
Morgan, repr. in a revised form in Grice, logic and conversation, the second
James lecture, : principle of conversational helpfulness, implicaturum,
cancellability. While the essay was also repr. by Cole and Morgan. Grice
always cites it from the two-column reprint in The Logic of Grammar, ed. by
Davidson and Harman. Most people without a philosophical background first encounter
Grice through this essay. A philosopher usually gets first acquainted with his
In defence of a dogma, or Meaning. In Logic and Conversation, Grice
re-utilises the notion of an implicaturum and the principle of conversational helpfulness
that he introduced at Oxford to a more select audience. The idea Grice is that
the observation of the principle of conversational helfpulness is rational
(reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who is concerned with the
two goals which are central to conversation (to give/receive information,
to influence/be influenced) should be interested in participating in a
conversation that is only going to be profitable on the assumption that it
is conducted along the lines of the principle of conversational
helfpulness. Grices point is methodological. He is not at all interested
in conversational exchanges as such. Unfortunately, the essay starts in
media res, and skips Grices careful list of Oxonian examples of disregard
for the key idea of what a conversant implicates by the conversational
move he makes. His concession is that there is an explicatum or explicitum
(roughly, the logical form) which is beyond pragmatic constraints. This
concession is easily explained in terms of his overarching irreverent,
conservative, dissenting rationalism. This lecture alone had been read by
a few philosophers leaving them confused. I do not know what Davidson and
Harman were thinking when they reprinted just this in The logic of grammar. I
mean: it is obviously in media res. Grice starts with the logical devices, and
never again takes the topic up. Then he explores metaphor, irony, and
hyperbole, and surely the philosopher who bought The logic of grammar must be
left puzzled. He has to wait sometime to see the thing in full completion.
Oxonian philosophers would, out of etiquette, hardly quote from unpublished
material! Cohen had to rely on memory, and thats why he got all his Grice
wrong! And so did Strawson in If and the horseshoe. Even Walker responding to
Cohen is relying on memory. Few philosophers quote from The logic of grammar.
At Oxford, everybody knew what Grice was up to. Hare was talking implicaturum
in Mind, and Pears was talking conversational implicaturum in Ifs and cans. And
Platts was dedicating a full chapter to “Causal Theory”. It seems the Oxonian
etiquette was to quote from Causal Theory. It was obvious that Grices
implication excursus had to read implicaturum! In a few dictionaries of
philosophy, such as Hamlyns, under implication, a reference to Grices locus
classicus Causal theory is made – Passmore quotes from Causal theory in Hundred
years of philosophy. Very few Oxonians would care to buy a volume published in
Encino. Not many Oxonian philosophers ever quoted The logic of grammar, though.
At Oxford, Grices implicatura remained part of the unwritten doctrines of a
few. And philosophers would not cite a cajoled essay in the references. The implicaturum
allows a display of truth-functional Grice. For substitutional-quantificational
Grice we have to wait for his treatment of the. In Prolegomena, Grice had
quoted verbatim from Strawsons infamous idea that there is a sense of
inferrability with if. While the lecture covers much more than if (He only said
if; Oh, no, he said a great deal more than that! the title was never meant to
be original. Grice in fact provides a rational justification for the three
connectives (and, or, and if) and before that, the unary functor not.
Embedding, Indicative conditionals: embedding, not and If, Sinton on Grice on
denials of indicative conditionals, not, if. Strawson had elaborated on
what he felt was a divergence between Whiteheads and Russells horseshoe, and
if. Grice thought Strawsons observations could be understood in terms of
entailment + implicaturum (Robbing Peter to Pay Paul). But problems, as first
noted to Grice, by Cohen, of Oxford, remain, when it comes to the scope of the implicaturum
within the operation of, say, negation. Analogous problems arise with implicatura
for the other earlier dyadic functors, and and or, and Grice looks for a single
explanation of the phenomenon. The qualification indicative is modal.
Ordinary language allows for if utterances to be in modes other than the
imperative. Counter-factual, if you need to be philosophical krypto-technical,
Subjectsive is you are more of a classicist! Grice took a cavalier to the
problem: Surely it wont do to say You couldnt have done that, since you were in
Seattle, to someone who figuratively tells you hes spend the full summer
cleaning the Aegean stables. This, to philosophers, is the centerpiece of the
lectures. Grice takes good care of not, and, or, and concludes with the if of
the title. For each, he finds a métier, alla Cook Wilson in Statement and
Inference. And they all connect with rationality. So he is using material from
his Oxford seminars on the principle of conversational helpfulness. Plus Cook
Wilson makes more sense at Oxford than at Harvard! The last bit, citing Kripke
and Dummett, is meant as jocular. What is important is the teleological
approach to the operators, where a note should be made about dyadicity. In
Prolegomena, when he introduces the topic, he omits not (about which he was
almost obsessed!). He just gives an example for and (He went to bed and took
off his dirty boots), one for or (the garden becomes Oxford and the kitchen
becomes London, and the implicaturum is in terms, oddly, of ignorance: My wife
is either in town or country,making fun of Town and Country), and if. His
favourite illustration for if is Cock Robin: If the Sparrow did not kill him,
the Lark did! This is because Grice is serious about the erotetic, i.e.
question/answer, format Cook Wilson gives to things, but he manages to bring
Philonian and Megarian into the picture, just to impress! Most importantly, he
introduces the square brackets! Hell use them again in Presupposition and
Conversational Implicaturum and turns them into subscripts in Vacuous Namess.
This is central. For he wants to impoverish the idea of the implicaturum. The
explicitum is minimal, and any divergence is syntactic-cum-pragmatic import.
The scope devices are syntactic and eliminable, and as he knows: what the eye
no longer sees, the heart no longer grieves for! The modal implicaturum.
Since Grice uses indicative, for the title of his third James lecture
(Indicative Conditionals) surely he implicates subjunctive ‒ i.e.
that someone might be thinking that he should give an account of
indicative-cum-subjective. This relates to an example Grice gives in Causal
theory, that he does not reproduce in Prolegomena. Grice states the philosophical
mistake as follows. What is actual is not also possible. Grice seems to be
suggesting that a subjective conditional would involve one or other of the
modalities, he is not interested in exploring. On the other hand, Mackie has
noted that Grices conversationalist hypothesis (Mackie quotes verbatim from
Grices principle of conversational helpfulness) allows for an explanation of
the Subjectsive if that does not involve Kripke-type paradoxes involving
possible worlds, or other. In Causal Theory, Grice notes that the issue with
which he has been mainly concerned may be thought rather a fine point, but it
is certainly not an isolated one. There are several philosophical theses or
dicta which would he thinks need to be examined in order to see whether or not they
are sufficiently parallel to the thesis which Grice has been discussing to be
amenable to treatment of the same general kind. An examples which occurs to me
is the following. What is actual is not also possible. I must emphasise that I
am not saying that this example is importantly similar to the thesis which I
have been criticizing, only that, for all I know, it may be. To put the matter
more generally, the position adopted by Grices objector seems to Grice to
involve a type of manoeuvre which is characteristic of more than one
contemporary mode of philosophizing. He is not condemning that kind of
manoeuvre. He is merely suggesting that to embark on it without due caution is
to risk collision with the facts. Before we rush ahead to exploit the linguistic
nuances which we have detected, we should make sure that we are reasonably
clear what sort of nuances they are. If was also of special interest to Grice
for many other reasons. He defends a dispositional account of intending that in
terms of ifs and cans. He considers akrasia conditionally. He explored the
hypothetical-categorical distinction in the buletic mode. He was concerned with
therefore as involved with the associated if of entailment. Refs.: “Implicaturum”
is introduced in Essay 2 in WoW – but there are scattered references elsewhere.
He often uses the plural ‘implicatura’ too, as in “Retrospective Epilogue,” The
H. P. Grice Papers, BANC. An implicaturum requires a complexum. Frege was the
topic of the explorations by Dummett. A tutee of Grices once brought
Dummetts Frege to a tutorial and told Grice that he intended to explore
this. Have you read it? No I havent, Grice answered. And after a pause, he
went on: And I hope I will not. Hardly promising, the tutee thought. Some
authors, including Grice, but alas, not Frege, have noted some similarities
between Grices notion of a conventional implicaturum and Freges schematic and
genial rambles on colouring. Aber Farbung, as Frege would state! Grice was more
interested in the idea of a Fregeian sense, but he felt that if he had to play
with Freges aber he should! One of Grices metaphysical construction-routines,
the Humeian projection, is aimed at the generation of concepts, in most cases
the rational reconstruction of an intuitive concept displayed in ordinary
discourse. We arrive at something like a Fregeian sense. Grice exclaimed,
with an intonation of Eureka, almost. And then he went back to
Frege. Grices German was good, so he could read Frege, in the vernacular.
For fun, he read Frege to his children (Grices, not Freges): In einem obliquen
Kontext, Frege says, Grice says, kann ja z. B. die Ersetzung eines „aber durch
ein „und, die in einem direkten Kontext keinen Unterschied des Wahrheitswerts
ergibt, einen solchen Unterschied bewirken. Ill make that easy for you,
darlings: und is and, and aber is but. But surely, Papa, aber is not cognate
with but! Its not. That is Anglo-Saxon, for you. But is strictly Anglo-Saxon
short for by-out; we lost aber when we sailed the North Sea. Grice went on:
Damit wird eine Abgrenzung von Sinn und Färbung (oder Konnotationen) eines
Satzes fragwürdig. I. e. he is saying that She was poor but she was honest only
conventionally implicates that there is a contrast between her poverty and her
honesty. I guess he heard the ditty during the War? Grice ignored that remark,
and went on: Appell und Kundgabe wären ferner von Sinn und Färbung genauer zu
unterscheiden. Ich weiß so auf interessante Bedeutungs Komponenten hin,
bemüht sich aber nicht, sie genauer zu differenzieren, da er letztlich nur
betonen will, daß sie in der Sprache der Logik keine Rolle spielen. They play a
role in the lingo, that is! What do? Stuff like but. But surely they are not
rational conversational implicatura!? No, dear, just conventional tricks you
can ignore on a nice summer day! Grice however was never interested in what he
dismissively labels the conventional implicaturum. He identifies it because he
felt he must! Surely, the way some Oxonian philosophers learn to use stuff
like, on the one hand, and on the other, (or how Grice learned how to use men
and de in Grecian), or so, or therefore, or but versus and, is just to allow
that he would still use imply in such cases. But surely he wants conversational
to stick with rationality: conversational maxim and converational implicaturum
only apply to things which can be justified transcendentally, and not
idiosyncrasies of usage! Grice follows Church in noting that Russell misreads
Frege as being guilty of ignoring the use-mention distinction, when he doesnt.
One thing that Grice minimises is that Freges assertion sign is composite. Tha
is why Baker prefers to use the dot “.” as the doxastic correlative for the
buletic sign ! which is NOT composite. The sign „├‟ is composite. Frege
explains his Urteilstrich, the vertical component of his sign ├ as conveying
assertoric force. The principal role of the horizontal component as such is to
prevent the appearance of assertoric force belonging to a token of what does
not express a thought (e.g. the expression 22). ─p expresses a thought even if
p does not.) cf. Hares four sub-atomic particles: phrastic (dictum), neustic
(dictor), tropic, and clistic. Cf. Grice on the radix controversy: We do not
want the “.” in p to become a vanishing sign. Grices Frege, Frege, Words, and
Sentences, Frege, Farbung, aber. Frege was one of Grices obsessions. A Fregeian
sense is an explicatum, or implicitum, a concession to get his principle of
conversational helpfulness working in the generation of conversational implicatura,
that can only mean progress for philosophy! Fregeian senses are not to be
multiplied beyond necessity. The employment of the routine of Humeian
projection may be expected to deliver for us, as its result,
a concept – the concept(ion) of value, say, in something like a
Fregeian sense, rather than an object. There is also a strong affinity
between Freges treatment of colouring (of the German particle aber, say) and
Grices idea of a convetional implicaturum (She was poor, but she was
honest,/and her parents were the same,/till she met a city feller,/and she lost
her honest Names, as the vulgar Great War ditty went). Grice does not seem
interested in providing a philosophical exploration of conventional implicatura,
and there is a reason for this. Conventional implicatura are not
essentially connected, as conversational implicatura are, with rationality.
Conventional implicatura cannot be calculable. They have less of a
philosophical interest, too, in that they are not cancellable. Grice sees
cancellability as a way to prove some (contemporary to him, if dated)
ordinary-language philosophers who analyse an expression in terms of sense and
entailment, where a cancellable conversational implicaturum is all there is (to
it). He mentions Benjamin in Prolegomena, and is very careful in noting
how Benjamin misuses a Fregeian sense. In his Causal theory, Grice lists
another mistake: What is known to be the case is not believed to be the
case. Grice gives pretty few example of a conventional implicaturum:
therefore, as in the utterance by Jill: Jack is an Englishman; he is,
therefore, brave. This is interesting because therefore compares to so
which Strawson, in PGRICE, claims is the asserted counterpart to if. But
Strawson is never associated with the type of linguistic botany that Grice is.
Grice also mentions the idiom, on the one hand/on the other hand, in some
detail in “Epilogue”: My aunt was a nurse in the Great War; my sister, on the
other hand, lives on a peak at Darien. Grice thinks that Frege misuses the
use-mention distinction but Russell corrects that. Grice bases this on Church.
And of course he is obsessed with the assertion sign by Frege, which Grice
thinks has one stroke tooo many. The main reference is give above for
‘complexum.’ Those without a philosophical background tend to ignore a joke by
Grice. His echoing Kant in the James is a joke, in the sense that he is using
Katns well-known to be pretty artificial quartet of ontological caegories to
apply to a totally different phenomenon: the taxonomy of the maxims! In his
earlier non-jocular attempts, he applied more philosophical concepts with a
more serious rationale. His key concept, conversation as rational co-operation,
underlies all his attempts. A pretty worked-out model is in terms then of this
central, or overarching principle of conversational helpfulness (where
conversation as cooperation need not be qualified as conversation as rational
co-operation) and being structured by two contrasting sub-principles: the
principle of conversational benevolence (which almost overlaps with the
principle of conversational helpfulness) and the slightly more jocular
principle of conversational self-love. There is something oxymoronic about
self-love being conversational, and this is what leads to replace the two
subprinciples by a principle of conversational helfpulness (as used in WoW:IV)
simpliciter. His desideratum of conversational candour is key. The clash between
the desideratum of conversational candour and the desideratum of conversational
clarity (call them supermaxims) explains why I believe that p (less clear than
p) shows the primacy of candour over clarity. The idea remains of an
overarching principle and a set of more specific guidelines. Non-Oxonian
philosophers would see Grices appeal to this or that guideline as ad hoc, but
not his tutees! Grice finds inspiration in Joseph Butler’s sermon on benevolence
and self-love, in his sermon 9, upon the love of our neighbour, preached on
advent Sunday. And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly
comprehended in this saying, Namesly, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,
Romans xiii. 9. It is commonly observed, that there is a disposition in
men to complain of the viciousness and corruption of the age in which they
live, as greater than that of former ones: which is usually followed with this
further observation, that mankind has been in that respect much the same in all
times. Now, to determine whether this last be not contradicted by the accounts
of history: thus much can scarce be doubted, that vice and folly takes
different turns, and some particular kinds of it are more open and avowed in
some ages than in others; and, I suppose, it may be spoken of as very much the
distinction of the present, to profess a contracted spirit, and greater regards
to self-interest, than appears to have been done formerly. Upon this account it
seems worth while to inquire, whether private interest is likely to be promoted
in proportion to the degree in which self-love engrosses us, and prevails over
all other principles; "or whether the contracted affection may not
possibly be so prevalent as to disappoint itself, and even contradict its own
end, private good?" Repr. in revised form as WOW, I. Grice felt
the need to go back to his explantion (cf. Fisher, Never contradict. Never
explain) of the nuances about seem and cause (“Causal theory”.). Grice uses ‘My
wife is in the kitchen or the bedroom,’ by Smith, as relying on a requirement
of discourse. But there must be more to it. Variations on a theme by Grice.
Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by
the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are
engaged. Variations on a theme by Grice. I wish to represent a
certain subclass of non-conventional implicaturcs, which I shall
call conversational implicaturcs, as being essentially connected with
certain general features of discourse; so my next step is to try to say what
these features are. The following may provide a first approximation to a
general principle. Our talk exchanges do not normally consist of a succession
of disconnected remarks, and would not be rational if they did. They are
characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each
participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of
purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction. This purpose or direction
may be fixed from the start (e.g., by an initial proposal of a question for
discussion), or it may evolve during the exchange; it may be fairly definite,
or it may be so indefinite as to leave very considerable latitude to the
participants, as in a casual conversation. But at each stage, some possible
conversational moves would be excluded as conversationally unsuitable. We might
then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be expected
ceteris paribus to observe, viz.: Make your conversational contribution such as
is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or
direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this
the co-operative principle. We might then formulate a rough general principle
which participants will be expected ceteris paribus to
observe, viz.: Make your contribution such as is required, at the
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk
exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this the Cooperative
Principle. Strictly, the principle itself is not co-operative: conversants
are. Less literary variant: Make your move such as is required by the
accepted goal of the conversation in which you are engaged. But why logic and
conversation? Logica had been part of the trivium for ages ‒ Although they
called it dialectica, then. Grice on the seven liberal arts. Moved by
Strawsons treatment of the formal devices in “Introduction to logical theory”
(henceforth, “Logical theory”), Grice targets these, in their
ordinary-discourse counterparts. Strawson indeed characterizes Grice as his
logic tutor – Strawson was following a PPE., and his approach to logic is
practical. His philosophy tutor was Mabbott. For Grice, with a M. A. Lit.
Hum. the situation is different. Grice knows that the Categoriae and De Int. of
his beloved Aristotle are part of the Logical Organon which had been so
influential in the history of philosophy. Grice attempts to reconcile
Strawsons observations with the idea that the formal devices reproduce some
sort of explicatum, or explicitum, as identified by Whitehead and Russell in
Principia Mathematica. In the proceedings, Grice has to rely on some general
features of discourse, or conversation as a rational co-operation. The
alleged divergence between the ordinary-language operators and their formal
counterparts is explained in terms of the conversational implicatura,
then. I.e. the content of the psychological attitude that the addressee A has
to ascribe to the utterer U to account for any divergence between the formal
device and its alleged ordinary-language counterpart, while still assuming that
U is engaged in a co-operative transaction. The utterer and his
addressee are seen as caring for the mutual goals of conversation ‒
the exchange of information and the institution of decisions ‒ and
judging that conversation will only be profitable (and thus reasonable and
rational) if conducted under some form of principle of conversational
helpfulness. The observation of a principle of conversational
helpfulness is reasonable (rational) along the following lines: anyone
who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication
(such as giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by
others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in
participating in a conversation that will be profitable ONLY on the assumption
that it is conducted in general accordance with a principle of conversational
helpfulness. In titling his seminar Logic and conversation, Grice is
thinking Strawson. After all, in the seminal “Logical theory,” that every
Oxonian student was reading, Strawson had the cheek to admit that he never
ceased to learn logic from his tutor, Grice. Yet he elaborates a totally anti
Griceian view of things. To be fair to Strawson, the only segment where he
acknwoledges Grices difference of opinion is a brief footnote, concerning the
strength or lack thereof, of this or that quantified utterance. Strawson uses
an adjective that Grice will seldom do, pragmatic. On top, Strawson attributes the
adjective to rule. For Grice, in Strawsons wording, there is this or that
pragmatic rule to the effect that one should make a stronger rather than a
weaker conversational move. Strawsons Introduction was published before Grice
aired his views for the Aristotelian Society. In this seminar then Grice takes
the opportunity to correct a few misunderstandings. Important in that it
is Grices occasion to introduce the principle of conversational helpfulness as
generating implicatura under the assumption of rationality. The lecture makes
it obvious that Grices interest is methodological, and not philological. He is
not interest in conversation per se, but only as the source for his principle
of conversational helpfulness and the notion of the conversational implicaturum,
which springs from the distinction between what an utterer implies and what his
expression does, a distinction apparently denied by Witters and all too
frequently ignored by Austin. Logic and conversation, an Oxford seminar, implicaturum,
principle of conversational helpfulness, eywords: conversational implicaturum,
conversational implicaturum. Conversational Implicaturum Grices main
invention, one which trades on the distinction between what an utterer implies
and what his expression does. A distinction apparently denied by Witters,
and all too frequently ignored by, of all people, Austin. Grice is
implicating that Austins sympathies were for the Subjectsification of
Linguistic Nature. Grice remains an obdurate individualist, and never loses
sight of the distinction that gives rise to the conversational implicaturum,
which can very well be hyper-contextualised, idiosyncratic, and perfectly
particularized. His gives an Oxonian example. I can very well mean that my
tutee is to bring me a philosophical essay next week by uttering It is
raining.Grice notes that since the object of the present exercise, is to
provide a bit of theory which will explain, for a certain family of
cases, why is it that a particular implicaturum is present, I
would suggest that the final test of the adequacy and utility of this
model should be: can it be used to construct an explanation of
the presence of such an implicaturum, and is it more comprehensive
and more economical than any rival? is the no
doubt pre-theoretical explanation which one would be prompted to give
of such an implicaturum consistent with, or better still a favourable pointer
towards the requirements involved in the model? cf. Sidonius: Far otherwise:
whoever disputes with you will find those protagonists of heresy, the Stoics,
Cynics, and Peripatetics, shattered with their own arms and their
own engines; for their heathen followers, if they resist the doctrine and
spirit of Christianity, will, under your teaching, be caught in their own
familiar entanglements, and fall headlong into their own toils; the barbed
syllogism of your arguments will hook the glib tongues of the
casuists, and it is you who will tie up their slippery
questions in categorical clews, after the manner of a clever
physician, who, when compelled by reasoned thought, prepares antidotes for
poison even from a serpent.qvin potivs experietvr qvisqve conflixerit stoicos
cynicos peripateticos hæresiarchas propriis armis propriis qvoqve concvti
machinamentis nam sectatores eorum Christiano dogmati ac sensvi si
repvgnaverint mox te magistro ligati vernaculis implicaturis in retia
sua præcipites implagabvntur syllogismis tuæ propositionis vncatis volvbilem
tergiversantvm lingvam inhamantibvs dum spiris categoricis lubricas qvæstiones
tv potivs innodas acrivm more medicorvm qui remedivm contra venena cum ratio
compellit et de serpente conficivnt. If he lectured on Logic and
Conversation on implicaturum, Grice must have thought that Strawsons area was
central. Yet, as he had done in Causal theory and as he will at Harvard, Grice
kept collecting philosophers mistakes. So its best to see Grice as a
methodologist, and as using logic and conversation as an illustration of his
favourite manoeuvre, indeed, central philosophical manoeuver that gave him a
place in the history of philosophy. Restricting this manoeuvre to just an area
minimises it. On the other hand, there has to be a balance: surely logic and
conversation is a topic of intrinsic interest, and we cannot expect all
philosophers – unless they are Griceians – to keep a broad unitarian view of
philosophy as a virtuous whole. Philosophy, like virtue, is entire.
Destructive implicaturum to it: Mr. Puddle is our man in æsthetics implicates
that he is not good at it. What is important to Grice is that the mistakes of
these philosophers (notably Strawson!) arise from some linguistic phenomena, or,
since we must use singular expressions this or that linguistic phenomenon. Or
as Grice puts it, it is this or that linguistic phenomenon which provides the
material for the philosopher to make his mistake! So, to solve it, his theory
of conversation as rational co-operation is posited – technically, as a way to
explain (never merely describe, which Grice found boring ‒ if English, cf.
never explain, never apologise ‒ Jacky Fisher: Never contradict. Never
explain.) these phenomena – his principle of conversational helpfulness and the
idea of a conversational implicaturum. The latter is based not so much on
rationality per se, but on the implicit-explicit distinction that he constantly
plays with, since his earlier semiotic-oriented explorations of Peirce. But
back to this or that linguistic phenomenon, while he would make fun of Searle
for providing this or that linguistic phenomenon that no philosopher would ever
feel excited about, Grice himself was a bit of a master in illustrating this a
philosophical point with this or that linguistic phenomenon that would not be
necessarily connected with philosophy. Grice rarely quotes authors, but surely
the section in “Causal theory,” where he lists seven philosophical theses
(which are ripe for an implicaturum treatment) would be familiar enough for
anybody to be able to drop a names to attach to each. At Harvard, almost every
example Grice gives of this or that linguistic phenomenon is UN-authored (and
sometimes he expands on his own view of them, just to amuse his audience – and
show how committed to this or that thesis he was), but some are not unauthored.
And they all belong to the linguistic turn: In his three groups of examples,
Grice quotes from Ryle (who thinks he knows about ordinary language), Witters,
Austin (he quotes him in great detail, from Pretending, Plea of excuses, and No
modification without aberration,), Strawson (in “Logical theory” and on Truth
for Analysis), Hart (as I have heard him expand on this), Grice, Searle, and
Benjamin. Grice implicates Hare on ‘good,’ etc. When we mention the
explicit/implicit distinction as source for the implicaturum, we are referring
to Grices own wording in Retrospective epilogue where he mentions an utterer as
conveying in some explicit fashion this or that, as opposed to a gentler, more
(midland or southern) English, way, via implicaturum, or implIciture, if you
mustnt. Cf. Fowler: As a southern Englishman, Ive stopped trying teaching a
northern Englishman the distinction between ought and shall. He seems to get it
always wrong. It may be worth exploring how this connects with rationality. His
point would be that that an assumption that the rational principle of
conversational helpfulness is in order allows P-1 not just to convey in a
direct explicit fashion that p, but in an implicit fashion that q, where q is
the implicaturum. The principle of conversational helpfulness as generator of
this or that implicatura, to use Grices word (generate). Surely, He took off
his boots and went to bed; I wont say in which order sounds hardly in the vein
of conversational helpfulness – but provided Grice does not see it as logically
incoherent, it is still a rational (if not reasonable) thing to say. The point
may be difficult to discern, but you never know. The utterer may be conveying,
Viva Boole. Grices point about rationality is mentioned in his later
Prolegomena, on at least two occasions. Rational behaviour is the phrase he
uses (as applied first to communication and then to discourse) and in stark
opposition with a convention-based approach he rightly associates with Austin.
Grice is here less interested here as he will be on rationality, but
coooperation as such. Helpfulness as a reasonable expecation (normative?), a
mutual one between decent chaps, as he puts it. His charming decent chap is so
Oxonian. His tutee would expect no less ‒ and indeed no more! A rather obscure
exploration on the connection of semiotics and philosophical psychology. Grice
is aware that there is an allegation in the air about a possible vicious circle
in trying to define category of expression in terms of a category of
representation. He does not provide a solution to the problem which hell take
up in his Method in philosophical psychology, in his role of President of the
APA. It is the implicaturum behind the lecture that matters, since Grice
will go back to it, notably in the Retrospective Epilogue. For Grice, its all
rational enough. Theres a P, in a situation, say of danger – a bull ‒. He
perceives the bull. The bulls attack causes this perception. Bull! the P1 G1
screams, and causes in P2 G2 a rearguard movement. So where is
the circularity? Some pedants would have it that Bull cannot be understood in a
belief about a bull which is about a bull. Not Grice. It is nice that he
brought back implicaturum, which had become obliterated in the lectures, back
to title position! But it is also noteworthy, that these are not explicitly
rationalist models for implicaturum. He had played with a model, and an
explanatory one at that, for implicaturum, in his Oxford seminar, in terms of a
principle of conversational helpfulness, a desideratum of conversational
clarity, a desideratum of conversational candour, and two sub-principles: a
principle of conversational benevolence, and a principle of conversational
self-interest! Surely Harvard could be spared of the details! Implicaturum.
Grice disliked a presupposition. BANC also contains a folder for Odd ends:
Urbana and non-Urbana. Grice continues with the elaboration of a formal
calculus. He originally baptised it System Q in honour of Quine. At a
later stage, Myro will re-Names it System G, in a special version, System GHP,
a highly powerful/hopefully plausible version of System G, in gratitude to
Grice. Odd Ends: Urbana and Not Urbana, Odds and ends: Urbana and not
Urbana, or not-Urbana, or Odds and ends: Urbana and non Urbana, or Oddents,
urbane and not urbane, semantics, Urbana lectures. The Urbana lectures are
on language and reality. Grice keeps revising them, as these items
show. Language and reality, The University of Illinois at Urbana, The
Urbana Lectures, Language and reference, language and reality, The Urbana
lectures, University of Illinois at Urbana, language, reference, reality. Grice
favours a transcendental approach to communication. A beliefs by a
communicator worth communicating has to be true. An order by a
communicator worth communicating has to be satisfactory. The fourth lecture is
the one Grice dates in WOW . Smith has not ceased from beating his wife,
presupposition and conversational implicaturum, in Radical pragmatics, ed. by
R. Cole, repr. in a revised form in Grice, WOW, II, Explorations in semantics
and metaphysics, essay, presupposition and implicaturum, presupposition,
conversational implicaturum, implicaturum, Strawson. Grice: The loyalty
examiner will not summon you, do not worry. The cancellation by Grice could be
pretty subtle. Well, the loyalty examiner will not be summoning you at any
rate. Grice goes back to the issue of negation and not. If, Grice notes, is is
a matter of dispute whether the government has a very undercover person who
interrogates those whose loyalty is suspect and who, if he existed, could be
legitimately referred to as the loyalty examiner; and if, further, I am known
to be very sceptical about the existence of such a person, I could perfectly
well say to a plainly loyal person, Well, the loyalty examiner will not be
summoning you at any rate, without, Grice would think, being taken to
imply that such a person exists. Further, if the utterer U is well known to disbelieve
in the existence of such a person, though others are inclined to believe in
him, when U finds a man who is apprised of Us position, but who is worried in
case he is summoned, U may try to reassure him by uttering, The loyalty
examiner will not summon you, do not worry. Then it would be clear that U
uttered this because U is sure there is no such person. The lecture was
variously reprinted, but the Urbana should remain the preferred citation. There
are divergences in the various drafts, though. The original source of this
exploration was a seminar. Grice is interested in re-conceptualising Strawsons
manoeuvre regarding presupposition as involving what Grice disregards as a
metaphysical concoction: the truth-value gap. In Grices view, based on a principle
of conversational tailoring that falls under his principle of conversational
helpfulness ‒ indeed under the desideratum of conversational clarity
(be perspicuous [sic]). The king of France is bald entails there is a king of
France; while The king of France aint bald merely implicates it. Grice
much preferred Collingwoods to Strawsons presuppositions! Grice thought, and
rightly, too, that if his notion of the conversational implicaturum was to gain
Oxonian currency, it should supersede Strawsons idea of the
præ-suppositum. Strawson, in his attack to Russell, had been playing with
Quines idea of a truth-value gap. Grice shows that neither the metaphysical
concoction of a truth-value gap nor the philosophical tool of the
præ-suppositum is needed. The king of France is bald entails that there is a
king of France. It is part of what U is logically committed to by what he
explicitly conveys. By uttering, The king of France is not bald on the other
hand, U merely implicitly conveys or implicates that there is a king of France.
A perfectly adequate, or impeccable, as Grice prefers, cancellation, abiding
with the principle of conversational helpfulness is in the offing. The king of
France ain’t bald. What made you think he is? For starters, he ain’t real!
Grice credits Sluga for having pointed out to him the way to deal with the
definite descriptor or definite article or the iota quantifier the formally.
One thing Russell discovered is that the variable denoting function is to be
deduced from the variable propositional function, and is not to be taken as an
indefinable. Russell tries to do without the iota i as an indefinable, but
fails. The success by Russell later, in On denoting, is the source of all his
subsequent progress. The iota quantifier consists of an inverted iota to be
read the individuum x, as in (℩x).F(x). Grice opts for the
Whiteheadian-Russellian standard rendition, in terms of the iota operator.
Grices take on Strawson is a strong one. The king of France is bald; entails
there is a king of France, and what the utterer explicitly conveys is
doxastically unsatisfactory. The king of France aint bald does not. By uttering
The king of France aint bald U only implicates that there is a king of France,
and what he explicitly conveys is doxastically satisfactory. Grice knew he was
not exactly robbing Peter to pay Paul, or did he? It is worth placing the
lecture in context. Soon after delivering in the New World his exploration on
the implicaturum, Grice has no better idea than to promote Strawsons philosophy
in the New World. Strawson will later reflect on the colder shores of the Old
World, so we know what Grice had in mind! Strawsons main claim to fame in the
New World (and at least Oxford in the Old World) was his On referring, where he
had had the cheek to say that by uttering, The king of France is not bald, the
utterer implies that there is a king of France (if not that, as Grice has it,
that what U explicitly conveys is doxastically satisfactory. Strawson later
changed that to the utterer presupposes that there is a king of France. So
Grice knows what and who he was dealing with. Grice and Strawson had
entertained Quine at Oxford, and Strawson was particularly keen on that turn of
phrase he learned from Quine, the truth-value gap. Grice, rather, found it
pretty repulsive: Tertium exclusum! So, Grice goes on to argue that by uttering
The king of France is bald, one entailment of what U explicitly conveys is
indeed There is a king of France. However, in its negative co-relate, things
change. By uttering The king of France aint bald, the utterer merely implicitly
conveys or implicates (in a pretty cancellable format) that there is a king of
France. The king of France aint bald: theres no king of France! The loyalty
examiner is like the King of France, in ways! The piece is crucial for Grices
re-introduction of the square-bracket device: [The king of France] is bald;
[The king of France] aint bald. Whatever falls within the scope of the square
brackets is to be read as having attained common-ground status and therefore,
out of the question, to use Collingwoods jargon! Grice was very familiar with
Collingwood on presupposition, meant as an attack on Ayer. Collingwoods
reflections on presuppositions being either relative or absolute may well lie
behind Grices metaphysical construction of absolute value! The earliest
exploration by Grice on this is his infamous, Smith has not ceased from beating
his wife, discussed by Ewing in Meaninglessness for Mind. Grice goes back to
the example in the excursus on implying that in Causal Theory, and it is best
to revisit this source. Note that in the reprint in WOW Grice does NOT go, one
example of presupposition, which eventually is a type of conversational implicaturum.
Grices antipathy to Strawsons presupposition is metaphysical: he dislikes the
idea of a satisfactory-value-gap, as he notes in the second paragraph to Logic
and conversation. And his antipathy crossed the buletic-doxastic divide! Using φ to represent a sentence in either mode,
he stipulate that ~φ is satisfactory just in case ⌈φ⌉ is unsatisfactory. A crunch,
as he puts it, becomes obvious: ~ ⊢The king of France is bald may perhaps be
treated as equivalent to ⊢~(The king of
France is bald). But what about ~!Arrest the intruder? What do we say in cases
like, perhaps, Let it be that I now put my hand on my head or Let it be that my
bicycle faces north, in which (at least on occasion) it seems to be that
neither !p nor !~p is either satisfactory or unsatisfactory? If !p is neither
satisfactory nor unsatisfactory (if that make sense, which doesnt to me), does
the philosopher assign a third buletically satisfactory value (0.5) to !p
(buletically neuter, or indifferent). Or does the philosopher say that we have
a buletically satisfactory value gap, as Strawson, following Quine, might
prefer? This may require careful consideration; but I cannot see that the
problem proves insoluble, any more than the analogous problem connected with
Strawsons doxastic presupposition is insoluble. The difficulty is not so much
to find a solution as to select the best solution from those which present
themselves. The main reference is Essay 2 in WoW, but there are scattered
references elsewhere. Refs.: The main sources are the two
sets of ‘logic and conversation,’ in BANC, but there are scattered essays on ‘implicaturum’
simpliciter, too -- “Presupposition and
conversational implicaturum,” c. 2-f. 25; and “Convesational implicaturum,” c.
4-f. 9, “Happiness, discipline, and implicaturums,” c. 7-f. 6; “Presupposition
and implicaturum,” c. 9-f. 3, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
conversational manual: -- Grice was fascinated by the etymology of ‘etiquette’ – from
Frankish *stikkan, cognate with Old English stician "to pierce," from
Proto-Germanic *stikken "to be stuck," stative form from PIE *steig-
"to stick; pointed" (It.
etichetta) -- of conversational rational etiquette -- conversational iimmanuel,
cnversational manual. Before playing with ‘immanuel,’ Grice does use ‘manual’
more technically. A know-how. “Surely, I can have a manual, but don’t know how
to play bridge.” “That’s not how I’m using ‘manual.’” It should be pointed out
that it’s the visual thing that influenced. When people (especially
non-philosophers) saw the list of maxims, they thought: “Washington!” “A
manual!”. In the Oxford seminrs, Grice was never so ‘additive.’ His desideratum
of conversational clarity, his desideratum of conversational candour, his
principle of conversational self-love and his principle of conversational
benevolence, plus his principle of conversational helpfulness, were meant as
‘philosophical’ leads to explain this or that philosophical mistake. The
seminars were given for philosophy tutees. And Grice is playing on the ‘manuals
of etiquette’ – conversational etiquette. If you do not BELONG to this targeted
audience, it is likely that you’ll misconstrue Grice’s point, and you will!
Especially R. T. L.!The Gentlemen's Book of Etiquette and Manual of Politeness
Being a Complete Guide for a Gentleman's Conduct in All His Relations Towards
Society by Cecil B. Hartley. Wit and vivacity are two highly important
ingredients in the conversation of a man in polite society, yet a straining for
effect, or forced wit, is in excessively bad taste. There is no one more
insupportable in society than the everlasting talkers who scatter puns,
witticisms, and jokes with so profuse a hand that they become as tiresome as a
comic newspaper, and whose loud laugh at their own wit drowns other voices which
might speak matter more interesting. The really witty man does not shower forth
his wit so indiscriminately; his charm consists in wielding his powerful weapon
delicately and easily, and making each highly polished witticism come in the
right place and moment to be effectual. While real wit is a most delightful
gift, and its use a most charming accomplishment, it is, like many other bright
weapons, dangerous to use too often. You may wound where you meant only to
amuse, and remarks which you mean only in for general applications, may be
construed into personal affronts, so, if you have the gift, use it wisely, and
not too freely. The most important requisite for a good conversational power is
education, and, by this is meant, not merely the matter you may store in your
memory from observation or books, though this is of vast importance, but it
also includes the developing of the mental powers, and, above all, the
comprehension. An English writer says, “A man should be able, in order to enter
into conversation, to catch rapidly the meaning of anything that is advanced;
for instance, though you know nothing of science, you should not be obliged to
stare and be silent, when a man who does understand it is explaining a new
discovery or a new theory; though you have not read a word of Blackstone, your
comprehensive powers should be sufficiently acute to enable you to take in the
statement that may be made of a recent cause; though you may not have read some
particular book, you should be capable of appreciating the criticism which you
hear of it. Without such power—simple enough, and easily attained by attention
and practice, yet too seldom met with in general society—a conversation which
departs from the most ordinary topics cannot be maintained without the risk of
lapsing into a lecture; with such power, society becomes instructive as well as
amusing, and you have no remorse at an evening’s end at having wasted three or
four hours in profitless banter, or simpering platitudes. This facility of
comprehension often startles us in some women, whose education we know to have
been poor, and whose reading is limited. If they did not rapidly receive your
ideas, they could not, therefore, be fit companions for intellectual men, and
it is, perhaps, their consciousness of a deficiency which leads them to pay the
more attention to what you say. It is this which makes married women so much
more agreeable to men of thought than young ladies, as a rule, can be, for they
are accustomed to the society of a husband, and the effort to be a companion to
his mind has engrafted the habit of attention and ready reply.” Refs.: H. P.
Grice, “Paget’s conversational manual.”
conversational maxim. The idea of a maxim implies freewill and freedom in
general. A beautiful thing about Grice’s conversational maxims is that surely
they do not ‘need to be necessarily’ independent, as Strawson and Wiggins emphatically
put it (p.520). The important thing is other. A conversational maxim is
UNIVERSALISABLE (v. universalierung) into a ‘manual,’ the “Immanuel,” strictly,
the “Conversational Immanuel.” Grice is making fun of those ‘conversational
manuals’ for the learning of some European language in the Grand Tour (as in
“Learn Swiss in five easy lessons”). Grice is echoing Kant. Maximen (subjektive
Grundsätze): selbstgesetzte Handlungsregeln, die ein Wollen ausdrücken, vs.
Imperative (objektive Grundsätze): durch praktische Vernunft bestimmt;
Ratschläge, moralisch relevante Grundsätze. („das Gesetz aber ist das objektive
Prinzip, gültig für jedes vernünftige Wesen, und der Grundsatz, nach dem es
handeln soll, d. i. ein Imperativ.“) das Problem ist jedoch die Subjektivität
der Maxime. When considering Grice’s concept of a ‘conversational maxim,’ one
has to be careful. First, he hesitated as to the choice of the label. He used
‘objective’ and ‘desideratum’ before. And while few cite this, in WoW:PandCI he
adds one – leading the number of maxims to ten, what he called the
‘conversational catalogue.’ So when exploring the maxims, it is not necessary
to see their dependence on the four functions that Kant tabulated: quantitas,
qualitas, relatio, and modus, or quantity, quality, relation, and mode (Grice
follows Meiklejohn’s translation), but in terms of their own formulation, one
by one. Grice
formulates the overarching principle: “We might then formulate a rough general
principle which participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe,
namely: Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage
at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange
in which you are engaged. One might label this the COOPEHATIVE PIUNCIPLE.”He
then goes on to introduce the concept of a ‘conversational maxim.’“On the
assumption that some such general principle as this is acceptable, one may
perhaps distinguish four categories under one or another of which will fall
certain more specific MAXIMS maxims and
submaxims, the following of which will, in general, yield results in accordance
with the Cooperative Principle.” Note that in his
comparative “more specific maxims,” he is implicating that, in terms of the
force, the principle is a MAXIM. Had he not wanted this implicaturum, he could
have expressed it as: “On the assumption that some such general principle as
this is acceptable, one may perhaps distinguish four categories under one or
another of which will fall certain MAXIMS.”
He is
comparing the principle with the maxims in terms of ‘specificity.’ I.e. the
principle is the ‘summun genus,’ as it were, the category is the ‘inferior
genus,’ and the maxim is the ‘species infima.’He is having in mind something
like arbor porphyriana. For why otherwise care to distinguish in the
introductory passage, between ‘maxims and submaxims.’ This use of ‘submaxim’ is
very interesting. Because it is unique. He would rather call the four maxims as
SUPRA-maxims, supermaxim, or supramaxim. And leaving ‘maxim’ for what here he
is calling the submaxim.Note that if one challenges the ‘species infima,’ one
may proceed to distinguish this or that sub-sub-maxim falling under the maxim.
Take “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.” Since this, as he
grants, applies mainly to informative cases, one may consider that it is
actually a subsubmaxim. The submaxim would be: “Do not say that for which you
are not entitled” (alla Nowell-Smith). And then provide one subsubmaxim for the
desideratum: “Do not give an order which you are not entitled to give” or “Do
not order that for you lack adequate authority,” and the other subsubmaxim for
the creditum: “Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”Grice: “Echoing
Kant, I call these categories Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner.” Or
Mode. “Manner” may be Ross’s translation of Aristotle’s ‘mode.’ Consider the
exploration of Aristotle on ‘modus’ in Categoriae. It is such a mixed bag that
surely ‘manner’ is not inappropriate!“The category of QUANTITY” – i. e. either
the conversational category of quantity, or as one might prefer, the category
of conversational quantity – “relates to the quantity of information to be
provided,”So it’s not just ANY QUANTUM, as Aristotle or Kant, or Ariskant have
it – just QUANTITY OF INFORMATION, whatever ‘information’ is, and how the
quantity of information is to be assessed. E g. Grice surely shed doubts re:
the pillar box seems red and the pillar box is red. He had till now used
‘strength,’ even ‘logical strength,’ in terms of entailment – and here, neither
the phenomenalist nor the physicalist utterance entail the other.“and under it
fall the following maxims:”That is, he goes straight to the ‘conversational
maxim.’ He will provide supermaxim for the other three conversational
categories.Why is the category of conversational quantity lacking a
supermaxim?The reason is that it would seem redundant and verbose: ‘be appropriately
informative.’ By having TWO maxims, he is playing with a weighing in, or
balance between one maxim and the other. Cf.To say the truth, all the truth,
and nothing but the truth.No more no less.One maximm states the ‘at most,’ the
other maxim states the ‘at least.’One maxim states the ‘maxi,’ the other maxim
states the ‘min.’ Together they state the ‘maximin.’First, “Make your
contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).”It’s
the contribution which is informative, not the utterer. Cf. “Be as informative
as is required.” Grice implicates that if you make your contribution as
informative as is required YOU are being as informative as is required. But
there is a category-shift here. Grice means, ‘required BY the goal of the
exchange). e.g.How are youFine thanks – the ‘and you’ depends on whether you
are willing to ‘keep the conversation going’ or your general mood. Second, “Do
not make your contribution more informative than is required.”“ (The second
maxim is disputable;”He goes on to give a different reason. But the primary
reason is that “Do not make your contribution more informative than is
required” is ENTAILED by “Make your contribution as informative as is required
(for the current purposes of the exchange)” – vide R. M. Hare on “Imperative
inferences” IN a diagram:Make your contribution as informative as is required
(for the current purposes of the exchange)Therefore, do not make your
contribution more informative than is required (by the current purposes of the
exchange).Grice gives another reason (he will give yet a further one) why the
maxim is ‘disputable.’“it might be said that to be overinformative is not a
transgression of the CP but merely a waste of time.”For both
conversationalists, who are thereby abiding by Ferraro’s law of the least
conversational effort.”“A waste of time” relates to Grice’s previous
elaborations on ‘undue effort’ and ‘unnecessary trouble.’He is proposing a
conversational maximin.When he formulates his principle of economy of rational
effort, it is a waste of ‘time and energy.’Here it is just ‘time.’ “Energy” is
a more generic concept.“However, it might be answered that such
overinformativeness may be confusing in that it is liable to raise side
issues;”Methinks the lady doth protest too much.His example, “He was in a
blacked out city.”It does not seem to relate to the pillar boxA: What color is
the pillar boxB: It seems red.Such a ‘confusion’ and ‘side issue,’ if so
designed, is part of the implicaturum.“and there may also be an indirect
effect, in that the hearers (or addressee) may be misled as a result of
thinking that there is some particular POINT in the provision of the excess of
information.”Cf. Peter Winch on “H. P. Grice’s Conversational Point.”More
boringly, it is part of the utterer’s INTENTION to provide an excess of
information.”This may be counterproductive, or not.“Meet Mr. Puddle”“Meet Mr.
Puddle, our man in nineteenth-century continental philosophy.”The introducer
point: to keep the conversation going.Effect on Grice: Mr. Puddle is hopeless
at nineteenth-century continental philosophy (OR HE IS BEING UNDERDESCRIBED). One
has to think of philosophically relevant examples here, which is all that Grice
cares for. Malcolm says, “Moore knows it; because he’s seen it!” – Malcolm
implicates that Grice will not take Malcolm’s word. So Malcom needs to provide
the excess of information, and add, to his use of ‘know,’ which Malcolm claims
Moore does not know how to use, the ‘reason’ – If knowledge is justified true
belief, Malcolm is conveying explicitly that Moore knows and ONE OF THE
CONDITIONS for it. Cf.I didn’t know you were pregnant.You still do not. (Here
the cancellation is to the third clause). Grice: “However this may be, there is
perhaps a different [second] reason for doubt about the admission of this
second maxim, viz., that its effect will be secured by a later maxim, which
concems relevance.)”He could be a lecturer. His use of ‘later’ entails he knows
in advance what he is going to say. Cf. Foucault:“there is another reason to
doubt. The effect is secured by a maxim concerning relevance.”No “later” about
it!Grice:“Under the category of QUALITY falls a supermaxim” – he forgets to
add, as per obvious, “The category of quality relates to the QUALITY of
information.” In this way, there is some reference to Aristotle’s summumm
genus. PROPOSITIO DEDICATIVA, PROPOSITIO ABDICATIVA, PROPOSITIO INFINITA. Cf.
Apuleius and Boethius on QUALITAS of propositio. Dedicatio takes priority over
abdicatio. So one expects one’s co-conversationalist to say that something IS
the case. Note too, that, if he used “more specific maxims and submaxims,” he
means “more specific supermaxims and maxims” – He is following Porophyry in
being confusing! Cf. supramaxim. Grice “-'Try to make your contribution one
that is true' –“This surely requires generality – and Grice spent the next two
decades about it. He introduced the predicate ‘acceptability.’ “Try to make
your contribution one that is acceptable”“True for your statements; good for
your desiderative-mode utterances.”“and two more specific maxims:”“1. Do not say
what you believe to be false.”There is logic here. It is easy to TRY to make
your contribution one that is true.” And it is easy NOT to say what you believe
to be false. Grice is forbidding Kant to have a maxim on us: “Be truthful!”
“Say the true!” “MAKE – don’t just TRY – to make your contribution one that is
true.”“I was only trying.”Cf. Moses, “Try not to kill” “Thou shalt trye not to
kylle.”Grice:“2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.”This is
involved with truth. In “Truth and other enigmas,” Dummett claims that truth
is, er, an enigma. For some philosophers, all you can guarantee is that you
have evidence. Lacking evidence for what?The qualification, “adequate,” turns the
maxim slightly otiose. Do not say that for you lack evidence which would make
your contribution not a true one.However, Grice is thinking Gettier. And
Gettier allows that one CAN have ADEQUATE EVIDENCE, and p NOT be true.If we are
talking ‘acceptability’ it’s more ‘ground’ or ‘reason’, rather than ‘evidential
justification.’ Grice is especially obsessed with this, in his explorations on
‘intending,’ where ‘acceptance’ is deemed even in the lack of ‘evidential
justification,’ and leaving him wondering what he means by ‘non-evidential
justification.’“Under the category of RELATION I place a single maxim, viz.,
'Be relevant.'”The category comes from Aristotle, ‘pros it.’ And ‘re-‘ in
relation is cognate with ‘re-‘ in ‘relevant.’RELATION refers to ‘refer,’ Roman
‘referre.’ But in Anglo-Norman, you do have ‘relate’ qua verb. To ‘refer’ or
‘re-late,’ is to bring y back to x. As Russell well knows in his fight with
Bradley’s theory of ‘relation,’ a relation involves x and y. A relation is a two-place
predicate. What about X = xIs identity a relation, in the case of x = x?Can a
thing relate to itself?In cases where we introduce two variables. The maxim
states that one brings y back to x.“Mrs. Smith is an old windbag.”“The weather
has been delightful for this time of year, hasn’t it.”If INTENDED to mean, “You
ARE ignorant!,” then the conversationalist IS bring back “totally otiose remark
about the weather” to the previous insulting comment.To utter an utterly
irrelevant second move you have to be Andre Breton.“Though the maxim itself is
terse, its formulation conceals a number of problems that exercise me a good
deal: questions about what different kinds and focuses of relevance there may
be, how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the fact
that subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, and so on. I find the
treatment of such questions exceedingly difficult, and I hope to revert to them
in a later work.”He is having in mind Nowell-Smith, who had ‘be relevant’ as
the most important of the rules of conversational etiquette, or how etiquette
becomes logical. But Nowell-Smith felt overwhelmed by Grice and left for the
north, to settle in the very fashionable Kent. Grice is also having in mind
Urmson’s appositeness (Criteria of intensionality). “Why did you title your
painting “Maga’s Daughter”? She’s your wife!” – and Grice is also having in
mind P. F. Strawson and what Strawson has as the principle of relevance
vis-à-vis the principles of presumption of ignorance and knowledge.So it was in
the Oxonian air.“Finally, under the category of MODE, which I understand as
relating not (like the previous categories) to what is said [THE CONTENT, THE
EXPLICITUM, THE COMMUNICATUM, THE EXPLICATUM] but, rather, to HOW what is said
is to be said,”Grice says that ‘meaning’ is diaphanous. An utterer means that p
reduces to what an utterer means by x. This diaphanousness ‘meaning’ shares
with ‘seeing.’ “To expand on the experience of seeing is just to expand on what
is seen.’He is having the form-content distinction.If that is a distinction. This
multi-layered dialectic displays the true nature of the speculative
form/content distinction: all content is form and all form is content, not in a
uniform way, but through being always more or less relatively indifferent or
posited. The Role of the Form/Content
Distinction in Hegel's Science of ...deontologistics.files.wordpress.com ›
2012/01 › formc... PDF Feedback About Featured Snippets Web results The Form-Content Distinction in Moral
Development Researchwww.karger.com › Article › PDF The form-content distinction
is a potentially useful conceptual device for understanding certain
characteristics of moral development. In the most general sense it ... by CG
Levine - 1979 - Cited by 25 - Related articles The Form-Content Distinction in Moral
Development Research ...www.karger.com › Article › Abstract Dec 23, 2009 - The
Form-Content Distinction in Moral Development Research. Levine C.G.. Author
affiliations. University of Western Ontario, London, Ont. by CG Levine - 1979
- Cited by 25 - Related articles
Preschool children's mastery of the form/content distinction in
...www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov › pubmed Preschool children's mastery of the
form/content distinction in communicative tasks. Hedelin L(1), Hjelmquist E.
Author information: (1)Department of Psychology, ... by L Hedelin - 1998 -
Cited by 10 - Related articles Form
and Content: An Introduction to Formal Logic - Digital
...digitalcommons.conncoll.edu › cgi › viewcontentPDF terminology has to do
with anything. In this context, 'material' means having to do with content.
This is our old friend, the form/content distinction again. Consider. by DD
Turner - 2020 Simmel's Dialectic of
Form and Content in Recent Work in ...www.tandfonline.com › doi › full May 1,
2019 - This suggests that for Simmel, the form/content distinction was not a
dualism; instead, it was a duality.11 Ronald L. Breiger, “The Duality of
... Are these distinctions between
“form” and “content” intentionally ...www.reddit.com › askphilosophy › comments
› are_th... The form/content distinction also doesn't quite fit the distinction
between form and matter (say, in Aristotle), although Hegel develops the
distinction between form ... Preschool
Children's Mastery of the Form/Content Distinction ...link.springer.com ›
article Preschoolers' mastery of the form/content distinction in language and
communication, along its contingency on the characteristics of p. by L Hedelin
- 1998 - Cited by 10 - Related articles
Verbal Art: A Philosophy of Literature and Literary
Experiencebooks.google.com › books Even if form and content were in fact
inseparable in the sense indicated, that would not make the form/content
distinction unjustified. Form and matter are clearly ... Anders Pettersson -
2001 - Literary Criticism One Century
of Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathologybooks.google.com › books He then
outlines the most important implications of the form–content distinction in a
statement which is identical in the first three editions, with only minor ...
Giovanni Stanghellini, Thomas Fuchs - 2013 - Medical“I include the
supermaxim-'Be perspicuous' –” Or supramaxim. So the “more specific maxims and
submaxims” becomes the clumsier “supermaxims and maxims”Note that in under the
first category it is about making your contribution, etc. Now it is the utterer
himself who has to be ‘perspicuous,’ as it is the utterer who has to be
relevant. It’s not the weaker, “Make your contribution a perspicuous one.” Or
“Make your contribution a relevant one (to the purposes of the exchange).”Knowing
that most confound ‘perspicacity’ with ‘perspicuity,’ he added “sic,” but
forgot to pronounce it, in case it was felt as insulting. He has another ‘sic’
under the prolixity maxim.“and various maxims such as: The “such as” is a colloquialism.Surely
it was added in the ‘lecture’ format. In written, it becomes viz. The fact that
the numbers them makes for ‘such as’ rather disimplicaturable. “1. Avoid
obscurity of expression.”Unless you are Heracleitus. THEY told me, Heraclitus,
they told me you were dead, /They brought me bitter news to hear and bitter
tears to shed./I wept as I remember'd how often you and I/Had tired the sun
with talking and sent him down the sky./And now that thou art lying, my dear
old Carian guest,/A handful of grey ashes, long, long ago at rest,/Still are
thy pleasant voices, thy nightingales, awake;/For Death, he taketh all away,
but them he cannot take. In a way this is entailed by “Be perspicuous,” if that
means ‘be clear,’ in obtuse English.Be clearTherefore, or what is the same
thing. Thou shalt not not be obscure.2. Avoid ambiguity.”Except as a trope, or
‘figure, (schema, figura). “Aequi-vocate, if that will please your clever
addressee.” Cf. Parker’s zeugma: “My apartment was so small, that I've barely
enough room to lay a hat and a few friends“3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary
prolixity).”Here he added a ‘sic’ that he failed to pronounce in case it may
felt as insulting. But the idea of a self-refuting conversational maxim is
surely Griceian, in a quessertive way. Since this concerns FORM rather than
CONTENT, it is not meant to overlap with ‘informativeness.’So given that p and
q are equally informative, if q is less brief (longer – ars longa, vita
brevis), utter p. This has nothing to do with logical strength. It is just to
be assessed in a SYNTACTICAL way.Vide “Syntactics in Semiotics”“4. Be orderly.”This
involves two moves in the contribution or ‘turn.’ One cannot be ‘disorderly,’
if one just utters ‘p.’ So this involves a molecular proposition. The ‘order’
can be of various types. Indeed, one of Grice’s example is “Jones is between
Smith and Williams” – order of merit or size?‘Between’ is not ambiguous!There
is LOGICAL order, which is prior.But there is a more absolute use of ‘orderly.’
