The Grice Club: IMPLICATVRA, in 12 volumes; vol. VI

evolutum: evolutionary Grice -- Darwinism, the view that biological species evolve primarily by means of chance variation and natural selection. Although several important scientists prior to Charles Darwin 180982 had suggested that species evolve and had provided mechanisms for that evolution, Darwin was the first to set out his mechanism in sufficient detail and provide adequate empirical grounding. Even though Darwin preferred to talk about descent with modification, the term that rapidly came to characterize his theory was evolution. According to Darwin, organisms vary with respect to their characteristics. In a litter of puppies, some will be bigger, some will have longer hair, some will be more resistant to disease, etc. Darwin termed these variations chance, not because he thought that they were in any sense “uncaused,” but to reject any general correlation between the variations that an organism might need and those it gets, as Lamarck had proposed. Instead, successive generations of organisms become adapted to their environments in a more roundabout way. Variations occur in all directions. The organisms that happen to possess the characteristics necessary to survive and reproduce proliferate. Those that do not either die or leave fewer offspring. Before Darwin, an adaptation was any trait that fits an organism to its environment. After Darwin, the term came to be limited to just those useful traits that arose through natural selection. For example, the sutures in the skulls of mammals make parturition easier, but they are not adaptations in an evolutionary sense because Danto, Arthur Coleman Darwinism 204 204 they arose in ancestors that did not give birth to live young, as is indicated by these same sutures appearing in the skulls of egg-laying birds. Because organisms are integrated systems, Darwin thought that adaptations had to arise through the accumulation of numerous, small variations. As a result, evolution is gradual. Darwin himself was unsure about how progressive biological evolution is. Organisms certainly become better adapted to their environments through successive generations, but as fast as organisms adapt to their environments, their environments are likely to change. Thus, Darwinian evolution may be goal-directed, but different species pursue different goals, and these goals keep changing. Because heredity was so important to his theory of evolution, Darwin supplemented it with a theory of heredity pangenesis. According to this theory, the cells throughout the body of an organism produce numerous tiny gemmules that find their way to the reproductive organs of the organism to be transmitted in reproduction. An offspring receives variable numbers of gemmules from each of its parents for each of its characteristics. For instance, the male parent might contribute 214 gemmules for length of hair to one offspring, 121 to another, etc., while the female parent might contribute 54 gemmules for length of hair to the first offspring and 89 to the second. As a result, characters tend to blend. Darwin even thought that gemmules themselves might merge, but he did not think that the merging of gemmules was an important factor in the blending of characters. Numerous objections were raised to Darwin’s theory in his day, and one of the most telling stemmed from his adopting a blending theory of inheritance. As fast as natural selection biases evolution in a particular direction, blending inheritance neutralizes its effects. Darwin’s opponents argued that each species had its own range of variation. Natural selection might bias the organisms belonging to a species in a particular direction, but as a species approached its limits of variation, additional change would become more difficult. Some special mechanism was needed to leap over the deep, though possibly narrow, chasms that separate species. Because a belief in biological evolution became widespread within a decade or so after the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species in 1859, the tendency is to think that it was Darwin’s view of evolution that became popular. Nothing could be further from the truth. Darwin’s contemporaries found his theory too materialistic and haphazard because no supernatural or teleological force influenced evolutionary development. Darwin’s contemporaries were willing to accept evolution, but not the sort advocated by Darwin. Although Darwin viewed the evolution of species on the model of individual development, he did not think that it was directed by some internal force or induced in a Lamarckian fashion by the environment. Most Darwinians adopted just such a position. They also argued that species arise in the space of a single generation so that the boundaries between species remained as discrete as the creationists had maintained. Ideal morphologists even eliminated any genuine temporal dimension to evolution. Instead they viewed the evolution of species in the same atemporal way that mathematicians view the transformation of an ellipse into a circle. The revolution that Darwin instigated was in most respects non-Darwinian. By the turn of the century, Darwinism had gone into a decided eclipse. Darwin himself remained fairly open with respect to the mechanisms of evolution. For example, he was willing to accept a minor role for Lamarckian forms of inheritance, and he acknowledged that on occasion a new species might arise quite rapidly on the model of the Ancon sheep. Several of his followers were less flexible, rejecting all forms of Lamarckian inheritance and insisting that evolutionary change is always gradual. Eventually Darwinism became identified with the views of these neo-Darwinians. Thus, when Mendelian genetics burst on the scene at the turn of the century, opponents of Darwinism interpreted this new particulate theory of inheritance as being incompatible with Darwin’s blending theory. The difference between Darwin’s theory of pangenesis and Mendelian genetics, however, did not concern the existence of hereditary particles. Gemmules were as particulate as genes. The difference lay in numbers. According to early Mendelians, each character is controlled by a single pair of genes. Instead of receiving a variable number of gemmules from each parent for each character, each offspring gets a single gene from each parent, and these genes do not in any sense blend with each other. Blue eyes remain as blue as ever from generation to generation, even when the gene for blue eyes resides opposite the gene for brown eyes. As the nature of heredity was gradually worked out, biologists began to realize that a Darwinian view of evolution could be combined with Mendelian genetics. Initially, the founders of this later stage in the development of neoDarwinism exhibited considerable variation in Darwinism Darwinism 205 205 their beliefs about the evolutionary process, but as they strove to produce a single, synthetic theory, they tended to become more Darwinian than Darwin had been. Although they acknowledged that other factors, such as the effects of small numbers, might influence evolution, they emphasized that natural selection is the sole directive force in evolution. It alone could explain the complex adaptations exhibited by organisms. New species might arise through the isolation of a few founder organisms, but from a populational perspective, evolution was still gradual. New species do not arise in the space of a single generation by means of “hopeful monsters” or any other developmental means. Nor was evolution in any sense directional or progressive. Certain lineages might become more complex for a while, but at this same time, others would become simpler. Because biological evolution is so opportunistic, the tree of life is highly irregular. But the united front presented by the neo-Darwinians was in part an illusion. Differences of opinion persisted, for instance over how heterogeneous species should be. No sooner did neo-Darwinism become the dominant view among evolutionary biologists than voices of dissent were raised. Currently, almost every aspect of the neo-Darwinian paradigm is being challenged. No one proposes to reject naturalism, but those who view themselves as opponents of neo-Darwinism urge more important roles for factors treated as only minor by the neo-Darwinians. For example, neoDarwinians view selection as being extremely sharp-sighted. Any inferior organism, no matter how slightly inferior, is sure to be eliminated. Nearly all variations are deleterious. Currently evolutionists, even those who consider themselves Darwinians, acknowledge that a high percentage of changes at the molecular level may be neutral with respect to survival or reproduction. On current estimates, over 95 percent of an organism’s genes may have no function at all. Disagreement also exists about the level of organization at which selection can operate. Some evolutionary biologists insist that selection occurs primarily at the level of single genes, while others think that it can have effects at higher levels of organization, certainly at the organismic level, possibly at the level of entire species. Some biologists emphasize the effects of developmental constraints on the evolutionary process, while others have discovered unexpected mechanisms such as molecular drive. How much of this conceptual variation will become incorporated into Darwinism remains to be seen. Evolutionary griceianism -- evolutionary epistemology, a theory of knowledge inspired by and derived from the fact and processes of organic evolution the term was coined by the social psychologist Donald Campbell. Most evolutionary epistemologists subscribe to the theory of evolution through natural selection, as presented by Darwin in the Origin of Species 1859. However, one does find variants, especially one based on some kind of neoLamarckism, where the inheritance of acquired characters is central Spencer endorsed this view and another based on some kind of jerky or “saltationary” evolutionism Thomas Kuhn, at the end of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, accepts this idea. There are two approaches to evolutionary epistemology. First, one can think of the transformation of organisms and the processes driving such change as an analogy for the growth of knowledge, particularly scientific knowledge. “Darwin’s bulldog,” T. H. Huxley, was one of the first to propose this idea. He argued that just as between organisms we have a struggle for existence, leading to the selection of the fittest, so between scientific ideas we have a struggle leading to a selection of the fittest. Notable exponents of this view today include Stephen Toulmin, who has worked through the analogy in some detail, and David Hull, who brings a sensitive sociological perspective to bear on the position. Karl Popper identifies with this form of evolutionary epistemology, arguing that the selection of ideas is his view of science as bold conjecture and rigorous attempt at refutation by another name. The problem with this analogical type of evolutionary epistemology lies in the disanalogy between the raw variants of biology mutations, which are random, and the raw variants of science new hypotheses, which are very rarely random. This difference probably accounts for the fact that whereas Darwinian evolution is not genuinely progressive, science is or seems to be the paradigm of a progressive enterprise. Because of this problem, a second set of epistemologists inspired by evolution insist that one must take the biology literally. This evidence of the senses evolutionary epistemology 294 294 group, which includes Darwin, who speculated in this way even in his earliest notebooks, claims that evolution predisposes us to think in certain fixed adaptive patterns. The laws of logic, e.g., as well as mathematics and the methodological dictates of science, have their foundations in the fact that those of our would-be ancestors who took them seriously survived and reproduced, and those that did not did not. No one claims that we have innate knowledge of the kind demolished by Locke. Rather, our thinking is channeled in certain directions by our biology. In an update of the biogenetic law, therefore, one might say that whereas a claim like 5 ! 7 % 12 is phylogenetically a posteriori, it is ontogenetically a priori. A major division in this school is between the continental evolutionists, most notably the late Konrad Lorenz, and the Anglo-Saxon supporters, e.g. Michael Ruse. The former think that their evolutionary epistemology simply updates the critical philosophy of Kant, and that biology both explains the necessity of the synthetic a priori and makes reasonable belief in the thing-in-itself. The latter deny that one can ever get that necessity, certainly not from biology, or that evolution makes reasonable a belief in an objectively real world, independent of our knowing. Historically, these epistemologists look to Hume and in some respects to the pragmatists, especially William James. Today, they acknowledge a strong family resemblance to such naturalized epistemologists as Quine, who has endorsed a kind of evolutionary epistemology. Critics of this position, e.g. Philip Kitcher, usually strike at what they see as the soft scientific underbelly. They argue that the belief that the mind is constructed according to various innate adaptive channels is without warrant. It is but one more manifestation of today’s Darwinians illicitly seeing adaptation everywhere. It is better and more reasonable to think knowledge is rooted in culture, if it is person-dependent at all. A mark of a good philosophy, like a good science, is that it opens up new avenues for research. Although evolutionary epistemology is not favored by conventional philosophers, who sneer at the crudities of its frequently nonphilosophically trained proselytizers, its supporters feel convinced that they are contributing to a forward-moving philosophical research program. As evolutionists, they are used to things taking time to succeed. -- evolutionary psychology, the subfield of psychology that explains human behavior and cultural arrangements by employing evolutionary biology and cognitive psychology to discover, catalog, and analyze psychological mechanisms. Human minds allegedly possess many innate, special-purpose, domain-specific psychological mechanisms modules whose development requires minimal input and whose operations are context-sensitive, mostly automatic, and independent of one another and of general intelligence. Disagreements persist about the functional isolation and innateness of these modules. Some evolutionary psychologists compare the mind with its specialized modules to a Swiss army knife. Different modules substantially constrain behavior and cognition associated with language, sociality, face recognition, and so on. Evolutionary psychologists emphasize that psychological phenomena reflect the influence of biological evolution. These modules and associated behavior patterns assumed their forms during the Pleistocene. An evolutionary perspective identifies adaptive problems and features of the Pleistocene environment that constrained possible solutions. Adaptive problems often have cognitive dimensions. For example, an evolutionary imperative to aid kin presumes the ability to detect kin. Evolutionary psychologists propose models to meet the requisite cognitive demands. Plausible models should produce adaptive behaviors and avoid maladaptive ones e.g., generating too many false positives when identifying kin. Experimental psychological evidence and social scientific field observations aid assessment of these proposals. These modules have changed little. Modern humans manage with primitive hunter-gatherers’ cognitive equipment amid the rapid cultural change that equipment produces. The pace of that change outstrips the ability of biological evolution to keep up. Evolutionary psychologists hold, consequently, that: 1 contrary to sociobiology, which appeals to biological evolution directly, exclusively evolutionary explanations of human behavior will not suffice; 2 contrary to theories of cultural evolution, which appeal to biological evolution analogically, it is at least possible that no cultural arrangement has ever been adaptive; and 3 contrary to social scientists, who appeal to some general conception of learning or socialization to explain cultural transmission, specialized psychological evolutionary ethics evolutionary psychology 295 295 mechanisms contribute substantially to that process.

existentia: Grice learned to use \/x for the existential quantifier, since “it shows the analogy with ‘or’ and avoids you fall into any ontological trap, of existential generalization, a rule of inference admissible in classical quantification theory. It allows one to infer an existentially quantified statement DxA from any instance A a/x of it. Intuitively, it allows one to infer ‘There exists a liar’ from ‘Epimenides is a liar’. It is equivalent to universal instantiation the rule that allows one to infer any instance A a/x of a universally quantified statement ExA from ExA. Intuitively, it allows one to infer ‘My car is valuable’ from ‘Everything is valuable’. Both rules can also have equivalent formulations as axioms; then they are called specification ExA / A a/x and particularization Aa/x / DxA. All of these equivalent principles are denied by free logic, which only admits weakened versions of them. In the case of existential generalization, the weakened version is: infer DxA from Aa/x & E!a. Intuitively: infer ‘There exists a liar’ from ‘Epimenides is a liar and Epimenides exists’. existential import, a commitment to the existence of something implied by a sentence, statement, or proposition. For example, in Aristotelian logic though not in modern quantification theory, any sentence of the form ‘All F’s are G’s’ implies ‘There is an F that is a G’ and is thus said to have as existential import a commitment to the existence of an F that is a G. According to Russell’s theory of descriptions, sentences containing definite descriptions can likewise have existential import since ‘The F is a G’ implies ‘There is an F’. The presence of singular terms is also often claimed to give rise to existential commitment. Underlying this notion of existential import is the idea long stressed by W. V. Quine that ontological commitment is measured by existential sentences statements, propositions of the form Dv f. existential instantiation, a rule of inference admissible in classical quantification theory. It allows one to infer a statement A from an existentially quantified statement DxB if A can be inferred from an instance Ba/x of DxB, provided that a does not occur in either A or B or any other premise of the argument if there are any. Intuitively, it allows one to infer a contradiction C from ‘There exists a highest prime’ if C can be inferred from ‘a is a highest prime’ and a does not occur in C. Free logic allows for a stronger form of this rule: with the same provisions as above, A can be inferred from DxB if it can be inferred from Ba/x & E!a. Intuitively, it is enough to infer ‘There is a highest natural number’ from ‘a is a highest prime and a exists’. existentialism, a philosophical and literary movement that came to prominence in Europe, particularly in France, immediately after World War II, and that focused on the uniqueness of each human individual as distinguished from abstract universal human qualities. Historians differ as to antecedents. Some see an existentialist precursor in Pascal, whose aphoristically expressed Catholic fideism questioned the power of rationalist thought and preferred the God of Scripture to the abstract “God of the philosophers.” Many agree that Kierkegaard, whose fundamentally similar but Protestant fideism was based on a profound unwillingness to situate either God or any individual’s relationship with God within a systematic philosophy, as Hegel had done, should be exact similarity existentialism 296 296 considered the first modern existentialist, though he too lived long before the term emerged. Others find a proto-existentialist in Nietzsche, because of the aphoristic and anti-systematic nature of his writings, and on the literary side, in Dostoevsky. A number of twentiethcentury novelists, such as Franz Kafka, have been labeled existentialists. A strong existentialist strain is to be found in certain other theist philosophers who have written since Kierkegaard, such as Lequier, Berdyaev, Marcel, Jaspers, and Buber, but Marcel later decided to reject the label ‘existentialist’, which he had previously employed. This reflects its increasing identification with the atheistic existentialism of Sartre, whose successes, as in the novel Nausea, and the philosophical work Being and Nothingness, did most to popularize the word. A mass-audience lecture, “Existentialism Is a Humanism,” which Sartre to his later regret allowed to be published, provided the occasion for Heidegger, whose early thought had greatly influenced Sartre’s evolution, to take his distance from Sartre’s existentialism, in particular for its self-conscious concentration on human reality over Being. Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism, written in reply to a admirer, signals an important turn in his thinking. Nevertheless, many historians continue to classify Heidegger as an existentialist quite reasonably, given his early emphasis on existential categories and ideas such as anxiety in the presence of death, our sense of being “thrown” into existence, and our temptation to choose anonymity over authenticity in our conduct. This illustrates the difficulty of fixing the term ‘existentialism’. Other thinkers of the time, all acquaintances of Sartre’s, who are often classified as existentialists, are Camus, Simone de Beauvoir, and, though with less reason, Merleau-Ponty. Camus’s novels, such as The Stranger and The Plague, are cited along with Nausea as epitomizing the uniqueness of the existentialist antihero who acts out of authenticity, i.e., in freedom from any conventional expectations about what so-called human nature a concept rejected by Sartre supposedly requires in a given situation, and with a sense of personal responsibility and absolute lucidity that precludes the “bad faith” or lying to oneself that characterizes most conventional human behavior. Good scholarship prescribes caution, however, about superimposing too many Sartrean categories on Camus. In fact the latter, in his brief philosophical essays, notably The Myth of Sisyphus, distinguishes existentialist writers and philosophers, such as Kierkegaard, from absurdist thinkers and heroes, whom he regards more highly, and of whom the mythical Sisyphus condemned eternally by the gods to roll a huge boulder up a hill before being forced, just before reaching the summit, to start anew is the epitome. Camus focuses on the concept of the absurd, which Kierkegaard had used to characterize the object of his religious faith an incarnate God. But for Camus existential absurdity lies in the fact, as he sees it, that there is always at best an imperfect fit between human reasoning and its intended objects, hence an impossibility of achieving certitude. Kierkegaard’s leap of faith is, for Camus, one more pseudo-solution to this hard, absurdist reality. Almost alone among those named besides Sartre who himself concentrated more on social and political thought and became indebted to Marxism in his later years, Simone de Beauvoir 886 unqualifiedly accepted the existentialist label. In The Ethics of Ambiguity, she attempted, using categories familiar in Sartre, to produce an existentialist ethics based on the recognition of radical human freedom as “projected” toward an open future, the rejection of inauthenticity, and a condemnation of the “spirit of seriousness” akin to the “spirit of gravity” criticized by Nietzsche whereby individuals identify themselves wholly with certain fixed qualities, values, tenets, or prejudices. Her feminist masterpiece, The Second Sex, relies heavily on the distinction, part existentialist and part Hegelian in inspiration, between a life of immanence, or passive acceptance of the role into which one has been socialized, and one of transcendence, actively and freely testing one’s possibilities with a view to redefining one’s future. Historically, women have been consigned to the sphere of immanence, says de Beauvoir, but in fact a woman in the traditional sense is not something that one is made, without appeal, but rather something that one becomes. The Sartrean ontology of Being and Nothingness, according to which there are two fundamental asymmetrical “regions of being,” being-in-itself and being-for-itself, the latter having no definable essence and hence, as “nothing” in itself, serving as the ground for freedom, creativity, and action, serves well as a theoretical framework for an existentialist approach to human existence. Being and Nothingness also names a third ontological region, being-for-others, but that may be disregarded here. However, it would be a mistake to treat even Sartre’s existentialist insights, much less those of others, as dependent on this ontology, to which he himself made little direct existentialism existentialism 297 297 reference in his later works. Rather, it is the implications of the common central claim that we human beings exist without justification hence “absurdly” in a world into which we are “thrown,” condemned to assume full responsibility for our free actions and for the very values according to which we act, that make existentialism a continuing philosophical challenge, particularly to ethicists who believe right choices to be dictated by our alleged human essence or nature.

explanatum: cf. iustificatum – That the distinction is not absolute shows in that explanatum cannot be non-iustificatum or vice versa. To explain is in part to justify – but Grice was in a hurry, and relying on an upublication not meant for publication! Grice on explanatory versus justificatory reasons -- early 15c., explanen, "make (something) clear in the mind, to make intelligible," from Latin explanare "to explain, make clear, make plain," literally "make level, flatten," from ex "out" (see ex-) + planus "flat" (from PIE root *pele- (2) "flat; to spread"). The spelling was altered by influence of plain. Also see plane (v.2). In 17c., occasionally used more literally, of the unfolding of material things: Evelyn has buds that "explain into leaves" ["Sylva, or, A discourse of forest-trees, and the propagation of timber in His Majesties dominions," 1664]. Related: Explained; explaining; explains. To explain (something) away "to deprive of significance by explanation, nullify or get rid of the apparent import of," generally with an adverse implication, is from 1709. I think we may find, in our talk about reasons, three main kinds of case. (1) The first is that class of cases exemplified by the use of such a sentence as "The reason why the bridge collapsed was that the girders were made of cellophane". Variant forms would be exemplified in "The (one) reason for the collapse of the bridge was that . . ." and "The fact that the girders were made of cellophane was the (one) reason for the collapse of the bridge (why the bridge collapsed)", and so on. This type of case includes cases in which that for which the (a) reason is being given is an action. We can legitimately use such a sentence form as "The reason why he resigned his office (for his resigning his office) was that p"; and, so far as I can see, the same range of variant forms will be available. I shall take as canonical (paradigmatic) for this type of case (type (1)) the form "The (a) reason why A was (is) that B". The significant features of a type (1) case seem to me to include the following. (a) The canonical form is 'factive' both with respect to A and to B. If I use it, I imply both that it is true that A and that it is true that B. (b) If the reason why A was that B, then B is the explanation of its being the case that A; and if one reason why A was (that) B, then B is one explanation of its being the case that A, and if there are other explanations (as it is implicated that there are, or may be) then A is overdetermined; and (finally) if a part of the reason why A was that B, then B is a part of the explanation of A's being so. This feature is not unconnected with the previous one; if B is the explanation of A, then both B and A must be facts; and if one fact is a reason for another fact, then it looks as if the connection between them must be that the first explains the second. (c) In some, but not all, cases in which the reason why A was that B, we can speak of B as causing, or being the cause of, A (A's being the case). If the reason why the bridge collapsed was that the girders were made of cellophane, then we can say that the girders' being made of cellophane caused the bridge to collapse (or, at least, caused it to collapse when the bus drove onto it). But not end p.37 in all cases; it might be true that the reason why X took offence was that all Tibetans are specially sensitive to comments on their appearance, though it is very dubious whether it would be proper to describe the fact, or circumstance, that all Tibetans have this particular sensitivity as the cause of, or as causing, X to take offence. However, it may well be true that if B does cause A, then the (or a) reason why A is that B. (d) The canonical form employs 'reason' as a count-noun; it allows us to speak (for example) of the reason why A, of there being more than one reason why A, and so on. But for type (1) cases we have, at best, restricted licence to use variants in which 'reason' is used as a massnoun. "There was considerable reason why the bridge collapsed (for the bridge collapsing)" and "The weakness of the girders was some reason why the bridge collapsed" are oddities; so is "There was good reason why the bridge collapsed", though "There was a good reason why the bridge collapsed" is better; but "There was (a) bad reason why the bridge collapsed" is terrible. The discomforts engendered by attempts to treat 'reason' as a mass-noun persist even when A specifies an action; "There was considerable reason why he resigned his office" is unhappy, though one would not object to, for example, "There was considerable reason for him to resign his office", which is not a type (1) case. (e) Relativization to a person is, I think, excluded, unless (say) the relativizing 'for X' means "in X's opinion", as in "for me, the reason why the bridge collapsed was . . .". Again, this feature persists even when A specifies an action: "For him, the reason why he resigned was . . ." and "The reason for him why he resigned was . . ." are both unnatural (for different reasons). I shall call type (1) cases "reasons why" or "explanatory reasons" – for etymologically, they make something ‘plain’ – out of nothing, almost – vide Latin explanare – but never IM-planare – and in any case, not to be confused with what Carnap calls an ‘explication’! (2) The cases which I am allocating to type (2) are a slightly less tidy family than those of type (1). Examples are: "The fact that they were a day late was some (a)reason for thinking that the bridge had collapsed." "The fact that they were a day late was a reason for postponing the conference." We should particularly notice the following variants and allied examples (among others): end p.38 That they were a day late was reason to think that the bridge had collapsed. There was no reason why the bridge should have collapsed. The fact that they were so late was a (gave) good reason for us to think that . . . He had reason to think that . . . (to postpone . . .) but he seemed unaware of the fact. The fact that they were so late was a reason for wanting (for us to want) to postpone the meeting. I shall take as the paradigmatic form for type (2) "That B was (a) reason (for X) to A", where "A" may conceal a psychological verb like "think", "want", or "decide", or may specify an action. Salient features seem to me to include the following. (a) Unlike type (1), where there is double factivity, the paradigmatic form is non-factive with respect to A, but factive with respect to B; with regard to B, however, modifications are available which will cancel factivity; for example, "If it were (is) the case that B, that would be a reason to A." (b) In consonance with the preceding feature, it is not claimed that B explains A (since A may not be the case), nor even that if A were the case B would explain it (since someone who actually does the action or thinks the thought specified by A may not do so because of B). It is, however, in my view (though some might question my view) claimed that B is a justification (final or provisional) for doing, wanting, or thinking whatever is specified in A. The fact that B goes at least some way towards making it the case that an appropriate person or persons should (or should have) fulfil (fulfilled) A. (c) The word "cause" is still appropriate, but in a different grammatical construction from that used for type (1). In Example (1), the fact that they were so late is not claimed to cause anyone to think that the bridge had collapsed, but it is claimed to be (or to give) cause to think just that. (d) Within type (2), 'reason' may be treated either as a count-noun or as a mass-noun. Indeed, the kinds of case which form type (2) seem to be the natural habitat of 'reason' as a mass-noun. A short version of an explanation of this fact (to which I was helped end p.39 by George Myro) seems to me to be that (i) there are no degrees of explanation: there may be more than one explanation, and something may be a part (but only a part) of the explanation, but a set of facts either does explain something or it does not. There are, however, degrees of justification (justifiability); one action or belief may be more justifiable, in a given situation, than another (there may be a better case for it). (ii) Justifiability is not just a matter of the number of supporting considerations, but rather of their combined weight (together with their outweighing the considerations which favour a rival action or belief). So a mass-term is needed, together with specifications of degree or magnitude. (e) That B may plainly be a reason for a person or people to A; indeed, when no person is mentioned or implicitly referred to, it is very tempting to suppose that it is being claimed that the fact that B would be a reason for anyone, or any normal person, to A. One might call type (2) cases "justificatory reasons" or "reasons for (to)". (3) Examples: John's reason for thinking Samantha to be a witch was that he had suddenly turned into a frog. John's reason for wanting Samantha to be thrown into the pond was that (he thought that) she was a witch. John's reason for denouncing Samantha was that she kept turning him into a frog. John's reason for denouncing Samantha was to protect himself against recurrent metamorphosis. If X's reason for doing (thinking) A was that B, it follows that X A-ed because B (because X knew (thought) that B). If X's reason for doing (wanting, etc.) A was to B, it follows that X A-ed in order to (so as to) B. The sentence form "X had several reasons for A-ing, such as that (to) B" falls, in my scheme, under type (3), unlike the seemingly similar sentence "X had reason to A, since B", which I locate under type (2). The paradigmatic form I take as being "X's reason(s) for A-ing was that B (to B)". Salient features of type (3) cases should be fairly obvious. end p.40 (a) In type (3) cases reasons may be either of the form that B or of the form to B. If they are of the former sort, then the paradigmatic form is doubly factive, factive with respect both to A and to B. It is always factive with respect to A (A-ing). When it is factive with respect to B, factivity may be cancelled by inserting "X thought that" before B. (b) Type (3) reasons are "in effect explanatory". If X's reason for A-ing was that (to) B, X's thinking that B (or wanting to B) explains his A-ing. The connection between type (3) reasons being, in effect, explanatory, and their factivity is no doubt parallel to the connection which obtains for type (1) reasons. I reserve the question of the applicability of "cause" to a special concluding comment. (c) So far as I can see, "reason" cannot, in type (3) cases, be treated as a mass-noun. This may be accounted for by the explanatory character of reasons of this type. We can, however, here talk of reasons as being bad; X's reasons for A-ing may be weak or appalling. In type (2) cases, we speak of there being little reason, or even no reason, to A. But in type (3) cases, since X's reasons are explanatory of his actions or thoughts, they have to exist. (I doubt if this is the full story, but it will have to do for the moment.) (d) Of their very nature, type (3) reasons are relative to persons. Because of their hybrid nature (they seem, as will in a moment, I hope, emerge, in a way to partake of the character both of type (1) and of type (2)) one might call them "Justificatory-Explanatory" reasons. Strawson said my explanation required an explanation. ex-plāno , āvi, ātum, 1, v. a. * I. Lit., to flatten or spread out: “suberi cortex in denos pedes undique explanatus,” Plin. 16, 8, 13, § 34.— II. Trop., of speech, to make plain or clear, to explain (class.: “syn.: explico, expono, interpretor): qualis differentia sit honesti et decori, facilius intelligi quam explanari potest,” Cic. Off. 1, 27, 94; cf. Quint. 5, 10, 4: “rem latentem explicare definiendo, obscuram explanare interpretando, etc.,” Cic. Brut. 42, 152: “explanare apertiusque dicere aliquid,” id. Fin. 2, 19, 60: “docere et explanare,” id. Off. 1, 28, 101: “aliquid conjecturā,” id. de Or. 2, 69, 280: “rem,” id. Or. 24, 80: “quem amicum tuum ais fuisse istum, explana mihi,” Ter. Ph. 2, 3, 33: “de cujus hominis moribus pauca prius explananda sunt, quam initium narrandi faciam,” Sall. C. 4, 5.—Pass. impers.: “juxta quod flumen, aut ubi fuerit, non satis explanatur,” Plin. 6, 23, 26, § 97.— 2. To utter distinctly: “et ille juravit, expressit, explanavitque verba, quibus, etc.,” Plin. Pan. 64, 3.—Hence, explānātus , a, um, P. a. (acc. to II.), plain, distinct (rare): “claritas in voce, in lingua etiam explanata vocum impressio,” i. e. an articulate pronunciation, Cic. Ac. 1, 5, 19: parum explanatis vocibus sermo praeruptus, Sen. de Ira, 1, 1, 4.—Adv. ex-plānāte , plainly, clearly, distinctly: “scriptum,” Gell. 16, 8, 3.—Comp.: “ut definire rem cum explanatius, tum etiam uberius (opp. presse et anguste),” Cic. Or. 33, 117.

heteroclitical implicaturum:-- Greek κλιτικός (klitikós, “inflexional”, but transliterated as ‘heterocliticum’) -- signifying a stem which alternates between more than one form when declined for grammatical case. Examples of heteroclitic noun stems in Proto-Indo-European include *wod-r/n- "water" (nominoaccusative *wódr; genitive *udnés; locative *udén) and *yékw-r/n- "liver" (nominoaccusative *yékwr, genitive *ikwnés). In Proto-Indo-European, heteroclitic stems tend to be noun stems with grammatically inanimate gender. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “The heteroclitical implicaturum: implicaturum, implicitum, explicatum, explicitum: what I learned at Clifton, and why.”