‘keep your room tidy.’orderly (adj.) 1570s, "arranged in order," from
order (n.) + -ly (1). Meaning "observant of rule or discipline, not
unruly" is from 1590s. Related: Orderliness.He does not in the lecture
give a philosophical example, but later will in revisiting the Urmson example
and indeed Strawson, but mainly Urmson, “He went to bed and took off his
boots,” and indeed Ryle, “She felt frail and took arsenic.”“And one might need
others.”Regarding ‘mode,’ that is. “It is obvious that the observance of some
of these maxims is a matter of less urgency than is the observance of others;”Not
as per ‘moral’ demands, since he’ll say these are not MORAL.“a man who has
expressed himself with undue prolixity would, in general, be open to milder
comment than would a man who has said something he believes to be false.”Except
in Oscar Wilde’s circle, where they were obsessed with commenting on
prolixities! Cf. Hare against Kant, “Where is the prisoner?” “He left [while he
is hiding in the attic].”That’s why Grice has the ‘in general.’“Indeed, it
might be felt that the importance of at least the first maxim of Quality is
such that it should not be included in a scheme of the kind I am constructing;”But
since ‘should’ is weak, I will. “other maxims come into operation only on the
assumption that this maxim of Quality is satisfied.”So the keyword is
co-ordination.“While this may be correct, so far as the generation of implicaturums
is concerned it seems to play a role not totally different from the other
maxims, and it will be convenient, for the present at least, to treat it as a
member of the list of maxims.”He is having weighing, and clashing in mind. And
he wants a conversationalist to honour truth over informativeness, which begs
the question that as he puts it, ‘false’ “information” is no information.In the
earlier lectures, tutoring, or as a university lecturer, he was sure that his
tutee will know that he was introducing maxims ONLY WITH THE PURPOSE, NEVER TO
MORALISE, but as GENERATORS of implicatura – in philosophers’s mistakes.But
this manoeuver is only NOW disclosed. Those without a philosophical background
may not realise about this. “There are, of course, all sorts of other maxims
(aesthetic, social, or moral in character), such as 'Be polite', that are also
normally observed by participants in talk exchanges, and these may also generate
nonconventional implicaturums.”He is obviously aware that Émile DurkheimWill Know that
‘conversational’ is subsumed under ‘social,’ if not Williamson (perhaps). – keyword: ‘norm.’ Grice excludes ‘moral’
because while a moral maxim makes a man ‘good,’ a conversational maxim makes a
man a ‘good’ conversationalist. Not because there is a distinction in
principle!“The conversational maxims, however, and the conversational implicaturums
connected with them, are specially connected (I hope) with”He had this way with
idioms.Cf. Einstein,“E =, I hope, mc2.”“the particular purposes that talk (and
so, talk exchange)”He is playing Dutch.The English lost the Anglo-Saxon for
‘talk.’ They have ‘language,’ and the Hun has ‘Sprache.’ But only the Dutch
have ‘taal.’So he is distinguishing between the TOOL and the USE of the TOOL.“is
adapted lo serve and is primlarily employed to serve.”The ‘adapted’ is
mechanistic talk. He mentions ‘evolutionarily’ elsewhere. He means ‘the
particular goal language evolved to serve, viz.’ groom.Grooming, Gossip and the
Evolution of Language is a 1996 book by the anthropologist Robin Dunbar, in
which the author argues that language evolved from social grooming. He further
suggests that a stage of this evolution was the telling of gossip, an argument
supported by the observation that language is adapted for storytelling.
The book has been criticised on the grounds that since words are so cheap,
Dunbar's "vocal grooming" would fall short in amounting to an honest
signal. Further, the book provides no compelling story[citation needed] for how
meaningless vocal grooming sounds might become syntactical speech. Thesis
Dunbar argues that gossip does for group-living humans what manual grooming does
for other primates—it allows individuals to service their relationships and
thus maintain their alliances on the basis of the principle: if you scratch my
back, I'll scratch yours. Dunbar argues that as humans began living in
increasingly larger social groups, the task of manually grooming all one's
friends and acquaintances became so time-consuming as to be unaffordable.[1] In
response to this problem, Dunbar argues that humans invented 'a cheap and
ultra-efficient form of grooming'—vocal grooming. To keep allies happy, one now
needs only to 'groom' them with low-cost vocal sounds, servicing multiple
allies simultaneously while keeping both hands free for other tasks. Vocal
grooming then evolved gradually into vocal language—initially in the form of
'gossip'.[1] Dunbar's hypothesis seems to be supported by the fact that the
structure of language shows adaptations to the function of narration in
general.[2] Criticism Critics of Dunbar's theory point out that the very
efficiency of "vocal grooming"—the fact that words are so cheap—would
have undermined its capacity to signal honest commitment of the kind conveyed
by time-consuming and costly manual grooming.[3] A further criticism is that
the theory does nothing to explain the crucial transition from vocal grooming—the
production of pleasing but meaningless sounds—to the cognitive complexities of
syntactical speech.[citation needed] References Dunbar, R. I. M.
(1996). Grooming, gossip and the evolution of language. London: Faber and
Faber. ISBN 9780571173969. OCLC 34546743. von Heiseler, Till Nikolaus
(2014) Language evolved for storytelling in a super-fast evolution. In: R. L.
C. Cartmill, Eds. Evolution of Language. London: World Scientific, pp. 114-121.
https://www.academia.edu/9648129/LANGUAGE_EVOLVED_FOR_STORYTELLING_IN_A_SUPER-FAST_EVOLUTION
Power, C. 1998. Old wives' tales: the gossip hypothesis and the reliability of
cheap signals. In J. R. Hurford, M. Studdert Kennedy and C. Knight (eds),
Approaches to the Evolution of Language: Social and Cognitive Bases. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 111 29. Categories: 1996 non-fiction
booksAmerican non-fiction booksBooks by Robin DunbarEnglish-language
booksEvolution of languageHarvard University Press booksPopular science
booksGrice: “I have stated my maxims”the maxims“as if this purpose were a
maximally effective exchange of information;”“MAXIMALLY EFFECTIVE”“this
specification is, of course, too narrow,”But who cares?This is slightly sad in
that he is thinking Strawson and forgetting his (Grice’s) own controversy with
G. A. Paul on the sense-datum, for ‘the pillar box seems red’ and ‘the pillar
box is red,’ involving an intensional context, are less amenable to fall under
the maxims.“and the scheme needs to be generalized to allow for such general purposes
as influencing or directing the actions of others.”He has a more obvious way
below:Giving and receving informationInfluencing and being influenced by others.He
never sees the purpose as MAXIMAL INFORMATION, but maximally effective EXCHANGE
of information – does he mean merely ‘transmission.’ It may well be.If I say,
“I rain,” I have ex-changed information.I don’t need anything in return.If so,
it makes sense that he is equating INFORMING With INFLUENCING or better DIRECTION your
addresse’s talk.Note that, for all he loved introspection and conversational
avowals, and self-commands, these do not count.It’s informing your addressee
about some state of affairs, and directing his action. Grice is always clear
that the ULTIMATE GOAL is the utterer’s ACTION.“As one of my avowed aims is to
see talking as a special case or variety of purposive, indeed rational,
behavior, it may be worth noting that the specific expectations or presumptions
connected with at least some of the foregoing maxims have their analogues in
the sphere of transactions that are not talk exchanges.”Transaction is a good
one.TRANS-ACTIO“I list briefly one such analog for each conversational
category.”While he uses ‘conversational category,’ he also applies it to the
second bit: ‘category of conversational quantity,’ ‘category of conversational
quality,’ ‘category of conversational relation,’ and ‘category of
conversational mode.’ But it is THIS application that justifies the
sub-specifications.They are not categories of thought or ontological or
‘expression’.His focus is on the category as conversation.His focus is on the
‘conversational category.’“1. Quantity. If you are assisting me to mend a car,
I expect your contribution to be neither more nor less than is required; if, e.
g., at a particular stage I need fourscrews, I expect you to hand me four,
rather than two or six. He always passed six, since two will drop.“Make your
contribution neither more nor less informative than is required (for the
purposes of the exchange).”This would have covered the maxi and the min.“NEITHER
MORE NOR LESS” is the formula of effectiveness, and economy, and minimization
of expenditure.“2. Quality. I expect your contributions to be genuine and not
spurious.”Here again he gives an expansion of the conversational category,
which is more general than ‘try to make your contribution one that is true,’
and the point about the ‘quality of information,’ which he did not make.Perhaps
because it would have led him to realise that ‘false’ information, i.e.
‘information’ which is not genuine and spurious, is not ‘information.’But “Make
your contribution one that is genuine and not spurious.”Be candid.Does not need
a generalization as it covers both informational and directive utterances.“If I
need sugar as an ingredient in the cake you are assisting me to make, I do not
expect you to hand me salt;”Or you won’t eat the cake.“if I need a spoon, I do
not expect a trick spoon made of rubber.”Spurious and genuine are different.In
the ‘trick spoon,’ the conversationalist is just not being SERIOUS.But surely a
maxim, “Be serious” is too serious. – Seriously!“3. Relation. I expect a
partner's contribution to be appropriate to immediate needs at each stage of
the transaction;”Odd that he would use ‘appropriate,’ which was the topic of
the “Prolegomena,” and what he was supposed to EXPLAIN, not to use in the
explanation.For each of the philosophers making a mistake are giving a judgment
of ‘appropriateness,’ conversational appropriateness. Here it is good that he
relativises the ‘appropriateness’ TO the ‘need’.Grice is not quite sticking to
the etymology of ‘relatio’ and ‘refer,’ bring y back to x. Or he is. Bring y
(your contribution) back to the need x.Odd that he thinks he’ll expand more on
relation, when he did a good bit!“if I am mixing ingredients for a cake, I do
not expect to be handed a good book, or even an oven cloth (though this might
be an appropriate contribution at a later stage).”“I just expect you to be
silent.”“4. Manner. I expect a partner to make it clear what contribution he is
making, and to execute his performance with reasonable dispatch.” For Lewis,
clarity is not enough!The ‘Execute your performance with reasonable dispatch!’
seems quite different from “Be perspicuous.”“Execute your performance with
reasonable dispatch”Is more like“Execute your performance”And not just STAND
there!A: What time is it B just stands there“These analogies are relevant to
what I regard as a fundamental question about the principle of conversational
helpfulness and its attendant conversational maxims,”For Boethius, it is a
PRINCIPLE because it does not need an answer!“viz., what the basis is for the
assumption which we seem to make, and on which (I hope) it will appear that a
great range of implicaturums depend [especially as we keep on EXPLOITING the
rather otiose maxims], that talkers will ingeneral (ceteris paribus and in the
absence of indications to the contrary) proceed in the manner that these
principles prescribe.”Grice really doesn’t care! He is into the EXPLOITING of
the maxim, as in his response to the Scots philosopher G. A. Paul:“Paul, I
surely do not mean to imply that you may end up believing that I have a doubt
about the pillar box being red: it seems red to me, as I have this sense-datum
of ‘redness’ which attaches to me as I am standing in front of the pillar box
in clear daylight.”Grice is EXPLOITING the desideratum, YET STILL SAYING
SOMETHING TRUE, so at least he is not VIOLATING the principle of conversational
helpfulness, or the category of conversational quality, or the desideratum of
conversational candour.And that is what he is concerned with. “A dull but, no doubt at a certain level,
adequate answer is that it is just a well-recognized empirical fact that *people*
(not pirots, although perhaps Oxonians, rather than from Malagasy) DO behave in
these ways;”Elinor Ochs was terrified Grice’s maxims are violated – never
exploited, she thought – in Madagascar.“they, i. e. people, or Oxonians, have
learned to do so in childhood and not lost the habit of doing so; and, indeed,
it would involve a good deal of effort to make a radical departure from the
habit. It is much easier, for example, to tell the truth than to invent lies.”Effort
again; least effort. And ease. Great Griceian guidelines!“I am, however, enough
of a rationalist to want to find a basis that underlies these facts,”OR
EXPLAIN.“undeniable though they may be;”BEIGIN OF A THEORY FOR A THEORY – not
the theory for the generation of implicate, but for the theory of conversation.He
is less interested in this than the other. “I would like to be able to think of
the standard type of conversational practice not merely as something that all
or most do IN FACT follow but as something that it is REASONABLE for us to
follow, that we SHOULD NOT abandon. For a time, I was attracted by the idea
that observance of the principle of conversational helpfulness and the conversational
maxims, in a talk exchange, could be thought of as a quasi-contractual matter,
with parallels outside the realm of discourse. If you pass by when I am struggling
with my stranded car, I no doubt have some degree of expectation that you will
offer help, but once you join me in tinkering under the hood, my expectations
become stronger and take more specific forms (in the absence of indications
that you are merely an incompetent meddler); and talk exchanges seemed to me to
exhibit, characteristically, certain features that jointly distinguish
cooperative transactions:”So how is this not quasi-contractual? He is listing THIS OR THAT FEATURE that
jointly distinguishes a cooperative transaction – all grand great words.But he
wants to say that ‘quasi-contractual’ is NO RATIONAL!He is playing, as a
philosopher, with the very important point of what follows from what.A1.
Conversasation is purposiveA2. Conversation is rationalA3. Conversation is
cooperativeA4. There is such a thing as non-rational cooperation (is there?)So
he is aiming at the fact that the FEATURES that jointly distinguish cooperative
transactions NEED NOT BE PRESENT, and Grice surely does not wish THAT to
demolish his model. If he bases it in general constraints of rationality, the
better.“1. The participants have some common immediate aim, like getting a car
mended; their ultimate aims may, of course, be independent and even in
conflict-each may want to get the car mended in order to drive off, leaving the
other stranded. In characteristic talk exchanges, there is a common aim even
if, as in an over-the-wall chat, it is a second-order one,”Is he being logical?“second-order
predicate calculus”“meta-language”He means higher or supervenientOr
‘operative’“, that each party should, for the time being, identify himself with
the transitory conversational interests of the other.”By identify he means
assume.YOU HAVE TO DESIRE what your partner desires.The intersection between
your desirability and your addressee’s desirability is not NULL.And the way to
do this is conditionalIF: You perceive B has Goal G, you assume Goal G. “2. The
contributions of the participants .should be dovetailed, mutually dependent. Unless
it’s one of those seminars by Grice and J. F. Thomson!“3. There is some sort of
understanding (which may be explicit but which is often tacit)”i.e. implicated
rather than explicated – part of the implicaturum, or implicitum, rather than
the explicatum or explicitum.“that, other things being equal, the transaction
should continue in appropriate style unless both parties are agreeable that it
should terminate. You do not just shove off or start doing something else.”This
is especially tricky over the phone (“He never ends!” Or in psychiatric
interviews!)Note that ‘starting doing something else’ may work. E. g. watch
your watch!“But while some such quasi-contractual basis as this may apply to
some cases, there are too many types of exchange, like quarreling and letter
writing, that it fails to fit comfortably.”TWO OPPOSITE EXAMPLES.Fighting is
arguing is competition, adversarial, epagogue, not conversation,
cooperation, friendly, collaborative
venture, and diagoge.Letter writing is usually otiose – “what, with the
tellyphone!” And letter writing is no conversation.“In any case, one feels that
the talker who is irrelevant or obscure has primarily let down not his audience
but himself.”And the talker who is mendacious has primarily let Kant down!”“So
I would like t< be able to show that observance of the principle of
conversational helfpulness and maxims is reasonal de (rational) along the
following lines”That any Aristkantian rationalist would agree to.“: that any
one who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication
(e.g., giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by
others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in
participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on the assumption
that they are conducted in general accordance with the principle of
conversational helpfulness and the maxims.”Where the keyword is: profit,
effort, least effort, no energy, no undue effort, no unnecessary trouble. That
conversation is reasonable unless it is unreasonable. That a conversational
exchange should be rational unless it shows features of irrationality.“Whether
any such conclusion can be reached, I am uncertain;”It’s not clear what the
premises are!Plus, he means DEDUCTIVELY reached? Transcendentally reached?
Empirically reached? Philosophically reached? Conclusively reached? Etc.It
seems the conclusion need not be reached, because we never departed from the
state of the affairs that the conclusion describes.“in any case, I am fairly sure
that I cannot reach it until I am a good deal clearer about the nature of
relevance and of the circumstances in which it is required.”For perhaps “I
don’t want to imply any doubt, but that pillar box seems red.”IS irrelevant,
yet true!“It is now time to show the connection between the principle of
conversational helfpulness and the conversational maxims, on the one hand, and
conversational implicaturum on the other.”This is clearer in the seminars. The
whole thing was a preamble “A participant in a talk exchange may fail to
fulfill a maxim in various ways, which include the following: 1. He may quietly
and unostentatiously VIOLATE (or fail to observe) a maxim; if so, in some cases
he will be liable to mislead.”And be blamed by Kant.Mislead should not worry
Grice, cf. “Misleading, but true.”The violate (or fail to observe) shows that
(1) covers two specifications. Tom may be unaware that there was such a maxim
as to ‘be brief, avoid unnecessary prolixity, unless you need to eschew
obfuscation!”This is Grice’s anti-Ryleism. He doesn’t want to say that there is
KNOWLEDGE of the maxims. For one may know what the maxims are and fail to
observe them “2. He may OPT OUT from the operation both of the maxim and of the
principle of conversational helpfulness; he may say, indicate, or allow it to
become plain that he is unwilling to cooperate in the way the maxim requires.
He may say, e. g., I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.” Where is the
criminal?I cannot say more; my lips are sealed.I shall unseal them. What do you
mean ‘cannot.’ You don’t mean ‘may not,’ do you?I think Grice means ‘may
not.’Is the universe finite? Einstein: I cannot say more; my lips are sealed. “3.
He may be faced by a CLASH of maxims [That’s why he needs more than one – or at
least two specifications of the same maxim]: He may be unable, e. g., to
fulfill the first maxim of Quantity (Be as informative as is required) without
violating the second maxim of Quality (Have adequate evidence for what you
say).” Odd that he doesn’t think this generates implicaturum: He has obviously
studied the sub-perceptualities here.For usually, a phenomenalist, like Sextus,
thinks that by utteringThe pillar box seems red to me – that is all I have
adequate evidence forHe is conveying that he is unable to answer the question
(“What colour is the pillar box?”) And being as ‘informative’ as is
requiredWithout saying something for which it is not the case that he has or will
ever have adequate evidence.Cf.Student at Koenigsberg to Kant: What’s the
noumenon?Kant: My lips are sealed.It may require some research to list ALL
CLASHES.Because each clash shows some EVALUATION qua reasoning, and it may be
all VERY CETERIS PARIBUS.Cf.Where is the criminal?My lips are sealed.The
utterer has NOT opted out. He has answered, via implicaturum, that he is not
telling. He is being relevant. He is not telling because he doesn’t want to
DISCLOSE the whereabouts of the alleged criminal, etc. For Kant, this is not a
conversation! Odd that Grice is ‘echoing Kant,’ where Kant would hardly allow a
clash with ‘Be truthful!’“4. He may FLOUT a maxim; that is, he may BLATANTLY
fail to fulfill (or observe) it.Mock? Taunt?The magic flute. Grice’s magic
flute.flout (v.) "treat with disdain or contempt" (transitive),
1550s, intransitive sense "mock, jeer, scoff" is from 1570s; of
uncertain origin; perhaps a special use of Middle English “flowten,”"to
play the flute" (compare Middle Dutch “fluyten,” "to play the
flute," also "to jeer"). Related: Flouted; flouting.Grice: “One
thing we do not know is if the flute came to England via Holland.”“Or he may,
as we may say, ‘play the flute’ with a maxim, expecting others to be
agreeable.”“Or he may, as we might say, ‘play the flute’ with the
conversational maxim, expecting others to join with some other musical instrument
– or something – occasionally the same.”“On the assumption that the speaker is
able to fulfill the maxim and to do so without violating another maxim (because
oi a clash), is not opting out, and is not, in view of the blatancy of his performance,
trying to mislead,”This is interesting. It’s the TRYING to mislead.Grice and G.
A. Paul:Grice cannot be claimed to have TRIED to mislead, and thus deemed to
have misled G. A. Paul, even if he had, when he said, “I hardly think there is
any doubt about it, but that pillar box seems red to me.”“the hearer is faced
with a minor problem:”Implicaturum: This reasoning is all abductive – to the
‘best’ explanation“How can his saying what he did say be reconciled with the
supposition that he is observing the overall principle of conversational
helfpulness?”This was one of Grice’s conversations with G. A. Paul:Paul (to
Grice): This is what I do not understand, Grice. How can your saying what you
did say be reconciled with the supposition that you are not going to mislead
me?”Unfortunately, on that Saturday, Paul went to the Irish Sea. Grice “This
situation is one that characteristically”There are others – vide clash, above –
but not marked by Grice as one such situation – “gives rise to a conversational
implicaturum; and when a conversational implicaturum is generated”Chomskyan
jargon borrowed from Austin (“I don’t see why Austin admired Chomsky so!”)“in
this way, I shall say that a maxim is being EXPLOITED.”Why not ‘flouted’? Some
liked the idea of playing the flute.EXPLOIT is figurative.Grice exploits a
Griceian maxim.exploit (v.) c. 1400, espleiten,
esploiten "to accomplish, achieve, fulfill," from Old French
esploitier, espleiter "carry out, perform, accomplish," from esploit
(see exploit (n.)). The sense of "use selfishly" first recorded 1838,
from a sense development in French perhaps from use of the word with reference
to mines, etc. (compare exploitation). Related: Exploited; exploiting.exploit
(n.) late 14c., "outcome of an action," from Old French esploit
"a carrying out; achievement, result; gain, advantage" (12c., Modern
French exploit), a very common word, used in senses of "action, deed,
profit, achievement," from Latin explicitum "a thing settled, ended,
or displayed," noun use of neuter of explicitus, past participle of
explicare "unfold, unroll, disentangle," from ex "out" (see
ex-) + plicare "to fold" (from PIE root *plek- "to
plait"). Meaning "feat, achievement" is c. 1400. Sense
evolution is from "unfolding" to "bringing out" to
"having advantage" to "achievement." Related:
Exploits. exploitative (adj.) "serving for or used in
exploitation," 1882, from French exploitatif, from exploit (see exploit
(n.)). Alternative exploitive (by 1859) appears to be a native formation from
exploit + -ive.exploitation (n.) 1803, "productive working" of
something, a positive word among those who used it first, though regarded as a
Gallicism, from French exploitation, noun of action from exploiter (see exploit
(v.)). Bad sense developed 1830s-50s, in part from influence of French
socialist writings (especially Saint Simon), also perhaps influenced by use of
the word in U.S. anti-slavery writing; and exploitation was hurled in insult at
activities it once had crowned as praise. It follows from this science
[conceived by Saint Simon] that the tendency of the human race is from a state
of antagonism to that of an universal peaceful association -- from the
dominating influence of the military spirit to that of the industriel one; from
what they call l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme to the exploitation of the
globe by industry. ["Quarterly Review," April & July 1831] Grice: “I am now
in a position to characterize the notion of conversational implicaturum.”Not to
provide a reductive analysis. The concept is too dear for me to torture it with
one of my metaphysical routines.”“A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as
if to say) that p”That seems good for the analysandumGrice loves the “by (in,
when)” “(or making as if to). Note the oratio obliqua.Or ‘that’-clause. So this
is not ‘uttering’As in the analysans of ‘meaning that.’“By uttering ‘x’ U means
that p.’The “by” already involves a clause with a ‘that’-clause.So this is not
a report of a physical event.It is a report embued already with intentionality.The
utterer is not just ‘uttering’The utterer is EXPLICITLY conveying that p.We
cannot say MEANING that p.Because Grice uses “mean” as opposed to “explicitly
convey”His borderline scenarios are such,“Keep me company, dear”“If we are to
say that when he uttererd that he means that his wife was to keep him company
or not is all that will count for me to change my definition of ‘mean’ or
not.”Also irony.But here it is more complicated. A man utters, “Grice defeated
Strawson”If he means it ironically, to mean that Strawson defeated Grice, it is
not the case that the utterer MEANT the opposite. He explicitly conveyed that.Grice
considers the Kantian ‘cause and effect,’“If I am dead, I shall have no time
for reading.”He is careful here that the utterer does not explicitly conveys
that he will have no time for reading – because it’s conditioned on he being
dead.“has implicated that q,” “may be said to have conversationally implicated
that q,”So this is a specification alla arbor porphyrana of ‘By explicitly
conveying that p, U implicitly conveys that q.’Where he is adding the second-order
adverb, ‘conversationally.’By explicitly conveying that p, U has implicitly
conveyed that q in a CONVERSATIONAL FASHION” iff or if“PROVIDED THAT”“(1) he is
to be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the principle
of conversational helfpulness;”Especially AT LEAST, because he just said that
an implicaturum is ‘generated’ (Chomskyan jargon) when AT LEAST A MAXIM IS played the flute.“(2) the
supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required in order to
make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in THOSE terms)
consistent with this presumption;”THIS IS THE CRUCIAL CLAUSE – and the one that
not only requires ONE’S RATIONALITY, but the expectation that one’s addressee,
BEING RATIONAL, will expect the utterer to BE RATIONAL.This is the
‘rationalisation’ he refers to in “Retrospective Epilogue.”Note that ‘q’ is
obviously now the content of a state in the utterer’s soul – a desideratum or a
creditum --, at least a CREDITUM, in view of Grice’s view of everything at
least exhibitive and perhaps protreptic --“and (3) the speaker thinks (and
would expect the hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the
competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition
mentioned in (2) IS required.”All that jargon about mutuality is a result of
Strawson tutoring Schiffer!“Apply this to my initial example, to B's remark that
C has not yet been to prison.”What made Grice think of such a convoluted
example?He was laughing at Searle for providing non-philosophical examples, and
there he is!“In a suitable setting A might reason as follows:”“(1) B has
APPARENTLY violated – indeed he has played the flute with -- the maxim 'Be
relevant' and so may be regarded as [ALSO] having flouted one of the maxims
conjoining perspicuity,”In previous versions, under the desideratum of
conversational clarity Grice had it that the desideratum included the
expectation of this ‘relatedness’ AND that of ‘perspicuity’ (sic). In the
above, Grice is stating that if you are irrelevant (or provide an unrelated
contribution) you are not being perspicuous.But “He hasn’t been to prison” is
perspicuous enough.And so is the link to the question --.Plus, wasn’t
perspicuity only to apply to the ‘mode,’ to the ‘form,’ rather than the
content.Here it is surely the CONTENT – that it is not the case that C is a
criminal – that triggers it all.So, since there is a “not,” here this is
parallel to the example examined by Strawson in the footnote to “Logical
Theory.”The utterer is saying that it is not the case that C has been in prison
yet.The ‘yet’ makes all the difference, even if a Fregeian colouring
‘convention’!“It is not the case that C has been in prison” Is, admittedly, not
very perspicuous.“So what, neither has the utterer nor the addressee.”So there
is an equivocation here as to the utterance perhaps not being perspicuous,
while the utterer IS perspicuous.“yet I have no reason to suppose that he is
opting out from the operation of the CP;”Or playing the flute with my beloved
principle of conversational helpfulness.“(2) given the circumstances, I can
regard his irrelevance as only apparent – as when we say that a plastic flower
is not a flower, or to use Austin’s example, “That decoy duck is surely not a
duck! That trick rubber spoon is no spoon! -- if, and only if, I suppose him to
think that C is potentially dishonest;”As many are!The potentially is the
trick.Recall Aristotle: “Will I say that I am potentially dishonest?! Not me!
PLATO was! Theophrastus WILL! Or is it ‘shall’?”“(3) B knows that I am capable
of working out step (2). So B implicates that C is potentially dishonest.'”Unless
he goes on like I go with G. A. Paul, “I do not mean of course to mean that I
mean that he is potentially dishonest, because although he is, he shouldn’t, or
rather, I don’t think you are expecting me to convey explicitly that he shouln’t
or should for that matter.”“The presence of a conversational implicaturum must
be capable of being worked out; for even if it can in fact be intuitively
grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicaturum
(if present at all) will not count as a CONVERSATIONAL implicaturum.”This is
the Humpty Dumpty in Grice.Cf. Provide the sixteen derivational steps in Jane
Austen’s Novel remark, “I sense and sensibilia” – This is what happens
sometimes when people who are not philosophers engage with Grice!For a
philosopher, it is clear Grice is not being serious there. He is mocking an
‘ideal’-language philosopher (as Waissmann called them). Let’s revise the
word:By “counting” he means “DEEM.” He has said that “She is poor, but she is
honest,” is NOT CALCULABLE. So if an argument is not produced, this may not be
a matter of argument.Philosophers are OBSESSED, and this is Grice’s trick, with
ARGUMENT. Recall Grice on Hardie, “Unlike my father, who was rather blunt,
Hardie taught me to ARGUE for this or that reason.”His mention of “INTUITION”
is not perspicuous. He told J. M. Rountree that meaning is a matter of
INTUITION, not a theoretical concept within a theory.So it’s not like Grice
does not trust the intuition. So the point is TERMINOLOGICAL and
methodological. Terminological, in that this is a specfification of
‘conversationally,’ rather than for cases like “How rude!” (he just flouted the
maxim ‘be polite!’ but ‘be polite’ is not a CONVERSATIONAL maxim. Is Grice
implicating that nonconversational nonconventional implicate are not
calculable? We don’t think so.But he might.I think he will. Because in the case
of ‘aesthetic maxim,’ ‘moral maxim,’ and ‘social maxim’ – such as “be polite,”
– the calculation may involve such degree of gradation that you better not get
Grice started!“it will be a CONVENTIONAL implicaturum.”OK – So perhaps he does
allow that non-conventional non-conversational implicate ARE calculable.But he
may add:“Unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, it will not be a
conversational implicaturum; it will be a conventional implicaturum.”Strawson:
“And what nonconventional nonconversational implicate?Grice: You are right,
Strawon. Let me modify and refine the point: “It will be a dull, boring,
undetachable, conventional implicaturum – OR any of those dull implicate that
follow from (or result – I won’t use ‘generate’) one of those maxims that I
have explicitly said they were NOT conversational maxims.“For surely, there is
something very ‘contradictory-sounding’ to me saying that the implicaturum is
involved with the flouting of a maxim which is NOT a conversational maxim, and
yet that the maxim is a CONVERSATIONAL implicaturum.”“Therefore, I restrict
calculability to CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURUM, because it involves the
conversational maxims that contributors are expected to be reciprocal; whereas
you’ll agree that Queen Victoria does not need to be abide with ‘be polite,’ as
she frequently did not – “We are not amused, you fools! Only Gilbert and
Sullivan amuse me!””“To work out that a particular CONVERSATIONAL [never mind
nonconversational nonconventional] implicaturum is present, the hearer will
reply on the following data:”As opposed to ‘sense-datum.’Perhaps assumption,
alla Gettier, is better:“ (1) the conventional meaning of the words used,
together with the identity of any references that may be involved;”WoW Quite a
Bit. This is the reason why Grice entitled WoW his first book.In he hasn’t been
to ‘prison’ we are not using ‘prison’ as Witters does (“My language is my
prison”).Strawson: But is that the CONVENTIONAL meaning? Even for King Alfred?He hasn't been to prisonprison (n.) early 12c., from Old
French prisoun "captivity, imprisonment; prison; prisoner, captive"
(11c., Modern French prison), altered (by influence of pris "taken;"
see prize (n.2)) from earlier preson, from Vulgar Latin *presionem, from Latin
prensionem (nominative prensio), shortening of prehensionem (nominative
*prehensio) "a taking," noun of action from past participle stem of
prehendere "to take" (from prae- "before," see pre-, +
-hendere, from PIE root *ghend- "to seize, take"). "Captivity,"
hence by extension "a place for captives," the MAIN modern sense.”
(There are 34 other unmain ones). He hasn't been to a place for captives
yet.You mean he is one.Cf. He hasn't been to asylum.You mean Foucault?(2) the principle
of conversational helpfulness and this and that conversational maxim;”This is
more crucial seeing that the utterer may utter something which has no
conventional meaning?Cf. Austin, “Don’t ask for the meaning of a word! Less so
for the ‘conventional’ one!”What Grice needs is ‘the letter,’ so he can have
the ‘spirit’ as the implicaturum. Or he needs the lines, so he can have the implicaturum
as a reading ‘between the lines.’If the utterance is a gesture, like showing a
bandaged leg, or a Neapolitan rude gesture, it is difficult to distinguish or
to identify what is EXPLICITLY conveyed.By showing his bandaged leg, U
EXPLICITLY conveys that he has a bandaged leg. And IMPLICITLY conveys that he
cannot really play cricket.The requirement of ‘denotatum’ is even tricker,
“Swans are beautiful.” Denotata? Quantificational? Substitutional?In any case,
Grice is not being circular in requiring that the addressee should use as an
assumption or datum that U thinks that the expression E is generally uttered by
utterers when they m-intend that p.But there are tricks here.“(3) the context,
linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance;”Cf. Grice, “Is there a general
context for a general theory of context?”“(4) other items of background
knowledge;”So you don’t get:How is C getting on at the bank? My lips are sealed
Why do you care Mind your own business. Note that “he hasn’t been to prison
yet” (meaning the tautologous ‘he is potentially dishonest’) is the sort of
tricky answer to a tricky question! In asking, the asker KNOWS that he’ll get
that sort of reply knowing the utterer as he does. “and (5) the fact (or
supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are
available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be
the case.”This is Schiffer reported by Strawson.“A general pattern for the
working out of a conversational implicaturum might be given as follows:”Again
the abductive argument that any tutee worth of Hardie might expect 'He has said
that p;”Ie explicitly conveys that p.Note the essential oratio obliqua, or
that-clause.“there is no reason to suppose. that he is not observing the
maxims, or at least the principle of conversational helpfulness”That is, he is
not a prisoner of war, or anything.“He could not be doing this unless he
thought that q;”Or rather, even if more tautologically still, he could not be
doing so REASONABLY, as Austin would forbid, unless…’ For if the utterer is
IRRATIONAL (or always playing the flute) surely he CAN do it!“he knows (and
knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he
thinks that q IS required;”Assumed MUTUAL RATIONALITY, which Grice fails to
have added as assumption or datum. Cf. paraconsistent logics – “he is using
‘and’ and ‘or’ in a ‘deviant’ logical way, to echo Quine,” – He is an intuitionist,
his name is Dummett.“he has done nothing to stop me thinking that q; he intends
me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that q; and so he has
implicated that q.'”The ‘or’ is delightful, for m-intention requires
‘intention,’ but the intention figures in previous positions, so ‘willingess to
allow the addressee to think’ does PERFECTLY FINE! Especially at Oxford where
we are ever so subtle!
conversational
maxim of ambiguity avoidance, the: Grice thought that there should be a way
to characterise each maxim other than by its formulation. “It’s a good exercise
to grasp the concept behind the maxim.” Quality relates to Strength or
Fortitutde, the first to “at least,” the
second to “at most.” For Quality, he has a supra-maxim, “of trust” – the two
maxims are “maxim of candour” and “maxim of evidence”. Under relation, “maxim
of relevance.” Under manner, suprapaxim “maxim of perspicuity” and four maxims,
the first is exactly the same as the supramaxim, “maxim of percpicuity” now
becomes “maxim of obscurity avoidance” – or “maxim of clarity” – obscure and
clear are exact opposites – perspicuous [sic] is more of a trick. The second
maxin under mode is this one of ambiguity avoidance – perhaps there should be a
positive way to express this: be univocal. Do not be equivocal. Do not
equivocate, univocate! The next two, plus the extra one that makes this a
catalogue – the next is ‘maxim of brevity’ or “conversational maxim of
unnecessary prolixity avoidance,” here we see the ‘sic’: “Grice’s maxim of
conversational brevity, or of avoidance of conversationally unnecessary
prolixity.” The next is “maxim of order” – and the one that makes this a
decalogue: “maxim of conversational tailoring” --. a phonological or
orthographic form having multiple meanings senses, characters, semantic
representations assigned by the language system. A lexical ambiguity occurs
when a lexical item word is assigned multiple meanings by the language. It
includes a homonymy, i.e., distinct lexical items having the same sound or form
but different senses ‘knight’/’night’,
‘lead’ n./‘lead’ v., ‘bear’ n./‘bear’ v.; and b polysemy, i.e., a single
lexical item having multiple senses
‘lamb’ the animal/‘lamb’ the flesh, ‘window’ glass/‘window’ opening. The
distinction between homonymy and polysemy is problematic. A structural
ambiguity occurs when a phrase or sentence is correlated by the grammar of the
language with distinct constituent structures phrase markers or sequences of
phrase markers. Example: ‘Competent women and men should apply’ ‘[NP[NPCompetent women] and men] . . .’ vs.
‘[NPCompetent[NPwomen and men]] . . .’, where ‘NP’ stands for ‘noun phrase’. A
scope ambiguity is a structural ambiguity deriving from alternative
interpretations of scopes of operators see below. Examples: ‘Walt will diet and
exercise only if his doctor approves’
sentence operator scope: doctor’s approval is a necessary condition for
both diet and exercise wide scope ‘only if’ vs. approval necessary for exercise
but not for dieting wide scope ‘and’; ‘Bertie has a theory about every
occurrence’ quantifier scope: one grand
theory explaining all occurrences ‘a theory’ having wide scope over ‘every
occurrence’ vs. all occurrences explained by several theories together ‘every
occurrence’ having wide scope. The scope of an operator is the shortest full
subformula to which the operator is attached. Thus, in `A & B C’, the scope
of ‘&’ is ‘A & B’. For natural languages, the scope of an operator is
what it C-commands. X C-commands Y in a tree diagram provided the first branching
node that dominates X also dominates Y. An occurrence of an operator has wide
scope relative to that of another operator provided the scope of the former
properly includes scope of the latter. Examples: in ‘~A & B’, ’-’ has wide
scope over ‘&’; in ‘Dx Ey Fxy’, the existential quantifier has wide scope
over the universal quantifier. A pragmatic ambiguity is duality of use resting
on pragmatic principles such as those which underlie reference and
conversational implicaturum; e.g., depending on contextual variables, ‘I don’t
know that he’s right’ can express doubt or merely the denial of genuine
knowledge.
maxim of conversational maximin
informativeness: a maxim combining the maximum and the minimum.
maxim of maximal conversational
informativeness: a maxim only dealing with the ‘maximum,’ not the ‘minimum,’
which is a problem for Grice. “Why regulate volunteerness?”
maxim of minimal conversational
informativeness: maxim dealing with the minimum, not the maximum.
maxim of conversational trust: Grice preferred
‘trust’ to ‘truth.’ Grice: “One of the few useful items in the English
philosophical vocabulary: a word that encompasses the volitional and the
non-volitional. Of course, the same could be said of ‘verum,’ cognate with
German ‘wahr.’
maxim of conversational veracity: Grice:
“When I’m feeling Latinate, you’ll hear me refer to this as the maxim of
conversational veracity – The Romans distinguished the verax and the mendax. I
don’t.”
maxim of conversational evidential
adequacy: Grice: “We need a maxim to ensure adequate evidence – this would be
otiose in the volitional – but then we can always generalise the ‘evidence’ to
‘ground,’ or reason, which is what my American tutee, R. J. Fogelin, did.
maxim of conversational relevance: Grice:
“Personally, I prefer ‘relation,’ but Strawson doesn’t. But then Strawson
thinks this is ‘unimportant.’ Not to me, ‘relevant,’ like ‘important,’ are the
most unrelevant and unimportant pieces, especially as abused by an Oxford
philosopher who should know better!”
maxim of conversational perspicuity:
Grice: “D. H. Lewis made me ‘hate’ clarity – “clarity is not enough – plus,
it’s metaphorical? How can I render clear what is essentially obscure? In fact,
I would go on to say that the task of the philosopher is to dramatise the
mundane, to render obscure what seems clear. Perspicuity is unclear enough and
will do fine.”
maxim of conversational clarity, or maxim
of conversational obscurity avoidance: Grice: “It might be said that ‘be
perspicuous’ YIELDS ‘avoid obscurity,’ alla ‘be clear, don’t be obscure.’ But I
prefer to be repetitive, if not AS repetitive as the Jewish God – the Jews have
more than ten commandments!”
maxim of conversational ambiguity
avoidance, maxim of conversational equivocation avoidance, maxim of conversational
univocity: Grice: “This is a teaser, as how ‘ambiguous’ can ‘ambiguous’ be? And
why should I dumb down my wit to help my addressee? Dorothy Parker never did!”
maxim of conversational brevity – or maxim of conversationally unnecessary prolixity avoidance – Grice: “I would call it maxim of redundancy.” “Or maxim of redundancy avoidance,” or maxim of conversational entropy.” A: Did you watch the programme? – Grice: A friend suggested this to me. B: No, I was in a blacked-out city. Versus “No, I was in New York, which was blacked-out. Grice: "In response to my exploration on conversation, I was given an example by a fellow playgroup member which seems to me, as far as it goes, to provide a welcome kind of support for the picture I am putting forward in that it appears to exhibit a kind of interaction between the members of my list of conversational maxims to which I had not really paid due attention — perhaps for the matter not really concerning directly philosophical methodology.” Suppose that it is generally known that Oxford and London were blacked out the day prior. The following conversation takes place: A: Did Smith see the show on the bobby box last night? Grice: “It will be CONVERSATIONALLY unobjectionable for B, who knows that Smith was in London, to reply, B: No, he was in a blacked-out city. "B could have said that Smith was in *London*, thereby providing a further piece of information.” “However, I should like to be able to argue that, in preferring the conversational move featuring the indefinite descriptor, ‘a blacked-out city' B implicates (or communicates the implicaturum) (by the maxims prescribing relation and redundancy avoidance) a more appropriate piece of information, viz., why_ Smith was prevented from seeing the ‘show’ on the bobby box.” "B could have provided BOTH pieces of information, in an over-prolixic version of the above: ‘Smith was in London , which, as every schoolboy knows, was blacked-out yesterday.” — thereby insulting A. But THE ***GAIN****, as Bentham would put it, would have been **INSUFFICIENT** to **JUSTIFY** the additional conversational **COST**.” “Or so I think.” Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Bobby-box implicatura.”
maxim of conversational order: Grice:
“Order is vague: first is the generalised, then the particularized.” By “the
very particularized,” Grice means ‘temporal ordered sequence.” E. g. “Were I to
say, Lady Ogilvy fainted and took arsenic, Strawson would get a different
feeling if I were to utter instead, ‘Lady Ogilvy took arsenic and fainted.’”
maxim of conversational tailoring: ‘The
king of France is not bald – France is a monarchy.”
conversational
point:
Grice distinguishes between ‘point’ and ‘conversational point.’ “What’s the
good of being quoted by another philosopher on the point of ‘point.’?” But that
is what Winch does. So, as a revenge, Grice elaborated on the point. P. London-born philosopher. He quotes Grice in a Royal Philosophy talk: “Grice’s
point is that we should distinguish the truth of one’s remark form the point of
one’s remarks – Grice’s example is: “Surely I have neither any doubt nor any
desire to deny that the pillar box in front of me is red, and yet I won’t
hesitate to say that it seems red to me” – Surely pointless, but an incredible
truth meant to refute G. A. Paul
conversational reason. With ‘reason,’ Grice is following Ariskant. There’s the
‘ratio’ and there’s the “Vernunft.” “To converse” can mean to have sex (cf.
know) so one has to be careful. Grice is using ‘conversational’ casually.
First, he was aware of the different qualifications for ‘implication’. There is
Nowell-Smith’s contextual implication and C. K. Grant’s ‘pragmatic
implication.’ So he chose ‘conversational implication’ himself. Later, when
narrowing down the notion, he distinguished between ‘conversational
implication’ and ‘non-conversational implication’: “Thank you. B: You’re
welcome.” If B is following the maxim, ‘be polite,’ the implication that he is
pleased he was able to assist his emissor is IMPLICATED but not
conversationally so. It is not a ‘conversational implication.’ Grice needs to
restrict the notion for philosophical purposes. Both for the framework of his
theory (it is easier to justify transcendentally conversational implication
than it is non-conversational implication). Note that ‘I am pleased I was able
to assist’ is CANCELLABLE or defeatible, so that’s not the issue. In any case,
both ‘conversational impication’ and these type of calculable
‘non-conversational’ implication still yielding from some ‘maxim’ (such as ‘be
polite’) Grice covers under the generic “non-conventional” precisely because
they can be defeated. When it comes to NON-DEFEASIBLE implicatura, Grice uses
‘conventional implication’ (as in “She was poor but she was honest.”). Grice
did not find these fun. And it shows. Strawson stuck with them, but his
philosophising about them ain’t precisely ‘fun.’ Used in Retrospective, p. 369.
Also: conversational rationality. Surely, “principle of conversational
rationality” sounds otiose. Expectation of mutual rationality sounds better.
Critique of conversational reason sounds best! Grice is careful here. When he
provides a reductive analysis of ‘reasoning,’ this goes as follows: the
reasoner reasons from premise to conclusion. That’s the analysandum. What’s the
analysans? At least it involves TWO clauses: If the reasoner reasons from
premise to conclusion, it is assumed that he BELIEVES that the premise obtains;
and he believes that the conclusion obtains. This has to be generalised to
cover the desiderative, using ‘accept.’ He accepts that the premise obtains,
and he accepts that the conclusion obtains. But there is obviously a SECOND
condition: that the conclusion follows from the premise! He uses ‘demonstrably’
for that, or the demonstratum.’ He is open as to what kind of yielding is involved
because he wants to allow for inductive reasoning and abductive reasoning, not
just deductive reasoning. AND THERE IS A TYPICALLY GRICEIAN third condition,
involving CAUSATION. He had used ‘cause’ in reductive analyses before – if not
so much in ‘meaning,’ due to Urmson’s counterexample involving ‘bribery,’ where
‘cause’ does not seem to do – but in his analysis of ‘intending’ for the
British Academy. So at Oxford he promotes this THIRD causal condition as
involving that, naturally enough, it is the rasoner’s BELIEF that demonstrably
q follows from p, which CAUSES the reasoner TO BELIEVE (or more generally,
accept) that the conclusion obtains. Grice is happy with that belief in the
validity of the demonstration ‘populates’ the world of alethic beliefs, and
does not concern with generalising that into a generic ‘acceptance.’ The word
‘rationalist’ is anathema at Oxford, because tutor after tutor has brainwashed
their tutees that the distinction is ‘empiricst-rationalist’ and that at Oxford
we are ‘empiricists.’ So Grice is really being ‘heretic’ here in the words of
G. P. Baker. demonstratum: The Eng. word
“reason” and the Fr. word “raison” are
both formed on the basis of Roman “reor,” to count or calculate, whence think,
believe. The Roman verb translates the Grecian “λέγειν,” two of whose principal
meanings it retains, but only two: count and think. The third principal meaning
of the Grecian term, speak, discourse, which designates a third type of putting
into relation and proportion, is rendered by other Roman series: “dicere”
(originally cognate with ‘deixis,’ and so not necessarily ‘verbal’), “loquor,”
“orationem habere” (the most ‘vocal’ one, as it relates to the ‘mouth,’ cf.
‘orality’) or “sermonem habere,” so that ultimately the Grecian λόγος is
approached by Roman philosophers by means of a syntagm, “ratio et oratio,”
reason and discourse. Each vernacular fragments the meaning of logos into a
greater or lesser. Cf. ‘principium reddendae rationis.’ Rationality functions
as a principle of the intelligibility of the world and history, particularly in
Hegel. Then there’s The Partitions of Reason and Semantic diffractions.
Although there is no language that retains under a single word all the meanings
of logos except by bringing logos into the language in question, the
distribution of these meanings is more or less close to Roman. For the
classical Fr. word “raison,” which
maintains almost all the Roman meanings including the mathematical sense of
proportion, as in “raison d’une série,” or “raison inverse,” a contemporary Fr.
-G. dictionary proposes the following
terms: Vernunft, Verstand rational faculty. This example shows that the whole
of the vocabulary is thus mobilized. Reason and faculties We can distinguish
between two interfering systems. The first designates reason, identified with
thought in general, in its relationship to a bodily and/or mental instance. The
second situates reason in a hierarchy of faculties whose organization it
determines. Regarding the first system, as it is expressed in various
languages, where one will find studies of the main distortions, especially
around the expressions of the Roman ‘anima.’ Philosophers especially emphasize
the ways of designating reason and mind that appear to be the most irreducible
from one language to another. Regarding the second system, and the partitions
that do not coincide. For Grice, ‘to understand’ presupposes ‘rationality – not
for Kant, who sticks with Verstand/Vernunft distinction. Ratio speculatum,
praticatum. From Aristotle to Kant, two great domains of rationality have been
distinguished: theory, or speculative reason, and practice. The lurality of
meanings, each represented by one or more specific words. The first question,
from the point of view of the difference of languages, is thus that of the
breadth of the meaning of “reason” or its equivalents, and of the systems
diffracting the meanings of logos and then of ratio. But another complex of
problems immediately arises. The Roman “ratio” absorbs the meanings of other
Grecian terms, such as νοῦς and διάνοια, which are also translated in other,
more technical ways, such as intellectus; so that reason, in the sense of
rationality, is a comprehensive term, whereas ‘reason’ in the sense of
intellect or understanding is a singular and differentiated faculty. However,
none of the comprehensive terms or systems of opposition coincides with those
of another language, which are moreover changing. Then there’s Reason and
Rationality: man, animal, god. Since Aristotle’s definition of man as an animal
endowed with logos, which Roman writers rendered by “animal rationale” —
omitting the discursive dimension—reason, or the logos, is a specific
difference that defines man by his difference from other living beings and/or
his participation in a divine or cosmic nature. Reason is opposed to madness
understood as de-mentia. More broadly, reason is conceived in terms of
difference from what does not belong to its domain and falls outside its
immediate law, but which man may, in certain ways, share with other animals,
such as sensation, passion, imagination, and possibly memory. Rationality and
the principle of intelligibility. Rationality, defined by the logos, is
connected with logic as the art of speaking and thinking, and with its founding
principles. Les quodlibet cinq, six et sept. Ed. by M. de Wulf and J. Hoffmans. Louvain,
Belg.: Institut supérieur de Philosophie de l’Université, 191 Hegel, Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich. Elements of the Phil.
of Right. Tr. H. Nisbet and
ed. by Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge
, . . Science of LogiTr. V. Miller.
London: Allen and Unwin, . . Werke. Ed.
by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel. 20 vols. FrankfuSuhrkamp, .
Heidegger, Martin. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Tr. Albert Hofstadter Bloomington: Indiana , . .
Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Tr. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington:
Indiana , . Hume, D. . A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. by D.
Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton. Oxford: Oxford , . Kant, Immanuel. Critique
of Practical Reason. Translated and ed.
by Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge , . . Critique of Pure Reason. 2nd
ed. Tr. N. Kemp-Smith. : Macmillan, 193
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz. Extraits
des manuscrits. Ed. by Louis Couturat. :
Presses Universitaires de France, 190 Reprint. Hildesheim, Ger.: Olms, . .
Philosophical Essays. Translated and ed.
by Roger Ariew and Dan Garber. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, . .
Philosophical Papers and Letters. 2nd ed. Ed.
and Tr. Leroy E. Loemker.
Dordrecht, Neth.: D. Reidel, . . Die philosophischen Schriften. Ed. by I. Gerhardt. 7 vols. Berlin, 187590.
Reprint. Hildesheim, Ger.: Olms, . . Leibnizens mathematische
Schriften. Ed. by I. Gerhardt. 7
vols. Berlin, 18496 . Textes inédits d’après les manuscrits de la Bibliothèque
provinciale de Hanovre. Ed. by Gaston
Gru2 vols. : Presses Universitaires de France, 194 Locke, J.. An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. by
P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon, . Micraelius, J. . Lexicon philosophicum
terminorum philosophis usitatorum. 2nd ed. Stettin, 166 Paulus, J.. Henri de
Gand: Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique. : Vrin, 193 Schelling,
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph. Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe. Ed. by Jörg Jantzen, T. Buchheim, Jochem Hennigfeld, Wilhelm G.
Jacobs, and Siegbert Peetz. 40 vols. StuttgaFrommann-Holzboog, . . Of the I as
the Principle of Phil. , or On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge. In The
Unconditional in Human Knowledge: Four Early Essays 17949 Translated with
commentary by F. Marti. Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell , . Spinoza, Baruch. Complete
Works. With tr.s by Samuel Shirley. Ed.
by Michael L. Morgan. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, . . Oper2nd ed. Ed. by Gebhardt. 5 vols. Heidelberg: Carl
Winters.
conversational
trustworthiness
– or just trust. Principle of Conversational trustworthiness -- Conversational
desideratum of maximal evidence, information bearing on the truth or falsity of
a proposition. In philosophical discussions, a person’s evidence is generally
taken to be all the information a person has, positive or negative, relevant to
a proposition. The notion of evidence used in philosophy thus differs from the
ordinary notion according to which physical objects, such as a strand of hair
or a drop of blood, counts as evidence. One’s information about such objects
could be evidence in the philosophical sense. The concept of evidence plays a
central role in our understanding of knowledge and rationality. According to a
traditional and widely held view, one has knowledge only when one has a true
belief based on very strong evidence. Rational belief is belief based on
adequate evidence, even if that evidence falls short of what is needed for
knowledge. Many traditional philosophical debates, such as those about our
knowledge of the external world, the rationality of religious belief, and the
rational basis for moral judgments, are largely about whether the evidence we
have in these areas is sufficient to yield knowledge or rational belief. The
senses are a primary source of evidence. Thus, for most, if not all, of our
beliefs, ultimately our evidence traces back to sensory experience. Other
sources of evidence include memory and the testimony of others. Of course, both
of these sources rely on the senses in one way or another. According to
rationalist views, we can also get evidence for some propositions through mere
reason or reflection, and so reason is an additional source of evidence. The
evidence one has for a belief may be conclusive or inconclusive. Conclusive
evidence is so strong as to rule out all possibility of error. The discussions
of skepticism show clearly that we lack conclusive evidence for our beliefs
about the external world, about the past, about other minds, and about nearly
any other topic. Thus, an individual’s perceptual experiences provide only
inconclusive evidence for beliefs about the external world since such
experiences can be deceptive or hallucinatory. Inconclusive, or prima facie,
evidence can always be defeated or overridden by subsequently acquired
evidence, as, e.g., when testimonial evidence in favor of a proposition is
overridden by the evidence provided by subsequent experiences. evidentialism, in the philosophy of religion,
the view that religious beliefs can be rationally accepted only if they are
supported by one’s “total evidence,” understood to mean all the other
propositions one knows or justifiably believes to be true. Evidentialists
typically add that, in order to be rational, one’s degree of belief should be
proportioned to the strength of the evidential support. Evidentialism was
formulated by Locke as a weapon against the sectarians of his day and has since
been used by Clifford among many others to attack religious belief in general.
A milder form of evidentialism is found in Aquinas, who, unlike Clifford,
thinks religion can meet the evidentialist challenge. A contrasting view is
fideism, best understood as the claim that one’s fundamental religious
convictions are not subject to independent rational assessment. A reason often
given for this is that devotion to God should be one’s “ultimate concern,” and
to subject faith to the judgment of reason is to place reason above God and
make of it an idol. Proponents of fideism include Tertullian, Kierkegaard, Karl
Barth, and some Vittersians. A third view, which as yet lacks a generally
accepted label, may be termed experientialism; it asserts that some religious
beliefs are directly justified by religious experience. Experientialism differs
from evidentialism in holding that religious beliefs can be rational without
being supported by inferences from other beliefs one holds; thus theistic
arguments are superfluous, whether or not there are any sound ones available.
But experientialism is not fideism; it holds that religious beliefs may be
directly grounded in religious experience wtihout the mediation of other
beliefs, and may be rationally warranted on that account, just as perceptual
beliefs are directly grounded in perceptual experience. Recent examples of
experientialism are found in Plantinga’s “Reformed Epistemology,” which asserts
that religious beliefs grounded in experience can be “properly basic,” and in
the contention of Alston that in religious experience the subject may be
“perceiving God.”
converse. 1 Narrowly, the result of the
immediate logical operation called conversion on any categorical proposition,
accomplished by interchanging the subject term and the predicate term of that
proposition. Thus, the converse of the categorical proposition ‘All cats are
felines’ is ‘All felines are cats’. 2 More broadly, the proposition obtained
from a given ‘if . . . then . . .’ conditional proposition by interchanging the
antecedent and the consequent clauses, i.e., the propositions following the
‘if’ and the ‘then’, respectively; also, the argument obtained from an argument
of the form ‘P; therefore Q’ by interchanging the premise and the
conclusion. converse, outer and inner,
respectively, the result of “converting” the two “terms” or the relation verb
of a relational sentence. The outer converse of ‘Abe helps Ben’ is ‘Ben helps
Abe’ and the inner converse is ‘Abe is helped by Ben’. In simple, or atomic,
sentences the outer and inner converses express logically equivalent
propositions, and thus in these cases no informational ambiguity arises from
the adjunction of ‘and conversely’ or ‘but not conversely’, despite the fact
that such adjunction does not indicate which, if either, of the two converses
intended is meant. However, in complex, or quantified, relational sentences such
as ‘Every integer precedes some integer’ genuine informational ambiguity is
produced. Under normal interpretations of the respective sentences, the outer
converse expresses the false proposition that some integer precedes every
integer, the inner converse expresses the true proposition that every integer
is preceded by some integer. More complicated considerations apply in cases of
quantified doubly relational sentences such as ‘Every integer precedes every
integer exceeding it’. The concept of scope explains such structural ambiguity:
in the sentence ‘Every integer precedes some integer and conversely’,
‘conversely’ taken in the outer sense has wide scope, whereas taken in the
inner sense it has narrow scope.
convey: used in index to WoW. Etymology is
funny. From con-via – cum-via, go on the road with.
coonway: a., english
philosopher whose Principia philosophiae antiquissimae et recentissimae 1690;
English translation, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy,
1692 proposes a monistic ontology in which all created things are modes of one
spiritual substance emanating from God. This substance is made up of an
infinite number of hierarchically arranged spirits, which she calls monads.
Matter is congealed spirit. Motion is conceived not dynamically but vitally.
Lady Conway’s scheme entails a moral explanation of pain and the possibility of
universal salvation. She repudiates the dualism of both Descartes and her
teacher, Henry More, as well as the materialism of Hobbes and Spinoza. The work
shows the influence of cabalism and affinities with the thought of the mentor
of her last years, Francis Mercurius van Helmont, through whom her philosophy
became known to Leibniz.
co-operatum: Grice previously used ‘help’ – which has a Graeco-Roman
counterpart -- Grice is very right in noting that ‘helpfulness’ does not
‘equate’ cooperation. Correspondingly he changed the principle of
conversational helpfulness into the principle of conversational co-operation.
He also points that one has to distinguish between the general theisis that
conversation is rational from the thesis that the particular form of
rationality that conversation takes is cooperative rationality, which most
libertarians take as ‘irrationality’ personified, almost! Grice is obsessed
with this idea that ‘co-operation’ need not just be ‘conversational.’ Indeed,
his way to justify a ‘rationalist’ approach is through analogy. If he can find
‘co-operative’ traits in behaviour other than ‘conversational,’ the greater the
chance to generalise, and thus justify. The co-operation would be
self-justifying. co-operation. The hyphen in Strawson and Wiggins (p. 520). Grice
found ‘co-operative’ too Marxist, and would prefer ‘help,’ as in ‘mutual help.’
This element of ‘mutuality’ is necessary. And it is marked grammatical, with
the FIRST person and the SECOND person. The third need NOT be a person – can be
a dog (as in “Fido is shaggy”). The mututality is necessary in that the
emissor’s intention involves the belief that his recipient is rational. You
cannot co-operate with a rock. You cannot co-operate with a vegetal. You cannot
cooperate with a non-rational animal. You can ONLY cooperate with a co-rational
agent. Animal co-operation poses a nice side to the Griceian idea. Surely the
stereotype is a member of species S cooperating with another specimen of the
same species. But then there are great examples of ‘sym-biosis’: the crane that
gets rid off the hippopotamus’s ticks. Is this cooperation? Is this
intentional? If Grice thinks that there is a ‘mechanistically derivable’
explanation,, it isn’t. He did not necessarily buy ‘bio-sociological’
approaches. Which was a problem, because we don’t have much philosophical
seriouis discourse on ‘cooperation’ at the general level Grice is aiming at.
Except in ethics, which is biased. So it is no wonder that Grice had to rely on
‘meta-ethics’ to even conceptualise the field of cooperation: the maximin
becomes a balance between a principle of conversational egoism and a principle
of conversational altruism. He later found the egoism-tag as ‘understood.’ And
his ‘altruism’ became ‘helpfulness,’ became ‘benevolence,’ and became
‘co-operation.’
copulatum: It was an Oxonian exercise to trace the ‘copula.’ “I’ve
been working like a dog, should be sleeping like a log.” Where is the copula:
Lennon is a dog-like worker – Lennon is a potential log-like sleeper.” Grice
uses ‘copula’ in PPQ. The term is
sometimes used ambiguously, for ‘conjunctum.’ A conjunctive is called a
copulative. But Grice obviously narrows down the use of copulatum to izz and
hazz. He is having in mind Strawson.The formula does not allow for differences
in tense and grammatical number; nor for the enormous class of * all
'-sentences which do not contain, as their main verb, the verb * to be '. We might
try to recast the sentences so that they at least fitted into one of the two
patterns * All x is y ' or ' All x are y ' ; but the results would be, as
English, often clumsy andt sometimes absurd. for Aristotle, 'Socrates is a man'
is true "in virtue of his being that thing which constitutes existing for
him (being which constitutes his mode of existence)," Hermann Weidemann,
"In Defense of Aristotle's Theory of Predication," p. 84— only so
long as that "being" be taken as an assertion of being per se. But
Weidemann wants to take it merely copulatively. In "Prädikation," p.
1196, he says that when 'is' is used as tertium adiacens it has no meaning by
itself, but merely signifies the connection of subject and predicate. Cf. his
"Aristoteles über das isolierte Aussagenwort," p. 154. H. P. Grice,
"Aristotle on the Multiplicity of Being," also rejects an existential
reading of tertium adiacens and pushes for a copulative one. Cf. Alan Code,
"Aristotle: Essence and Accident," pp. 414-7. Aristotle has connected the semantic multiplicity in the copula not
with variation between predicates of one subject, but with variation between
essential (per se)predications upon different (indeed categorially
different) subjects (such ...eads
me to wonder whether Aristotle may be maintaining not only that the copula exhibits
semantic ...An extended treatment of my views about izzing and hazzing can
be found in Alan. A crucial ... on occasion admit catégorial variation in
the sense of the copulative 'is', evidently is ... Aristotle has
connected the semantic multiplicity in the copula not with variation ...with
the copulative 'is';
so he rather strangely interprets the last remark. (1017a27-30) as alluding to
semantic multiplicity in
the copula as being.
(supposedly) a consequence of semantic multiplicity in the existential
'is'. This interpretation seems difficult to defend. When Aristotle says that
predicates sometimes say what a thing is, sometimes what is it like (its
quality), sometimes how much it is (its quantity) and so on, he seems to be
saying that if we consider the range of predicates which can be applied to
some item, for example to a substance like Socrates or a cow,
these predicates are categorically various, and so the uses of the copula in the ascription
of these predicates will undergo corresponding variation"H. P.
Grice brings the question he had considered with J. L. Austin and P. F.
Strawson at Oxford about Aristotle’s categories.In “Categoriae,” Aristotle
distinguishes two sorts of case of the application of word or phrase to a range
of situations. In one sort of case, both the word and a single definition
(account, “logos”) apply throughout that range. In the other sort of case, the
word but no single definition applies through the range.These two sorts of case
have a different nature. In the first case, the word is applied synonymously
(of better as “sunonuma” – literally “sun-onuma”, cognomen). In the second case
the word is applied homonymously (or better “homonuma”, or aequi-vocally,
literally “homo-numa.”)Grice notes that a homonymous application has some sort
of sub-division which Aristotle calls "paronymy" (“paronuma”),
literally ‘para onuma.’To put it roughly, homonyms have multiple meanings –
what Grice has as “semantic multiplicity.”Synonyms have one meaning or ONE
SENSE, but apply to different kinds of thing.A paronym, such as ‘be,’ derives
from other things of a different kind. Paronyms display a ‘UNIFIED semantic
multiplicity,’ if that’s not too oxymoronic: how can the multiplicity be
unified while remaining a multiplicity? Aristotle states, confusingly, that
"being is said in many ways". As Grice notes, ‘good’ (agathon) also
is a paronym that displays unified semantic multiplicity.In Nichomachean
Ethics, even more confusingly, Aristotle says that "good is said in as
many ways as being". He doesn’t number the ways.So the main goal for Grice
is to answer the question: If, as Aristotle suggests, at least some expressions
connected with the notion of "being" exhibit semantic multiplicity,
of which expressions is the suggestion true? Grice faces the question of
existential being and Semantic Multiplicity. Grice stresses that Semantic
Multiplicity of "be" is not
only the case of it interpretation. Other words he wants to know in what way of
interpretation of this word the philosophers can detect the SM. Generally
speaking there are four possible interpretations of "being": First,
"be" is taken to mean "exist.”Second, "be" is taken as
a copula in a predication statement.Third, "be" is taken for
expressing the identity.Fourth, "Being" is considered to be a noun
(equivalent to ‘object' or ‘entity') – subjectification, category shift:
“Smith’s being tall suggests he is an athlete.” (cfr. A. G. N. Flew on the
‘rubbish’ that adding ‘the’ to ‘self’ results in – contra J. R. Jones).
Philosophers have some problems for this kind of theory with separating
interpretations from each other. It is natural for thinkers to unite the first
and the fourth. The object or entity should be the things which already exist.
So the SM would attach to such a noun as "entity" if, and only if, it
also attaches to the word "exist". Furthermore, it seems to be a good
idea to unite the first and the third. In some ways theorist can paraphrase the
word "exist" in the terms of self-identity. Grice gives an example:
“Julius Caesar exists if and only if Julius Caesar is identical for Julius
Caesar.” Cf. Grice on ‘relative identity.’So the philosophers should
investigate SM in two possible interpretations – when "be" is
understood as "exist" and when "be" is understood as
copula. From Aristotle's point of view ‘being’ is predicated of everything.
From this statement, Grice draws the conclusion that "exist" can
apply to every thing, even a square circle.This word should signify a plurality
of universals and exhibits semantic multiplicity. But Grice continue his
analyses and tries to show, that "exist" has not merely SM, but
UNIFIED semantic multiplicity. God forbid that he breaks M. O. R., Modifed
Occam’s Razor – Semantic multiplicies are not to be multiplied unificatory
necessity.”In “Metaphysics,” Aristotle says that whatever things are signified
by the "forms of predication". Philosophers understood the forms of
predication (praedicabilium, praedicamentum) as a category. So in this way
"being" has as many significations as there are forms of predication.
"Be" in this case indicates what a thing is, what is like or how much
it is and ctr. And no reasons to make a difference between two utterances like
"man walks (flourishes)" and "the man is walking
(flourishing)" – cfr. Strawson on no need to have ‘be’ explicitly in the
surface form, which render some utterances absurd. Grice says that it is not a
problem with interpretation of verb-forms like ‘walks' and ‘flourishes' while
we can replace them by expression in a canonical form like ‘is walking' and ‘is
flourishing'. Aristotle names them as canonical in form within the multiplicity
of use of "be" because ‘is’ is not existential, but copulative.Cf.
Descartes, I think therefore I am – I am a res cogitans, ergo I am a res.
"When Aristotle says that predicates sometimes say what a thing is,
sometimes what is it like (its quality), sometimes how much it is (its
quantity) and so on, he seems to be saying that, if we consider the range of
predicates which can be applied to some item, for example to a substance like
Socrates or a cow, these predicates are categorically various, and so the uses
of the copula in the ascription of these predicates will undergo corresponding
variation" It means that, from Aristotle's point of view, "Socrates
is F" is not an essential predication, where "F" shows the item
in the category C. So the logical form of the proposition “Socrates is F” is
understood as "Socrates has something which is (C) F" where is (C)
represent essential connection to category C. In conclusion it can be said that
the copula is a matter of the logical nature of constant connection expressed
by "has" and a categorical variant relation expressed by essential
"is". So we have both types of interpretation: as existence and as a
copula. (Our gratitude to P. A.
Sobolevsky). ases of ''Unified Semantic
Multiplicity'' (USM). Prominent among examples of USM is the
application of the word 'be'; according to. Aristotle, “being is said
in ... Aristotle and the alleged multiplicity of being (or
something). Grice is all for focal unity. Or, to echo Jones, if there is semantic
multiplicity (homonymy), it is in the
end UNIFIED semantic multiplicity (paronymy). Or something. Copula – H. P.
Grice on Aristotle on the copula (“Aristotle on the multiplicity of being”) --
copula, in logic, a form of the verb ‘to be’ that joins subject and predicate
in singular and categorical propositions. In ‘George is wealthy’ and ‘Swans are
beautiful’, e.g., ‘is’ and ‘are’, respectively, are copulas. Not all
occurrences of forms of ‘be’ count as copulas. In sentences such as ‘There are
51 states’, ‘are’ is not a copula, since it does not join a subject and a
predicate, but occurs simply as a part of the quantifier term ‘there are’.
corpus: Grice would not have gone to Oxford
had his talent not been in the classics, Greek and Latin. As a Midlander, he
was sent to Corpus. At the time, most of Oxford was oriented towards the
classics, or Lit. Hum. (Philosophia). At some point, each college attained some
stereotypical fame, which Grice detested (“Corpus is for classicists”). By this
time, Grice, after a short stay at Merton, accepted the fellowship at St.
John’s, which was “a different animal.” In them days, there were only two
tutorial fellows in philosophy, Scots Mabbott, and English Grice. But Grice
also was “University Lecturer in Philosophy,” which meant he delivered seminars
for tutees all over Oxford. St. John’s keeps a record of all the tutees by
Grice. They include, alphabetically, a few good names. Why is Corpus so
special? Find out! History of “Corpus Christi.” Cf. St. John’s. Cf. Merton.
Each should have an entry. Corpus is Grice’s alma mater – so crucial. Hardieian: you only have one tutor in your life, and Grice’s
was Hardie. So an exploration on Hardie may be in order. Grice hastens to add
that he only learned ‘form,’ not matter, from Hardie, but the ethical and
Aristotelian approach he also admitted. Corpus -- Grice, “Personal identity” –
soul and body -- disembodiment, the immaterial state of existence of a person
who previously had a body. Disembodiment is thus to be distinguished from
nonembodiment or immateriality. God and angels, if they exist, are
non-embodied, or immaterial. By contrast, if human beings continue to exist after
their bodies die, then they are disembodied. As this example suggests,
disembodiment is typically discussed in the context of immortality or survival
of death. It presupposes a view according to which persons are souls or some
sort of immaterial entity that is capable of existing apart from a body.
Whether it is possible for a person to become disembodied is a matter of
controversy. Most philosophers who believe that this is possible assume that a
disembodied person is conscious, but it is not obvious that this should be the
case. Corpus -- Grice’s body --
embodiment, the bodily aspects of human subjectivity. Embodiment is the central
theme in European phenomenology, with its most extensive treatment in the works
of Maurice MerleauPonty. Merleau-Ponty’s account of embodiment distinguishes
between “the objective body,” which is the body regarded as a physiological
entity, and “the phenomenal body,” which is not just some body, some particular
physiological entity, but my or your body as I or you experience it. Of course,
it is possible to experience one’s own body as a physiological entity. But this
is not typically the case. Typically, I experience my body tacitly as a unified
potential or capacity for doing this and that
typing this sentence, scratching that itch, etc. Moreover, this sense
that I have of my own motor capacities expressed, say, as a kind of bodily
confidence does not depend on an understanding of the physiological processes
involved in performing the action in question. The distinction between the
objective and phenomenal body is central to understanding the phenomenological
treatment of embodiment. Embodiment is not a concept that pertains to the body
grasped as a physiological entity. Rather it pertains to the phenomenal body
and to the role it plays in our object-directed experiences.
cosmologicum. Grice systematized metaphysics quite carefully. He
distinguished between eschatology (or the theory of categories) and ontology
proper. Within ontology, there is ‘ontologia generalis’ and ‘ontologia
specialis.’ There are at least two branches of ‘ontologia specialis’:
‘cosmologia’ and ‘anthropologia.’ Grice would often refer to the ‘world’ in
toto. For example, in “Meaning revisited,” when he speaks of the ‘triangle’:
world-denotatum; signum-emissor, and soul. Grice was never a solipsist, and
most of his theories are ‘causal’ in nature, including that of meaning and
perception. As such, he was constantly fighting against acosmism. While not one
of his twelve labours, he took a liking for the coinage. ‘Acosmism’ is formed
in analogy to ‘atheism,’ meaning the denial of the ultimate reality of the
world. Ernst Platner used it in 1776 to describe Spinoza’s philosophy, arguing
that Spinoza did not intend to deny “the existence of the Godhead, but the existence
of the world.” Maimon, Fichte, Hegel, and others make the same claim. By the
time of Feuerbach it was also used to characterize a basic feature of
Christianity: the denial of the world or worldliness. Cosmologicum -- emanationism, a doctrine
about the origin and ontological structure of the world, most frequently
associated with Plotinus and other Neoplatonists, according to which everything
else that exists is an emanation from a primordial unity, called by Plotinus
“the One.” The first product of emanation from the One is Intelligence noûs, a
realm resembling Plato’s world of Forms. From Intelligence emanates Soul
psuche, conceived as an active principle that imposes, insofar as that is
possible, the rational structure of Intelligence on the matter that emanates
from Soul. The process of emanation is typically conceived to be necessary and
timeless: although Soul, for instance, proceeds from Intelligence, the notion
of procession is one of logical dependence rather than temporal sequence. The One
remains unaffected and undiminished by emanation: Plotinus likens the One to
the sun, which necessarily emits light from its naturally infinite abundance
without suffering change or loss of its own substance. Although emanationism
influenced some Jewish, Christian, and Islamic thinkers, it was incompatible
with those theistic doctrines of divine activity that maintained that God’s
creative choice and the world thus created were contingent, and that God can,
if he chooses, interact directly with individual creatures.
cotton onto the implicaturum:
this is not cognate with the plant. It’s Welsh, rather.Strawson’s and Wiggins’s
example of the ‘suggestio falsi’ – or alternative to Grice’s tutee example.
Since Strawson and Wiggins are presenting the thing to the ultra-prestigious
British Academy, they thought a ‘tutee’ example would not be prestigious
enough. So they have two philosophers, Strawson and Grice, talking about a
third party, another philosopher, well known by his mood outbursts. They are
assessing the third party’s philosophical abilities at their London club.
Strawson volunteers: “And Smith?”. Grice responds: “If he had a more angelic
temperament…” Strawson, “like a fool, I rushed in – Strawson Wiggins p. 520. The
angelic temperament. To like someone or something; to view someone or something
favorably. ... After we explained our plan again, the rest of the group
seemed to cotton onto it.
2. To begin to understand something. Has nothing to do with cotton 1560s,
"to prosper, succeed;" of things, "to agree, suit, fit," a
word of uncertain origin. Perhaps from Welsh cytuno "consent,
agree;" but perhaps rather a metaphor from cloth-finishing and thus
from cotton (n.).
Hensleigh Wedgwood compares cot "a fleece of wool matted together."
Meaning "become closely or intimately associated (with)," is from
1805 via the sense of "to get along together" (of persons), attested
from c. 1600. Related: Cottoned; cottoning.
cournot: H. P. Grice draws
from Cournot for his idea of a scientific law. -- Antoine-Augustin, a critical
realist in scientific and philosophical matters, he was a conservative in
religion and politics. His Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the
Theory of Wealth 1838, though a fiasco at the time, pioneered mathematical
economics. Cournot upheld a position midway between science and metaphysics.
His philosophy rests on three basic counteridenticals Cournot,
Antoine-Augustin concepts: order,
chance, and probability. The Exposition of the Theory of Chances and
Probabilities 1843 focuses on the calculus of probability, unfolds a theory of
chance occurrences, and distinguishes among objective, subjective, and
philosophical probability. The Essay on the Foundations of Knowledge 1861
defines science as logically organized knowledge. Cournot developed a
probabilist epistemology, showed the relevance of probabilism to the scientific
study of human acts, and further assumed the existence of a providential and
complex order undergirding the universe. Materialism, Vitalism, Rationalism
1875 acknowledges transrationalism and makes room for finality, purpose, and
God.
craig: Grice loved his interpolation
theorem, a theorem for firstorder logic: if a sentence y of first-order logic
entails a sentence q there is an “interpolant,” a sentence F in the vocabulary
common to q and y that entails q and is entailed by y. Originally, William
Craig proved his theorem in 7 as a lemma, to give a simpler proof of Beth’s
definability theorem, but the result now stands on its own. In abstract model
theory, logics for which an interpolation theorem holds are said to have the
Craig interpolation property. Craig’s interpolation theorem shows that
first-order logic is closed under implicit definability, so that the concepts
embodied in first-order logic are all given explicitly. In the philosophy of
science literature ‘Craig’s theorem’ usually refers to another result of
Craig’s: that any recursively enumerable set of sentences of first-order logic
can be axiomatized. This has been used to argue that theoretical terms are in
principle eliminable from empirical theories. Assuming that an empirical theory
can be axiomatized in first-order logic, i.e., that there is a recursive set of
first-order sentences from which all theorems of the theory can be proven, it
follows that the set of consequences of the axioms in an “observational”
sublanguage is a recursively enumerable set. Thus, by Craig’s theorem, there is
a set of axioms for this subtheory, the Craig-reduct, that contains only
observation terms. Interestingly, the Craig-reduct theory may be semantically
weaker, in the sense that it may have models that cannot be extended to a model
of the full theory. The existence of such a model would prove that the
theoretical terms cannot all be defined on the basis of the observational
vocabulary only, a result related to Beth’s definability theorem.
crazy-bayesy: cited by H. P.
Grice, “Aspects of reason.” Bayesian rationality, minimally, a property a
system of beliefs or the believer has in virtue of the system’s “conforming to
the probability calculus.” “Bayesians” differ on what “rationality” requires,
but most agree that i beliefs come in degrees of firmness; ii these “degrees of
belief” are theoretically or ideally quantifiable; iii such quantification can
be understood in terms of person-relative, time-indexed “credence functions”
from appropriate sets of objects of belief propositions or sentences each set closed under at least finite
truth-functional combinations into the
set of real numbers; iv at any given time t, a person’s credence function at t
ought to be usually: “on pain of a Dutch book argument” a probability function;
that is, a mapping from the given set into the real numbers in such a way that
the “probability” the value assigned to any given object A in the set is
greater than or equal to zero, and is equal to unity % 1 if A is a necessary
truth, and, for any given objects A and B in the set, if A and B are
incompatible the negation of their conjunction is a necessary truth then the
probability assigned to their disjunction is equal to the sum of the
probabilities assigned to each; so that the usual propositional probability
axioms impose a sort of logic on degrees of belief. If a credence function is a
probability function, then it or the believer at the given time is “coherent.”
On these matters, on conditional degrees of belief, and on the further
constraint on rationality many Bayesians impose that change of belief ought to
accord with “conditionalization”, the reader should consult John Earman, Bayes
or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory 2; Colin Howson
and Peter Urbach, Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach 9; and Richard
Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision 5. Bayes’s
theorem, any of several relationships between prior and posterior probabilities
or odds, especially 13 below. All of these depend upon the basic relationship 0
between contemporaneous conditional and unconditional probabilities.
Non-Bayesians think these useful only in narrow ranges of cases, generally
because of skepticism about accessibility or significance of priors. According
to 1, posterior probability is prior probability times the “relevance quotient”
Carnap’s term. According to 2, posterior odds are Bayesian Bayes’s theorem
74 74 prior odds times the “likelihood
ratio” R. A. Fisher’s term. Relationship 3 comes from 1 by expanding P data via
the law of total probability. Bayes’s rule 4 for updating probabilities has you
set your new unconditional probabilities equal to your old conditional ones
when fresh certainty about data leaves probabilities conditionally upon the
data unchanged. The corresponding rule 5 has you do the same for odds. In
decision theory the term is used differently, for the rule “Choose so as to
maximize expectation of utility.”
credibility: While Grice uses ‘probability’ as the correlatum of
desirability, he suggests ‘credibility’ is a better choice. It relates to the
‘creditum.’ Now, what is the generic for ‘trust’ when it comes to the creditum
and the desideratum? An indicative utterance expresses a belief. The utterer is
candid if he holds that belief. “Candid” applies to imperative utterances which
express genuine desires and notably the emissor’s intention that his recipient
will form a ‘desideratum.’ Following
Jeffrey and Davidson, respectively, Grice uses ‘desirability’ and
‘probability,’ but sometimes ‘credibibility,’ realizing that ‘credibility’ is
more symmetrical with ‘desirability’ than ‘probability’ is. Urmson had explored
this in “Parenthetical verbs.” Urmson co-relates, ‘certaintly’ with ‘know’ and
‘probably’ with ‘believe.’ But Urmson adds four further adverbs: “knowingly,”
“unknowingly,” “believably,” and “unbelievably.” Urmson also includes three
more: “uncredibly,” in variation with “incredibly,” and ‘credibly.” The keyword
should be ‘credibility.’
creditum: The Romans were good at this. Notably in negative
contexts. They distinguished between an emissor being fallax and being mendax.
It all has to do with ‘creditum.’ “Creditum’ is vero, more or less along
correspondence-theoretical lines. Used by Grice for the doxastic equivalent of
the buletic or desideratum. A creditum is an implicaturum, as Grice defines the
implicaturum of the content that an addresse has to assume the utterer BELIEVES
to deem him rational. The ‘creditum’-condition is essential for Grice in his
‘exhibitive’ account to the communication. By uttering “Smoke!”, U means that
there is some if the utterer intends that his addressee BELIEVE that he, the
utterer, is in a state of soul which has the propositional complex there is
smoke. It is worth noting that BELIEF is not needed for the immediate state of
the utterer’s soul: this can always be either a desire or a belief. But a
belief is REQUIRED as the immediate (if not ultimate) response intended by the
utterer that his addressee adapt. It is curious that given the primacy that
Grice held of the desirability over the credibility that many of his
conversational maxims are formulated as imperatives aimed at matters of belief,
conditions and value of credibility, probability and adequate evidence. In the
cases where Grice emphasizes ‘information,’ which one would associate with
‘belief,’ this association may be dropped provided the exhibitive account: you
can always influence or be influenced by others in the institution of a common
decision provided you give and receive the optimal information, or rather,
provided the conversationalists assume that they are engaged in a MAXIMAL
exchange of information. That ‘information’ does not necessarily apply to
‘belief’ is obvious in how complicated an order can get, “Get me a bottle”. “Is
that all?” “No, get me a bottle and make sure that it is of French wine, and
add something to drink the wine with, and drive careful, and give my love to
Rosie.” No belief is explicitly transmitted, yet the order seems informative
enough. Grice sometimes does use ‘informative’ in a strict context involving
credibility. He divides the mode of credibility into informational (when
addressed to others) and indicative (when addressed to self), for in a
self-addressed utterance such as, “I am being silly,” one cannot intend to
inform oneself of something one already knows! The English have ‘credibility’
and belief,
which is cognate with ‘love.’ H. P. Grice, “Disposition and belief,” H. P.
Grice, “Knowledge and belief.” a dispositional psychological state in virtue of
which a person will assent to a proposition under certain conditions.
Propositional knowledge, traditionally understood, entails belief. A behavioral
view implies that beliefs are just dispositions to behave in certain ways. Your
believing that the stove is hot is just your being disposed to act in a manner
appropriate to its being hot. The problem is that our beliefs, including their
propositional content indicated by a “that”-clause, typically explain why we do
what we do. You avoid touching the stove because you believe that it’s
dangerously hot. Explaining action via beliefs refers indispensably to
propositional content, but the behavioral view does not accommodate this. A
state-object view implies that belief consists of a special relation between a
psychological state and an object of belief, what is believed. The objects of
belief, traditionally understood, are abstract propositions existing
independently of anyone’s thinking of them. The state of believing is a
propositional attitude involving some degree of confidence toward a
propositional object of belief. Such a view allows that two persons, even
separated by a long period of time, can believe the same thing. A state-object
view allows that beliefs be dispositional rather than episodic, since they can
exist while no action is occurring. Such a view grants, however, that one can
have a disposition to act owing to believing something. Regarding mental
action, a belief typically generates a disposition to assent, at least under
appropriate circumstances, to the proposition believed. Given the central role
of propositional content, however, a state-object view denies that beliefs are
just dispositions to act. In addition, such a view should distinguish between
dispositional believing and a mere disposition to believe. One can be merely
disposed to believe many things that one does not actually believe, owing to
one’s lacking the appropriate psychological attitude to relevant propositional
content. Beliefs are either occurrent or non-occurrent. Occurrent belief,
unlike non-occurrent belief, requires current assent to the proposition
believed. If the assent is self-conscious, the belief is an explicit occurrent
belief; if the assent is not self-conscious, the belief is an implicit
occurrent behaviorism, supervenient belief 78
78 belief. Non-occurrent beliefs permit that we do not cease to believe
that 2 ! 2 % 4, for instance, merely because we now happen to be thinking of
something else or nothing at all. . --
belief revision, the process by which cognitive states change in light of new
information. This topic looms large in discussions of Bayes’s Theorem and other
approaches in decision theory. The reasons prompting belief revision are characteristically
epistemic; they concern such notions as quality of evidence and the tendency to
yield truths. Many different rules have been proposed for updating one’s belief
set. In general, belief revision typically balances risk of error against information
increase. Belief revision is widely thought to proceed either by expansion or
by conceptual revision. Expansion occurs in virtue of new observations; a
belief is changed, or a new belief established, when a hypothesis or
provisional belief is supported by evidence whose probability is high enough to
meet a favored criterion of epistemic warrant. The hypothesis then becomes part
of the existing belief corpus, or is sufficient to prompt revision. Conceptual
revision occurs when appropriate changes are made in theoretical
assumptions in accordance with such
principles as simplicity and explanatory or predictive power by which the corpus is organized. In actual
cases, we tend to revise beliefs with an eye toward advancing the best
comprehensive explanation in the relevant cognitive domain.
crescas: h., philosopher,
theologian, and statesman. He was a well-known representative of the Jewish
community in both Barcelona and Saragossa. Following the death of his son in
the anti-Jewish riots of 1391, he wrote a chronicle of the massacres published
as an appendix to Ibn Verga, Shevet Yehudah, ed. M. Wiener, 1855. Crescas’s
devotion to protecting Jewry in a time
when conversion was encouraged is documented in one extant work, the Refutation
of Christian Dogmas 139798, found in the 1451 Hebrew translation of Joseph ibn
Shem Tov Bittul ’Iqqarey ha-Nofrim. His major philosophical work, Or Adonai The
Light of the Lord, was intended as the first of a two-part project that was to
include his own more extensive systematization of halakha Jewish law as well as
a critique of Maimonides’ work. But this second part, “Lamp of the Divine
Commandment,” was never written. Or Adonai is a philosophico-dogmatic response
to and attack on the Aristotelian doctrines that Crescas saw as a threat to the
Jewish faith, doctrines concerning the nature of God, space, time, place, free
will, and infinity. For theological reasons he attempts to refute basic tenets
in Aristotelian physics. He offers, e.g., a critique of Aristotle’s arguments
against the existence of a vacuum. The Aristotelian view of time is rejected as
well. Time, like space, is thought by Crescas to be infinite. Furthermore, it
is not an accident of motion, but rather exists only in the soul. In defending
the fundamental doctrines of the Torah, Crescas must address the question
discussed by his predecessors Maimonides and Gersonides, namely that of
reconciling divine foreknowledge with human freedom. Unlike these two thinkers,
Crescas adopts a form of determinism, arguing that God knows both the possible
and what will necessarily take place. An act is contingent with respect to
itself, and necessary with respect to its causes and God’s knowledge. To be
willed freely, then, is not for an act to be absolutely contingent, but rather
for it to be “willed internally” as opposed to “willed externally.” Reactions
to Crescas’s doctrines were mixed. Isaac Abrabanel, despite his respect for
Crescas’s piety, rejected his views as either “unintelligible” or
“simple-minded.” On the other hand, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola appeals to
Crescas’s critique of Aristotelian physics; Judah Abrabanel’s Dialogues of Love
may be seen as accommodating Crescas’s metaphysical views; and Spinoza’s
notions of necessity, freedom, and extension may well be influenced by the
doctrines of Or Adonai.
Grice’s criterion for the implicaturum, --
cf. G. P. Baker, “Grice and criterial semantics” -- broadly, a sufficient
condition for the presence of a certain property or for the truth of a certain
proposition. Generally, a criterion need be sufficient merely in normal
circumstances rather than absolutely sufficient. Typically, a criterion is
salient in some way, often by virtue of being a necessary condition as well as
a sufficient one. The plural form, ‘criteria’, is commonly used for a set of
singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. A set of truth conditions
is said to be criterial for the truth of propositions of a certain form. A
conceptual analysis of a philosophically important concept may take the form of
a proposed set of truth conditions for paradigmatic propositions containing the
concept in question. Philosophers have proposed criteria for such notions as meaningfulness,
intentionality,
creationism, theological criterion knowledge, justification, justice,
rightness, and identity including personal identity and event identity, among
many others. There is a special use of the term in connection with Vitters’s
well-known remark that “an ‘inner process’ stands in need of outward criteria,”
e.g., moans and groans for aches and pains. The suggestion is that a
criteriological connection is needed to forge a conceptual link between items
of a sort that are intelligible and knowable to items of a sort that, but for
the connection, would not be intelligible or knowable. A mere symptom cannot
provide such a connection, for establishing a correlation between a symptom and
that for which it is a symptom presupposes that the latter is intelligible and
knowable. One objection to a criteriological view, whether about aches or
quarks, is that it clashes with realism about entities of the sort in question
and lapses into, as the case may be, behaviorism or instrumentalism. For it
seems that to posit a criteriological connection is to suppose that the nature and
existence of entities of a given sort can depend on the conditions for their
intelligibility or knowability, and that is to put the epistemological cart
before the ontological horse.
critical legal studies: explored by Grice
in his analysis of legal vs. moral right --
a loose assemblage of legal writings and thinkers in the United States
and Great Britain since the mid-0s that aspire to a jurisprudence and a
political ideology. Like the legal
realists of the 0s and 0s, the jurisprudential program is largely negative,
consisting in the discovery of supposed contradictions within both the law as a
whole and areas of law such as contracts and criminal law. The jurisprudential
implication derived from such supposed contradictions within the law is that any
decision in any case can be defended as following logically from some
authoritative propositions of law, making the law completely without guidance
in particular cases. Also like the legal
realists, the political ideology of critical legal studies is vaguely leftist,
embracing the communitarian critique of liberalism. Communitarians fault
liberalism for its alleged overemphasis on individual rights and individual
welfare at the expense of the intrinsic value of certain collective goods.
Given the cognitive relativism of many of its practitioners, critical legal
studies tends not to aspire to have anything that could be called a theory of
either law or of politics.
Grice’s
critique of conversational reason – “What does Kant mean by ‘critique’?
Should he?” – Grice. Critical Realism, a philosophy that at the highest level
of generality purports to integrate the positive insights of both New Realism
and idealism. New Realism was the first wave of realistic reaction to the
dominant idealism of the nineteenth century. It was a version of immediate and
direct realism. In its attempt to avoid any representationalism that would lead
to idealism, this tradition identified the immediate data of consciousness with
objects in the physical world. There is no intermediary between the knower and
the known. This heroic tour de force foundered on the phenomena of error,
illusion, and perceptual variation, and gave rise to a successor realism Critical Realism that acknowledged the mediation of “the
mental” in our cognitive grasp of the physical world. ’Critical Realism’ was
the title of a work in epistemology by Roy Wood Sellars 6, but its more general
use to designate the broader movement derives from the 0 cooperative volume,
Essays in Critical Realism: A Cooperative Study of the Problem of Knowledge,
containing position papers by Durant Drake, A. O. Lovejoy, J. B. Pratt, A. K.
Rogers, C. A. Strong, George Santayana, and Roy Wood Sellars. With New Realism,
Critical Realism maintains that the primary object of knowledge is the
independent physical world, and that what is immediately present to
consciousness is not the physical object as such, but some corresponding mental
state broadly construed. Whereas both New Realism and idealism grew out of the
conviction that any such mediated account of knowledge is untenable, the
Critical Realists felt that only if knowledge of the external world is
explained in terms of a process of mental mediation, can error, illusion, and
perceptual variation be accommodated. One could fashion an account of mental
mediation that did not involve the pitfalls of Lockean representationalism by
carefully distinguishing between the object known and the mental state through
which it is known. The Critical Realists differed among themselves both epistemologically
and metaphysically. The mediating elements in cognition were variously
construed as essences, ideas, or sensedata, and the precise role of these items
in cognicriterion, problem of the Critical Realism tion was again variously construed. Metaphysically,
some were dualists who saw knowledge as unexplainable in terms of physical
processes, whereas others principally Santayana and Sellars were materialists
who saw cognition as simply a function of conscious biological systems. The
position of most lasting influence was probably that of Sellars because that
torch was taken up by his son, Wilfrid, whose very sophisticated development of
it was quite influential. -- critical
theory, any social theory that is at the same time explanatory, normative,
practical, and self-reflexive. The term was first developed by Horkheimer as a
self-description of the Frankfurt School and its revision of Marxism. It now
has a wider significance to include any critical, theoretical approach,
including feminism and liberation philosophy. When they make claims to be
scientific, such approaches attempt to give rigorous explanations of the causes
of oppression, such as ideological beliefs or economic dependence; these
explanations must in turn be verified by empirical evidence and employ the best
available social and economic theories. Such explanations are also normative
and critical, since they imply negative evaluations of current social
practices. The explanations are also practical, in that they provide a better
self-understanding for agents who may want to improve the social conditions
that the theory negatively evaluates. Such change generally aims at
“emancipation,” and theoretical insight empowers agents to remove limits to
human freedom and the causes of human suffering. Finally, these theories must
also be self-reflexive: they must account for their own conditions of
possibility and for their potentially transformative effects. These
requirements contradict the standard account of scientific theories and
explanations, particularly positivism and its separation of fact and value. For
this reason, the methodological writings of critical theorists often attack
positivism and empiricism and attempt to construct alternative epistemologies.
Critical theorists also reject relativism, since the cultural relativity of
norms would undermine the basis of critical evaluation of social practices and
emancipatory change. The difference between critical and non-critical theories
can be illustrated by contrasting the Marxian and Mannheimian theories of
ideology. Whereas Mannheim’s theory merely describes relations between ideas of
social conditions, Marx’s theory tries to show how certain social practices
require false beliefs about them by their participants. Marx’s theory not only explains
why this is so, it also negatively evaluates those practices; it is practical
in that by disillusioning participants, it makes them capable of transformative
action. It is also self-reflexive, since it shows why some practices require
illusions and others do not, and also why social crises and conflicts will lead
agents to change their circumstances. It is scientific, in that it appeals to
historical evidence and can be revised in light of better theories of social
action, language, and rationality. Marx also claimed that his theory was
superior for its special “dialectical method,” but this is now disputed by most
critical theorists, who incorporate many different theories and methods. This
broader definition of critical theory, however, leaves a gap between theory and
practice and places an extra burden on critics to justify their critical
theories without appeal to such notions as inevitable historical progress. This
problem has made critical theories more philosophical and concerned with questions
of justification.
Grice’s
critters:
one is never sure if Grice uses ‘creature’ seriously! creation ex nihilo, the
act of bringing something into existence from nothing. According to traditional
Christian theology, God created the world ex nihilo. To say that the world was
created from nothing does not mean that there was a prior non-existent
substance out of which it was fashioned, but rather that there was not anything
out of which God brought it into being. However, some of the patristics
influenced by Plotinus, such as Gregory of Nyssa, apparently understood
creation ex nihilo to be an emanation from God according to which what is
created comes, not from nothing, but from God himself. Not everything that God
makes need be created ex nihilo; or if, as in Genesis 2: 7, 19, God made a
human being and animals from the ground, a previously existing material, God
did not create them from nothing. Regardless of how bodies are made, orthodox
theology holds that human souls are created ex nihilo; the opposing view,
traducianism, holds that souls are propagated along with bodies. creationism, acceptance of the early chapters
of Genesis taken literally. Genesis claims that the universe and all of its
living creatures including humans were created by God in the space of six days.
The need to find some way of reconciling this story with the claims of science
intensified in the nineteenth century, with the publication of Darwin’s Origin
of Species 1859. In the Southern states of the United States, the indigenous form
of evangelical Protestant Christianity declared total opposition to
evolutionism, refusing any attempt at reconciliation, and affirming total
commitment to a literal “creationist” reading of the Bible. Because of this,
certain states passed laws banning the teaching of evolutionism. More recently,
literalists have argued that the Bible can be given full scientific backing,
and they have therefore argued that “Creation science” may properly be taught
in state-supported schools in the United States without violation of the
constitutional separation of church and state. This claim was challenged in the
state of Arkansas in 1, and ultimately rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. The
creationism dispute has raised some issues of philosophical interest and importance.
Most obviously, there is the question of what constitutes a genuine science. Is
there an adequate criterion of demarcation between science and nonscience, and
will it put evolutionism on the one side and creationism on the other? Some
philosophers, arguing in the spirit of Karl Popper, think that such a criterion
can be found. Others are not so sure; and yet others think that some such
criterion can be found, but shows creationism to be genuine science, albeit
already proven false. Philosophers of education have also taken an interest in
creationism and what it represents. If one grants that even the most orthodox
science may contain a value component, reflecting and influencing its
practitioners’ culture, then teaching a subject like biology almost certainly
is not a normatively neutral enterprise. In that case, without necessarily
conceding to the creationist anything about the true nature of science or
values, perhaps one must agree that science with its teaching is not something
that can and should be set apart from the rest of society, as an entirely
distinct phenomenon.
Grice
as Croceian:
expression and intention -- Croce, B., philosopher. He was born at
Pescasseroli, in the Abruzzi, and after 6 lived in Naples. He briefly attended
the of Rome and was led to study
Herbart’s philosophy. In 4 he founded the influential journal La critica. In 0
he was made life member of the senate.
Early in his career he befriended Giovanni Gentile, but this friendship was breached
by Gentile’s Fascism. During the Fascist period and World War II Croce lived in
isolation as the chief anti-fascist thinker in Italy. He later became a leader
of the Liberal party and at the age of eighty founded the Institute for
Historical Studies. Croce was a literary and historical scholar who joined his
great interest in these fields to philosophy. His best-known work in the
Englishspeaking world is Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General
Linguistic 2. This was the first part of his “Philosophy of Spirit”; the second
was his Logic 5, the third his theory of the Practical 9, and the fourth his
Historiography 7. Croce was influenced by Hegel and the Hegelian aesthetician
Francesco De Sanctis 181783 and by Vico’s conceptions of knowledge, history,
and society. He wrote The Philosophy of Giambattista Vico 1 and a famous
commentary on Hegel, What Is Living and What Is critical theory Croce,
Benedetto Dead in the Philosophy of
Hegel 7, in which he advanced his conception of the “dialectic of distincts” as
more fundamental than the Hegelian dialectic of opposites. Croce held that
philosophy always springs from the occasion, a view perhaps rooted in his
concrete studies of history. He accepted the general Hegelian identification of
philosophy with the history of philosophy. His philosophy originates from his
conception of aesthetics. Central to his aesthetics is his view of intuition,
which evolved through various stages during his career. He regards aesthetic
experience as a primitive type of cognition. Intuition involves an awareness of
a particular image, which constitutes a non-conceptual form of knowledge. Art
is the expression of emotion but not simply for its own sake. The expression of
emotion can produce cognitive awareness in the sense that the particular
intuited as an image can have a cosmic aspect, so that in it the universal
human spirit is perceived. Such perception is present especially in the
masterpieces of world literature. Croce’s conception of aesthetic has
connections with Kant’s “intuition” Anschauung and to an extent with Vico’s
conception of a primordial form of thought based in imagination fantasia.
Croce’s philosophical idealism includes fully developed conceptions of logic,
science, law, history, politics, and ethics. His influence to date has been
largely in the field of aesthetics and in historicist conceptions of knowledge
and culture. His revival of Vico has inspired a whole school of Vico
scholarship. Croce’s conception of a “Philosophy of Spirit” showed it was
possible to develop a post-Hegelian philosophy that, with Hegel, takes “the
true to be the whole” but which does not simply imitate Hegel. Croce -- expression theory of art, a theory
that defines art as the expression of feelings or emotion sometimes called
expressionism in art. Such theories first acquired major importance in the
nineteenth century in connection with the rise of Romanticism. Expression
theories are as various as the different views about what counts as expressing
emotion. There are four main variants. 1 Expression as communication. This
requires that the artist actually have the feelings that are expressed, when
they are initially expressed. They are “embodied” in some external form, and
thereby transmitted to the perceiver. Leo Tolstoy 18280 held a view of this
sort. 2 Expression as intuition. An intuition is the apprehension of the unity
and individuality of something. An intuition is “in the mind,” and hence the
artwork is also. Croce held this view, and in his later work argued that the
unity of an intuition is established by feeling. 3 Expression as clarification.
An artist starts out with vague, undefined feelings, and expression is a
process of coming to clarify, articulate, and understand them. This view
retains Croce’s idea that expression is in the artist’s mind, as well as explanation,
covering law expression theory of art 299
299 his view that we are all artists to the degree that we articulate,
clarify, and come to understand our own feelings. Collingwood held this view. 4
Expression as a property of the object. For an artwork to be an expression of
emotion is for it to have a given structure or form. Suzanne K. Langer 55
argued that music and the other arts “presented” or exhibited structures or
forms of feeling in general.
Grice’s
crucial experiment:
a means of deciding between rival theories (or arguments) for this or that
impicatum, that, providing parallel explanations of large classes of phenomena,
come to be placed at issue by a single fact. For example, the Newtonian
emission theory predicts that light travels faster in water than in air;
according to the wave theory, light travels slower in water than in air.
Dominique François Arago proposed a crucial experiment comparing the respective
velocities. Léon Foucault then devised an apparatus to measure the speed of light
in various media and found a lower velocity in water than in air. Arago and
Foucault concluded for the wave theory, believing that the experiment refuted
the emission theory. Other examples include Galileo’s discovery of the phases
of Venus Ptolemaic versus Copernican astronomy, Pascal’s Puy-de-Dôme experiment
with the barometer vacuists versus plenists, Fresnel’s prediction of a spot of
light in circular shadows particle versus wave optics, and Eddington’s
measurement of the gravitational bending of light rays during a solar eclipse
Newtonian versus Einsteinian gravitation. At issue in crucial experiments is
usually a novel prediction. The notion seems to derive from Francis Bacon,
whose New Organon 1620 discusses the “Instance of the Fingerpost Instantia later experimentum crucis,” a term borrowed from the post set up
at crossroads to indicate several directions. Crucial experiments were
emphasized in early nineteenth-century scientific methodology e.g., in John F. Herschel’s A Preliminary
Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy 1830. Duhem argued that crucial
experiments resemble false dilemmas: hypotheses in physics do not come in
pairs, so that crucial experiments cannot transform one of the two into a
demonstrated truth. Discussing Foucault’s experiment, Duhem asks whether we
dare assert that no other hypothesis is imaginable and suggests that instead of
light being either a simple particle or wave, light might be something else,
perhaps a disturbance propagated within a dielectric medium, as theorized by
Maxwell. In the twentieth century, crucial experiments and novel predictions
figured prominently in the work of Imre Lakatos 274. Agreeing that crucial
experiments are unable to overthrow theories, Lakatos accepted them as
retroactive indications of the fertility or progress of research programs.
crusius: As C. of E.,
Grice was pretty protestant -- Christian August, philosopher, theologian, and a
devout Lutheran pastor who believed that religion was endangered by the
rationalist views especially of Wolff. He devoted his considerable
philosophical powers to working out acute and often deep criticisms of Wolff
and developing a comprehensive alternative to the Wolffian system. His main
philosophical works were published in the 1740s. In his understanding of
epistemology and logic Crusius broke with many of the assumptions that allowed
Wolff to argue from how we think of things to how things are. For instance,
Crusius tried to show that the necessity in causal connection is not the same
as logical necessity. He rejected the Leibnizian view that this world is
probably the best possible world, and he criticrucial experiment Crusius,
Christian August cized the Wolffian
view of freedom of the will as merely a concealed spiritual mechanism. His ethics
stressed our dependence on God and his commands, as did the natural law theory
of Pufendorf, but he developed the view in some strikingly original ways.
Rejecting voluntarism, Crusius held that God’s commands take the form of innate
principles of the will not the understanding. Everyone alike can know what they
are, so contra Wolff there is no need for moral experts. And they carry their
own motivational force with them, so there is no need for external sanctions.
We have obligations of prudence to do what will forward our own ends; but true
obligation, the obligation of virtue, arises only when we act simply to comply
with God’s law, regardless of any ends of our own. In this distinction between
two kinds of obligation, as in many of his other views, Crusius plainly
anticipated much that Kant came to think. Kant when young read and admired his
work, and it is mainly for this reason that Crusius is now remembered.
cudworth: d. Lady Masham,
English philosopher and author of two treatises on religion, A Discourse
Concerning the Love of God 1690 and Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a
Virtuous Christian Life 1705. The first argues against the views of the English
Malebranchian, John Norris; the second, ostensibly about the importance of
education for women, argues for the need to establish natural religion on
rational principles and explores the place of revealed religion within a
rational framework. Cudworth’s reputation is founded on her long friendship
with John Locke. Her correspondence with him is almost entirely personal; she
also entered into a brief but philosophically interesting exchange of letters
with Leibniz.
cumberland -- Law – Grice was
obsessed with laws that would introduce psychological concepts -- Cumberland,
R. English philosopher and bishop. He wrote a Latin Treatise of the Laws of
Nature 1672, tr. twice into English and once into . Admiring Grotius,
Cumberland hoped to refute Hobbes in the interests of defending Christian
morality and religion. He refused to appeal to innate ideas and a priori
arguments because he thought Hobbes must be attacked on his own ground. Hence
he offered a reductive and naturalistic account of natural law. The one basic
moral law of nature is that the pursuit of the good of all rational beings is
the best path to the agent’s own good. This is true because God made nature so
that actions aiding others are followed by beneficial consequences to the
agent, while those harmful to others harm the agent. Since the natural
consequences of actions provide sanctions that, once we know them, will make us
act for the good of others, we can conclude that there is a divine law by which
we are obligated to act for the common good. And all the other laws of nature
follow from the basic law. Cumberland refused to discuss free will, thereby
suggesting a view of human action as fully determined by natural causes. If on
his theory it is a blessing that God made nature including humans to work as it
does, the religious reader must wonder if there is any role left for God concerning
morality. Cumberland is generally viewed as a major forerunner of
utilitarianism.
inductum – Grice knew a lot
about induction theory via Kneale and Keynes -- curve-fitting problem, the
problem of making predictions from past observations by fitting curves to the
data. Curve fitting has two steps: first, select a family of curves; then, find
the bestfitting curve by some statistical criterion such as the method of least
squares e.g., choose the curve that has the least sum of squared deviations
between the curve and data. The method was first proposed by Adrian Marie
Legendre 17521833 and Carl Friedrich Gauss 1777 1855 in the early nineteenth
century as a way of inferring planetary trajectories from noisy data. More
generally, curve fitting may be used to construct low-level empirical
generalizations. For example, suppose that the ideal gas law, P % nkT, is
chosen as the form of the law governing the dependence of the pressure P on the
equilibrium temperature T of a fixed volume of gas, where n is the molecular
number per unit volume and k is Boltzmann’s constant a universal constant equal
to 1.3804 $ 10†16 erg°C†1. When the parameter nk is adjustable, the law
specifies a family of curves one for
each numerCudworth, Damaris curve-fitting problem ical value of the parameter. Curve fitting
may be used to determine the best-fitting member of the family, thereby
effecting a measurement of the theoretical parameter, nk. The philosophically
vexing problem is how to justify the initial choice of the form of the law. On
the one hand, one might choose a very large, complex family of curves, which
would ensure excellent fit with any data set. The problem with this option is
that the best-fitting curve may overfit the data. If too much attention is paid
to the random elements of the data, then the predictively useful trends and
regularities will be missed. If it looks too good to be true, it probably is.
On the other hand, simpler families run a greater risk of making grossly false
assumptions about the true form of the law. Intuitively, the solution is to
choose a simplefamily of curves that maintains a reasonable degree of fit. The
simplicity of a family of curves is measured by the paucity of parameters. The
problem is to say how and why such a trade-off between simplicity and goodness
of fit should be made. When a theory can accommodate recalcitrant data only by
the ad hoc i.e., improperly
motivated addition of new terms and
parameters, students of science have long felt that the subsequent increase in
the degree of fit should not count in the theory’s favor, and such additions
are sometimes called ad hoc hypotheses. The best-known example of this sort of
ad hoc hypothesizing is the addition of epicycles upon epicycles in the
planetary astronomies of Ptolemy and Copernicus. This is an example in which a
gain in fit need not compensate for the loss of simplicity. Contemporary
philosophers sometimes formulate the curve-fitting problem differently. They
often assume that there is no noise in the data, and speak of the problem of
choosing among different curves that fit the data exactly. Then the problem is
to choose the simplest curve from among all those curves that pass through
every data point. The problem is that there is no universally accepted way of
defining the simplicity of single curves. No matter how the problem is
formulated, it is widely agreed that simplicity should play some role in theory
choice. Rationalists have championed the curve-fitting problem as exemplifying
the underdetermination of theory from data and the need to make a priori
assumptions about the simplicity of nature. Those philosophers who think that
we have no such a priori knowledge still need to account for the relevance of
simplicity to science. Whewell described curve fitting as the colligation of
facts in the quantitative sciences, and the agreement in the measured
parameters coefficients obtained by different colligations of facts as the
consilience of inductions. Different colligations of facts say on the same gas
at different volume or for other gases may yield good agreement among
independently measured values of parameters like the molecular density of the
gas and Boltzmann’s constant. By identifying different parameters found to
agree, we constrain the form of the law without appealing to a priori knowledge
good news for empiricism. But the accompanying increase in unification also
worsens the overall degree of fit. Thus, there is also the problem of how and
why we should trade off unification with total degree of fit. Statisticians
often refer to a family of hypotheses as a model. A rapidly growing literature
in statistics on model selection has not yet produced any universally accepted
formula for trading off simplicity with degree of fit. However, there is wide
agreement among statisticians that the paucity of parameters is the appropriate
way of measuring simplicity.
Grice’s
defense of modernist logic -- cut-elimination theorem, a theorem stating that a
certain type of inference rule including a rule that corresponds to modus
ponens is not needed in classical logic. The idea was anticipated by J.
Herbrand; the theorem was proved by G. Gentzen and generalized by S. Kleene.
Gentzen formulated a sequent calculus
i.e., a deductive system with rules for statements about derivability.
It includes a rule that we here express as ‘From C Y D,M and M,C Y D, infer C Y
D’ or ‘Given that C yields D or M, and that C plus M yields D, we may infer
that C yields D’. Cusa cut-elimination theorem This is called the cut rule because it
cuts out the middle formula M. Gentzen showed that his sequent calculus is an
adequate formalization of the predicate logic, and that the cut rule can be
eliminated; anything provable with it can be proved without it. One important
consequence of this is that, if a formula F is provable, then there is a proof
of F that consists solely of subformulas of F. This fact simplifies the study
of provability. Gentzen’s methodology applies directly to classical logic but
can be adapted to many nonclassical logics, including some intuitionistic
logics. It has led to some important theorems about consistency, and has
illuminated the role of auxiliary assumptions in the derivation of consequences
from a theory.
cybernetic
implicaturum
– What Grice disliked about the cybernetic implicaturum is that it is
‘mechanisitically derivable” and thus not really ‘rational’ in the way an implicaturum
is meant to be rational. A machine cannot implicate. Grice “Method in
philosophical psychology” -- cybernetics coined by N. Wiener in 7 from Grecian
kubernetes, ‘helmsman’, the study of the communication and manipulation of
information in service of the control and guidance of biological, physical, or
chemical energy systems. Historically, cybernetics has been intertwined with
mathematical theories of information communication and computation. To describe
the cybernetic properties of systems or processes requires ways to describe and
measure information reduce uncertainty about events within the system and its
environment. Feedback and feedforward, the basic ingredients of cybernetic
processes, involve information as what
is fed forward or backward and are basic
to processes such as homeostasis in biological systems, automation in industry,
and guidance systems. Of course, their most comprehensive application is to the
purposive behavior thought of cognitively goal-directed systems such as
ourselves. Feedback occurs in closed-loop, as opposed to open-loop, systems.