explicatum: Grice is clear here. There is explicat- and explicit-. Both yield different fields. The explicit- has to do with what is shown. The explicat- does not. But both are cognate. And of course, the ambiguity replicates in implicit- and implicat- Short and Lewis have both ‘explicatus’ and ‘explicitus’ as Part. and P. a., from explico. “I wonder why they had to have TWO!” – Grice.He once asked this to his master at Clifton. And he said, “because this is a participium heteroclitum.” Grice never forgot that! An Heteroclite Participle. R E D U N D A N S abounding. Art'cipium the Participle faepe o/?em redundat abounds, ut as Perfe&tum the perfe&? ter/? [aid] priùs before ; ut as explico to unfold conduplicat doubles [its Participle] explicitus explicatufque, making both explicitus and explicatus. Et and fic /3 fevi I have plantea folet is wont dare to give fatus planted, & and ferui I have put fertus placed. Cello to bcat vult will mittere produce -celfus ab -ui from [the perfe&* tenfe in] -ui ; fed but -culfus ab -i -cu!fus from [its perfr&7 in] -i. Compofitum à fto the Compound offlo to /fand [ makes] - ftaturus, pariterque amd aff? -ftiturus [in the future Participle.] Etiam alfo duplex two Participles fit are made à fimplice perfeéto from one perfe&i tenfe ; tendo to/lretch habet hath tentus, and tenfus; pando to opem takes fibi to itfejf paffus, and panfus : Item affo mifcui I have mixed miftus, vel or mixtus ; alo to breed up, altus and alitus ; Poto to drink makes potatus & and potus ; lavo to wa/h, lautus and lotus. A tundo from [tundo] to knock down -tufus is made ; retundo to blunt [makes] both -tufus and -tunfus. Pinfo to bake effert makes triplex three Participles piftus, pinfufque, & pinfitus, piftus, and pinfus, and pinfitus. Civi, the perfe&? tenfe à cieo ofcieo to provoke makes the participle citus [with the i. -- Vult tendo tenfus, tentus , vult flectere pando - Panfus Panfus paffus 5 pinfo vult piftus dare pinfus Pinfitus ; & fevi fatus, & ferui dare fertus. Compofitum à fto-ftaturus meliufque-ftiturus. * Conftaturus Lucan. Mart. Obftaturus Quint. _ Tundo in compofitis -tufus ; -tunfufque retundo Congeminat ; plico & explicitus facit, éx-que-plicatus. Verba in-uo &-vo-ütus tendunt ; ruo fed breve-ütus dat. A cieo pariter manat citus , à cio citus. - Cello ab -ui celfus , fed ab-i vult mittere -culfus. At Oxford, nobody was interested in the explication. That’s too explicit. It was, being English, all about the ‘innuendo,’ the ‘understatement,’ the implication. The first Oxonian was C. K. Grant, with his ‘pragmatic implication.’ Then came Nowell-Smith with his ‘contextual implication.’ Urmson was there with his ‘implied’ claims. And Strawson was saying that ‘the king of France is not bald’ implies that thereis a king of France. So, it was enough, Grice thought! We have to analyse what we imply by imply, or at least what _I_ do. He thought publishing was always vulgar. But when he was invited for one of those popularisations, when he was invited to contribute to a symposium on a topic of his choice – he chose “The causal theory of perception” and dedicates an ‘extensum excursus’ on ‘implication.’ The conclusion is simple: “The pillar box seems red” implies. And implies a LOT. So much so that neo-Wittgensteinians were saying that what Grice implies is part of what Grice is committed in terms of ‘satisfactoriness’ of what he is expressing. Not so! What Grice implies is, surely, that the pillar box may not be red. But surely he can cancel that EXPLICITLY “The pillar box seems red and is red.” So, what he implies is not part of what he explicitly commits in terms of value satisfactoriness. In terms of value satisfactoriness, Grice distinguishes between the subperceptual (“The pillar box seems red”) and the perceptual proper (“Grice perceives that the pillar box is red”). The causal theory merely states that “Grice perceives that the pillar box is red” (a perceptum for the subperceptum, “the pillar box seems red”) if and only if, first, the pillar box is red; second, the subperceptum: the pillar box seems red; and third and last, the fact that the pillar box is red CAUSES the pillar box seeming red. None of that is explicit, but none of it is implicit. It is merely a philosophical reductive analysis which has cleared away an unnecessary implication out of the picture. The philosopher, involved in conceptual analysis, has freed from the ‘pragmatic implication’ and can provide, for his clearly stated ‘analysans,’ three different prongs which together constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions – the analysandum. And his problem is resolved. Grice’s cavalier attitude towards the explicit is obvious in the way he treats “Wilson is a great man,” versus “the prime minister is a great man” “I don’t care if I’m not sure if I want to say that an emissor of (i) and an emissor of (ii) have put forward, in an explicit fashion, the same proposition. His account of ‘disambiguation’ is meant even more jocularly. He knows that in the New World, they spell ‘vice’ as ‘vyse’ – So Wilson being in the grip of a vyse is possibly the same thing put forward as the prime minister being caught in the grip of either a carpenter’s tool or a sort of something like a sin – if not both. (Etymologically, ‘vice’ and ‘vice’ are cognate, since they are ‘violent’ things – cf. violence. While ‘implicare’ developed into vulgar Engish as ‘employ,’ “it’s funny explicature did not develop into ‘exploy.’”A logical construction is an explication. A reductive analysis is an explication. Cf. Grice on Reductionism as a bete noire, sometimes misquoted as Reductivism. Grice used both ‘explanation’ and ‘explication’, so one has to be careful. When he said that he looked for a theory that would explain conversation or the implicaturum, he did not mean explication. What is the difference, etymologically, between explicate and explain? Well, explain is from ‘explanare,’ which gives ‘explanatum.’Trop., of speech, to make plain or clear, to explain (class.:“syn.: explico, expono, interpretor): qualis differentia sit honesti et decori, facilius intelligi quam explanari potest,” Cic.Off. 1, 27, 94; cf. Quint. 5, 10, 4: “rem latentem explicare definiendo, obscuram explanare interpretando, etc.,” Cic. Brut. 42, 152: “explanare apertiusque dicere aliquid,” id. Fin. 2, 19, 60: “docere et explanare,” id. Off. 1, 28, 101: “aliquid conjecturā,” id. de Or. 2, 69, 280: “rem,” id. Or. 24, 80: “quem amicum tuum ais fuisse istum, explana mihi,” Ter. Ph. 2, 3, 33: “de cujus hominis moribus pauca prius explananda sunt, quam initium narrandi faciam,” Sall. C. 4, 5.—Pass.impers.: “juxta quod flumen, aut ubi fuerit, non satis explanatur,” Plin. 6, 23, 26, § 97.—2. To utter distinctly: “et ille juravit, expressit, explanavitque verba, quibus, etc.,” Plin. Pan. 64, 3.Hence, explānātus , a, um, P. a. (acc. to II.), plain, distinct (rare): “claritas in voce, in lingua etiam explanata vocum impressio,” i. e. an articulate pronunciation, Cic. Ac. 1, 5, 19: parum explanatis vocibus sermo praeruptus, Sen. de Ira, 1, 1, 4. Adv. ex-plānāte , plainly, clearly, distinctly: “scriptum,” Gell. 16, 8, 3.—Comp.: “ut definire rem cum explanatius, tum etiam uberius (opp. presse et anguste),” Cic. Or. 33, 117.Cr. Occam. M. O. R. the necessity is explanatory necessity. Senses or conventional implicaturata (not reachable by ‘argument’) and Strawson do not explain. G. A. Paul does not explain. Unlike Austin, who was in love with a taxonomy, Grice loved an explanation. “Ἀρχὴν δὲ τῶν πάντων ὕδωρ ὑπεστήσατο, καὶ τὸν κόσμον ἔμψυχον καὶ δαιμόνων πλήρη. “Arkhen de ton panton hudor hupestesato.” Thales’s doctrine is that water is the universal primary substance, and that the world is animate and full of divinities. “Ἀλλὰ Θαλῆς μὲν ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχηγὸς φιλοσοφίας ὕδωρ φησὶν εἶναι (διὸ καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐφ᾽ ὕδατος ἀπεφήνατο εἶναι), λαβὼν ἴσως τὴν ὑπόληψιν ταύτην ἐκ τοῦ πάντων ὁρᾶν τὴν τροφὴν ὑγρὰν οὖσαν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν ἐκ τούτου γιγνόμενον καὶ τούτῳ ζῶν (τὸ δ᾽ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ πάντων) – διά τε δὴ τοῦτο τὴν ὑπόληψιν λαβὼν ταύτην καὶ διὰ τὸ πάντων τὰ σπέρματα τὴν φύσιν ὑγρὰν ἔχειν, τὸ δ᾽ ὕδωρ ἀρχὴν τῆς φύσεως εἶναι τοῖς ὑγροῖς. εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἳ καὶ τοὺς παμπαλαίους καὶ πολὺ πρὸ τῆς νῦν γενέσεως καὶ πρώτους θεολογήσαντας οὕτως οἴονται περὶ τῆς φύσεως ὑπολαβεῖν‧ Ὠκεανόν τε γὰρ καὶ Τηθὺν ἐποίησαν τῆς γενέσεως πατέρας [Hom. Ξ 201], καὶ τὸν ὅρκον τῶν θεῶν ὕδωρ, τὴν καλουμένην ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν Στύγα τῶν ποιητῶν‧ τιμιώτατον μὲν γὰρ τὸ πρεσβύτατον, ὅρκος δὲ τὸ τιμιώτατόν ἐστιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν [984a] ἀρχαία τις αὕτη καὶ παλαιὰ τετύχηκεν οὖσα περὶ τῆς φύσεως ἡ δόξα, τάχ᾽ ἂν ἄδηλον εἴη, Θαλῆς μέντοι λέγεται οὕτως ἀποφήνασθαι περὶ τῆς πρώτης αἰτίας. (Ἵππωνα γὰρ οὐκ ἄν τις ἀξιώσειε θεῖναι μετὰ τούτων διὰ τὴν εὐτέλειαν αὐτοῦ τῆς διανοίας)‧ Ἀναξιμένης δὲ ἀέρα καὶ Διογένης πρότερον ὕδατος καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἀρχὴν τιθέασι τῶν ἁπλῶν σωμάτων.” De caelo: “Οἱ δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὕδατος κεῖσθαι [sc. τὴν γὴν]. τοῦτον γὰρ ἀρχαιότατον παρειλήφαμεν τὸν λόγον, ὅν φασιν εἰπεῖν Θαλῆν τὸν Μιλήσιον, ὡς διὰ τὸ πλωτὴν εἶναι μένουσαν ὥσπερ ξύλον ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον (καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἐπ᾽ ἀέρος μὲν οὐθὲν πέφυκε μένειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὕδατος), ὥσπερ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ὄντα περὶ τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ ὕδατος τοῦ ὀχοῦντος τὴν γῆν‧ οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ ὕδωρ πέφυκε μένειν μετέωρον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπί τινός [294b] ἐστιν. ἔτι δ᾽ ὥσπερ ἀὴρ ὕδατος κουφότερον, καὶ γῆς ὕδωρ‧ ὥστε πῶς οἷόν τε τὸ κουφότερον κατωτέρω κεῖσθαι τοῦ βαρυτέρου τὴν φύσιν; ἔτι δ᾽ εἴπερ ὅλη πέφυκε μένειν ἐφ᾽ ὕδατος, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν μορίων ἕκαστον [αὐτῆς]‧ νῦν δ᾽ οὐ φαίνεται τοῦτο γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τυχὸν μόριον φέρεται εἰς βυθόν, καὶ θᾶττον τὸ μεῖζον. The problem of the nature of matter, and its transformation into the myriad things of which the universe is made, engaged the natural philosophers, commencing with Thales. For his hypothesis to be credible, it was essential that he could explain how all things could come into being from water, and return ultimately to the originating material. It is inherent in Thaless hypotheses that water had the potentiality to change to the myriad things of which the universe is made, the botanical, physiological, meteorological and geological states. In Timaeus, 49B-C, Plato had Timaeus relate a cyclic process. The passage commences with that which we now call “water” and describes a theory which was possibly that of Thales. Thales would have recognized evaporation, and have been familiar with traditional views, such as the nutritive capacity of mist and ancient theories about spontaneous generation, phenomena which he may have observed, just as Aristotle believed he, himself had, and about which Diodorus Siculus, Epicurus (ap. Censorinus, D.N. IV.9), Lucretius (De Rerum Natura) and Ovid (Met. I.416-437) wrote. When Aristotle reported Thales’s pronouncement that the primary principle is water, he made a precise statement: Thales says that it [the nature of things] is water, but he became tentative when he proposed reasons which might have justified Thaless decision. Thales’s supposition may have arisen from observation. It is Aristotle’s opinion that Thales may have observed, that the nurture of all creatures is moist, and that warmth itself is generated from moisture and lives by it; and that from which all things come to be is their first principle. Then, Aristotles tone changed towards greater confidence. He declared: Besides this, another reason for the supposition would be that the semina of all things have a moist nature. In continuing the criticism of Thales, Aristotle wrote: That from which all things come to be is their first principle (Metaph. 983 b25). Simple metallurgy had been practised long before Thales presented his hypotheses, so Thales knew that heat could return metals to a liquid state. Water exhibits sensible changes more obviously than any of the other so-called elements, and can readily be observed in the three states of liquid, vapour and ice. The understanding that water could generate into earth is basic to Thaless watery thesis. At Miletus it could readily be observed that water had the capacity to thicken into earth. Miletus stood on the Gulf of Lade through which the Maeander river emptied its waters. Within living memory, older Milesians had witnessed the island of Lade increasing in size within the Gulf, and the river banks encroaching into the river to such an extent that at Priene, across the gulf from Miletus the warehouses had to be rebuilt closer to the waters edge. The ruins of the once prosperous city-port of Miletus are now ten kilometres distant from the coast and the Island of Lade now forms part of a rich agricultural plain. There would have been opportunity to observe other areas where earth generated from water, for example, the deltas of the Halys, the Ister, about which Hesiod wrote (Theogony, 341), now called the Danube, the Tigris-Euphrates, and almost certainly the Nile. This coming-into-being of land would have provided substantiation of Thaless doctrine. To Thales water held the potentialities for the nourishment and generation of the entire cosmos. Aëtius attributed to Thales the concept that even the very fire of the sun and the stars, and indeed the cosmos itself is nourished by evaporation of the waters (Aëtius, Placita). It is not known how Thales explained his watery thesis, but Aristotle believed that the reasons he proposed were probably the persuasive factors in Thaless considerations. Thales gave no role to the Olympian gods. Belief in generation of earth from water was not proven to be wrong until A.D. 1769 following experiments of Antoine Lavoisier, and spontaneous generation was not disproved until the nineteenth century as a result of the work of Louis Pasteur.The first philosophical explanation of the world was speculative not practical. has its intelligibility in being identified with one of its parts (the world is water). First philosophical explanation for Universe human is rational and the world in independent; He said the arché is water; Monist: He believed reality is one Thales of Miletus, first philosophical explanation of the origin and nature of justice (and Why after all, did a Thales is Water.” Without the millions of species that make up the biosphere, and the billions of interactions between them that go on day by day,.Oddly, Grice had spent some time on x-questions in the Kant lectures. And why is an x-question. A philosophical explanation of conversation. A philosophical explanation of implicaturum. Description vs. explanation. Grice quotes from Fisher, Never contradict. Never explain. Taxonomy, is worse than explanation, always. Grice is exploring the taxonomy-description vs. explanation dichotomy. He would often criticise ordinary-language philosopher Austin for spending too much valuable time on linguistic botany, without an aim in his head. Instead, his inclination, a dissenting one, is to look for the big picture of it all, and disregard a piece-meal analysis. Conversation is a good example. While Austin would Subjectsify Language (Linguistic Nature), Grice rather places rationality squarely on the behaviour displayed by utterers as they make conversational moves that their addressees will judge as rational along specific lines. Observation of the principle of conversational helpfulness is rational (reasonable) along the following lines: anyone who cares about the two goals which are central to conversation, viz. giving and receiving information, and influencing and being influenced by others, is expected to have an interest in taking part in a conversation which will only be profitable (if not possible) under the assumption that it is conducted along the lines of the principle of conversational helpfulness. Grice is not interested in conversation per se, but as a basis for a theory that explains the mistakes ordinary-language philosophers are making. The case of What is known to be the case is not believed to be the case. EXPLICATUM -- “to understand” – to explain -- Dilthey, W. philosopher and historian whose main project was to establish the conditions of historical knowledge, much as Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason had for our knowledge of nature. He studied theology, history, and philosophy at Heidelberg and Berlin and in 2 accepted the chair earlier held by Hegel at the of Berlin. Dilthey’s first attempt at a critique of historical reason is found in the Introduction to the Human Sciences 3, the last in the Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences 0. He is also a recognized contributor to hermeneutics, literary criticism, and worldview theory. His Life of Schleiermacher and essays on the Renaissance, Enlightenment, and Hegel are model works of Geistesgeschichte, in which philosophical ideas are analyzed in relation to their social and cultural milieu. Dilthey holds that life is the ultimate nexus of reality behind which we cannot go. Life is viewed, not primarily in biological terms as in Nietzsche and Bergson, but as the historical totality of human experience. The basic categories whereby we reflect on life provide the background for the epistemological categories of the sciences. According to Dilthey, Aristotle’s category of acting and suffering is rooted in prescientific experience, which is then explicated as the category of efficacy or influence Wirkung in the human sciences and as the category of cause Ursache in the natural sciences. Our understanding of influence in the human sciences is less removed from the full reality of life than are the causal explanations arrived at in the natural sciences. To this extent the human sciences can claim a priority over the natural sciences. Whereas we have direct access to the real elements of the historical world psychophysical human beings, the elements of the natural world are merely hypothetical entities such as atoms. The natural sciences deal with outer experiences, while the human sciences are based on inner experience. Inner experience is reflexive and implicitly self-aware, but need not be introspective or explicitly self-conscious. In fact, we often have inner experiences of the same objects that outer experience is about. An outer experience of an object focuses on its physical properties; an inner experience of it on our felt responses to it. A lived experience Erlebnis of it includes both. The distinction between the natural and the human sciences is also related to the methodological difference between explanation and understanding. The natural sciences seek causal explanations of nature connecting the discrete representations of outer experience through hypothetical generalizations. The human sciences aim at an understanding Verstehen that articulates the typical structures of life given in lived experience. Finding lived experience to be inherently connected and meaningful, Dilthey opposed traditional atomistic and associationist psychologies and developed a descriptive psychology that Husserl recognized as anticipating phenomenological psychology. In Ideas 4 Dilthey argued that descriptive psychology could provide a neutral foundation for the other human sciences, but in his later hermeneutical writings, which influenced Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer, he rejected the possibility of a foundational discipline or method. In the Formation, he asserted that all the human sciences are interpretive and mutually dependent. Hermeneutically conceived, understanding is a process of interpreting the “objectifications of life,” the external expressions of human experience and activity. The understanding of others is mediated by these common objectifications and not immediately available through empathy Einfühlung. Moreover, to fully understand myself I must interpret the expressions of my life just as I interpret the expressions of others. Whereas the natural sciences aim at ever broader generalizations, the human sciences place equal weight on understanding individuality and universality. Dilthey regarded individuals as points of intersection of the social and cultural systems in which they participate. Any psychological contribution to understanding human life must be integrated into this more public framework. Although universal laws of history are rejected, particular human sciences can establish uniformities limited to specific social and cultural systems. In a set of sketches 1 supplementing the Formation, Dilthey further developed the categories of life in relation to the human sciences. After analyzing formal categories such as the partwhole relation shared by all the sciences, he distinguished the real categories of the human sciences from those of the natural sciences. The most important human science categories are value, purpose, and meaning, but they by no means exhaust the concepts needed to reflect on the ultimate sense of our existence. Such reflection receives its fullest expression in a worldview Weltanschauung, such as the worldviews developed in religion, art, and philosophy. A worldview constitutes an overall perspective on life that sums up what we know about the world, how we evaluate it emotionally, and how we respond to it volitionally. Since Dilthey distinguished three exclusive and recurrent types of worldview naturalism e.g., Democritus, Hume, the idealism of freedom e.g., Socrates, Kant, and objective idealism e.g., Parmenides, Hegel he is often regarded as a relativist. But Dilthey thought that both the natural and the human sciences could in their separate ways attain objective truth through a proper sense of method. Metaphysical formulations of worldviews are relative only because they attempt an impossible synthesis of all truth. Explicatum -- explanation, an act of making something intelligible or understandable, as when we explain an event by showing why or how it occurred. Just about anything can be the object of explanation: a concept, a rule, the meaning of a word, the point of a chess move, the structure of a novel. However, there are two sorts of things whose explanation has been intensively discussed in philosophy: events and human actions. Individual events, say the collapse of a bridge, are usually explained by specifying their cause: the bridge collapsed because of the pressure of the flood water and its weakened structure. This is an example of causal explanation. There usually are indefinitely many causal factors responsible for the occurrence of an event, and the choice of a particular factor as “the cause” appears to depend primarily on contextual considerations. Thus, one explanation of an automobile accident may cite the icy road condition; another the inexperienced driver; and still another the defective brakes. Context may determine which of these and other possible explanations is the appropriate one. These explanations of why an event occurred are sometimes contrasted with explanations of how an event occurred. A “how” explanation of an event consists in an informative description of the process that has led to the occurrence of the event, and such descriptions are likely to involve descriptions of causal processes. The covering law model is an influential attempt to represent the general form of such explanations: an explanation of an event consists in “subsuming,” or “covering,” it under a law. When the covering law is deterministic, the explanation is thought to take the form of a deductive argument: a statement the explanandum describing the event to be explained is logically derived from the explanans the law together with statements of antecedent conditions. Thus, we might explain why a given rod expanded by offering this argument: ‘All metals expand when heated; this rod is metallic and it was heated; therefore, it expanded’. Such an explanation is called a deductive-nomological explanation. On the other hand, probabilistic or statistical laws are thought to yield statistical explanations of individual events. Thus, the explanation of the contraction of a contagious disease on the basis of exposure to a patient with the disease may take the form of a statistical explanation. Details of the statistical model have been a matter of much controversy. It is sometimes claimed that although explanations, whether in ordinary life or in the sciences, seldom conform fully to the covering law model, the model nevertheless represents an ideal that all explanations must strive to attain. The covering law model, though influential, is not universally accepted. Human actions are often explained by being “rationalized’ i.e., by citing the agent’s beliefs and desires and other “intentional” mental states such as emotions, hopes, and expectations that constitute a reason for doing what was done. You opened the window because you wanted some fresh air and believed that by opening the window you could secure this result. It has been a controversial issue whether such rationalizing explanations are causal; i.e., whether they invoke beliefs and desires as a cause of the action. Another issue is whether existential polarity explanation 298 298 these “rationalizing” explanations must conform to the covering law model, and if so, what laws might underwrite such explanations. Refs.: One good source is the “Prejudices and predilections.” Also the first set of ‘Logic and conversation.” There is also an essay on the ‘that’ versus the ‘why.’ The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

exportatum – exportation: in classical logic, the principle that A 8 B / C is logically equivalent to A / B / C. 2 The principle A 8 B P C P A P B P C, which relevance logicians hold to be fallacious when ‘P’ is read as ‘entails’. 3 In discussions of propositional attitude verbs, the principle that from ‘a Vs that b is an f’ one may infer ‘a Vs f-hood of b’, where V has its relational transparent sense. For example, exportation in sense 3 takes one from ‘Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy’ to ‘Ralph believes spyhood of Ortcutt’, wherein ‘Ortcutt’ can now be replaced by a bound variable to yield ‘Dx Ralph believes spyhood of x’.

exhibitum – Grice contrasts this with the protrepticum – A piece of a communicatum is an exhitibum if it is a communication-device for the emisor to display his psychological attitude. It is protrepticum if the emisor intends the sendee to entertain a state other than the uptake – i. e. form a volition to close the door, for how else will he comply with the order in the imperative mode?

protrepticum: the opposite of the exhibitium.

expositum -- exponible. In dialectica, an exponible proposition is that which needs to be expounded, i.e., elaborated or explicated in order to make clear their true ‘form,’ as opposed to its mere ‘matter.’ ‘Giorgione is so called because of his size.’ ‘Giorgione is so called because of his size’ has a misleading ‘matter’ (implicating at least two forms). It may suggestin a simple predication. In fact, it means, ‘Giorgione is called ‘Giorgione’ because of his size’. Grice’s examples: “An English pillar box is called ‘red’ because it is red,” “Grice is called ‘Grice’ because he is Grice.” “Grice is called ‘Grice’ because his Anglo-Norman ancestors had ‘grey’ in their coat of arms.” “Grice is called ‘Grice’ because his ancestor kept grice, i. e. pigs.” Another example by Grice: ‘Every man except Strawson is running’, expounded as ‘Strawson is not running and every man other than Strawson is running (for Prime Minister)’; and ‘Only Strawson says something true’, uttered by Grice. Grice claims ‘Only Strawson says something true’ should be expounded (or explicated, or explciited, or exposed, or provided ‘what is expositum, or the expositum provided: not only as ‘Strawson says something true and no one other than Strawson says something true’, but needs an implicated third clause, ‘Grice says something false’ for surely Grice is being self-referentially ironic. If only Strawson says something true – that proposition can only be uttered by Strawson. Grice borrowed it from Descartes: “Only Descarets says something ture.” This last example brings out an important aspect of exponible propositions, viz., their use in a sophisma. Sophismatic treatises are a common genre at Oxford in which this or that semantic issue is approached dialectically (what Grice calls “the Oxonian dialectic”) by its application in solving a puzzle case. Another important ingredient of an exponible proposition is its containing a particular term, sometimes called the exponible term (terminus exponibilis in Occam). Attention on such a term is focused in the study of the implicaturum of a syncategorematic expression, Note that such an exponible term could only be expounded in context, not by an explicit definition. A syncategorematic term that generates an exponible proposition is one such as: ‘twice’, ‘except’, ‘begins’ and ‘ceases [to eat iron, or ‘beat your wife,’ to use Grice’s example in “Causal Theory of Perception”]’, and ‘insofar as’ e.g. ‘Strawson insofar as he is rational is risible’.

expressum: At one time, Oxford was all about the Croceans! It all changed! The oppositum is the impressum, or sense-datum. In a functionalist model, you have perceptual INPUT and behavioural OUTPUT, the expressum. In between, the black box of the soul. Darwin, Eckman. Drawing a skull meaning there is danger. cf. impressum. Inside out. Expression of Impressions. As an empiricist, Grice was into ‘impress.’ But it’s always good to have a correlatum. Grice liked an abbreviation, especially because he loved subscripts. So, he starts to analyse the ‘ordinary-language’ philosohper’s mistake by using a few symbols: there’s the phrase, or utterance, and there’s the expression, for which Grice uses ‘e’ for a ‘token,’ and ‘E’ for a type. So, suppose we are considering Hart’s use of ‘carefully.’ ‘Carefully’ would be the ‘expression,’ occurring within an utterance. Surely, since Grice uses ‘expression’ in that way, he also uses to say what Hart is doing, Hart is expressing. Grice notes that ‘expressing’ may be too strong. Hart is expressing the belief THAT if you utter an utterance containing the ‘expression’ ‘carefully,’ there is an implicaturum to the effect that the agent referred to is taking RATIONAL steps towards something. IRRATIONAL behaviour does not count as ‘careful’ behaviour. Grice uses the same abbreviations in discussing philosophy as the ‘conceptual analysis’ of this or that expression. It is all different with Ogden, Collingwood, and Croce, that Collingwood loved! "Ideas, we may say generally, are symbols, as serving to express some actual moment or phase of experience and guiding towards fuller actualization of what is, or seems to be, involved in its existence or MEANING . That no idea is ever wholly adequate MEANS that the suggestiveness of experience is inexhaustible" Forsyth, English Philosophy, 1910, . Thus the significance of sound, the meaning of an utterance is here identical with the active response to surroundings and with the natural expression of emotions According to Husserl, the function of expression is only directly and immediately adapted to what is usually described as the meaning (Bedeutung) or the sense (Sinn) of the speech or parts of speech. Only because the meaning associated with a wordsowid expresses something, is that word-sound called 'expres- sion' (Ideen, p. 256 f). "Between the ,nearnng and the what is meant, or what it expresses, there exists an essential relation, because the meaning is the expression of the meant through its own content (Gehalt) What is meant (dieses Bedeutete) lies in the 'object' of the thought or speech. We must therefore distinguish these three-Word, Meaning, Object "1 Geyser, Gp cit p z8 PDF compression, OCR, web optimization using a watermarked evaluation copy of CVISION PDFCompresso These complexities are mentioned here to show how vague are most of the terms which are commonly thought satisfactory in this topic. Such a word as 'understand' is, unless specially treated, far too vague to serve except provisionally or at levels of discourse where a real understanding of the matter (in the reference sense) is not possible. The multiple functions of speech will be classified and discussed in the following chapter. There it will be seen that the expression of the speaker's intention is one of the five regular language functions. Grice hated Austin’s joke, the utteratum, “I use ‘utterance’ only as equivalent to 'utteratum;' for 'utteratio' I use ‘the issue of an utterance,’” so he needed something for ‘what is said’ in general, not just linguistic, ‘what is expressed,’ what is explicitly conveyed,’ ex-prĭmo , pressi, pressum, 3, v. a. premo. express (mostly poet. and in postAug. prose; “freq. in the elder Pliny): (faber) et ungues exprimet et molles imitabitur aere capillos,” Hor. A. P. 33; cf.: “alicujus furorem ... verecundiae ruborem,” Plin. 34, 14, 40, § 140: “expressa in cera ex anulo imago,” Plaut. Ps. 1, 1, 54: “imaginem hominis gypso e facie ipsa,” Plin. 35, 12, 44, § 153; cf.: “effigiem de signis,” id. ib.: “optime Herculem Delphis et Alexandrum, etc.,” id. 34, 8, 19, § 66 et saep.: “vestis stricta et singulos artus exprimens,” exhibiting, showing, Tac. G. 17: “pulcher aspectu sit athleta, cujus lacertos exercitatio expressit,” has well developed, made muscular, Quint. 8, 3, 10.

extensionalism: one of the twelve labours of H. P. Grice -- a family of ontologies and semantic theories restricted to existent entities. Extensionalist ontology denies that the domain of any true theory needs to include non-existents, such as fictional, imaginary, and impossible objects like Pegasus the winged horse or round squares. Extensionalist semantics reduces meaning and truth to set-theoretical relations between terms in a language and the existent objects, standardly spatiotemporal and abstract entities, that belong to the term’s extension. The extension of a name is the particular existent denoted by the name; the extension of a predicate is the set of existent objects that have the property represented by the predicate. The sentence ‘All whales are mammals’ is true in extensionalist semantics provided there are no whales that are not mammals, no existent objects in the extension of the predicate ‘whale’ that are not also in the extension of ‘mammal’. Linguistic contexts are extensional if: i they make reference only to existent objects; ii they support substitution of codesignative terms referring to the same thing, or of logically equivalent propositions, salva veritate without loss of truthvalue; and iii it is logically valid to existentially quantify conclude that There exists an object such that . . . etc. objects referred to within the context. Contexts that do not meet these requirements are intensional, non-extensional, or referentially opaque. The implications of extensionalism, associated with the work of Frege, Russell, Quine, and mainstream analytic philosophy, are to limit its explanations of mind and meaning to existent objects and material-mechanical properties and relations describable in an exclusively extensional idiom. Extensionalist semantics must try to analyze away apparent references to nonexistent objects, or, as in Russell’s extensionalist theory of definite descriptions, to classify all such predications as false. Extensionalist ontology in the philosophy of mind must eliminate or reduce propositional attitudes or de dicto mental states, expressed in an intensional idiom, such as ‘believes that ————’, ‘fears that ————’, and the like, usually in favor of extensional characterizations of neurophysiological states. Whether extensionalist philosophy can satisfy these explanatory obligations, as the thesis of extensionality maintains, is controversial.