Actually, ‘open-loop’ is a misnomer involving no loop, but it has become entrenched.
The standard example of an openloop system is that of placing a heater with
constant output in a closed room and leaving it switched on. Room temperature
may accidentally reach, but may also dramatically exceed, the temperature
desired by the occupants. Such a heating system has no means of controlling
itself to adapt to required conditions. In contrast, the standard closed-loop
system incorporates a feedback component. At the heart of cybernetics is the
concept of control. A controlled process is one in which an end state that is
reached depends essentially on the behavior of the controlling system and not
merely on its external environment. That is, control involves partial
independence for the system. A control system may be pictured as having both an
inner and outer environment. The inner environment consists of the internal
events that make up the system; the outer environment consists of events that
causally impinge on the system, threatening disruption and loss of system
integrity and stability. For a system to maintain its independence and identity
in the face of fluctuations in its external environment, it must be able to
detect information about those changes in the external environment. Information
must pass through the interface between inner and outer environments, and the
system must be able to compensate for fluctuations of the outer environment by
adjusting its own inner environmental variables. Otherwise, disturbances in the
outer environment will overcome the system
bringing its inner states into equilibrium with the outer states,
thereby losing its identity as a distinct, independent system. This is nowhere
more certain than with the homeostatic systems of the body for temperature or
blood sugar levels. Control in the attainment of goals is accomplished by
minimizing error. Negative feedback, or information about error, is the
difference between activity a system actually performs output and that activity
which is its goal to perform input. The standard example of control incorporating
negative feedback is the thermostatically controlled heating system. The actual
room temperature system output carries information to the thermostat that can
be compared via goal-state comparator to the desired temperature for the room
input as embodied in the set-point on the thermostat; a correction can then be
made to minimize the difference error
the furnace turns on or off. Positive feedback tends to amplify the
value of the output of a system or of a system disturbance by adding the value
of the output to the system input quantity. Thus, the system accentuates
disturbances and, if unchecked, will eventually pass the brink of instability.
Suppose that as room temperature rises it causes the thermostatic set-point to
rise in direct proportion to the rise in temperature. This would cause the
furnace to continue to output heat possibly with disastrous consequences. Many
biological maladies have just this characteristic. For example, severe loss of
blood causes inability of the heart to pump effectively, which causes loss of
arterial pressure, which, in turn, causes reduced flow of blood to the heart,
reducing pumping efficiency. cybernetics cybernetics Cognitively goal-directed systems are also
cybernetic systems. Purposive attainment of a goal by a goal-directed system
must have at least: 1 an internal representation of the goal state of the
system a detector for whether the desired state is actual; 2 a feedback loop by
which information about the present state of the system can be compared with the
goal state as internally represented and by means of which an error correction
can be made to minimize any difference; and 3 a causal dependency of system
output upon the error-correction process of condition 2 to distinguish goal
success from fortuitous goal satisfaction.
cynical
implicaturum,
Cynic -- a classical Grecian philosophical school characterized by asceticism
and emphasis on the sufficiency of virtue for happiness eudaimonia, boldness in
speech, and shamelessness in action. The Cynics were strongly influenced by
Socrates and were themselves an important influence on Stoic ethics. An ancient
tradition links the Cynics to Antisthenes c.445c.360 B.C., an Athenian. He
fought bravely in the battle of Tanagra and claimed that he would not have been
so courageous if he had been born of two Athenians instead of an Athenian and a
Thracian slave. He studied with Gorgias, but later became a close companion of
Socrates and was present at Socrates’ death. Antisthenes was proudest of his
wealth, although he had no money, because he was satisfied with what he had and
he could live in whatever circumstances he found himself. Here he follows
Socrates in three respects. First, Socrates himself lived with a disregard for
pleasure and pain e.g., walking barefoot
in snow. Second, Socrates thinks that in every circumstance a virtuous person
is better off than a nonvirtuous one; Antisthenes anticipates the Stoic
development of this to the view that virtue is sufficient for happiness,
because the virtuous person uses properly whatever is present. Third, both
Socrates and Antisthenes stress that the soul is more important than the body,
and neglect the body for the soul. Unlike the later Cynics, however, both
Socrates and Antisthenes do accept pleasure when it is available. Antisthenes
also does not focus exclusively on ethics; he wrote on other topics, including
logic. He supposedly told Plato that he could see a horse but not horseness, to
which Plato replied that he had not acquired the means to see horseness. Diogenes
of Sinope c.400c.325 B.C. continued the emphasis on self-sufficiency and on the
soul, but took the disregard for pleasure to asceticism. According to one
story, Plato called Diogenes “Socrates gone mad.” He came to Athens after being
exiled from Sinope, perhaps because the coinage was defaced, either by himself
or by others, under his father’s direction. He took ‘deface the coinage!’ as a
motto, meaning that the current standards were corrupt and should be marked as
corrupt by being defaced; his refusal to live by them was his defacing them.
For example, he lived in a wine cask, ate whatever scraps he came across, and
wrote approvingly of cannibalism and incest. One story reports that he carried
a lighted lamp in broad daylight looking for an honest human, probably
intending to suggest that the people he did see were so corrupted that they
were no longer really people. He apparently wanted to replace the debased
standards of custom with the genuine standards of nature but nature in the sense of what was minimally
required for human life, which an individual human could achieve, without
society. Because of this, he was called a Cynic, from the Grecian word kuon
dog, because he was as shameless as a dog. Diogenes’ most famous successor was
Crates fl. c.328325 B.C.. He was a Boeotian, from Thebes, and renounced his
wealth to become a Cynic. He seems to have been more pleasant than Diogenes;
according to some reports, every Athenian house was open to him, and he was
even regarded by them as a household god. Perhaps the most famous incident
involving Crates is his marriage to Hipparchia, who took up the Cynic way of
life despite her family’s opposition and insisted that educating herself was
preferable to working a loom. Like Diogenes, Crates emphasized that happiness
is self-sufficiency, and claimed that asceticism is required for
self-sufficiency; e.g., he advises us not to prefer oysters to lentils. He
argues that no one is happy if happiness is measured by the balance of pleasure
and pain, since in each period of our lives there is more pain than pleasure.
Cynicism continued to be active through the third century B.C., and returned to
prominence in the second century A.D. after an apparent decline.
cyrenaic
implicaturum
-- Cyrenaics, a classical Grecian philosophical school that began shortly after
Socrates and lasted for several centuries, noted especially for hedonism.
Ancient writers trace the Cyrenaics back to ArisCynics Cyrenaics 200 200 tippus of Cyrene fifth-fourth century
B.C., an associate of Socrates. Aristippus came to Athens because of Socrates’
fame and later greatly enjoyed the luxury of court life in Sicily. Some people
ascribe the founding of the school to his grandchild Aristippus, because of an
ancient report that the elder Aristippus said nothing clear about the human
end. The Cyrenaics include Aristippus’s child Arete, her child Aristippus
taught by Arete, Hegesius, Anniceris, and Theodorus. The school seems to have
been superseded by the Epicureans. No Cyrenaic writings survive, and the reports
we do have are sketchy. The Cyrenaics avoid mathematics and natural philosophy,
preferring ethics because of its utility. According to them, not only will
studying nature not make us virtuous, it also won’t make us stronger or richer.
Some reports claim that they also avoid logic and epistemology. But this is not
true of all the Cyrenaics: according to other reports, they think logic and
epistemology are useful, consider arguments and also causes as topics to be
covered in ethics, and have an epistemology. Their epistemology is skeptical.
We can know only how we are affected; we can know, e.g., that we are whitening,
but not that whatever is causing this sensation is itself white. This differs
from Protagoras’s theory; unlike Protagoras the Cyrenaics draw no inferences
about the things that affect us, claiming only that external things have a
nature that we cannot know. But, like Protagoras, the Cyrenaics base their
theory on the problem of conflicting appearances. Given their epistemology, if
humans ought to aim at something that is not a way of being affected i.e.,
something that is immediately perceived according to them, we can never know
anything about it. Unsurprisingly, then, they claim that the end is a way of
being affected; in particular, they are hedonists. The end of good actions is
particular pleasures smooth changes, and the end of bad actions is particular
pains rough changes. There is also an intermediate class, which aims at neither
pleasure nor pain. Mere absence of pain is in this intermediate class, since
the absence of pain may be merely a static state. Pleasure for Aristippus seems
to be the sensation of pleasure, not including related psychic states. We
should aim at pleasure although not everyone does, as is clear from our
naturally seeking it as children, before we consciously choose to. Happiness,
which is the sum of the particular pleasures someone experiences, is
choiceworthy only for the particular pleasures that constitute it, while
particular pleasures are choiceworthy for themselves. Cyrenaics, then, are not
concerned with maximizing total pleasure over a lifetime, but only with
particular pleasures, and so they should not choose to give up particular
pleasures on the chance of increasing the total. Later Cyrenaics diverge in important
respects from the original Cyrenaic hedonism, perhaps in response to the
development of Epicurus’s views. Hegesias claims that happiness is impossible
because of the pains associated with the body, and so thinks of happiness as
total pleasure minus total pain. He emphasizes that wise people act for
themselves, and denies that people actually act for someone else. Anniceris, on
the other hand, claims that wise people are happy even if they have few
pleasures, and so seems to think of happiness as the sum of pleasures, and not
as the excess of pleasures over pains. Anniceris also begins considering
psychic pleasures: he insists that friends should be valued not only for their
utility, but also for our feelings toward them. We should even accept losing
pleasure because of a friend, even though pleasure is the end. Theodorus goes a
step beyond Anniceris. He claims that the end of good actions is joy and that
of bad actions is grief. Surprisingly, he denies that friendship is reasonable,
since fools have friends only for utility and wise people need no friends. He
even regards pleasure as intermediate between practical wisdom and its
opposite. This seems to involve regarding happiness as the end, not particular
pleasures, and may involve losing particular pleasures for long-term
happiness.
Empiricism – “with a capital
E, of course.” – Grice. Czolbe, H., philosopher. He was born in Danzig and
trained in theology and medicine. His main works are Neue Darstellung des
Sensualismus “New Exposition of Sensualism,” 1855, Entstehung des
Selbstbewusstseins “Origin of Self-Consciousness,” 1856, Die Grenzen und der
Ursprung der menschlichen Erkenntnis “The Limits and Origin of Human
Knowledge,” 1865, and a posthumously published study, Grundzüge der
extensionalen Erkenntnistheorie 1875. Czolbe proposed a sensualistic theory of
knowledge: knowledge is a copy of the actual, and spatial extension is ascribed
even to ideas. Space is the support of all attributes. His later work defended
a non-reductive materialism. Czolbe made the rejection of the supersensuous a
central principle and defended a radical “senCzolbe, Heinrich Czolbe, Heinrich
201 201 sationalism.” Despite this, he
did not present a dogmatic materialism, but cast his philosophy in hypothetical
form. In his study of the origin of self-consciousness Czolbe held that
dissatisfaction with the actual world generates supersensuous ideas and branded
this attitude as “immoral.” He excluded supernatural phenomena on the basis not
of physiological or scientific studies but of a “moral feeling of duty towards
the natural world-order and contentment with it.” The same valuation led him to
postulate the eternality of terrestrial life. Nietzsche was familiar with
Czolbe’s works and incorporated some of his themes into his philosophy.
englishry: Grice was first
an Englishman, and then an Oxonian – and then a philosopher – and then a
genius! Englishness – Englishry, -- St. George for England. A critique of
racism, hostility, contempt, condescension, or prejudice, on the basis of
social practices of racial classification, and the wider phenomena of social,
economic, and political mistreatment that often accompany such classification.
The most salient instances of racism include the Nazi ideology of the “Aryan
master race,” chattel slavery, South
African apartheid in the late twentieth century, and the “Jim Crow” laws and
traditions of segregation that subjugated African descendants in the Southern
United States during the century after the
Civil War. Social theorists dispute whether, in its essence, racism is a
belief or an ideology of racial inferiority, a system of social oppression on
the basis of race, a form of discourse, discriminatory conduct, or an attitude
of contempt or heartlessness and its expression in individual or collective
behavior. The case for any of these as the essence of racism has its drawbacks,
and a proponent must show how the others can also come to be racist in virtue
of that essence. Some deny that racism has any nature or essence, insisting it
is nothing more than changing historical realities. However, these thinkers
must explain what makes each reality an instance of racism. Theorists differ
over who and what can be racist and under what circumstances, some restricting
racism to the powerful, others finding it also in some reactions by the
oppressed. Here, the former owe an explanation of why power is necessary for
racism, what sort economic or political? general or contextual?, and in whom or
what racist individuals? their racial groups?. Although virtually everyone
thinks racism objectionable, people disagree over whether its central defect is
cognitive irrationality, prejudice, economic/prudential inefficiency, or moral
unnecessary suffering, unequal treatment. Finally, racism’s connection with the
ambiguous and controversial concept of race itself is complex. Plainly, racism
presupposes the legitimacy of racial classifications, and perhaps the
metaphysical reality of races. Nevertheless, some hold that racism is also
prior to race, with racial classifications invented chiefly to explain and help
justify the oppression of some peoples by others. The term originated to
designate the pseudoscientific theories of racial essence and inferiority that
arose in Europe in the nineteenth century and were endorsed by G.y’s Third
Reich. Since the civil rights movement in the United States after World War II,
the term has come to cover a much broader range of beliefs, attitudes,
institutions, and practices. Today one hears charges of unconscious, covert,
institutional, paternalistic, benign, anti-racist, liberal, and even reverse
racism. Racism is widely regarded as involving ignorance, irrationality,
unreasonableness, injustice, and other intellectual and moral vices, to such an
extent that today virtually no one is willing to accept the classification of
oneself, one’s beliefs, and so on, as racist, except in contexts of
self-reproach. As a result, classifying anything as racist, beyond the most
egregious cases, is a serious charge and is often hotly disputed.
rational
Griceian deconstruction of communication -- a demonstration of the incompleteness
or incoherence of a philosophical position using concepts and principles of
argument whose meaning and use is legitimated only by that philosophical
position. A deconstruction is thus a kind of internal conceptual critique in
which the critic implicitly and provisionally adheres to the position
criticized. The early work of Derrida is the source of the term and provides
paradigm cases of its referent. That deconstruction remains within the position
being discussed follows from a fundamental deconstructive argument about the
nature of language and thought. Derrida’s earliest deconstructions argue
against the possibility of an interior “language” of thought and intention such
that the senses and referents of terms are determined by their very nature.
Such terms are “meanings” or logoi. Derrida calls accounts that presuppose such
magical thought-terms “logocentric.” He claims, following Heidegger, that the
conception of such logoi is basic to the concepts of Western metaphysics, and
that Western metaphysics is fundamental to our cultural practices and
languages. Thus there is no “ordinary language” uncontaminated by philosophy.
Logoi ground all our accounts of intention, meaning, truth, and logical
connection. Versions of logoi in the history of philosophy range from Plato’s
Forms through the self-interpreting ideas of the empiricists to Husserl’s
intentional entities. Thus Derrida’s fullest deconstructions are of texts that
give explicit accounts of logoi, especially his discussion of Husserl in Speech
and Phenomena. There, Derrida argues that meanings that are fully present to
consciousness are in decision tree deconstruction 209 209 principle impossible. The idea of a
meaning is the idea of a repeatable ideality. But “repeatability” is not a
feature that can be present. So meanings, as such, cannot be fully before the
mind. Selfinterpreting logoi are an incoherent supposition. Without logoi,
thought and intention are merely wordlike and have no intrinsic connection to a
sense or a referent. Thus “meaning” rests on connections of all kinds among
pieces of language and among our linguistic interactions with the world.
Without logoi, no special class of connections is specifically “logical.”
Roughly speaking, Derrida agrees with Quine both on the nature of meaning and
on the related view that “our theory” cannot be abandoned all at once. Thus a
philosopher must by and large think about a logocentric philosophical theory that
has shaped our language in the very logocentric terms that that theory has
shaped. Thus deconstruction is not an excision of criticized doctrines, but a
much more complicated, self-referential relationship. Deconstructive arguments
work out the consequences of there being nothing helpfully better than words,
i.e., of thoroughgoing nominalism. According to Derrida, without logoi
fundamental philosophical contrasts lose their principled foundations, since
such contrasts implicitly posit one term as a logos relative to which the other
side is defective. Without logos, many contrasts cannot be made to function as
principles of the sort of theory philosophy has sought. Thus the contrasts
between metaphorical and literal, rhetoric and logic, and other central notions
of philosophy are shown not to have the foundation that their use
presupposes.
deductum – also
demonstratum, argumentum -- deduction, a finite sequence of sentences whose
last sentence is a conclusion of the sequence the one said to be deduced and
which is such that each sentence in the sequence is an axiom or a premise or
follows from preceding sentences in the sequence by a rule of inference. A
synonym is ‘derivation’. Deduction is a system-relative concept. It makes sense
to say something is a deduction only relative to a particular system of axioms
and rules of inference. The very same sequence of sentences might be a
deduction relative to one such system but not relative to another. The concept
of deduction is a generalization of the concept of proof. A proof is a finite
sequence of sentences each of which is an axiom or follows from preceding
sentences in the sequence by a rule of inference. The last sentence in the
sequence is a theorem. Given that the system of axioms and rules of inference are
effectively specifiable, there is an effective procedure for determining,
whenever a finite sequence of sentences is given, whether it is a proof
relative to that system. The notion of theorem is not in general effective
decidable. For there may be no method by which we can always find a proof of a
given sentence or determine that none exists. The concepts of deduction and
consequence are distinct. The first is a syntactical; the second is semantical.
It was a discovery that, relative to the axioms and rules of inference of
classical logic, a sentence S is deducible from a set of sentences K provided
that S is a consequence of K. Compactness is an important consequence of this
discovery. It is trivial that sentence S is deducible from K just in case S is deducible
from Dedekind cut deductíon 211 211
some finite subset of K. It is not trivial that S is a consequence of K just in
case S is a consequence of some finite subset of K. This compactness property
had to be shown. A system of natural deduction is axiomless. Proofs of theorems
within a system are generally easier with natural deduction. Proofs of theorems
about a system, such as the results mentioned in the previous paragraph, are
generally easier if the system has axioms. In a secondary sense, ‘deduction’
refers to an inference in which a speaker claims the conclusion follows
necessarily from the premises. -- deduction theorem, a result about certain
systems of formal logic relating derivability and the conditional. It states
that if a formula B is derivable from A and possibly other assumptions, then
the formula APB is derivable without the assumption of A: in symbols, if G 4
{A} Y B then GYAPB. The thought is that, for example, if Socrates is mortal is
derivable from the assumptions All men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then
If Socrates is a man he is mortal is derivable from All men are mortal.
Likewise, If all men are mortal then Socrates is mortal is derivable from
Socrates is a man. In general, the deduction theorem is a significant result only
for axiomatic or Hilbert-style formulations of logic. In most natural deduction
formulations a rule of conditional proof explicitly licenses derivations of APB
from G4{A}, and so there is nothing to prove.
defeasibility. Strawson Wiggins ‘somehwere in the kitchen,’ ‘in one of
the dining-room cupboards’ unless some feature of the context defeats the
implication, there is an implicaturum to the effect that the emissor cannot
make a ‘stronger’ move by Grice’s principle of conversational fortitude (“Be ‘a
fortiori’”). Cf. G. P. Baker on H. L. A.
Hart. All very Oxonian. Cf. R. Hall, Oxonian, on ‘Excluders.’ For Strawson and
Wiggins that a principle holds ‘generally, ceteris paribus, is a condition for
the existence of conversation, or of a good conversation. Defeasibility is a
sign of the freedom of the will. The communicators can always opt out. Not a
salivating dog. Note that defeasibility does not apply just to the implicaturum.
Since probabilistic demonstrate are uncertain, there is an element of defeasibility
in the EXplicatum of a probabilistic utterance. Levinson’s quote, “Probability,
Defeasibility, and Mode Operators.” Defeasibility -- Grice:
“So far as generalizations of these kinds are concerned, it seems to me that
one needs to be able to mark five features: (1) conditionality; (2) generality;
(3) type of generality (absolute, ceteris paribus, etc., thereby, ipso facto,
discriminating with respect to defeasibility or indefeasibility).” -- Baker, “Meaning
and defeasibility” – defeater – in Aspects of reason -- defeasibility, a
property that rules, principles, arguments, or bits of reasoning have when they
might be defeated by some competitor. For example, the epistemic principle
‘Objects normally have the properties they appear to have’ or the normative
principle ‘One should not lie’ are defeated, respectively, when perception
occurs under unusual circumstances e.g., under colored lights or when there is
some overriding moral consideration e.g., to prevent murder. Apparently
declarative sentences such as ‘Birds typically fly’ can be taken in part as
expressing defeasible rules: take something’s being a bird as evidence that it
flies. Defeasible arguments and reasoning inherit their defeasibility from the
use of defeasible rules or principles. Recent analyses of defeasibility include
circumscription and default logic, which belong to the broader category of
non-monotonic logic. The rules in several of these formal systems contain
special antecedent conditions and are not truly defeasible since they apply
whenever their conditions are satisfied. Rules and arguments in other
non-monotonic systems justify their conclusions only when they are not defeated
by some other fact, rule, or argument. John Pollock distinguishes between
rebutting and undercutting defeaters. ‘Snow is not normally red’ rebuts in
appropriate circumstances the principle ‘Things that look red normally are
red’, while ‘If the available light is red, do not use the principle that
things that look red normally are red’ only undercuts the embedded rule.
Pollock has influenced most other work on formal systems for defeasible
reasoning.
defensible – H. P. Grice, “Conceptual analysis and the defensible
province of philosophy.” Grice uses the ‘territorial’ province, and the further
implicaturum is that conceptual analysis as the province of philosophy is a
defensible one. Grice thinks it is.
definitum: Grice lists ‘the’ in his list of communicative devices. He
was interested in the iota operator. After Sluga, he knew there were problems
here. He proposed a quantificational approach alla Whitehead and Russell,
indeed a Whitehead and Russellian expansion in three clauses, with identity,
involved. Why wasn’t Russell not involved with the ‘indefinite’. One would
think because that’s rendered already by (Ex), ‘some (at least one)’. Russell’s interest in definitum is not
philosophical. His background was mathematics, rather --. Grice was obsessed
with ‘aspects’ in verbs. There’s the ‘imperfect’ and the ‘perfect.’ These
translate Aristotle’s ‘teleos’ and ‘ateleos.’ But why the change from “factum”
to “fectum”? So it’s better to turn to ‘definitum,’ and ‘indefinitum, as better
paraphrases of Aristotle’s jargon – keeping in mind we are talking of his
‘teleos’ and ‘ateleos. Aristotle
and telos. In the Met. Y.1048b1835, Aristotle discusses the definition of an
action πϱᾶξις. He distinguishes two kinds of activities: kinêseis ϰινήσεις and
energeiai ἐνέϱγειαι: Only that movement in which the end is present is an
action. E.g., at the same time we are v.ing and have v.n ὁϱᾷ ἅμα, are
understanding and have understood φϱονεῖ, are thinking and have thought noei
kai nenoêken νοεῖ ϰαὶ νενόηϰεν when it is not true that at the same time we are
learning and have learnt ou manthanei kai memathêken οὐ μανθάνει ϰαὶ μεμάθηϰεν,
or are being cured and have been cured oud’ hugiazetai kai hugiastai οὐδ᾿ ὑγιάζεται
ϰαὶ ὑγίασται. At the same time we are living well and have lived well εὖ ζῇ ϰαὶ
εὖ ἔζηϰεν ἅμα, and are happy and have been happy εὐδαιμονεῖ ϰαὶ εὐδαιμόνηϰεν.
Of these processes, then, we must call the one set movements ϰινήσεις, and the
other actualities energeiai ἐνέϱγειαι. We v. that the distinctive properties of
these two categories of verbs are provided by relations of inference and
semantic compatibility between the form of the present and the form of the
perfect. In the case of energeiai, there is a relation of inference between the
present and the perfect, in the sense that when someone says I v. we can infer
I have v.n. There is also a relation of semantic compatibility since one can
very well say I have v.n and continue to v.. Thus the two forms—the present and
the perfect— are verifiable at the same time ἅμα, simultaneously. On the other
hand, in the case of kinêseis, the present and the perfect are not verifiable
at the same time. In fact, when someone says I am building a house, we cannot
infer I have built a house, at least in the sense in which the house is
finished. In addition, once the house is finished, one is no longer
constructing it, which means that there is a semantic incompatibility between
the present and the perfect. τέλος, which means both complete action, that is,
end, and limit in competition with πέϱας, plays a crucial role in this
opposition. In the category of energeiai, we have actions proper, that is,
activities that are complete τέλεια because they have an immanent finality ἐνυπάϱχει
τὸ τέλος. In the category of kinêseis, we have imperfect activities ἀτελείς
that do not carry their own end within themselves but are transitive and aim at
realizing something. Thus activities having an external goal that is at the
same time a limit peras do not carry their own goal telos within themselves;
they are directed toward a goal but this goal is not attained during the
activity, but is realized at the end of the activity. And history repeated itself, in the same
terms, regarding Slavic languages, with on the one hand the words perfective
and imperfective, modeled on the Roman opposition and imported to describe an
opposition in which lexicon and grammar are truly interwoven since it is a
question of categories of verbs, which determine the whole organization of conjugation,
and on the other hand the Russian words that are used to characterize the same
categories of verbs, and that signify the accomplished and the unaccomplished.
In the terminological imbroglio, we can once again v. the effects of a
confusion connected with the inability to acknowledge the autonomy of lexical
aspect, or, in the particular case of Slavic languages, the difficulty of
isoRomang the aspectual dimension in the general system of the language.
Nevertheless, the same questions, that of the telos and that of accomplishment,
are at the foundation of the two aspectual dimensions. They are even so
prominent that, alongside the heterogeneous inventory from which we began, we
also find, and almost simultaneously in the aspectual tradition, a leveling of
all differences in favor of two categories that are supposed to be the
categories par excellence of grammatical aspect: the perfective on the one
hand, and the imperfective on the other. However, there is also the continuing
competition of the perfect, another tr. of the same word, perfectum,
designating a category that is not exactly the same as that of the perfective,
and which is, for its part, always a grammatical category, never a lexical
category: one speaks of perfect to designate compound tenses in G. ic
languages, e. g. , of the type I have received
as opposed to I received, which corresponds to the idea that the telos
is not only achieved, but transcended in the constitution of a fixed state,
given as the result of the completion of the process. Two, or three,
grammatical categories that are the same and not the same as the two, three, or
four lexical categories. It is in the name of these categories, and literally
behind their name, that the aspectual descriptions succeeded in being applicable
to all languages, confRomang all the imperfects of all languages and also the
Eng. progressive and the Russian imperfective, all the aorists in all
languages, and aligning perfects, perfectives, the Eng. perfect, the G. Perfekt, the Roman perfectum and the Grecian
perfect. The facts are different, but the words, and the recurrence of a
problematics that v.ms invariable, are too strong. Although it is a matter of
conjugations, the lexicon and the relation to ontological questions are too
influential. The word imperfectum was invented, we
v. a hesitation that is precisely the one that causes a problem here, between
imperfectum and infectum a nonachieved finality, an absence of finality. The
important point is that the whole history of aspectual terminology is
constituted by such exchanges. The invention of the words perfectum and
imperfectum itself proceeds from an enterprise of tr., in which it is a
question of taking as a model, or rephrasing, the Grecian grammarians’
opposition between suntelikos συντελιϰός and non-suntelikos. However, the
difference between the two terminologies is noticeable. A supine past
participle, -fectum, has replaced telikos, and hence telos, thereby
reintroducing, if not tense was tense really involved in that past participle?,
at least the achievement of an act, and consequently merges with the question
of the accomplished. In this operation, the Stoics’ opposition between
suntelikos which would thus designate the choice of perfects or imperfects and
παϱατατιϰός the extensive, in which the question of the telos is not involved
was made symmetrical, introducing into aspectual terminology a binariness from
which we have never recovered. And this symmetricalization, which sought to
describe the organization of a conjugation, was then modeled on the distinction
introduced by Aristotle between tτέλειος and aἀτελής, which was not grammatical
but lexical. This resulted in a new confusion that is not without foundation
because it was already implicit in the montage constructed by the Grecian
philosophers, with on the one hand the telos used by Aristotle to differentiate
types of process, and on the other the same telos used by the Stoics to
structure conjugation. exist in G. , is said to be primarily a matter of
discursive construction with the imparfait forming the background of a
narration, and the past tenses forming the foreground of what develops and
occurs. More recently, this area has been dominated by theories that situate
aspect in a theory of discursive representations cf. Kamp’s discourse
representation theory, and try to reduce it to a matter of discursive
organization: thus the models currently most discussed make the imparfait an
anaphoric mark that repeats an element of the context instead of constructing
an independent referent. Once again the relations are inextricably confused:
the types of discourse clearly have particular aspectual properties we have
already v.n this in connection with aoristic utterances that structure both
aspect and tense differently, and yet all or almost all aspectual forms can
appear anywhere, in all or almost all types of discursive contexts. Thus we
have foregrounded imparfaits, which have been recorded and are sometimes called
narrative imparfaits— e. g. , in an utterance like Trois jours après, il
mourait Three days later, he was dying, where it is a question of narrating a
prominent event, and where the distinction between imparfait and passé simple
becomes more difficult to evaluate. We also find passé composés in narratives,
where they compete with the passé simple: that is why many analysts of the
language consider the passé simple an archaic form that is being abandoned in
favor of the passé composé. The difficulty is clear: it is hard to attach a
given formal procedure to a given enunciative structuration, not only because
enunciative structures are supposed to be compatible with several aspectual
values, but first of all because the formal procedures themselves are all, more
or less broadly, polysemous, their value depending precisely on the context and
thus on the enunciative structure in which they are situated. Here again, this
is commonplace: polysemy is everywhere in languages. But in this case it
affects aspect: it consists precisely in running through aspectual oppositions,
the very ones that are also supposed to be associated with some aspectual
marker. The case of narrative uses of the imparfait v.ms to indicate that the
imparfait can have different aspectual values, of which some are more or less
apparently perfective. The narrative passé composés for instance, Il s’est levé
et il est sorti He got up and went out describe the process in its advent and
thus do not have the same aspectual properties as those that appear in
utterances describing the state resulting from the process e.g., Désolé, en ce
moment il est sorti Sorry, he left just now. Not to mention the presents, which
are highly polysemous in many languages and which, depending on the language,
therefore occupy a more or less extensive aspectual terrain. We are obliged to
note that aspect is at least partially independent of formal procedures, that
it also plays a role elsewhere, in particular, in the enunciative
configuration. teleology: the objectivum. Grice
speaks of the objective as a maxim. This is very Latinate. So if the maxim is
an objective, the goal is the objective, or objectivum. Meaning
"goal, aim" (1881) is from military term objective point (1852),
reflecting a sense evolution in French. This
is an expansion on the desideratum. Cf. ‘desirable,’ and ‘desirability,’ and
‘end.’ Grice feels like introducing goal-oriented conceptual machinery. In a
later stage of his career he ensured that this machinery be seen as NOT
mechanistically derivable. Which is odd seeing that in the ‘progression’ of the
‘soul,’ he allows for talk of adaptiveness and survival which suggest a
mechanist explanation. If an agent has a desideratum that means that, to echo
Bennett, A displays a goal-oriented behaviour, where the goal is the ‘telos.’
Smoke cannot ‘mean’ fire, because smoke doesn’t really behave in a
goal-oriented matter. Grice does play with the idea of finality in nature,
because that would allow him to justify the objectivity of his system. how does
soul originate from matter? Does the vegetal soul have a telos.
Purposive-behaviour is obvious in plants (phototropism). If it is present in
the vegetal soul, it is present in the animal soul. If it is present in the
animal soul, it is present in the rational soul. With each stage, alla
Hartmann, there are distinctions in the specification of the telos. Grice could
be more continental than Scheler! Grices métier. Unity of science was a very
New-World expression that Grice did not quite buy. Grice was brought up in a
world, the Old World, indeed, as he calls it in his Proem to the Locke lectures,
of Snows two cultures. At the time of Grices philosophising, philosophers such
as Winch (who indeed quotes fro Grice) were contesting the idea that science is
unitary, when it comes to the explanation of rational behaviour. Since a
philosophical approach to the explanation of rational behaviour, including
conversational behaviour (to account for the conversational implicatura) is his
priority, Grice needs to distinguish himself from those who propose a unified
science, which Grice regards as eliminationist and reductionist. Grice is
ambivalent about science and also playful (philosophia regina scientiarum).
Grice seems to presuppose, or implicate, that, since there is the devil of
scientism, science cannot get at teleology. The devil is in the physiological
details, which are irrelevant. The language Grice uses to describe his Ps as
goal-oriented, aimed at survival and reproduction, seems teleological and
somewhat scientific, though. But he means that ironically! As the scholastics
use it, teleology is a science, the science of telos, or finality (cf.
Aristotle on telos aitia, causa finalis. The unity of science is threatened by
teleology, and vice versa. Unified science seeks for a mechanistically
derivable teleology. But Grices sympathies lie for detached finality. Grice is
obsessed with the Greek idea of a telos, as slightly overused by Aristotle.
Grice thinks that some actions are for their own sake. What is the telos of
Oscar Wilde? Can we speak of Oscar Wilde’s métier? If a tiger is to tigerise, a
human is to humanise, and a person is to personise. Grice thought that
teleology is a key philosophical way to contest mechanism, so popular in The
New World. Strictly, and Grice knew this, teleology is constituted as a
discipline. One term that Cicero was unable to translate! For the philosopher,
teleology is that part of philosophy that studies the realm of the telos.
Informally, teleological is opposed to mechanistic. Grice is interested in the
mechanism/teleology debate, indeed jumps into it, with a goal in mind! Grice
finds some New-World philosophers too mechanistic-oriented, in contrast with
the more two-culture atmosphere he was familiar with at Oxford! Code is the
Aristotelian, and he and Grice are especially concerned in the idea of causa
finalis. For Grice only detached finality poses a threat to Mechanism, as it
should! Axiological objectivity is possible only given finality or purpose in
Nature, the admissibility of a final cause. Grice’s “Definition” of Meaning – and
Communicatum – Oddly, in “Utterer’s meaning and intentions,” Grice keeps
calling his analyses ‘definition,’ and ‘re-definition.’ He is well aware of the
trick introduced by Robinson on this. definiendum plural: definienda, the
expression that is defined in a definition. The expression that gives the
definition is the definiens plural: definientia. In the definition father, male
parent, ‘father’ is the definiendum and ‘male parent’ is the definiens. In the
definition ‘A human being is a rational animal’, ‘human being’ is the
definiendum and ‘rational animal’ is the definiens. Similar terms are used in
the case of conceptual analyses, whether they are meant to provide synonyms or
not; ‘definiendum’ for ‘analysandum’ and ‘definiens’ for ‘analysans’. In ‘x
knows that p if and only if it is true that p, x believes that p, and x’s
belief that p is properly justified’, ‘x knows that p’ is the analysandum and
‘it is true that p, x believes that p, and x’s belief that p is properly
justified’ is the analysans. definist,
someone who holds that moral terms, such as ‘right’, and evaluative terms, such
as ‘good’ in short, normative terms are definable in non-moral, non-evaluative
i.e., non-normative terms. William Frankena offers a broader account of a
definist as one who holds that ethical terms are definable in non-ethical
terms. This would allow that they are definable in nonethical but evaluative
terms say, ‘right’ in terms of what is
non-morally intrinsically good. Definists who are also naturalists hold that
moral terms can be defined by terms that denote natural properties, i.e.,
properties whose presence or absence can be determined by observational means.
They might define ‘good’ as ‘what conduces to pleasure’. Definists who are not
naturalists will hold that the terms that do the defining do not denote natural
properties, e.g., that ‘right’ means ‘what is commanded by God’. definition, specification of the meaning or,
alternatively, conceptual content, of an expression. For example, ‘period of
fourteen days’ is a definition of ‘fortnight’. Definitions have traditionally
been judged by rules like the following: 1 A definition should not be too
narrow. ‘Unmarried adult male psychiatrist’ is too narrow a definition for
‘bachelor’, for some bachelors are not psychiatrists. ‘Having vertebrae and a
liver’ is too narrow for ‘vertebrate’, for, even though all actual vertebrate
things have vertebrae and a liver, it is possible for a vertebrate thing to
lack a liver. 2 A definition should not be too broad. ‘Unmarried adult’ is too
broad a definition for ‘bachelor’, for not all unmarried adults are bachelors.
‘Featherless biped’ is too broad for ‘human being’, for even though all actual
featherless bipeds are human beings, it is possible for a featherless biped to
be non-human. 3 The defining expression in a definition should ideally exactly
match the degree of vagueness of the expression being defined except in a
precising definition. ‘Adult female’ for ‘woman’ does not violate this rule,
but ‘female at least eighteen years old’ for ‘woman’ does. 4 A definition
should not be circular. If ‘desirable’ defines ‘good’ and ‘good’ defines
‘desirable’, these definitions are circular. Definitions fall into at least the
following kinds: analytical definition: definition whose corresponding
biconditional is analytic or gives an analysis of the definiendum: e.g.,
‘female fox’ for ‘vixen’, where the corresponding biconditional ‘For any x, x
is a vixen if and only if x is a female fox’ is analytic; ‘true in all possible
worlds’ for ‘necessarily true’, where the corresponding biconditional ‘For any
P, P is necessarily true if and only if P is true in all possible worlds’ gives
an analysis of the definiendum. contextual definition: definition of an
expression as it occurs in a larger expression: e.g., ‘If it is not the case
that Q, then P’ contextually defines ‘unless’ as it occurs in ‘P unless Q’;
‘There is at least one entity that is F and is identical with any entity that
is F’ contextually defines ‘exactly one’ as it occurs in ‘There is exactly one
F’. Recursive definitions see below are an important variety of contextual
definition. Another important application of contextual definition is Russell’s
theory of descriptions, which defines ‘the’ as it occurs in contexts of the
form ‘The so-and-so is such-and-such’. coordinative definition: definition of a
theoretical term by non-theoretical terms: e.g., ‘the forty-millionth part of
the circumference of the earth’ for ‘meter’. definition by genus and species:
When an expression is said to be applicable to some but not all entities of a
certain type and inapplicable to all entities not of that type, the type in
question is the genus, and the subtype of all and only those entities to which
the expression is applicable is the species: e.g., in the definition ‘rational
animal’ for ‘human’, the type animal is the genus and the subtype human is the
species. Each species is distinguished from any other of the same genus by a
property called the differentia. definition in use: specification of how an
expression is used or what it is used to express: e.g., ‘uttered to express
astonishment’ for ‘my goodness’. Vitters emphasized the importance of
definition in use in his use theory of meaning. definition per genus et
differentiam: definition by genus and difference; same as definition by genus
and species. explicit definition: definition that makes it clear that it is a
definition and identifies the expression being defined as such: e.g., ‘Father’
means ‘male parent’; ‘For any x, x is a father by definition if and only if x
is a male parent’. implicit definition: definition that is not an explicit
definition. lexical definition: definition of the kind commonly thought
appropriate for dictionary definitions of natural language terms, namely, a
specification of their conventional meaning. nominal definition: definition of
a noun usually a common noun, giving its linguistic meaning. Typically it is in
terms of macrosensible characteristics: e.g., ‘yellow malleable metal’ for
‘gold’. Locke spoke of nominal essence and contrasted it with real essence.
ostensive definition: definition by an example in which the referent is
specified by pointing or showing in some way: e.g., “ ‘Red’ is that color,”
where the word ‘that’ is accompanied with a gesture pointing to a patch of
colored cloth; “ ‘Pain’ means this,” where ‘this’ is accompanied with an
insertion of a pin through the hearer’s skin; “ ‘Kangaroo’ applies to all and
only animals like that,” where ‘that’ is accompanied by pointing to a
particular kangaroo. persuasive definition: definition designed to affect or
appeal to the psychological states of the party to whom the definition is
given, so that a claim will appear more plausible to the party than it is:
e.g., ‘self-serving manipulator’ for ‘politician’, where the claim in question
is that all politicians are immoral. precising definition: definition of a
vague expression intended to reduce its vagueness: e.g., ‘snake longer than
half a meter and shorter than two meters’ for ‘snake of average length’;
‘having assets ten thousand times the median figure’ for ‘wealthy’.
prescriptive definition: stipulative definition that, in a recommendatory way,
gives a new meaning to an expression with a previously established meaning:
e.g., ‘male whose primary sexual preference is for other males’ for ‘gay’. real
definition: specification of the metaphysically necessary and sufficient
condition for being the kind of thing a noun usually a common noun designates:
e.g., ‘element with atomic number 79’ for ‘gold’. Locke spoke of real essence
and contrasted it with nominal essence. recursive definition also called
inductive definition and definition by recursion: definition in three clauses
in which 1 the expression defined is applied to certain particular items the
base clause; 2 a rule is given for reaching further items to which the
expression applies the recursive, or inductive, clause; and 3 it is stated that
the expression applies to nothing else the closure clause. E.g., ‘John’s
parents are John’s ancestors; any parent of John’s ancestor is John’s ancestor;
nothing else is John’s ancestor’. By the base clause, John’s mother and father
are John’s ancestors. Then by the recursive clause, John’s mother’s parents and
John’s father’s parents are John’s ancestors; so are their parents, and so on.
Finally, by the last closure clause, these people exhaust John’s ancestors. The
following defines multiplication in terms of definition definition 214 214 addition: ‘0 $ n % 0. m ! 1 $ n % m $ n
! n. Nothing else is the result of multiplying integers’. The base clause tells
us, e.g., that 0 $ 4 % 0. The recursive clause tells us, e.g., that 0 ! 1 $ 4 %
0 $ 4 ! 4. We then know that 1 $ 4 % 0 ! 4 % 4. Likewise, e.g., 2 $ 4 % 1 ! 1 $
4 % 1 $ 4 ! 4 % 4 ! 4 % 8. stipulative definition: definition regardless of the
ordinary or usual conceptual content of the expression defined. It postulates a
content, rather than aiming to capture the content already associated with the
expression. Any explicit definition that introduces a new expression into the
language is a stipulative definition: e.g., “For the purpose of our discussion
‘existent’ means ‘perceivable’ “; “By ‘zoobeedoobah’ we shall mean ‘vain
millionaire who is addicted to alcohol’.” synonymous definition: definition of
a word or other linguistic expression by another word synonymous with it: e.g.,
‘buy’ for ‘purchase’; ‘madness’ for ‘insanity’.
Refs.: There are specific essays on
‘teleology,’ ‘final cause,’ and ‘finality,’ the The Grice Papers. Some of the
material published in “Reply to Richards” (repr. in “Conception”) and “Actions
and events,” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
degree: Grice on the
flat/variable distinction – Grice considers that ‘ought’ is weaker than ‘must’
– ‘ought’ displays ‘degree-acceptability.’ Grice loved a degree – he uses “d”
in aspects of reason -- degree, also called arity, adicity, in formal
languages, a property of predicate and function expressions that determines the
number of terms with which the expression is correctly combined to yield a
well-formed expression. If an expression combines with a single term to form a
wellformed expression, it is of degree one monadic, singulary. Expressions that
combine with two terms are of degree two dyadic, binary, and so on. Expressions
of degree greater than or equal to two are polyadic. The formation rules of a
formalized language must effectively specify the degrees of its primitive
expressions as part of the effective determination of the class of wellformed
formulas. Degree is commonly indicated by an attached superscript consisting of
an Arabic numeral. Formalized languages have been studied that contain
expressions having variable degree or variable adicity and that can thus
combine with any finite number of terms. An abstract relation that would be
appropriate as extension of a predicate expression is subject to the same
terminology, and likewise for function expressions and their associated
functions. -- degree of unsolvability, a
maximal set of equally complex sets of natural numbers, with comparative
complexity of sets of natural numbers construed as recursion-theoretic
reducibility ordering. Recursion theorists investigate various notions of
reducibility between sets of natural numbers, i.e., various ways of filling in
the following schematic definition. For sets A and B of natural numbers: A is
reducible to B iff if and only if there is an algorithm whereby each membership
question about A e.g., ‘17 1 A?’ could be answered allowing consultation of an
definition, contextual degree of unsolvability 215 215 “oracle” that would correctly answer
each membership question about B. This does not presuppose that there is a
“real” oracle for B; the motivating idea is counterfactual: A is reducible to B
iff: if membership questions about B were decidable then membership questions
about A would also be decidable. On the other hand, the mathematical
definitions of notions of reducibility involve no subjunctive conditionals or
other intensional constructions. The notion of reducibility is determined by
constraints on how the algorithm could use the oracle. Imposing no constraints
yields T-reducibility ‘T’ for Turing, the most important and most studied
notion of reducibility. Fixing a notion r of reducibility: A is r-equivalent to
B iff A is r-reducible to B and B is rreducible to A. If r-reducibility is
transitive, r-equivalence is an equivalence relation on the class of sets of
natural numbers, one reflecting a notion of equal complexity for sets of
natural numbers. A degree of unsolvability relative to r an r-degree is an
equivalence class under that equivalence relation, i.e., a maximal class of
sets of natural numbers any two members of which are r-equivalent, i.e., a
maximal class of equally complex in the sense of r-reducibility sets of natural
numbers. The r-reducibility-ordering of sets of natural numbers transfers to
the rdegrees: for d and dH r-degrees, let d m, dH iff for some A 1 d and B 1 dH
A is r-reducible to B. The study of r-degrees is the study of them under this
ordering. The degrees generated by T-reducibility are the Turing degrees.
Without qualification, ‘degree of unsolvability’ means ‘Turing degree’. The
least Tdegree is the set of all recursive i.e., using Church’s thesis, solvable
sets of natural numbers. So the phrase ‘degree of unsolvability’ is slightly
misleading: the least such degree is “solvability.” By effectively coding
functions from natural numbers to natural numbers as sets of natural numbers,
we may think of such a function as belonging to a degree: that of its coding
set. Recursion theorists have extended the notions of reducibility and degree
of unsolvability to other domains, e.g. transfinite ordinals and higher types
taken over the natural numbers.
demonstratum: Cf. illatum – In act of communication, Grice’s focus is on
the reasoning on the emissor’s part. This is end-means. The conversational
moves is the most effectively designed move. The potential uptake by the
emissee is also taken into the consideration by the emissor. And actual uptake
is not of philosophical importance. hen Grice tried to conceptualise what
‘communicating’ and ‘smoke means fire’ have in common he came with the idea of
‘consequentia,’ as a dyadic relation that, eventually, will become triadic,
with the missor and the missee brought into the bargain. “Look that smoke,
there must be fire somewhere’ – “By that handwave, he meant that he was about
to leave me.” In any case, Grice’s arriving at ‘consequentia’ is exactly
Hobbes’s idea in “Computatio.’ And ‘con-sequentia’ involves a bit of
‘demonstratio.’ One thing follows the other. One thing YIELDS the other. The
link may be causal (smoke means fire) or ‘communicative’). ‘Rationality’ is one
of those words Austin forbids to use. Grice would venture with ‘reason,’ and
better, ‘reasons’ to make it countable, and good for botanising. Only in the
New World, and when he started to get input from non-philosophers, did Grice
explore ‘rationality’ itself. Oxonians philosophers take it for granted, and do
not have to philosophise about it. Especially those who belong to Grice’s play
group of ‘ordinary-language’ philosophers! Oxonian philosophers will quote from
the Locke version! Obviously, while each of the four lectures credits their own
entry below, it may do to reflect on Grices overall aim. Grice structures the
lectures in the form of a philosophical dialogue with his audience. The
first lecture is intended to provide a bit of linguistic botanising for
reasonable, and rational. In later lectures, Grice tackles reason qua
noun. The remaining lectures are meant to explore what he calls the
Aequi-vocality thesis: must has only one Fregeian that crosses what he calls
the buletic-doxastic divide. He is especially concerned ‒ this being
the Kant lectures ‒ with Kants attempt to reduce the
categorical imperative to a counsel of prudence (Ratschlag der Klugheit), where
Kants prudence is Klugheit, versus skill, as in rule of skill, and even if Kant
defines Klugheit as a skill to attain what is good for oneself ‒
itself divided into privatKlugheit and Weltklugheit. Kant re-introduces the
Aristotelian idea of eudaimonia. While a further lecture on happiness as
the pursuit of a system of ends is NOT strictly part of the either the
Kant or the Locke lectures, it relates, since eudaemonia may be
regarded as the goal involved in the relevant
imperative. “Aspects”, Clarendon, Stanford, The Kant memorial
Lectures, “Aspects,” Clarendon, Some aspects of reason, Stanford; reason,
reasoning, reasons. The lectures were also delivered as the Locke
lectures. Grice is concerned with the reduction of the categorical
imperative to the hypothetical or suppositional imperative. His main
thesis he calls the æqui-vocality thesis: must has one unique or singular
sense, that crosses the buletic-boulomaic/doxastic divide. “Aspects,”
Clarendon, Grice, “Aspects, Clarendon, Locke lecture notes: reason. On “Aspects”.
Including extensive language botany on rational, reasonable, and indeed reason
(justificatory, explanatory, and mixed). At this point, Grice notes that
linguistic botany is indispensable towards the construction of a more
systematic explanatory theory. It is an exploration of a range of uses of
reason that leads him to his Aequi-vocality thesis that must has only one
sense; also ‘Aspects of reason and reasoning,’ in Grice, “Aspects,”
Clarendon, the Locke lectures, the Kant lectures, Stanford, reason,
happiness. While Locke hardly mentions reason, his friend Burthogge does,
and profusely! It was slightly ironic that Grice had delivered these
lectures as the Rationalist Kant lectures at Stanford. He was honoured to
be invited to Oxford. Officially, to be a Locke lecture you have to be
*visiting* Oxford. While Grice was a fellow of St. Johns, he was still
most welcome to give his set of lectures on reasoning at the Sub-Faculty of
Philosophy. He quotes very many authors, including Locke! In his proemium,
Grice notes that while he was rejected the Locke scholarship back in the day,
he was extremely happy to be under Lockes ægis now! When preparing for his
second lecture, he had occasion to revise some earlier drafts dated pretty
early, on reasons, Grice, “Aspects,” Clarendon, reason,
reasons. Linguistic analysis on justificatory, explanatory and mixed uses
of reason. While Grice knows that the basic use of reason is qua verb
(reasoner reasons from premise p to conclusion c), he spends some time in
exploring reason as noun. Grice found it a bit of a roundabout way to
approach rationality. However, his distinction between justificatory and
explanatory reason is built upon his linguistic botany on the use of reason qua
noun. Explanatory reason seems more basic for Grice than justificatory
reason. Explanatory reason explains the behaviour of a rational
agent. Grice is aware of Freud and his rationalizations. An agent may
invoke some reason for his acting which is not legitimate. An agent may
convince himself that he wants to move to Bournemouth because of the weather;
when in fact, his reason to move to Bournemouth is to be closer to Cowes and
join the yacht club there. Grice loved an enthymeme. Grices enthymeme. Grice,
the implicit reasoner! As the title of the lecture implies, Grice takes the
verb, to reason, as conceptually prior. A reasoner reasons, briefly, from a
premise to a conclusion. There are types of reason: flat reason and gradual
reason. He famously reports Shropshire, another tutee with Hardie, and his
proof on the immortality of the human soul. Grice makes some remarks on akrasia
as key, too. The first lecture is then dedicated to an elucidation, and indeed
attempt at a conceptual analysis in terms of intentions and doxastic conditions
reasoner R intends that premise P yields conclusion C and believes his
intention will cause his entertaining of the conclusion from his entertaining
the premise. One example of particular interest for a study of the use of
conversational reason in Grice is that of the connection between implicaturum
and reasoning. Grice entitles the sub-section of the lecture as Too good to be
reasoning, which is of course a joke. Cf. too much love will kill you, and
Theres no such thing as too much of a good thing (Shakespeare, As you like it).
Grice notes: I have so far been considering difficulties which may arise from
the attempt to find, for all cases of actual reasoning, reconstructions of
sequences of utterances or explicit thoughts which the reasoner might plausibly
be supposed to think of as conforming to some set of canonical patterns of
inference. Grice then turns to a different class of examples, with regard to
which the problem is not that it is difficult to know how to connect them with
canonical patterns, but rather that it is only too easy (or shall I say
trivial) to make the connection. Like some children (not many), some cases of
reasoning are too well behaved for their own good. Suppose someone says to
Grice, and It is very interesting that Grice gives conversational examples.
Jack has arrived, Grice replies, I conclude from that that Jack has arrived. Or
he says Jack has arrived AND Jill has *also* arrived, And Grice replies, I
conclude that Jill has arrived.(via Gentzens conjunction-elimination). Or he
says, My wife is at home. And Grice replies, I reason from that that someone
(viz. your wife) is at home. Is there not something very strange about the
presence in my three replies of the verb conclude (in example I and II) and the
verb reason (in the third example)? misleading, but doxastically fine,
professor! It is true, of course, that if instead of my first reply I had said
(vii) vii. So Jack has arrived, has he? the strangeness would have been
removed. But here so serves not to indicate that an inference is being made,
but rather as part of a not that otiose way of expressing surprise. One might
just as well have said (viii). viii. Well, fancy that! Now, having spent a
sizeable part of his life exploiting it, Grice is not unaware of the truly fine
distinction between a statements being false (or axiologically satisfactory),
and its being true (or axiologically satisfactory) but otherwise
conversationally or pragmatically misleading or inappropriate or pointless,
and, on that account and by such a fine distinction, a statement, or an
utterance, or conversational move which it would be improper (in terms of the
reasonable/rational principle of conversational helfpulness) in one way or
another, to make. It is worth considering Grices reaction to his own
distinction. Entailment is in sight! But Grice does not find himself lured by
the idea of using that distinction here! Because Moores entailment, rather than
Grices implicaturum is entailed. Or because explicatu, rather than implicaturum
is involved. Suppose, again, that I were to break off the chapter at this
point, and switch suddenly to this argument. ix. I have two hands (here is one
hand and here is another). If had three more hands, I would have five. If I
were to have double that number I would have ten, and if four of them were
removed six would remain. So I would have four more hands than I have now. Is
one happy to describe this performance as reasoning? Depends whos one and whats
happy!? There is, however, little doubt that I have produced a canonically
acceptable chain of statements. So surely that is reasoning, if only
conversationally misleadingly called so. Or suppose that, instead of writing in
my customary free and easy style, I had framed my remarks (or at least the
argumentative portions of my remarks) as a verbal realization, so to speak, of
sequences of steps in strict conformity with the rules of a natural-deduction
system of first-order predicate logic. I give, that is to say, an updated
analogue of a medieval disputation. Implicaturum. Gentzen is Ockham. Would
those brave souls who continued to read be likely to think of my performance as
the production of reasoning, or would they rather think of it as a crazy
formalisation of reasoning conducted at some previous time? Depends on crazy or
formalisation. One is reminded of Grice telling Strawson, If you cannot
formalise, dont say it; Strawson: Oh, no! If I can formalise it, I shant say
it! The points suggested by this stream of rhetorical questions may be
summarized as follows. Whether the samples presented FAIL to achieve the title
of reasoning, and thus be deemed reasoning, or whether the samples achieve the
title, as we may figuratively put it, by the skin of their teeth, perhaps does
not very greatly matter. For whichever way it is, the samples seem to offend
against something (different things in different cases, Im sure) very central
to our conception of reasoning. So central that Moore would call it entailment!
A mechanical application of a ground rule of inference, or a concatenation
thereof, is reluctantly (if at all) called reasoning. Such a mechanical
application may perhaps legitimately enter into (i.e. form individual steps in)
authentic reasonings, but they are not themselves reasonings, nor is a string
of them. There is a demand that a reasoner should be, to a greater or lesser
degree, the author of his reasonings. Parroted sequences are not reasonings
when parroted, though the very same sequences might be reasoning if not
parroted. Ped sequences are another matter. Some of the examples Grice gives
are deficient because they are aimless or pointless. Reasoning is
characteristically addressed to this or that problem: a small problem, a large
problem, a problem within a problem, a clear problem, a hazy problem, a
practical problem, an intellectual problem; but a problem! A mere flow of ideas
minimally qualifies (or can be deemed) as reasoning, even if it happens to be
logically respectable. But if it is directed, or even monitored (with
intervention should it go astray, not only into fallacy or mistake, but also
into such things as conversational irrelevance or otiosity!), that is another
matter! Finicky over-elaboration of intervening steps is frowned upon, and in
extreme cases runs the risk of forfeiting the title of reasoning. In
conversation, such over-elaboration will offend against this or that
conversational maxim, against (presumably) some suitably formulated maxim
conjoining informativeness. As Grice noted with regard to ‘That pillar box
seems red to me.’ That would be baffling if the addressee fails to detect the
communication-point. An utterance is supposed to inform, and what is the above
meant to inform its addressee? In thought, it will be branded as pedantry or
neurotic caution. If a distinction between brooding and conversing is to be made!
At first sight, perhaps, one would have been inclined to say that greater
rather than lesser explicitnessness is a merit. Not that inexplicitness, or implicaturum-status,
as it were ‒ is bad, but that, other things being equal, the more explicitness
the better. But now it looks as if proper explicitness (or explicatum-status)
is an Aristotelian mean, or mesotes, and it would be good some time to enquire
what determines where that mean lies. The burden of the foregoing observations
seems to me to be that the provisional account of reasoning, which has been
before us, leaves out something which is crucially important. What it leaves
out is the conception of reasoning, as I like to see conversation, as a
purposive activity, as something with goals and purposes. The account or
picture leaves out, in short, the connection of reasoning with the will!
Moreover, once we avail ourselves of the great family of additional ideas which
the importation of this conception would give us, we shall be able to deal with
the quandary which I laid before you a few minutes ago. For we could say e.g.
that R reasons (informally) from p to c just in case R thinks that p and
intends that, in thinking c, he should be thinking something which would be the
conclusion of a formally valid argument the premisses of which are a
supplementation of p. This will differ from merely thinking that there exists
some formally valid supplementation of a transition from p to c, which I felt
inclined NOT to count as (or deem) reasoning. I have some hopes that this
appeal to the purposiveness or goal-oriented character of authentic reasoning
or good reasoning might be sufficient to dispose of the quandary on which I
have directed it. But I am by no means entirely confident that this is the
case, and so I offer a second possible method of handling the quandary, one to
which I shall return later when I shall attempt to place it in a larger
context. We have available to us (let us suppose) what I might call a hard way
of making inferential moves. We in fact employ this laborious, step-by-step
procedure at least when we are in difficulties, when the course is not clear,
when we have an awkward (or philosophical) audience, and so forth. An
inferential judgement, however, is a normally desirable undertaking for us only
because of its actual or hoped for destinations, and is therefore not desirable
for its own sake (a respect in which, possibly, it may differ from an inferential
capacity). Following the hard way consumes time and energy. These are in
limited supply and it would, therefore, be desirable if occasions for employing
the hard way were minimized. A substitute for the hard way, the quick way,
which is made possible by habituation and intention, is available to us, and
the capacity for it (which is sometimes called intelligence, and is known to be
variable in degree) is a desirable quality. The possibility of making a good
inferential step (there being one to be made), together with such items as a
particular inferers reputation for inferential ability, may determine whether
on a particular occasion we suppose a particular transition to be inferential
(and so to be a case of reasoning) or not. On this account, it is not essential
that there should be a single supplementation of an informal reasoning which is
supposed to be what is overtly in the inferers mind, though quite often there
may be special reasons for supposing this to be the case. So Botvinnik is
properly credited with a case of reasoning, while Shropshire is not. Drawing
from his recollections of an earlier linguistic botany on reason. Grice
distinguishes between justificatory reason and explanatory reason. There is a
special case of mixed reason, explanatory-cum-justificatory. The lecture can be
seen as the way an exercise that Austin took as taxonomic can lead to
explanatory adequacy, too! Bennett is an excellent correspondent. He holds a
very interesting philosophical correspondence with Hare. This is just one f.
with Grices correspondence with Bennett. Oxford don, Christchurh, NZ-born
Bennett, of Magdalen, B. Phil. Oxon. Bennett has an essay on the interpretation
of a formal system under Austin. It is interesting that Bennett was led to
consider the interpretation of a formal system under Austins Play Group.
Bennett attends Grices seminars. He is my favourite philosopher. Bennett quotes
Grice in his Linguistic behaviour. In return, Grice quotes Bennett in the
Preface toWOW. Bennett has an earlier essay on rationality, which
evidences that the topic is key at Grices Oxford. Bennett has studied better
than anyone the way Locke is Griceian. A word or expression does not just stand
for idea, but for the intention of the utterer to stand for it! Grice also enjoyed
construal by Bennett of Grice as a nominalist. Bennett makes a narrow use of
the epithet. Since Grice does distinguish between an utterance-token (x) and an
utterance-type, and considers that the attribution of meaning from token to
type is metabolic, this makes Grice a nominalist. Bennett is one of the few to
follow Kantotle and make him popular on the pages of the Times Literary
Supplement, of all places. Refs.: The locus classicus is “Aspects,” Clarendon.
But there are allusions on ‘reason’ and ‘rationality, in The H. P. Grice
Papers, BANC.
Griceian
Dennett
– Dennett knew Grice from the Oxford days – and quotes him extensively – He is
what Grice called “a New-World Griceian.” D. C., philosopher, author of books on topics in the
philosophy of mind, free will, and evolutionary biology, and tireless advocate
of the importance of philosophy for empirical work on evolution and on the
nature of the mind. Dennett is perhaps best known for arguing that a creature
or, more generally, a system, S, possesses states of mind if and only if the
ascription of such states to S facilitates explanation and prediction of S’s
behavior The Intentional Stance, 7. S might be a human being, a chimpanzee, a
desktop computer, or a thermostat. In ascribing beliefs and desires to S we
take up an attitude toward S, the intentional stance. We could just as well
although for different purposes take up other stances: the design stance we
understand S as a kind of engineered system or the physical stance we regard S
as a purely physical system. It might seem that, although we often enough
ascribe beliefs and desires to desktop computers and thermostats, we do not
mean to do so literally as with people.
Dennett’s contention, however, is that there is nothing more nor less to having
beliefs, desires, and other states of mind than being explicable by reference
to such things. This, he holds, is not to demean beliefs, but only to affirm
that to have a belief is to be describable in this particular way. If you are
so describable, then it is true, literally true, that you have beliefs. Dennett
extends this approach to consciousness, which he views not as an inwardly
observable performance taking place in a “Cartesian Theater,” but as a story we
tell about ourselves, the compilation of “multiple drafts” concocted by neural
subsystems see Conciousness Explained, 1. Elsewhere Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 5
Dennett has argued that principles of Darwinian selection apply to diverse
domains including cosmology and human culture, and offered a compatibilist
account of free will with an emphasis on agents’ control over their actions
Elbow Room, 4.
denotatum -- denotation, the
thing or things that an expression applies to; extension. The term is used in
contrast with ‘meaning’ and ‘connotation’. A pair of expressions may apply to
the same things, i.e., have the same denotation, yet differ in meaning:
‘triangle’, ‘trilateral’; ‘creature with a heart’, ‘creature with a kidney’;
‘bird’, ‘feathered earthling’; ‘present capital of France’, ‘City of Light’. If
a term does not apply to anything, some will call it denotationless, while
others would say that it denotes the empty set. Such terms may differ in
meaning: ‘unicorn’, ‘centaur’, ‘square root of pi’. Expressions may apply to
the same things, yet bring to mind different associations, i.e., have different
connotations: ‘persistent’, ‘stubborn’, ‘pigheaded’; ‘white-collar employee’,
‘office worker’, ‘professional paper-pusher’; ‘Lewis Carroll’, ‘Reverend
Dodgson’. There can be confusion about the denotation-connotation terminology,
because this pair is used to make other contrasts. Sometimes the term
‘connotation’ is used more broadly, so that any difference of either meaning or
association is considered a difference of connotation. Then ‘creature with a
heart’ and ‘creature with a liver’ might be said to denote the same individuals
or sets but to connote different properties. In a second use, denotation is the
semantic value of an expression. Sometimes the denotation of a general term is
said to be a property, rather than the things having the property. This occurs
when the denotation-connotation terminology is used to contrast the property
expressed with the connotation. Thus ‘persistent’ and ‘pig-headed’ might be
said to denote the same property but differ in connotation.
Grice’s
deontic operator
– Grice was aware of Bentham’s play on words with deontology -- as a Kantian,
Griceian is a deontologist. However, he refers to the ‘sorry story of deontic
logic,’ because of von Wright (from whom he borrowed but to whom he never
returned ‘alethic’) deontic logic, the logic of obligation and permission.
There are three principal types of formal deontic systems. 1 Standard deontic
logic, or SDL, results from adding a pair of monadic deontic operators O and P,
read as “it ought to be that” and “it is permissible that,” respectively, to
the classical propositional calculus. SDL contains the following axioms:
tautologies of propositional logic, OA S - P - A, OA / - O - A, OA / B / OA /
OB, and OT, where T stands for any tautology. Rules of inference are modus
ponens and substitution. See the survey of SDL by Dagfinn Follesdal and Risto
Hilpinin in R. Hilpinin, ed., Deontic Logic, 1. 2 Dyadic deontic logic is
obtained by adding a pair of dyadic deontic operators O / and P / , to be read as “it ought to be that
. . . , given that . . .” and “it is permissible that . . . , given that . . .
,” respectively. The SDL monadic operator O is defined as OA S OA/T; i.e., a
statement of absolute obligation OA becomes an obligation conditional on
tautologous conditions. A statement of conditional obligation OA/B is true
provided that some value realized at some B-world where A holds is better than
any value realized at any B-world where A does not hold. This axiological
construal of obligation is typically accompanied by these axioms and rules of
inference: tautologies of propositional logic, modus ponens, and substitution,
PA/C S - O-A/C, OA & B/C S [OA/C & OB/C], OA/C / PA/C, OT/C / OC/C,
OT/C / OT/B 7 C, [OA/B & OA/C] / OA/B 7 C, [PB/B 7 C & OA/B 7 C] /
OA/B, and [P< is the negation of any tautology. See the comparison of
alternative dyadic systems in Lennart Aqvist, Introduction to Deontic Logic and
the Theory of Normative Systems, 7. 3 Two-sorted deontic logic, due to Castañeda
Thinking and Doing, 5, pivotally distinguishes between propositions, the
bearers of truth-values, and practitions, the contents of commands,
imperatives, requests, and such. Deontic operators apply to practitions,
yielding propositions. The deontic operators Oi, Pi, Wi, and li are read as “it
is obligatory i that,” “it is permissible i that,” “it is wrong i that,” and
“it is optional i denotation deontic logic 219
219 that,” respectively, where i stands for any of the various types of
obligation, permission, and so on. Let p stand for indicatives, where these
express propositions; let A and B stand for practitives, understood to express
practitions; and allow p* to stand for both indicatives and practitives. For
deontic definition there are PiA S - Oi - A, WiA S Oi - A, and LiA S - OiA
& - Oi - A. Axioms and rules of inference include p*, if p* has the form of
a truth-table tautology, OiA / - Oi - A, O1A / A, where O1 represents
overriding obligation, modus ponens for both indicatives and practitives, and
the rule that if p & A1 & . . . & An / B is a theorem, so too is p
& OiA1 & . . . & OiAn / OiB.
-- deontic paradoxes, the paradoxes of deontic logic, which typically
arise as follows: a certain set of English sentences about obligation or
permission appears logically consistent, but when these same sentences are
represented in a proposed system of deontic logic the result is a formally
inconsistent set. To illustrate, a formulation is provided below of how two of
these paradoxes beset standard deontic logic. The contrary-to-duty imperative
paradox, made famous by Chisholm Analysis, 3, arises from juxtaposing two
apparent truths: first, some of us sometimes do what we should not do; and
second, when such wrongful doings occur it is obligatory that the best or a better
be made of an unfortunate situation. Consider this scenario. Art and Bill share
an apartment. For no good reason Art develops a strong animosity toward Bill.
One evening Art’s animosity takes over, and he steals Bill’s valuable
lithographs. Art is later found out, apprehended, and brought before Sue, the
duly elected local punishment-and-awards official. An inquiry reveals that Art
is a habitual thief with a history of unremitting parole violation. In this
situation, it seems that 14 are all true and hence mutually consistent: 1 Art
steals from Bill. 2 If Art steals from Bill, Sue ought to punish Art for
stealing from Bill. 3 It is obligatory that if Art does not steal from Bill,
Sue does not punish him for stealing from Bill. 4 Art ought not to steal from
Bill. Turning to standard deontic logic, or SDL, let sstand for ‘Art steals
from Bill’ and let p stand for ‘Sue punishes Art for stealing from Bill’. Then
14 are most naturally represented in SDL as follows: 1a s. 2a s / Op. 3a O- s /
- p. 4a O - s. Of these, 1a and 2a entail Op by propositional logic; next,
given the SDL axiom OA / B / OA / OB, 3a implies O - s / O - p; but the latter,
taken in conjunction with 4a, entails O - p by propositional logic. In the
combination of Op, O - p, and the axiom OA / - O - A, of course, we have a
formally inconsistent set. The paradox of the knower, first presented by
Lennart Bqvist Noûs, 7, is generated by these apparent truths: first, some of
us sometimes do what we should not do; and second, there are those who are obligated
to know that such wrongful doings occur. Consider the following scenario. Jones
works as a security guard at a local store. One evening, while Jones is on
duty, Smith, a disgruntled former employee out for revenge, sets the store on
fire just a few yards away from Jones’s work station. Here it seems that 13 are
all true and thus jointly consistent: 1 Smith set the store on fire while Jones
was on duty. 2 If Smith set the store on fire while Jones was on duty, it is
obligatory that Jones knows that Smith set the store on fire. 3 Smith ought not
set the store on fire. Independently, as a consequence of the concept of
knowledge, there is the epistemic theorem that 4 The statement that Jones knows
that Smith set the store on fire entails the statement that Smith set the store
on fire. Next, within SDL 1 and 2 surely appear to imply: 5 It is obligatory
that Jones knows that Smith set the store on fire. But 4 and 5 together yield 6
Smith ought to set the store on fire, given the SDL theorem that if A / B is a
theorem, so is OA / OB. And therein resides the paradox: not only does 6 appear
false, the conjunction of 6 and 3 is formally inconsistent with the SDL axiom
OA / - O - A. The overwhelming verdict among deontic logicians is that SDL
genuinely succumbs to the deontic operator deontic paradoxes 220 220 deontic paradoxes. But it is
controversial what other approach is best followed to resolve these puzzles.
Two of the most attractive proposals are Castañeda’s two-sorted system Thinking
and Doing, 5, and the agent-and-time relativized approach of Fred Feldman
Philosophical Perspectives, 0.
Grice
on types of priority
-- Grice often uses ‘depend’ – but not clearly in what sense – there’s
ontological dependence, the basic one. dependence, in philosophy, a relation of
one of three main types: epistemic dependence, or dependence in the order of
knowing; conceptual dependence, or dependence in the order of understanding;
and ontological dependence, or dependence in the order of being. When a
relation of dependence runs in one direction only, we have a relation of
priority. For example, if wholes are ontologically dependent on their parts,
but the latter in turn are not ontologically dependent on the former, one may
say that parts are ontologically prior to wholes. The phrase ‘logical priority’
usually refers to priority of one of the three varieties to be discussed here.
Epistemic dependence. To say that the facts in some class B are epistemically
dependent on the facts in some other class A is to say this: one cannot know
any fact in B unless one knows some fact in A that serves as one’s evidence for
the fact in B. For example, it might be held that to know any fact about one’s
physical environment e.g., that there is a fire in the stove, one must know as
evidence some facts about the character of one’s own sensory experience e.g.,
that one is feeling warm and seeing flames. This would be to maintain that
facts about the physical world are epistemically dependent on facts about
sensory experience. If one held in addition that the dependence is not
reciprocal that one can know facts about
one’s sensory experience without knowing as evidence any facts about the
physical world one would be maintaining
that the former facts are epistemically prior to the latter facts. Other
plausible though sometimes disputed examples of epistemic priority are the
following: facts about the behavior of others are epistemically prior to facts
about their mental states; facts about observable objects are epistemically
prior to facts about the invisible particles postulated by physics; and
singular facts e.g., this crow is black are epistemically prior to general
facts e.g., all crows are black. Is there a class of facts on which all others
epistemically depend and that depend on no further facts in turn a bottom story in the edifice of knowledge?
Some foundationalists say yes, positing a level of basic or foundational facts
that are epistemically prior to all others. Empiricists are usually foundationalists
who maintain that the basic level consists of facts about immediate sensory
experience. Coherentists deny the need for a privileged stratum of facts to
ground the knowledge of all others; in effect, they deny that any facts are
epistemically prior to any others. Instead, all facts are on a par, and each is
known in virtue of the way in which it fits in with all the rest. Sometimes it
appears that two propositions or classes of them each epistemically depend on
the other in a vicious way to know A,
you must first know B, and to know B, you must first know A. Whenever this is
genuinely the case, we are in a skeptical predicament and cannot know either
proposition. For example, Descartes believed that he could not be assured of
the reliability of his own cognitions until he knew that God exists and is not
a deceiver; yet how could he ever come to know anything about God except by
relying on his own cognitions? This is the famous problem of the Cartesian
circle. Another example is the problem of induction as set forth by Hume: to
know that induction is a legitimate mode of inference, one would first have to
know that the future will resemble the past; but since the latter fact is
establishable only by induction, one could know it only if one already knew
that induction is legitimate. Solutions to these problems must show that
contrary to first appearances, there is a way of knowing one of the problematic
propositions independently of the other. Conceptual dependence. To say that B’s
are conceptually dependent on A’s means that to understand what a B is, you
must understand what an A is, or that the concept of a B can be explained or
understood only through the concept of an A. For example, it could plausibly be
claimed that the concept uncle can be understood only in terms of the concept
male. Empiricists typically maintain that we understand what an external thing
like a tree or a table is only by knowing what experiences it would induce in
us, so that the concepts we apply to physical things depend on the concepts we
apply to our experideontological ethics dependence 221 221 ences. They typically also maintain that
this dependence is not reciprocal, so that experiential concepts are
conceptually prior to physical concepts. Some empiricists argue from the thesis
of conceptual priority just cited to the corresponding thesis of epistemic
priority that facts about experiences
are epistemically prior to facts about external objects. Turning the tables,
some foes of empiricism maintain that the conceptual priority is the other way
about: that we can describe and understand what kind of experience we are
undergoing only by specifying what kind of object typically causes it “it’s a
smell like that of pine mulch”. Sometimes they offer this as a reason for
denying that facts about experiences are epistemically prior to facts about
physical objects. Both sides in this dispute assume that a relation of
conceptual priority in one direction excludes a relation of epistemic priority
in the opposite direction. But why couldn’t it be the case both that facts about
experiences are epistemically prior to facts about physical objects and that
concepts of physical objects are conceptually prior to concepts of experiences?
How the various kinds of priority and dependence are connected e.g., whether
conceptual priority implies epistemic priority is a matter in need of further
study. Ontological dependence. To say that entities of one sort the B’s are
ontologically dependent on entities of another sort the A’s means this: no B
can exist unless some A exists; i.e., it is logically or metaphysically
necessary that if any B exists, some A also exists. Ontological dependence may
be either specific the existence of any B depending on the existence of a
particular A or generic the existence of any B depending merely on the existence
of some A or other. If B’s are ontologically dependent on A’s, but not
conversely, we may say that A’s are ontologically prior to B’s. The traditional
notion of substance is often defined in terms of ontological priority substances can exist without other things, as
Aristotle said, but the others cannot exist without them. Leibniz believed that
composite entities are ontologically dependent on simple i.e., partless
entities that any composite object
exists only because it has certain simple elements that are arranged in a
certain way. Berkeley, J. S. Mill, and other phenomenalists have believed that
physical objects are ontologically dependent on sensory experiences that the existence of a table or a tree consists
in the occurrence of sensory experiences in certain orderly patterns. Spinoza
believed that all finite beings are ontologically dependent on God and that God
is ontologically dependent on nothing further; thus God, being ontologically
prior to everything else, is in Spinoza’s view the only substance. Sometimes
there are disputes about the direction in which a relationship of ontological
priority runs. Some philosophers hold that extensionless points are prior to
extended solids, others that solids are prior to points; some say that things
are prior to events, others that events are prior to things. In the face of
such disagreement, still other philosophers such as Goodman have suggested that
nothing is inherently or absolutely prior to anything else: A’s may be prior to
B’s in one conceptual scheme, B’s to A’s in another, and there may be no saying
which scheme is correct. Whether relationships of priority hold absolutely or
only relative to conceptual schemes is one issue dividing realists and
anti-realists.
de re: as opposed to de dicto, of what is said or of the
proposition, as opposed to de re, of the thing. Many philosophers believe the
following ambiguous, depending on whether they are interpreted de dicto or de
re: 1 It is possible that the number of U.S. states is even. 2 Galileo believes
that the earth moves. Assume for illustrative purposes that there are
propositions and properties. If 1 is interpreted as de dicto, it asserts that
the proposition that the number of U.S. states is even is a possible truth something true, since there are in fact fifty
states. If 1 is interpreted as de re, it asserts that the actual number of
states fifty has the property of being possibly even something essentialism takes to be true.
Similarly for 2; it may mean that Galileo’s belief has a certain content that the earth moves or that Galileo believes, of the earth, that
it moves. More recently, largely due to Castañeda and John Perry, many
philosophers have come to believe in de se “of oneself” ascriptions, distinct
from de dicto and de re. Suppose, while drinking with others, I notice that
someone is spilling beer. Later I come to realize that it is I. I believed at
the outset that someone was spilling beer, but didn’t believe that I was. Once
I did, I straightened my glass. The distinction between de se and de dicto
attributions is supposed to be supported by the fact that while de dicto
propositions must be either true or false, there is no true proposition
embeddable within ‘I believe that . . .’ that correctly ascribes to me the
belief that I myself am spilling beer. The sentence ‘I am spilling beer’ will
not do, because it employs an “essential” indexical, ‘I’. Were I, e.g., to
designate myself other than by using ‘I’ in attributing the relevant belief to
myself, there would be no explanation of my straightening my glass. Even if I
believed de re that LePore is spilling beer, this still does not account for
why I lift my glass. For I might not know I am LePore. On the basis of such
data, some philosophers infer that de se attributions are irreducible to de re
or de dicto attributions. Internal-external
distinction – de re -- externalism, the view that there are objective reasons
for action that are not dependent on the agent’s desires, and in that sense
external to the agent. Internalism about reasons is the view that reasons for
action must be internal in the sense that they are grounded in motivational
facts about the agent, e.g. her desires and goals. Classic internalists such as
Hume deny that there are objective reasons for action. For instance, whether
the fact that an action would promote health is a reason to do it depends on
whether one has a desire to be healthy. It may be a reason for some and not for
others. The doctrine is hence a version of relativism; a fact is a reason only
insofar as it is so connected to an agent’s psychological states that it can
motivate the agent. By contrast, externalists hold that not all reasons depend
on the internal states of particular agents. Thus an externalist could hold
that promoting health is objectively good and that the fact that an action
would promote one’s health is a reason to perform it regardless of whether one
desires health. This dispute is closely tied to the debate over motivational
internalism, which may be conceived as the view that moral beliefs for instance
are, by virtue of entailing motivation, internal reasons for action. Those who
reject motivational internalism must either deny that expressive completeness
externalism 300 300 sound moral beliefs
always provide reasons for action or hold that they provide external reasons.
Derridaian
implicaturum
-- J., philosopher, author of deconstructionism, and leading figure in the
postmodern movement. Postmodern thought seeks to move beyond modernism by
revealing inconsistencies or aporias within the Western European tradition from
Descartes to the present. These aporias are largely associated with
onto-theology, a term coined by Heidegger to characterize a manner of thinking
about being and truth that ultimately grounds itself in a conception of
divinity. Deconstruction is the methodology of revelation: it typically
involves seeking out binary oppositions defined interdependently by mutual
exclusion, such as good and evil or true and false, which function as founding
terms for modern thought. The ontotheological metaphysics underlying modernism
is a metaphysics of presence: to be is to be present, finally to be absolutely
present to the absolute, that is, to the divinity whose own being is conceived
as presence to itself, as the coincidence of being and knowing in the Being
that knows all things and knows itself as the reason for the being of all that
is. Divinity thus functions as the measure of truth. The aporia here, revealed
by deconstruction, is that this modernist measure of truth cannot meet its own
measure: the coincidence of what is and what is known is an impossibility for
finite intellects. Major influences on Derrida include Hegel, Freud, Heidegger,
Sartre, Saussure, and structuralist thinkers such as Lévi-Strauss, but it was his
early critique of Husserl, in Introduction à “L’Origine de la géometrie” de
Husserl 2, that gained him recognition as a critic of the phenomenological
tradition and set the conceptual framework for his later work. Derrida sought
to demonstrate that the origin of geometry, conceived by Husserl as the guiding
paradigm for Western thought, was a supratemporal ideal of perfect knowing that
serves as the goal of human knowledge. Thus the origin of geometry is
inseparable from its end or telos, a thought that Derrida later generalizes in
his deconstruction of the notion of origin as such. He argues that this ideal
cannot be realized in time, hence cannot be grounded in lived experience, hence
cannot meet the “principle of principles” Husserl designated as the prime
criterion for phenomenology, the principle that all knowing must ground itself
in consciousness of an object that is coincidentally conscious of itself. This
revelation of the aporia at the core of phenomenology in particular and Western
thought in general was not yet labeled as a deconstruction, but it established
the formal structure that guided Derrida’s later deconstructive revelations of
the metaphysics of presence underlying the modernism in which Western thought
culminates. Griceians were amused by the bit of a scandal at The Other Place,
when D. H. Mellor (of all people) opposed with a “non placet” to the honouring
of Derrida. Derrida can be Griceian in a French sort of way.
descriptum: descriptivism,
the thesis that the meaning of any evaluative statement is purely descriptive
or factual, i.e., determined, apart from its syntactical features, entirely by
its truth conditions. Nondescriptivism of which emotivism and prescriptivism
are the main varieties is the view that the meaning of full-blooded evaluative
statements is such that they necessarily express the speaker’s sentiments or
commitments. Nonnaturalism, naturalism, and supernaturalism are descriptivist
views about the nature of the properties to which the meaning rules refer.
Descriptivism is related to cognitivism and moral realism. Discussed at large by Grice just because his
tutee, P. F. Strawson, showed an interst in it. theory of descriptions, an
analysis, initially developed by Peano, and borrowed from (but never returned
to) Peano by Russell, of sentences containing descriptions. In Peano’s view,
it’s about the ‘article,’ definite (‘the’) and ‘indefinite’ (‘some (at least
one).’ Descriptions include indefinite descriptions such as ‘an elephant’ and
definite descriptions such as ‘the positive square root of four’. On Russell’s
analysis, descriptions are “incomplete symbols” that are meaningful only in the
context of other symbols, i.e., only in the context of the sentences containing
them. Although the words ‘the first president of the United States’ appear to
constitute a singular term that picks out a particular individual, much as the
name ‘George Washington’ does, Russell held that descriptions are not referring
expressions, and that they are “analyzed out” in a proper specification of the
logical form of the sentences in which they occur. The grammatical form of ‘The
first president of the United States is tall’ is simply misleading as to its
logical form. According to Russell’s analysis of indefinite descriptions, the
sentence ‘I saw a man’ asserts that there is at least one thing that is a man,
and I saw that thing symbolically, Ex Mx
& Sx. The role of the apparent singular term ‘a man’ is taken over by the
existential quantifier ‘Ex’ and the variables it binds, and the apparent singular
term disappears on analysis. A sentence containing a definite description, such
as ‘The present king of France is bald’, is taken to make three claims: that at
least one thing is a present king of France, that at most one thing is a
present king of France, and that that thing is bald symbolically, Ex {[Fx & y Fy / y % x]
& Bx}. Again, the apparent referring expression ‘the present king of
France’ is analyzed away, with its role carried out by the quantifiers and
variables in the symbolic representation of the logical form of the sentence in
which it occurs. No element in that representation is a singular referring
expression. Russell held that this analysis solves at least three difficult
puzzles posed by descriptions. The first is how it could be true that George IV
wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverly, but false that George
IV wished to know whether Scott was Scott. Since Scott is the author of
Waverly, we should apparently be able to substitute ‘Scott’ for ‘the author of
Waverly’ and infer the second sentence from the first, but we cannot. On
Russell’s analysis, ‘George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of
Waverly’ does not, when properly understood, contain an expression ‘the author
of Waverly’ for which the name ‘Scott’ can be substituted. The second puzzle
concerns the law of excluded middle, which rules that either ‘The present king
of France is bald’ or ‘The present king of France is not bald’ must be true;
the problem is that neither the list of bald men nor that of non-bald men
contains an entry for the present king of France. Russell’s solution is that
‘The present king of France is not bald’ is indeed true if it is understood as
‘It is not the case that there is exactly one thing that is now King of France
and is bald’, i.e., as -Ex {Fx & y {[Fy / y % x] & Bx}. The final
puzzle is how ‘There is no present king of France’ or ‘The present king of
France does not exist’ can be true if
‘the present king of France’ is a referring expression that picks out something,
how can we truly deny that that thing exists? Since descriptions are not
referring expressions on Russell’s theory, it is easy for him to show that the
negation of the claim that there is at least and at most i.e., exactly one
present king of France, -Ex [Fx & y Fy / y % x], is true. Strawson offered
the first real challenge to Russell’s theory, arguing that ‘The present king of
France is bald’ does not entail but instead presupposes ‘There is a present
king of France’, so that the former is not falsified by the falsity of the
latter, but is instead deprived of a truth-value. Strawson argued for the
natural view that definite descriptions are indeed referring expressions, used
to single something out for predication. More recently, Keith Donnellan argued
that both Russell and Strawson ignored the fact that definite descriptions have
two uses. Used attributively, a definite description is intended to say
something about whatever it is true of, and when a sentence is so used it
conforms to Russell’s analysis. Used referentially, a definite description is
intended to single something out, but may not correctly describe it. For
example, seeing an inebriated man in a policeman’s uniform, one might say, “The
cop on the corner is drunk!” Donnellan would say that even if the person were a
drunken actor dressed as a policeman, the speaker would have referred to him
and truly said of him that he was drunk. If it is for some reason crucial that
the description be correct, as it might be if one said, “The cop on the corner
has the authority to issue speeding tickets,” the use is attributive; and
because ‘the cop on the corner’ does not describe anyone correctly, no one has
been said to have the authority to issue speeding tickets. Donnellan criticized
Russell for overlooking referential uses of theory of descriptions theory of
descriptions 914 914 descriptions, and
Strawson for both failing to acknowledge attributive uses and maintaining that
with referential uses one can refer to something with a definite description only
if the description is true of it. Discussion of Strawson’s and Donnellan’s
criticisms is ongoing, and has provoked very useful work in both semantics and
speech act theory, and on the distinctions between semantics and pragmatics and
between semantic reference and speaker’s reference, among others. .
de sensu implicaturum: vide casus obliquus. The casus rectus/casus obliquus
distinction. Peter Abelard, Kneale, Grice, Aristotle. Aquinas. de sensu implicaturum.
Ariskantian quessertions on de sensu implicate. “My sometimes mischievous friend Richard Grandy once
said, in connection with some other occasion on which I was talking, that to
represent my remarks, it would be necessary to introduce a new form of
speech act, or a new operator, which was to be called the operator of
quessertion. It is to be read as “It is perhaps possible that someone might
assert that . . .” and is to be symbolized “?├”; possibly it
might even be iterable […]. Everything I shall
suggest here is highly quessertable.” Grice 1989:297. If Grice had one thing, he had linguistic creativity.
Witness his ‘implicaturum,’ and his ‘implicaturum,’ not to mention his
‘pirotologia.’Sometime, somewhere, in the history of philosophy, a need was
felt by some Griceian philosopher, surely, for numbering intentions. The verb,
denoting the activity, out of which this ‘intention’ sprang was Latin
‘intendere,’ and somewhere, sometime, the need was felt to keep the Latinate
/t/ sound, and sometimes to make it sibilate, /s/. The source of it all seems to be Aristotle in
Soph.
Elen., 166a24–166a30, which was rendered twice om Grecian to Latin. In the
second Latinisation, ‘de sensu’ comes into view. Abelard proposes to use ‘de
rebus,’ or ‘de re,’ for what the previous translation had as ‘per divisionem.’
To make the distinction, he also proposes to use ‘de sensu’ for what the
previous translation has as ‘per compositionem,’ and ‘per conjunctionem.’ But
what did either mean? It was a subtle question, indeed. And trust Nicolai
Hartmann, in his mediaevalist revival, to add numbers and a further
distinction, now the ‘recte/’oblique’ distinction, and ‘intentio’ being
‘prima,’ ‘seconda,’ ‘tertia,’ and so on, ad infinitum. The proposal is clear.
We need a way to conceptualise first-order propositions. But we also need to
conceptualise ‘that’-clauses. The ‘that’-clause subordination is indeed
open-ended. ‘mean.’ Grice’s motivation in the presentation at the Oxford
Philosophical Society is to offer, as he calls it, a ‘proposal.’ In his words,
notice the emphasis on the Latinate ‘intend,’ – where it occurs, as applied to
an emissor, and as having as content, following that ‘that’-clause, an
‘intensional’ verb like ‘believe,’ which again, involves an ‘intentio tertia,’
now referring to a state back in the emissor expressed by yet another
intensional verb – all long for, ‘you communicate that p if you want your
addressee to realise that you hold this or that propositional attitude with
content p.’ "A meantNN something by x" is
(roughly) equivalent to "A intended the utterance of x to produce some
effect in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention"; and
we may add that to ask what A meant is to ask for a specification of the
intended effect (though, of course, it may not always be possible to get a straight
answer involving a "that" clause, for example, "a belief that .
. ."). (Grice 1989: 220). Grice’s motivation is to ‘reduce’ “mean”
to what has come to be known in the Griceian [sic] literature as a ‘Griceian’
[sic] ‘reflexive’ intention – he prefers M-intention -- which we will read as
involving an intentio seconda, and indeed intentio tertia, and beyond, which
makes its appearance explicitly in the second clause -- or ‘prong,’ as he’d
prefer -- of his ‘reductive’ analysis. Prong 1 then corresponds to the intention
prima or intention recta: Utterer U intends1 that Addressee A
believes that Utterer U holds psychological state or attitude ψ with content
“p.” Prong 2 corresponds to the intentio seconda or
intentio obliqua: Utterer
U intends2 that Addressee A believes (i) on the ‘rational,’ and not
just ‘causal,’ basis of (ii), i.e. of the addressee A’s recognition of the
utterer U’s intentio seconda or intentio obliqua i2, that Addressee
A comes to believe that Utterer U holds psychological state or attitude ψ with
content “p.” In Grice’s wording, “i2” acts as a ‘reason,’ and not
merely a ‘cause’ for Addressee A’s coming to believe that U holds psychological
state or attitude ψ with content “p”. Kemmerling has used “↝” to represent this
‘reason’ (i1 ↝ i2,
Kemmerling in Grandy/Warner, 1986, cf. Petrus in Petrus 2010). Prong 3 is a
closure prong, now involving a self-reflective third-order intention, there is
no ‘covert’ higher-order intention involved in (i)-(iii). Meaning-constitutive
intentions in utterer u’s meaning that p should be out there ‘in the open,’ or
‘above board,’ to count as having been ‘communicated.Grice quotes only one
author in ‘Meaning’: C. L. Stevenson, who started his career with a degree in
English from Yale. Willing to allow a ‘metabolical’ use of ‘mean’ he
recognises, he scare quotes it: “There is a
sense, to be sure, in which a groan “means“ something, just a reduced
temperature may at times ”mean” convalescence.” Stevenson 1944:38). This
remark will have Grice later attempting an ‘evolutionary’ model of how an ‘x’
causing ‘y’ may proceed from ‘natural’ to less natural ones. Consider ‘is in
pain.’ A creature is physically hurt, and the expression of pain comes up
naturally as an effect. But if the creature attains rational control over his
expressive behaviour, and the creature is in pain (or expects his addressee A
to think that he is in pain), U can now imitate or replicate, in a something
like a Peirceian iconic mode, the natural behaviour manifested by a spontaneous
response to a hurtful stimulus. The ‘simulated’ pain will be an ‘icon’ of the
natural pain. Grice is getting Peirceian by the day, and he is not telling us!
There are, Grice says, as if to simplify Peirce the most he can, two modes of
representation. The primary one is now the explicitly Peirceian iconic one. The
‘risus naturaliter significat interiorem laetitiam’ of Occam. And then, there’s
the derivative *non*-iconic representation, in that order. The first is, shall
we say, ‘natural,’ and beyond the utterer U’s voluntary control (cf. Darwin on
the expression of emotions in man and animals); the second is not. Grice is
allowing for smoke representing fire, or if one must, alla Stevenson,
‘representing’ it. In Grice’s motivation to along the right lines, his
psychologist austere views of his 1948 ‘Meaning,’ when he rather artificially
disjoins a ‘natural’ “mean” and an ‘artificial’ “mean,” when merely different
‘uses’ stand for what he then thought were senses, he wants now to re-introduce
into philosophical discourse the iconic natural representation or meaning that
he had left aside.If this is part of what he calls a ‘myth,’ even if an
evolutionary one, to account for the emergence of ‘systems of communication,’
it does starts with an utterer U expressing (very much alla Croce or Marty) a
psychological state or attitude ψ by displaying some behavioural pattern in an
unintentional way. Grice is being Wittgensteinian here, and quotes almost
verbatim from Anscombe’s rendition, “No psychological concept except when
backed in behaviour that manifests it.”
If Ockham notes that “Risus naturaliter significat interiorem
laetitiam,” Grice shows this will allow to avoid, also alla Ockham, a polysemy
to ‘mean.’In Grice’s three clauses in his 1948 conceptual analysis of ‘meaning’
– the first clause of exhibitiveness, the second clause of intentio seconda or
reflexivity, and the third clause of communicative overtness, voluntary control
on the part of the utterer U is already in order. Since the utterer’s addressee
A is intended to recognise this, no longer is it required any prior ‘iconic’
association between a simulated behaviour and the behaviour naturally displayed
as a response to a stimulus. This amounts, for Grice to deeming the system of
expression as having become a full system now of intention-based
‘communication.’‘know’’ Intentio seconda or intentio obliqua comes up nicely
when Grice delivers the third William James Lecture, later reprinted as
“Further notes on logic and conversation.” There, Grice targets one type of
anti-Gettier scenario for the use of a factive psychological state or attitude
expressed by a verb like “know,” again followed by a “that”-clause. Grice is
criticisign Austin’s hasty attempt to analyse ‘know’ in terms of the
‘performatory’ ‘guarantee.’ As Grice puts it in “Prolegomena,” “to say ‘I know’
is to give a guarantee.” (Grice 1989:9) which can be traced back to Austin,
although since, as Grice witnessed it, Austin ‘all too frequently ignored’ the
real of emissor’s communicatum, one is never sure. In any case, Grice wants to overcome this
‘performatory’ fallacy, and he expands on the ‘suspect’ example of the
Prolegomena in the Third lecture. Grice’s troubles with ‘know’ were long-dated.
In Causal Theory he lists as the third philosophical mistake, “What is known by
me to be the case is not also believed by me to be the case.” (1989: 237).
Uncredited, but he may be having in mind Ryle’s odd characterisations with
terms such as ‘occurrence,’ ‘episode,’ and so on. In the section on ‘stress,’ Grice asks us to
assume that Grice knows that p. The question is whether this claim commits the
philosopher to the further clause, ‘Grice knows that Grice knows that p, and so
on, … to use the scholastic term we started this with, ad infinitum. It is not
that Grice is adverse to a regressive analysis per se. This is, in effect, with
what the third clause or prong in his analysis of ‘meaning’ does – ‘let all
meaning-constitutive intentions be overt, including this one. Indeed, when it comes to meaning or knowing,
we are talking optimal, we are talking ‘virtue.’ Both ‘meaning,’
‘communicating, ‘and ‘knowing,’ represent an ‘ideal,’ value-paradeigmatic
concept – where value, a favourite with Hartmann, appears under the guise of a
noumenon in the topos ouranos that only realises imperfectly in the sub-lunary
world. In the third William James lecture Grice cursorily dismisses these
demanding or restrictive anti-Gettier scenarios as too stipulatory for the
colloquial, ordinary, use – and thus ‘sense’ -- of ‘know.’ The approach Gettier
is cricising ends up being too convoluted, seeing that conversationalists tend
to make a rather loose use of the verb. Grice’s example illustrates linguistic
botanising. So we have Grice bringing the examinee who does know that the
battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815, with hardly conclusive evidence, or any
‘de sensu’ knowledge that the evidence (which he does not have) is conclusive.
Grice grants that, in a specially emphatic utterance of ‘know,’ there might be
a cancellable implicaturum to the effect that the knower does have conclusive
evidence for what he alleges to know. Grice’s explicit reference to this
‘regressive nature’ (p. 59) touches on the topic of intention de sensu. Grice
is contesting the strong view, as represented, according to Gettier, by
philosophers ranging from Plato’s Thaetetus to Ayer’s Problem of Empirical
Knowledge (indeed the only two loci Gettier cares to cite in his short essay)
that a claim, “Grice knows that p” entails a claim to the effect that there is
conclusive evidence for p, and which gives Grice a feeling of subjective
certainty, and that Grice knows that there is such conclusive evidence, and so
on, ad infinitum. Grice casts doubts on the intentio de sensu as applied to the
colloquial or ‘ordinary’ uses of ‘know’. If I know that p, must I know that I
know that p? Having just introduced his
“Modified Occam’s Razor” – ‘Senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity’
--, Grice doesn’t think so. At this point, however, he adds a characteristic
bracket: “(cf. causal theory).” With that bracket, Grice is allowing that the
denotatum of “p,” qua content of U’s psychological state or attitude of
‘knowing,’ the state-of-affairs itself, as we may put it, should play something
like a causal role in U’s knowing that p. Grice is open-minded as to what type
of link or connection that is. It need not be strictly causal. He is merely
suggesting the open-endness of ‘know in terms of these “further conditions” as
to how Grice ‘comes’ to know that p, and refers to the ‘causal theory,’ as
later developed by philosophers like E. F. Dretske and others. As a linguistic
botanist, Grice is well aware that ‘know,’ like ‘see,’ is what the Kiparskys
(whom Grice refers to) call a ‘factive.’An ascription of “Grice knows that p,”
or, indeed, “Grice sees that p,” (unless Grice hallucinates) entails “p.” The
defeating ‘hallucination’ scenario is key. It involves what Grice calls a dis-implicaturum.
The utterer is using ‘know’ or‘see’ in a loose way (and meaning less, rather
than more than he explicitly conveys. Note incidentally, as Grice later noted
in later seminars, how his analysis proves the philosopher’s adage wrong.
Surely what is known by me to be the case is believed by me to be the case. Any
divergence to the contrary is a matter of ‘implicatural’ stress – by which he
means supra-segmentation.‘want’Soon after his delivering the William James
lectures, Grice got involved in a project concerning an evaluation of Quine’s
programme, where again he touches on issues of intentio seconda or intentio
obliqua, and brings us back to Russell and ‘the author of Waverley.’ Grice’s
presentation comes out in Words and Objections, edited by Davidson and
Hintikka, a pun on Quine’s Word and Object. Grice’s contribution, ‘Vacuous
Names,’ (later reprinted in part in Ostertag’s volume on Definite descriptions)
concludes with an exploration of “the” phrases, and further on, with some
intriguing remarks on the subtle issues surrounding the scope of an ascription
of a predicate standing for a psychological state or attitude. Grice’s choice
of an ascription now notably involves an ‘opaque’ (rather than ‘factive,’ like
‘know’) psychological state or attitude: ‘wanting,’ which he symbolizes as “W.”
Grice considers a quartet of utterances: Jack wants someone to marry him; Jack
wants someone or other to marry him; Jack wants a particular person to marry
him, and There is someone whom Jack wants to marry him. Grice notes that “there
are clearly at least *two* possible readings” of an utterance like our (i): a
first reading “in which,” as Grice puts it, (i) might be paraphrased by (ii).”
A second reading is one “in which it might be paraphrased by (iii) or by (iv).”
Grice goes on to symbolize the phenomenon in his own version of a first-order
predicate calculus. ‘Ja wants that p’ becomes ‘Wjap,’ where ‘ja’
stands for the individual constant “Jack” as a super-script attached to the
predicate standing for Jack’s psychological state or attitude. Grice writes:
“Using the apparatus of classical predicate logic, we might hope to represent,”
respectively, the external reading and the internal reading (involving an
intentio secunda or intentio obliqua) as ‘(Ǝx)WjaFxja’
and ‘Wja(Ǝx)Fxja.’ Grice then
goes on to discuss a slightly more complex, or oblique, scenario involving this
second internal reading, which is the one that interests us, as it involves an
‘intentio seconda.’ Grice notes: “But suppose that Jack wants a specific
individual, Jill, to marry him, and this because Jack has been “*deceived* into
thinking that his friend Joe has a highly delectable sister called Jill, though
in fact Joe is an only child.” (The Jill Jack eventually goes up the hill with
is, coincidentally, another Jill, possibly existent). Let us recall that
Grice’s main focus of the whole essay is, as the title goes, ‘emptiness’! In
these circumstances, one is inclined to say that (i) is true only on reading
(vii),” where the existential quantifier occurs within the scope of the
psychological-state or -attitude verb, “but we cannot now represent (ii) or
(iii), with ‘Jill’ being vacuous, by (vi), where the existential quantifier (Ǝx) occurs outside the scope of the
psychological-attitude verb, want, “since [well,] Jill does not really exist,”
except as a figment of Jack’s imagination. In a manoeuver that I interpret as
‘purely intentionalist,’ and thus favouring by far Suppes’s over Chomsky’s
characterisation of Grice as a mere ‘behaviourist,’ Grice hopes that “we should
be provided with distinct representations for two familiar readings” of, now:
Jack wants Jill to marry him; Jack wants ‘Jill’ to marry him. It is at this
point that Grice applies a syntactic scope notation involving sub-scripted
numerals, (ix) and (x), where the numeric values merely indicate the order of
introduction of the symbol to which it is attached in a deductive schema for
the predicate calculus in question. Only the first notation yields the internal
de sensu reading (where ‘ji’ stands for ‘Jill’): ‘W2ja4F1ji3ja4’
and ‘W3ja4F2ji1ja4.’
Note that in the alternative external notation, the individual constant for
“Jill,” ‘ji,’ is introduced prior to ‘want,’ – ‘ji’’s sub-script is 1, while
‘W’’s sub-script is the higher numerical value 3. If Russell could have avowed
of this he would have had that the Prince Regents, by issuing the invitation,
wants to confirm that ‘the author of Waverley’ isN Scott, already having
confirmed that the author of Waverley =M the author of Waverley. Grice warns
Quine. Given that Jill does not exist, only the internal reading “can be true,”
or alethically satisfactory. Similarly, we might imagine an alternative
scenario where the butler informs the Prince: ‘We are sorry to inform Your
Majesty that your invitation was returned: apparently the author of Waverley
does not SEEM to exist.’ Grice sums up his reflections on the representation of
the opaqueness of a verb standing for a psychological state or attitude like
that expressed by ‘wanting’ with one observation that further marks him as an
intentionalist, almost of a Meinongian type. If he justified a loose use of
‘know,’ he is now is ready to allow for ‘existential’ phrases in cases of ‘vacuous’
designata, which however baffling, should not lead a philosopher to the wrong
characterisation of the linguistic phenomena (as it led Austin with ‘know’).
Provided such a descriptors occur within an opaque, intensional, de sensu,
psychological-state or attitude verbs, Grice captures the nuances of ‘ordinary’
discourse, while keeping Quine happy. As Grice puts it, we should also have
available to us also three neutral, yet distinct, (Ǝx)-quantificational forms (together with their isomorphs),” as a
philosopher who thinks that Wittgenstein denies a distinction, craves for a
generality! “Jill” now becomes “x”: ‘W4ja5Ǝx3F1x2ja5,’
‘Ǝx5W2ja5F1x4ja3’,
and ‘Ǝx5W3ja4F1x2ja4
.’ Since in (xii) the individual variable ‘x’ (ranging over ‘Jill’) “does not
dominate the segment following the ‘(Ǝx)’
quantifier, the formulation does not display any ‘existential’ or de re,
‘force,’ and is suitable therefore for representing the internal readings (ii)
or (iii), “if we have to allow, as we do have, if we want to faithfully
represent ‘ordinary’ discourse, for the possibility of expressing the fact that
a particular person, Jill, does not actually exist.” At least Grice does not
write, “really,” for he knew that Austin detested a ‘trouser word.’ Grice
concludes that (xi) and (xiii) are derivable from each of (ix) and (x), while
(xii) will be “derivable only” from (ix).‘intend’By this time, Grice had been
made a Fellow of the British Academy and it was about time for the delivery of
the philosophical lecture that goes with it. It only took him six five years.
Grice choses “Intention and uncertainty” as its topic. He was provoked by two
members of his ‘playgroup’ at Oxford, Hart and Hampshire, who in an essay
published in Mind, what Grice finds, again, as he did with the anti-Gettier
cases of ‘know,’ as rather a too strong analysis of ‘intending.’ In his
British-Academy lecture, Grice plays now with the psychological state or
attitude, realised by the verbal form, ‘intend,’ when specifically followed by
a ‘that’-clause, “intends that…,” as an echo of his dealing with “meaning to”
as merely ‘natural.’ He calls himself a neo-Prichardian, reviving this ‘willing
that’ which Urmson had popularised at Oxford, bringing to publication
Prichard’s exploration of William James and his “I will that the distant chair
slides over the floor towards me. It does not.”Grice’s ‘intending that…’ is
notably a practical, boulemaic, or buletic, or desiderative, rather than
alethic or doxastic, psychological state or attitude. It involves not just an itentum,
but an intentum that involves both a desideratum AND a factum – for the ‘future
indicative’ is conceptually involved. Grice claims that, if the conceptual
analysis of “intending that…” is to represent ‘ordinary’ discourse, shows that
it contains, as one of its prongs, in the final ‘neo-Prichardian’ version that
Grice gives, also a ‘doxastic’ (rather than ‘factive’ and ‘epistemic’)
psychological state or attitude, notably a belief on the part of the ‘intender’
that his willing that p has a probability greater than 0.5 to the effect that p
be realised. Contra Hart and Hampshire, Grice acknowledges the investigations
by the playgroup member Pears on this topic. Interestingly, a polemic arose
elsewhere with Davidson, who trying to be more Griceian thatn Grice, sees this
doxastic constraint as a mere cancellable implicaturum. Grice grants it may be
a dis-implicaturum at most, as in loose cases of ‘know,’ or ‘see.’ Grice is
adamant in regarding the doxastic component as a conceptual ‘entailment’ in the
‘ordinary’ use of ‘intend,’ unless the verb is used in a merely
‘disimplicatural,’ loose fashion. Grice’s example, ‘Jill intends to climb
Everest next week,’ when the prohibitive conditions are all to evident to
anyone concerned with such an utterance of (xv), perhaps Jill included, and
‘intends’ has to be read only ‘internally’ and hyperbolically. At this point,
if in “Vacuous Names, he fights with Meinong while enjoying engaging in
emptiness, it should be stressed that Grice gives as an illustration of a ‘disimplicaturum,’
along with a use of ‘see’ in a Shakespeareian context. ‘See,’ like ‘know,’ or ‘mean,’ exhibit what
Grice calls diaphaneity. So it’s only natural Grice turns his attention to
‘see.’ Grice’s examples are ‘Macbeth saw Banquo’ and ‘Hamlet saw his father on
the ramparts of Elsinore,’ and both involve hallucination! It is worth
comparing the fortune of ‘disimplicaturum’ with that of ‘implicaturum.’ Grice
coins ‘to dis-implicate’ as an active verb, for a case where the utterer does
NOT, as in the case of implicaturum, mean MORE than he says, but LESS. Grice’s
point is a subtle one. It involves his concession on something like an
explicatum, but alsoo on something like Moore’s entailment. If the ‘doxastic
condition’ is entailed by “intending that…,’ an utterer U may STILL use, in an
‘ordinary’ fashion, a strong ‘intending that…’ in a scenario where it is common
ground between the utterer U and his addressee A that the probability of ‘p’
being realised is lower than 0.5. The expression of the psychological state or
attitude is loose, since the utterer is, as it were, dropping an ‘entailment’
that applies in a use of ‘intending that’ where that ‘common-ground’ assumption
is absent. One reason may be echoic. Jill may think that she can succeed in
climbing Mt. Everest; she herself has used ‘intend.’ When that information is
transmitted, the strong psychological verb is kept when the doxastic constraint
is no longer shared by the utterer U and his addressee A (Like an implicaturum,
a disimplicaturum has to be recognised as such to count as one. No such thing as an ‘unwanted’ disimplicaturum.‘motivate’Sometimes,
it would seem that, for Grice, the English philosopher of English
‘ordinary-language’ philosophy, English is not enough! Grice would amuse at
Berkeley seminars, with things like, ‘A pirot potches o as fang, or potches o
and o’ as F-id,’ just to attract his addressee’s attention. The full passage,
in what Grice calls, after Carnap, pirotese, reads: “A pirot can be said to
potch of some obble x as fang or feng; also to cotch of x, or some obble o, as
fang or feng; or to cotch of one obble o and another obble o’ as being fid to
one another.” Grice’s deciphering, with ‘pirot,” a tribute to Carnap – and
Locke -- as any agent, and an ‘obble’ as an object. Grice borrows, but does not
return, the ‘pirot’ from Carnap (for whom pirots karulise elatically – Carnap’s
example of a syntactically well-formed formula in Introduction to Semantics).
Grice uses ‘pirotese’ ‘to potch’ as a correlate for ‘perceive,’ such as the
factive ‘see’ and ‘to cotch’ as a correlate for the similarly factive
‘know.’While ‘perceive’ strictly allows for a ‘that’-clause (as in Grice
analysis of “I perceive that the pillar box is red” in “The causal theory of
perception”), for simplificatory purposes, Grice is using ‘to potch’ as
applying directly to an object, which Grice rephrases as an ‘obble.’ Since some
perceptual feature or other is required in a predication of ‘perceiving’ and
‘potching,’ ‘feng’ is introduced as a perceptual predicate. And since pirots
should also be allowed to perceive an ‘obble’ o in some relation with another
‘obble’ o2, Grice introduces the dyadic ‘relational’ feature ‘fid.’ Grice’s exegesis reads: “‘To potch’ is
something like ‘to perceive,’ whereas ‘to cotch’ is something like ‘to think.’
‘Feng’ and ‘fang’ are possible descriptions, much like our adjectives; ‘fid’ is
a possible relation between ‘obbles.’”).
At this point, Grice has been made, trans-territorially, the President
of the American Philosophical Association, and is ready to give his
Presidential Address (now reprinted in his Conception of Value, for Clarendon.
He chooses ‘philosophical psychology’ It’s when Grice goes on to play now with
the neo-Wittgensteinian issues of incorrigibility and privileged access, that
issues of intentio seconda become prominent.
For any psychological attitude ψ1, if U holds it, U holds, as
a matter of what Grice calls ‘genitorial construction,’ a meta-psychological
attitude, ψ2, a seconda intentio if ever there was one, -- Grice
even uses the numeral ‘2’ -- that has, as its content followed the second
‘that’-clause, the very first psychological attitude ψ1. The general
schema being given below, with an instance of specification: ‘ψup ⊃ ψuψup,’
and ‘if U wills that p, U wills that U wills that p.’ The interesting bit, from
the perspective of our exploration of ‘intentio seconda,’ is that, if, alla
Peano, we apply this to itself, as in the anti-Gettier cases Grice discussed
earlier, we end with an ad-infinitum clause. It was Judith Baker, who earned
her doctorate under Grice at Berkeley who sees this clearlier than everyone
(She was a regular contributor to the Kant Society in Germany). Baker’s
publications are, like those of her tutor, scarce. But in a delightful
contribution to the Grice festschrift, “Do one’s motives have to be pure?” (in
Grandy/Warner 1986), Baker explores the crucial importance of that ad-infinitum
chain of intentiones secondæ as it applies to questions of not alethic but
practical value or satisfactoriness. Consider ‘ought’. Grice would say that
‘must’ is aequi-vocal, i.e. it is not that ‘must’ has an alethic ‘sense’ and a
practical ‘sense.’ Only “one” must, if one must! (As Grice jokes, “Who needs
ichthyological necessity?”). Baker notes
that the ad-infinitum chain may explain how ‘duty’ ‘cashes out’ in ‘interest.’