stabilitatum – stabilire -- Establishment – Grice speaks of the Establishment twice. Once re: Gellner: non-Establishment criticizing the English Establishment. Second: to refute Lewis. Something can be ‘established’ and not be conventional. “Surely Lewis should know the Graeco-Roman root of establish to figure that out!” stăbĭlĭo , īvi, ītum (sync. I.imperf. stabilibat, Enn. Ann. 44), 4, v. a. stabilis, to make firm, steadfast, or stable; to fix, stay, establish (class.; esp. in the trop. sense). I. Lit.: semita nulla pedem stabilibat, Enn. ap. Cic. Div. 1, 20, 40 (Ann. v. 44 Vahl.): “eo stabilita magis sunt,” Lucr. 3, 202; cf.: confirmandi et stabiliendi causā singuli ab infimo solo pedes terrā exculcabantur, * Caes. B. G. 7, 73: “vineas,” Col. 4, 33, 1: “loligini pedes duo, quibus se velut ancoris stabiliunt,” Plin. 9, 28, 44, § 83.— II. Trop.: regni stabilita scamna solumque, Enn. ap. Cic. Div. 1, 48 fin. (Ann. v. 99 Vahl.): “alicui regnum suom,” Plaut. Am. 1, 1, 39; cf.: libertatem civibus, Att. ap. Cic. Sest. 58, 123: “rem publicam (opp. evertere),” Cic. Fin. 4, 24, 65; so, “rem publicam,” id. Sest. 68, 143: “leges,” id. Leg. 1, 23, 62: “nisi haec urbs stabilita tuis consiliis erit,” id. Marcell. 9, 29: “matrimonia firmiter,” id. Rep. 6, 2, 2: pacem, concordiam, Pseud.-Sall. Rep. Ordin. 1 fin. (p. 267 Gerl.): “res Capuae stabilitas Romana disciplina,” Liv. 9, 20: “nomen equestre in consulatu (Cicero),” Plin. 33, 2, 8, § 34: “(aegrum) ad retinendam patientiam,” to strengthen, fortify him, Gell. 12, 5, 3. While Grice’s play with ‘estaablished’ is in the second metabolical stage of his programme – where ‘means’ applies to things other than the emissor, surely metaphorically – he is allowing that ‘estabalish’ may be used in the one-off predicament. By drawing a skull, U is establishing a procedure. Grice notably wants to make ‘established’ a weaker variant of ‘conventional.’ So that x, whatever, may be ‘established’ but not ‘conventional.’ In fact, it can be argued that to establish you have to do it at least once. Cfr. ‘settled. ‘Greenwich, Conn., settled in 1639.’ ‘Established’ Surely it would be obtuse to say that Greenwich, Conn. Was “conventionalized”.

farquharsonism – Grice enjoyed reading Cook Wilson, and was grateful to A S L Farquharson for making that possible.

fechner: as a philosophical psychologist, Grice had to read the boring Fechner! Gustav Theodor 180187, G. physicist and philosopher whose Elemente der Psychophysik 1860; English translation, 6 inaugurated experimental psychology. Obsessed with the mindbody problem, Fechner advanced an identity theory in which every object is both mental and physical, and in support invented psychophysics the “exact science of the functional relations . . . between mind and body.” Fechner began with the concept of the limen, or sensory threshold. The absolute threshold is the stimulus strength R, Reiz needed to create a conscious sensation S, and the relative threshold is the strength that must be added to a stimulus for a just noticeable difference jnd to be perceived. E. H. Weber 17951878 had shown that a constant ratio held between relative threshold and false cause, fallacy of Fechner, Gustav Theodor 304 304 stimulus magnitude, Weber’s law: DR/R % k. By experimentally determining jnd’s for pairs of stimulus magnitudes such as weights, Fechner formulated his “functional relation,” S % k log R, Fechner’s law, an identity equation of mind and matter. Later psychophysicists replaced it with a power law, R % kSn, where n depends on the kind of stimulus. The importance of psychophysics to psychology consisted in its showing that quantification of experience was possible, and its providing a general paradigm for psychological experimentation in which controlled stimulus conditions are systematically varied and effects observed. In his later years, Fechner brought the experimental method to bear on aesthetics Vorschule der Aesthetik, 1876.

ferguson: a. philosopher. His main theme was the rise and fall of virtue in individuals and societies. In his most important work, An Essay on the History of Civil Society Ferguson argues that human happiness of which virtue is a constituent is found in pursuing social goods rather than private ends. Ferguson thought that ignoring social goods not only prevented social progress but led to moral corruption and political despotism. To support this he used classical texts and travelers’ writings to reconstruct the history of society from “rude nations” through barbarism to civilization. This allowed him to express his concern for the danger of corruption inherent in the increasing selfinterest manifested in the incipient commercial civilization of his day. He attempted to systematize his moral philosophy in The Principles of Moral and Social Science 1792. J.W.A. Fermat’s last theorem.

feuerbach: -- G. materialist philosopher and critic of religion. He provided the major link between Hegel’s absolute idealism and such later theories of historical materialism as those of Marx and other “young or new Hegelians.” Feuerbach was born in Bavaria and studied theology, first at Heidelberg and then Berlin, where he came under the philosophical influence of Hegel. He received his doctorate in 1828 and, after an early publication severely critical of Christianity, retired from official G. academic life. In the years between 1836 and 1846, he produced some of his most influential works, which include “Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy” 1839, The Essence of Christianity 1841, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future 1843, and The Essence of Religion 1846. After a brief collaboration with Marx, he emerged as a popular champion of political liberalism in the revolutionary period of 1848. During the reaction that followed, he again left public life and died dependent upon the support of friends. Feuerbach was pivotal in the intellectual history of the nineteenth century in several respects. First, after a half-century of metaphysical system construction by the G. idealists, Feuerbach revived, in a new form, the original Kantian project of philosophical critique. However, whereas Kant had tried “to limit reason in order to make room for faith,” Feuerbach sought to demystify both faith and reason in favor of the concrete and situated existence of embodied human consciousness. Second, his “method” of “transformatory criticism” directed, in the first instance, at Hegel’s philosophical pronouncements was adopted by Marx and has retained its philosophical appeal. Briefly, it suggested that “Hegel be stood on his feet” by “inverting” the subject and predicate in Hegel’s idealistic pronouncements. One should, e.g., rewrite “The individual is a function of the Absolute” as “The Absolute is a function of the individual.” Third, Feuerbach asserted that the philosophy of G. idealism was ultimately an extenuation of theology, and that theology was merely religious consciousness systematized. But since religion itself proves to be merely a “dream of the human mind,” metaphysics, theology, and religion can be reduced to “anthropology,” the study of concrete embodied human consciousness and its cultural products. The philosophical influence of Feuerbach flows through Marx into virtually all later historical materialist positions; anticipates the existentialist concern with concrete embodied human existence; and serves as a paradigm for all later approaches to religion on the part of the social sciences.

fichte: G. philosopher. He was a proponent of an uncompromising system of transcendental idealism, the Wissenschaftslehre, which played a key role in the development of post-Kantian philosophy. Born in Saxony, Fichte studied at Jena and Leipzig. The writings of Kant led him to abandon metaphysical determinism and to embrace transcendental idealism as “the first system of human freedom.” His first book, Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung “Attempt at a Critique of all Revelations,” 1792, earned him a reputation as a brilliant exponent of Kantianism, while his early political writings secured him a reputation as a Jacobin. Inspired by Reinhold, Jacobi, Maimon, and Schulze, Fichte rejected the “letter” of Kantianism and, in the lectures and writings he produced at Jena 179499, advanced a new, rigorously systematic presentation of what he took to be its Ferguson, Adam Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 307 307 “spirit.” He dispensed with Kant’s things-inthemselves, the original duality of faculties, and the distinction between the transcendental aesthetic and the transcendental analytic. By emphasizing the unity of theoretical and practical reason in a way consistent with “the primacy of practical reason,” Fichte sought to establish the unity of the critical philosophy as well as of human experience. In Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre “On the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre,” 1794 he explained his conception of philosophy as “the science of science,” to be presented in a deductive system based on a self-evident first principle. The basic “foundations” of this system, which Fichte called Wissenschaftslehre theory of science, were outlined in his Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre “Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre,” 179495 and Grundriß der Eigentümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre in Rücksicht auf das theoretische Vermögen “Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre with respect to the Theoretical Faculty,” 1795 and then, substantially revised, in his lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo 179699. The “foundational” portion of the Wissenschaftslehrelinks our affirmation of freedom to our experience of natural necessity. Beginning with the former “the I simply posits itself”, it then demonstrates how a freely self-positing subject must be conscious not only of itself, but also of “representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity” and hence of an objective world. Fichte insisted that the essence of selfhood lies in an active positing of its own self-identity and hence that self-consciousness is an auto-productive activity: a Tathandlung or “fact/act.” However, the I can posit itself only as limited; in order for the originally posited act of “sheer self-positing” to occur, certain other mental acts must occur as well, acts through which the I posits for itself an objective, spatiotemporal world, as well as a moral realm of free, rational beings. The I first posits its own limited condition in the form of “feeling” occasioned by an inexplicable Anstob or “check” upon its own practical striving, then as a “sensation,” then as an “intuition” of a thing, and finally as a “concept.” The distinction between the I and the not-I arises only in these reiterated acts of self-positing, a complete description of which thus amounts to a “genetic deduction” of the necessary conditions of experience. Freedom is thereby shown to be possible only in the context of natural necessity, where it is limited and finite. At the same time “our freedom is a theoretical determining principle of our world.” Though it must posit its freedom “absolutely” i.e., schlechthin or “for no reason” a genuinely free agent can exist only as a finite individual endlessly striving to overcome its own limits. After establishing its “foundations,” Fichte extended his Wissenschaftslehre into social and political philosophy and ethics. Subjectivity itself is essentially intersubjective, inasmuch as one can be empirically conscious of oneself only as one individual among many and must thus posit the freedom of others in order to posit one’s own freedom. But for this to occur, the freedom of each individual must be limited; indeed, “the concept of right or justice Recht is nothing other than the concept of the coexistence of the freedom of several rational/sensuous beings.” The Grundlage des Naturrechts “Foundations of Natural Right,” 179697 examines how individual freedom must be externally limited if a community of free individuals is to be possible, and demonstrates that a just political order is a demand of reason itself, since “the concept of justice or right is a condition of self-consciousness.” “Natural rights” are thus entirely independent of moral duties. Unlike political philosophy, which purely concerns the public realm, ethics, which is the subject of Das System der Sittenlehre “The System of Ethical Theory,” 1798, concerns the inner realm of conscience. It views objects not as given to consciousness but as produced by free action, and concerns not what is, but what ought to be. The task of ethics is to indicate the particular duties that follow from the general obligation to determine oneself freely the categorical imperative. Before Fichte could extend the Wissenschaftslehre into the philosophy of religion, he was accused of atheism and forced to leave Jena. The celebrated controversy over his alleged atheism the Atheismusstreit was provoked by “Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens in einer göttliche Weltregierung” “On the Basis of our Belief in a Divine Governance of the World,” 1798, in which he sharply distinguished between philosophical and religious questions. While defending our right to posit a “moral world order,” Fichte insisted that this order does not require a personal deity or “moral lawgiver.” After moving to Berlin, Fichte’s first concern was to rebut the charge of atheism and to reply to the indictment of philosophy as “nihilism” advanced in Jacobi’s Open Letter to Fichte 1799. This was the task of Die Bestimmung des Menschen “The Vocation of Man,” 1800. During the occupation, he delivered Reden an die deutsche Nation “Addresses to the G. Nation,” 1808, which proposed a program of national education and attempted to kindle G. patriotism. The other publications of his Berlin years include a foray into political economy, Der geschlossene Handelstaat “The Closed Commercial State,” 1800; a speculative interpretation of human history, Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtiges Zeitalters “The Characteristics of the Present Age,” 1806; and a mystically tinged treatise on salvation, Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben “Guide to the Blessed Life,” 1806. In unpublished private lectures he continued to develop radically new versions of the Wissenschaftslehre. Fichte’s substantial influence was not limited to his well-known influence on Schelling and Hegel both of whom criticized the “subjectivism” of the early Wissenschaftslehre. He is also important in the history of G. nationalism and profoundly influenced the early Romantics, especially Novalis and Schlegel. Recent decades have seen renewed interest in Fichte’s transcendental philosophy, expecially the later, unpublished versions of the Wissenschaftslehre. This century’s most significant contribution to Fichte studies, however, is the ongoing publication of the first critical edition of his complete works.

Italian philosophy. Grice loved it and could recite an Italian philosopher for each letter of the alphabet, including the famous Alessandro Speranza, from Milano!

ficino: neoplatonic philosopher who played a leading role in the cultural life of Florence. Ordained a priest in 1473, he hoped to draw people to Christ by means of Platonism. It was through Ficino’s translation and commentaries that the works of Plato first became accessible to the Latin-speaking West, but the impact of Plato’s work was considerably affected by Ficino’s other interests. He accepted Neoplatonic interpretations of Plato, including those of Plotinus, whom he tr.; and he saw Plato as the heir of Hermes Trismegistus, a mythical Egyptian sage and supposed author of the hermetic corpus, which he tr. early in his career. He embraced the notion of a prisca theologia, an ancient wisdom that encapsulated philosophic and religious truth, was handed on to Plato, and was later validated by the Christian revelation. The most popular of his original works was Three Books on Life 1489, which contains the fullest Renaissance exposition of a theory of magic, based mainly on Neoplatonic sources. He postulated a living cosmos in which the World-Soul is linked to the world-body by spirit. This relationship is mirrored in man, whose spirit or astral body links his body and soul, and the resulting correspondence between microcosm and macrocosm allows both man’s control of natural objects through magic and his ascent to knowledge of God. Other popular works were his commentary on Plato’s Symposium 1469, which presents a theory of Platonic love; and his Platonic Theology 1474, in which he argues for the immortality of the soul.

fictum: in the widest usage, whatever contrasts with what is a matter of fact. As applied to works of fiction, however, this is not the appropriate contrast. For a work of fiction, such as a historical novel, might turn out to be true regarding its historical subject, without ceasing to be fiction. The correct contrast of fiction is to non-fiction. If a work of fiction might turn out to be true, how is ‘fiction’ best defined? According to some philosophers, such as Searle, the writer of nonfiction performs illocutionary speech acts, such as asserting that such-and-such occurred, whereas the writer of fiction characteristically only pretends to perform these illocutionary acts. Others hold that the core idea to which appeal should be made is that of making-believe or imagining certain states of affairs. Kendall Walton Mimesis as Make-Believe, 0, for instance, holds that a work of fiction is to be construed in terms of a prop whose function is to serve in games of make-believe. Both kinds of theory allow for the possibility that a work of fiction might turn out to be true.

fidanza: Bonaventura, Saint c.122174, theologian. Born Giovanni di Fidanza in Bagnorea, Tuscany, he was educated at Paris, earning a master’s degree in arts and a doctorate in theology. He joined the Franciscans about 1243, while still a student, and was elected minister general of the order in 1257. Made cardinal bishop of Albano by Pope Gregory X in 1274, Bonaventure helped organize the Second Ecumenical Council of Lyons, during the course of which he died, in July 1274. He was canonized in 1482 and named a doctor of the church in 1587. Bonaventure wrote and preached extensively on the relation between philosophy and theology, the role of reason in spiritual and religious life, and the extent to which knowledge in God is obtainable by the “wayfarer.” His basic position is nicely expressed in De reductione artium ad theologiam “On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology”: “the manifold wisdom of God, which is clearly revealed in sacred scripture, lies hidden in all knowledge and in all nature.” He adds, “all divisions of knowledge are handmaids of theology.” But he is critical of those theologians who wish to sever the connection between faith and reason. As he argues in another famous work, Itinerarium mentis ad deum “The Mind’s Journey unto God,” 1259, “since, relative to our life on earth, the world is itself a ladder for ascending to God, we find here certain traces, certain images” of the divine hand, in which God himself is mirrored. Although Bonaventure’s own philosophical outlook is Augustinian, he was also influenced by Aristotle, whose newly available works he both read and appreciated. Thus, while upholdBonaventure, Saint Bonaventure, Saint 94 94 ing the Aristotelian ideas that knowledge of the external world is based on the senses and that the mind comes into existence as a tabula rasa, he also contends that divine illumination is necessary to explain both the acquisition of universal concepts from sense images, and the certainty of intellectual judgment. His own illuminationist epistemology seeks a middle ground between, on the one hand, those who maintain that the eternal light is the sole reason for human knowing, providing the human intellect with its archetypal and intelligible objects, and, on the other, those holding that the eternal light merely influences human knowing, helping guide it toward truth. He holds that our intellect has certain knowledge when stable; eternal archetypes are “contuited by us [a nobis contuita],” together with intelligible species produced by its own fallible powers. In metaphysics, Bonaventure defends exemplarism, the doctrine that all creation is patterned after exemplar causes or ideas in the mind of God. Like Aquinas, but unlike Duns Scotus, he argues that it is through such ideas that God knows all creatures. He also adopts the emanationist principle that creation proceeds from God’s goodness, which is self-diffusive, but differs from other emanationists, such as al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, in arguing that divine emanation is neither necessary nor indirect i.e., accomplished by secondary agents or intelligences. Indeed, he sees the views of these Islamic philosophers as typical of the errors bound to follow once Aristotelian rationalism is taken to its extreme. He is also well known for his anti-Aristotelian argument that the eternity of the world something even Aquinas following Maimonides concedes as a theoretical possibility is demonstrably false. Bonaventure also subscribes to several other doctrines characteristic of medieval Augustinianism: universal hylomorphism, the thesis, defended by Ibn Gabirol and Avicenna among others, that everything other than God is composed of matter and form; the plurality of forms, the view that subjects and predicates in the category of substance are ordered in terms of their metaphysical priority; and the ontological view of truth, according to which truth is a kind of rightness perceived by the mind. In a similar vein, Bonaventure argues that knowledge ultimately consists in perceiving truth directly, without argument or demonstration. Bonaventure also wrote several classic works in the tradition of mystical theology. His bestknown and most popular mystical work is the aforementioned Itinerarium, written in 1259 on a pilgrimage to La Verna, during which he beheld the six-winged seraph that had also appeared to Francis of Assisi when Francis received the stigmata. Bonaventure outlines a seven-stage spiritual journey, in which our mind moves from first considering God’s traces in the perfections of irrational creatures, to a final state of peaceful repose, in which our affections are “transferred and transformed into God.” Central to his writings on spiritual life is the theme of the “three ways”: the purgative way, inspired by conscience, which expels sin; the illuminative way, inspired by the intellect, which imitates Christ; and the unitive way, inspired by wisdom, which unites us to God through love. Bonaventure’s writings most immediately influenced the work of other medieval Augustinians, such as Matthew of Aquasparta and John Peckham, and later, followers of Duns Scotus. But his modern reputation rests on his profound contributions to philosophical theology, Franciscan spirituality, and mystical thought, in all three of which he remains an authoritative source.

campus -- field theory, a theory that proceeds by assigning values of physical quantities to the points of space, or of space-time, and then lays down laws relating these values. For example, a field theory might suppose a value for matter density, or a temperature for each space-time point, and then relate these values, usually in terms of differential equations. In these examples there is at least the tacit assumption of a physical substance that fills the relevant region of space-time. But no such assumption need be made. For instance, in Ficino, Marsilio field theory 309 309 Maxwell’s theory of the electromagnetic field, each point of space-time carries a value for an electric and a magnetic field, and these values are then governed by Maxwell’s equations. In general relativity, the geometry e.g., the curvature of space-time is itself treated as a field, with lawlike connections with the distribution of energy and matter. Formulation in terms of a field theory resolves the problem of action at a distance that so exercised Newton and his contemporaries. We often take causal connection to require spatial contiguity. That is, for one entity to act causally on another, the two entities need to be contiguous. But in Newton’s description gravitational attraction acts across spatial distances. Similarly, in electrostatics the mutual repulsion of electric charges is described as acting across spatial distances. In the times of both Newton and Maxwell numerous efforts to understand such action at a distance in terms of some space-filling mediating substance produced no viable theory. Field theories resolve the perplexity. By attributing values of physical quantities directly to the space-time points one can describe gravitation, electrical and magnetic forces, and other interactions without action at a distance or any intervening physical medium. One describes the values of physical quantities, attributed directly to the space-time points, as influencing only the values at immediately neighboring points. In this way the influences propagate through space-time, rather than act instantaneously across distances or through a medium. Of course there is a metaphysical price: on such a description the space-time points themselves take on the role of a kind of dematerialized ether. Indeed, some have argued that the pervasive role of field theory in contemporary physics and the need for space-time points for a field-theoretic description constitute a strong argument for the existence of the space-time points. This conclusion contradicts “relationalism,” which claims that there are only spatiotemporal relations, but no space-time points or regions thought of as particulars. Quantum field theory appears to take on a particularly abstract form of field theory, since it associates a quantum mechanical operator with each space-time point. However, since operators correspond to physical magnitudes rather than to values of such magnitudes, it is better to think of the field-theoretic aspect of quantum field theory in terms of the quantum mechanical amplitudes that it also associates with the space-time points.

figura: figure-ground, the discrimination of an object or figure from the context or background against which it is set. Even when a connected region is grouped together properly, as in the famous figure that can be seen either as a pair of faces or as a vase, it is possible to interpret the region alternately as figure and as ground. This fact was originally elaborated in 1 by Edgar Rubin 6 1. Figureground effects and the existence of other ambiguous figures such as the Necker cube and the duck-rabbit challenged the prevailing assumption, Vitters thought, in classical theories of perception maintained, e.g., by H. P. Grice and J. S. Mill and H. von Helmholtz that complex perceptions could be understood in terms of primitive sensations constituting them. The underdetermination of perception by the visual stimulus, noted by Berkeley in his Essay of 1709, takes account of the fact that the retinal image is impoverished with respect to threedimensional information. Identical stimulation at the retina can result from radically different distal sources. Within Gestalt psychology, the Gestalt, or pattern, was recognized to be underdetermined by constituent parts available in proximal stimuli. M. Wertheimer 03 observed in 2 that apparent motion could be induced by viewing a series of still pictures in rapid succession. He concluded that perception of the whole, as involving movement, was fundamentally different from the perception of the static images of which it is composed. W. Köhler An example of visual reversal from Edgar Rubin: the object depicted can be seen alternately as a vase or as a pair of faces. The reversal occurs whether there is a black ground and white figure or white figure and black ground. figure figure ground 310 310 77 observed that there was no figure ground articulation in the retinal image, and concluded that inherently ambiguous stimuli required some autonomous selective principles of perceptual organization. As subsequently developed by Gestalt psychologists, form is taken as the primitive unit of perception. In philosophical treatments, figureground effects are used to enforce the conclusion that interpretation is central to perception, and that perceptions are no more than hypotheses based on sensory data. Refs.: Grice, “You can’t see a knife as a knife,” “The Causal Theory of Perception,” Vitters on ‘seeing-as’”.

filmer: r. English political writer who produced, most importantly, the posthumous Patriarcha 1680. It is remembered because Locke attacked it in the first of his Two Treatises of Government 1690. Filmer argued that God gave complete authority over the world to Adam, and that from him it descended to his eldest son when he became the head of the family. Thereafter only fathers directly descended from Adam could properly be rulers. Just as Adam’s rule was not derived from the consent of his family, so the king’s inherited authority is not dependent on popular consent. He rightly makes laws and imposes taxes at his own good pleasure, though like a good father he has the welfare of his subjects in view. Filmer’s patriarchalism, intended to bolster the absolute power of the king, is the classic English statement of the doctrine.

find play – where Grice’s implicaturum finds play Strawson Wiggins p. 523

fludd: r. English physician and writer. Influenced by Paracelsus, hermetism, and the cabala, Fludd defended a Neoplatonic worldview on the eve of its supersession by the new mechanistic philosophy. He produced improvements in the manufacture of steel and invented a thermometer, though he also used magnets to cure disease and devised a salve to be applied to a weapon to cure the wound it had inflicted. He held that science got its ideas from Scripture allegorically interpreted, when they were of any value. His works combine theology with an occult, Neoplatonic reading of the Bible, and contain numerous fine diagrams illustrating the mutual sympathy of human beings, the natural world, and the supernatural world, each reflecting the others in parallel harmonic structures. In controversy with Kepler, Fludd claimed to uncover essential natural processes rooted in natural sympathies and the operation of God’s light, rather than merely describing the external movements of the heavens. Creation is the extension of divine light into matter. Evil arises from a darkness in God, his failure to will. Matter is uncreated, but this poses no problem for orthodoxy, since matter is nothing, a mere possibility without the least actuality, not something Filmer, Robert Fludd, Robert 311 311 coeternal with the Creator.

fodor: j. a. – Griceian philosophical psychologis from the New World (Old World, originally)t, known for his energetic and often witty defense of intensional realism, a computationalrepresentational model of thought, and an atomistic, externalist theory of content determination for mental states. Fodor’s philosophical writings fall under three headings. First, he has defended the theory of mind implicit in contemporary cognitive psychology, that the cognitive mind-brain is both a representational/computational device and, ultimately, physical. He has taken on behaviorists Ryle, psychologists in the tradition of J. J. Gibson, and eliminative materialists P. A. Churchland. Second, he has engaged in various theoretical disputes within cognitive psychology, arguing for the modularity of the perceptual and language systems roughly, the view that they are domain-specific, mandatory, limited-access, innately specified, hardwired, and informationally encapsulated The Modularity of Mind, 3; for a strong form of nativism that virtually all of our concepts are innate; and for the existence of a “language of thought” The Language of Thought, 5. The latter has led him to argue against connectionism as a psychological theory as opposed to an implementation theory. Finally, he has defended the views of ordinary propositional attitude psychology that our mental states 1 are semantically evaluable intentional, 2 have causal powers, and 3 are such that the implicit generalizations of folk psychology are largely true of them. His defense is twofold. Folk psychology is unsurpassed in explanatory power; furthermore, it is vindicated by contemporary cognitive psychology insofar as ordinary propositional attitude states can be identified with information-processing states, those that consist in a computational relation to a representation. The representational component of such states allows us to explain the semantic evaluability of the attitudes; the computational component, their causal efficacy. Both sorts of accounts raise difficulties. The first is satisfactory only if supplemented by a naturalistic account of representational content. Here Fodor has argued for an atomistic, externalist causal theory Psychosemantics, 7 and against holism the view that no mental representation has content unless many other non-synonymous mental representations also have content Holism: A Shopper’s Guide, 2, against conceptual role theories the view that the content of a representation is determined by its conceptual role N. Block (who quotes Grice’s Method), B. F. Loar (DPhil Oxon under Grice’s collaborator G. J. Warnock) and against teleofunctional theories teleofunctionalism is the view that the content of a representation is determined, at least in part, by the biological functions of the representations themselves or systems that produce or use those representations Ruth Millikan, David Papineau. The second sort is satisfactory only if it does not imply epiphenomenalism with respect to content properties. To avoid such epiphenomenalism, Fodor has argued that not only strict laws but also ceteris paribus laws can be causal. In addition, he has sought to reconcile his externalism vis-à-vis content with the view that causal efficacy requires an individualistic individuation of states. Two solutions have been explored: the supplementation of broad externally determined content with narrow content, where the latter supervenes on what is “in the head” Psychosemantics, 7, and its supplementation with modes of presentation identical to sentences of the language of thought The Elm and the Expert, 5.

Grice’s folksy psychology: Grice loved Ramsey, “But Ramsey was born before folk-psychology, so his ‘Theories’ is very dense.”” one sense, a putative network of principles constituting a commonsense theory that allegedly underlies everyday explanations of human behavior; the theory assigns a central role to mental states like belief, desire, and intention. Consider an example of an everyday commonsense psychological explanation: Jane went to the refrigerator because she wanted a beer and she believed there was beer in the refrigerator. Like many such explanations, this adverts to a so-called propositional attitude a mental state, expressed by a verb ‘believe’ plus a that-clause, whose intentional content is propositional. It also adverts to a mental state, expressed by a verb ‘want’ plus a direct-object phrase, whose intentional content appears not to be propositional. In another, related sense, folk psychology is a network of social practices that includes ascribing such mental states to ourselves and others, and proffering explanations of human behavior that advert to these states. The two senses need distinguishing because some philosophers who acknowledge the existence of folk psychology in the second sense hold that commonsense psychological explanations do not employ empirical generalizations, and hence that there is no such theory as folk psychology. Henceforth, ‘FP’ will abbreviate ‘folk psychology’ in the first sense; the unabbreviated phrase will be used in the second sense. Eliminativism in philosophy of mind asserts that FP is an empirical theory; that FP is therefore subject to potential scientific falsification; and that mature science very probably will establish that FP is so radically false that humans simply do not undergo mental states like beliefs, desires, and intentions. One kind of eliminativist argument first sets forth certain methodological strictures about how FP would have to integrate with mature science in order to be true e.g., being smoothly reducible to neuroscience, or being absorbed into mature cognitive science, and then contends that these strictures are unlikely to be met. Another kind of argument first claims that FP embodies certain strong empirical commitments e.g., to mental representations with languagelike syntactic structure, and then contends that such empirical presuppositions are likely to turn out false. One influential version of folk psychological realism largely agrees with eliminativism about what is required to vindicate folk psychology, but also holds that mature science is likely to provide such vindication. Realists of this persuasion typically argue, for instance, that mature cognitive science will very likely incorporate FP, and also will very likely treat beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes as states with languagelike syntactic structure. Other versions of folkpsychological realism take issue, in one way or another, with either i the eliminativists’ claims about FP’s empirical commitments, or ii the eliminativists’ strictures about how FP must mesh with mature science in order to be true, or both. Concerning i, for instance, some philosophers maintain that FP per se is not committed to the existence of languagelike mental representations. If mature cognitive science turns out not to posit a “language of thought,” they contend, this would not necessarily show that FP is radically false; instead it might only show that propositional attitudes are subserved in some other way than via languagelike representational structures. Concerning ii, some philosophers hold that FP can be true without being as tightly connected to mature scientific theories as the eliminativists require. For instance, the demand that the special sciences be smoothly reducible to the fundamental natural sciences is widely considered an excessively stringent criterion of intertheoretic compatibility; so perhaps FP could be true without being smoothly reducible to neuroscience. Similarly, the demand that FP be directly absorbable into empirical cognitive science is sometimes considered too stringent as a criterion either of FP’s truth, or of the soundness of its ontology of beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes, or of the legitimacy of FP-based explanations of behavior. Perhaps FP is a true theory, and explanatorily legitimate, even if it is not destined to become a part of science. Even if FP’s ontological categories are not scientific natural kinds, perhaps its generalizations are like generalizations about clothing: true, explanatorily usable, and ontologically sound. No one doubts the existence of hats, coats, or scarves. No one doubts the truth or explanatory utility of generalizations like ‘Coats made of heavy material tend to keep the body warm in cold weather’, even though these generalizations are not laws of any science. Yet another approach to folk psychology, often wedded to realism about beliefs and desires although sometimes wedded to instrumentalism, maintains that folk psychology does not employ empirical generalizations, and hence is not a theory at all. One variant denies that folk psychology employs any generalizations, empirical or otherwise. Another variant concedes that there are folk-psychological generalizations, but denies that they are empirical; instead they are held to be analytic truths, or norms of rationality, or both at once. Advocates of non-theory views typically regard folk psychology as a hermeneutic, or interpretive, enterprise. They often claim too that the attribution of propositional attitudes, and also the proffering and grasping of folk-psychological explanations, is a matter of imaginatively projecting oneself into another person’s situation, and then experiencing a kind of empathic understanding, or Verstehen, of the person’s actions and the motives behind them. A more recent, hi-tech, formulation of this idea is that the interpreter “runs a cognitive simulation” of the person whose actions are to be explained. Philosophers who defend folk-psychological realism, in one or another of the ways just canvassed, also sometimes employ arguments based on the allegedly self-stultifying nature of eliminativism. One such argument begins from the premise that the notion of action is folk-psychological that a behavioral event counts as an action only if it is caused by propositional attitudes that rationalize it under some suitable actdescription. If so, and if humans never really undergo propositional attitudes, then they never really act either. In particular, they never really assert anything, or argue for anything since asserting and arguing are species of action. So if eliminativism is true, the argument concludes, then eliminativists can neither assert it nor argue for it an allegedly intolerable pragmatic paradox. Eliminativists generally react to such arguments with breathtaking equanimity. A typical reply is that although our present concept of action might well be folk-psychological, this does not preclude the possibility of a future successor concept, purged of any commitment to beliefs and desires, that could inherit much of the role of our current, folk-psychologically tainted, concept of action.

Fonseca, Pedro da, philosopher and logician. He entered the Jesuit order in 1548. Apart from a period in Rome, he lived in Portugal, teaching philosophy and theology at the universities of Evora and Coimbra and performing various administrative duties for his order. He was responsible for the idea of a published course on Aristotelian philosophy, and the resulting series of Coimbra commentaries, the Cursus Conimbricensis, was widely used in the seventeenth century. His own logic text, the Institutes of Dialectic 1564, went into many editions. It is a good example of Renaissance Aristotelianism, with its emphasis on Aristotle’s syllogistic, but it retains some material on medieval developments, notably consequences, exponibles, and supposition theory. Fonseca also wrote a commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics published in parts from 1577 on, which contains the Grecian text, a corrected Latin translation, comments on textual matters, and an extensive exploration of selected philosophical problems. He cites a wide range of medieval philosophers, both Christian and Arab, as well as the newly published Grecian commentators on Aristotle. His own position is sympathetic to Aquinas, but generally independent. Fonseca is important not so much for any particular doctrines, though he did hold original views on such matters as analogy, but for his provision of fully documented, carefully written and carefully argued books that, along with others in the same tradition, were read at universities, both Catholic and Protestant, well into the seventeenth century. He represents what is often called the Second Scholasticism.

Fontenelle, Bernard Le Bovier de: writer who heralded the age of the philosophes. A product of Jesuit education, he was a versatile freethinker with skeptical inclinations. Dialogues of the Dead 1683 showed off his analytical mind and elegant style. In 1699, he was appointed secretary of the Academy of Sciences. He composed famous eulogies of scientists; defended the superiority of modern science over tradition in Digression on Ancients and Moderns 1688; popularized Copernican astronomy in Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds 1686 famous for postulating the inhabitation of planets; stigmatized superstition and credulity in History of Oracles 1687 and The Origin of Fables 1724; promoted Cartesian physics in The Theory of Cartesian Vortices 1752; and wrote Elements of Infinitesimal Calculus 1727 in the wake of Newton and Leibniz. J.-L.S. Foot, Philippa b.0, British philosopher who exerted a lasting influence on the development of moral philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century. Her persisting, intertwined themes are opposition to all forms of subjectivism in ethics, the significance of the virtues and vices, and the connection between morality and rationality. In her earlier papers, particularly “Moral Beliefs” 8 and “Goodness and Choice” 1, reprinted in Virtues and Vices 8, she undermines the subjectivist accounts of moral “judgment” derived from C. L. Stevenson and Hare by arguing for many logical or conceptual connections between evaluations and the factual statements on which they must be based. Lately she has developed this kind of thought into the naturalistic claim that moral evaluations are determined by facts about our life and our nature, as evaluations of features of plants and animals as good or defective specimens of their kind are determined by facts about their nature and their life. Foot’s opposition to subjectivism has remained constant, but her views on the virtues in relation to rationality have undergone several changes. In “Moral Beliefs” she relates them to self-interest, maintaining that a virtue must benefit its possessor; in the subsequently repudiated “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives” 2 she went as far as to deny that there was necessarily anything contrary to reason in being uncharitable or unjust. In “Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 5 the virtues themselves appear as forms of practical rationality. Her most recent work, soon to be published as The Grammar of Goodness, preserves and develops the latter claim and reinstates ancient connections between virtue, rationality, and happiness.

forcing: a method introduced by Paul J. Cohen see his Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis 6 to prove independence results in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF. Cohen proved the independence of the axiom of choice AC from ZF, and of the continuum hypothesis CH from ZF ! AC. The consistency of AC with ZF and of CH with ZF ! AC had previously been proved by Gödel by the method of constructible sets. A model of ZF consists of layers, with the elements of a set at one layer always belonging to lower layers. Starting with a model M, Cohen’s method produces an “outer model” N with no more levels but with more sets at each level whereas Gödel’s method produces an ‘inner model’ L: much of what will become true in N can be “forced” from within M. The method is applicable only to hypotheses in the more “abstract” branches of mathematics infinitary combinatorics, general topology, measure theory, universal algebra, model theory, etc.; but there it is ubiquitous. Applications include the proof by Robert M. Solovay of the consistency of the measurability of all sets of all projective sets with ZF with ZF ! AC; also the proof by Solovay and Donald A. Martin of the consistency of Martin’s axiom MA plus the negation of the continuum hypothesis -CH with ZF ! AC. CH implies MA; and of known consequences of CH about half are implied by MA, about half refutable by MA ! -CH. Numerous simplifications, extensions, and variants e.g. Boolean-valued models of Cohen’s method have been introduced.

fordyce: d., philosopher and educational theorist whose writings were influential in the eighteenth century. His lectures formed the basis of his Elements of Moral Philosophy, written originally for The Preceptor 1748, later tr. into G. and , and abridged for the articles on moral philosophy in the first Encylopaedia Britannica 1771. Fordyce combines the preacher’s appeal to the heart in the advocacy of virtue with a moral “scientist’s” appraisal of human psychology. He claims to derive our duties experimentally from a study of the prerequisites of human happiness. M.A.St. foreknowledge, divine.

forma: form, in metaphysics, especially Plato’s and Aristotle’s, the structure or essence of a thing as contrasted with its matter. Plato’s theory of Forms is a realistic ontology of universals. In his elenchus, Socrates sought what is common to, e.g., all chairs. Plato believed there must be an essence or Form common to everything falling under one concept, which makes anything what it is. A chair is a chair because it “participates in” the Form of Chair. The Forms are ideal “patterns,” unchanging, timeless, and perfect. They exist in a world of their own cf. the Kantian noumenal realm. Plato speaks of them as self-predicating: the Form of Beauty is perfectly beautiful. This led, as he realized, to the Third Man argument that there must be an infinite number of Forms. The only true understanding is of the Forms. This we attain through anamnesis, “recollection.” 2 Aristotle agreed that forms are closely tied to intelligibility, but denied their separate existence. Aristotle explains change and generation through a distinction between the form and matter of substances. A lump of bronze matter becomes a statue through its being molded into a certain shape form. In his earlier metaphysics, Aristotle identified primary substance with the composite of matter and form, e.g. Socrates. Later, he suggests that primary substance is form what makes Socrates what he is the form here is his soul. This notion of forms as essences has obvious similarities with the Platonic view. They became the “substantial forms” of Scholasticism, accepted until the seventeenth century. Kant saw form as the a priori aspect of experience. We are presented with phenomenological “matter,” which has no meaning until the mind imposes some form upon it. Grice finds the ‘logical’ in ‘logical form’ otiose. “Unless we contrast it with logical matter.” Refs.: Grice, “Form: logical and other.” A formal fallacy is an invalid inference pattern that is described in terms of a formal logic. There are three main cases: 1 an invalid or otherwise unacceptable argument identified solely by its form or structure, with no reference to the content of the premises and conclusion such as equivocation or to other features, generally of a pragmatic character, of the argumentative discourse such as unsuitability of the argument for the purposes for which it is given, failure to satisfy inductive standards for acceptable argument, etc.; the latter conditions of argument evaluation fall into the purview of informal fallacy; 2 a formal rule of inference, or an argument form, that is not valid in the logical system on which the evaluation is made, instances of which are sufficiently frequent, familiar, or deceptive to merit giving a name to the rule or form; ad 3 an argument that is an instance of a fallacious rule of inference or of a fallacious argument form and that is not itself valid. The criterion of satisfactory argument typically taken as relevant in discussing formal fallacies is validity. In this regard, it is important to observe that rules of inference and argument forms that are not valid may have instances which may be another rule or argument form, or may be a specific argument that are valid. Thus, whereas the argument form i P, Q; therefore R a form that every argument, including every valid argument, consisting of two premises shares is not valid, the argument form ii, obtained from i by substituting P&Q for R, is a valid instance of i: ii P, Q; therefore P&Q. Since ii is not invalid, ii is not a formal fallacy though it is an instance of i. Thus, some instances of formally fallacious rules of inference or argument-forms may be valid and therefore not be formal fallacies. Examples of formal fallacies follow below, presented according to the system of logic appropriate to the level of description of the fallacy. There are no standard names for some of the fallacies listed below. Fallacies of sentential propositional logic. Affirming the consequent: If p then q; q / , p. ‘If Richard had his nephews murdered, then Richard was an evil man; Richard was an evil man. Therefore, Richard had his nephews murdered.’ Denying the antecedent: If p then q; not-p / , not-q. ‘If North was found guilty by the courts, then North committed the crimes charged of him; North was not found guilty by the courts. Therefore, North did not commit the crimes charged of him.’ Commutation of conditionals: If p then q / , If q then p. ‘If Reagan was a great leader, then so was Thatcher. Therefore, if Thatcher was a great leader, then so was Reagan.” Improper transposition: If p then q / , If not-p then not-q. ‘If the nations of the Middle East disarm, there will be peace in the region. Therefore, if the nations of the Middle East do not disarm, there will not be peace in the region.’ Improper disjunctive syllogism affirming one disjunct: p or q; p / ,, not-q. ‘Either John is an alderman or a ward committeeman; John is an alderman. Therefore, John is not a ward committeeman.’ This rule of inference would be valid if ‘or’ were interpreted exclusively, where ‘p or EXq’ is true if exactly one constituent is true and is false otherwise. In standard systems of logic, however, ‘or’ is interpreted inclusively. Fallacies of syllogistic logic. Fallacies of distribution where M is the middle term, P is the major term, and S is the minor term. Undistributed middle term: the middle term is not distributed in either premise roughly, nothing is said of all members of the class it designates, as in form, grammatical formal fallacy 316 316 Some P are M ‘Some politicians are crooks. Some M are S Some crooks are thieves. ,Some S are P. ,Some politicians are thieves.’ Illicit major undistributed major term: the major term is distributed in the conclusion but not in the major premise, as in All M are P ‘All radicals are communists. No S are M No socialists are radicals. ,Some S are ,Some socialists are not not P. communists.’ Illicit minor undistributed minor term: the minor term is distributed in the conclusion but not in the minor premise, as in All P are M ‘All neo-Nazis are radicals. All M are S All radicals are terrorists. ,All S are P. ,All terrorists are neoNazis.’ Fallacies of negation. Two negative premises exclusive premises: the syllogism has two negative premises, as in No M are P ‘No racist is just. Some M are not S Some racists are not police. ,Some S are not P. ,Some police are not just. Illicit negative/affirmative: the syllogism has a negative premise conclusion but no negative conclusion premise, as in All M are P ‘All liars are deceivers. Some M are not S Some liars are not aldermen. ,Some S are P. ,Some aldermen are deceivers.’ and All P are M ‘All vampires are monsters. All M are S All monsters are creatures. ,Some S are not P. ,Some creatures are not vampires.’ Fallacy of existential import: the syllogism has two universal premises and a particular conclusion, as in All P are M ‘All horses are animals. No S are M No unicorns are animals. ,Some S are not P. ,Some unicorns are not horses.’ A syllogism can commit more than one fallacy. For example, the syllogism Some P are M Some M are S ,No S are P commits the fallacies of undistributed middle, illicit minor, illicit major, and illicit negative/affirmative. Fallacies of predicate logic. Illicit quantifier shift: inferring from a universally quantified existential proposition to an existentially quantified universal proposition, as in Ex Dy Fxy / , Dy Ex Fxy ‘Everyone is irrational at some time or other /, At some time, everyone is irrational.’ Some are/some are not unwarranted contrast: inferring from ‘Some S are P’ that ‘Some S are not P’ or inferring from ‘Some S are not P’ that ‘Some S are P’, as in Dx Sx & Px / , Dx Sx & -Px ‘Some people are left-handed / , Some people are not left-handed.’ Illicit substitution of identicals: where f is an opaque oblique context and a and b are singular terms, to infer from fa; a = b / , fb, as in ‘The Inspector believes Hyde is Hyde; Hyde is Jekyll / , The Inspector believes Hyde is Jekyll.’ Forma gives rise to formalism (or the formalists), which Grice contrasts with Ryle and Strawson’s informalism (the informalists). Formalism is described by Grice as the the view that mathematics concerns manipulations of symbols according to prescribed structural rules. It is cousin to nominalism, the older and more general metaphysical view that denies the existence of all abstract objects and is often contrasted with Platonism, which takes mathematics to be the study of a special class of non-linguistic, non-mental objects, and intuitionism, which takes it to be the study of certain mental constructions. In sophisticated versions, mathematical activity can comprise the study of possible formal manipulations within a system as well as the manipulations themselves, and the “symbols” need not be regarded as either linguistic or concrete. Formalism is often associated with the mathematician formalism formalism 317 317 David Hilbert. But Hilbert held that the “finitary” part of mathematics, including, for example, simple truths of arithmetic, describes indubitable facts about real objects and that the “ideal” objects that feature elsewhere in mathematics are introduced to facilitate research about the real objects. Hilbert’s formalism is the view that the foundations of mathematics can be secured by proving the consistency of formal systems to which mathematical theories are reduced. Gödel’s two incompleteness theorems establish important limitations on the success of such a project. And then there’s “formalization,” an abstract representation of a theory that must satisfy requirements sharper than those imposed on the structure of theories by the axiomatic-deductive method. That method can be traced back to Euclid’s Elements. The crucial additional requirement is the regimentation of inferential steps in proofs: not only do axioms have to be given in advance, but the rules representing argumentative steps must also be taken from a predetermined list. To avoid a regress in the definition of proof and to achieve intersubjectivity on a minimal basis, the rules are to be “formal” or “mechanical” and must take into account only the form of statements. Thus, to exclude any ambiguity, a precise and effectively described language is needed to formalize particular theories. The general kind of requirements was clear to Aristotle and explicit in Leibniz; but it was only Frege who, in his Begriffsschrift 1879, presented, in addition to an expressively rich language with relations and quantifiers, an adequate logical calculus. Indeed, Frege’s calculus, when restricted to the language of predicate logic, turned out to be semantically complete. He provided for the first time the means to formalize mathematical proofs. Frege pursued a clear philosophical aim, namely, to recognize the “epistemological nature” of theorems. In the introduction to his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 3, Frege wrote: “By insisting that the chains of inference do not have any gaps we succeed in bringing to light every axiom, assumption, hypothesis or whatever else you want to call it on which a proof rests; in this way we obtain a basis for judging the epistemological nature of the theorem.” The Fregean frame was used in the later development of mathematical logic, in particular, in proof theory. Gödel established through his incompleteness theorems fundamental limits of formalizations of particular theories, like the system of Principia Mathematica or axiomatic set theories. The general notion of formal theory emerged from the subsequent investigations of Church and Turing clarifying the concept of ‘mechanical procedure’ or ‘algorithm.’ Only then was it possible to state and prove the incompleteness theorems for all formal theories satisfying certain very basic representability and derivability conditions. Gödel emphasized repeatedly that these results do not establish “any bounds for the powers of human reason, but rather for the potentialities of pure formalism in mathematics.” As Grice notes, to ormalize: narrowly construed, to formulate a subject as a theory in first-order predicate logic; broadly construed, to describe the essentials of the subject in some formal language for which a notion of consequence is defined. For Hilbert, formalizing mathematics requires at least that there be finite means of checking purported proofs. The formalists speak of a ‘formal’ language, “but is it a language?” – Grice. formal language: H. P. Grice, “Bergmann on ideal language versus ordinary language,” a language in which an expression’s grammaticality and interpretation if any are determined by precisely defined rules that appeal only to the form or shape of the symbols that constitute it rather than, for example, to the intention of the speaker. It is usually understood that the rules are finite and effective so that there is an algorithm for determining whether an expression is a formula and that the grammatical expressions are uniquely readable, i.e., they are generated by the rules in only one way. A paradigm example is the language of firstorder predicate logic, deriving principally from the Begriffsschrift of Frege. The grammatical formulas of this language can be delineated by an inductive definition: 1 a capital letter ‘F’, ‘G’, or ‘H’, with or without a numerical subscript, folformalism, aesthetic formal language 318 318 lowed by a string of lowercase letters ‘a’, ‘b’, or ‘c’, with or without numerical subscripts, is a formula; 2 if A is a formula, so is -A; 3 if A and B are formulas, so are A & B, A P B, and A 7 B; 4 if A is a formula and v is a lowercase letter ‘x’, ‘y’, or ‘z’, with or without numerical subscripts, then DvA' and EvA' are formulas where A' is obtained by replacing one or more occurrences of some lowercase letter in A together with its subscripts if any by v; 5 nothing is a formula unless it can be shown to be one by finitely many applications of the clauses 14. The definition uses the device of metalinguistic variables: clauses with ‘A’ and ‘B’ are to be regarded as abbreviations of all the clauses that would result by replacing these letters uniformly by names of expressions. It also uses several naming conventions: a string of symbols is named by enclosing it within single quotes and also by replacing each symbol in the string by its name; the symbols ‘7’, ‘‘,’’, ‘&’, ‘P’, ‘-’ are considered names of themselves. The interpretation of predicate logic is spelled out by a similar inductive definition of truth in a model. With appropriate conventions and stipulations, alternative definitions of formulas can be given that make expressions like ‘P 7 Q’ the names of formulas rather than formulas themselves. On this approach, formulas need not be written symbols at all and form cannot be identified with shape in any narrow sense. For Tarski, Carnap, and others a formal language also included rules of “transformation” specifying when one expression can be regarded as a consequence of others. Today it is more common to view the language and its consequence relation as distinct. Formal languages are often contrasted with natural languages, like English or Swahili. Richard Montague, however, has tried to show that English is itself a formal language, whose rules of grammar and interpretation are similar to though much more complex than predicate logic. Then there’s formal learnability theory, the study of human language learning through explicit formal models typically employing artifical languages and simplified learning strategies. The fundamental problem is how a learner is able to arrive at a grammar of a language on the basis of a finite sample of presented sentences and perhaps other kinds of information as well. The seminal work is by E. Gold 7, who showed, roughly, that learnability of certain types of grammars from the Chomsky hierarchy by an unbiased learner required the presentation of ungrammatical strings, identified as such, along with grammatical strings. Recent studies have concentrated on other types of grammar e.g., generative transformational grammars, modes of presentation, and assumptions about learning strategies in an attempt to approximate the actual situation more closely. If Strawson and Ryle are into ‘informal logic,’ Hilbert isn’t. Formal logic, versus ‘material logic,’ is the science of correct reasoning, going back to Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, based upon the premise that the validity of an argument is a function of its structure or logical form. The modern embodiment of formal logic is symbolic mathematical logic. This is the study of valid inference in artificial, precisely formulated languages, the grammatical structure of whose sentences or well-formed formulas is intended to mirror, or be a regimentation of, the logical forms of their natural language counterparts. These formal languages can thus be viewed as mathematical models of fragments of natural language. Like models generally, these models are idealizations, typically leaving out of account such phenomena as vagueness, ambiguity, and tense. But the idea underlying symbolic logic is that to the extent that they reflect certain structural features of natural language arguments, the study of valid inference in formal languages can yield insight into the workings of those arguments. The standard course of study for anyone interested in symbolic logic begins with the classical propositional calculus sentential calculus, or PC. Here one constructs a theory of valid inference for a formal language built up from a stock of propositional variables sentence letters and an expressively complete set of connectives. In the propositional calculus, one is therefore concerned with arguments whose validity turns upon the presence of two-valued truth-functional sentence-forming operators on sentences such as classical negation, conjunction, disjunction, and the like. The next step is the predicate calculus lower functional calculus, first-order logic, elementary quantification theory, the study of valid inference in first-order languages. These are languages built up from an expressively complete set of connectives, first-order universal or existential quantifiers, individual variables, names, predicates relational symbols, and perhaps function symbols. Further, and more specialized, work in symbolic logic might involve looking at fragments of the language of the propositional or predicate calculus, changing the semantics that the language is standardly given e.g., by allowing truth-value gaps or more than two truth-values, further embellishing the language e.g., by adding modal or other non-truth-functional connectives, or higher-order quantifiers, or liberalizing the grammar or syntax of the language e.g., by permitting infinitely long well-formed formulas. In some of these cases, of course, symbolic logic remains only marginally connected with natural language arguments as the interest shades off into one in formal languages for their own sake, a mark of the most advanced work being done in formal logic today. Some philosophers (“me included” – Grice) speak of “formal semantics,” as opposed to Austin’s informal linguistic botanising -- the study of the interpretations of formal languages. A formal language can be defined apart from any interpretation of it. This is done by specifying a set of its symbols and a set of formation rules that determine which strings of symbols are grammatical or well formed. When rules of inference transformation rules are added and/or certain sentences are designated as axioms a logical system also known as a logistic system is formed. An interpretation of a formal language is roughly an assignment of meanings to its symbols and truth conditions to its sentences. Typically a distinction is made between a standard interpretation of a formal language and a non-standard interpretation. Consider a formal language in which arithmetic is formulable. In addition to the symbols of logic variables, quantifiers, brackets, and connectives, this language will contain ‘0’, ‘!’, ‘•’, and ‘s’. A standard interpretation of it assigns the set of natural numbers as the domain of discourse, zero to ‘0’, addition to ‘!’, multiplication to ‘•’, and the successor function to ‘s’. Other standard interpretations are isomorphic to the one just given. In particular, standard interpretations are numeral-complete in that they correlate the numerals one-to-one with the domain elements. A result due to Gödel and Rosser is that there are universal quantifications xAx that are not deducible from the Peano axioms if those axioms are consistent even though each An is provable. The Peano axioms if consistent are true on each standard interpretation. Thus each An is true on such an interpretation. Thus xAx is true on such an interpretation since a standard interpretation is numeral-complete. However, there are non-standard interpretations that do not correlate the numerals one-to-one with domain elements. On some of these interpretations each An is true but xAx is false. In constructing and interpreting a formal language we use a language already known to us, say, English. English then becomes our metalanguage, which we use to talk about the formal language, which is our object language. Theorems proven within the object language must be distinguished from those proven in the metalanguage. The latter are metatheorems. One goal of a semantical theory of a formal language is to characterize the consequence relation as expressed in that language and prove semantical metatheorems about that relation. A sentence S is said to be a consequence of a set of sentences K provided S is true on every interpretation on which each sentence in K is true. This notion has to be kept distinct from the notion of deduction. The latter concept can be defined only by reference to a logical system associated with a formal language. Consequence, however, can be characterized independently of a logical system, as was just done.

foucault: m., philosopher and historian of thought. Foucault’s earliest writings e.g., Maladie mentale et personnalité [“Mental Illness and Personality”], 4 focused on psychology and developed within the frameworks of Marxism and existential phenomenology. He soon moved beyond these frameworks, in directions suggested by two fundamental influences: formal mode Foucault, Michel 320 320 history and philosophy of science, as practiced by Bachelard and especially Canguilhem, and the modernist literature of, e.g., Raymond Roussel, Bataille, and Maurice Blanchot. In studies of psychiatry Histoire de la folie [“History of Madness in the Classical Age”], 1, clinical medicine The Birth of the Clinic, 3, and the social sciences The Order of Things, 6, Foucault developed an approach to intellectual history, “the archaeology of knowledge,” that treated systems of thought as “discursive formations” independent of the beliefs and intentions of individual thinkers. Like Canguilhem’s history of science and like modernist literature, Foucault’s archaeology displaced the human subject from the central role it played in the humanism dominant in our culture since Kant. He reflected on the historical and philosophical significance of his archaeological method in The Archaeology of Knowledge 9. Foucault recognized that archaeology provided no account of transitions from one system to another. Accordingly, he introduced a “genealogical” approach, which does not replace archaeology but goes beyond it to explain changes in systems of discourse by connecting them to changes in the non-discursive practices of social power structures. Foucault’s genealogy admitted the standard economic, social, and political causes but, in a non-standard, Nietzschean vein, refused any unified teleological explanatory scheme e.g., Whig or Marxist histories. New systems of thought are seen as contingent products of many small, unrelated causes, not fulfillments of grand historical designs. Foucault’s geneaological studies emphasize the essential connection of knowledge and power. Bodies of knowledge are not autonomous intellectual structures that happen to be employed as Baconian instruments of power. Rather, precisely as bodies of knowledge, they are tied but not reducible to systems of social control. This essential connection of power and knowledge reflects Foucault’s later view that power is not merely repressive but a creative, if always dangerous, source of positive values. Discipline and Punish 5 showed how prisons constitute criminals as objects of disciplinary knowledge. The first volume of the History of Sexuality 6 sketched a project for seeing how, through modern biological and psychological sciences of sexuality, individuals are controlled by their own knowledge as self-scrutinizing and self-forming subjects. The second volume was projected as a study of the origins of the modern notion of a subject in practices of Christian confession. Foucault wrote such a study The Confessions of the Flesh but did not publish it because he decided that a proper understanding of the Christian development required a comparison with ancient conceptions of the ethical self. This led to two volumes 4 on Grecian and Roman sexuality: The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self. These final writings make explicit the ethical project that in fact informs all of Foucault’s work: the liberation of human beings from contingent conceptual constraints masked as unsurpassable a priori limits and the adumbration of alternative forms of existence.

Grice’s foundationalism: the view that knowledge and epistemic knowledge-relevant justification have a two-tier structure: some instances of knowledge and justification are non-inferential, or foundational; and all other instances thereof are inferential, or non-foundational, in that they derive ultimately from foundational knowledge or justification. This structural view originates in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics at least regarding knowledge, receives an extreme formulation in Descartes’s Meditations, and flourishes, with varying details, in the works of such twentieth-century philosophers as Russell, C. I. Lewis, and Chisholm. Versions of foundationalism differ on two main projects: a the precise explanation of the nature of non-inferential, or foundational, knowledge and justification, and b the specific explanation of how foundational knowledge and justification can be transmitted to non-foundational beliefs. Foundationalism allows for differences on these projects, since it is essentially a view about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification. The question whether knowledge has foundations is essentially the question whether the sort of justification pertinent to knowledge has a twotier structure. Some philosophers have construed the former question as asking whether knowledge depends on beliefs that are certain in some sense e.g., indubitable or infallible. This construal bears, however, on only one species of foundationalism: radical foundationalism. Such foundationalism, represented primarily by Descartes, requires that foundational beliefs be certain and able to guarantee the certainty of the non-foundational beliefs they support. Radical foundationalism is currently unpopular for two main reasons. First, very few, if any, of our perceptual beliefs are certain i.e., indubitable; and, second, those of our beliefs that might be candidates for certainty e.g., the belief that I am thinking lack sufficient substance to guarantee the certainty of our rich, highly inferential knowledge of the external world e.g., our knowledge of physics, chemistry, and biology. Contemporary foundationalists typically endorse modest foundationalism, the view that non-inferentially justified, foundational beliefs need not possess or provide certainty and need not deductively support justified non-foundational beliefs. Foundational beliefs or statements are often called basic beliefs or statements, but the precise understanding of ‘basic’ here is controversial among foundationalists. Foundationalists agree, however, in their general understanding of non-inferentially justified, foundational beliefs as beliefs whose justification does not derive from other beliefs, although they leave open whether the causal basis of foundational beliefs includes other beliefs. Epistemic justification comes in degrees, but for simplicity we can restrict discussion to justification sufficient for satisfaction of the justification condition for knowledge; we can also restrict discussion to what it takes for a belief to have justification, omitting issues of what it takes to show that a belief has it. Three prominent accounts of non-inferential justification are available to modest foundationalists: a self-justification, b justification by non-belief, non-propositional experiences, and c justification by a non-belief reliable origin of a belief. Proponents of self-justification including, at one time, Ducasse and Chisholm contend that foundational beliefs can justify themselves, with no evidential support elsewhere. Proponents of foundational justification by non-belief experiences shun literal self-justification; they hold, following C. I. Lewis, that foundational perceptual beliefs can be justified by non-belief sensory or perceptual experiences e.g., seeming to see a dictionary that make true, are best explained by, or otherwise support, those beliefs e.g., the belief that there is, or at least appears to be, a dictionary here. Proponents of foundational justification by reliable origins find the basis of non-inferential justification in belief-forming processes e.g., perception, memory, introspection that are truth-conducive, i.e., that tend to produce true rather than false beliefs. This view thus appeals to the reliability of a belief’s nonbelief origin, whereas the previous view appeals to the particular sensory or perceptual experiences that correspond to e.g., make true or are best explained by a foundational belief. Despite disagreements over the basis of foundational justification, modest foundationalists typically agree that foundational justification is characterized by defeasibility, i.e., can be defeated, undermined, or overridden by a certain sort of expansion of one’s evidence or justified beliefs. For instance, your belief that there is a blue dictionary before you could lose its justification e.g., the justification from your current perceptual experiences if you acquired new evidence that there is a blue light shining on the dictionary before you. Foundational justification, therefore, can vary over time if accompanied by relevant changes in one’s perceptual evidence. It does not follow, however, that foundational justification positively depends, i.e., is based, on grounds for denying that there are defeaters. The relevant dependence can be regarded as negative in that there need only be an absence of genuine defeaters. Critics of foundationalism sometimes neglect that latter distinction regarding epistemic dependence. The second big task for foundationalists is to explain how justification transmits from foundational beliefs to inferentially justified, non-foundational beliefs. Radical foundationalists insist, for such transmission, on entailment relations that guarantee the truth or the certainty of nonfoundational beliefs. Modest foundationalists are more flexible, allowing for merely probabilistic inferential connections that transmit justification. For instance, a modest foundationalist can appeal to explanatory inferential connections, as when a foundational belief e.g., I seem to feel wet is best explained for a person by a particular physical-object belief e.g., the belief that the air conditioner overhead is leaking on me. Various other forms of probabilistic inference are available to modest foundationalists; and nothing in principle requires that they restrict foundational beliefs to what one “seems” to sense or to perceive. The traditional motivation for foundationalism comes largely from an eliminative regress argument, outlined originally regarding knowledge in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. The argument, in shortest form, is that foundationalism is a correct account of the structure of justification since the alternative accounts all fail. Inferential justification is justification wherein one belief, B1, is justified on the basis of another belief, B2. How, if at all, is B2, the supporting belief, itself justified? Obviously, Aristotle suggests, we cannot have a circle here, where B2 is justified by B1; nor can we allow the chain of support to extend endlessly, with no ultimate basis for justification. We cannot, moreover, allow B2 to remain unjustified, foundationalism foundationalism 322 322 lest it lack what it takes to support B1. If this is right, the structure of justification does not involve circles, endless regresses, or unjustified starter-beliefs. That is, this structure is evidently foundationalist. This is, in skeletal form, the regress argument for foundationalism. Given appropriate flesh, and due attention to skepticism about justification, this argument poses a serious challenge to non-foundationalist accounts of the structure of epistemic justification, such as epistemic coherentism. More significantly, foundationalism will then show forth as one of the most compelling accounts of the structure of knowledge and justification. This explains, at least in part, why foundationalism has been very prominent historically and is still widely held in contemporary epistemology.

fourier: f.-m.-c. social theorist and radical critic, often called a utopian socialist. His main works were The Theory of Universal Unity 1822 and The New Industrial and Societal World 1829. He argued that since each person has, not an integral soul but only a partial one, personal integrity is possible only in unity with others. Fourier thought that all existing societies were antagonistic. Following Edenism, he believed societies developed through stages of savagery, patriarchalism, barbarianism, and civilization. He believed this antagonism could be transcended only in Harmony. It would be based on twelve kinds of passions. Five were sensual, four affective, and three distributive; and these in turn encouraged the passion for unity. The basic social unit would be a phalanx containing 300 400 families about 1,6001,800 people of scientifically blended characters. As a place of production but also of maximal satisfaction of the passions of every member, Harmony should make labor attractive and pleasurable. The main occupations of its members should be gastronomy, opera, and horticulture. It should also establish a new world of love a form of polygamy where men and women would be equal in rights. Fourier believed that phalanxes would attract members of all other social systems, even the less civilized, and bring about this new world system. Fourier’s vision of cooperation both in theory and experimental practice influenced some anarchists, syndicalists, and the cooperationist movement. His radical social critique was important for the development of political and social thought in France, Europe, and North America.

frankena: w. philosopher who wrote a series of influential articles and a text, Ethics 3, which was tr. into eight languages and remains in use today. Frankena taught at the of Michigan 778, where he and his colleagues C. L. Stevenson 879, a leading noncognitivist, and Richard Brandt, an important ethical naturalist, formed for many years one of the most formidable faculties in moral philosophy in the world. Frankena was known for analytical rigor and sharp insight, qualities already evident in his first essay, “The Naturalistic Fallacy” 9, which refuted Moore’s influential claim that ethical naturalism or any other reductionist ethical theory could be convicted of logical error. At best, Frankena showed, reductionists could be said to conflate or misidentify ethical properties with properties of some other kind. Even put this way, such assertions were question-begging, Frankena argued. Where Moore claimed to see properties of two different kinds, naturalists and other reductionists claimed to be able to see only one. Many of Frankena’s most important papers concerned similarly fundamental issues about value and normative judgment. “Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy” 8, for example, is a classic treatment of the debate between internalism, which holds that motivation is essential to obligation or to the belief or perception that one is obligated, and externalism, which holds that motivation is only contingently related to these. In addition to metaethics, Frankena’s published works ranged broadly over normative ethical theory, virtue ethics, moral psychology, religious ethics, moral education, and the philosophy of education. Although relatively few of his works were devoted exclusively to the area, Frankena was also known as the preeminent historian of ethics of his day. More usually, Frankena used the history of ethics as a framework within which to discuss issues of perennial interest. It was, however, for Ethics, one of the most widely used and frequently cited philosophical ethics textbooks of the twentieth century, that Frankena was perhaps best known. Ethics continues to provide an unparalleled introduction to the subject, as useful in a first undergraduate course as it is to graduate students and professional philosophers looking for perspicuous ways to frame issues and categorize alternative solutions. For example, when in the 0s philosophers came to systematically investigate normative ethical theories, it was Frankena’s distinction in Ethics between deontological and teleological theories to which they referred.