Both Grice and Baker are avowed Kantotelians. By allowing ‘duty’ to cash out in
interest they are merging Aristotle’s utilitarian teleology with Kant’s
deontology, and succeeding! It is possible to symbolize Grice’s and Baker’s
proposal. If there is a “p” SUCH AS, at some point in the iteration of willing
and intentiones secondæ, the agent is not willing to accept it, this blocks the
potential Kantian universalizability of the content of a teleological attitude
“p,” stripping “p” of any absolute value status that it may otherwise attain.In
Grice’s reductive analysis of ‘mean,’ ‘know,’ ‘want,’ ‘intend,’ and ‘motivate,’
we witness the subtlety of his approach that is only made possible from the
recognition of Aristotle’s insight back in “De Sophisticis Elenchis” to Kant’s
explorations on the purity of motives. It should not surprise us. It’s Grice’s
nod, no doubt, to an unjustly neglected philosopher, who should be neglected no
more.ReferencesBlackburn, S. W. 1984. Spreading the words: groundings in the
philosophy of language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Darwin, Charles. 1872.
The expression of emotions in man and animals. London: Murray. Grandy, R. E.
and R. O. Warner 1986. Philosophical grounds of rationality: intentions,
categories, ends. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Grice, H. P. 1948. Meaning, The
Oxford Philosophical Society. Repr. in Grice 1989. Grice, H. P. 1961. The
causal theory of perception, The Aristotelian Society. Repr. in Grice 1989.
Grice, H. P. 1967. Logic and Conversation, The William James lectures. Repr. in
a revised 1987 form in Grice 1989. Grice, H. P. 1969. Vacuous Names, in
Davidson and Hintikka, Words and objections. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. Grice, H.
P. 1971. Intention and uncertainty, The British Academy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. Grice, H. P. 1975. How pirots karulise elatically: some
simpler ways, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC MSS 90/135c, The Bancroft Library,
University of California, Berkeley. Grice, H. P. 1982. Meaning Revisited, in N.
V. Smith, Mutual knowledge. London: Croom Helm, repr. in Grice 1989. Grice,
H.P. 1987. Retrospective epilogue, in Studies in the Way of Words. Grice, H. P.
1989. Studies in the way of words. London and Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press. Hart, H. L. A. and S. N. Hampshire 1958. Intention, decision,
and certainty, Mind, 67:1-12.Kemmerling, A. M. 1986. Utterer’s meaning
revisited, in Grandy/Warner 1986. Kneale, W. C. and M. Kneale. 1966. The
development of logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Pecocke, C. A. B. 1989. Transcendental Arguments in the Theory of Content: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered
Before the University of Oxford on 16 May 1989. Oxford University Press.
Prichard, H. A. 1968. Moral Obligation and Duty and Interest. Essays and
Lectures, edited by
W. D. Ross and J. O. Urmson. Oxford: Oxford University. Stevenson,
C. L. 1944. Ethics and language. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Strawson, P. F. 1964 Intention and convention in speech acts, The Philosophical
Review, repr. in Logico-Linguistic Papers, London, Methuen, 1971, pp. 149-169 as Blackburn puts
it in his discussion of Grice in the intention-based chapter of his “Spreading
the word: groundings in the philosophy of language.” Intentio seconda or
obliqua bears heavily on Grice’s presentation for the Oxford Philosophical
Society. The motivation behind Grice’s analysis pertains to philosophical
methodology. Grice is legitimizing an ascription of ‘mean’ to a rational agent,
such as … a philosopher. This very ascription Grice finds to be ‘seemingly
denied by Wittgenstein’ (Grice 1986). As an exponent of what he would later and
in jest dub “The Post-War Oxonian School of ‘Ordinary-Language’ Philosophy,”
Grice engages in a bit of language botany, and dealing with the intricacies of
‘communicative’ uses of “mean.” Interestingly, and publicly – although a
provision is in order here – Grice acknowledges emotivist Stevenson, who
apparently taught Grice about ‘metabolic’ uses of “mean.” Stevenson, who read
English as a minor at Yale, would not venture to apply ‘mean’ to moans!
Realising it as a colloquial extension, he is allowed to use ‘mean,’ but in
scare quotes only! (“Smith’s reduced temperature ‘means’ that he is is
convalescent.” “There is a sense, to be sure, in
which a groan “means“ something, just a reduced temperature may at times ”mean”
convalescence.” Stevenson 1944:38). Close enough but no cigar. Stevenson
has ‘groan,’ which at least rhymes with ‘moan.’ (As for the proviso, Grice
never ‘meant’ to ‘publish’ his talk on ‘Meaning,’ but one of his tutees
submitted for publication, and on acceptance, Grice allowed the publication).
In “Meaning” Grice does not provide a conceptual analysis for, ‘by moaning, U
means [simpliciter] that p.’ He will in his “Meaning Revisited” – the
metabolical scare quotes are justified on two counts: ‘By moaning U means that
p’ is legitimized on the basis of the generic ‘x ‘means’ y iff x is a
consequence of y.’ But it is also justified on the basis that there is a
continuum between U’s involuntarily moaning thereby meaning that he is in pain,
and U’s voluntarily moaning, thereby ‘communicating’ that he is in pain.
However, and more importantly for our exploration of the ‘intentum,’ Grice
hastens to add that he does not agree with Stevenson’s purely ‘causal’ account.
The main reason is not ‘anti-naturalistic.’ It is just that Grice sees
Stevenson’s proposal as as involving a vicious circle. Typically, Grice
extrapolates the relevant quote from Stevenson, slightly out of context. Grice
refers to Stevenson’s appeal to "an elaborate process of conditioning attending
… communication."Grice: “If we have to take seriously the second part of
the qualifying phrase ("attending … communication"), Stevenson’s
account of meaning is obviously circular. We might just as well say, "U
means” if “U communicates,” which, though true, is not helpful. It MIGHT be
helpful for Cicero translating from Grecian to Roman: ‘com-municatio’ indeed
translates a Grecian turn of phrase involving ‘what is common.’ f. “con-” and
root “mu-,” to bind; cf.: immunis, munus, moenia.’And the suggestion would be
helpful if we say that to ‘communicate,’ or ‘mean,’ is just to bring some
intentum to be allotted ‘common ground,’ because of the psi-transmission it is
shared between the emissor and his intended addressee. This one hopes is both
true AND ‘helpful.’ In any case, Grice’s tutee Strawson later
found Grice’s elucidation of utterer’s meaning to be ‘objection-proof’
(Starwson and Wiggins, 2001) in terms of a set of necessary and sufficient
conditions, of an utterer or emissor E meaning that p, by uttering ‘x,’ and
appealing to primary and secondary intentionality. But is Grice’s
intentionalism a sort of behaviourism? Grice denies that in “Method” calling
‘behaviourism’ ‘silly. Grice further explores intentio obliqua as it pertains
to his remarks towards a general theory of “re-presentation.” The place where
this excursus takes place is crucial. It is his Valediction to his compilation
of essays, Studies in the Way of Words, posthumously published. At this stage,
he must have felt that, what he once regarded krypto-technic in Peirce, is no
more! Grice has already identified in that ‘Valediction’ many strands of his
philosophical thought, and concludes his re-assessment of his ‘philosophy of
language’ and semiotics with an attempt to provide some general remarks about
‘to represent’ in general, perhaps to counter the allegations of vicious
circularity which his approach had received, seeing that “p” features, as a
‘gap-sign,’ as the content of both an ‘expression’ and a ‘psychological’
attitude. In trying to reconcile his austere views on “Meaning,” back in that
evening at the Oxford Philosophical Society, where he distinguished two senses
of ‘mean’ (“Smoke ‘means’ fire,” and ““Smoke” means ‘smoke’”). By focusing on
the most general of verbs for a psychological state or attitude, ‘to
represent,’ that even allows for a non-psychological reading, Grice wants to be
seen as answering the challenge of an alleged vicious circle with which his
intention-based approach is usually associated. The secondary-intentional non-iconic
mode of representation rests on a prior iconic mode and can be understood as
‘pre-conventional,’ without any explicit recourse to the features we associate
with a developed system of communication. Grice needs no ‘language of thought’
or sermo mentalis alla Ockham there. Grice allows that one can communicate
fully without the need to use what more conventional philosophers call ‘a
language.’ Artists do it all the time!
The passage from intentio prima to full intentio seconda is, for Grice,
gradual and complex. Grice means to adhere with ‘ordinary’ discourse, in its implicatura
and dis-implicaata. The passage also adhering to a functionalist approach qua
‘method in philosophical psychology,’ as he’d prefer, that needs not to
postulate a full-blown ‘linguistic entity’ as the object of intentional
thought. In this respect, it is worth mentioning the work of C. A. B. Peacocke,
who knew Grice from his Oxford days and later joined his seminars at Berkeley,
and who has developed this line of thought in a better fashion than less
careful philosophers. Grice’s programme has occasionally, and justly, been
compared with phenomenological approaches to expression and communication, such
as Marty’s. It is hoped that the previous notes have shed some light on those aspects
where this interface can further be elaborated. Even as we leave an intentio
seconda to resume the discussion for a longer day. In his explorations on the
embedding of intensional concepts, Grice should be inspirational to
philosophers in more than one way, but especially in the one that he favoured
most: the problematicity of it all. As he put it in another context, when
defending absolute value. “Such a defence of absolute value is
of course, bristling with unsolved or incompletely solved problems. I do not
find this thought daunting. If philosophy generated no new problems it would be
dead, because it would be finished; and if it recurrently regenerated the same
old problems it would not be alive because it could never begin. So those who
still look to philosophy for their bread-and-butter should pray that the supply
of new problems never dries up.” (Grice 1991). In the Graeco-Roman tradition,
philosophers started to use ‘intentio prima,’ ‘intentio secunda,’ ‘intentio
tertia,’ and “… ad infinitum,” as they would put it. In post-war Oxford,
English philosopher H. P. Grice felt the need. The formalist he was, he found
subscribing numbers to embedded intentions has a strong appeal for him. Grice’s
main motivation is in the philosophy of language, but as ancillary towards
solving this or that problem concerning the ‘linguistic’ methodology of his
day. To appreciate Grice’s contribution one need to abstract a little from his
own historical circumstances, or rather, place them in the proper context, and connect
it with the general history of philosophy. As a matter of history, ‘intentio prima,’
or ‘recta,’ as opposed to ‘obliqua,’ is part of Nicolai Hartmann’s ‘mediaeval
revival,’ as a reaction to mediaevalism having made scorn by the likes of
Rabelais that amused D. P. Henry. For the mediaeval philosopher, to use Grice’s
symbolism, was concerned with whether a chimaera could eat ‘I2,’ a
second intention. The mediaeval philosopher’s implicaturum seems to be that a
chimaera can easily eat ‘I1.’ Such a ‘quaestio subtilissima,’
Rabelais jokes. If ‘I1,’ or, better, for simplificatory purposes, ‘IR’
is a specific state, stance, or attitude of the ‘soul,’ ‘ψ1’ or ‘ψR’
directed towards its ‘de re’ ‘intentum,’ or ‘prae-sentatum,’ of the noumenon,
‘IO,’ ‘intentio obliqua,’ is a state, stance, or attitude of the
‘soul,’ of the same genus, ‘ψ2,’ or ‘ψS’ directed towards
‘ψR,’ its ‘de sensu’ ‘intentum’ now ‘re-prae-sentatum’ of the
phainomenon or ob-jectum (Abelard translates Aristotle’s ‘per divisionem’ as
‘de re’ and ‘per compositionem’ and ‘per conjunctionem’ by ‘de sensu,’ and ‘per
Soph. Elen., Kneale and Kneale, 1966). Grice’s intentionalism has been widely
discussed, but the defense he himself makes of intensionalism (versus
extensionalism) has proved inspiring, as when he assumes as an attending
commentary to his reductive analysis of the state of affairs by which the
emissor communicates that p, that he is putting forward “the legitimacy of
[the] application of [existential generalization] to a statement the expression
of which contains such [an] "intensional" verb[…] as "intend"
(Grice 1989: 116 ). The expression ‘de sensu’ is due to Abelard, but Russell
likes it. While serving as Prince Regent of England in 1815, George IV casually
remarks his wish to meet ‘the author of Waverley’ in the flesh. The Prince was
being funny, you see. The prince would not know this, but when his press
becomes embroiled in pecuniary difficulties, Scotts set out to write a
cash-cow. The result is Waverley, a novel which did not name its author. It is
a tale of the last Jacobite rebellion in England, the “Forty-Five.” The novel
meets with considerable success. The next year, Scott. There follows a sequel,
the same general vein. Mindful of his
reputation, Scotts maintains the anonymous habit he displays with Waverley, and
publishes the sequel under “the Author of Waverley.” The identity “Author of
Waverley” = “Scott” is widely rumoured, and Scott is given the honour of dining with George,
Prince Regent, who had wished to meet “Author of Waverley” in the flesh for a
‘snug little dinner’ at Carleton, on hearing ‘the author of Waverley’ was in
town. The use of a descriptor may lead to the implicaturum that His Majesty is
p’rhaps not sure that ‘the author of Waverley’ has a name, and isR
Scott. Lack of certainty is one thing, yet, to quote from Russell, “an interest
in the law of identity can hardly be attributed to the first gentleman of
Europe.” Grice admired Russell profusely and one of his essays is wittily
entitled, “Definite descriptions in Russell and in the Vernacular,” so his
explorations of ‘intentio’ ‘de sensu’ have an intrinsic interest. Keywords: H. Paul Grice, intentio seconda, implicaturum,
intentionalism, intentum, intentum de sensu,
‘that’-clause, the recte-oblique distinction. Grice explored issues of intentum
de sensu in various areas. First, ‘meaning.’ Second, ‘knowing.’ Third,
‘wanting.’ Fourth, ‘intending,’ Fifth, pirots, with incorrigibility and
privileged access. Sixth, morality and the regressus. Seventh, the continuum
and the unity. With
Grice, it all starts, roughly, when Grice comes up with a topic for a talk at
The Oxford Philosophical Society.The Society is holding one of those meetings,
and Grice thinks of presenting a few conclusions he had reached at his seminars
on C. S. Peirce.What’s the good of an Oxford don of keeping tidy lecture notes
if you will not be able to lecture to a philosophical addressee? Peirce is the
philosopher on whom Grice choses to lecture. In part, for “not being
particularly popular on these shores,” and in part because Grice noted the
‘heretic’ in Peirce with which he could identify.Granted, at this stage, Grice
disliked the un-Englishness of some of Peirce’s over-Latinate jargon, what
Grice finds the ‘krypto-technic.’ ‘Sign,’ ‘symbol,’ ‘icon,’ and the rest of
them!Instead, Grice thinks, initially for the sake of his tutees and students –
he was university lecturer -- sticking with the simpler, ‘ordinary’, short
English lexeme ‘mean.’A. M. Kemmerling, of all people, who wrote the obituary
for Grice for Synthese, has precisely cast doubts on the ‘universal’ validity
of Grice’s proposed conceptual reductive analysis, notably in his Ph.D
dissertation on ‘Meinen.’ Note the irony
in Kemmerling’s title: Was Grice mit "Meinen"
meint - Eine Rekonstruktion der Griceschen Analyse rationaler Kommunikation.” Nothing jocular in the
subtitle, for this indeed is a reconstruction of ‘rational’ communication. The
funny bit is in “Was mit “Meinen” Grice meint”! In that very phrase, which is
rhetorical, and allows for an answer, because ‘meinen’ is both mentioned and
used, Kemmerling allows that he is ‘buying’ Grice’s idea that his reductive
analysis of ‘mean’ applies to German ‘meinen.’ Kemmerling is also pointing to
the ‘primacy’ (to use Suppes’s phrase) of ‘utterer’s’ or ‘emissor’s
“communicatum” or ‘Meinung.” Kemmerling advertises his interest in exploring on
what _Grice_ means – by uttering ‘meinen,’ almost! As Kemmerling notes,
German ‘meinen,’ cognate via common Germanic with English ‘mean,’ (cf. Frisian
‘mein,’ – and Hazzlitt, “Bread, butter, and green cheese, very good English,
very good cheese”) is none other than ‘mean’ that Grice means. And ‘Grice
means’ is the only literal, i. e. non-metabolic use of the verb Grice allows –
as applied to a rational agent, which features in the subtitle to Kemmerling’s
dissertation. Thus one reads in Kluge, “Etymologische Wörterbuch
der deutschen Sprache, 1881, of “meinen,”
rendered by J. F. Davis as ‘to think, opine, mean,’ from a MHG used to indicate, in Davis’s rendition,
‘to direct one's thoughts to, have in view, aim at, be affected towards a
person, love,’ OHG meinen, meinan, ‘to mean, think, say,
declare.’ = OS mênian,
Du. meenen, OE mœ̂nan, E mean (to this Anglo-Saxon mœ̂nan, cf. prob. moan – I know your meaning from your moaning),
all from WGmc. meinen, mainjan, ‘mênjan,’ and cognate with ‘man,’ ‘to think’ (cf. ‘mahnen,’ ‘Mann,’ and ‘Minne’). Kemmerling is
very apropos, because Grice engaged in philosophical discussion with him, as
testified by his perceptive contribution to P. G. R. I. C. E. (Kemmerling, 1986).
On top, in his presentation for the Oxford Philosophical Society, Grice wants
to restrict the philosophical interest to ‘de sensu,’ the ‘that’-clause (cf.
the recte-oblique distinction), viz. not just ‘what Grice means,’ if this is
going to be expaned as ‘something wonderful.’ Not enough for Grice. It has to
be expanded, for the thing to have philosophical interest into a ‘propositional
clause,’, an ‘intensional’ context, i. e., ‘Grice means that…’ Grice cavalierly
dismisses other use of ‘mean,’ – notably the ubiquitous, ‘mean to…’ – He will
later explain his reason for this. It was after William James provoked
Prichard. For William James uttered: “I will that the distant table slides on
the floor toward me. It doesn’t’. Prichard turns this into the conceptual
priority of ‘will that…’ for which Grice gives him the credit he deserved at a
later lecture now on his being appointed a Fellow of The British Academy
(Grice, 1971). Strictly, what Grice does
in the Oxford Philosophical Socieety presentation is to distinguish between
various ‘mean’ and end up focusing on ‘mean’ as followed by a ‘that’-clause. In
the typical Oxonian fashion, that Grice borrows (but never returns) from J. C.
Wilson, Grice has the IO as ‘meaning that so-and-so’ (Grice, 1989:
217). Grice explicitly displays the primacy of a reductive analysis of the
conceptual circumstances involving an emissor (Anglo-Saxon ‘utterer’) who
‘means’ that p. It will be a longer ‘shaggy-dog’ story Grice tells when he
crosses the divide from ‘propositional’ (p) to ‘predicative’ ascriptions (“By
uttering ‘Fido is shaggy,’ Grice means that the dog is hairy-coated (Grice
1989). Grice notes that ‘metabolically,’ “mean,” at least in English, can be
applied to various other things, sometimes even involving a ‘that’-clause. “By
delivering his budget, the major means that we will have a hard year.’ Grice
finds that ‘but we won’t’ turns him into a self-contradicter. In Grice’s usage,
‘x ‘means’ y’ iff ‘y is a consequence [consequentia] of x’ --. Quite a
departure from Old Frisian. If Hume’s objection to the use of the verb ‘cause,’
is that it covers animistic beliefs (“Charles I’s decapitation willed his
death”), English allows for disimplicated or loose ‘metabolic’ uses of ‘will’
(“It ‘will’ rain”) and ‘mean’ (Grice’s moaning means that he is in pain).
desideratum: Qua volition,
a mental event involved with the initiation of action. ‘To will’ is sometimes
taken to be the corresponding verb form of ‘volition’. The concept of volition
is rooted in modern philosophy; contemporary philosophers have transformed it
by identifying volitions with ordinary mental events, such as intentions, or
beliefs plus desires. Volitions, especially in contemporary guises, are often
taken to be complex mental events consisting of cognitive, affective, and
conative elements. The conative element is the impetus – the underlying
motivation – for the action. A velleity is a conative element insufficient by
itself to initiate action. The will is a faculty, or set of abilities, that
yields the mental events involved in initiating action. There are three primary
theories about the role of volitions in action. The first is a reductive
account in which action is identified with the entire causal sequence of the
mental event (the volition) causing the bodily behavior. J. S. Mill, for
example, says: “Now what is action? Not one thing, but a series of two things:
the state of mind called a volition, followed by an effect. . . . [T]he two
together constitute the action” (Logic). Mary’s raising her arm is Mary’s
mental state causing her arm to rise. Neither Mary’s volitional state nor her
arm’s rising are themselves actions; rather, the entire causal sequence (the
“causing”) is the action. The primary difficulty for this account is
maintaining its reductive status. There is no way to delineate volition and the
resultant bodily behavior without referring to action. There are two
non-reductive accounts, one that identifies the action with the initiating
volition and another that identifies the action with the effect of the
volition. In the former, a volition is the action, and bodily movements are
mere causal consequences. Berkeley advocates this view: “The Mind . . . is to
be accounted active in . . . so far forth as volition is included. . . . In
plucking this flower I am active, because I do it by the motion of my hand,
which was consequent upon my volition” (Three Dialogues). In this century,
Prichard is associated with this theory: “to act is really to will something”
(Moral Obligation, 1949), where willing is sui generis (though at other places
Prichard equates willing with the action of mentally setting oneself to do
something). In this sense, a volition is an act of will. This account has come
under attack by Ryle (Concept of Mind, 1949). Ryle argues that it leads to a
vicious regress, in that to will to do something, one must will to will to do
it, and so on. It has been countered that the regress collapses; there is
nothing beyond willing that one must do in order to will. Another criticism of
Ryle’s, which is more telling, is that ‘volition’ is an obscurantic term of
art; “[volition] is an artificial concept. We have to study certain specialist
theories in order to find out how it is to be manipulated. . . . [It is like]
‘phlogiston’ and ‘animal spirits’ . . . [which] have now no utility” (Concept
of Mind). Another approach, the causal theory of action, identifies an action
with the causal consequences of volition. Locke, e.g., says: “Volition or
willing is an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any
action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. . . . [V]olition is
nothing but that particular determination of the mind, whereby . . . the mind
endeavors to give rise, continuation, or stop, to any action which it takes to
be in its power” (Essay concerning Human Understanding). This is a functional
account, since an event is an action in virtue of its causal role. Mary’s arm
rising is Mary’s action of raising her arm in virtue of being caused by her
willing to raise it. If her arm’s rising had been caused by a nervous twitch,
it would not be action, even if the bodily movements were photographically the
same. In response to Ryle’s charge of obscurantism, contemporary causal
theorists tend to identify volitions with ordinary mental events. For example,
Davidson takes the cause of actions to be beliefs plus desires and Wilfrid
Sellars takes volitions to be intentions to do something here and now. Despite
its plausibility, however, the causal theory faces two difficult problems: the first
is purported counterexamples based on wayward causal chains connecting the
antecedent mental event and the bodily movements; the second is provision of an
enlightening account of these mental events, e.g. intending, that does justice
to the conative element. See also ACTION THEORY, FREE WILL PROBLEM, PRACTICAL
REASONING, WAYWARD CAUSAL CHAIN. M.B. volition volition. Grice makes a double use of this. It should be thus two
entries. There’s the conversational desideratum, where a desideratum is like a
maxim or an imperative – and then there are two specific desiderata: the
desideratum of conversational clarity, and the desideratum of conversational
candour. Grice was never sure what adjective to use for the ‘desiderative.’ He
liked buletic. He liked desideratum because it has the co-relate
‘consideratum,’ for belief. He uses
‘deriderative’ and a few more! Of course what he means is a sub-psychological
modality, or rather a ‘soul.’ So he would apply it ‘primarily’ to the soul, as
Plato and Aristotle does. The ‘psyche’, or ‘anima’ is what is ‘desiderativa.’
The Grecians are pretty confused about this (but ‘boulemaic’ and ‘buletic’ are
used), and the Romans didn’t help. Grice is concerned with a
rational-desiderative, that takes a “that”-clause (or oratio obliqua), and qua
constructivist, he is also concerned with a pre-rational desiderative (he has
an essay on “Needs and Wants,” and his detailed example in “Method” is a
squarrel (sic) who needs a nut. On top, while Grice suggest s that it goes both
ways: the doxastic can be given a reductive analaysis in terms of the buletic,
and the buletic in terms of the doxastic, he only cares to provide the former.
Basically, an agent judges that p, if his willing that p correlates to a state
of affairs that satisfies his desires. Since he does not provide a reductive
analysis for Prichard’s willing-that, one is left wondering. Grice’s position
is that ‘willing that…’ attains its ‘sense’ via the specification, as a
theoretical concept, in some law in the folk-science that agents use to explain
their behaviour. Grice gets subtler when he deals with mode-markers for the
desiderative: for these are either utterer-oriented, or addressee-oriented, and
they may involve a buletic attitude itself, or a doxastic attitude. When utterer-addressed,
utterer wills that utterer wills that p. There is no closure here, and indeed,
a regressus ad infinitum is what Grice wants, since this regressus allows him
to get univeersabilisability, in terms of conceptual, formal, and applicational
kinds of generality. In this he is being Kantian, and Hareian. While Grice
praises Kantotle, Aristotle here would stay unashamedly ‘teleological,’ and
giving priority to a will that may not be universalisable, since it’s the
communitarian ‘good’ that matters. what does Grice have to say about our
conversational practice? L and S have “πρᾶξις,” from “πράσσω,” and which they
render as ‘moral action,’ oποίησις, τέχνη;” “oποιότης,” “ἤθη καὶ πάθη καὶ π.,”
“oοἱ πολιτικοὶ λόγοι;” “ἔργῳ καὶ πράξεσιν, οὐχὶ λόγοις” Id.6.3; ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι
ὄντα τε καὶ πραττόμενα, “exhibited in actual life,” action in drama, “oλόγος;
“μία π. ὅλη καὶ τελεία.” With practical Grice means buletic. Praxis involves
acting, and surely Grice presupposes acting. By uttering, i. e. by the act of
uttering, expression x, U m-intends that p. Grice occasionally refers to action
and behaviour as the thing which an ascription of a psychological state
explains. Grice prefers the idiom of soul. Theres the ratiocinative soul.
Within the ratiocinative, theres the executive soul and the merely
administrative soul. Cicero had to translate Aristotle into prudentia, every
time Aristotle talked of phronesis. Grice was aware that the terminology
by Kant can be confusing. Kant used ‘pure’ reason for reason in the doxastic
realm. The critique by Kant of practical reason is hardly symmetrical to
his critique of doxastic reason. Grice, with his æqui-vocality thesis of
must (must crosses the buletic-boulomaic/doxastic divide), Grice is being more
of a symmetricalist. The buletic, boulomaic, or volitive, is a part of the
soul, as is the doxatic or judicative. And judicative is a trick because there
is such a thing as a value judgement, or an evaluative judgement, which is
hardly doxastic. Grice plays with two co-relative operators: desirability
versus probability. Grice invokes the exhibitive/protreptic distinction he had
introduced in the fifth James lecture, now applied to psychological attitudes
themselves. This Grice’s attempt is to tackle the Kantian problem in the
Grundlegung: how to derive the categorical imperative from a counsel of
prudence. Under the assumption that the protasis is Let the agent be happy,
Grice does not find it obtuse at all to construct a universalisable imperative
out of a mere motive-based counsel of prudence. Grice has an earlier paper on
pleasure which relates. The derivation involves seven steps. Grice
proposes seven steps in the derivation. 1. It is a fundamental law of
psychology that, ceteris paribus, for any creature R, for any P and Q, if R wills
P Λ judges if P, P as a result of Q, R wills Q. 2. Place this law
within the scope of a "willing" operator: R wills for any
P Λ Q, if R wills P Λ judges that if P, P as a result of Q,
R wills Q. 3. wills turns to should. If rational, R will have to block
unsatisfactory (literally) attitudes. R should (qua rational) judge for any
P Λ Q, if it is satisfactory to will that P Λ it is
satisfactory to judge that if P, P as a result of Q, it is sastisfactory to
will that Q. 4. Marking the mode: R should (qua rational) judge for any
P Λ Q, if it is satisfactory that !P Λ that if it .P, .P
only as a result of Q, it is satisfactory that !Q. 5. via (p & q
-> r) -> (p -> (q -> r)): R should (qua rational)
judge for any P Λ Q, if it is satisfactory that if .P, .P only
because Q, i is satisfactory that, if let it be that P, let it be that Q. 6. R
should (qua rational) judge for any P Λ Q, if P, P only because p
yields if let it be that P, let it be that Q. 7. For any P Λ Q if P,
P only because Q yields if let it be that P, let it be that Q. Grice was
well aware that a philosopher, at Oxford, needs to be a philosophical
psychologist. So, wanting and needing have to be related to willing. A plant
needs water. A floor needs sweeping. So need is too broad. So is want, a
non-Anglo-Saxon root for God knows what. With willing things get closer to the
rational soul. There is willing in the animal soul. But when it comes to
rational willing, there must be, to echo Pritchard, a conjecture, some doxastic
element. You cannot will to fly, or will that the distant chair slides over the
floor toward you. So not all wants and needs are rational willings, but then
nobody said they would. Grice is interested in emotion in his power structure
of the soul. A need and a want may count as an emotion. Grice was never too
interested in needing and wanting because they do not take a that-clause. He
congratulates Urmson for having introduced him to the brilliant willing that …
by Prichard. Why is it, Grice wonders, that many ascriptions of buletic states
take to-clause, rather than a that-clause? Even mean, as ‘intend.’ In this
Grice is quite different from Austin, who avoids the that-clause. The
explanation by Austin is very obscure, like those of all grammars on the
that’-clause, the ‘that’ of ‘oratio obliqua’ is not in every way similar to the
‘that’-clause in an explicit performative formula. Here the utterer is not
reporting his own ‘oratio’ in the first person singular present indicative
active. Incidentally, of course, it is not in the least necessary that an
explicit performative verb should be followed by a ‘that’-clause. In important
classes of cases it is followed by ‘to . . .,’ or by or nothing, e. g. ‘I
apologize for…,’ ‘I salute you.’ Now many of these verbs appear to be quite
satisfactory pure performatives. Irritating though it is to have them as such,
linked with clauses that look like statements, true or false, e. g., when I say
‘I prophesy that …,’ ‘I concede that …’,
‘I postulate that …,’ the clause following normally looks just like a
statement, but the verb itself seems to be pure performatives. One
may distinguish the performative opening part, ‘I state that …,’ which makes
clear how the utterance is to be taken, that it is a statement, as distinct from
a prediction, etc.), from the bit in the that-clause which is required to be
true or false. However, there are many cases which, as language stands at
present, we are not able to split into two parts in this way, even though the
utterance seems to have a sort of explicit performative in it. Thus, ‘I liken x
to y,’ or ‘I analyse x as y.’ Here we both do the likening and assert that
there is a likeness by means of one compendious phrase of at least a
quasi-performative character. Just to spur us on our way, we may also mention
‘I know that …’, ‘I believe that …’, etc. How complicated are these examples?
We cannot assume that they are purely descriptive, which has Grice talking of
the pseudo-descriptive. Want etymologically means absence; need should be
preferred. The squarrel (squirrel) Toby needs intake of nuts, and youll soon
see gobbling them! There is not much philosophical bibliography on these two
psychological states Grice is analysing. Their logic is interesting. Smith
wants to play cricket. Smith needs to play cricket. Grice is
concerned with the propositional content attached to the want and need
predicate. Wants that sounds harsh; so does need that. Still, there
are propositional attached to the pair above. Smith plays cricket. Grice
took a very cavalier attitude to what linguists spend their lives
analysing. He thought it was surely not the job of the philosopher,
especially from a prestigious university such as Oxford, to deal with the
arbitrariness of grammatical knots attached to this or that English verb. He
rarely used English, but stuck with ordinary language. Surely, he saw
himself in the tradition of Kantotle, and so, aiming at grand philosophical
truths: not conventions of usage, even his own! 1. Squarrel Toby has a
nut, N, in front of him. 2. Toby is short on squarrel food (observed or
assumed), so, 3. Toby wills squarrel food (by postulate of Folk Pyschological
Theory θ connecting willing with intake of N). 4. Toby prehends a nut
as in front (from (1) by Postulate of Folk Psychological Theory θ, if it
is assumed that nut and in front are familiar to Toby). 5. Toby joins squarrel
food with gobbling, nut, and in front (i.e. Toby judges gobbling, on nut in
front, for squarrel food (by Postulate of Folk Psychological
Theory θ with the aid of prior observation. So, from 3, 4 and 5, 6.
Tobby gobbles; and since a nut is in front of him, gobbles the nut in front of
him. The system of values of the society to which the agent belongs forms the
external standard for judging the relative importance of the commitments by the
agent. There are three dimensions of value: universally human, cultural that
vary with societies and times; and personal that vary with individuals. Each
dimension has a standard for judging the adequacy of the relevant values. Human
values are adequate if they satisfy basic needs; cultural values are adequate
if they provide a system of values that sustains the allegiance of the
inhabitants of a society; and personal values are adequate if the conceptions
of well‐being formed out of them enable individuals to live
satisfying lives. These values conflict and our well‐being requires some way of settling their conflicts, but
there is no universal principle for settling the conflicts; it can only be done
by attending to the concrete features of particular conflicts. These features
vary with circumstances and values. Grice reads Porter.The idea of the value
chain is based on the process view of organizations, the idea of seeing a
manufacturing (or service) organization as a system, made up of subsystems each
with inputs, transformation processes and outputs. Inputs, transformation
processes, and outputs involve the acquisition and consumption of resources –
money, labour, materials, equipment, buildings, land, administration and
management. How value chain activities are carried out determines costs and
affects profits.In his choice of value system and value sub-system, Grice is
defending objectivity, since it is usually the axiological relativist who uses
such a pretentious phrasing! More than a value may co-ordinate in a system. One
such is eudæmonia (cf. system of ends). The problem for Kant is the reduction
of the categorical imperative to the hypothetical or
suppositional imperative. For Kant, a value tends towards the
Subjectsive. Grice, rather, wants to offer a metaphysical defence of objective
value. Grice called the manual of conversational maxims the Conversational
Immanuel. The keyword to search the H. P. Grice is ‘will,’ and ‘volitional,’
even ‘ill-will,’ (“Metaphysics and ill-will,” s. V, c. 7-f. 28) and
‘benevolence’ (vide below under ‘conversational benevolence”). Also
‘desirability’: “Modality, desirability, and probability,” s. V, c. 8-ff.
14-15, and the conference lecture in a different series, “Probability,
desirability, and mood operators,” s. II, c. 2-f.11). Grice makes systematic use of ‘practical’ to
contrast with the ‘alethic,’ too (“Practical reason,” s. V, c. 9-f.1), The H.
P. Grice Papers, BANC.
desideratum of conversational
candour: The term ‘desideratum’ has to be
taken seriously. It involves freedom. This includes the maximin. It should be
noted that candour is DESIRABLE. There is a desirability for candour. Candour
is not a given. Ditto for clarity. See conversational desideratum, simpliciter.
A rational desideratum is a desideratum by a rational agent and which he
expects from another rational agent. One should make the strongest move, and on
the other hand try not to mislead.Grice's Oxford "Conversation"
Lectures, 1966Grice: Between Self-Love and Benevolence As I was saying (somewhere),
Grice uses "self-love", charmingly qualified with capitals, as "Conversational
Self-Love", and, less charmingly,
"Conversational Benevolence", in lectures advertised at
Oxford, as "Logic and
Conversation" that he gave at Oxford in 1964 as "University Lecturer in Philosophy". He also gave
seminars on "Conversational helpfulness." A number of the lectures by
Grice include discussion of thetypes of behaviour people in general exhibit,
and thereforethe types of expectations[cfr. owings]they might bring to a
venture such as a conversation.Grice suggests that people in general both
exhibitand EXPECT a certain degree of helpfulness [-- alla Rosenschein,
epistemic/boulemaic:If A cognizes that B wills p, then A wills p.] "from OTHERS" [-- reciprocal vs.
reflexive, etc.] usually on the understanding that such helpfulness does NOT
get in the way of particular goals and does not involve undue effort cf. least
effort? - cfr. Hobbes on self-love. It two people, even complete strangers,are
going through a gate, the expectation isthat the FIRST ONE through will hold
thegate open, or at least leave it open, for thesecond. The expectation is such
that todo OTHERWISE without particular reasonwould be interpreted as RUDE. The
type of helpfulness exhibited andexpected in conversation is more
specificbecause of a particular, although not a unique feature of
conversation.It is a COLLABORATIVE venture betweenthe participants.There is a
SHARED aimGrice wonders. His words, Does "helpfulness in something WE ARE
DOING TOGETHER” equate to 'cooperation'?He seems to have decided that it
does. By the later lectures in the series, 'the principle of conversational
helpfulness'has been rebranded the expectation of 'cooperation.' During the
Oxford lectures, Grice develops his account of the precise nature of this
cooperation. It can be seen as governed by certain regularities, or principles,
detailing expected behaviour. The expression'maxim' to describe these
regularities appears relatively late in the lectures.Grice's INITIAL choices of
terms are 'objectives' and 'desiderata'.He was particularly fond of the latter.
He was interested in detailing the desirable forms of behaviour for the purpose
of achieving a joint goal of the conversation. Initially, Grice posits TWO such
desiderata. Those relating to candour on the one hand and clarity on the other.
The desideratum of candour contains his general PRINCIPLE of making the
strongest (MAX) possible statement and, as a LIMITING (MAX) factor on this, the
suggestion that speakers should try not to mislead. (Do not mislead). cfr.
our"We are brothers"-- but not mutual."We are married to each
other". "You _are_ a boor".----The desideratum of conversational
clarity concerns the manner of expression. [His later reference to Modus or
Mode as used by Kant as one of the four
categories] for any conversational contribution. It includes the IMPORTANT
expectations of relevance to understanding and also insists that the main
import of an utterance be clear and explicit. (“Explicate!”) These two factors
are constantly to be WEIGHED against two
FUNDAMENTAL and SOMETIMES COMPETING DEMANDS. Contributions to a conversation
are aimed towards the agreed current purposes by the PRINCIPLE of Conversational
Benevolence. The principle of CONVERSATIONAL SELF-LOVE ensures the assumption
on the part of both participants that neither will go to unnecessary trouble
[LEAST EFFORT] in framing their contribution. This has been a topic of interest
to Noh end. In "Conversational Immanuel" Grice tries different ways
of making sense -- it is very easy to do so -- of Grice's distinctions that go
over the head of some linguists I know! Reasonable versus rational for example.
A Rawlsian distinction of sorts. Rational is too weak. We need 'reasonable'.
So, what sort of reasonableness is that which results from this harmonious, we
hope, clash of self-love and benevolence? Grice tried, wittily, to extend the
purposes of conversation to involve MUTUALLY INFLUENCING EACH OTHER -- a
reciprocal. (WoW, ii). And there's a mythical reconstruction of this in his
"Meaning Revisited" which he contributed to this symposium organised
by N. Smith on Mutua knowledge. But issues remains, we hope. The concept of
‘candour’is especially basic for Grice since it is constitutive of what it
means to identify the ‘significatum.’ As he notes, ‘false’ information is no
information. This is serious, because it has to do with the acceptum. A
contribution which is not trustworthy is not deemed a contribution. It is
conceptually impossible to intend to PROVIDE information if you are aware that
you are not being trustworthy and not conveying it. As for the degree of
explicitness, as Grice puts it. Since in communication in a certain fashion all
must be public, if an idea or thesis is heavily obscured, it can no longer be
regarded as having been propounded. This gives acceptum justification to the
correlative desideratum of conversational clarity. On top, if there is a level
of obscurity, the thing is not deemed to have been a communicatum or
significatum. It is all about confidence, you know. U expects A will find him
confident. Thus we find in Short and Lewis, “confīdo,” wich they render as
“to trust confidently in something,” and also, “confide in, rely firmly upon,
to believe, be assured of,” as an enhancing of “sperare,” in Cicero’s Att. 6,
9, 1. Trust and rationality are pre-requisites of conversation. Urmson develops
this. They phrase in Urmson is "implied claim." Whenever U makes a
conversational contribution in a standard context, there is an implied claim to
U being trustworthy and reasonable. What do Grice and Urmson mean by an
"implied claim"? It is obvious enough, but they both love to expand.
Whenever U utters an expression which can be used to convey truth or falsehood
there is an implied claim to trustworthiness by U, unless the situation shows
that this is not so. U may be acting or reciting or incredulously echoing the
remark of another, or flouting the expectation. This, Grice and Urmson think,
may need an explanation. Suppose that U utters, in an ordinary
circumstance, ‘It will rain tomorrow,’ or ‘It rained yesterday,’ or ‘It is
raining.’ This act carries with it the claim that U should be trusted and
licenses A to believe that it will rain tomorrow. By this is meant that
just as it is understood that no U will give an order unless he is entitled to give
orders, so it is understood that no U will utter a sentence of a kind which can
be used to make a statement unless U is willing to claim that that statement is
true, and hence one would be acting in a misleading manner if one uttered the
sentence if he was not willing to make that claim. Here, the predicate
“implies that …,” Grice, Grant, Moore, Nowell-Smith, and Urmson hasten to add,
is being used in such a way that, if there is a an expectation that a thing is
done in Circumstance C, U implies that C holds if he does the thing. The point
is often made if not always in the terms Grice uses, and it is, Urmson and
Grice believe, in substance uncontroversial. Grice and Urmson wish to make the
point that, when an utterer U deploys a hedge with an indicative sentence,
there is not merely an implied claim that the whole statement is true but also
that is true. The implied or expressed claim by the utterer to
trustworthiness need not be very strong. The whole point of a hedge is to
modify or weaken (if not, as Grice would have it, flout) the claim by U to full
trustworthiness which would be implied by the unhedged assertion. But
even if U utters “He is, I suppose, at home;” or “I guess that the penny
will come down heads," U expresses, or for Urmson plainly implies,
with however little reason, that this is what U accepts as worth the trust by
A. Now Grice and Urmson meet an objection which is made by some philosophers to
this comparison. Grice and Urmson intend to meet the objection by a fairly
detailed examination of the example which they themselves would most likely
choose. In doing this Grice and Urmson further explain the use of a
parenthetical verb. The adverb is "probably" and the verb is “I
believe.” To say, that something is probable, the imaginary objector will say,
is to imply that it is reasonable to believe, that the evidence justifies a
guarded claim for the trust or trustworthiness of U and the truth of the
statement. But to say that someone else, a third person, believes something
does not imply that it is reasonable for U or A to believe it, nor that the
evidence justifies the guarded or implied claim to factivity or truth which U
makes. Therefore, the objector continues, the difference between the use
of “I believe” and “probably” is not, as Grice and Urmson suggest, merely one
of nuance and degree of impersonality. In one case, “probably,” reasonableness
is implied; in the other, “believe,” it is not. This objection is met by Grice
and Urmson. They do so by making a general point. To use the rational-reasonable
distinction in “Conversational implicaturum” and “Aspects,” there is an implied
claim by U to reasonableness. Further to an implied claim to trust
whenever a sentence is uttered in a standard context, now Grice and Urmson add,
to meet the sceptical objection about the contrast between “probably” and “I
believe” that, whenever U makes a statement in a standard context there is an
implied claim to reasonableness. This contention must be explained alla
Kant. Cf. Strawson on the presumption of conversational relevance, and
Austin, Moore, Nowell-Smith, Grant, and Warnock. To use Hart’s
defeasibility, and Hall’s excluder, unless U is acting or story-telling, or
preface his remarks with some such phrase as “I know Im being silly, but
…” or, “I admit it is unreasonable, but …” it is, Grice and
Urmson think, a presupposition or expectation of communication or conversation
that a communicator will not make a statement, thereby implying this trust,
unless he has some ground, however tenuous, for the statement. To
utter “The King is visiting Oxford tomorrow,” or “The President of the BA has a
corkscrew in his pocket,” and then, when asked why the utterer is uttering
that, to answer “Oh, for no reason at all,” would be to sin,
theologically, against the basic conventions governing the use of discourse.
Grice goes on to provide a Kantian justification for that, hence his amusing
talk of maxims and stuff. Therefore, Urmson and Grice think there is an
implied or expressed claim to reasonableness which goes with all
our statements, i.e. there is a mutual expectation that a communicator will not
make a statement unless he is prepared to claim and defend its reasonablenesss.
Cf. Grice’s desideratum of conversational candour, subsumed under the
over-arching principle of conversational helpfulness (formerly conversational
benevolence-cum-self-love). Grice thinks that the principle of
conversational benevolence has to be weighed against the principle of
conversational self-love. The result is the overarching principle of
conversational helpfulness. Clarity gets in the picture. The desideratum of
conversational clarity is a reasonable requirement for conversants to abide
by. Grice follows some observations by Warnock. The logical grammar
of “trust,” “candour,” “charity,” “sincerity,” “decency,” “honesty,” is subtle,
especially when we are considering the two sub-goals of conversation: giving
and receiving information/influencing and being influenced by others. In both
sub-goals, trust is paramount. The explorations of trust has become an Oxonian
hobby, with authors not such like Warnock, but Williams, and
others. Grice’s essay is entitled, “Trust, metaphysics, value.” Trust as a
corollary of the principle of conversational helpfulness. In a given
conversational setting, assuming the principle of conversational helpfulness is
operating, U is assumed by A to be trustworthy and candid. There are two
modes of trust, which relate to the buletic sub-goal and the doxastic sub-goal
which Grice assumes the principle of conversational helpfulness captures:
giving and receiving information, and influencing and being influenced by
others. In both sub-goals, trust is key. In the doxastic realm, trust
has to do, not so much or only, with truth (with which the expression is
cognate), or satisfactoriness-value, but evidence and probability. In the
buletic realm, there are the dimensions of satisfactoriness-value (‘good’
versus ‘true’), and ‘ground’ versus evidence, which becomes less crucial. But
note that one is trustworthy regarding BOTH the buletic attitude and the
doxastic attitude. Grice mentions this or that buletic attitudes which is not
usually judged in terms of evidential support (“I vow to thee my country.”)
However, in the buletic realm, U is be assumed as trustworthy if U has the
buletic attitude he is expressing. The cheater, the insincere, the dishonest,
the untrustworthy, for Grice is not irrational, just repugnant. How immoral is
the idea that honesty is the best policy? Is Kant right in thinking there is no
right to refrain from trust? Surely it is indecent. For Kant, there is no
motivation or ‘motive,’ pure or impure, behind telling the truth – it’s just a
right, and an obligation – an imperative. Being trustworthy for Kant is
associated with a pure motive. Grice agrees. Decency comes into the picture. An
indecent agent may still be rational, but in such a case, conversation may
still be seen as rational (if not reasonable) and surely not be seen as
rational helpfulness or co-operation, but rational adversarial competition,
rather, a zero-sum game. Grice found the etymology of ‘decent’ too obscure.
Short and Lewis have “dĕcet,” which they deem cognate with Sanscrit “dacas,”
‘fame,’ and Grecian “δοκέω,‘to seem,’ ‘to think,’ and with Latin ‘decus,’
‘dingus.’ As an impersonal verb, Short and Lewis render it as ‘it is seemly,
comely, becoming,; it beseems, behooves, is fitting, suitable, proper (for syn.
v. debeo init.): decere quasi aptum esse consentaneumque tempori et personae,
Cic. Or. 22, 74; cf. also nunc quid aptum sit, hoc est, quid maxime deceat in
oratione videamus, id. de Or. 3, 55, 210 (very freq. and class.; not in
Caesar). Grice’s idea of decency is connected to his explorations on rational
and reasonable. To cheat may be neither unreasonable nor rational. It is just
repulsive. Indecent, in other words. In all this, Grice is concerned with
ordinary language, and treasures Austin questioning Warnock, when Warnock was
pursuing a fellowship at Magdalen. “What would you say the difference is
between ‘Smith plays cricket rather properly’ and ‘Smith plays cricket rather
incorrectly’?” They spent the whole dinner over the subtlety. By desserts,
Warnock was in love with Austin. Cf. Grice on his prim and proper Aunt
Matilda. The exploration by Grice on trust is Warnockian in character, or vice
versa. In “Object of morality,” Warnock has trust as key, as indeed, the very
object of morality. Grice starts to focus on trust in an Oxford seminars on the
implicaturum. If there is a desideratum of conversational candour, and the goal
of the principle of conversational helpfulness is that of giving and receiving
information, and influencing and being influenced by others, ‘false’
‘information’ is just no information – Since exhibiteness trumps protrepsis,
this applies to the buletic, too. Grice loved that Latin dictum, “tuus candor.”
He makes an early defence of this in his fatal objection to Malcolm. A
philosopher cannot intentionally instill a falsehood in his tutee, such as
“Decapitation willed the death of Charles I” (the alleged paraphrase of the
paradoxical philosopher saying that ‘causing’ is ‘willing’ and rephrasing
“Decapitation was the cause of the death of Charles I.” There is, for both
Grice and Apel, a transcendental (if weak) justification, not just utilitarian
(honesty as the best policy), as Stalnaker notes in his contribution to the
Grice symposium for APA. Unlike Apel, the transcendental argument is a weak one
in that Grice aims to show that conversation that did not abide by trust would
be unreasonable, but surely still ‘possible.’ It is not a transcendental
justification for the ‘existence’ of conversation simpliciter, but for the
existence of ‘reasonable,’ decent conversation. If we approach charity in the
first person, we trust ourselves that some of our beliefs have to be true, and
that some of our desires have to be satisfactory valid, and we are equally
trusted by our conversational partners. This is Grice’s conversational golden
rule. What would otherwise be the point of holding that conversation is
rational co-operation? What would be the point of conversation simpliciter?
Urmson follows Austin, so Austin’s considerations on this, notably in “Other
minds,” deserve careful examination. Urmson was of course a member of Grice’s
play group, and these are the philosophers that we consider top priority.
Another one was P. H. Nowell-Smith. At least two of his three rules deserve
careful examination. Nowell-Smith notes that this or that ‘rule’ of contextual
implication is not meant to be taken as a ‘rigid rule’. Unlike this or that
rule of entailment, a conversational rule can be broken without the utterer
being involved in self-contradiction or absurdity. When U uses an expression to
make a statement, it is contextually implied that he believes it to be true.
Similarly, when he uses it to perform any of the other jobs for which sentences
are used, it is contextually implied that he is using it for one of the jobs
that it normally does. This rule is often in fact broken. Anti-Kantian lying,
Bernhard-type play-acting, Andersen-type story-telling, and Wildeian irony is
each a case in which U breaks the rule, or flouts the expectation, either
overtly or covertly. But each of these four cases is a secondary use, i.e. a
use to which an expression cannot logically or conceptually be put unless, as
Hart would have it, it has a primary use. There is no limit to the possible
uses to which an expression may be put. In many cases a man makes his point by
deliberately using an expression in a queer way or even using it in the ‘sense’
opposite to its unique normal one, as in irony (“He is a fine friend,” implying
that he is a scoundrel). The distinction between a primary and a secondary use
is important because many an argument used by a philosopher consists in
pointing out some typical example of the way in which some expression E is
used. Such an argument is always illegitimate if the example employed is an
example of a secondary use, however common such a use may be. U contextually
implies that he has what he himself believes to be good reasons for his
statement. Once again, we often break this rule and we have special devices for
indicating when we are breaking it. Phrases such as ‘speaking offhand …,’ 'I do
not really know but …,’ and ‘I should be inclined to say that …,’ are used by scrupulous
persons to warn his addressee that U has not got what seem to him good reasons
for his statement. But unless one of these guarding phrases is used we are
entitled to believe that U believes himself to have good reasons for his
statement and we soon learn to *mistrust* people who habitually infringe this
rule. It is, of course, a mistake to infer from what someone says categorically
that he has in fact good reasons for what he says. If I tell you, or ‘inform’
to you, that the duck-billed platypus is a bird (because I ' remember ' reading
this in a book) I am unreliable; but I am not using language improperly. But if
I tell you this without using one of the guarding phrases and without having
what I think good reasons, I am. What U says may be assumed to be relevant to
the interests of his addressee. This is the most important of the three rules;
unfortunately it is also the most frequently broken. Bores are more common than
liars or careless talkers. This rule is particularly obvious in the case of answers
to questions, since it is assumed that the answer is an answer. Not all
statements are answers to questions; information may be volunteered.
Nevertheless the publication of a text-book on trigonometry implies that the
author believes that there are people who want to learn about trigonometry, and
to give advice implies a belief that the advice is relevant to one’s
addressee's problem. This rule is of the greatest importance for ethics. For
the major problem of ethics is that of bridging the gap between a decisions, an
ought-sentence, an injunction, and a sentence used to give advice on the one
hand and the statements of *fact*, sometime regarding the U’s soul, that
constitute the reasons for these on the other. It is in order to bridge these
gaps that insight into necessary synthetic connexions is invoked. This rule of
contextual implication may help us to show that there is no gap to be bridged
because the reason-giving sentence must turn out to be also *practical* from
the start and not a statement of *fact*, even concerning the state of the U’s
soul, from which a practical sentence can somehow be deduced. This rule is,
therefore, more than a rule of good manners; or rather it shows how, in matters
of ordinary language, rules of good manners shade into logical rules. Unless we
assume that it is being observed we cannot understand the connexions between
decisions, advice, and appraisals and the reasons given in support of them. Refs.: The main reference is in the first set of ‘Logic and
conversation.’ Many keywords are useful, not just ‘candour,’ but notably
‘trust.’ (“Rationality and trust,” c. 9-f. 5, “Trust, metaphysics, and value,”
c. 9-f. 20, and “Aristotle and friendship, rationality, trust, and decency,” c.
6-f. 18), BANC.
desideratum of conversational
clarity. There is some overlap here with
Grice’s category of conversational manner – of Grice’s maxim of conversational
perspicuity [sic] – and at least one of the maxims proper, ‘obscuirty
avoidance,’ or maxim of conversational obscurity avoidance. But at Oxford he
defined the philosopher as the one whose profession it is to makes clear things
obscure. The word desideratum has to be taken seriously. It involves freedom.
In what way is “The pillar box seems red to me” less perspicuous than “The
pillar box is red”? In all! If mutual expectation not to mislead and produce
the stronger contribution are characteristics of candour, expectation of mutual
relevance to interests, and being explicit and clear in your point are two
characteristics of this desideratum. “Candour” and “clarity’ are somewhat
co-relative for Grice. He is interested in identifying this or that
desideratum. By having two of them, he can play. So, how UNCLEAR can a
conversationalist be provided he WANTS to be candid? Candour trumps clarity.
But too much ‘unperspicuity’ may lead to something not being deemed an ‘implicaturum’
at all. Grice is especially concerned with philosopher’s paradoxes. Why would
Strawson say that the usage of ‘not,’ ‘and,’ ‘or,’ ‘if,’ ‘if and only if,’
‘all,’ ‘some (at least one), ‘the,’ do not correspond to the logician’s use?
Questions of candour and clarity interact. Grice’s first application, which he
grants is not original, relates to “The pillar box seems red” versus “The
pillar box is red.” “I would not like to give the false impression that the
pillar box is not red” seems less clear than “The pillar box is red” – Yet the
unperspicuous contributin is still ‘candid,’ in the sense that it expresses a
truth. So one has to be careful. On top, philosophers like Lewis were using
‘clarity is not enough’ as a battle cry! Grice’s favourite formulations of the
imperatives here are ‘self-contradictory,’ and for which he uses ‘[sic]’,
notably: “Be perspicuous [sic]’ and “Be brief. Avoid unnecessary prolixity
[sic].’
desirability: Correlative: credibility. For Grice, credibility reduces
to desirability (He suggests that the reverse may also be possible but does not
give a proposal). This Grice calls the Jeffrey operator. If Urmson likes
‘probably,’ Grice likes ‘desirably.’ This theorem is a corollary of the
desirability axiom by Jeffrey, which is: "If prob XY = 0, for a prima
facie PF(A V B) A (x E w)] = PFA A (x E
w)] + PfB A (x El+ w)]. This is the account by Grice of the adaptability of a
pirot to its changeable environs. Grice borrows the notion of probability (henceforth,
“pr”) from Davidson, whose early claim to fame was to provide the logic of the
notion. Grice abbreviates probability by Pr. and compares it to a buletic operator
‘pf,’ ‘for prima facie,’ attached to ‘De’ for desirability. A rational agent
must calculate both the probability and the desirability of his
action. For both probability and desirability, the degree is crucial.
Grice symbolises this by d: probability in degree d; probability in degree d. The
topic of life Grice relates to that of adaptation and surival, and connects
with his genitorial programme of creature construction (Pology.): life as
continued operancy. Grice was fascinated with life (Aristotle, bios) because
bios is what provides for Aristotle the definition (not by genus) of
psyche. The steps are as follows. Pf(p ⊃!q)/Pr(p
⊃ q); pf((p1 ^ p2) ⊃!q)/pr(p1 ^ p2 ⊃q); pf((p1 ^ p2 ^ p3) ⊃!q)/pr(p1 ^ p2 ^ p3 ^ p4 ⊃q);
pf (all things before me ⊃!q)/pr (all things before me ⊃
q); pf (all things considered ⊃ !q)/pr(all things considered ⊃ q); !q/|- q; G wills !q/G judges q. Strictly, Grice avoids
using the noun probability (other than for the title of this or that lecture).
One has to use the sentence-modifier ‘probably,’ and ‘desirably.’ So the
specific correlative to the buletic prima facie ‘desirably’ is the doxastic ‘probably.’
Grice liked the Roman sound to ‘prima facie,’ ‘at first sight’: “exceptio, quae prima facie justa videatur.” Refs.:
The two main sources are “Probability, desirability, and mood operators,” c.
2-f. 11, and “Modality, desirability and probability,” c. 8-ff. 14-15. But most
of the material is collected in “Aspects,” especially in the third and fourth
lectures. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.
detachability. A rather abstract notion. One thinks of ‘detach’ in
physical terms (‘semi-detached house’). Grice means it in an abstract way. To
detach – what is it that we detach? We detach an implicaturum. Grice is not so
much concerned with how to DETACH an implicaturum, but how sometimes you
cannot. It’s NON-detachability that is the criterion. And this should be a
matter of a prioricity. However, since style gets in the picture, he has to
allow for exceptions to this criterion. A conversational, even philosophically
interesting one, generated by the conversational category of modus (as the
maxim of orderliness: “he went to bed and took off his boots”) is detachable. How
to interpret this in an one-off predicament. Cf. non-detachability. And the
other features or tests or catalysts that Grice uses. In Causal Theory of
Perception, the ideas are FOUR, which he nicely summarises in WoW on the
occasion of eliminating the excursus. And then he expands on Essay II, as an
update. His tutees at Oxford are aware of the changes. Few care, though. Even
his colleagues don’t, they are into their own things. So let’s compare the two
versions of the catalysts in Causal and Essay II. Version of the four catalysts
up to the first two examples in “Causal”: The first cxample is a stock case of what
is sometimes called " prcsupposition " and it is often held that here
1he truth of what is irnplicd is a necessary condition of the original
statement's beirrg cither true or false. This might be disputed, but it is at
lcast arguable that it is so, and its being arguable might be enough to
distinguish-this type of case from others. I shall however for convenience
assume that the common view mentioned is correct. This consideration clearly
distinguishes (1) from (2); even if the implied proposition were false, i.e. if
there were no reason in the world to contrast poverty with honesty either in
general or in her case, the original statement could still be false; it would
be false if for example she were rich and dishonest. One might perhaps be less
comfortable about assenting to its truth if the implied contrast did not in
fact obtain; but the possibility of falsity is enough for the immediate
purpose. My next experiment on these examples is to ask what it is in each case
which could properly be said to be the vehicle of implication (to do the
implying). There are at least four candidates, not necessarily mutually
exclusive. Supposing someone to have uttered one or other of my sample
sentences, we may ask whether the vehicle of implication would be (a) what the
speaker said (or asserted), or (b) the speaker (" did he imply that . . .
.':) or (c) the words the speaker used, or (d) his saying that (or again his
saying that in that way); or possibly some plurality of these items. As regards
(a) I think (1) and (2) differ; I think it would be correct to say in the case
of (l) that what he speaker said (or asserted) implied that Smith had been
beating this wife, and incorrect to say in the case of (2) that what te said
(or asserted) implied that there was a contrast between e.g., honesty and
poverty. A test on which I would rely is the following : if accepting that the
implication holds involves one in r27 128 H. P. GRICE accepting an
hypothetical' if p then q ' where 'p ' represents the original statement and '
q' represents what is implied, then what the speaker said (or asserted) is a
vehicle of implication, otherwise not. To apply this rule to the given
examples, if I accepted the implication alleged to hold in the case of (1), I
should feel compelled to accept the hypothetical " If Smith has left off
beating his wife, then he has been beating her "; whereas if I accepted
the alleged implication in the case of (2), I should not feel compelled to
accept the hypothetical " If she was poor but honest, then there is some
contrast between poverty and honesty, or between her poverty and her
honesty." The other candidates can be dealt with more cursorily; I should
be inclined to say with regard to both (l) and (2) that the speaker could be
said to have implied whatever it is that is irnplied; that in the case of (2)
it seems fairly clear that the speaker's words could be said to imply a
contrast, whereas it is much less clear whether in the case of (1) the
speaker's words could be said to imply that Smith had been beating his wife;
and that in neither case would it be evidently appropriate to speak of his
saying that, or of his saying that in that way, as implying what is implied.
The third idea with which I wish to assail my two examples is really a twin
idea, that of the detachability or cancellability of the implication. (These
terms will be explained.) Consider example (1): one cannot fi.nd a form of
words which could be used to state or assert just what the sentence "
Smith has left off beating his wife " might be used to assert such that
when it is used the implication that Smith has been beating his wife is just
absent. Any way of asserting what is asserted in (1) involves the irnplication
in question. I shall express this fact by saying that in the case of (l) the
implication is not detqchable from what is asserted (or simpliciter, is not
detachable). Furthermore, one cannot take a form of words for which both what
is asserted and what is implied is the same as for (l), and then add a further
clause withholding commitment from what would otherwise be implied, with the
idea of annulling the implication without annulling the assertion. One cannot
intelligibly say " Smith has left off beating his wife but I do not mean
to imply that he has been beating her." I shall express this fact by
saying that in the case of (1) the implication is not cancellable (without THE
CAUSAL THEORY OF PERCEPTION r29 cancelling the assertion). If we turn to (2) we
find, I think, that there is quite a strong case for saying that here the
implication ls detachable. Thcrc sccms quitc a good case for maintaining that
if, instead of sayirrg " She is poor but shc is honcst " I were to
say " She is poor and slre is honcst", I would assert just what I
would havc asscrtcct ii I had used thc original senterrce; but there would now
be no irnplication of a contrast between e.g', povery and honesty. But the
question whether, in tl-re case of (2), thc inrplication is cancellable, is
slightly more cornplex. Thcrc is a sonse in which we may say that it is
non-cancellable; if sorncone were to say " She is poor but she is honest,
though of course I do not mean to imply that there is any contrast between
poverty and honesty ", this would seem a puzzling and eccentric thing to
have said; but though we should wish to quarrel with the speaker, I do not
think we should go so far as to say that his utterance was unintelligible; we
should suppose that he had adopted a most peculiar way of conveying the the
news that she was poor and honesl. The fourth and last test that I wish to impose
on my exarnples is to ask whether we would be inclined to regard the fact that
the appropriate implication is present as being a matter of the meaning of some
particular word or phrase occurring in the sentences in question. I am aware
that this may not be always a very clear or easy question to answer;
nevertheless Iwill risk the assertion that we would be fairly happy to say
that, as regards (2), the factthat the implication obtains is a matter of the
meaning of the word ' but '; whereas so far as (l) is concerned we should have
at least some inclination to say that the presence of the implication was a
matter of the meaning of some of the words in the sentence, but we should be in
some difficulty when it came to specifying precisely which this word, or words
are, of which this is true. After third example introduced:It is plain that
there is no case at all for regarding the truth of what is implied here as a
pre-condition of the truth or falsity cf 130 H. P. GRICB what I have asserted;
a denial of the truth of what is implied would have no bearing at all on
whether what I have asserted is true or false. So (3) is much closer to (2)
than (1) in this respect. Next, I (the speaker) could certainly be said to have
implied that Jones is hopeless (provided that this is what I intended to get
across) and my saying that (at any rate my saying /s/ that and no more) is also
certainly a vehicle of implication. On the other hand my words and what I say
(assert) are, I think, not here vehicles of implication. (3) thus differs from
both (1) and (2). The implication is cancellable but not detachable; if I add
o'I do not of course mean to imply that he is no good at philosophy " my
whole utterance is intelligible and linguistically impeccable, even though it
may be extraordinary tutorial behaviour; and I can no longer be said to have
implied that he was no good, even though perhaps that is what my colleagues
might conclude to be the case if I had nothing else to say. The implication is
not however, detachable; any other way of making, in the same context of
utterance, just the assertion I have made would involve the same implication.
Finally, the fact that the implication holds is not a matter of any particular
word or phrase within the sentence which I have uttered; so in this respect (3)
is certainly different from (2) and, possibly different from (1). One obvious
fact should be mentioned before I pass to the last example. This case of
implication is unlike the others in that the utterance of the sentence "
Jones has beautiful handwriting etc." does not standardly involve the
implication here attributed to it; it requires a special context (that it
should be uttered at Collections) to attach the implication to its uttgrance.
After fourth and last example is introduced: in the case of (a) I can produce a
strong argument in favour of holding that the fulfllment of the THE CAUSAL
THEORY OF PERCEPTION implication of the speaker's ignorance is not a precaution
of the truth or falsity of the disjunctive statement. Suppose (c) that the
speaker knows that his wife is in the kitchen, (b) that the house has only two
rooms (and no passages etc.) Even though (a) is the casc, thc spcaker can
certainly say truly " My wife is in the housc "; he is merely not
being as informative as he could bc if nccd arose. But the true proposition
that his wife is in thc housc together with the true proposition that the house
consists entirely of a kitchen and a bedroom, entail the proposition that his
wife is either in the kitchen or in the bedroom. But il to cxpress the
proposition p in certain circumstances would bc to spcak truly, and p, togelher
with another true proposition, crrtails q, then surely to express 4 in the same
circvmstances must be to speak truly. So I shall take it that the disjunctive
statement in (4) does not fail to be true or false if the implied ignorance is
in fact not realized. Secondly, I think it is fairly clear that in this case,
as in the case of (3), we could say that the speaker had irnplied that he did
not know, and also that his saying that (or his saying that rather than
something else, v2., in which room she was) implied that he did not know.
Thirdly, the irnplication is in a sense non-detachable, in that if in a given
context the utterance of the disjunctive sentence would involve the implication
that the speaker did not know in which room his his wife was, this implication
would also be involved in the utterance of any other form of words which would
make the same assertion(e.g., "The alternatives are (1) .(2) " or
" One of the following things is the case: (a) (r) "). ln another
possible sense, however, the implication could perhaps bc said to be
detachable: for there will be some contexls of ruttcrance in Which the normal
implication will not hold; e.g., thc spokesman who announces, " The next
conference will be cither in Geneva or in New York " perhaps does not
imply that lrc does not know which; for he may well be just not saying which.
This points to the fact that the implication is cancellablg; :r nrarl could
say, " My wife is either in the kitchen or in the bctlroorn " in
circumstances in which the implication would rrornrally be present, and then go
on, " Mind you, I'm not saying tlrrrt I don't know which"; this might
be unfriendly (and grcr'lrrps ungrammatical) but would be perfectly
intelligible, I2 131 132 H. P. GRICB Finally, the fact that the utterance of
the disjunctive sentence normally involves the implication of the speaker's
ignorance of the truth-values of the disjuncts is, I should like to say, to be explained
by reference to a general principle governing the use of language. Exactly what
this principle is I am uncertain, but L first sftol would be the following:
"One should not make a weaker statement rather than a stronger one unless
there is a good reason for so doing." This is certainly not an adequate
formulation but will perhaps be good enough for my present purpose. On the
assumption that such a principle as this is of general application, one can
draw the conclusion that the utterance of a disjunctive sentence would imply
the speaker's ignorance of the truth-values of the disjuncts, given that (a)
the obvious reason for not making a statemcnt which there is some call on one
to make is that one is not in a position to make it, and given (6) the logical
fact that each disjunct entails the disjunctive, but not vice versa; which
being so, the disjuncts are stronger than the disjunctive. lf the outline just
given js on the right lines, then I would wish to say, we have a reason for
refusing in the case of (4) to regard the implication of the speaker's
ignorance as being part of the meaning of the word'or'; someone who knows about
the logical relation between a disjunction and its disjuncts, and who also knew
about the alleged general principle governing discourse, could work out for
hirnself that disjunctive utterances would involve the implication which they
do in fact involve. I must insist, however, that my aim in discussing this last
point has been merelyto indicate the position I would wish to take up, and not
to argue scriously in favour of it. My main purpose in this sub-section has
been to introduce four ideas of which l intend to make some use; and to provide
some conception of tlre ways in which they apply or fail to apply to various
types of implication. By the numbering of it, it seems he has added an extra.
It’s FIVE catalysts now. He’ll go back to them in Essay IV, and in
Presupposition and Conversational Impicature. He needs those catalysts. Why? It
seems like he is always thinking that someone will challenge him! This is
Grice: “We can now show that, it having been stipulated as being what it is, a
conversational implicaturum must possess certain features. Or rather here are
some catalyst ideas which will help us to determine or individuate. Four tests
for implicaturum as it were. First, CANCELLABILITY – as noted in “Causal
Theory” – for two of the examples (‘beautiful handwriting’ and ‘kitchen or
bedroom’ and NEGATIVE version of “You don’t cease to eat iron”) and the one of
the pillar box -- Since, to assume the presence of a conversational implicum,
we have to assume that the principle of conversational co-operation is being
observed, and since it is possible to opt out of the observation of this principle,
it follows that an implicaturum can be canceled in a particular case. It may be
explicitly canceled, if need there be, by the addition of a clause by which the
utterer states or implies that he has
opted out (e. g. “The pillar box seems red but it is.”). Then again it may be
contextually (or implicitly) canceled (e. g. to a very honest person, who knows
I disbelieve the examiner exists, “The loyalty examiner won’t be summoning you
at any rate”). The utterance that usually would carry an implicaturum is used
on an occasion that makes it clear or obvious that the utterer IS opting out
without having to bore his addressee by making this obviousness explicit. There
is a second litmus test or catalyst idea. nsofar as the calculation that a implicaturum
is present requires, besides contextual and background information only a
knowledge or understanding or processing of what has been said or explicitly
conveyed (‘are you playing squash? B shows bandaged leg) (or the ‘conventional’
‘commitment’ of the utterance), and insofar as the manner or style, of FORM,
rather than MATTER, of expression plays no role in the calculation, it will NOT
be possible to find another way of explicitly conveying or putting forward the
same thing, the same so-and-so (say that q follows from p) which simply ‘lacks’
the unnecessary implicaturum in question -- except [will his excluders never
end?] where some special feature of the substituted version [this other way
which he says is not conceivable] is itself relevant to the determination of
the implicaturum (in virtue of this or that conversational maxims pertaining to
the category of conversational mode. If we call this feature, as Grice does in
“Causal Theory,” ‘non-detachability’ – in that the implicaturum cannot be
detached from any alternative expression that makes the same point -- one may
expect the implicaturum carried by this or that locution to have a high degree
of non-detachability. ALTERNATIVES FOR “NOT” Not, it is not the case, it is
false that. There’s nothing unique about ‘not’.ALTERNATIVES FOR “AND” and,
nothing, furthermore, but. There isnothing unique about ‘and’ALTERNATIVES FOR
“OR”: One of the following is true. There is nothing unique about ‘or’ALTERNATIVES
FOR “IF” Provided. ‘There is nothing unique about ‘if’ALTERNATIVES FOR “THE” –
There is at least one and at most one. And it exists. (existence and
uniqueness). There is nothing unique about ‘the’.THIS COVERS STRAWSON’S first
problem.What about the other English philosophers?AUSTIN – on ‘voluntarily’
ALTERNATIVES to ‘voluntarily,’ with the will, willingly, intentionally. Nothing
unique about ‘voluntarily.’STRAWSON on ‘true’ – it is the case, redundance
theory, nothing. Nothing unique about ‘true’HART ON good. To say that ‘x is
commendable’ is to recommend x. Nothing unique about ‘good.’HART on ‘carefully.’
Da Vinci painted Mona Lisa carefully, with caution, with precaution. Nothing
unique about ‘carefully.’THIRD LITMUS TEST or idea. To speak approximately,
since the calculation of the presence of an implicaturum presupposes an initial
knowledge, or grasping, or understanding, or taking into account of the ‘conventional’
force (not in Austin’s sense, but translating Latin ‘vis’) of the expression
the utterance of which carries the implicaturum, a conversational implicaturum
will be a condition that is NOT, be definition, on risk of circularity of
otiosity, included in the original specification of the expression's
conventional force. If I’m saying that ‘seems’ INVOLVES, as per conventional
force, ‘doubt or denial,’what’s my point? If Strawson is right that ‘if’ has
the conventional force of conventionally committing the utterer with the belief
that q follows from p, why bother? And if that were so, how come the implicaturum
is still cancellable?Though it may not be impossible for what starts life, so
to speak, as a conversational implicaturum to become conventionalized, to
suppose that this is so in a given case would require special justification. (Asking
Lewis). So, initially at least, a conversational implicaturum is, by definition
and stipulation, not part of the sense, truth-condition, conventional force, or
part of what is explicitly conveyed or put forward, or ‘meaning’ of the
expression to the employment of which the impicatum attaches. FOURTH LITMUS
TEST or catalyst idea.Mentioned in “Causal theory” The alethic value –
conjoined with the test about the VEHICLE --. He has these as two different
tests in “Causal”. Since the truth of a conversational implicaturum is not
required by (is not a condition for) the truth of what is said or explicitly
conveyed (what is said or explicated – the explicatum or explcitum, or what is
explicitly conveyed or communicated) may be true -- what is implicated may be
false – that he has beautiful handwriting, that q follows from p, that the
utterer is ENDORSING what someone else said, that the utterer is recommending
x, that the person who is said to act carefully has taken precaution), the implicaturum
is NOT carried by what is said or the EXPLICATUM or EXPLICITUM, or is
explicitly conveyed, but only by the ‘saying’ or EXPLICATING or EXPLICITING of
what is said or of the explicatum or explicitum, or by 'putting it that
way.’.The fifth and last litmus test or catalyst idea. Since, to calculate a
conversational implicaturum is to calculate what has to be supposed in order to
preserve the supposition that the utterer is a rational, benevolent, altruist
agent, and that the principle of conversational cooperation is being observed,
and since there may be various possible specific explanations or alternatives
that fill the gap here – as to what is the content of the psychological
attitude to be ascribed to the utterer, a list of which may be open, or
open-ended, the conversational implicaturum in such cases will technically be
an open-ended disjunction of all such specific explanations, which may well be
infinitely non-numerable. Since the list of these IS open, the implicaturum
will have just the kind of INDETERMINACY or lack of determinacy that an implicaturum
appears in most cases to possess.
determinatum: determinable, a
general characteristic or property analogous to a genus except that while a
property independent of a genus differentiates a species that falls under the
genus, no such independent property differentiates a determinate that falls
under the determinable. The color blue, e.g., is a determinate with respect of
the determinable color: there is no property F independent of color such that a
color is blue if and only if it is F. In contrast, there is a property, having
equal sides, such that a rectangle is a square if and only if it has this
property. Square is a properly differentiated species of the genus rectangle.
W. E. Johnson introduces the terms ‘determinate’ and ‘determinable’ in his
Logic, Part I, Chapter 11. His account of this distinction does not closely
resemble the current understanding sketched above. Johnson wants to explain the
differences between the superficially similar ‘Red is a color’ and ‘Plato is a
man’. He concludes that the latter really predicates something, humanity, of
Plato; while the former does not really predicate anything of red. Color is not
really a property or adjective, as Johnson puts it. The determinates red, blue,
and yellow are grouped together not because of a property they have in common
but because of the ways they differ from each other. Determinates under the
same determinable are related to each other and are thus comparable in ways in
which they are not related to determinates under other determinables.
Determinates belonging to different determinables, such as color and shape, are
incomparable. ’More determinate’ is often used interchangeably with ‘more
specific’. Many philosophers, including Johnson, hold that the characters of
things are absolutely determinate or specific. Spelling out what this claim
means leads to another problem in analyzing the relation between determinate
and determinable. By what principle can we exclude red and round as a
determinate of red and red as a determinate of red or round? determinism, the view that every event or
state of affairs is brought about by antecedent events or states of affairs in
accordance with universal causal laws that govern the world. Thus, the state of
the world at any instant determines a unique future, and that knowledge of all
the positions of things and the prevailing natural forces would permit an
intelligence to predict the future state of the world with absolute precision.
This view was advanced by Laplace in the early nineteenth century; he was
inspired by Newton’s success at integrating our physical knowledge of the world.
Contemporary determinists do not believe that Newtonian physics is the supreme
theory. Some do not even believe that all theories will someday be integrated
into a unified theory. They do believe that, for each event, no matter how
precisely described, there is some theory or system of laws such that the
occurrence of that event under that description is derivable from those laws
together with information about the prior state of the system. Some
determinists formulate the doctrine somewhat differently: a every event has a
sufficient cause; b at any given time, given the past, only one future is
possible; c given knowledge of all antecedent conditions and all laws of
nature, an agent could predict at any given time the precise subsequent history
of the universe. Thus, determinists deny the existence of chance, although they
concede that our ignorance of the laws or all relevant antecedent conditions
makes certain events unexpected and, therefore, apparently happen “by chance.”
The term ‘determinism’ is also used in a more general way as the name for any
metaphysical doctrine implying that there is only one possible history of the
world. The doctrine described above is really scientific or causal determinism,
for it grounds this implication on a general fact about the natural order,
namely, its governance by universal causal law. But there is also theological
determinism, which holds that God determines everything that happens or that,
since God has perfect knowledge about the universe, only the course of events
that he knows will happen can happen. And there is logical determinism, which
grounds the necessity of the historical order on the logical truth that all
propositions, including ones about the future, are either true or false.
Fatalism, the view that there are forces e.g., the stars or the fates that
determine all outcomes independently of human efforts or wishes, is claimed by
some to be a version of determinism. But others deny this on the ground that
determinists do not reject the efficacy of human effort or desire; they simply
believe that efforts and desires, which are sometimes effective, are themselves
determined by antecedent factors as in a causal chain of events. Since
determinism is a universal doctrine, it embraces human actions and choices. But
if actions and choices are determined, then some conclude that free will is an
illusion. For the action or choice is an inevitable product of antecedent
factors that rendered alternatives impossible, even if the agent had
deliberated about options. An omniscient agent could have predicted the action
or choice beforehand. This conflict generates the problem of free will and
determinism.
deutero-esperanto: Also Gricese – Pirotese. “Gricese” is best. Arbitrariness
need not be a two-party thing. E communicates to himself that there is danger
by drawing a skull. Grice genially opposed to the idea of a convention. He
hated a convention. A language is not conventional. Meaning is not
conventional. Communication is not conventional. He was even unhappy with the account
of convention by Lewis in terms of an arbitrary co-ordination. While the
co-ordination bit passes rational muster, the arbitrary element is deemed a
necessary condition, and Grice hated that. For Grice there is natural, and
iconic. When a representation ceases to be iconic and becomes, for lack of a
better expression, non-iconic, things get, we may assume conventional. One form
of correlation in his last definition of meaing allows for a conventional
correlation. “Pain!,” the P cries. There is nothing in /pein/ that minimally
resembles the pain the P is suffering. So from his involuntary “Ouch” to his
simulated “Ouch,” he thinks he can say “Pain.” Bennett explored the stages after
that. The dog is shaggy is Grices example. All sorts of resultant procedures
are needed for reference and predication, which may be deemed conventional. One
may refer nonconventionally, by ostension. It seems more difficult to predicate
non-conventionally. But there may be iconic predication. Urquhart promises
twelve parts of speech: each declinable in eleven cases, four numbers, eleven
genders (including god, goddess, man, woman, animal, etc.); and conjugable in
eleven tenses, seven moods, and four voices. The language will translate any
idiom in any other language, without any alteration of the literal sense, but
fully representing the intention. Later, one day, while lying in his bath,
Grice designed deutero-esperanto. The obble is fang may be current only
for Griceian members of the class of utterers. It is only this or that
philosophers practice to utter The obble is fang in such-and-such
circumstances. In this case, the utterer U does have a readiness to utter The
obble is feng in such-and-such circumstances. There is also the scenario in
which The obble is fang is may be conceived by the philosopher not to be deemed
current at all, but the utterance of The obble is feng in such-and-such
circumstances is part of some system of communication which the utterer U
(Lockwith,, Urquart, Wilkins, Edmonds, Grice) has devised but which has never
been put into operation, like the highway code which Grice invent another day
again while lying in his bath. In that case, U does this or that basic or
resultant procedure for the obble is feng in an attenuated but philosophically
legitimate fashion. U has envisaged a possible system of practices which
involve a readiness to utter Example by Grice that does NOT involve a
convention in this usage. Surely Grice can as he indeed did, invent a
language, call it Deutero-Esperanto, Griceish, or Pirotese, which nobody
at Oxford ever uses to communicat. That makes Grice the authority - cf. arkhe,
authority, government (in plural), "authorities" - and Grice can lay
down, while lying in the tub, no doubt - what is proper. A P can be said
to potch of some obble o as fang or as feng. Also to cotch of some obble
o, as fang or feng; or to cotch of one obble o and another obble o as being fid
to one another.” In symbols: (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oy ^ potch(x, y, fang) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^
Oy ^ potch(x, y, feng) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oy ^ cotch(x, y, fang) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Ox ^
cotch(x, y, feng) (Ex)(Ey).Px ^ Oz ^ Oy ^ cotch(x, fid(y,z)). Let’s say that Ps
(as Russell and Carnap conceived them) inhabit a world of obbles, material
objects, or things. To potch is something like to perceive; to cotch something
like to think. Feng and fang are possible descriptions, much like our
adjectives. Fid is a possible relation between obbles. Grice provides a
symbolisation for content internalisation. The perceiver or cognitive
Subjects perceives or cognises two objects, x, y, as holding a relation of some
type. There is a higher level that Ps can reach when the object of their
potchings and cotchings is not so much objects but states of affairs. Its
then that the truth-functional operators will be brought to existence “^”:
cotch(p ^ q) “V”: cotch(p v q) “)”: )-cotch(p ) q) A P will be able
to reject a content, refuse-thinking: ~. Cotch(~p). When P1 perceives P2, the
reciprocals get more complicated. P2 cotches that P1!-judges that
p. Grice uses ψ1 for potching and ψ2
for cotching. If P2 is co-operative, and abides by "The Ps Immanuel,"
P2 will honour, in a Kantian benevolent way, his partners goal by adopting
temporarily his partners goal potch(x (portch(y, !p)) ⊃ potch(x, !p). But by then, its hardly simpler
ways. Especially when the Ps outdo their progenitor Carnap as metaphysicians.
The details are under “eschatology,” but the expressions are here “α izzes α.” This
would be the principle of non-contradiction or identity. P1 applies it war, and
utters War is war which yields a most peculiar implicaturum. “if α izzes
β ∧ β izzes γ, α izz γ.” This is transitivity, which is
crucial for Ps to overcome Berkeley’s counterexample to Locke, and define their
identity over time. “if α hazzes β, α izzes β.” Or, what is accidental is not
essential. A P may allow that what is essential is accidental while misleading,
is boringly true. “α hazzes β iff α hazzes x ∧ x izzes β.” “If β is a katholou or universalium, β is
an eidos or forma.” For surely Ps need not be stupid to fail to see
squarrelhood. “if α hazzes β ∧ α
izzes a particular, γ≠α ∧ α izz β.” “α izzes predicable
of β iff ((β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x
izzes α). “α izzes essentially predicable of β ⊃⊂ β izzes α α
izzes non-essentially/accidentally predicable of β ⊃⊂ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x
izzes α). α = β iff α izzes β ∧ β
izzes α. “α izzes an atomon, or individuum ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(β izzes α ⊃ α
izzes β). “α izzes a particular ⊃⊂ □(∀β)(α izzes predicable of β ⊃ (α izzes β ∧ β
izzes α)). α izzes a universalium ⊃⊂ ◊(∃β)(α izzes predicable of α ∧ ~(α izzes β ∧ β
izzes α). α izzes some-thing ⊃ α
izzes an individuum. α izzes an eidos or forma ⊃ (α izzes some-thing ∧ α izzes a universalium); α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ (β izzes α) ∨ (∃x)(β hazzes x ∧ x
izzes α). “ α izzes essentially predicable of α α izzes accidentally
predicable of β ⊃ α ≠ β. ~(α izzes accidentally predicable of
β) ⊃ α ≠ β. α izzes an kathekaston or particular ⊃ α izzes an individuum; α izz a particular ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izz α). ~(∃x).(x
izzes a particular ∧ x izzes a forma) ⊢ α
izzes a forma ⊃ ~(∃x)(x ≠ α ∧ x izzes α). x izzes a particular ⊃ ~(∃β)(α izzes β); α izzes a forma ⊃ ((α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ β
hazzes α); α izzes a forma ∧ β
izzes a particular ⊃ (α izzes predicable of β ⊃⊂ β hazzes A); (α izzes a particular ∧ β izzes a universalium ∧ β izzes predicable of α) ⊃ (∃γ)(α ≠ γ ∧ γ
izzes essentially predicable of α). (∃x)
(∃y)(x izzes a particular ∧ y
izzes a universalium ∧ y izzes predicable of x ⊃ ~(∀x)(x izzes a universalium ∧ x izzes some-thing). (∀β)(β izzes a universalium ⊃ β izzes some-thing). α izzes a particular) ⊃ ~∃β.(α ≠ β ∧ β
izzes essentially predicable of α). (α izzes predicable of β ∧ α ≠ β) ⊃ α
izzes non-essentially or accidentally predicable of β. Grice
is following a Leibnizian tradition. A philosophical language is any
constructed language that is constructed from first principles or certain
ideologies. It is considered a type of engineered language.
Philosophical languages were popular in Early Modern times, partly motivated by
the goal of recovering the lost Adamic or Divine language. The term
“ideal language” is sometimes used near-synonymously, though more modern
philosophical languages such as “Toki Pona” are less likely to involve such an
exalted claim of perfection. It may be known as a language of pure
ideology. The axioms and grammars of the languages together differ from
commonly spoken languages today. In most older philosophical languages,
and some newer ones, words are constructed from a limited set of morphemes that
are treated as "elemental" or fundamental. "Philosophical
language" is sometimes used synonymously with "taxonomic
language", though more recently there have been several conlangs
constructed on philosophical principles which are not taxonomic. Vocabularies
of oligo-synthetic communication-systems are made of compound expressions,
which are coined from a small (theoretically minimal) set of morphemes;
oligo-isolating communication-systems, such as Toki Pona, similarly use a
limited set of root words but produce phrases which remain s. of distinct
words. Toki Pona is based on minimalistic simplicity, incorporating
elements of Taoism. Láadan is designed to lexicalize and grammaticalise the
concepts and distinctions important to women, based on muted group
theory. A priori languages are constructed languages where the vocabulary
is invented directly, rather than being derived from other existing languages
(as with Esperanto, or Grices Deutero-Esperanto, or Pirotese or Ido). It all
starts when Carnap claims to know that pritos karulise elatically. Grice as
engineer. Pirotese is the philosophers engaging in Pology. Actually, Pirotese
is the lingo the Ps parrot. Ps karulise elatically. But not all of
them. Grice finds that the Pological talk allows to start from
zero. He is constructing a language, (basic) Pirotese, and the
philosophical psychology and world that that language is supposed to represent
or denote. An obble is a Ps object. Grice introduces potching and
cotching. To potch, in Pirotese, is what a P does with an obble: he perceives
it. To cotch is Pirotese for what a P can further do with an obble: know or
cognise it. Cotching, unlike potching, is factive. Pirotese would
not be the first language invented by a philosopher. Deutero-Esperanto
-- Couturat, L., philosopher and logician who wrote on the history of
philosophy, logic, philosophy of mathematics, and the possibility of a
universal language. Couturat refuted Renouvier’s finitism and advocated an
actual infinite in The Mathematical Infinite 6. He argued that the assumption
of infinite numbers was indispensable to maintain the continuity of magnitudes.
He saw a precursor of modern logistic in Leibniz, basing his interpretation of
Leibniz on the Discourse on Metaphysics and Leibniz’s correspondence with
Arnauld. His epoch-making Leibniz’s Logic 1 describes Leibniz’s metaphysics as
panlogism. Couturat published a study on Kant’s mathematical philosophy Revue
de Métaphysique, 4, and defended Peano’s logic, Whitehead’s algebra, and
Russell’s logistic in The Algebra of Logic 5. He also contributed to André
Lalande’s Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie 6. Refs.: While the reference to “Deutero-Esperanto’ comes from
“Meaning revisited,” other keywords are useful, notably “Pirotese” and
“Symbolo.” Also keywords like “obble,” and “pirot.” The H. P. Grice Papers,
BANC.
Grice
the Deweyian:
Grice was John Dewey Lecturer -- Dewey, J., philosopher, social critic, and
theorist of education. During an era when philosophy was becoming thoroughly
professionalized, Dewey remained a public philosopher having a profound
international influence on politics and education. His career began
inauspiciously in his student days at the
of Vermont and then as a high school teacher before he went on to study
philosophy at the newly formed Johns Hopkins . There he studied with Peirce, G.
S. Hall, and G. S. Morris, and was profoundly influenced by the version of
Hegelian idealism propounded by Morris. After receiving his doctorate in 4,
Dewey moved to the of Michigan where he
rejoined Morris, who had relocated there. At Michigan he had as a colleague the
young social psychologist G. H. Mead, and during this period Dewey himself
concentrated his writing in the general area of psychology. In 4 he accepted an
appointment as chair of the Department of Philosophy, Psychology, and Education
at the of Chicago, bringing Mead with
him. At Chicago Dewey was instrumental in founding the famous laboratory
school, and some of his most important writings on education grew out of his
work in that experimental school. In 4 he left Chicago for Columbia , where he
joined F. J. E. Woodbridge, founder of The Journal of Philosophy. He retired
from Columbia in 0 but remained active in both philosophy and public affairs
until his death in 2. Over his long career he was a prolific speaker and
writer, as evidenced by a literary output of forty books and over seven hundred
articles. Philosophy. At the highest level of generality Dewey’s philosophical
orientation can be characterized as a kind of naturalistic empiricism, and the
two most fundamental notions in his philosophy can be gleaned from the title of
his most substantial book, Experience and Nature 5. His concept of experience
had its origin in his Hegelian background, but Dewey divested it of most of its
speculative excesses. He clearly conceived of himself as an empiricist but was
careful to distinguish his notion of experience both from that of the idealist
tradition and from the empiricism of the classical British variety. The
idealists had so stressed the cognitive dimension of experience that they
overlooked the non-cognitive, whereas he saw the British variety as
inappropriately atomistic and subjectivist. In contrast to these Dewey
fashioned a notion of experience wherein action, enjoyment, and what he called
“undergoing” were integrated and equally fundamental. The felt immediacy of
experience what he generally characterized as its aesthetic quality was basic
and irreducible. He then situated cognitive experience against this broader
background as arising from and conditioned by this more basic experience.
Cognitive experience was the result of inquiry, which was viewed as a process
arising from a felt difficulty within our experience, proceeding through the
stage of conceptual elaboration of possible resolutions, to a final
reconstruction of the experience wherein the initial fragmented situation is
transformed into a unified whole. Cognitive inquiry is this mediating process
from experience to experience, and knowledge is what makes possible the final
more integrated experience, which Dewey termed a “consummation.” On this view
knowing is a kind of doing, and the criterion of knowledge is “warranted
assertability.” On the first point, Dewey felt that one of the cardinal errors
of philosophy from Plato to the modern period was what he called “the spectator
theory of knowledge.” Knowledge had been viewed as a kind of passive recording
of facts in the world and success was seen as a matter of the correspondence of
our beliefs to these antecedent facts. To the contrary, Dewey viewed knowing as
a constructive conceptual activity that anticipated and guided our adjustment
to future experiential interactions with our environment. It was with this
constructive and purposive view of thinking in mind that Dewey dubbed his
general philosophical orientation instrumentalism. Concepts are instruments for
dealing with our experienced world. The fundamental categories of knowledge are
to be functionally understood, and the classical dualisms of philosophy
mindbody, meansend, fact value are ultimately to be overcome. The purpose of
knowing is to effect some alteration in the experiential situation, and for
this purpose some cognitive proposals are more effective than others. This is the
context in which “truth” is normally invoked, and in its stead Dewey proposed
“warranted assertability.” He eschewed the notion of truth even in its less
dangerous adjectival and adverbial forms, ‘true’ and ‘truly’ because he saw it
as too suggestive of a static and finalized correspondence between two separate
orders. Successful cognition was really a more dynamic matter of a present
resolution of a problematic situation resulting in a reconstructed experience
or consummation. “Warranted assertability” was the success characterization,
having the appropriately normative connotation without the excess metaphysical
baggage. Dewey’s notion of experience is intimately tied to his notion of
nature. He did not conceive of nature as “the-world-as-it-would-be-independent-of-human-experience”
but rather as a developing system of natural transactions admitting of a
tripartite distinction between the physicochemical level, the psychophysical
level, and the level of human experience with the understanding that this categorization
was not to be construed as implying any sharp discontinuities. Experience
itself, then, is one of the levels of transaction in nature and is not
reducible to the other forms. The more austere, “scientific” representations of
nature as, e.g., a purely mechanical system, Dewey construed as merely useful
conceptualizations for specific cognitive purposes. This enabled him to
distinguish his “naturalism,” which he saw as a kind of nonreductive
empiricism, from “materialism,” which he saw as a kind of reductive
rationalism. Dewey and Santayana had an ongoing dialogue on precisely this
point. Dewey’s view was also naturalistic to the degree that it advocated the
universal scope of scientific method. Influenced in this regard by Peirce, he
saw scientific method not as restricted to a specific sphere but simply as the
way we ought to think. The structure of all reflective thought is
future-oriented and involves a movement from the recognition and articulation
of a felt difficulty, through the elaboration of hypotheses as possible
resolutions of the difficulty, to the stage of verification or falsification.
The specific sciences physics, biology, psychology investigate the different
levels of transactions in nature, but the scientific manner of investigation is
simply a generalized sophistication of the structure of common sense and has no
intrinsic restriction. Dewey construed nature as an organic unity not marked by
any radical discontinuities that would require the introduction of non-natural
categories or new methodological strategies. The sharp dualisms of mind and
body, the individual and the social, the secular and the religious, and most
importantly, fact and value, he viewed as conceptual constructs that have far
outlived their usefulness. The inherited dualisms had to be overcome,
particularly the one between fact and value inasmuch as it functioned to block
the use of reason as the guide for human action. On his view people naturally
have values as well as beliefs. Given human nature, there are certain
activities and states of affairs that we naturally prize, enjoy, and value. The
human problem is that these are not always easy to come by nor are they always
compatible. We are forced to deal with the problem of what we really want and
what we ought to pursue. Dewey advocated the extension of scientific method to
these domains. The deliberative process culminating in a practical judgment is
not unlike the deliberative process culminating in factual belief. Both kinds
of judgment can be responsible or irresponsible, right or wrong. This
deliberative sense of evaluation as a process presupposes the more basic sense
of evaluation concerning those dimensions of human experience we prize and find
fulfilling. Here too there is a dimension of appropriateness, one grounded in
the kind of beings we are, where the ‘we’ includes our social history and
development. On this issue Dewey had a very Grecian view, albeit one transposed
into a modern evolutionary perspective. Fundamental questions of value and
human fulfillment ultimately bear on our conception of the human commuDewey,
John Dewey, John 230 230 nity, and this
in turn leads him to the issues of democracy and education. Society and
education. The ideal social order for Dewey is a structure that allows maximum
selfdevelopment of all individuals. It fosters the free exchange of ideas and
decides on policies in a manner that acknowledges each person’s capacity
effectively to participate in and contribute to the direction of social life.
The respect accorded to the dignity of each contributes to the common welfare
of all. Dewey found the closest approximation to this ideal in democracy, but
he did not identify contemporary democracies with this ideal. He was not
content to employ old forms of democracy to deal with new problems. Consistent
with instrumentalism, he maintained that we should be constantly rethinking and
reworking our democratic institutions in order to make them ever more
responsive to changing times. This constant rethinking placed a considerable
premium on intelligence, and this underscored the importance of education for
democracy. Dewey is probably best known for his views on education, but the
centrality of his theory of education to his overall philosophy is not always
appreciated. The fundamental aim of education for him is not to convey
information but to develop critical methods of thought. Education is
future-oriented and the future is uncertain; hence, it is paramount to develop
those habits of mind that enable us adequately to assess new situations and to
formulate strategies for dealing with the problematic dimensions of them. This
is not to suggest that we should turn our backs on the past, because what we as
a people have already learned provides our only guide for future activity. But
the past is not to be valued for its own sake but for its role in developing
and guiding those critical capacities that will enable us to deal with our
ever-changing world effectively and responsibly. With the advent of the
analytic tradition as the dominant style of philosophizing in America, Dewey’s
thought fell out of favor. About the only arenas in which it continued to
flourish were schools of education. However, with the recent revival of a
general pragmatic orientation in the persons of Quine, Putnam, and Rorty, among
others, the spirit of Dewey’s philosophy is frequently invoked. Holism,
anti-foundationalism, contextualism, functionalism, the blurring of the lines
between science and philosophy and between the theoretical and the practical all central themes in Dewey’s philosophy have become fashionable. Neo-pragmatism is a
contemporary catchphrase. Dewey is, however, more frequently invoked than read,
and even the Dewey that is invoked is a truncated version of the historical
figure who constructed a comprehensive philosophical vision.
diagoge: Grice makes a triad here: apagoge, diagoge, and epagoge. Cf.
Grice’s emphasis on the ‘argument’ involved in the conversational implciatum,
though. To work out an impilcatum is to reach it ‘by argument.’ No argument, no
conversational implicaturum. But cf. argument in Emissor draws skull and
communicates that there is danger. ARGUMENT involved in that Emissor intends
his addressee WILL REASON. Can the lady communicate to the pigeons that she is
selling ‘twopence a bag’ for their pleasure? Grice contrasted epagoge with
diagoge. Cooperation with competition. Cooperative game with competitive game. But
epagoge is induction, so here we’ll consider his views on probability and how
it contrastds with diagoge. The diagoge is easy to identity: Grice is a social
animal, with the BA, Philosophy, conferences, discussion, The American
Philosophical Association, transcripts by Randall Parker, from the audio-tapes
contained in c. 10 within the same s. IV miscellaneous, Beanfest, transcripts
and audio-cassettes, s. IV, c. 6-f. 8, and f. 10, and s. V, c. 8-f. 4-8 Unfortunately, Parker typed carulise
for karulise, or not. Re: probability, Grice loves to reminisce an anecdote
concerning his tutor Hardie at Corpus when Hardie invoked Mills principles
to prove that Hardie was not responsible for a traffic jam. In drafts on word
play, Grice would speak of not bringing more Grice to your Mill. Mills
System of Logic was part of the reading material for his degree in Lit.
Hum.at Oxford, so he was very familiar with it. Mill represents the best
of the English empiricist tradition. Grice kept an interest on inductive
methodology. In his Life and opinions he mentions some obscure essays by
Kneale and Keynes on the topic. Grice was interested in Kneales secondary
induction, since Grice saw this as an application of a
construction routine. He was also interested in Keyness notion of a
generator property, which he found metaphysically intriguing.
Induction. Induction ‒ Mill’s Induction, induction, deduction, abduction,
Mill. More Grice to the Mill. Grice loved Hardies playing with Mill’s
method of difference with an Oxford copper. He also quotes Kneale and Keynes on
induction. Note that his seven-step derivation of akrasia relies on an inductive
step! Grice was fortunate to associate with Davidson, whose initial work is on
porbability. Grice borrows from Davidson the idea that inductive probability,
or probable, attaches to the doxastic, while prima facie attaches to desirably,
or desirability. Jeffreys notion of desirability is
partition-invariant in that if a proposition, A, can be expressed as the
disjoint disjunction of both {B1, B2, B3} and {C1, C2, C3}, ∑ Bi ∈ AProb (Bi ∣∣ A).
Des (Bi) = ∑Ci ∈ A Prob (Ci ∣∣ A).
Des (Ci). It follows that applying the rule of desirability maximization
will always lead to the same recommendation, irrespective of how the decision
problem is framed, while an alternative theory may recommend different courses
of action, depending on how the decision problem is formulated. Here,
then, is the analogue of Jeffreys desirability axiom (D), applied to sentences
rather than propositions: (D) (prob(s and t) = 0 and prob(s or t) "#
0, ⊃ d ( ) prob(s)des(s)+ prob(t)des(t) es s or t
=-"---- prob( s) + prob(t ) (Grice writes prob(s) for the Subjectsive
probability of sand des(s) for the desirability or utility of s.) B. Jeffrey
admits that "desirability" (his terms for evidential value) does not
directly correspond to any single pre-theoretical notion of desire. Instead, it
provides the best systematic explication of the decision theoretic idea, which
is itself our best effort to make precise the intuitive idea of weighing
options. As Jeffrey remarks, it is entirely possibly to desire someone’s love
when you already have it. Therefore, as Grice would follow, Jeffrey has the
desirability operator fall under the scope of the probability operator. The
agents desire that p provided he judges that p does not obtain.
Diagoge/epagoge, Grices audio-files, the audio-files, audio-files of various
lectures and conferences, some seminars with Warner and J. Baker, audio files
of various lectures and conferences. Subjects: epagoge, diagoge. A
previous folder in the collection contains the transcripts. These are the
audio-tapes themselves, obviously not in folder. The kind of metaphysical
argument which I have in mind might be said, perhaps, to exemplify a dia-gogic
or trans-ductive as opposed to epa-gogic or in-ductive approach to
philosophical argumentation. Hence Short and Lewis have, for ‘diagoge,’ the
cognates of ‘trādūco,’ f. transduco. Now, the more emphasis is placed on
justification by elimination of the rival, the greater is the impetus given to
refutation, whether of theses or of people. And perhaps a greater emphasis on a
diagogic procedure, if it could be shown to be justifiable, would have an
eirenic effect. Cf. Aristotle on diagoge, schole, otium. Liddell and Scott
have “διαγωγή,” which they render as “literally carrying across,” -- “τριήρων”
Polyaen.5.2.6, also as “carrying through,” and “hence fig.” “ἡ διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν
δ., “taking a person through a subject by instruction, Pl. Ep.343; so, course
of instruction, lectures, ἐν τῇ ἐνεστώσῃ δ. prob. in Phld. Piet.25; also
passing of life, way or course of life, “δ. βίου” Pl. R.344e: abs., Id.
Tht.177a, etc., way of passing time, amusement, “δ. μετὰ παιδιᾶς” Arist. EN
1127b34, cf. 1177a27; “δ. ἐλευθέριος” Id. Pol.1339b5; διαγωγαὶ τοῦ συζῆν public
pastimes, ib.1280b37, cf. Plu.126b (pl.). also delay, D.C. 57.3. management,
τῶν πραγμάτων δ. dispatch of business, Id.48.5. IV. station for ships, f. l. in
Hdn.4.2.8. And there are other entries to consider: διαγωγάν: διαίρεσιν,
διανομήν, διέλευσιν. Grice knew what he was talking about! Refs.: The main
sources listed under ‘desirability,’ above. There is a specific essay on
‘probability and life.’ Good keywords, too, are epagoge and induction The H. P.
Grice Papers, BANC.
dialogical
implicaturum
– Grice seldom uses ‘dialogue.’ It’s always conversational with him. He must
have thought that ‘dialogue’ was too Buberian. In Roman, ‘she had a
conversation with him’ means ‘she had sex with him.’ “She had a dialogue with
him” does not. Classicists are obsessed with the beginning of Greek theatre: it
all started with ‘dialogue.’ It wasn’t like Aeschylus needed a partner. He
wrote the parts for BOTH. Was he reconstructing naturally-occurring Athenian
dialogue? Who knows! The
*two*-actor rule, which was indeed preceded by a convention in which only a
single actor would appear on stage, along with the chorus. It was in 471 B. C.
that Aeschylus introduces a second actor, called Cleander. You see, Aeschylus always cast himself as protagonist in
his own plays. For the season of 471 B. C., the Athenians were surprised when
Aeschylus introduced Cleander as his deuteragonist. “I can now conversationally
implicate!” he said to a cheering crowd! Dialogism -- Bakhtin: m. m.,
philosopher of dialogism -- and cultural theorist whose influence is pervasive
in a wide range of academic disciplines
from literary hermeneutics to the epistemology of the human sciences,
and cultural theory. He may legitimately be called a philosophical
anthropologist in the venerable Continental tradition. Because of his seminal
work on Rabelais and Dostoevsky’s poetics, Baden School Bakhtin, Mikhail
Mikhailovich 70 70 his influence has
been greatest in literary hermeneutics. Without question dialogism, or the
construal of dialogue, is the hallmark of Bakhtin’s thought. Dialogue marks the
existential condition of humanity in which the self and the other are
asymmetrical but double-binding. In his words, to exist means to communicate
dialogically, and when the dialogue ends, everything else ends. Unlike Hegelian
and Marxian dialectics but like the Chin. correlative logic of yin and yang,
Bakhtin’s dialogism is infinitely polyphonic, open-ended, and indeterminate,
i.e., “unfinalizable” to use his term.
Dialogue means that there are neither first nor last words. The past and the
future are interlocked and revolve around the axis of the present. Bakhtin’s
dialogism is paradigmatic in a threefold sense. First, dialogue is never
abstract but embodied. The lived body is the material condition of social
existence as ongoing dialogue. Not only does the word become enfleshed, but
dialogue is also the incorporation of the self and the other. Appropriately,
therefore, Bakhtin’s body politics may be called a Slavic version of Tantrism.
Second, the Rabelaisian carnivalesque that Bakhtin’s dialogism incorporates
points to the “jesterly” politics of resistance and protest against the
“priestly” establishment of officialdom. Third, the most distinguishing
characteristic of Bakhtin’s dialogism is the primacy of the other over the
self, with a twofold consequence: one concerns ethics and the other
epistemology. In modern philosophy, the discovery of “Thou” or the primacy of
the other over the self in asymmetrical reciprocity is credited to Feuerbach.
It is hailed as the “Copernican revolution” of mind, ethics, and social
thought. Ethically, Bakhtin’s dialogism, based on heteronomy, signals the birth
of a new philosophy of responsibility that challenges and transgresses the
Anglo- tradition of “rights talk.” Epistemologically, it lends our welcoming
ears to the credence that the other may be right the attitude that Gadamer calls the soul of
dialogical hermeneutics.
diaphaneity: Grice
unique in his subtlety. Strawson and Wiggins. 'the quality of being freely
pervious to light; transparency', OED. This is a crucial concept for Grice. He applies it
‘see,’ which which, after joint endeavours with G. J. Warnock, he was obsessed!
Grice considers the ascription, “Warnock sees that it is raining.” And then he
adds, “And it is true, I see that it is raining, too.” What’s the diference.
Then comes Strawson. “Strawson, you see that it is raining, right?” So we have
an ascription in the first, second, and third persons. When it comes to the
identification of a sense (like vision) via experience or qualia, we are at a
problem, because ‘see,’ allowing for what Ryle calls a ‘conversational avowal,’
that nobody has an authority to distrust, is what Grice calls a ‘diaphanous’
predicate. More formally. That means that “Grice sees that it is raining,” in
terms of experience, cannot really be expanded except by expanding into WHAT IS
that Grice sees, viz. that it is raining. The same with “communicating that p,”
and “meaning that p.”
dictum: Cf. dictor, and dictivenss. Not necessarily involved with
‘say,’ but with ‘deixis,’ So a dictum is involved in Emissor E drawing a skull,
communicating that there is danger. It is Hare who introduced ‘dictum’ in the
Oxonian philosophical literature in his T. H. Green Essay. Hare distinguishes
between the ‘dictum,’ that the cat is on the mat, from the ‘dictor,’ ‘I state
that the cat is on the mat, yes.’ ‘Cat, on the mat, please.’ Grice often refers
to Hare’s play with words, which he obviously enjoys. In “Epilogue,” Grice
elaborates on the ‘dictum,’ and turns it into ‘dictivitas.’ How does he coin
that word? He starts with Cicero, who has ‘dictivm,’ and creates an abstract
noun to match. Grice needs a concept of a ‘dictum’ ambiguous as it is. Grice
distinguishes between what an Utterer explicitly conveys, e. g. that Strawson
took off his boots and went to bed. Then there’s what Grice implicitly conveys,
to wit: that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed – in that order. Surely
Grice has STATED that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed. Grice has
ASSERTED that Strawson took off his boots and went to bed. But if Grice were to
order Strawson: “Put on your parachute and jump!” the implicatura may differ.
By uttering that utterance, Grice has not asserted or stated anything. So Grice
needs a dummy that will do for indicatives and imperatives. ‘Convey’ usually
does – especially in the modality ‘explicitly’ convey. Because by uttering that
utterance Grice has explicitly conveyed that Strawson is to put on his
parachute and jump. Grice has implicitly conveyd that Strawson is to put on his
parachute and THEN jump, surely.
Griceian
dignitas:
a moral worth or status usually attributed to human persons. Persons are said
to have dignity as well as to express it. Persons are typically thought to have
1 “human dignity” an dichotomy paradox dignity 234 234 intrinsic moral worth, a basic moral
status, or both, which is had equally by all persons; and 2 a “sense of
dignity” an awareness of one’s dignity inclining toward the expression of one’s
dignity and the avoidance of humiliation. Persons can lack a sense of dignity
without consequent loss of their human dignity. In Kant’s influential account
of the equal dignity of all persons, human dignity is grounded in the capacity
for practical rationality, especially the capacity for autonomous
self-legislation under the categorical imperative. Kant holds that dignity
contrasts with price and that there is nothing
not pleasure nor communal welfare nor other good consequences for which it is morally acceptable to
sacrifice human dignity. Kant’s categorical rejection of the use of persons as
mere means suggests a now-common link between the possession of human dignity
and human rights see, e.g., the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. One now widespread discussion of dignity concerns “dying with dignity”
and the right to conditions conducive thereto.
Griceian
dilemma,
a trilemma, tetralemma, monolemma, lemma
– Grice thought that Ryle’s dilemmas
were overrated. Strictly, a ‘dilemma’ is a piece of reasoning or argument or
argument form in which one of the premises is a disjunction, featuring “or.” Constructive
dilemmas take the form ‘If A and B, if C, D, A or C; therefore, B or D’ and are
instances of modus ponendo ponens in the special case where A is C and B is D; A
so-called ‘destructive’ dilemma is of the form ‘If A, B, if C, D, not-B or
not-D; therefore, not-A or not-C’ and it is likewise an instance of modus tollendo tollens
in that special case. A dilemma in which the disjunctive premise is false is
commonly known as a “false” dilemma, which is one of Ryle’s dilemmas: “a
category mistake!”
diminutive: diminished
capacity: explored by Grice in his analysis of legal versus moral right -- a
legal defense to criminal liability that exists in two distinct forms: 1 the
mens rea variant, in which a defendant uses evidence of mental abnormality to
cast doubt on the prosecution’s assertion that, at the time of the crime, the
defendant possessed the mental state criteria, the mens rea, required by the
legal definition of the offense charged; and 2 the partial responsibility
variant, in which a defendant uses evidence of mental abnormality to support a
claim that, even if the defendant’s mental state satisfied the mens rea
criteria for the offense, the defendant’s responsibility for the crime is
diminished and thus the defendant should be convicted of a lesser crime and/or
a lesser sentence should be imposed. The mental abnormality may be produced by
mental disorder, intoxication, trauma, or other causes. The mens rea variant is
not a distinct excuse: a defendant is simply arguing that the prosecution
cannot prove the definitional, mental state criteria for the crime. Partial
responsibility is an excuse, but unlike the similar, complete excuse of legal
insanity, partial responsibility does not produce total acquittal; rather, a
defendant’s claim is for reduced punishment. A defendant may raise either or
both variants of diminished capacity and the insanity defense in the same case.