frankfurt school: a group of philosophers, cultural critics, and social scientists associated with the Institute for Social Research, which was founded in Frankfurt. Its prominent members included, among others, the philosophers Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse, as well as the psychoanalyst Erich Fromm and the literary critic Walter Benjamin. Habermas is the leading representative of its second generation. The Frankfurt School is less known for particular theories or doctrines than for its program of a “critical theory of society.” Critical theory represents a sophisticated effort to continue Marx’s transformation of moral philosophy into social and political critique, while rejecting orthodox Marxism as a dogma. Critical theory is primarily a way of doing philosophy, integrating the normative aspects of philosophical reflection with the explanatory achievements of the social sciences. The ultimate goal of its program is to link theory and practice, to provide insight, and to empower subjects to change their oppressive circumstances and achieve human emancipation, a rational society that satisfies human needs and powers. The first generation of the Frankfurt School went through three phases of development. The first, lasting from the beginning of the Institute until the end of the 0s, can be called “interdisciplinary historical materialism” and is best represented in Horkheimer’s programmatic writings. Horkheimer argued that a revised version of historical materialism could organize the results of social research and give it a critical perspective. The second, “critical theory” phase saw the abandonment of Marxism for a more generalized notion of critique. However, with the near-victory of the Nazis in the early 0s, Horkheimer and Adorno entered the third phase of the School, “the critique of instrumental reason.” In their Dialectic of Enlightenment 1 as well as in Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man 4, the process of instrumentally dominating nature leads to dehumanization and the domination of human beings. In their writings after World War II, Adorno and Horkheimer became increasingly pessimistic, seeing around them a “totally administered society” and a manipulated, commodity culture. Horkheimer’s most important essays are from the first phase and focus on the relation of philosophy and social science. Besides providing a clear definition and program for critical social science, he proposes that the normative orientation of philosophy should be combined with the empirical research in the social sciences. This metaphilosophical orientation distinguishes a “critical,” as opposed to “traditional,” theory. For example, such a program demands rethinking the relation of epistemology to the sociology of science. A critical theory seeks to show how the norm of truth is historical and practical, without falling into the skepticism or relativism of traditional sociologies of knowledge such as Mannheim’s. Adorno’s major writings belong primarily to the second and third phases of the development of the Frankfurt School. As the possibilities for criticism appeared to him increasingly narrow, Adorno sought to discover them in aesthetic experience and the mimetic relation to nature. Adorno’s approach was motivated by his view that modern society is a “false totality.” His diagnosis of the causes traced this trend back to the spread of a one-sided, instrumental reason, based on the domination of nature and other human beings. For this reason, he sought a noninstrumental and non-dominating relation to nature and to others, and found it in diverse and fragmentary experiences. Primarily, it is art that preserves this possibility in contemporary society, since in art there is a possibility of mimesis, or the “non-identical” relation to the object. Adorno’s influential attempt to avoid “the logic of identity” gives his posthumous Aesthetic Theory 0 and other later works a paradoxical character. It was in reaction to the third phase that the second generation of the Frankfurt School recast the idea of a critical theory. Habermas argued for a new emphasis on normative foundations as well as a return to an interdisciplinary research program in the social sciences. After first developing such a foundation in a theory of cognitive interests technical, practical, and emancipatory, Habermas turned to a theory of the unavoidable presuppositions of communicative action and an ethics of discourse. The potential for emancipatory change lies in communicative, or discursive, rationality and practices that embody it, such as the democratic public sphere. Habermas’s analysis of communication seeks to provide norms for non-dominating relations to others and a broader notion of reason.

free: “ “Free” is one of the trickiest adjectives in English. My favourite is ‘alcohol-free’. And then there’s ‘free logic.”” Free logic, a system of quantification theory, with or without identity, that allows for non-denoting singular terms. In classical quantification theory, all singular terms free variables and individual constants are assigned a denotation in all models. But this condition appears counterintuitive when such systems are applied to natural language, where many singular terms seem to be non-denoting ‘Pegasus’, ‘Sherlock Holmes’, and the like. Various solutions of this problem have been proposed, ranging from Frege’s chosen object theory assign an arbitrary denotation to each non-denoting singular term to Russell’s description theory deny singular term status to most expressions used as such in natural language, and eliminate them from the “logical form” of that language to a weakening of the quantifiers’ “existential import,” which allows for denotations to be possible, but not necessarily actual, objects. All these solutions preserve the structure of classical quantification theory and make adjustments at the level of application. Free logic is a more radical solution: it allows for legitimate singular terms to be denotationless, maintains the quantifiers’ existential import, but modifies both the proof theory and the semantics of first-order logic. Within proof theory, the main modification consists of eliminating the rule of existential generalization, which allows one to infer ‘There exists a flying horse’ from ‘Pegasus is a flying horse’. Within semantics, the main problem is giving truth conditions for sentences containing non-denoting singular terms, and there are various ways of accomplishing this. Conventional semantics assigns truth-values to atomic sentences containing non-denoting singular terms by convention, and then determines the truth-values of complex sentences as usual. Outer domain semantics divides the domain of interpretation into an inner and an outer part, using the inner part as the range of quantifiers and the outer part to provide for “denotations” for non-denoting singular terms which are then not literally denotationless, but rather left without an existing denotation. Supervaluational semantics, when considering a sentence A, assigns all possible combinations of truth-values to the atomic components of A containing non-denoting singular terms, evaluates A on the basis of each of those combinations, and then assigns to A the logical product of all such evaluations. Thus both ‘Pegasus flies’ and ‘Pegasus does not fly’ turn out truth-valueless, but ‘Pegasus flies or Pegasus does not fly’ turns out true since whatever truth-value is assigned to its atomic component ‘Pegasus flies’ the truth-value for the whole sentence is true. A free logic is inclusive if it allows for the possibility that the range of quantifiers be empty that there exists nothing at all; it is exclusive otherwise. Then there’s the free rider, a person who benefits from a social arrangement without bearing an appropriate share of the burdens of maintaining that arrangement, e.g. one who benefits from government services without paying one’s taxes that support them. The arrangements from which a free rider benefits may be either formal or informal. Cooperative arrangements that permit free riders are likely to be unstable; parties to the arrangement are unlikely to continue to bear the burdens of maintaining it if others are able to benefit without doing their part. As a result, it is common for cooperative arrangements to include mechanisms to discourage free riders, e.g. legal punishment, or in cases of informal conventions the mere disapproval of one’s peers. It is a matter of some controversy as to whether it is always morally wrong to benefit from an arrangement without contributing to its maintenance. Then there’s the free will problem, the problem of the nature of free agency and its relation to the origins and conditions of responsible behavior. For those who contrast ‘free’ with ‘determined’, a central question is whether humans are free in what they do or determined by external events beyond their control. A related concern is whether an agent’s responsibility for an action requires that the agent, the act, or the relevant decision be free. This, in turn, directs attention to action, motivation, deliberation, choice, and intention, and to the exact sense, if any, in which our actions are under our control. Use of ‘free will’ is a matter of traditional nomenclature; it is debated whether freedom is properly ascribed to the will or the agent, or to actions, choices, deliberations, etc. Controversy over conditions of responsible behavior forms the predominant historical and conceptual background of the free will problem. Most who ascribe moral responsibility acknowledge some sense in which agents must be free in acting as they do; we are not responsible for what we were forced to do or were unable to avoid no matter how hard we tried. But there are differing accounts of moral responsibility and disagreements about the nature and extent of such practical freedom a notion also important in Kant. Accordingly, the free will problem centers on these questions: Does moral responsibility require any sort of practical freedom? If so, what sort? Are people practically free? Is practical freedom consistent with the antecedent determination of actions, thoughts, and character? There is vivid debate about this last question. Consider a woman deliberating about whom to vote for. From her first-person perspective, she feels free to vote for any candidate and is convinced that the selection is up to her regardless of prior influences. But viewing her eventual behavior as a segment of larger natural and historical processes, many would argue that there are underlying causes determining her choice. With this contrast of intuitions, any attempt to decide whether the voter is free depends on the precise meanings associated with terms like ‘free’, ‘determine’, and ‘up to her’. One thing event, situation determines another if the latter is a consequence of it, or necessitated by it, e.g., the voter’s hand movements by her intention. As usually understood, determinism holds that whatever happens is determined by antecedent conditions, where determination is standardly conceived as causation by antecedent events and circumstances. So construed, determinism implies that at any time the future is already fixed and unique, with no possibility of alternative development. Logical versions of determinism declare each future event to be determined by what is already true, specifically, by the truth that it will occur then. Typical theological variants accept the predestination of all circumstances and events inasmuch as a divine being knows in advance or even from eternity that they will obtain. Two elements are common to most interpretations of ‘free’. First, freedom requires an absence of determination or certain sorts of determination, and second, one acts and chooses freely only if these endeavors are, properly speaking, one’s own. From here, accounts diverge. Some take freedom liberty of indifference or the contingency of alternative courses of action to be critical. Thus, for the woman deliberating about which candidate to select, each choice is an open alternative inasmuch as it is possible but not yet necessitated. Indifference is also construed as motivational equilibrium, a condition some find essential to the idea that a free choice must be rational. Others focus on freedom liberty of spontaneity, where the voter is free if she votes as she chooses or desires, a reading that reflects the popular equation of freedom with “doing what you want.” Associated with both analyses is a third by which the woman acts freely if she exercises her control, implying responsiveness to free rider free will problem 326 326 intent as well as both abilities to perform an act and to refrain. A fourth view identifies freedom with autonomy, the voter being autonomous to the extent that her selection is self-determined, e.g., by her character, deeper self, higher values, or informed reason. Though distinct, these conceptions are not incompatible, and many accounts of practical freedom include elements of each. Determinism poses problems if practical freedom requires contingency alternate possibilities of action. Incompatibilism maintains that determinism precludes freedom, though incompatibilists differ whether everything is determined. Those who accept determinism thereby endorse hard determinism associated with eighteenthcentury thinkers like d’Holbach and, recently, certain behaviorists, according to which freedom is an illusion since behavior is brought about by environmental and genetic factors. Some hard determinists also deny the existence of moral responsibility. At the opposite extreme, metaphysical libertarianism asserts that people are free and responsible and, a fortiori, that the past does not determine a unique future a position some find enhanced by developments in quantum physics. Among adherents of this sort of incompatibilism are those who advocate a freedom of indifference by describing responsible choices as those that are undetermined by antecedent circumstances Epicureans. To rebut the charge that choices, so construed, are random and not really one’s “own,” it has been suggested that several elements, including an agent’s reasons, delimit the range of possibilities and influence choices without necessitating them a view held by Leibniz and, recently, by Robert Kane. Libertarians who espouse agency causation, on the other hand, blend contingency with autonomy in characterizing a free choice as one that is determined by the agent who, in turn, is not caused to make it a view found in Carneades and Reid. Unwilling to abandon practical freedom yet unable to understand how a lack of determination could be either necessary or desirable for responsibility, many philosophers take practical freedom and responsibility to be consistent with determinism, thereby endorsing compatibilism. Those who also accept determinism advocate what James called soft determinism. Its supporters include some who identify freedom with autonomy the Stoics, Spinoza and others who champion freedom of spontaneity Hobbes, Locke, Hume. The latter speak of liberty as the power of doing or refraining from an action according to what one wills, so that by choosing otherwise one would have done otherwise. An agent fails to have liberty when constrained, that is, when either prevented from acting as one chooses or compelled to act in a manner contrary to what one wills. Extending this model, liberty is also diminished when one is caused to act in a way one would not otherwise prefer, either to avoid a greater danger coercion or because there is deliberate interference with the envisioning of alternatives manipulation. Compatibilists have shown considerable ingenuity in responding to criticisms that they have ignored freedom of choice or the need for open alternatives. Some apply the spontaneity, control, or autonomy models to decisions, so that the voter chooses freely if her decision accords with her desires, is under her control, or conforms to her higher values, deeper character, or informed reason. Others challenge the idea that responsibility requires alternative possibilities of action. The so-called Frankfurt-style cases developed by Harry G. Frankfurt are situations where an agent acts in accord with his desires and choices, but because of the presence of a counterfactual intervener a mechanism that would have prevented the agent from doing any alternative action had he shown signs of acting differently the agent could not have done otherwise. Frankfurt’s intuition is that the agent is as responsible as he would have been if there were no intervener, and thus that responsible action does not require alternative possibilities. Critics have challenged the details of the Frankfurt-style cases in attempting to undermine the appeal of the intuition. A different compatibilist tactic recognizes the need for open alternatives and employs versions of the indifference model in describing practical freedom. Choices are free if they are contingent relative to certain subsets of circumstances, e.g. those the agent is or claims to be cognizant of, with the openness of alternatives grounded in what one can choose “for all one knows.” Opponents of compatibilism charge that since these refinements leave agents subject to external determination, even by hidden controllers, compatibilism continues to face an insurmountable challenge. Their objections are sometimes summarized by the consequence argument so called by Peter van Inwagen, who has prominently defended it: if everything were determined by factors beyond one’s control, then one’s acts, choices, and character would also be beyond one’s control, and consequently, agents would never be free and there would be nothing free will problem free will problem 327 327 for which they are responsible. Such reasoning usually employs principles asserting the closure of the practical modalities ability, control, avoidability, inevitability, etc. under consequence relations. However, there is a reason to suppose that the sort of ability and control required by responsibility involve the agent’s sense of what can be accomplished. Since cognitive states are typically not closed under consequence, the closure principles underlying the consequence argument are disputable.

freges sättigung: Frege’s original Sinn. Fregeian saturation. Grice was once at the Bodleian assisting Austin in his translation of Frege’s Grundlegung – and browsing through the old-style library fiches, Grice exclaims: “All these essays in German journals about Fregeian saturation can surely saturate one!’ Austin was not amused. Neben mathematischen und physikalischen Vorlesungen sowie einer in Philosophie hat Frege in Jena Vorlesungen in Chemie besucht und in diesem Fach auch an einem einsemestrigen Praktikum teilgenommen. In seiner wohlbekannten Rede über Bindung und Sättigung von Ausdrücken klingt davon noch etwas nach.Betrachten wir nun die Konsequenzen der Fregeschen Auffassung der prädikativen Natur der Begriffe. Hierfür ist es zunächst erforderlich, abschließend einige Besonderheiten anzumerken, die daraus folgen, daß auch Begriffsausdrücke bedeutungsvoll sein sollen. Zunächst hatten wir ja mit Hilfe der Analogie festgestellt, daß in einem Satz dasjenige, was Begriffsausdrücke bedeuten, denselben ontologischen Status haben muß wie das, was Eigennamen bedeuten. Insofern scheinen sowohl Eigennamen als auch Begriffsausdrücke jeweils bestimmte (wenn auch hinsichtlich ihrer Sättigung oder Bindungsfähigkeit unterschiedene) Entitäten als Bedeutung zu haben. Und Frege erklärt auch explizit „Begriff ist Bedeutung eines Prädikates“ [BG, 198]. Frege’s distinction between saturated expressions and unsaturated expressions corresponds to the distinction between objects and concepts. A saturated expression refers to an object or argument and has a complete sense in itself, while an unsaturated expression refers to a concept or function and does not have a complete sense. For example, in the sentence “Socrates is the teacher of Plato,” “Socrates” and “Plato” are proper names and are saturated, while “. . . is the teacher of . . .” is unsaturated, for it has empty spaces that must be filled with saturated expressions before it gains a complete sense. “Statements in general . . . can be imagined to be split up into two parts; one complete in itself, and the other in need of supplementation, or ‘unsaturated’.” Frege, “Function and Concept,” Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. -- frege, G., philosopher. A founder of modern mathematical logic, an advocate of logicism, and a major source of twentieth-century analytic philosophy, he directly influenced Russell, Vitters, and Carnap. Frege’s distinction between the sense and the reference of linguistic expressions continues to be debated. His first publication in logic was his strikingly original 1879 Begriffsschrift Concept-notation. Here he devised a formal language whose central innovation is the quantifier-variable notation to express generality; he set forth in this language a version of second-order quantificational logic that he used to develop a logical definition of the ancestral of a relation. Frege invented his Begriffsschrift in order to circumvent drawbacks of the use of colloquial language to state proofs. Colloquial language is irregular, unperspicuous, and ambiguous in its expression of logical relationships. Moreover, logically crucial features of the content of statements may remain tacit and unspoken. It is thus impossible to determine exhaustively the premises on which the conclusion of any proof conducted within ordinary language depends. Frege’s Begriffsschrift is to force the explicit statement of the logically relevant features of any assertion. Proofs in the system are limited to what can be obtained from a body of evidently true logical axioms by means of a small number of truth-preserving notational manipulations inference rules. Here is the first hallmark of Frege’s view of logic: his formulation of logic as a formal system and the ideal of explicitness and rigor that this presentation subserves. Although the formal exactitude with which he formulates logic makes possible the metamathematical investigation of formalized theories, he showed almost no interest in metamathematical questions. He intended the Begriffsschrift to be used. How though does Frege conceive of the subject matter of logic? His orientation in logic is shaped by his anti-psychologism, his conviction that psychology has nothing to do with logic. He took his notation to be a full-fledged language in its own right. The logical axioms do not mention objects or properties whose investigation pertains to some special science; and Frege’s quantifiers are unrestricted. Laws of logic are, as he says, the laws of truth, and these are the most general truths. He envisioned the supplementation of the logical vocabulary of the Begriffsschrift with the basic vocabulary of the special sciences. In this way the Begriffsschrift affords a framework for the completely rigorous deductive development of any science whatsoever. This resolutely nonpsychological universalist view of logic as the most general science is the second hallmark of Frege’s view of logic. This universalist view distinguishes his approach sharply from the coeval algebra of logic approach of George Boole and Ernst Schröder. Vitters, both in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 1 and in later writings, is very critical of Frege’s universalist view. Logical positivism most notably Carnap in The Logical Syntax of Language 4 rejected it as well. Frege’s universalist view is also distinct from more contemporary views. With his view of quantifiers as intrinsically unrestricted, he saw little point in talking of varying interpretations of a language, believing that such talk is a confused way of getting at what is properly said by means of second-order generalizations. In particular, the semantical conception of logical consequences that becomes prominent in logic after Kurt Gödel’s and Tarski’s work is foreign to Frege. Frege’s work in logic was prompted by an inquiry after the ultimate foundation for arithmetic truths. He criticized J. S. Mill’s empiricist attempt to ground knowledge of the arithmetic of the positive integers inductively in our manipulations of small collections of things. He also rejected crudely formalist views that take pure mathematics to be a sort of notational game. In contrast to these views and Kant’s, he hoped to use his Begriffsschrift to define explicitly the basic notions of arithmetic in logical terms and to deduce the basic principles of arithmetic from logical axioms and these definitions. The explicitness and rigor of his formulation of logic will guarantee that there are no implicit extralogical premises on which the arithmetical conclusions depend. Such proofs, he believed, would show arithmetic to be analytic, not synthetic as Kant had claimed. However, Frege redefined ‘analytic’ to mean ‘provable from logical laws’ in his rather un-Kantian sense of ‘logic’ and definitions. Frege’s strategy for these proofs rests on an analysis of the concept of cardinal number that he presented in his nontechnical 4 book, The Foundations of Arithmetic. Frege, attending to the use of numerals in statements like ‘Mars has two moons’, argued that it contains an assertion about a concept, that it asserts that there are exactly two things falling under the concept ‘Martian moon’. He also noted that both numerals in these statements and those of pure arithmetic play the logical role of singular terms, his proper names. He concluded that numbers are objects so that a definition of the concept of number must then specify what objects numbers are. He observed that 1 the number of F % the number of G just in case there is a one-to-one correspondence between the objects that are F and those that are G. The right-hand side of 1 is statable in purely logical terms. As Frege recognized, thanks to the definition of the ancestral of a relation, 1 suffices in the second-order setting of the Begriffsschrift for the derivation of elementary arithmetic. The vindication of his logicism requires, however, the logical definition of the expression ‘the number of’. He sharply criticized the use in mathematics of any notion of set or collection that views a set as built up from its elements. However, he assumed that, corresponding to each concept, there is an object, the extension of the concept. He took the notion of an extension to be a logical one, although one to which the notion of a concept is prior. He adopted as a fundamental logical principle the ill-fated biconditional: the extension of F % the extension of G just in case every F is G, and vice versa. If this principle were valid, he could exploit the equivalence relation over concepts that figures in the right-hand side of 1 to identify the number of F with a certain extension and thus obtain 1 as a theorem. In The Basic Laws of Arithmetic vol. 1, 3; vol. 2, 3 he formalized putative proofs of basic arithmetical laws within a modified version of the Begriffsschrift that included a generalization of the law of extensions. However, Frege’s law of extensions, in the context of his logic, is inconsistent, leading to Russell’s paradox, as Russell communicated to Frege in 2. Frege’s attempt to establish logicism was thus, on its own terms, unsuccessful. In Begriffsschrift Frege rejected the thesis that every uncompound sentence is logically segmented into a subject and a predicate. Subsequently, he said that his approach in logic was distinctive in starting not from the synthesis of concepts into judgments, but with the notion of truth and that to which this notion is applicable, the judgeable contents or thoughts that are expressed by statements. Although he said that truth is the goal of logic, he did not think that we have a grasp of the notion of truth that is independent of logic. He eschewed a correspondence theory of truth, embracing instead a redundancy view of the truth-predicate. For Frege, to call truth the goal of logic points toward logic’s concern with inference, with the recognition-of-thetruth judging of one thought on the basis of the recognition-of-the-truth of another. This recognition-of-the-truth-of is not verbally expressed by a predicate, but rather in the assertive force with which a sentence is uttered. The starting point for logic is then reflection on elementary inference patterns that analyze thoughts and reveal a logical segmentation in language. This starting point, and the fusion of logical and ontological categories it engenders, is arguably what Frege is pointing toward by his enigmatic context principle in Foundations: only in the context of a sentence does a word have a meaning. He views sentences as having a function-argument segmentation like that manifest in the terms of arithmetic, e.g., 3 $ 4 ! 2. Truth-functional inference patterns, like modus ponens, isolate sentences as logical units in compound sentences. Leibniz’s law the substitution of one name for another in a sentence on the basis of an equation isolates proper names. Proper names designate objects. Predicates, obtainable by removing proper names from sentences, designate concepts. The removal of a predicate from a sentence leaves a higher level predicate that signifies a second-level concept under which first-level concepts fall. An example is the universal quantifier over objects: it designates a second-level concept under which a first-level concept falls, if every object falls under it. Frege takes each first-level concept to be determinately true or false of each object. Vague predicates, like ‘is bald’, thus fail to signify concepts. This requirement of concept determinacy is a product of Frege’s construal of quantification over objects as intrinsically unrestricted. Thus, concept determinacy is simply a form of the law of the excluded middle: for any concept F and any object x, either x is F or x is not F. Frege elaborates and modifies his basic logical ideas in three seminal papers from , “Function and Concept,” “On Concept and Frege, Gottlob Frege, Gottlob 329 329 Object,” and “On Sense and Meaning.” In “Function and Concept,” Frege sharpens his conception of the function-argument structure of language. He introduces the two truth-values, the True and the False, and maintains that sentences are proper names of these objects. Concepts become functions that map objects to either the True or the False. The course-of-values of a function is introduced as a generalization of the notion of an extension. Generally then, an object is anything that might be designated by a proper name. There is nothing more basic to be said by way of elucidating what an object is. Similarly, first-level functions are what are designated by the expressions that result from removing names from compound proper names. Frege calls functions unsaturated or incomplete, in contrast to objects, which are saturated. Proper names and function names are not intersubstitutable so that the distinction between objects and functions is a type-theoretic, categorial distinction. No function is an object; no function name designates an object; there are no quantifiers that simultaneously generalize over both functions and concepts. Just here Frege’s exposition of his views, if not the views themselves, encounter a difficulty. In explaining his views, he uses proper names of the form ‘the concept F’ to talk about concepts; and in contrasting unsaturated functions with saturated objects, apepars to generalize over both with a single quantifier. Benno Kerry, a contemporary of Frege, charged Frege’s views with inconsistency. Since the phrase ‘the concept horse’ is a proper name, it must designate an object. On Frege’s view, it follows that the concept ‘horse’ is not a concept, but an object, an apparent inconsistency. Frege responded to Kerry’s criticism in “On Concept and Object.” He embraced Kerry’s paradox, denying that it represents a genuine inconsistency, while admitting that his remarks about the functionobject distinction are, as the result of an unavoidable awkwardness of language, misleading. Frege maintained that the distinction between function and object is logically simple and so cannot be properly defined. His remarks on the distinction are informal handwaving designed to elucidate what is captured within the Begriffsschrift by the difference between proper names and function names together with their associated distinct quantifiers. Frege’s handling of the function object distinction is a likely source for Vitters’s sayshow distinction in the Tractatus. At the beginning of “On Sense and Meaning,” Frege distinguishes between the reference or meaning Bedeutung of a proper name and its sense Sinn. He observes that the sentence ‘The Morning Star is identical with the Morning Star’ is a trivial instance of the principle of identity. In contrast, the sentence ‘The Morning Star is identical with the Evening Star’ expresses a substantive astronomical discovery. The two sentences thus differ in what Frege called their cognitive value: someone who understood both might believe the first and doubt the second. This difference cannot be explained in terms of any difference in reference between names in these sentences. Frege explained it in terms of a difference between the senses expressed by ‘the Morning Star’ and ‘the Evening Star’. In posthumously published writings, he indicated that the sensereference distinction extends to function names as well. In this distinction, Frege extends to names the notion of the judgeable content expressed by a sentence: the sense of a name is the contribution that the name makes to the thought expressed by sentences in which it occurs. Simultaneously, in classifying sentences as proper names of truth-values, he applies to sentences the notion of a name’s referring to something. Frege’s function-argument view of logical segmentation constrains his view of both the meaning and the sense of compound names: the substitution for any name occurring in a compound expression of a name with the same reference sense yields a new compound expression with the same reference sense as the original. Frege advances several theses about sense that individually and collectively have been a source of debate in philosophy of language. First, the sense of an expression is what is grasped by anyone who understands it. Despite the connection between understanding and sense, Frege provides no account of synonymy, no identity criteria for senses. Second, the sense of an expression is not something psychological. Senses are objective. They exist independently of anyone’s grasping them; their availability to different thinkers is a presupposition for communication in science. Third, the sense expressed by a name is a mode of presentation of the name’s reference. Here Frege’s views contrast with Russell’s. Corresponding to Frege’s thoughts are Russell’s propositions. In The Principles of Mathematics 3, Russell maintained that the meaningful words in a sentence designate things, properties, and relations that are themselves constituents of the proposition expressed by the sentence. For Frege, our access through judgment to objects and functions is via Frege, Gottlob Frege, Gottlob 330 330 the senses that are expressed by names that mean these items. These senses, not the items they present, occur in thoughts. Names expressing different senses may refer to the same item; and some names, while expressing a sense, refer to nothing. Any compound name containing a name that has a sense, but lacks a reference, itself lacks a meaning. A person may fully understand an expression without knowing whether it means anything and without knowing whether it designates what another understood name does. Fourth, the sense ordinarily expressed by a name is the reference of the name, when the name occurs in indirect discourse. Although the Morning Star is identical with the Evening Star, the inference from the sentence ‘Smith believes that the Morning Star is a planet’ to ‘Smith believes that the Evening Star is a planet’ is not sound. Frege, however, accepts Leibniz’s law without restriction. He accordingly takes such seeming failures of Leibniz’s law to expose a pervasive ambiguity in colloquial language: names in indirect discourse do not designate what they designate outside of indirect discourse. The fourth thesis is offered as an explanation of this ambiguity.

liberatum: liberum arbitrium – vide ‘arbitrium’ How can arbitrium not be free? Oddly this concerns rationality. For Grice, as for almost everyone, a rational agent is an autonomous agent. Freewill is proved grammatically. The Romans had a ‘modus deliberativus’, and even a ‘modus optativus’ (ortike ktesis) “in imitationem Graecis.”If you utter “Close the door!” you rely on free will. It would be otiose for a language or system of communication to have as its goal to inform/get informed, and influence/being influenced if determinism and fatalism were true. freedom: Like identity, crucial in philosophy in covering everything. E cannot communicate that p, unless E is FREE. An amoeba cannot communicate thatp. End setting, unweighed rationality, rationality about the ends, autonomy. Grice was especially concerned with Kants having brought back the old Greek idea of eleutheria for philosophical discussion. Refs.: the obvious keywords are “freedom” and “free,” but most of the material is in “Actions and events,” in PPQ, and below under ‘kantianism’ – The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.Bratman, of Stanford, much influenced by Grice (at Berkeley then) thanks to their Hands-Across-the-Bay programme, helps us to understand this Pological progression towards the idea of strong autonomy or freedom. Recall that Grices Ps combine Lockes very intelligent parrots with Russells and Carnaps nonsensical Ps of which nothing we are told other than they karulise elatically. Grices purpose is to give a little thought to a question. What are the general principles exemplified, in creature-construction, in progressing from one type of P to a higher type? What kinds of steps are being made? The kinds of step with which Grice deals are those which culminate in a licence to include, within the specification of the content of the psychological state of this or that type of P, a range of expressions which would be inappropriate with respect to this lower-type P. Such expressions include this or that connective, this or that quantifier, this or that temporal modifier, this or that mode indicator, this or that modal operator, and (importantly) this or that expression to refer to this or that souly state like … judges that … and … will that … This or that expression, that is, the availability of which leads to the structural enrichment of the specification of content. In general, these steps will be ones by which this or that item or idea which has, initially, a legitimate place outside the scope of this or that souly instantiable (or, if you will, the expressions for which occur legitimately outside the scope of this or that souly predicate) come to have a legitimate place within the scope of such an instantiable, a step by which, one might say, this or that item or ideas comes to be internalised. Grice is disposed to regard as prototypical the sort of natural disposition or propension which Hume attributes to a person, and which is very important to Hume, viz. the tendency of the soul to spread itself upon objects, i.e. to project into the world items which, properly or primitively considered, is a feature of this or that souly state. Grice sets out in stages the application of aspects of the genitorial programme. We then start with a zero-order, with a P equipped to satisfy unnested, or logically amorphous, judging and willing, i.e. whose contents do not involve judging or willing. We soon reach our first P, G₁. It would be advantageous to a P₀ if it could have this or that judging and this or that willing, which relate to its own judging or willing. Such G₁ could be equipped to control or regulate its own judgings and willings. It will presumably be already constituted so as to conform to the law that, cæteris paribus, if it wills that p and judge that ~p, if it can, it makes it the case that p in its soul To give it some control over its judgings and willings, we need only extend the application of this law to the Ps judging and willing. We equip the P so that, cæteris paribus, if it wills that it is not the case that it wills that p and it judges that they do will that p, if it can, it makes it the case that it does not will that p. And we somehow ensure that sometimes it can do this. It may be that the installation of this kind of control would go hand in had with the installation of the capacity for evaluation. Now, unlike it is the case with a G1, a G2s intentional effort depends on the motivational strength of its considered desire at the time of action. There is a process by which this or that conflicting considered desire motivates action as a broadly causal process, a process that reveals motivational strength. But a G2 might itself try to weigh considerations provided by such a conflicting desire B1 and B2 in deliberation about this or that pro and this or that con of various alternatives. In the simplest case, such weighing treats each of the things desired as a prima facie justifying end. In the face of conflict, it weighs this and that desired end, where the weights correspond to the motivational strength of the associated considered desire. The outcome of such deliberation, Aristotle’s prohairesis, matches the outcome of the causal motivational process envisioned in the description of G₂. But, since the weights it invokes in such deliberation correspond to the motivational strength of this or that relevant considered desire (though perhaps not to the motivational strength of this or that relevant considered desire), the resultant activitiy matches those of a corresponding G₂ (each of whose desires, we are assuming, are considered). To be more realistic, we might limit ourselves to saying that a P₂ has the capacity to make the transition from this or that unconsidered desire to this or that considered desire, but does not always do this. But it will keep the discussion more manageable to simplify and to suppose that each desire is considered. We shall not want this G2 to depend, in each will and act in ways that reveal the motivational strength of this or that considered desire at the time of action, but for a G₃ it will also be the case that in this or that, though not each) case, it acts on the basis of how it weights this or that end favoured by this or that conflicting considered desire. This or that considered desire will concern matters that cannot be achieved simply by action at a single time. E. g. G3 may want to nurture a vegetable garden, or build a house. Such matters will require organized and coordinated action that extends over time. What the G3 does now will depend not only on what it now desires but also on what it now expects it will do later given what it does now. It needs a way of settling now what it will do later given what it does now. The point is even clearer when we remind ourselves that G3 is not alone. It is, we may assume, one of some number of G3; and in many cases it needs to coordinate what it does with what other G3 do so as to achieve ends desired by all participants, itself included. These costs are magnified for G4 whose various plans are interwoven so that a change in one element can have significant ripple effects that will need to be considered. Let us suppose that the general strategies G4 has for responding to new information about its circumstances are sensitive to these kinds of costs. Promoting in the long run the satisfaction of its considered desires and preferences. G₄ is a somewhat sophisticated planning agent but it has a problem. It can expect that its desires and preferences may well change over time and undermine its efforts at organizing and coordinating its activities over time. Perhaps in many cases this is due to the kind of temporal discounting. So for example G4 may have a plan to exercise every day but may tend to prefer a sequence of not exercising on the present day but exercising all days in the future, to a uniform sequence the present day included. At the end of the day it returns to its earlier considered preference in favour of exercising on each and every day. Though G₄, unlike G3, has the capacity to settle on prior plans or plaices concerning exercise, this capacity does not yet help in such a case. A creature whose plans were stable in ways in part shaped by such a no-regret principle would be more likely than G4 to resist temporary temptations. So let us build such a principle into the stability of the plans of a G5, whose plans and policies are not derived solely from facts about its limits of time, attention, and the like. It is also grounded in the central concerns of a planning agent with its own future, concerns that lend special significance to anticipated future regret. So let us add to G5 the capacity and disposition to arrive at such hierarchies of higher-order desires concerning its will. This gives us creature G6. There is a problem with G6, one that has been much discussed. It is not clear why a higher-order desire ‒ even a higher-order desire that a certain desire be ones will ‒ is not simply one more desire in the pool of desires (Berkeley Gods will problem). Why does it have the authority to constitute or ensure the agents (i. e. the creatures) endorsement or rejection of a first-order desire? Applied to G6 this is the question of whether, by virtue solely of its hierarchies of desires, it really does succeed in taking its own stand of endorsement or rejection of various first-order desires. Since it was the ability to take its own stand that we are trying to provide in the move to P₆, we need some response to this challenge. The basic point is that G₆ is not merely a time-slice agent. It is, rather, and understands itself to be, a temporally persisting planning agent, one who begins, and continues, and completes temporally extended projects. On a broadly Lockean view, its persistence over time consists in relevant psychological continuities (e.g., the persistence of attitudes of belief and intention) and connections (e.g., memory of a past event, or the later intentional execution of an intention formed earlier). Certain attitudes have as a primary role the constitution and support of such Lockean continuities and connections. In particular, policies that favour or reject various desires have it as their role to constitute and support various continuities both of ordinary desires and of the politicos themselves. For this reason such policies are not merely additional wiggles in the psychic stew. Instead, these policies have a claim to help determine where the agent ‒ i.e., the temporally persisting agent ‒ stands with respect to its desires, or so it seems to me reasonable to say. The psychology of G7 continues to have the hierarchical structure of pro-attitudes introduced with G6. The difference is that the higher-order pro-attitudes of G6 were simply characterized as desires in a broad, generic sense, and no appeal was made to the distinctive species of pro-attitude constituted by plan-like attitudes. That is the sense in which the psychology of G7 is an extension of the psychology of G6. Let us then give G7 such higher-order policies with the capacity to take a stand with respect to its desires by arriving at relevant higher-order policies concerning the functioning of those desires over time. G₇exhibits a merger of hierarchical and planning structures. Appealing to planning theory and ground in connection to the temporally extended structure of agency to be ones will. G7 has higher-order policies that favour or challenge motivational roles of its considered desires. When G7 engages in deliberative weighing of conflicting, desired ends it seems that the assigned weights should reflect the policies that determine where it stands with respect to relevant desires. But the policies we have so far appealed to ‒ policies concerning what desires are to be ones will ‒ do not quite address this concern. The problem is that one can in certain cases have policies concerning which desires are to motivate and yet these not be policies that accord what those desires are for a corresponding justifying role in deliberation. G8. A solution is to give our creature, G_8,the capacity to arrive at policies that express its commitment to be motivated by a desire by way of its treatment of that desire as providing, in deliberation, a justifying end for action. G₈has policies for treating (or not treating) certain desires as providing justifying ends, as, in this way, reason-providing, in motivationally effective deliberation. Let us call such policies self-governing policies. We will suppose that these policies are mutually compatible and do not challenge each other. In this way G8 involves an extension of structures already present in G7. The grounds on which G8 arrives at (and on occasion revises) such self-governing policies will be many and varied. We can see these policies as crystallizing complex pressures and concerns, some of which are grounded in other policies or desires. These self-governing policies may be tentative and will normally not be immune to change. If we ask what G8 values in this case, the answer seems to be: what it values is constituted in part by its higher-order self-governing policies. In particular, it values exercise over nonexercise even right now, and even given that it has a considered, though temporary, preference to the contrary. Unlike lower Ps, what P₈ now values is not simply a matter of its present, considered desires and preferences. Now this model of P8 seems in relevant aspects to be a partial) model of us, in our better moments, of course. So we arrive at the conjecture that one important kind of valuing of which we are capable involves, in the cited ways, both our first-order desires and our higher order self-governing policies. In an important sub-class of cases our valuing involves reflexive polices that are both first-order policies of action and higher-order policies to treat the first-order policy as reason providing in motivationally effective deliberation. This may seem odd. Valuing seems normally to be a first-order attitude. One values honesty, say. The proposal is that an important kind of valuing involves higher-order policies. Does this mean that, strictly speaking, what one values (in this sense) is itself a desire ‒ not honesty, say, but a desire for honesty? No, it does not. What I value in the present case is honesty; but, on the theory, my valuing honesty in art consists in certain higher-order self-governing policies. An agents reflective valuing involves a kind of higher-order willing. Freud challenged the power structure of the soul in Plato: it is the libido that takes control, not the logos. Grice takes up this polemic. Aristotle takes up Platos challenge, each type of soul is united to the next by the idea of life. The animal soul, between the vegetative and the rational, is not detachable.

Grice’s Freudian slip: Grice thought that the idea of a Freudian slip was ‘ridiculous,’ – for Grice ‘mean’ is intentional, unless it is used metaphorically, for ‘dark clouds mean rain.’ Since his interest is in ‘communicate,’ surely the ‘slipper’ (R. lapsus linguae) cannot ‘communicate.’ “What bothers me most is Freudian convoluted attempts to have this, as Lacan will, as the libido saying this or that!” -- Austrian neurologist and psychologist, the founder of psychoanalysis. Starting with the study of hysteria in late nineteenth-century Vienna, Freud developed a theory of the mind that has come to dominate modern thought. His notions of the unconscious, of a mind divided against itself, of the meaningfulness of apparently meaningless activity, of the displacement and transference of feelings, of stages of psychosexual development, of the pervasiveness and importance of sexual motivation, as well as of much else, have helped shape modern consciousness. His language and that of his translators, whether specifying divisions of the mind e.g. id, ego, and superego, types of disorder e.g. obsessional neurosis, or the structure of experience e.g. Oedipus complex, narcissism, has become the language in which we describe and understand ourselves and others. As the poet W. H. Auden wrote on the occasion of Freud’s death, “if often he was wrong and, at times, absurd, / to us he is no more a person / now but a whole climate of opinion / under whom we conduct our different lives. . . .” Hysteria is a disorder involving organic symptoms with no apparent organic cause. Following early work in neurophysiology, Freud in collaboration with Josef Breuer came to the view that “hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences,” in particular buried memories of traumatic experiences, the strangulated affect of which emerged in conversion hysteria in the distorted form of physical symptoms. Treatment involved the recovery of the repressed memories to allow the cathartic discharge or abreaction of the previously displaced and strangulated affect. This provided the background for Freud’s seduction theory, which traced hysterical symptoms to traumatic prepubertal sexual assaults typically by fathers. But Freud later abandoned the seduction theory because the energy assumptions were problematic e.g., if the only energy involved was strangulated affect from long-past external trauma, why didn’t the symptom successfully use up that energy and so clear itself up? and because he came to see that fantasy could have the same effects as memory of actual events: “psychical reality was of more importance than material reality.” What was repressed was not memories, but desires. He came to see the repetition of symptoms as fueled by internal, in particular sexual, energy. While it is certainly true that Freud saw the Frege-Geach point Freud, Sigmund 331 331 working of sexuality almost everywhere, it is not true that he explained everything in terms of sexuality alone. Psychoanalysis is a theory of internal psychic conflict, and conflict requires at least two parties. Despite developments and changes, Freud’s instinct theory was determinedly dualistic from beginning to end at the beginning, libido versus ego or self-preservative instincts, and at the end Eros versus Thanatos, life against death. Freud’s instinct theory not to be confused with standard biological notions of hereditary behavior patterns in animals places instincts on the borderland between the mental and physical and insists that they are internally complex. In particular, the sexual instinct must be understood as made up of components that vary along a number of dimensions source, aim, and object. Otherwise, as Freud argues in his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality 5, it would be difficult to understand how the various perversions are recognized as “sexual” despite their distance from the “normal” conception of sexuality heterosexual genital intercourse between adults. His broadened concept of sexuality makes intelligible sexual preferences emphasizing different sources erotogenic zones or bodily centers of arousal, aims acts, such as intercourse and looking, designed to achieve pleasure and satisfaction, and objects whether of the same or different gender, or even other than whole living persons. It also allows for the recognition of infantile sexuality. Phenomena that might not on the surface appear sexual e.g. childhood thumbsucking share essential characteristics with obviously sexual activity infantile sensual sucking involves pleasurable stimulation of the same erotogenic zone, the mouth, stimulated in adult sexual activities such as kissing, and can be understood as earlier stages in the development of the same underlying instinct that expresses itself in such various forms in adult sexuality. The standard developmental stages are oral, anal, phallic, and genital. Neuroses, which Freud saw as “the negative of perversions” i.e., the same desires that might in some lead to perverse activity, when repressed, result in neurosis, could often be traced to struggles with the Oedipus complex: the “nucleus of the neuroses.” The Oedipus complex, which in its positive form postulates sexual feelings toward the parent of the opposite sex and ambivalently hostile feelings toward the parent of the same sex, suggests that the universal shape of the human condition is a triangle. The conflict reaches its peak between the ages of three and five, during the phallic stage of psychosexual development. The fundamental structuring of emotions has its roots in the prolonged dependency of the human infant, leading to attachment a primary form of love to the primary caregiver, who partly for biological reasons such as lactation is most often the mother, and the experience of others as rivals for the time, attention, and concern of the primary caregiver. Freud’s views of the Oedipus complex should not be oversimplified. The sexual desires involved, e.g., are typically unconscious and necessarily infantile, and infantile sexuality and its associated desires are not expressed in the same form as mature genital sexuality. His efforts to explain the distinctive features of female psychosexual development in particular led to some of his most controversial views, including the postulation of penis envy to explain why girls but not boys standardly experience a shift in gender of their primary love object both starting with the mother as the object. Later love objects, including psychoanalysts as the objects of transference feelings in the analytic setting, the analyst functions as a blank screen onto which the patient projects feelings, are the results of displacement or transference from earlier objects: “The finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it.” Freud used the same structure of explanation for symptoms and for more normal phenomena, such as dreams, jokes, and slips of the tongue. All can be seen as compromise formations between forces pressing for expression localized by Freud’s structural theory in the id, understood as a reservoir of unconscious instinct and forces of repression some also unconscious, seeking to meet the constraints of morality and reality. On Freud’s underlying model, the fundamental process of psychic functioning, the primary process, leads to the uninhibited discharge of psychic energy. Such discharge is experienced as pleasurable, hence the governing principle of the fundamental process is called the pleasure principle. Increase of tension is experienced as unpleasure, and the psychic apparatus aims at a state of equilibrium or constancy sometimes Freud writes as if the state aimed at is one of zero tension, hence the Nirvana principle associated with the death instinct in Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle [0]. But since pleasure can in fact only be achieved under specific conditions, which sometimes require arrangement, planning, and delay, individuals must learn to inhibit discharge, and this secondary process thinking is governed by what Freud came to call the reality principle. The aim is still satisfaction, but the “exigencies of life” require attention, reasoning, and judgment to avoid falling into the fantasy wishfulfillment of the primary process. Sometimes defense mechanisms designed to avoid increased tension or unpleasure can fail, leading to neurosis in general, under the theory, a neurosis is a psychological disorder rooted in unconscious conflict particular neuroses being correlated with particular phases of development and particular mechanisms of defense. Repression, involving the confining of psychic representations to the unconscious, is the most important of the defense mechanisms. It should be understood that unlike preconscious ideas, which are merely descriptively unconscious though one may not be aware of them at the moment, they are readily accessible to consciousness, unconscious ideas in the strict sense are kept from awareness by forces of repression, they are dynamically unconscious as evidenced by the resistance to making the unconscious conscious in therapy. Freud’s deep division of the mind between unconscious and conscious goes beyond neurotic symptoms to help make sense of familiar forms of irrationality such as selfdeception, ambivalence, and weakness of the will that are highly problematical on Cartesian models of an indivisible unitary consciousness. Perhaps the best example of the primary process thinking that characterizes the unconscious unconstrained by the realities of time, contradiction, causation, etc. can be found in dreaming. Freud regarded dreams as “the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious.” Dreams are the disguised fulfillment of unconscious wishes. In extracting the meaning of dreams through a process of interpretation, Freud relied on a central distinction between the manifest content the dream as dreamt or as remembered on waking and the latent content the unconscious dreamthoughts. Freud held that interpretation via association to particular elements of the manifest content reversed the process of dream construction, the dream-work in which various mechanisms of distortion operated on the day’s residues perceptions and thoughts stemming from the day before the dream was dreamt and the latent dream-thoughts to produce the manifest dream. Prominent among the mechanisms are the condensation in which many meanings are represented by a single idea and displacement in which there is a shift of affect from a significant and intense idea to an associated but otherwise insignificant one also typical of neurotic symptoms, as well as considerations of representability and secondary revision more specific to dream formation. Symbolism is less prominent in Freud’s theory of dreams than is often thought; indeed, the section on symbols appeared only as a later addition to The Interpretation of Dreams 0. Freud explicitly rejected the ancient “dream book” mode of interpretation in terms of fixed symbols, and believed one had to recover the hidden meaning of a dream through the dreamer’s not the interpreter’s associations to particular elements. Such associations are a part of the process of free association, in which a patient is obliged to report to the analyst all thoughts without censorship of any kind. The process is crucial to psychoanalysis, which is both a technique of psychotherapy and a method of investigation of the workings of the mind. Freud used the results of his investigations to speculate about the origins of morality, religion, and political authority. He tended to find their historical and psychological roots in early stages of the development of the individual. Morality in particular he traced to the internalization as one part of the resolution of the Oedpius complex of parental prohibitions and demands, producing a conscience or superego which is also the locus of self-observation and the ego-ideal. Such identification by incorporation introjection plays an important role in character formation in general. The instinctual renunciation demanded by morality and often achieved by repression Freud regarded as essential to the order society needs to conduct its business. Civilization gets the energy for the achievements of art and science by sublimation of the same instinctual drives. But the costs of society and civilization to the individual in frustration, unhappiness, and neurosis can be too high. Freud’s individual therapy was meant to lead to the liberation of repressed energies which would not by itself guarantee happiness; he hoped it might also provide energy to transform the world and moderate its excess demands for restraint. But just as his individual psychology was founded on the inevitability of internal conflict, in his social thought he saw some limits especially on aggression the death instinct turned outward as necessary and he remained pessimistic about the apparently endless struggle reason must wage Civilization and Its Discontents, 0. Freudscher Versprecher Zur Navigation springenZur Suche springen Ein Freudscher Versprecher (nach Sigmund Freud), auch Lapsus Linguae genannt, ist eine sprachliche Fehlleistung, bei der angeblich ein eigentlicher Gedanke oder eine Intention des Sprechers unwillkürlich zutage tritt. Inhaltsverzeichnis 1 Allgemeine Beschreibung 2 Begründungen der Theorie 3 Akzeptanz und wissenschaftliche Abgrenzung 4 Beispiele 5 Literatur 6 Weblinks 7 Einzelnachweise Allgemeine Beschreibung Bei der Bewertung eines scheinbar sinnvollen Versprechers als einer Freudschen Fehlleistung wird davon ausgegangen, dass in der Bedeutungsabweichung, die durch einen Versprecher entsteht, eine unbewusste Aussage zum Vorschein kommt. Es wird also nicht angenommen, dass solchen Versprechern eine einfache, (neuro-)physiologische oder auch assoziative Beeinflussung der Sprachproduktion zugrunde liegt,[1][2] sondern behauptet, dass es v. a. eine psychische Ursache dafür gibt. Bei den Freudschen Fehlleistungen würde somit anstelle des eigentlich Gemeinten etwas gesagt werden, das dem Gedachten ggf. sogar besser entspräche und in diesem Sinne interpretiert werden könnte. Die Existenz eines solchen Phänomens wurde durch Freud (1900, 1904) in Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens behauptet. Seit dem allgemeinen Bekanntwerden der auf Freuds Befunde gestützten Theorie der Fehlleistungen hat jemand, dem ein solcher Versprecher unterläuft, einen schlechten Stand, seinem Publikum nachzuweisen, dass es sich gar nicht um einen Lapsus der Freudschen Art handelt, wohingegen vor Freuds Zeit solch ein Versprecher lediglich ein Anlass zur Heiterkeit gewesen wäre, oder eventuell begleitet von völligem Unverständnis, auch empörtem Getuschel. Ein Beispiel von Freud sei hier berichtet:[3] „Ein Mann erzählt von irgendwelchen Vorgängen, die er beanstandet, und setzt fort: Dann aber sind Tatsachen zum ‚Vorschwein‘ gekommen. ([…] Auf Anfrage bestätigt er, dass er diese Vorgänge als ‚Schweinereien‘ bezeichnen wollte.) ‚Vorschein und Schweinerei‘ haben zusammen das sonderbare ‚Vorschwein‘ entstehen lassen.“ – Sigmund Freud[4] Diese Bewertung hatte also nicht verbalisiert werden sollen, hatte sich aber Bahn verschafft, indem sie sich in die aktuelle Äußerung als (Freudscher) Versprecher einschob. Aufgrund spezifischer Motivation kann man erst dann, nämlich bei solchen, einen Nebengedanken unterdrückenden Maßnahmen, von einer eigentlichen „Fehl“-Leistung sprechen. Begründungen der Theorie Freudsche Versprecher sind solche, bei denen eine psychische Motivation angenommen wird, ein „Sinn“, wie es bei Freud heißt, um eine Abgrenzung gegen die Urteile „Zufall“ oder „physiologischer Hintergrund“ als Ursache solcher (Fehl- oder richtigen) Leistungen vorzunehmen. An dieser Bestimmung wird zugleich die Bandbreite des Problemfeldes deutlich: Einerseits handelt es sich um ein Phänomen. Das heißt: Es ist für den Sprecher mindestens potentiell erkennbar, dass seinen Zuhörern etwas zu Ohren kam, was so nicht bewusst beabsichtigt gewesen war; Rosa Ferber hat allerdings festgestellt, dass die meisten Versprecher gar nicht bemerkt werden, weder von den Sendern noch von den Empfängern.[5] Andererseits handelt es sich bei Freuds Aussage, es stecke allgemein ein „Sinn“ hinter allen sog. „Freudschen Fehlleistungen“, um die wissenschaftliche Interpretation eines Phänomens: Unter der Prämisse, dass der Versprecher einen unbewussten oder vorbewussten Beweggrund zur Ursache habe – einen erkennbaren Sinn oder eine Struktur – besteht die erste Aufgabe darin, zu untersuchen, welcher Beweggrund als der wahrscheinlichste angenommen werden kann. Akzeptanz und wissenschaftliche Abgrenzung Gegenüber dieser Vorgehensweise spaltet sich das wissenschaftliche Lager in mindestens drei Teile auf: Die einen halten die Frage der Motivierung überhaupt für verfehlt und falsch und wollen nur Untersuchungen zulassen, die sich aus der Sicht der rein physiologischen Prozesse mit der Sprachproduktion und den deren Ablauf störenden Versprechern befassen. Für dieses Lager sind Versprecher wertvolle Fenster, die Einblicke u. a. in die neurologisch gesteuerte Sprachproduktion gestatten. Michael Motley wäre dagegen ein Vertreter des anderen Lagers, der in der Psycholinguistik die Motivierung von Versprechern experimentell nachzuweisen versucht. Motley konnte, indem er bei einem Schnelllesen-Experiment als Kontext sexuell oder neutral geprägte Situationen anbot, zeigen, dass die Frequenz der Freud’schen Versprechern bei sexuellen Kontext-Situationen im Vergleich zu neutralen zunimmt. Damit bestätigte er experimentell die Freudsche Theorie, und Dilger/Bredenkamp kombinieren beide Ansätze. Neurolinguistischen Untersuchungen zufolge existieren organisch bedingte oder zufällig auftretende Störungen des ordentlichen Sprachablaufs. Grund können beispielsweise Zerstörungen oder Fehlbildungen von Arealen des Sprachzentrums im Gehirn sein. Daher ist es nicht sinnvoll, hinter jeder Art von Versprechern eine Freudsche Fehlleistung zu vermuten. Die Versprecherforschung im Rahmen der kognitiven Linguistik untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen sprachlichen Strukturen und auftretenden Versprechertypen. Die hierbei gefundenen Erklärungen für unterschiedliche Arten von Versprechern machen in vielen Fällen die Annahme einer psychischen Ursache im Sinne der Freudschen Theorien überflüssig (siehe Linguistische Versprecher-Theorien). Insbesondere aber ist die Frage der Motivierung bei lexikalischen Versprechern nicht unangebracht. Je nachdem, welche Auffassung man von den psychischen Vorgängen und der „Topologie des psychischen Apparates“ hat, wird man dem Unbewussten mehr oder weniger Wirkungskraft zuschreiben. Beispiele Freud führt in der Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens an: Der deutschnationale Abgeordnete Lattmann tritt 1908 im Reichstag für eine Ergebenheitsadresse an Wilhelm II. ein, und wenn man das tue, „[…] so wollen wir das auch rückgratlos tun.“ Nach, laut Sitzungsprotokoll, minutenlanger stürmischer Heiterkeit erklärt der Redner, er habe natürlich rückhaltlos gemeint. Otto Rank führt im Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse eine Stelle aus Shakespeares Der Kaufmann von Venedig an: Porzia ist es eigentlich durch ein Gelübde verboten, Bassanio ihre Liebe zu gestehen, sagt aber „Halb bin ich Euer, die andre Hälfte Euer – mein wollt ich sagen.“ Literatur Sven Staffeldt: Das Drängen der störenden Redeabsicht. Dieter Fladers Kritik an Freuds Theorie der Versprecher, Kümmerle, Göppingen 2004. Sebastiano Timpanaro: Il lapsus freudiano: Psicanalisi e critica testuale (Florenz: La Nuova Italia 1974). Englische Übersetzung: The Freudian Slip: Psychoanalysis and Textual Criticism. Transl. by Kate Soper (London, 1976). Weblinks Sabine Stahl: "Wolker bis heitig" und andere Versprecher, SWR2 – „Wissen“ vom 3. April 2009 Einzelnachweise Nora Wiedenmann (1998): Versprecher. Phänomene und Daten. Mit Materialien auf Diskette. Wien: Wissenschaftsverlag Edition Praesens. Nora Wiedenmann (1997): Versprecher – Dissimilation und Similation von Konsonanten. Sprachproduktion unter spatio-temporalem Aspekt. Dissertation. Sprechwissenschaft und Psycholinguistik, Institut für Phonetik und Sprachliche Kommunikation; Philosophische Fakultät für Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaft II; Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München; = 1999: Versprecher: Dissimilation von Konsonanten. Sprachproduktion unter spatio-temporalem Aspekt (Linguistische Arbeiten, 404). Tübingen: Niemeyer. Hartmann Hinterhuber: Sigmund Freud, Rudolf Meringer und Carl Mayer: Versprechen und Verlesen. In: Neuropsychiatrie. Band 21, Nr. 4, 2007, S. 291–296. Sigmund Freud: Gesammelte Werke. Band XI, 1916/1917, S. 35. R. Ferber: Fehlerlinguistik. Eine Sprechfehlersammlung und ihre beschreibende Darstellung. In: Unpublished MA thesis, University of Freiburg. 1986. Kategorien: PsychoanalyseMündliche KommunikationSigmund Freud als NamensgeberFehlleistung. The Signorelli parapraxis represents the first and best known example of a parapraxis and its analysis in Freud's The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. The parapraxis centers on a word-finding problem and the production of substitutes. Freud could not recall the name (Signorelli) of the painter of the Orvieto frescos and produced as substitutes the names of two painters Botticelli and Boltraffio. Freud's analysis shows what associative processes had linked Signorelli to Botticelli and Boltraffio. The analysis has been criticised by linguists and others. Contents 1 Botticelli – Boltraffio – Trafoi 2 Trafoi in Kraepelin's dream 3 Sebastiano Timpanaro 4 Swales' investigation 5 Freud neglected his own observation 6 See also 7 References 8 Sources 9 Further reading Botticelli – Boltraffio – Trafoi One important ingredient in Freud's analysis was the North-Italian village Trafoi where he received the message of the suicide of one of his patients, struggling with sexual problems. Without Trafoi the substitute Boltraffio associated to it would be incomprehensible. Freud links Trafoi to the theme death and sexuality, a theme preceding the word finding problem in a conversation Freud had during a trip by train through Bosnia-Herzegovina. The second important ingredient in Freud's analysis is the extraction of an Italian word signor from the forgotten name Signorelli. Herr, the German counterpart of Signor, is then linked to (Her)zegovina and the word Herr occurring, as Freud tells us, in the conversation. That country's Turks, he recalled, valued sexual pleasure a lot, and he was told by a colleague that a patient once said to him: "For you know, sir (Herr) if that ceases, life no longer has any charm". Moreover, Freud argued that (Bo)snia linked (Bo)tticelli with (Bo)ltraffio and Trafoi. He concludes by saying: "We shall represent this state of affairs carefully enough if we assert that beside the simple forgetting of proper names there is another forgetting which is motivated by repression".[1] Freud denies the relevance of the content of the frescos. Nevertheless, psychoanalysts have pursued their investigations particularly into this direction, finding however no new explanation of the parapraxis. Jacques Lacan suggested that the parapraxis may be an act of self-forgetting. Trafoi in Kraepelin's dream The first critique to Freud came from Emil Kraepelin, who in a postscript to his 1906 monograph on language disturbances in dreams, relates a dream involving Trafoi. The dream centers around a neologism Trafei, which Kraepelin links to Trafoi. The dream may be seen as an implicit critique on Freud's analysis. Italian trofei is associated to Trafei in the same way as Trafoi (cf. van Ooijen, 1996) and clarifies Kraepelin's dream. The meaning of trofei reads in German Siegeszeichen (victory-signs) and this German word together with Latin signum clearly links to Freud's first name (Engels, 2006, p. 22-24). Sebastiano Timpanaro In The Freudian Slip Sebastiano Timpanaro discusses Freud's analysis in chapter 6 "Love and Death at Orvieto." (p. 63-81). He in fact doubts that the name Boltraffio would have played a major role during the parapraxis, as he states: "Boltraffio is a Schlimbesserung [that is a substitute worse than another substitute]" and adds "the correction goes astray because of incapacity to localize the fault."(p. 71). He calls Botticelli an "involuntary banalization" and Boltraffio "a semi-conscious disimproved correction."(p. 75). As to the Signor-element in Freud's analysis he puts: "The immediate equivalence Signore= Herr is one thing, the extraction of signor from Signorelli and of Her(r) from Herzegowina is another." Swales' investigation Peter Swales (2003) investigated the historical data and states that Freud probably visited an exposition of Italian masters in Bergamo mid-September 1898, showing paintings of Signorelli, Botticelli and Boltraffio one next to the other. In his view the paintings at the exposition were the source of the substitute names in the parapraxis. Swales dwells largely on the three paintings. The association of the name Boltraffio to the name Da Vinci, another hypothesis formulated by Swales (because Freud might have seen the statue of Boltraffio at the bottom of the Da Vinci monument on Piazza della Scala in Milan some days before his visit to Bergamo), is not further pursued by Swales. Although Freud visited Trafoi on the 8th of August 1898, Swales doubts whether Freud received a message on the suicide of one of his patients. Freud neglected his own observation Fresco of the Deeds of the Antichrist Freud in his analysis did not use the fact that he remembered very well a picture of the painter in the lower left corner of one of the frescos. The picture, sort of a signature, was thus a third substitute to the forgotten name Signorelli. The "signature" can be interpreted as a reference to the Latin verb signare and this word, instead of Freud's signore, then leads to a simple analysis of the Signorelli parapraxis (Engels, 2006, p. 66-69). There seems to be no more need for the Bosnia-Herzegovina associations (Bo and Herr) Freud himself introduced. In the alternative to Freud's analysis the suicide message in Trafoi remains an important point to understand the parapraxis (this message being a blow to Freud's self-esteem). The occurrence of the Signorelli parapraxis during Freud's trip from Ragusa to Trebinje (in Herzegovina) is not questioned, as was done by Swales.[citation needed] See also Dream speech References Freud, S. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, chapter 1, "Forgetting of Proper Names". Sources Engels, Huub (2006). Emil Kraepelins Traumsprache 1908-1926. ISBN 978-90-6464-060-5 Timpanaro, S. (1976). The Freudian Slip: Psychoanalysis and Textual Criticism. London: NLB. Swales, P. (2003). Freud, Death and Sexual Pleasures. On the Psychical Mechanism of Dr. Sigm. Freud. Arc de Cercle, 1, 4-74. Further reading Molnar, M. (1994). Reading the Look. In Sander, Gilman, Birmele, Geller & Greenberg (ed.): Reading Freud's Reading. pp. 77–90. New York: Oxford. Ooijen, B. van. (1996). Vowel mutability and lexical selection in English: Evidence from a word reconstruction task. Memory & Cognition, 24, 573-583. Ooijen shows that in word reconstruction tasks e.g. the non-word kebra is more readily substituted by cobra than by zebra. This is what is meant by 'vowel mutability.' Owens, M.E. (2004). Forgetting Signorelli: Monstruous Visions of the Resurrection of the Dead. Muse: scholarly journals online. Categories: Psychoanalytic terminologyFreudian psychology.