For example, a common definition of firstdegree murder requires the prosecution
to prove that a defendant intended to kill and did so after premeditation. A
defendant charged with this crime might raise both variants as follows. To deny
the allegation of premeditation, a defendant might claim that the killing
occurred instantaneously in response to a “command hallucination.” If believed,
a defendant cannot be convicted of premeditated homicide, but can be convicted
of the lesser crime of second-degree murder, which typically requires only
intent. And even a defendant who killed intentionally and premeditatedly might
claim partial responsibility because the psychotic mental state rendered the
agent’s reasons for action nonculpably irrational. In this case, either the
degree of crime might be reduced by operation of the partial excuse, rather
than by negation of definitional mens rea, or a defendant might be convicted of
first-degree murder but given a lesser penalty. In the United States the mens
rea variant exists in about half the jurisdictions, although its scope is
usually limited in various ways, primarily to avoid a defendant’s being
acquitted and freed if mental abnormality negated all the definitional mental
state criteria of the crime charged. In English law, the mens rea variant
exists but is limited by the type of evidence usable to support it. No jurisdiction has adopted a distinct,
straightforward partial responsibility variant, but various analogous doctrines
and procedures are widely accepted. For example, partial responsibility grounds
both the doctrine that intentional killing should be reduced from murder to
voluntary manslaughter if a defendant acted “in the heat of passion” upon
legally adequate provocation, and the sentencing judge’s discretion to award a
decreased sentence based on a defendant’s mental abnormality. In addition to
such partial responsibility analogues, England, Wales, and Scotland have
directly adopted the partial responsibility variant, termed “diminished
responsibility,” but it applies only to prosecutions for murder. “Diminished
responsibility” reduces a conviction to a lesser crime, such as manslaughter or
culpable homicide, for behavior that would otherwise constitute murder.
direction
of fit
– referred to by Grice in “Intention and uncertainty,” and symbolized by an
upward arrow and a downward arrow – there are only TWO directions (or senses)
of fit: expressum to ‘re’ and ‘re’ to expressum. The first is indicativus
modus; the second is imperativus modus -- according to his thesis of
aequivocality – the direction of fit is overrated -- a metaphor that derives
from a story in Anscombe’s Intention 7 about a detective who follows a shopper
around town making a list of the things that the shopper buys. As Anscombe
notes, whereas the detective’s list has to match the way the world is each of
the things the shopper buys must be on the detective’s list, the shopper’s list
is such that the world has to fit with it each of the things on the list are
things that he must buy. The metaphor is now standardly used to describe the
difference between kinds of speech act assertions versus commands and mental
states beliefs versus desires. For example, beliefs are said to have the
world-to-mind direction of fit because it is in the nature of beliefs that
their contents are supposed to match the world: false beliefs are to be
abandoned. Desires are said to have the opposite mind-to-world direction of fit
because it is in the nature of desires that the world is supposed to match
their contents. This is so at least to the extent that the role of an
unsatisfied desire that the world be a certain way is to prompt behavior aimed
at making the world that way.
disgrice: In PGRICE,
Kemmerling speaks of disgricing as the opposite of gricing. The first way to
disgrice Kemmerling calls ‘strawsonising.’For Strawson, even the resemblance
(for Grice, equivalence in terms of 'iff' -- cf. his account of what an
syntactically structured non-complete expression) between (G) There
is not a single volume in my uncle’s library which is not by an English author,’and
the negatively existential form (LFG) ~ (Ex)(Ax . ~ Bx)’ is
deceptive, ‘It is not the case that there exists an x such that x is a book in Grice’s uncle’s
library and x is written by an
Englishman. FIRST, 'There is not a
single volume in uncle’s library which is not by an English author' -- as normally used, carries the
presupposition -- or entails, for Grice --
(G2) Some (at least one) book is in Grice’s uncle’s library. SECOND, 'There
is not a single volume in Grice’s uncle’s library which is not by an English
author,’ is far from being 'entailed' by (G3e) It is not the case that
there is some (at least one) book in my room. If we give ‘There not a single book in my room which is not by an English
author’ the modernist logical form ‘~
(Ex)(Ax .~ Bx),’ we see that this is ENTAILED
by the briefer, and indeed logicall stronger (in terms of entailments) ~ (Ex)Ax. So when Grice, with a solemn face, utters, ‘There
is not a single foreign volume in my uncle’s library, to reveal later that the library is empty, Grice should expect
his addressee to get some odd feeling. Surely not the feeling of having been
lied to -- or been confronted with an initial false utterance --, because we
have not. Strawson gets the feeling of having been made "the victim of a sort
of communicative outrage." "What you say is outrageous!" This
sounds stronger than it is. An outrage is believed to be an evil deed, offense,
crime; affront, indignity, act not within established or reasonable
limits," of food, drink, dress, speech, etc., from Old French outrage "harm, damage;
insult; criminal behavior; presumption, insolence, overweening" (12c.),
earlier oltrage (11c.),
From Vulgar Latin ‘ultraticum,’
excess," from Latin ultra,
beyond" (from suffixed form of PIE root *al- "beyond"). Etymologically, "the passing
beyond reasonable bounds" in any sense. The meaning narrowed in English
toward violent excesses because of folk etymology from out + rage. Of injuries to feelings,
principles, etc., from outrage, v. outragen,
"to go to excess, act immoderately," from outrage (n.) or from Old
French oultrager. From
1580s with meaning "do violence to, attack, maltreat." Related: Outraged; outraging. But Strawson gets the
feeling of having been made "the victim of a sort of communicative
outrage.” When Grice was only trying to tutor him in The Organon. Of
course it is not the case that Grice is explicitly conveying or expressing that
there there is some (at least one) book in his uncle's room. Grice has not said
anything false. Or rather, it is not the case that Grice utters an
utterance which is not alethically or doxastically satisfactory. Yet what Grice
gives Strawson the defeasible, cancellable, license to to assume that
Grice thinks there is at least one book. Unless he goes on to cancel the implicaturum,
Grice may be deemed to be misleading Strawson. What Grice explicitly conveys to
be true (or false) it is necessary (though not sufficient) that there should at
least one volume in his uncle’s library -- It is not the case that my uncle has
a library and in that library all the books are autochthonous to England, i.e.
it is not the case that Grice’s uncle has a library; for starters, it is not
the case that Grice has a literate uncle. Of this SUBTLE, nuantic, or cloudy or
foggy, "slight or delicate degree of difference in expression, feeling,
opinion, etc.," from Fr. nuance "slight difference, shade of colour,” from nuer "to
shade," from nue "cloud," from Gallo-Roman nuba, from
Latin nubes "a
cloud, mist, vapour," sneudh- "fog," source also of Avestan snaoda "clouds,"
Latin obnubere "to
veil," Welsh nudd "fog," Greek nython, in
Hesychius "dark, dusky") According to Klein, the French usage is a
reference to "the different colours of the clouds,” in reference to color
or tone, "a slight variation in shade; of music, as a French term in
English -- 'sort' is the relation between ‘There is not a volume in my
uncle's library which is not by an English author,’ and ‘My uncle's
library is not empty. RE-ENTER GRICE. Grice suggested that Strawson see such a
fine point such as that, which Grice had the kindness to call an 'implicaturum',
the result of an act of an ‘implicatura’ (they were both attending Kneale’s
seminar on the growth and ungrowth of logic) is irrelevant to the issue of
‘entailment’. It is a 'merely pragmatic’ implicaturum, Grice would say,
bringing forward a couple of distinctions: logical/pragmatic point;
logical/pragmatic inference; entailment/implicaturum; conveying
explicitly/conveying implicitly; stating/implicating; asserting/implying; what
an utterer means/what the expression 'means' -- but cf. Nowell-Smith, who left
Oxford after being overwhelmed by Grice, "this is how the rules of
etiquette inform the rules of logic -- on the 'rule' of relevance in
"Ethics," 1955. If to call such a point, as Grice does, as
"irrelevant to logic" is vacuous in that it may be interpreted as
saying that that such a fine foggy point is not considered in a modernist
formal system of first-order predicate calculus with identity, this Strawson
wishes not to dispute, but to emphasise. Call it his battle cry! But to 'logic'
as concerned with this or that relation between this or that general class of
statement occurring in ordinary use, and the attending general condition under
which this or that statement is correctly called 'true' or 'false,' this fine
foggy nice point would hardly be irrelevant. GRICE'S FORMALIST (MODERNIST)
INTERPRETATION. Some 'pragmatic' consideration, or assumption, or expectation,
a desideratum of conversational conduct obviously underlies and in fact
'explains' the implicaturum, without having to change the ‘sense’ of
Aristotle’s syllogistics in terms of the logical forms of A, E, I, and O. If we
abide by an imperative of conversational helpfulness, enjoining the maximally
giving and receiving of information and the influencing and being influenced by
others in the institution of a decisions, the sub-imperative follows to the
effect, ‘Thou shalt NOT make a weak move compared to the stronger one that thou
canst truthfully make, and with equal or greater economy of means.’ Assume the
form ‘There is not a single … which is not . . .,’ or ‘It is not the case
that ... there is some (at least one) x that ... is not ... is introduced
in ‘ordinary’ language with the same SENSE as the expression in the
‘ideal’ language, ~(Ex)(Ax and ~Bx). Then prohibition inhibits the utterance of
the form where the utterer can truly and truthfully simply convey
explicitly ‘There is not a single ..., i. e. ~(Ex)(Fx). It is
defeasible prohibition which tends to confer on the overprolixic form ('it is
not the case that ... there is some (at least one) x that is not ...') just
that kind of an implicaturum which Strawson identifies. But having
detected a nuance in a conversational phenomenon is not the same thing as rushing
ahead to try to explain it BEFORE exploring in some detail what kind of a
nuance it is. The mistake is often commited by Austin, too (in "Other Minds,"
and "A Plea for Excuses"), and by Hart (on 'carefully'), and by Hare
(on "good"), and by Strawson on 'true,' (Analysis), ‘the,’ and 'if --
just to restrict to the play group. Grice tries to respond to anti-sense-datum
in "That pillar box seems red to me,” but Strawson was not listening. The overprolixic form in the ‘ordinary’
language, ‘It is not the case that there is some (at least one x) such that ...
x is not ...’ would tend, if it does not remain otiose, to develop or generate
just that baffling effect in one's addressee ('outrage!') that Strawson identifies,
as opposed to the formal-device in the ‘ideal’ language with which the the
‘ordinary’ language counterpart is co-related. What weakens our resistance
to the negatively existential analysis in this case more than in the case of
the corresponding "All '-sentence is the powerful attraction of the negative
opening phrase There is not …'. To avoid misunderstanding one may
add a point about the neo-traditionalist interpretation of the forms of the traditional
Aristotelian system. Strawson is not claiming that it faithfully
represents this or that intention of the principal exponent of the Square of
Opposition. Appuleius, who knows, was perhaps, more interested in formulating
this or that theorem governing this or that logical relation of this or that
more imposing general statement than this or that everyday general statement
that Strawson considers. Appuleius, who knows, might have
been interested, e. g., in the logical powers of this or that
generalisation, or this or that sentence which approximates more closely to the
desired conditions that if its utterance by anyone, at any time, at any place,
results in a true statement, so does its utterance by anyone else, at any other
time, at any other place. How far the account by the neo-traditionalist
of this or that general sentence of 'ordinary' langauge is adequate for every
generalization may well be under debate. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “In defence of
Appuleius,” BANC.
disimplicaturum: “We should not conclude from this that an implication of
the existence of thing said to be seen is NOT part of the conventional meaning
of ‘see’ nor even (as some philosophers have done) that there is one sense of
‘see’ which lacks this implication!” (WoW:44). If Oxonians are obsessed with
‘implication,’ do they NEED ‘disimplicaturum’? Grice doesn’t think so! But
sometimes you have to use it to correct a mistake. Grice does not give names,
but he says he has heard a philosopher claim that there are two SENSES of
‘see,’ one which what one sees exists, and one in which it doesn’t! It would be
good to trace that! It relates, in any case to ‘remembers,’but not quite, and
to ‘know.’ But not quite. The issue of ‘see’ is not that central, since Grice
realizes that it is just a modality of perception, even if crucial. He coined
‘visum’ with Warnock to play with the idea of ‘what is seen’ NOT being
existent. On another occasion, when he
cannot name a ridiculous philosopher, he invents him: “A philosopher will not
be given much credit if he comes with an account of the indefinite ‘one’ as
having three senses: one proximate to the emissor (“I broke a finger”), one
distant (“He’s meeting a woman”) and one where the link is not specified (“A
flower”). he target is of course Davidson having the cheek to quote Grice’s
Henriette Herz Trust lecture for the BA! Lewis and Short have ‘intendere’ under
‘in-tendo,’ which they render as ‘to stretch out or forth, extend, also to turn
ones attention to, exert one’s self for, to purpose, endeavour,” and finaly as
“intend”! “pergin, sceleste, intendere hanc arguere?” Plaut. Mil. 2, 4,
27 Grices tends towards claiming that you cannot extend what you dont
intend. In the James lectures, Grice mentions the use of is to mean seem (The
tie is red in this light), and see to mean hallucinate. Denying
Existence: The Logic, Epistemology and Pragmatics of ...books.google.com ›
books ... then it seems unidiomatic if not ungrammatical to speak of
hallucinations as ... that fighting people and 156 APPEARING UNREALS 4 Two
Senses of "See"? A. Chakrabarti - 1997 - Language Arts &
Disciplines The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism,
Morality, and ...books.google.com › books sight, say sense-data; others will
then say that there are two senses of 'see'. ... wrong because I am dreaming or
hallucinating them, which of course could ... Stanley Cavell - 1999 -
Philosophy Wittgenstein and Perception - Page 37 - Google Books
Resultbooks.google.com › books For example, Gilbert Harman characterises the
two senses of see as follows: see† = 'the ... which is common to genuine cases
of seeing and to hallucinations. Michael Campbell, Michael O'Sullivan - 2015 -
Philosophy The Alleged Ambiguity of'See'www.jstor.org › stable
including dreams, hallucinations and the perception of physical objects. ...
existence of at least two senses of ' see' were his adherence to the doctrine
that 'see' ... by AR White - 1963 - Cited by 3 - Related articles
Seeing and Naming - jstorwww.jstor.org › stable there are or aren't two
senses of 'see'. If there are, I'm speaking of ... The third kind of case is
illustrated by Macbeth's dagger hallucination, at least if we assume ... by RJ
Hall - 1977 - Cited by 3 - Related articles Philosophy at LaGuardia
Community Collegewww.laguardia.edu › Philosophy › GADFLY-2011 PDF Lastly, I
will critically discuss Ayer's two senses of 'see', ... (e.g., hallucinations);
it thus seems correct to say that ... Hallucinations are hallucinations. There
are. Talking about seeing: An examination of some aspects of the
...etd.ohiolink.edu › ... I propose a distinction between delusions and
hallucinations,'and argue ... say that there are two senses of .'see* in
ordinary language or not, he does, as I will ... by KA Emmett - 1974 -
Related articles Wittgenstein and Perceptionciteseerx.ist.psu.edu
› viewdoc › download PDF 2 Two senses of 'see'. 33 ... may see things that are
not there, for example in hallucinations. ... And so, hallucinations are not genuine
perceptual experiences. by Y Arahata - Related articles Allen
Blur - University of Yorkwww-users.york.ac.uk › Publications_files PDF of
subjectively indistinguishable hallucination (e.g. Crane 2006). ... and
material objects of sight, and correlatively for a distinction between two
senses of 'see',. by K Allen - Related articles Austin and
sense-data - UBC Library Open Collectionsopen.library.ubc.ca › ... › UBC Theses
and Dissertations Sep 15, 2011 - (5) Illusions and Hallucinations It is not enough
to reject Austin's way of ... I will not deal with Austin and Ayer on "two
senses of 'see'" because I ... by DD Todd - 1967 - Cited by 1 - Related
articles. Godfrey Vesey (1965, p. 73) deposes, "if a person sees
something at all it must look like something to him, even if it only looks like
'somebody doing something.' With Davidson, Grice was more cavalier,
because he could blame it on a different ‘New-World’ dialect or idiolect, about
‘intend.’ When Grice uses ‘disimplicaturum’ to apply to ‘cream in coffee’ that
is a bit tangential – and refers more generally to his theory of communication.
What would the rationale of disimplicaturum be? In this case, if the emissee
realizes the obvious category mistake (“She’s not the cream in your coffee”)
there may be a need to disimplicate explicitly. To consider. There is an
example that he gives that compares with ‘see’ and it is even more
philosophical but he doesn’t give examples: to use ‘is’ when one means ‘seem’
(the tie example). The reductive
analyses of being and seeing hold. We have here two cases of loose use (or disimplicaturum).
Same now with his example in “Intention and Uncertainty” (henceforth,
“Uncertainty”): Smith intends to climb Mt. Everest + [common-ground status:
this is difficult]. Grices response to Davidsons pretty unfair use of Grices
notion of conversational implicaturum in Davidsons analysis of intention caught
a lot of interest. Pears loved Grices reply. Implicaturum here is out of the
question ‒ disimplicaturum may not. Grice just saw that his theory of
conversation is too social to be true when applied to intending. The doxastic
condition is one of the entailments in an ascription of an intending. It cannot
be cancelled as an implicaturum can. If it can be cancelled, it is best seen as
a disimplicaturum, or a loose use by an utterer meaning less than what he says
or explicitly conveys to more careful conversants. Grice and Davidson were
members of The Grice and Davidson Mutual Admiration Society. Davidson, not
being Oxonian, was perhaps not acquainted with Grices polemics at Oxford with
Hart and Hampshire (where Grice sided with Pears, rather). Grice and Pears
hold a minimalist approach to intending. On the other hand, Davidson makes
what Grice sees as the same mistake again of building certainty into the
concept. Grice finds that to apply the idea of a conversational implicaturum
at this point is too social to be true. Rather, Grice prefers to coin the
conversational disimplicaturum: Marmaduke Bloggs intends to climb Mt
Everest on hands and knees. The utterance above, if merely reporting what
Bloggs thinks, may involve a loose use of intends. The certainty on the
agents part on the success of his enterprise is thus cast with
doubt. Davidson was claiming that the agents belief in the probability of
the object of the agents intention was a mere conversational implicaturum on
the utterers part. Grice responds that the ascription of such a belief is
an entailment of a strict use of intend, even if, in cases where the utterer
aims at a conversational disimplicaturum, it can be dropped. The
addressee will still regard the utterer as abiding by the principle of
conversational helpfulness. Pears was especially interested in the
Davidson-Grice polemic on intending, disimplicaturum, disimplicaturum. Strictly,
a section of his reply to Davidson. If Grices claim to fame is implicaturum, he
finds disimplicaturum an intriguing notion to capture those occasions when an
utterer means LESS than he says. His examples include: a loose use of intending
(without the entailment of the doxastic condition), the uses of see in
Shakespeareian contexts (Macbeth saw Banquo, Hamlet saw his father on the
ramparts of Elsinore) and the use of is to mean seems (That tie is blue under
this light, but green otherwise, when both conversants know that a change of
colour is out of the question. He plays with Youre the cream in my coffee being
an utterance where the disimplicaturum (i.e. entailment dropping) is total. Disimplicaturum
does not appeal to a new principle of conversational rationality. It is
perfectly accountable by the principle of conversational helpfulness, in
particular, the desideratum of conversational candour. In everyday explanation we exploit, as Grice notes,
an immense richness in the family of expressions that might be thought of as
the wanting family. This wanting family includes expressions like want, desire,
would like to, is eager to, is anxious to, would mind not…, the idea of appeals to me, is thinking of, etc. As Grice
remarks, The likeness and differences within this wanting family demand careful
attention. In commenting on Davidsons treatment of wanting in
Intending, Grice notes: It seems to Grice that the picture of the soul
suggested by Davidsons treatment of wanting is remarkably tranquil and, one
might almost say, computerized. It is the picture of an ideally decorous board
meeting, at which the various heads of sections advance, from the standpoint of
their particular provinces, the case for or against some proposed course of
action. In the end the chairman passes judgement, effective for action;
normally judiciously, though sometimes he is for one reason or another
over-impressed with the presentation made by some particular member. Grices
soul doesnt seem to him, a lot of the time, to be like that at all. It is more
like a particularly unpleasant department meeting, in which some members shout,
wont listen, and suborn other members to lie on their behalf; while the
chairman, who is often himself under suspicion of cheating, endeavours to
impose some kind of order; frequently to no effect, since sometimes the meeting
breaks up in disorder, sometimes, though it appears to end comfortably, in
reality all sorts of enduring lesions are set up, and sometimes, whatever the
outcome of the meeting, individual members go off and do things unilaterally.
Could it be that Davidson, of the New World, and Grice, of the Old World, have
different idiolects regarding intend? Could well be! It is said that the New
World is prone to hyperbole, so perhaps in Grices more cautious use, intend is
restricted to the conditions HE wants it to restrict it too! Odd that for all
the generosity he displays in Post-war Oxford philosophy (Surely I can help you
analyse you concept of this or that, even if my use of the corresponding expression
does not agree with yours), he goes to attack Davidson, and just for trying to
be nice and apply the conversational implicaturum to intend! Genial Grice! It
is natural Davidson, with his naturalistic tendencies, would like to see
intending as merely invoking in a weak fashion the idea of a strong
psychological state as belief. And its natural that Grice hated that! Refs.:
The source is Grice’s comment on Davidson on intending. The H. P. Grice Papers,
BANC.
disjunctum: Strangely enough
Ariskant thought disjunctum, but not conjunctum a categorial related to the
category of ‘community’!Aulus Gellius (The Attic Nights, XVI, 8) tells us about
this disjunction: “There also is ■ another type of a^twpa which the Greeks call
and we call disjunctum, disjunctive sentence. Gellius notes that ‘or’ is by
default ‘inclusive’: where one or several propositions may be simultaneously
true, without ex- cluding one another, although they may also all be false.
Gellius expands on the non-default reading of exclusive disjunction: pleasure
is either good or bad or it is neither good nor bad (“Aut malum est voluplas,
aut bonum, aul neque bonum, neque malum est”). All the elements of the
exclusive disjunctive exclude one another, and their contradictory elements,
Gr. avTtxs'-p.sva, are incompatible with one another”. “Ex omnibus quae
disjunguntiir, unum esse verum debet, falsa cetera.”Grice lists ‘or’ as the
second binary functor in his response to Strawson. But both Grice and Strawson
agreed that the Oxonian expert on ‘or’ is Wood. Mitchell is good, too, though. The
relations between “v” and “or” (or “either ... or …”) are, on the whole, less
intimate than those between “.” and “and,” but less distant than those between
“D” and “if.” Let us speak of a statement made by coupling two clauses by “or” as
an alternative statement ; and let us speak of the first and second alternatesof
such a statement, on analogy with our talk of the antecedent and consequent of
a hypothetical statement. At a bus-stop, someone might say: “Either we catch
this bus or we shall have to walk all the way home.” He might equally well have
said “If we don't catch this bus, we shall have to walk all the way home.” It
will be seen that the antecedent of the hypothetical statement he might have
made is the negation of the first alternate of the alternative statement he did
make. Obviously, we should not regard our catching the bus as a sufficient
condition of the 'truth' of either statement; if it turns out that the bus we
caught was not the last one, we should say that the man who had made the
statement had been wrong. The truth of one of the alternates is no more a
sufficient condition of the truth of the alternative statement than the falsity
of the antecedent is a sufficient condition of the truth of the hypothetical
statement. And since 'p"Dpyq' (and, equally, * q"3p v q ') is a law
of the truth-functional system, this fact sufficiently shows a difference
between at least one standard use of “or” and the meaning given to “v.” Now in
all, or almost all, the cases where we are prepared to say something of the
form “p or q,” we are also prepared to say something of the form 4 if not-p,
then q \ And this fact may us to exaggerate the difference between “v” and “or”
to think that, since in some cases, the fulfilment of one alternate is not a
sufficient condition of the truth of the alternative statement of which It is
an alternate, the fulfilment of one alternate is a sufficient condition of the
truth of an alternative statement. And this is certainly an exaggeration. If
someone says ; “Either it was John or it was Robert but I couldn't tell which,”
we are satisfied of the truth of the alternative statement if either of the
alternates turns out to be true; and we say that the speaker was wrong only if
neither turns out to be true. Here we seem to have a puzzle ; for we seem to be
saying that * Either it was John or it was Robert ' entails 4 If it wasn't
John, it was Robert * and, at the same time, that ‘It was John’ entails the
former, but not the latter. What we are suffering from here is perhaps a
crudity in our notion of entailraent, a difficulty In applying this too
undifferentiated concept to the facts of speech ; or, if we prefer it, an
ambiguity in the notion of a sufficient condition. The statement that it was John
entails the statement that it was either John or Robert in the sense thai it
confirms it; when It turns out to have been John, the man who said that either
It was John or it was Robert is shown to have been right. But the first
statement does not entail the second in the sense that the step ‘It was John,
so it was either John or Robert’ is a logically proper step, unless the person
saying this means by it simply that the alternative statement made previously
was correct, i.e., 'it was one of the two '. For the alternative statement
carries the implication of the speaker's uncertainty as to which of the two it
was, and this implication is inconsistent with the assertion that it was John.
So in this sense of * sufficient condition ', the statement that it was John is
no more a sufficient condition of (no more entails) the statement that it was
either John or Robert than it is a sufficient condition of (entails) the
statement that if it wasn't John, it was Robert. The further resemblance, which
we have already noticed, between the alternative statement and the hypothetical
statement, is that whatever knowledge or experience renders it reasonable to assert
the alternative statement, also renders it reasonable to make the statement
that (under the condition that it wasn't John) it was Robert. But we are less
happy about saying that the hypothetical statement is confirmed by the
discovery that it was John, than we are about saying that the alternative
statement is confirmed by this discovery. For we are inclined to say that the
question of confirmation of the hypothetical statement (as opposed to the
question of its reasonableness or acceptability) arises only if the condition
(that it wasn't John) turns out to be fulfilled. This shows an asymmetry, as
regards confirmation, though not as regards acceptability, between 4 if not p,
then q ' and * if not qy then p ' which is not mirrored in the forms ‘either p
or q’ and ‘either q or p.’ This asymmetry is ignored in the rule that * if not
p, then q ' and ‘if not q, then p’ are logically equivalent, for this rule
regards acceptability rather than confirmation. And rightly. For we may often
discuss the l truth ' of a subjunctive conditional, where the possibility of
confirmation is suggested by the form of words employed to be not envisaged. It
is a not unrelated difference between * if ' sentences and ‘or’ sentences that
whereas, whenever we use one of the latter, we should also be prepared to use
one of the former, the converse does not hold. The cases in which it does not
generally hold are those of subjunctive conditionals. There is no ‘or’ sentence
which would serve as a paraphrase of ‘If the Germans had invaded England in
1940, they would have won the war’ as this sentence would most commonly be
used. And this is connected with the fact that c either . . . or . . .' is
associated with situations involving choice or decision. 4 Either of these
roads leads to Oxford ' does not mean the same as ' Either this road leads to
Oxford or that road does’ ; but both confront us with the necessity of making a
choice. This brings us to a feature of * or ' which, unlike those so far
discussed, is commonly mentioned in discussion of its relation to * v ' ; the
fact, namely, that in certain verbal contexts, ‘either … or …’ plainly carries
the implication ‘and not both . . . and . . .', whereas in other contexts, it
does not. These are sometimes spoken of as, respectively, the exclusive and
inclusive senses of ‘or;’ and, plainly, if we are to identify 4 v’ with either,
it must be the latter. The reason why, unlike others, this feature of the
ordinary use of “or” is commonly mentioned, is that the difference can readily
be accommodated (1 Cf. footnote to p. 86.In the symbolism of the
truth-functional system: It is the difference between “(p y q) .~ (p . q)”
(exclusive sense) and “p v q” (inclusive sense). “Or,” like “and,” is commonly
used to join words and phrases as well as clauses. The 4 mutuality difficulties
attending the general expansion of 4 x and y are/ 5 into * x is /and y is/' do
not attend the expansion of 4 x or y isf into c r Is/or y is/ ? (This is not to
say that the expansion can always correctly be made. We may call “v” the
disjunctive sign and, being warned against taking the reading too seriously,
may read it as ‘or.' While he never approached the topic separately, it’s easy
to find remarks about disjunction in his oeuvre. A veritable genealogy of
disjunction can be traced along Griceian lines. DISJUNCTUM -- disjunction
elimination. 1 The argument form ‘A or B, if A then C, if B then C; therefore,
C’ and arguments of this form. 2 The rule of inference that permits one to
infer C from a disjunction together with derivations of C from each of the
disjuncts separately. This is also known as the rule of disjunctive elimination
or V-elimination. disjunction
introduction. 1 The argument form ‘A or B; therefore, A or B’ and arguments of
this form. 2 The rule of inference that permits one to infer a disjunction from
either of its disjuncts. This is also known as the rule of addition or
Vintroduction. . disjunctive
proposition, a proposition whose main propositional operator main connective is
the disjunction operator, i.e., the logical operator that represents ‘and/or’.
Thus, ‘P-and/orQ-and-R’ is not a disjunctive proposition because its main
connective is the conjunction operation, but ‘P-and/or-Q-and-R’ is disjunctive.
Refs.: Grice uses an illustration involving ‘or’ in the ‘implication’ excursus
in “Causal Theory.” But the systematic account comes from WoW, especially essay
4.
dispositum. Grice: “The
–positum is a very formative Roman expression: there’s the suppositum, the
praepositum, and the dispositum. All very apposite!” -- H. P. Grice,
“Disposition and intention” – Grice inspired D. F. Pears on this, as they tried
to refute Austin’s rather dogmatic views in ‘ifs’ and ‘cans’ – where the ‘can’
relates to the disposition, and the ‘if’ to the conditional analysis for it.
Grice’s phrase is “if I can”. “I intend to climb Mt Everest on hands and
knees,” Marmaduke Bloggs says, “if a can.” A disposition, more generally is,
any tendency of an object or system to act or react in characteristic ways in
certain situations. Fragility, solubility, and radioactivity, and
intentionality, are typical dispositions. And so are generosity and
irritability. For Ryle’s brand of analytic behaviorism, functionalism, and some
forms of materialism, an event of the soul, such as the occurrence of an idea,
and states such as a belief, a will, or an intention, is also a disposition. A hypothetical or
conditional statement is alleged to be ‘implicated’ by dispositional claims.
What’s worse, this conditional is alleged to capture the basic meaning of the
ascription of a state of the soul. The glass would shatter if suitably struck.
Left undisturbed, a radium atom will probably decay in a certain time. An
ascription of a disposition is taken as subjunctive rather than material
conditionals to avoid problems like having to count as soluble anything not
immersed in water. The characteristic mode of action or reaction shattering, decaying, etc. is termed the disposition’s manifestation or
display. But it need not be observable. Fragility is a regular or universal
disposition. A suitably struck glass invariably shatters. Radio-activity on the
other hand is alleged to be a variable or probabilistic disposition. Radium may
(but then again may not) decay in a certain situation. A dispositions may be
what Grice calls “multi-track,” i. e. multiply
manifested, rather than “single-track,” or singly manifested. Hardness or
elasticity may have different manifestations in different situations. In his
very controversial (and only famous essay), “The Concept of Mind,” Ryle, who
held, no less, the chair of metaphysical philosophy at Oxford, argues – just to
provoke -- that there is nothing more to a dispositional claim than its
associated conditional. A dispositional property is not an occurrent property.
To possess a dispositional property is not to undergo any episode or
occurrence, or to be in a particular state. Grice surely refuted this when he
claims that the soul is in this or that a state. Consider reasoning. The soul
is in state premise; then the soul is in state conclusion. The episode or
occurrence is an event, when the state of the premise causes the state of the
conclusion. Coupled with a ‘positivist’ (or ultra-physicalist,
ultra-empiricist, and ultra-naturalist) rejection of any unobservable, and a
conception of an alleged episode or state of the soul as a dispositios, this
supports the view of behaviorism that such alleged episode or state is nothing
but a disposition TO observable behaviour – if Grice intends to climb Mt.
Everest on hands and knees if he can, there is no ascription without the
behaviour that manifests it – the ascription is meant to EXPLAIN (or explicate,
or provide the cause) for the behaviour. Grice reached this ‘functionalist’
approach later in his career, and presented it with full fanfare in “Method in
philosophoical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre.” By contrast, realism
holds that dispositional talk is also about an actual or occurrent property or a
state, possibly unknown or unobservable – the ‘black box’ of the functionalist,
a function from sensory input to behavioural output. In particular, it is about
the bases of dispositions in intrinsic properties or states. Thus, fragility is
based in molecular structure, radioactivity in nuclear structure. A
disposition’s basis is viewed as at least partly the cause of its manifestation
in behaviour. Some philosophers, for fear of an infinite regress, hold that the
basis is categorical, not dispositional D. M. Armstrong, A Materialist Theory
of Mind, 8. Others, notably Popper, Madden, and Harre (Causal powers) hold that
every property is dispositional. Grice’s essay has now historical interest –
but showed the relevance of these topics among two tightly closed groups in
post-war Oxford: the dispositionalists led by Ryle, and the anti-dispositionalists,
a one-member group led by Grice. Refs.: Grice, “Intention and dispositions.”
distributum: distributio -- undistributed middle: a logical
fallacy in traditional syllogistic logic, resulting from the violation of the
rule that the middle term (the term that appears twice in premises) must be
distributed at least once in the premises. Any syllogism that commits this
error is invalid. Consider “All philosophers are persons,” and “Some persons
are bad.” No conclusion follows from these two premises because “persons” in
the first premise is the predicate of an affirmative proposition, and in the
second is the subject of a particular proposition. Neither of them is
distributed. “If in a syllogism the middle term is distributed in neither
premise, we are said to have a fallacy of undistributed middle.” Keynes, Formal
Logic. DISTRIBUTUM -- distribution, the property of standing for every
individual designated by a term. The Latin term distributio originated in the
twelfth century; it was applied to terms as part of a theory of reference, and
it may have simply indicated the property of a term prefixed by a universal
quantifier. The term ‘dog’ in ‘Every dog has his day’ is distributed, because
it supposedly refers to every dog. In contrast, the same term in ‘A dog bit the
mailman’ is not distributed because it refers to only one dog. In time, the
idea of distribution came to be used only as a heuristic device for determining
the validity of categorical syllogisms: 1 every term that is distributed in a premise
must be distributed in the conclusion; 2 the middle term must be distributed at
least once. Most explanations of distribution in logic textbooks are
perfunctory; and it is stipulated that the subject terms of universal
propositions and the predicate terms of negative propositions are distributed.
This is intuitive for A-propositions, e.g., ‘All humans are mortal’; the
property of being mortal is distributed over each human. The idea of
distribution is not intuitive for, say, the predicate term of O-propositions.
According to the doctrine, the sentence ‘Some humans are not selfish’ says in
effect that if all the selfish things are compared with some select human one
that is not selfish, the relation of identity does not hold between that human
and any of the selfish things. Notice that the idea of distribution is not
mentioned in this explanation. The idea of distribution is currently
disreputable, mostly because of the criticisms of Geach in Reference and
Generality 8 and its irrelevance to standard semantic theories. The related
term ‘distributively’ means ‘in a manner designating every item in a group
individually’, and is used in contrast with ‘collectively’. The sentence ‘The
rocks weighed 100 pounds’ is ambiguous. If ‘rocks’ is taken distributively,
then the sentence means that each rock weighed 100 pounds. If ‘rocks’ is taken
collectively, then the sentence means that the total weight of the rocks was
100 pounds. distributive laws, the
logical principles A 8 B 7 C S A 8 B 7 A 7 C and A 7 B 8 C S A 7 B 8 A 7 C.
Conjunction is thus said to distribute over disjunction and disjunction over
conjunction.
ditto: Or Strawson’s big mistake. Strawson quite didn’t
understand what “Analysis” was for, and submits this essay on the
perlocutionary effects of ‘true.’ Grice comes to the resuce of veritable
analysis. cf. verum. Grice disliked Strawson’s ditto theory in Analysis of
‘true’ as admittive performatory. 1620s, "in the month of the same
name," Tuscan dialectal ditto "(in) the said (month or year),"
literary Italian detto, past participle of dire "to say," from Latin
dicere "speak, tell, say" (from PIE root *deik- "to show,"
also "pronounce solemnly"). Italian used the word to avoid
repetition of month names in a series of dates, and in this sense it was picked
up in English. Its generalized meaning of "the aforesaid, the same thing,
same as above" is attested in English by 1670s. In early 19c. a suit of
men's clothes of the same color and material through was ditto or dittoes
(1755). Dittohead, self-description of followers of U.S. radio personality Rush
Limbaugh, attested by 1995. dittoship is from 1869.
dodgson: c. l. – Grice quotes Carroll often. Cabbages and
kings – Achilles and the Tortoise – Humpty Dumpty and his Deutero-Esperanto -- Carroll,
Lewis, pen name of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson 183298, English writer and
mathematician. The eldest son of a large clerical family, he was educated at
Rugby and Christ Church, Oxford, where he remained for the rest of his
uneventful life, as mathematical lecturer until 1 and curator of the senior
commonroom. His mathematical writings under his own name are more numerous than
important. He was, however, the only Oxonian of his day to contribute to
symbolic logic, and is remembered for his syllogistic diagrams, for his methods
for constructing and solving elaborate sorites problems, for his early interest
in logical paradoxes, and for the many amusing examples that continue to
reappear in modern textbooks. Fame descended upon him almost by accident, as
the author of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland 1865, Through the Looking Glass
1872, The Hunting of the Snark 1876, and Sylvie and Bruno 9 93; saving the
last, the only children’s books to bring no blush of embarrassment to an adult
reader’s cheek. Dodgson took deacon’s orders in 1861, and though pastorally
inactive, was in many ways an archetype of the prim Victorian clergyman. His
religious opinions were carefully thought out, but not of great philosophic
interest. The Oxford movement passed him by; he worried about sin though
rejecting the doctrine of eternal punishment, abhorred profanity, and fussed
over Sunday observance, but was oddly tolerant of theatergoing, a lifelong
habit of his own. Apart from the sentimental messages later inserted in them,
the Alice books and Snark are blessedly devoid of religious or moral concern.
Full of rudeness, aggression, and quarrelsome, if fallacious, argument, they
have, on the other hand, a natural attraction for philosophers, who pillage
Carneades Carroll, Lewis 119 119 them
freely for illustrations. Humpty-Dumpty, the various Kings and Queens, the Mad
Hatter, the Caterpillar, the White Rabbit, the Cheshire Cat, the Unicorn, the
Tweedle brothers, the Bellman, the Baker, and the Snark make fleeting
appearances in the s of Russell, Moore, Broad, Quine, Nagel, Austin, Ayer,
Ryle, Blanshard, and even Vitters an unlikely admirer of the Mock Turtle. The
first such allusion to the March Hare is in Venn’s Symbolic Logic 1. The usual
reasons for quotation are to make some point about meaning, stipulative
definition, the logic of negation, time reversal, dream consciousness, the
reification of fictions and nonentities, or the absurdities that arise from
taking “ordinary language” too literally. For exponents of word processing, the
effect of running Jabberwocky through a spell-checker is to extinguish all hope
for the future of Artificial Intelligence. Though himself no philosopher,
Carroll’s unique sense of philosophic humor keeps him and his illustrator, Sir
John Tenniel effortlessly alive in the modern age. Alice has been tr. into
seventy-five languages; new editions and critical studies appear every year;
imitations, parodies, cartoons, quotations, and ephemera proliferate beyond
number; and Carroll societies flourish in several countries, notably Britain
and the United States.
dominium -- domain – used by Grice in his treatment of
Extensionalism -- of a science, the class of individuals that constitute its
subject matter. Zoology, number theory, and plane geometry have as their
respective domains the class of animals, the class of natural numbers, and the
class of plane figures. In Posterior Analytics 76b10, Aristotle observes that
each science presupposes its domain, its basic concepts, and its basic
principles. In modern formalizations of a science using a standard firstorder
formal language, the domain of the science is often, but not always, taken as
the universe of the intended interpretation or intended model, i.e. as the
range of values of the individual variables.
donkey – quantification – considered by Grice -- sentences,
sentences exemplified by ‘Every man who owns a donkey beats it’, ‘If a man owns
a donkey, he beats it’, and similar forms (“Every nice girl loves a sailor”),
which have posed logical puzzles since medieval times but were noted more
recently by Geach. At issue is the logical form of such sentences specifically, the correct construal of the
pronoun ‘it’ and the indefinite noun phrase ‘a donkey’. Translations into
predicate logic by the usual strategy of rendering the indefinite as
existential quantification and the pronoun as a bound variable cf. ‘John owns a
donkey and beats it’ P Dx x is a donkey & John owns x & John beats x
are either ill-formed or have the wrong truth conditions. With a universal
quantifier, the logical form carries the controversial implication that every
donkey-owning man beats every donkey he owns. Efforts to resolve these issues
have spawned much significant research in logic and linguistic semantics.
dossier: Grice is not clear about the status of this – but
some philosophers have been too mentalistic. How would a genitorial programme
proceed. Is there a dossier in a handwave by which the emissor communicates
that he knows the route or that he is about to leave his emissee. It does not seem
so, because the handwave is unstructured. Unlike “Fido is shaggy.” In the case
of “Fido is shaggy,” there must be some OVERLAP between the emissor’s soul and
the emissee’s soul – in terms of dossier. So perhaps there is overlap in the
handwave. There must be an overlap as to WHICH route he means. By making the
handwave the emissor communicates that HE, the emissor, subject IS (copula)
followed by predicate “knower of the route.” So here we have a definite ‘the
route.’ Which route? To heaven, to hell. Cf. The scots ‘high road,’ ‘low road.’
To Loch Lomond. If there is not this minimal common ground nothing can be
communicated. In the alternative meaning, “I (subject) am (copula) about to
leave you – where again there must be an overlap in the identification of the
denotata of the pronouns. In the case of Blackburn’s skull or the arrow at the
fork of a road, the common ground is instituted in situu in the one-off
predicament, and there still must be some overlap of dossier. In its most
technical usage, Grice wants to demystify Donnellan’s identificatory versus
non-identificatory uses of ‘the,’ as unnecessary implications to Russell’s
otherwise neat account. The topic interested Strawson (“Principle of assumption
of ignorance, knowledge and relevance”) and Urmson’s principle of aptitude. Grice’s
favourite vacuous name is ‘Bellerophon.’ ‘Vacuous names’ is an essay
commissioned by Davison and Hintikka for Words and objections: essays on the
work of W. V. Quine (henceforth, W and O) for Reidel, Dordrecht. “W and O” had
appeared (without Grices contribution) as a special issue of Synthese. Grices
contribution, along with Quines Reply to Grice, appeared only in the reprint of
that special issue for Reidel in Dordrecht. Grice cites from various
philosophers (and logicians ‒ this was the time when logic was starting to
be taught outside philosophy departments, or sub-faculties), such as Mitchell,
Myro, Mates, Donnellan, Strawson, Grice was particularly
proud to be able to quote Mates by mouth or book. Grice takes the opportunity,
in his tribute to Quine, to introduce one of two of his syntactical devices to
allow for conversational implicatura to be given maximal scope. The device
in Vacuous Namess is a subscription device to indicate the ordering of
introduction of this or that operation. Grice wants to give room for
utterances of a special existential kind be deemed rational/reasonable,
provided the principle of conversational helfpulness is thought of by the
addressee to be followed by the utterer. Someone isnt attending the party
organised by the Merseyside Geographical Society. That is Marmaduke
Bloggs, who climbed Mt. Everest on hands and knees. But who, as it
happened, turned out to be an invention of the journalists at the Merseyside
Newsletter, “W and O,” vacuous name, identificatory use, non-identificatory
use, subscript device. Davidson and Hintikka were well aware of the New-World
impact of the Old-World ideas displayed by Grice and Strawson in their
attack to Quine. Quine had indeed addressed Grices and Strawsons sophisticated
version of the paradigm-case argument in Word and Object. Davidson and
Hintikka arranged to publish a special issue for a periodical publication, to
which Strawson had already contributed. It was only natural, when Davidson and
Hintikka were informed by Reidel of their interest in turning the special issue
into a separate volume, that they would approach the other infamous member of
the dynamic duo! Commissioned by Davidson and Hintikka for “W and O.” Grice
introduces a subscript device to account for implicatura of utterances
like Marmaduke Bloggs won’t be attending the party; he was invented by the
journalists. In the later section, he explores identificatory and non
identificatory uses of the without involving himself in the problems Donnellan
did! Some philosophers, notably Ostertag, have found the latter section the
most intriguing bit, and thus Ostertag cared to reprint the section on
Descriptions for his edited MIT volume on the topic. The essay is structured
very systematically with an initial section on a calculus alla Gentzen,
followed by implicatura of vacuous Namess such as Marmaduke Bloggs, to end with
definite descriptions, repr. in Ostertag, and psychological predicates. It
is best to focus on a few things here. First his imaginary dialogues on
Marmaduke Bloggs, brilliant! Second, this as a preamble to his Presupposition
and conversational implicaturum. There is a quantifier phrase, the, and two
uses of it: one is an identificatory use (the haberdasher is clumsy, or THE
haberdasher is clumsy, as Grice prefers) and then theres a derived,
non-identificatory use: the haberdasher (whoever she was! to use Grices and
Mitchells addendum) shows her clumsiness. The use of the numeric subscripts
were complicated enough to delay the publication of this. The whole thing was a
special issue of a journal. Grices contribution came when Reidel turned that
into a volume. Grice later replaced his numeric subscript device by square
brackets. Perhaps the square brackets are not subtle enough, though. Grices
contribution, Vacuous Namess, later repr. in part “Definite descriptions,” ed.
Ostertag, concludes with an exploration of the phrases, and further on, with
some intriguing remarks on the subtle issues surrounding the scope of an
ascription of a predicate standing for a psychological state or
attitude. Grices choice of an ascription now notably involves an
opaque (rather than factive, like know) psychological state or attitude:
wanting, which he symbolizes as W. At least Grice does not write,
really, for he knew that Austin detested a trouser word! Grice concludes that
(xi) and (xiii) will be derivable from each of (ix) and (x), while (xii) will
be derivable only from (ix).Grice had been Strawsons logic tutor at St. Johns
(Mabbott was teaching the grand stuff!) and it shows! One topic that especially
concerned Grice relates to the introduction and elimination rules, as he later
searches for generic satisfactoriness. Grice
wonders [W]hat should be said of Takeutis conjecture (roughly)
that the nature of the introduction rule determines the character of
the elimination rule? There seems to be
no particular problem about allowing an introduction rule which tells
us that, if it is established in Xs personalized system that φ, then it is
necessary with respect to X that φ is true (establishable). The accompanying
elimination rule is, however, slightly less promising. If we suppose such a
rule to tell us that, if one is committed to the idea that it is necessary with
respect to X that φ, then one is also committed to whatever is expressed by φ,
we shall be in trouble; for such a rule is not acceptable; φ will be a volitive
expression such as let it be that X eats his hat; and my commitment to the idea
that Xs system requires him to eat his hat does not ipso facto involve me in
accepting (buletically) let X eat his hat. But if we take the elimination rule
rather as telling us that, if it is necessary with respect to X that let X eat
his hat, then let X eat his hat possesses satisfactoriness-with-respect-to-X, the
situation is easier; for this version of the rule seems inoffensive, even for
Takeuti, we hope. A very interesting concept Grice introduces in the
definite-descriptor section of Vacuous Namess is that of a conversational
dossier, for which he uses δ for a definite descriptor. The key concept is that
of conversational dossier overlap, common ground, or conversational pool. Let
us say that an utterer U has a dossier for a definite description δ if there is
a set of definite descriptions which include δ, all the members of which the
utterer supposes to be satisfied by one and the same item and the utterer U
intends his addressee A to think (via the recognition that A is so intended)
that the utterer U has a dossier for the definite description δ which the
utterer uses, and that the utterer U has specifically selected (or chosen, or
picked) this specific δ from this dossier at least partly in the hope that his
addressee A has his own dossier for δ which overlaps the utterers dossier for δ,
viz. shares a substantial, or in some way specially favoured, su-bset with the
utterers dossier. Its unfortunate that the idea of a dossier is not better
known amog Oxonian philosophers. Unlike approaches to the phenomenon by other
Oxonian philosophers like Grices tutee Strawson and his three principles
(conversational relevance, presumption of conversational knowledge, and
presumption of conversational ignorance) or Urmson and his, apter than
Strawsons, principle of conversational appositeness (Mrs.Smiths husband just delivered
a letter, You mean the postman!?), only Grice took to task the idea of
formalising this in terms of set-theory and philosophical
psychology ‒ note his charming reference to the utterers hope (never
mind intention) that his choice of d from his dossier will overlap with some d
in the dossier of his his addressee. The point of adding whoever he may be for
the non-identificatory is made by Mitchell, of Worcester, in his Griceian
textbook for Hutchinson. Refs.: The main reference is Grice’s “Vacuous names,”
in “W and O” and its attending notes, BANC.
doxastic – discussed by J. L. Austin in the myth of the cave.
Plato is doing some form of linguistic botany when he distinguishes between the
doxa and the episteme – Stich made it worse with his ‘sub-doxastic’! from
Grecian doxa, ‘belief’, of or pertaining to belief. A doxastic mental state,
for instance, is or incorporates a belief. Doxastic states of mind are to be
distinguished, on the one hand, from such non-doxastic states as desires,
sensations, and emotions, and, on the other hand, from subdoxastic states. By
extension, a doxastic principle is a principle governing belief. A doxastic
principle might set out conditions under which an agent’s forming or abandoning
a belief is justified epistemically or otherwise.
doxographia
griceiana -- Griceian doxographers. A
Griceian doxographer is a a compiler of andcommentators on the opinions of
Grice. “I am my first doxographer,” Grice said. Grice enjoyed the term coined
by H. Diels for the title of his work “Doxographi Graeci,” which Grice typed
“Doxographi Gricei”. In his “Doxographi,” Diels assembles a series of Grecian
texts in which the views of Grecian philosophers from the archaic to the
Hellenistic era are set out in a relatively schematic way. In the introduction,
Diels reconstructs the history of the writing of these opinions, viz. the
doxography strictly – the ‘writing’ (graphein) of the ‘opinion’ (“doxa”) – cfr.
the unwritten opinions; Diels’s ‘Doxographi’ is now a standard part of the
historiography of philosophy. Doxography is important both as a source of
information about a philosopher, and also because a later philosopher (later
than Grice, that is), ancient, medieval, and modern, should rely on it besides
what Diels calls the ‘primary’ material – “what Grice actually philosophised
on.” The crucial text for Diels’s reconstruction is the book Physical Opinions
of the Philosophers Placita Philosophorum, traditionally ascribed to Plutarch
but no longer thought to be by him. “Placita philosophorum” lists the views of
various philosophers and schools under subject headings such as “What Is
Nature?” and “On the Rainbow.” Out of this oeuvre and others Diels reconstructs
a Collection of Opinions that he ascribes to Aetius, a philosopher mentioned by
Theodoret as its author. Diels takes Aetius’s ultimate source to be
Theophrastus, who wrote a more discursive Physical Opinions. Because Aetius
mentions the views of Hellenistic philosophers writing after Theophrastus,
Diels postulates an intermediate source, which he calls the “Vetusta Placita.” The
most accessible doxographical material for Grice is in “The Life of Opinions of
the Eminent Philosopher H. P. Grice,” “Vita et sententiae H. P. Griceiani quo
in philosophia probatus fuit.” by H. P. Grice, après “Vitae et sententiae eorum qui in
philosophia probati fuerunt,”
by Diogenes Laertius, who is, however, mainly interested in gossip.
Laertius arranges philosophers by schools and treats each school
chronologically.
dummett – Dummett on ‘implicaturum’ in “Truth and other
enigmas” – Note the animosity by Dummett against
Grice’s playgroup for Grice never inviting him to a Saturday morning! “I will say this: conversational implicaturum, or as he
fastidiously would prefer, the ‘implicaturum,’ was, yes, ‘invented,’ by H. P.
Grice, of St. John’s, but University Lecturer, to boot, to replace an abstract
semantic concept such as Frege’s ‘Sinn,’ expelled in Grice’s original
Playgroup’s determination to pay attention, in the typical Oxonian manner, to
nothing but what an *emisor* (never mind his emission!) ‘communicates’ in a
‘particularised’ context — so that was a good thing -- for Grice!” “Truth and other enigmas.” Cited by Grice in Way of
Words -- dummett, m. a. e. – cited by H. P. Grice. philosopher of language,
logic, and mathematics, noted for his sympathy for metaphysical antirealism and
for his exposition of the philosophy of Frege. Dummett regards allegiance to
the principle of bivalence as the hallmark of a realist attitude toward any
field of discourse. This is the principle that any meaningful assertoric
sentence must be determinately either true or else false, independently of
anyone’s ability to ascertain its truth-value by recourse to appropriate
empirical evidence or methods of proof. According to Dummett, the sentences of
any learnable language cannot have verification-transcendent truth conditions
and consequently we should query the intelligibility of certain statements that
realists regard as meaningful. On these grounds, he calls into question realism
about the past and realism in the philosophy of mathematics in several of the
papers in two collections of his essays, Truth and Other Enigmas 8 and The Seas
of Language 3. In The Logical Basis of Metaphysics 1, Dummett makes clear his
view that the fundamental questions of metaphysics have to be approached
through the philosophy of language, and more specifically through the theory of
meaning. Here his philosophical debts to Frege and Vitters are manifest.
Dummett has been the world’s foremost expositor and champion of Frege’s
philosophy, above all in two highly influential books, Frege: Philosophy of
Language 3 and Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics 1. This is despite the fact
that Frege himself advocated a form of Platonism in semantics and the
philosophy of mathematics that is quite at odds with Dummett’s own anti-realist
inclinations. It would appear, however, from what Dummett says in Origins of
Analytical Philosophy 3, that he regards Frege’s great achievement as that of
having presaged the “linguistic turn” in philosophy that was to see its most
valuable fruit in the later work of Vitters. Vitters’s principle that grasp of
the meaning of a linguistic expression must be exhaustively manifested by the
use of that expression is one that underlies Dummett’s own approach to meaning
and his anti-realist leanings. In logic and the philosophy of mathematics this
is shown in Dummett’s sympathy for the intuitionistic approach of Brouwer and
Heyting, which involves a repudiation of the law of excluded middle, as set forth
in Dummett’s own book on the subject, Elements of Intuitionism 7.
dworkin: analysed by Grice in his exploration of legal versus
moral right -- Ronald M. b.1, jurist,
political philosopher, and a central contributor to recent legal and political
theory. He has served as professor of jurisprudence, of Oxford 998, professor of law, New
York 5, and Quain Professor of
Jurisprudence, , London 8. He was the
first significant critic of Hart’s positivist analysis of law as based on a
determinable set of social rules. Dworkin argues that the law contains legal
principles as well as legal rules. Legal principles are standards phrased
generally e.g., ‘No one shall profit from his own wrong’; they do not have a
formal “pedigree,” but are requirements of morality. Nonetheless, courts are
obliged to apply such principles, and thus have no lawmaking discretion.
Judicially enforceable legal rights must derive from antecedent political
rights. Dworkin characterizes rights as political “trumps” hence his title Taking Rights Seriously 2d
ed., 8, which collects the papers that defend the views sketched. Dworkin
postulates an idealized judge, Hercules, who can invariably determine what
rights are legally enforceable. Dworkin denies any metaphysical commitments
thereby, and emphasizes instead the constructive and interpretive nature of
both adjudication and legal theory. These arguments are made in papers
collected in A Matter of Principle 5. Law’s Empire 6 systematizes his view. He
presents there a theory of “law as integrity.” The court’s obligation is to
make the community’s law the best it can be by finding decisions that best fit
both institutional du Vair, Guillaume Dworkin, Ronald M. 249 249 history and moral principle. Hercules
always best determines the best fit. Dworkin has also contributed to
substantive political theory. He defends a form of liberalism that makes
equality as prominent as liberty. His account of equality is found in a number
of independent papers; see, e.g., “Foundations of Liberal Equality,” Tanner
Lectures on Human Values XI 0. Dworkin has applied his liberal theory in two
ways. He has continually acted as a critical watchdog of the U.S. Supreme
Court, assessing decisions for their adherence to the ideals of principle,
respect for equality, and achievement of best fit. Some of these essays are in
the two collections mentioned; the most recent are in Freedom’s Law 6. Life’s
Dominion 3 derives from these ideals an account of abortion and euthanasia.
Dworkin’s philosophizing has a conceptual richness and rhetorical fire that,
when not wholly under control, give his theoretical positions a protean quality
at the level of detail. Nonetheless, the ideas that adjudication should be
principled and enforce rights, and that we all deserve equal dignity and
respect, exercise a powerful fascination.
e: the
‘universalis abdicative.’ Cf. Grice on the Square of Opposition, or figura
quadrata -- Grice, “Circling the square of Opposition.”
Posts
No comments:
Post a Comment