functionalism: Grice’s functionalism: a response to the dualist challenge -- dualism, the view that reality consists of two disparate parts. The crux of dualism is an apparently unbridgeable gap between two incommensurable orders of being that must be reconciled if our assumption that there is a comprehensible universe is to be justified. Dualism is exhibited in the pre-Socratic division between appearance and reality; Plato’s realm of being containing eternal Ideas and realm of becoming containing changing things; the medieval division between finite man and infinite God; Descartes’s substance dualism of thinking mind and extended matter; Hume’s separation of fact from value; Kant’s division between empirical phenomena and transcendental noumena; the epistemological double-aspect theory of James and Russell, who postulate a neutral substance that can be understood in separate ways either as mind or brain; and Heidegger’s separation of being and time that inspired Sartre’s contrast of being and nothingness. The doctrine of two truths, the sacred and the profane or the religious and the secular, is a dualistic response to the conflict between religion and science. Descartes’s dualism is taken to be the source of the mindbody problem. If the mind is active unextended thinking and the body is passive unthinking extension, how can these essentially unlike and independently existing substances interact causally, and how can mental ideas represent material things? How, in other words, can the mind know and influence the body, and how can the body affect the mind? Descartes said mind and body interact and that ideas represent material things without resembling them, but dream argument dualism 244 244 could not explain how, and concluded merely that God makes these things happen. Proposed dualist solutions to the mindbody problem are Malebranche’s occasionalism mind and body do not interact but God makes them appear to; Leibniz’s preestablished harmony among noninteracting monads; and Spinoza’s property dualism of mutually exclusive but parallel attributes expressing the one substance God. Recent mindbody dualists are Popper and John C. Eccles. Monistic alternatives to dualism include Hobbes’s view that the mental is merely the epiphenomena of the material; Berkeley’s view that material things are collections of mental ideas; and the contemporary materialist view of Smart, Armstrong, and Paul and Patricia Churchland that the mind is the brain. A classic treatment of these matters is Arthur O. Lovejoy’s The Revolt Against Dualism. Dualism is related to binary thinking, i.e., to systems of thought that are two-valued, such as logic in which theorems are valid or invalid, epistemology in which knowledge claims are true or false, and ethics in which individuals are good or bad and their actions are right or wrong. In The Quest for Certainty, Dewey finds that all modern problems of philosophy derive from dualistic oppositions, particularly between spirit and nature. Like Hegel, he proposes a synthesis of oppositions seen as theses versus antitheses. Recent attacks on the view that dualistic divisions can be explicitly described or maintained have been made by Vitters, who offers instead a classification scheme based on overlapping family resemblances; by Quine, who casts doubt on the division between analytic or formal truths based on meanings and synthetic or empirical truths based on facts; and by Derrida, who challenges our ability to distinguish between the subjective and the objective. But despite the extremely difficult problems posed by ontological dualism, and despite the cogency of many arguments against dualistic thinking, Western philosophy continues to be predominantly dualistic, as witnessed by the indispensable use of two-valued matrixes in logic and ethics and by the intractable problem of rendering mental intentions in terms of material mechanisms or vice versa. functional dependence, a relationship between variable magnitudes especially physical magnitudes and certain properties or processes. In modern physical science there are two types of laws stating such relationships. 1 There are numerical laws stating concomitant variation of certain quantities, where a variation in any one is accompanied by variations in the others. An example is the law for ideal gases: pV % aT, where p is the pressure of the gas, V its volume, T its absolute temperature, and a a constant derived from the mass and the nature of the gas. Such laws say nothing about the temporal order of the variations, and tests of the laws can involve variation of any of the relevant magnitudes. Concomitant variation, not causal sequence, is what is tested for. 2 Other numerical laws state variations of physical magnitudes correlated with times. Galileo’s law of free fall asserts that the change in the unit time of a freely falling body in a vacuum in the direction of the earth is equal to gt, where g is a constant and t is the time of the fall, and where the rate of time changes of g is correlative with the temporal interval t. The law is true of any body in a state of free fall and for any duration. Such laws are also called “dynamical” because they refer to temporal processes usually explained by the postulation of forces acting on the objects in question. functionalism, the view that mental states are defined by their causes and effects. As a metaphysical thesis about the nature of mental states, functionalism holds that what makes an inner state mental is not an intrinsic property of the state, but rather its relations to sensory stimulation input, to other inner states, and to behavior output. For example, what makes an inner state a pain is its being a type of state typically caused by pinpricks, sunburns, and so on, a type that causes other mental states e.g., worry, and a type that causes behavior e.g., saying “ouch”. Propositional attitudes also are identified with functional states: an inner state is a desire for water partly in virtue of its causing a person to pick up a glass and drink its contents when the person believes that the glass contains water. The basic distinction needed for functionalism is that between role in terms of which a type of mental state is defined and occupant the particular thing that occupies a role. Functional states exhibit multiple realizability: in different kinds of beings humans, computers, Martians, a particular kind of causal role may have different occupants e.g., the causal role definitive of a belief that p, say, may be occupied by a neural state in a human, but occupied perhaps by a hydraulic state in a Martian. Functionalism, like behaviorism, thus entails that mental states may be shared by physically dissimilar systems. Although functionalism does not automatically rule out the existence of immaterial souls, its motivation has been to provide a materialistic account of mentality. The advent of the computer gave impetus to functionalism. First, the distinction between software and hardware suggested the distinction between role function and occupant structure. Second, since computers are automated, they demonstrate how inner states can be causes of output in the absence of a homunculus i.e., a “little person” intelligently directing output. Third, the Turing machine provided a model for one of the earliest versions of functionalism. A Turing machine is defined by a table that specifies transitions from current state and input to next state or to output. According to Turing machine functionalism, any being with pscychological states has a unique best description, and each psychological state is identical to a machine table state relative to that description. To be in mental state type M is to instantiate or realize Turing machine T in state S. Turing machine functionalism, developed largely by Putnam, has been criticized by Putnam, Ned Block, and Fodor. To cite just one serious problem: two machine table states and hence, according to Turing machine functionalism, two psychological states are distinct if they are followed by different states or by different outputs. So, if a pinprick causes A to say “Ouch” and causes B to say “Oh,” then, if Turing machine functionalism were true, A’s and B’s states of pain would be different psychological states. But we do not individuate psychological states so finely, nor should we: such fine-grained individuation would be unsuitable for psychology. Moreover, if we assume that there is a path from any state to any other state, Turing machine functionalism has the unacceptable consequence that no two systems have any of their states in common unless they have all their states in common. Perhaps the most prominent version of functionalism is the causal theory of mind. Whereas Turing machine functionalism is based on a technical computational or psychological theory, the causal theory of mind relies on commonsense understanding: according to the causal theory of mind, the concept of a mental state is the concept of a state apt for bringing about certain kinds of behavior Armstrong. Mental state terms are defined by the commonsense platitudes in which they appear David Lewis. Philosophers can determine a priori what mental states are by conceptual analysis or by definition. Then scientists determine what physical states occupy the causal roles definitive of mental states. If it turned out that there was no physical state that occupied the causal role of, say, pain i.e., was caused by pinpricks, etc., and caused worry, etc., it would follow, on the causal theory, that pain does not exist. To be in mental state type M is to be in a physical state N that occupies causal role R. A third version is teleological or “homuncular” functionalism, associated with William G. Lycan and early Dennett. According to homuncular functionalism, a human being is analogous to a large corporation, made up of cooperating departments, each with its own job to perform; these departments interpret stimuli and produce behavioral responses. Each department at the highest subpersonal level is in turn constituted by further units at a sub-subpersonal level and so on down until the neurological level is reached. The roleoccupant distinction is thus relativized to level: an occupant at one level is a role at the next level down. On this view, to be in a mental state type M is to have a sub- . . . subpersonal f-er that is in its characteristic state Sf. All versions of functionalism face problems about the qualitative nature of mental states. The difficulty is that functionalism individuates states in purely relational terms, but the acrid odor of, say, a paper mill seems to have a non-relational, qualitative character that functionalism misses altogether. If two people, on seeing a ripe banana, are in states with the same causes and effects, then, by functionalist definition, they are in the same mental state say, having a sensation of yellow. But it seems possible that one has an “inverted spectrum” relative to the other, and hence that their states are qualitatively different. Imagine that, on seeing the banana, one of the two is in a state qualitatively indistinguishable from the state that the other would be in on seeing a ripe tomato. Despite widespread intuitions that such inverted spectra are possible, according to functionalism, they are not. A related problem is that of “absent qualia.” The population of China, or even the economy of Bolivia, could be functionally equivalent to a human brain i.e., there could be a function that mapped the relations between inputs, outputs, and internal states of the population of China onto those of a human brain; yet the population of China, no matter how its members interact with one another and with other nations, intuitively does not have mental states. The status of these arguments remains controversial.

fundamentum divisionis: a term in Scholastic logic and ontology for the ‘grounds for a distinction’. Some distinctions categorize separately existing things, such as men and beasts. This is a real distinction, and the fundamentum divisionis exists in reality. Some distinctions categorize things that cannot exist separately but can be distinguished mentally, such as the difference between being a human being and having a sense of humor, or the difference between a soul and one of its powers, say, the power of thinking. A mental distinction is also called a formal distinction. Duns Scotus is well known for the idea of formalis distinctio cum fundamento ex parte rei a formal distinction with a foundation in the thing, primarily in order to handle logical problems with functionalism, analytical fundamentum divisionis 335 335 the Christian concept of God. God is supposed to be absolutely simple; i.e., there can be no multiplicity of composition in him. Yet, according to traditional theology, many properties can be truly attributed to him. He is wise, good, and powerful. In order to preserve the simplicity of God, Duns Scotus claimed that the difference between wisdom, goodness, and power was only formal but still had some foundation in God’s own being.

futurum contingens: Grice knew that his obsession with action was an obsession with the uncertainty of a contingent future, alla Aristotle. Futurum -- future contingents, singular events or states of affairs that may come to pass, and also may not come to pass, in the future. There are three traditional problems involving future contingents: the question of universal validity of the principle of bivalence, the question of free will and determinism, and the question of foreknowledge. The debate about future contingents in modern philosophical logic was revived by Lukasiewicz’s work on three-valued logic. He thought that in order to avoid fatalistic consequences, we must admit that the principle of bivalence for any proposition, p, either p is true or not-p is true does not hold good for propositions about future contingents. Many authors have considered this view confused. According to von Wright, e.g., when propositions are said to be true or false and ‘is’ in ‘it is true that’ is tenseless or atemporal, the illusion of determinism does not arise. It has its roots in a tacit oscillation between a temporal and an atemporal reading of the phrase ‘it is true’. In a temporalized reading, or in its tensed variants such as ‘it was/will be/is already true’, one can substitute, for ‘true’, other words like ‘certain’, ‘fixed’, or ‘necessary’. Applying this diachronic necessity to atemporal predications of truth yields the idea of logical determinism. In contemporary discussions of tense and modality, future contingents are often treated with the help of a model of time as a line that breaks up into branches as it moves from left to right i.e., from past to future. Although the conception of truth at a moment has been found philosophically problematic, the model of historical modalities and branching time as such is much used in works on freedom and determination. Aristotle’s On Interpretation IX contains a classic discussion of future contingents with the famous example of tomorrow’s sea battle. Because of various ambiguities in the text and in Aristotle’s modal conceptions in general, the meaning of the passage is in dispute. In the Metaphysics VI.3 and in the Niocmachean Ethics III.5, Aristotle tries to show that not all things are predetermined. The Stoics represented a causally deterministic worldview; an ancient example of logical determinism is Diodorus Cronus’s famous master argument against contingency. Boethius thought that Aristotle’s view can be formulated as follows: the principle of bivalence is universally valid, but propositions about future contingents, unlike those about past and present things, do not obey the stronger principle according to which each proposition is either determinately true or determinately false. A proposition is indeterminately true as long as the conditions that make it true are not yet fixed. This was the standard Latin doctrine from Abelard to Aquinas. Similar discussions occurred in Arabic commentaries on On Interpretation. In the fourteenth century, many thinkers held that Aristotle abandoned bivalence for future contingent propositions. This restriction was usually refuted, but it found some adherents like Peter Aureoli. Duns Scotus and Ockham heavily criticized the Boethian-Thomistic view that God can know future contingents only because the flux of time is present to divine eternity. According to them, God contingently foreknows free acts. Explaining this proved to be a very cumbersome task. Luis de Molina 15351600 suggested that God knows what possible creatures would do in any possible situation. This “middle knowledge” theory about counterfactuals of freedom has remained a living theme in philosophy of religion; analogous questions are treated in theories of subjunctive reasoning.

futurum indicativum: The Grecians called it just ‘horistike klesis.’ The Romans transliterated as modus definitivus, inclination anima affectations demonstrans.’ But they had other terms, indicativus, finitus, finitivus, and pronuntiativus. f. H. P. Grice and D. F. Pears, “Predicting and deciding.” The future is essentially involved in “E communicates that p,” i. e. E, the emissor, intends that his addressee, in a time later than t, will come to believe this or that. Grice is especially concerned with the future for his analysis of the communicatum. “Close the door!” By uttering “Close the door!,” U means that A is to close the door – in the future. So Grice spends HOURS exploring how one can have justification to have an intention about a future event. Grice is aware of the ‘shall.’ Grice uses ‘shall’ in the first person to mean wha the calls ‘futurum indicativum.’ (He considers the case of the ‘shall’ in the second and third persons in his analysis of mode). What are the conditions for the use of “shall” in the first person. “I shall close the door” may be predictable. It is in the indicative mode. “Thou shalt close the door,” and “He shall close the door” are in the imperative mode, or rather they correspond to the ‘futurum intentionale.’ Since Grice is an analytic philosopher, he specifies the analysis in the third person (“U means that…”) one has to be careful. For ‘futurum indicativum’ we have ‘shall’ in the first person, and ‘will’ in the second and third persons. So for the first group, U means that he will go. In the second group, U means that his addressee or a third party shall go. Grice adopts a subscript variant, stick with ‘will,’ but add the mode afterwards: so will-ind. will be ‘futurum indicativum,’ and will-int. will be futurum intentionale. The OED has it as “shall,” and defines as a Germanic preterite-present strong verb. In Old English, it is “sceal,” and which the OED renders as “to owe (money,” 1425 Hoccleve Min. Poems, The leeste ferthyng þat y men shal. To owe (allegiance); 1649 And by that feyth I shal to god and yow; followed by an infinitive, without to. Except for a few instances of shall will, shall may (mowe), "shall conne" in the 15th c., the infinitive after shall is always either that of a principal verb or of have or be; The present tense shall; in general statements of what is right or becoming, = ought, superseded by the past subjunctive should; in OE. the subjunctive present sometimes occurs in this use; 1460 Fortescue Abs. and Lim. Mon. The king shall often times send his judges to punish rioters and risers. 1562 Legh Armory; Whether are Roundells of all suche coloures, as ye haue spoken of here before? or shall they be Namesd Roundelles of those coloures? In OE. and occas. in Middle English used to express necessity of various kinds. For the many shades of meaning in Old English see Bosworth and Toller), = must, "must needs", "have to", "am compelled to", etc.; in stating a necessary condition: = `will have to, `must (if something else is to happen). 1596 Shaks. Merch. V. i. i. 116 You shall seeke all day ere you finde them, & when you haue them they are not worth the search. 1605 Shaks. Lear. He that parts vs, shall bring a Brand from Heauen. c In hypothetical clause, accompanying the statement of a necessary condition: = `is to. 1612 Bacon Ess., Greatn. Kingd., Neither must they be too much broken of it, if they shall be preserued in vigor; ndicating what is appointed or settled to take place = the mod. `is to, `am to, etc. 1600 Shaks. A.Y.L. What is he that shall buy his flocke and pasture? 1625 in Ellis Orig. Lett. Ser. "Tomorrow His Majesty will be present to begin the Parliament which is thought shall be removed to Oxford; in commands or instructions; n the second person, “shall” is equivalent to an imperative. Chiefly in Biblical language, of divine commandments, rendering the jussive future of the Hebrew and Vulgate. In Old English the imperative mode is used in the ten commandments. 1382 Wyclif Exod. Thow shalt not tak the Names of the Lord thi God in veyn. So Coverdale, etc. b) In expositions: you shall understand, etc. (that). c) In the formula you shall excuse (pardon) me. (now "must"). 1595 Shaks. John. Your Grace shall pardon me, I will not backe. 1630 R. Johnsons Kingd. and Commw. 191 You shall excuse me, for I eat no flesh on Fridayes; n the *third* person. 1744 in Atkyns Chanc. Cases (1782) III. 166 The words shall and may in general acts of parliament, or in private constitutions, are to be construed imperatively, they must remove them; in the second and third persons, expressing the determination by the Griceian utterer to bring about some action, event, or state of things in the future, or (occasionally) to refrain from hindering what is otherwise certain to take place, or is intended by another person; n the second person. 1891 J. S. Winter Lumley. If you would rather not stay then, you shall go down to South Kensington Square then; in third person. 1591 Shaks. Two Gent. Verona shall not hold thee. 1604 Shaks. Oth. If there be any cunning Crueltie, That can torment him much, It shall be his. 1891 J. S. Winter Lumley xiv, `Oh, yes, sir, she shall come back, said the nurse. `Ill take care of that. `I will come back, said Vere; in special interrogative uses, a) in the *first* person, used in questions to which the expected answer is a command, direction, or counsel, or a resolve on the speakers own part. a) in questions introduced by an interrogative pronoun (in oblique case), adverb, or adverbial phrase. 1600 Fairfax Tasso. What shall we doe? shall we be gouernd still, By this false hand? 1865 Kingsley Herew. Where shall we stow the mare? b) in categorical questions, often expressing indignant reprobation of a suggested course of action, the implication (or implicaturum, or entailment) being that only a negative (or, with negative question an affirmative) answer is conceivable. 1611 Shaks. Wint. T. Shall I draw the Curtaine? 1802 Wordsw. To the Cuckoo i, O Cuckoo! shall I call thee Bird, Or but a wandering Voice? 1891 J. S. Winter Lumley `Are you driving, or shall I call you a cab? `Oh, no; Im driving, thanks. c) In *ironical* affirmative in exclamatory sentence, equivalent to the above interrogative use, cf. Ger. soll. 1741 Richardson Pamela, A pretty thing truly! Here I, a poor helpless Girl, raised from Poverty and Distress, shall put on Lady-airs to a Gentlewoman born. d) to stand shall I, shall I (later shill I, shall I: v. shilly-shally), to be at shall I, shall I (not): to be vacillating, to shilly-shally. 1674 R. Godfrey Inj. and Ab. Physic Such Medicines. that will not stand shall I? shall I? but will fall to work on the Disease presently. b Similarly in the *third* person, where the Subjects represents or includes the utterer, or when the utterer is placing himself at anothers point of view. 1610 Shaks. Temp., Hast thou (which art but aire) a touch, a feeling Of their afflictions, and shall not my selfe, One of their kinde be kindlier moud then thou art? In the second and third person, where the expected answer is a decision on the part of the utterer or of some person OTHER than the Subjects. The question often serves as an impassioned repudiation of a suggestion (or implicaturum) that something shall be permitted. 1450 Merlin `What shal be his Names? `I will, quod she, `that it haue Names after my fader. 1600 Shaks. A.Y.L.; What shall he haue that kild the Deare? 1737 Alexander Pope, translating Horaces Epistle, And say, to which shall our applause belong, this new court jargon, or the good old song? 1812 Crabbe Tales, Shall a wife complain? In indirect question. 1865 Kingsley Herew, Let her say what shall be done with it; as a mere auxiliary, forming, with present infinitive, the future, and (with perfect infinitive) the future perfect tense. In Old English, the notion of the future tense is ordinarily expressed by the present tense. To prevent ambiguity, wile (will) is not unfrequently used as a future auxiliary, sometimes retaining no trace of its initial usage, connected with the faculty of volition, and cognate indeed with volition. On the other hand, sceal (shall), even when rendering a Latin future, can hardly be said to have been ever a mere future tense-sign in Old English. It always expressed something of its original notion of obligation or necessity, so Hampshire is wrong in saying I shall climb Mt. Everest is predictable. In Middle English, the present early ceases to be commonly employed in futural usage, and the future is expressed by shall or will, the former being much more common. The usage as to the choice between the two auxiliaries, shall and will, has varied from time to time. Since the middle of the seventeenth century, with Wallis, mere predictable futurity is expressed in the *first* person by shall, in the second and third by will, and vice versa. In oratio obliqua, usage allows either the retention of the auxiliary actually used by the original utterer, or the substitution of that which is appropriate to the point of view of the uttering reporting; in Old English, ‘sceal,; while retaining its primary usage, serves as a tense-sign in announcing a future event as fated or divinely decreed, cf. Those spots mean measle. Hence shall has always been the auxiliary used, in all persons, for prophetic or oracular announcements of the future, and for solemn assertions of the certainty of a future event. 1577 in Allen Martyrdom Campion; The queene neither ever was, nor is, nor ever shall be the head of the Church of England. 1601 Shaks. Jul. C. Now do I Prophesie. A Curse shall light vpon the limbes of men. b In the first person, "shall" has, from the early ME. period, been the normal auxiliary for expressing mere futurity, without any adventitious notion. (a) Of events conceived as independent of the volition of the utterer. To use will in these cases is now a mark of, not public-school-educated Oxonian, but Scottish, Irish, provincial, or extra-British idiom. 1595 in Cath. Rec. Soc. Publ. V. 357 My frend, yow and I shall play no more at Tables now. 1605 Shaks. Macb. When shall we three meet againe? 1613 Shaks. Hen. VIII, Then wee shall haue em, Talke vs to silence. 1852 Mrs. Stowe Uncle Toms C.; `But what if you dont hit? `I shall hit, said George coolly; of voluntary action or its intended result. Here I shall or we shall is always admissible except where the notion of a present, as distinguished from a previous, decision or consent is to be expressed, in which case ‘will’ shall be used. Further, I shall often expresses a determination insisted on in spite of opposition. In the 16th c. and earlier, I shall often occurs where I will would now be used. 1559 W. Cunningham Cosmogr. Glasse, This now shall I alway kepe surely in memorye. 1601 Shaks. Alls Well; Informe him so tis our will he should.-I shall my liege. 1885 Ruskin On Old Road, note: Henceforward I shall continue to spell `Ryme without our wrongly added h. c In the *second* person, shall as a mere future auxiliary appears never to have been usual, but in categorical questions it is normal, e.g. Shall you miss your train? I am afraid you will. d In the *third* person, superseded by will, except when anothers statement or expectation respecting himself is reported in the third person, e.g. He conveys that he shall not have time to write. Even in this case will is still not uncommon, but in some contexts leads to serious ambiguity. It might be therefore preferable, to some, to use ‘he shall’ as the indirect rendering of ‘I shall.’ 1489 Caxton Sonnes of Aymon ii. 64 Yf your fader come agayn from the courte, he shall wyll yelde you to the kynge Charlemayne. 1799 J. Robertson Agric. Perth, The effect of the statute labour has always been, now is, and probably shall continue to be, less productive than it might. Down to the eighteenth century, shall, the auxiliary appropriate to the first person, is sometimes used when the utterer refers to himself in the third person. Cf. the formula: `And your petitioner shall ever pray. 1798 Kemble Let. in Pearsons Catal. Mr. Kemble presents his respectful compliments to the Proprietors of the `Monthly Mirror, and shall have great pleasure at being at all able to aid them; in negative, or virtually negative, and interrogative use, shall often = will be able to. 1600 Shaks. Sonn. lxv: How with this rage shall beautie hold a plea. g) Used after a hypothetical clause or an imperative sentence in a statementsof a result to be expected from some action or occurrence. Now (exc. in the *first* person) usually replaced by will. But shall survives in literary use. 1851 Dasent Jest and Earnest, Visit Rome and you shall find him [the Pope] mere carrion. h) In clause expressing the object of a promise, or of an expectation accompanied by hope or fear, now only where shall is the ordinary future auxiliary, but down to the nineteenth century shall is often preferred to will in the second and third persons. 1628 in Ellis Orig. Lett. Ser., He is confident that the blood of Christ shall wash away his sins. 1654 E. Nicholas in N. Papers, I hope neither your Cosen Wat. Montagu nor Walsingham shall be permitted to discourse with the D. of Gloucester; in impersonal phrases, "it shall be well, needful", etc. (to do so and so). (now "will"). j) shall be, added to a future date in clauses measuring time. 1617 Sir T. Wentworth in Fortescue Papers. To which purpose my late Lord Chancelour gave his direction about the 3. of Decembre shallbe-two-yeares; in the idiomatic use of the future to denote what ordinarily or occasionally occurs under specified conditions, shall was formerly the usual auxiliary. In the *second* and *third* persons, this is now somewhat formal or rhetorical. Ordinary language substitutes will or may. Often in antithetic statements coupled by an adversative conjunction or by and with adversative force. a in the first person. 1712 Steele Spect. In spite of all my Care, I shall every now and then have a saucy Rascal ride by reconnoitring under my Windows. b) in the *second* person. 1852 Spencer Ess. After knowing him for years, you shall suddenly discover that your friends nose is slightly awry. c) in the *third* person. 1793 W. Roberts Looker-On, One man shall approve the same thing that another man shall condemn. 1870 M. Arnold St. Paul and Prot. It may well happen that a man who lives and thrives under a monarchy shall yet theoretically disapprove the principle of monarchy. Usage No. 10: in hypothetical, relative, and temporal clauses denoting a future contingency, the future auxiliary is shall for all persons alike. Where no ambiguity results, however, the present tense is commonly used for the future, and the perfect for the future-perfect. The use of shall, when not required for clearness, is, Grice grants, apt to sound pedantic by non Oxonians. Formerly sometimes used to express the sense of a present subjunctive. a) in hypothetical clauses. (shall I = if I shall) 1680 New Hampsh. Prov. Papers, If any Christian shall speak contempteously of the Holy Scriptures, such person shall be punished. b) in relative clauses, where the antecedent denotes an as yet undetermined person or thing: 1811 Southey Let., The minister who shall first become a believer in that book will obtain a higher reputation than ever statesman did before him. 1874 R. Congreve Ess. We extend our sympathies to the unborn generations which shall follow us on this earth; in temporal clauses: 1830 Laws of Cricket in Nyren Yng. Cricketers Tutor, If in striking, or at any other time, while the ball shall be in play, both his feet be over the popping-crease; in clauses expressing the purposed result of some action, or the object of a desire, intention, command, or request, often admitting of being replaced by may. In Old English, and occasionally as late as the seventeenth century, the present subjunctive was used exactly as in Latin. a) in final clause usually introduced by that. In this use modern idiom prefers should (22 a): see quot. 1611 below, and the appended remarks. 1879 M. Pattison Milton At the age of nine and twenty, Milton has already determined that this lifework shall be an epic poem; in relative clause: 1599 Shaks. Hen. V, ii. iv. 40: As Gardeners doe with Ordure hide those Roots that shall first spring. The choice between should and would follows the same as shall and will as future auxiliaries, except that should must sometimes be avoided on account of liability to be misinterpreted as = `ought to. In present usage, should occurs mainly in the first person. In the other persons it follows the use of shall. III Elliptical and quasi-elliptical uses. Usage No. 24: with ellipsis of verb of motion: = `shall go; he use is common in OHG. and OS., and in later HG., LG., and Du. In the Scandinavian languages it is also common, and instances occur in MSw.] 1596 Shaks. 1 Hen. IV, That with our small coniunction we should on. 1598 Shaks. Merry W. If the bottome were as deepe as hell, I shold down; n questions, what shall = `what shall (it) profit, `what good shall (I) do. Usage No. 26: with the sense `is due, `is proper, `is to be given or applied. Cf. G. soll. Usage No. 27: a) with ellipsis of active infinitive to be supplied from the context. 1892 Mrs. H. Ward David Grieve, `No, indeed, I havnt got all I want, said Lucy `I never shall, neither; if I shall. Now dial. 1390 Gower Conf. II. 96: Doun knelende on mi kne I take leve, and if I schal, I kisse hire. 1390 Gower Conf., II. 96: I wolde kisse hire eftsones if I scholde. 1871 Earle Philol. Engl. Tongue 203: The familiar proposal to carry a basket, I will if I shall, that is, I am willing if you will command me; I will if so required. 1886 W. Somerset Word-bk. Ill warn our Tomll do it vor ee, nif he shall-i.e. if you wish. c) with generalized ellipsis in proverbial phrase: needs must that needs shall = `he must whom fate compels. Usage No. 28: a) with ellipsis of do (not occurring in the context). 1477 Norton Ord. Alch., O King that shall These Workes! b) the place of the inf. is sometimes supplied by that or so placed at the beginning of the sentence. The construction may be regarded as an ellipsis of "do". It is distinct from the use (belonging to 27) in which so has the sense of `thus, `likewise, or `also. In the latter there is usually inversion, as so shall I. 1888 J. S. Winter Bootles Childr. iv: I should like to see her now shes grown up. `So you shall. Usage No. 29: with ellipsis of be or passive inf., or with so in place of this (where the preceding context has is, was, etc.). 1615 J. Chamberlain in Crt. And Times Jas.; He is not yet executed, nor I hear not when he shall. Surely he may not will that he be executed.

futurum intentionale: Surely intention has nothing to do with predictable truth. If Smith promises Jones a job – he intends that Jones get a job. Then the world explodes, so Jones does not get the job. Kant, Austin, or Grice, don’t care. A philosopher is not a scientist. He is into ‘conceptual matters,’ about what is to have a good intention, not whether the intention, in a future scenario, is realised or not. If they are interested in ‘tense,’ as Prior was as Grice was with his time-relative identity, it’s still because in the PRESENT, the emissor emits a future-tense utterance. The future figures more prominently than anything because in “Emissor communicates that p” there is the FUTURE ESSENTIAL. The emissor intends that his addressee in a time later than the present will do this or that. While Grice is always looking to cross the credibility/desirability divide, there is a feature that is difficult to cross in the bridge of asses. This is the shall vs. will. Grice is aware that ‘will,’ in the FIRST person, is not a matter of prediction. When Grice says “I will go to Harborne,” that’s not a prediction. He firmly contrasts it with “I shall go to Harborne” which is a perfect prediction in the indicative mode. “I will go to Harborne” is in the ‘futurum intentionale.’ Grice is also aware that in the SECOND and THIRD persons, ‘will’ reports something that the utterer must judge unpredictable. An utterance like “Thou wilt go to London” and “He will go to London” is in the ‘futurum indicativus.’ This is one nuance that Prichard forgets in the analysis of ‘willing’ that Grice eventually adopts. Prichard uses ‘will’ derivatively, and followed by a ‘that’-clause. Prichard quotes from the New-World, where the dialect is slightly different. For William James had said, “I will that the distant table slides over the floor toward me. And it does not.” Since James is using ‘will’ in the first person, the utterance is indeed NOT in the indicative, but the ‘intentional’ mode. In the case of the ‘communicatum,’ things get complicated, since U intends that A will believe that… In which case, U’s intention (and thus will) is directed towards the ‘will’ of his addressee, too, even if it is merely to adopt a ‘belief.’ So what would be the primary uses of the ‘will.’ In the first person, “I will go to Harborne” is in the futurum intentionale. It is used to report the utterer’s will. In the second and third person – “Thou will go to Harborne” and “He will go to Harborne,” the utterer uses the futurum indicativum and utters a statement which is predictable. Since analytic philosophers specify the analysis in the third person (“U means that…”) one has to be careful. For ‘futurum intentionale’ we have ‘will’ in the first person, and ‘shall’ in the second and third persons. So for the first group, U means that he SHALL go. In the second group, U means that his addressee or a third party WILL go. Grice adopts a subscript variant, stick with ‘will,’ but add the mode afterwards: so will-ind. will be ‘futurum indicativum,’ and will-int. will be futurum intentionale. Grice distinguishes the ‘futurum imperativum.’ This may be seen as a sub-class of the ‘futurum intentionale,’ as applied to the second and third persons, to avoid the idea that one can issue a ‘self-command.’ Grice has a futurum imperativum, in Latin ending in -tō(te), used to request someone to do something, or if something else happens first. “Sī quid acciderit, scrībitō. If anything happens, write to me' (Cicero). ‘Ubi nōs lāverimus, lavātō.’ 'When*we* have finished washing, *you* get washed.’ (Terence). ‘Crūdam si edēs, in acētum intinguitō.’ ‘If you eat cabbage raw, dip it in vinegar.’ (Cato). ‘Rīdētō multum quī tē, Sextille, cinaedum dīxerit et digitum porrigitō medium.’ 'Laugh loudly at anyone who calls you camp, Sextillus, and stick up your middle finger at him.' (Martial). In Latin, some verbs have only a futurum imperativum, e. g., scītō 'know', mementō 'remember'. In Latin, there is also a third person imperative also ending in -tō, plural -ntō exists. It is used in very formal contexts such as laws. ‘Iūsta imperia suntō, īsque cīvēs pārentō.’ 'Orders must be just, and citizens must obey them' (Cicero). Other ways of expressing a command or request are made with expressions such as cūrā ut 'take care to...', fac ut 'see to it that...' or cavē nē 'be careful that you don't...' Cūrā ut valeās. 'Make sure you keep well' (Cicero). Oddly, in Roman, the futurum indicativum can be used for a polite commands. ‘Pīliae salūtem dīcēs et Atticae.’ 'Will you please give my regards to Pilia and Attica?' (Cicero. The OED has will, would. It is traced to Old English willan, pres.t. wille, willaþ, pa. t. wolde. Grice was especially interested to check Jamess and Prichards use of willing that, Prichards shall will and the will/shall distinction; the present tense will; transitive uses, with simple obj. or obj. clause; occas. intr. 1 trans. with simple obj.: desire, wish for, have a mind to, `want (something); sometimes implying also `intend, purpose. 1601 Shaks. (title) Twelfe Night, Or what you will. 1654 Whitlock Zootomia 44 Will what befalleth, and befall what will. 1734 tr. Rollins Anc. Hist. V. 31 He that can do what ever he will is in great danger of willing what he ought not. b intr. with well or ill, or trans. with sbs. of similar meaning (e.g. good, health), usually with dat. of person: Wish (or intend) well or ill (to some one), feel or cherish good-will or ill-will. Obs. (cf. will v.2 1 b). See also well-willing; to will well that: to be willing that. 1483 Caxton Gold. Leg. I wyl wel that thou say, and yf thou say ony good, thou shalt be pesybly herde. Usage No. 2: trans. with obj. clause (with vb. in pres. subj., or in periphrastic form with should), or acc. and inf.: Desire, wish; sometimes implying also `intend, purpose (that something be done or happen). 1548 Hutten Sum of Diuinitie K viij, God wylle all men to be saued; enoting expression (usually authoritative) of a wish or intention: Determine, decree, ordain, enjoin, give order (that something be done). 1528 Cromwell in Merriman Life and Lett. (1902) I. 320 His grace then wille that thellection of a new Dean shalbe emonges them of the colledge; spec. in a direction or instruction in ones will or testament; hence, to direct by will (that something be done). 1820 Giffords Compl. Engl. Lawyer. I do hereby will and direct that my executrix..do excuse and release the said sum of 100l. to him; figurative usage. of an abstract thing (e.g. reason, law): Demands, requires. 1597 Shaks. 2 Hen. IV, Our Battaile is more full of Namess then yours Then Reason will, our hearts should be as good. Usage No. 4 transf. (from 2). Intends to express, means; affirms, maintains. 1602 Dolman La Primaud. Fr. Acad. Hee will that this authority should be for a principle of demonstration. 2 With dependent infinitive (normally without "to"); desire to, wish to, have a mind to (do something); often also implying intention. 1697 Ctess DAunoys Trav. I will not write to you often, because I will always have a stock of News to tell you, which..is pretty long in picking up. 1704 Locke Hum. Und. The great Encomiasts of the Chineses, do all to a man agree and will convince us that the Sect of the Literati are Atheists. 6 In relation to anothers desire or requirement, or to an obligation of some kind: Am (is, are) disposed or willing to, consent to; †in early use sometimes = deign or condescend to.With the (rare and obs.) imper. use, as in quot. 1490, cf. b and the corresponding negative use in 12 b. 1921 Times Lit. Suppl. 10 Feb. 88/3 Literature thrives where people will read what they do not agree with, if it is good. b In 2nd person, interrog., or in a dependent clause after beg or the like, expressing a request (usually courteous; with emphasis, impatient). 1599 Shaks. Hen. V, ii. i. 47 Will you shogge off? 1605 1878 Hardy Ret. Native v. iii, O, O, O,..O, will you have done! Usage No. 7 Expressing voluntary action, or conscious intention directed to the doing of what is expressed by the principal verb (without temporal reference as in 11, and without emphasis as in 10): = choose to (choose v. B. 3 a). The proper word for this idea, which cannot be so precisely expressed by any other. 1685 Baxter Paraphr., When God will tell us we shall know. Usage No. 8 Expressing natural disposition to do something, and hence habitual action: Has the habit, or `a way, of --ing; is addicted or accustomed to --ing; habitually does; sometimes connoting `may be expected to (cf. 15). 1865 Ruskin Sesame, Men, by their nature, are prone to fight; they will fight for any cause, or for none; expressing potentiality, capacity, or sufficiency: Can, may, is able to, is capable of --ing; is (large) enough or sufficient to.†it will not be: it cannot be done or brought to pass; it is all in vain. So, †will it not be? 1833 N. Arnott Physics, The heart will beat after removal from the body. Usage No. 10 As a strengthening of sense 7, expressing determination, persistence, and the like (without temporal reference as in 11); purposes to, is determined to. 1539 Bible (Great) Isa. lxvi. 6, I heare ye voyce of the Lorde, that wyll rewarde, etc; recompence his enemyes; emphatically. Is fully determined to; insists on or persists in --ing: sometimes with mixture of sense 8. (In 1st pers. with implication of futurity, as a strengthening of sense 11 a. Also fig. = must inevitably, is sure to. 1892 E. Reeves Homeward Bound viii. 239, I have spent 6,000 francs to come here..and I will see it! c In phr. of ironical or critical force referring to anothers assertion or opinion. Now arch. exc. in will have it; 1591 Shaks. 1 Hen. VI, This is a Riddling Merchant for the nonce, He will be here, and yet he is not here. 1728 Chambers Cycl., Honey, Some naturalists will have honey to be of a different quality, according to the difference of the flowers..the bees suck it from. Also, as auxiliary of the future tense with implication (entailment rather than cancellable implicaturum) of intention, thus distinguished from ‘shall,’ v. B. 8, where see note); in 1st person: sometimes in slightly stronger sense = intend to, mean to. 1600 Shaks. A.Y.L., To morrow will we be married. 1607 Shaks. Cor., Ile run away Till I am bigger, but then Ile fight. 1777 Clara Reeve Champion of Virtue, Never fear it..I will speak to Joseph about it. b In 2nd and 3rd pers., in questions or indirect statements. 1839 Lane Arab. Nts., I will cure thee without giving thee to drink any potion When King Yoonán heard his words, he..said.., How wilt thou do this? c will do (with omission of "I"): an expression of willingness to carry out a request. Cf. wilco. colloq. 1967 L. White Crimshaw Memorandum, `And find out where the bastard was `Will do, Jim said. 13 In 1st pers., expressing immediate intention: "I will" = `I am now going to, `I proceed at once to. 1885 Mrs. Alexander At Bay, Very well; I will wish you good-evening. b In 1st pers. pl., expressing a proposal: we will (†wule we) = `let us. 1798 Coleridge Nightingale 4 Come, we will rest on this old mossy bridge!, c figurative, as in It will rain, (in 3rd pers.) of a thing: Is ready to, is on the point of --ing. 1225 Ancr. R. A treou þet wule uallen, me underset hit mid on oðer treou. 14 In 2nd and 3rd pers., as auxiliary expressing mere futurity, forming (with pres. inf.) the future, and (with pf. inf.) the future pf. tense: corresponding to "shall" in the 1st pers. (see note s.v. shall v. B. 8). 1847 Tennyson Princess iii. 12 Rest, rest, on mothers breast, Father will come to thee soon. b As auxiliary of future substituted for the imper. in mild injunctions or requests. 1876 Ruskin St. Marks Rest. That they should use their own balances, weights, and measures; (not by any means false ones, you will please to observe). 15 As auxiliary of future expressing a contingent event, or a result to be expected, in a supposed case or under particular conditions (with the condition expressed by a conditional, temporal, or imper. clause, or otherwise implied). 1861 M. Pattison Ess. The lover of the Elizabethan drama will readily recal many such allusions; b with pers.sSubjects (usually 1st pers. sing.), expressing a voluntary act or choice in a supposed case, or a conditional promise or undertaking: esp. in asseverations, e.g. I will die sooner than, I’ll be hanged if, etc.). 1898 H. S. Merriman Rodens Corner. But I will be hanged if I see what it all means, now; xpressing a determinate or necessary consequence (without the notion of futurity). 1887 Fowler Deductive Logic, From what has been said it will be seen that I do not agree with Mr. Mill. Mod. If, in a syllogism, the middle term be not distributed in either premiss, there will be no conclusion; ith the notion of futurity obscured or lost: = will prove or turn out to, will be found on inquiry to; may be supposed to, presumably does. Hence (chiefly Sc. and north. dial.) in estimates of amount, or in uncertain or approximate statements, the future becoming equivalent to a present with qualification: e.g. it will be = `I think it is or `it is about; what will that be? = `what do you think that is? 1584 Hornby Priory in Craven Gloss. Where on 40 Acres there will be xiij.s. iv.d. per acre yerely for rent. 1791 Grose Olio (1792) 106, I believe he will be an Irishman. 1791 Grose Olio. C. How far is it to Dumfries? W. It will be twenty miles. 1812 Brackenridge Views Louisiana, The agriculture of this territory will be very similar to that of Kentucky. 1876 Whitby Gloss. sThis word we have only once heard, and that will be twenty years ago. 16 Used where "shall" is now the normal auxiliary, chiefly in expressing mere futurity: since 17th c. almost exclusively in Scottish, Irish, provincial, or extra-British use (see shall. 1602 Shaks. Ham. I will win for him if I can: if not, Ile gaine nothing but my shame, and the odde hits. 1825 Scott in Lockhart Ballantyne-humbug. I expect we will have some good singing. 1875 E. H. Dering Sherborne. `Will I start, sir? asked the Irish groom. Usage No. 3 Elliptical and quasi-elliptical uses; n absol. use, or with ellipsis of obj. clause as in 2: in meaning corresponding to senses 5-7.if you will is sometimes used parenthetically to qualify a word or phrase: = `if you wish it to be so called, `if you choose or prefer to call it so. 1696 Whiston The. Earth. Gravity depends entirely on the constant and efficacious, and, if you will, the supernatural and miraculous Influence of Almighty God. 1876 Ruskin St. Marks Rest. Very savage! monstrous! if you will. b In parenthetic phr. if God will (†also will God, rarely God will), God willing: if it be the will of God, `D.V.In OE. Gode willi&asg.ende (will v.2) = L. Deo volente. 1716 Strype in Thoresbys Lett. Next week, God willing, I take my journey to my Rectory in Sussex; fig. Demands, requires (absol. or ellipt. use of 3 c). 1511 Reg. Privy Seal Scot. That na seculare personis have intrometting with thaim uther wais than law will; I will well: I assent, `I should think so indeed. (Cf. F. je veux bien.) Usage No. 18: with ellipsis of a vb. of motion. 1885 Bridges Eros and Psyche Aug. I will to thee oer the stream afloat. Usage No. 19: with ellipsis of active inf. to be supplied from the context. 1836 Dickens Sk. Boz, Steam Excurs., `Will you go on deck? `No, I will not. This was said with a most determined air. 1853 Dickens Bleak Ho. lii, I cant believe it. Its not that I dont or I wont. I cant! 1885 Mrs. Alexander Valeries Fate vi, `Do you know that all the people in the house will think it very shocking of me to walk with you?.. `The deuce they will!; With generalized ellipsis, esp. in proverbial saying (now usually as in quot. 1562, with will for would). 1639 J. Clarke Paroem. 237 He that may and will not, when he would he shall not. c With so or that substituted for the omitted inf. phr.: now usually placed at the beginning of the sentence. 1596 Shaks. Tam. Shr. Hor. I promist we would beare his charge of wooing Gremio. And so we wil. d Idiomatically used in a qualifying phr. with relative, equivalent to a phr. with indef. relative in -ever; often with a thing as subj., becoming a mere synonym of may: e.g. shout as loud as you will = `however loud you (choose to) shout; come what will = `whatever may come; be that as it will = `however that may be. 1732 Pope Mor. Ess. The ruling Passion, be it what it will, The ruling Passion conquers Reason still. 20 With ellipsis of pass. inf. A. 1774 Goldsm. Surv. Exp. Philos. The airs force is compounded of its swiftness and density, and as these are encreased, so will the force of the wind; in const. where the ellipsis may be either of an obj. clause or of an inf. a In a disjunctive qualifying clause or phr. usually parenthetic, as whether he will or no, will he or not, (with pron. omitted) will or no, (with or omitted) will he will he not, will he nill he (see VI. below and willy-nilly), etc.In quot. 1592 vaguely = `one way or another, `in any case. For the distinction between should and would, v. note s.v. shall; in a noun-clause expressing the object of desire, advice, or request, usually with a person as subj., implying voluntary action as the desired end: thus distinguished from should, which may be used when the persons will is not in view. Also (almost always after wish) with a thing as Subjects, in which case should can never be substituted because it would suggest the idea of command or compulsion instead of mere desire. Cf. shall; will; willest; willeth; wills; willed (wIld); also: willian, willi, wyll, wille, wil, will, willode, will, wyllede, wylled, willyd, ied, -it, -id, willed; wijld, wilde, wild, willid, -yd, wylled,willet, willed; willd(e, wild., OE. willian wk. vb. = German “willen.” f. will sb.1, 1 trans. to wish, desire; sometimes with implication of intention: = will. 1400 Lat. and Eng. Prov. He þt a lytul me 3euyth to me wyllyth optat longe lyffe. 1548 Udall, etc. Erasm. Par. Matt. v. 21-24 Who so euer hath gotten to hymselfe the charitie of the gospell, whyche wylleth wel to them that wylleth yll. 1581 A. Hall Iliad, By Mineruas helpe, who willes you all the ill she may. A. 1875 Tennyson Q. Mary i. iv, A great party in the state Wills me to wed her; To assert, affirm: = will v.1 B. 4. 1614 Selden Titles Hon. None of this excludes Vnction before, but only wils him the first annointed by the Pope. 2 a to direct by ones will or testament (that something be done, or something to be done); to dispose of by will; to bequeath or devise; to determine by the will; to attempt to cause, aim at effecting by exercise of will; to set the mind with conscious intention to the performance or occurrence of something; to choose or decide to do something, or that something shall be done or happen. Const. with simple obj., acc. and inf., simple inf. (now always with to), or obj. clause; also absol. or intr. (with as or so). Nearly coinciding in meaning with will v.1 7, but with more explicit reference to the mental process of volition. 1630 Prynne Anti-Armin. 119 He had onely a power, not to fall into sinne vnlesse he willed it. 1667 Milton P.L. So absolute she seems..that what she wills to do or say, Seems wisest. 1710 J. Clarke tr. Rohaults Nat. Philos. If I will to move my Arm, it is presently moved. 1712 Berkeley Pass. Obed. He that willeth the end, doth will the necessary means conducive to that end. 1837 Carlyle Fr. Rev. All shall be as God wills. 1880 Meredith Tragic Com. So great, heroical, giant-like, that what he wills must be. 1896 Housman Shropsh. Lad xxx, Others, I am not the first, Have willed more mischief than they durst; intr. to exercise the will; to perform the mental act of volition. 1594 Hooker Eccl. Pol. To will, is to bend our soules to the hauing or doing of that which they see to be good. 1830 Mackintosh Eth. Philos. Wks.. But what could induce such a being to will or to act? 1867 A. P. Forbes Explan. Is this infinitely powerful and intelligent Being free? wills He? loves He? c trans. To bring or get (into, out of, etc.) by exercise of will. 1850 L. Hunt Table-t. (1882) 184 Victims of opium have been known to be unable to will themselves out of the chair in which they were sitting. d To control (another person), or induce (another) to do something, by the mere exercise of ones will, as in hypnotism. 1882 Proc. Soc. Psych. Research I. The one to be `willed would go to the other end of the house, if desired, whilst we agreed upon the thing to be done. 1886 19th Cent. They are what is called `willed to do certain things desired by the ladies or gentlemen who have hold of them. 1897 A. Lang Dreams & Ghosts iii. 59 A young lady, who believed that she could play the `willing game successfully without touching the person `willed; to express or communicate ones will or wish with regard to something, with various shades of meaning, cf. will, v.1 3., specifically: a to enjoin, order; to decree, ordain, a) with personal obj., usually with inf. or clause. 1481 Cov. Leet Bk. 496 We desire and also will you that vnto oure seid seruaunt ye yeue your aid. 1547 Edw. VI in Rymer Foedera, We Wyll and Commaunde yowe to Procede in the seid Matters. 1568 Grafton Chron., Their sute was smally regarded, and shortly after they were willed to silence. 1588 Lambarde Eiren. If a man do lie in awaite to rob me, and (drawing his sword upon me) he willeth me to deliver my money. 1591 Shaks. 1 Hen. VI We doe no otherwise then wee are willd. 1596 Nashe Saffron Walden P 4, Vp he was had and.willed to deliuer vp his weapon. 1656 Hales Gold. Rem. The King in the Gospel, that made a Feast, and..willed his servants to go out to the high-ways side. 1799 Nelson in Nicolas Disp., Willing and requiring all Officers and men to obey you; 1565 Cooper Thesaurus s.v. Classicum, By sounde of trumpet to will scilence. 1612 Bacon Ess., Of Empire. It is common with Princes (saith Tacitus) to will contradictories. 1697 Dryden Æneis i. 112 Tis yours, O Queen! to will The Work, which Duty binds me to fulfil. 1877 Tennyson Harold vi. i, Get thou into thy cloister as the king Willd it.; to pray, request, entreat; = desire v. 6. 1454 Paston Lett. Suppl. As for the questyon that ye wylled me to aske my lord, I fond hym yet at no good leyser. 1564 Haward tr. Eutropius. The Romaines sent ambassadoures to him, to wyll him to cease from battayle. 1581 A. Hall Iliad, His errand done, as he was willde, he toke his flight from thence. 1631 [Mabbe] Celestina. Did I not will you I should not be wakened? 1690 Dryden Amphitryon i. i, He has sent me to will and require you to make a swinging long Night for him; fig. of a thing, to require, demand; also, to induce, persuade a person to do something. 1445 in Anglia. Constaunce willeth also that thou doo noughte with weyke corage. Cable and Baugh note that one important s. of prescriptions that now form part of all our grammars -- that governing the use of will and shall -- has its origin in this period. Previous to 1622 no grammar recognized any distinction between will and shall. In 1653 Wallis in his Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae states in Latin and for the benefit of Europeans that Subjectsive intention is expressed by will in the first person, by shall in the second and third, while simple factual indicative predictable futurity is expressed by shall in the first person, by will in the second and third. It is not until the second half of the eighteenth century that the use in questions and subordinate clauses is explicitly defined. In 1755 Johnson, in his Dictionary, states the rule for questions, and in 1765 William Ward, in his Grammar, draws up for the first time the full set of prescriptions that underlies, with individual variations, the rules found in later tracts. Wards pronouncements are not followed generally by other grammarians until Lindley Murray gives them greater currency in 1795. Since about 1825 they have often been repeated in grammars, v. Fries, The periphrastic future with will and shall. Will qua modal auxiliary never had an s. The absence of conjugation is a very old common Germanic phenomenon. OE 3rd person present indicative of willan (and of the preterite-present verbs) is not distinct from the 1st person present indicative. That dates back at least to CGmc, or further if one looks just as the forms and ignore tense and/or mood). Re: Prichard: "Prichard wills that he go to London. This is Prichards example, admired by Grice ("but I expect not pleasing to Maucaulays ears"). The -s is introduced to indicate a difference between the modal and main verb use (as in Prichard and Grice) of will. In fact, will, qua modal, has never been used with a to-infinitive. OE uses present-tense forms to refer to future events as well as willan and sculan. willan would give a volitional nuance; sculan, an obligational nuance. Its difficult to find an example of weorthan used to express the future, but that doesnt mean it didnt happen. In insensitive utterers, will has very little of volition about it, unless one follows Walliss observation for for I will vs. I shall. Most probably use ll, or be going to for the future.

fuzzy implicaturum. Grice loved ‘fuzzy,’ “if only because it’s one of the few non-Graeco-Roman philosophical terms!” -- fuzzy set, a set in which membership is a matter of degree. In classical set theory, for every set S and thing x, either x is a member of S or x is not. In fuzzy set theory, things x can be members of sets S to any degree between 0 and 1, inclusive. Degree 1 corresponds to ‘is a member of’ and 0 corresponds to ‘is not’; the intermediate degrees are degrees of vagueness or uncertainty. Example: Let S be the set of men who are bald at age forty. L. A. Zadeh developed a logic of fuzzy sets as the basis for a logic of vague predicates. A fuzzy set can be represented mathematically as a function from a given universe into the interval [0, 1]. Zadeh tried to interpret Grice alla fuzzy in “Pragmatics”

gadamer: philosopher, the leading proponent of hermeneutics in the second half of the twentieth century. He studied at Marburg in the 0s with Natorp and Heidegger. His first book, Plato’s Dialectical Ethics 1, bears their imprint and reflects his abiding interest in Grecian philosophy. Truth and Method 0 established Gadamer as an original thinker and had an impact on a variety of disciplines outside philosophy, including theology, legal theory, and literary criticism. The three parts of Truth and Method combine to displace the scientific conceptions of truth and method as the model for understanding in the human sciences. In the first part, which presents itself as a critique of the abstraction inherent in aesthetic consciousness, Gadamer argues that artworks make a claim to truth. Later Gadamer draws on the play of art in the experience of the beautiful to offer an analogy to how a text draws its readers into the event of truth by making a claim on them. In the central portion of the book Gadamer presents tradition as a condition of understanding. Tradition is not for him an object of historical knowledge, but part of one’s very being. The final section of Truth and Method is concerned with language as the site of tradition. Gadamer sought to shift the focus of hermeneutics from the problems of obscurity and misunderstanding to the community of understanding that the participants in a dialogue share through language. Gadamer was involved in three debates that define his philosophical contribution. The first was an ongoing debate with Heidegger reflected throughout Gadamer’s corpus. Gadamer did not accept all of the innovations that Heidegger introduced into his thinking in the 0s, particularly his reconstruction of the history of philosophy as the history of being. Gadamer also rejected Heidegger’s elevation of Hölderlin to the status of an authority. Gadamer’s greater accessibility led Habermas to characterize Gadamer’s contribution as that of having “urbanized the Heideggerian province.” The second debate was with Habermas himself. Habermas criticized Gadamer’s rejection of the Enlightenment’s “prejudice against prejudice.” Whereas Habermas objected to the conservatism inherent in Gadamer’s rehabilitation of prejudice, Gadamer explained that he was only setting out the conditions for understanding, conditions that did not exclude the possibility of radical change. The third debate, which formed the basis of Dialogue and Deconstruction 9, was with Derrida. Derridean deconstruction is indebted to Heidegger’s later philosophy and so this debate was in part about the direction philosophy should take after Heidegger. However, many observers concluded that there was no real engagement between Gadamer and Derrida. To some it seemed that Derrida, by refusing to accept the terms on which Gadamer insisted dialogue should take place, had exposed the limits imposed by hermeneutics. To others it was confirmation that any attempt to circumvent the conditions of dialogue specified by Gadamerian hermeneutics is selfdefeating.

galen: philosopher, he traveled extensively in the Greco-Roman world before settling in Rome and becoming court physician to Marcus Aurelius. His philosophical interests lay mainly in the philosophy of science On the Therapeutic Method and nature On the Function of Parts, and in logic Introduction to Logic, in which he develops a crude but pioneering treatment of the logic of relations. Galen espoused an extreme form of directed teleology in natural explanation, and sought to develop a syncretist picture of cause and explanation drawing on Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and preceding medical writers, notably Hippocrates, whose views he attempted to harmonize with those of Plato On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato. He wrote on philosophical psychology On the Passions and Errors of the Soul; his materialist account of mind Mental Characteristics Are Caused by Bodily Conditions is notable for its caution in approaching issues such as the actual nature of the substance of the soul and the age and structure of the universe that he regarded as undecidable. In physiology, he adopted a version of the four-humor theory, that health consists in an appropriate balance of four basic bodily constituents blood, black bile, yellow bile, and phlegm, and disease in a corresponding imbalance a view owed ultimately to Hippocrates. He sided with the rationalist physicians against the empiricists, holding that it was possible to elaborate and to support theories concerning the fundamentals of the human body; but he stressed the importance of observation and experiment, in particular in anatomy he discovered the function of the recurrent laryngeal nerve by dissection and ligation. Via the Arabic tradition, Galen became the most influential doctor of the ancient world; his influence persisted, in spite of the discoveries of the seventeenth century, until the end of the nineteenth century. He also wrote extensively on semantics, but these texts are lost.

galileo galilei: philosopher. His Dialogue concerning the Two Chief World Systems defends Copernicus by arguing against the major tenets of the Aristotelian cosmology. On his view, one kind of motion replaces the multiple distinct celestial and terrestrial motions of Aristotle; mathematics is applicable to the real world; and explanation of natural events appeals to efficient causes alone, not to hypothesized natural ends. Galileo was called before the Inquisition, was made to recant his Copernican views, and spent the last years of his life under house arrest. Discourse concerning Two New Sciences 1638 created the modern science of mechanics: it proved the laws of free fall, thus making it possible to study accelerated motions; asserted the principle of the independence of forces; and proposed a theory of parabolic ballistics. His work was developed by Huygens and Newton. Galileo’s scientific and technological achievements were prodigious. He invented an air thermoscope, a device for raising water, and a computer for calculating quantities in geometry and ballistics. His discoveries in pure science included the isochronism of the pendulum and the hydrostatic balance. His telescopic observations led to the discovery of four of Jupiter’s satellites the Medicean Stars, the moon’s mountains, sunspots, the moon’s libration, and the nature of the Milky Way. In methodology Galileo accepted the ancient Grecian ideal of demonstrative science, and employed the method of retroductive inference, whereby the phenomena under investigation are attributed to remote causes. Much of his work utilizes the hypothetico-deductive method.

gambler’s fallacy: also called Monte Carlo fallacy, the fallacy of supposing, of a sequence of independent events, that the probabilities of later outcomes must increase or decrease to “compensate” for earlier outcomes. For example, since by Bernoulli’s theorem in a long run of tosses of a fair coin it is very probable that the coin will come up heads roughly half the time, one might think that a coin that has not come up heads recently must be “due” to come up heads must have a probability greater than one-half of doing so. But this is a misunderstanding of the law of large numbers, which requires no such compensating tendencies of the coin. The probability of heads remains one-half for each toss despite the preponderance, so far, of tails. In the sufficiently long run what “compensates” for the presence of improbably long subsequences in which, say, tails strongly predominate, is simply that such subsequences occur rarely and therefore have only a slight effect on the statistical character of the whole.

conversational game theory: Grice for ‘homo ludens’. In “Logic and conversation,” Grice uses the phrases, “the game of conversation,” “conversational game,” “conversational move,” “the conversational rules,” – so he knew he was echoing Neumann and Morgenstern. J. Hintikka, “Grice and game theory.” the theory of the structure of, and the rational procedures (or strategies) for performing in, games or game-like human interactions. Although there are forerunners, game theory is virtually invented by Neumann and Morgenstern. Its most striking feature is its compact representation of interactions of at least two players; e. g. two players may face two choices each, and in combination these choices produce four possible outcomes. Actual choices are of strategies, not of outcomes, although it is assessments of outcomes that recommend this or that procedure, maxim, imperative, or strategy. To do well in a game, even for each player to do well, as is often possible, generally requires taking the other player’s position, interest, and goal, into account. Hence, to evaluate an imperative or rule or strategiy directly, without reference to the outcomes they might produce in interaction with others, is conspicuously perverse. It is not surprising, therefore, that in meta-ethics, game theory has been preeminently applied to utilitarianianism. As the numbers of players and rational procedure, guideline or strategies rise, the complexity of the game of conversation increases geometrically. If players have *2* strategies each and each ranks the four possible outcomes without ties, there are already *78* strategically distinct conversations. Even minor real-life interactions may have astronomically greater complexity. Grice once complained to Hintikka that this makes game theory ‘useless,’ or ‘otiose.’ Alternatively, one can note that this makes it realistic and helps us understand why real-life choices are at least as complex as they sometimes seem. To complicate matters further, conversationalists can choose over probabilistic combinations of their pure rational guidelines or strategies. Hence, the original 4 outcomes in a simple 2 $ 2 game define a continuum of potential outcomes. After noting the structure of the game of conversation, one might then be struck by an immediate implication of this mere description. A rational agent may be supposed to attempt to maximize his potential or expected outcome in the game of conversation. But as there are at least two players in the game of conversation, in general conversationalists cannot all maximize simultaneously over their expected outcomes while assuming that all others are doing likewise. This is an analytical principle. In general, we cannot maximize over two functions simultaneously. The general notion of the greatest good of the greatest number, e. g., is incoherent. Hence, in inter-active choice contexts, the simple notion of economic rationality is incoherent. Virtually all of early game theory was dedicated to finding an alternative principle for resolving conversational game interactions. There are now many of what Grice calls a “solution theory,” most of which are about this or that outcome rather than this or that rational guideline or strategy they stipulate which outcomes or range of outcomes is game-theoretically “rational.” There is little consensus on how to generalize from the ordinary rationality of merely choosing more rather than less and of displaying consistent preferences to the general choice of strategies in games. A pay-off in early game theory is almost always represented in a cardinal, transferable utility. A transferable utility is an odd notion that is evidently introduced to avoid the disdain with which philosophers then treated interpersonal comparisons of utility. It seems to be analogous to money. One could say that the theory is one of wealth maximization. In the early theory, the “rationality” conditions are as follows.In general, if the sums of the pay-offs to each players in various outcomes differ, it is assumed that a rational player will manage to divide the largest possible payoff with the other player. 2 No rational agent will accept a payoff below the “security level” obtainable even if all the other player or players really form a coalition against the individual. Sometimes it is also assumed that no group of players will rationally accept less than it could get as its group security level but in some games, no outcome can meet this condition. This is an odd combination of elements. The collective elements are plausibly thought of as merely predictive. If we individually wish to do well, we should combine efforts to help us do best AS A CONVERSATIONAL DYAD. But what we want is a theory that converts two individual preferences into one collective result – Grice’s conversational shared goal of influencing and being influenced by others. Unfortunately, to put a move doing just this in the foundations of the theory is question-begging. Our fundamental burden is to determine whether a theory of subjective rationality MAY produce an inter-subjectively good result, not to stipulate that it must. In the theory with cardinal, additive payoffs, we can divide games. There is the constant-sum game, in which the sum of all players’ payoffs in each outcome is a constant, and variable sum games. A zero-sum games is a special case of a constant sum game. Two-player constant sum games are games of pure conversational ‘conflict.’ Each player’s gain is the other’s loss. In constant sum games with more than two players and in all variable sum games, there is generally reason for coalition formation to improve payoffs to members of the coalition. A game without transferable utility, such as a games in which players have only ordinal preferences, may be characterized as a game of pure conflict or of pure co-ordination (or co-operation) when players’ preference orderings over outcomes are, respectively, opposite or identical, or as games of mixed motive when their orderings are partly the same and partly reversed. Grice’s nalysis of such games is evidently less tractable than that of games with cardinal, additive utility, and their theory is only beginning to be extensively developed by Griceians. Despite the apparent circularity of the rationality assumptions of early game theory, it is the game theorists’ prisoner’s dilemma that makes clear that compelling subjectivistic principles of choice can produce an inter-subjective deficient outcome. This game given its catchy but inapt name. If they play it in isolation from any other interaction between them, two players in this game can each do what seems individually best and reach an outcome that both consider inferior to the outcome that results from making opposite strategy choices. Even with the knowledge that this is the problem they face, the players still have incentive to choose the strategies that jointly produce the inferior outcome. The prisoner’s dilemma involves both coordination (or co-operation) and conflict. It has played a central role in discussions of Griceian conversational pragmatics. Games that predominantly involve coordination (or cooperation), such as when we coordinate in all driving on the right or all on the left, have a similarly central role. The understanding of both classes of games has been read into the philosophy of Hobbes and Hume and into “mutual advantage” theories of justice.

gassendi: philosopher who advocates a via media to scientific knowledge about the empirically observable material world that avoids both the dogmatism of Cartesians, who claimed to have certain knowledge, and the skepticism of Montaigne and Charron, who doubted that we have knowledge about anything. Gassendi presented Epicurean atomism as a model for explaining how bodies are structured and interact. He advanced a hypothetico-deductive method by proposing that experiments should be used to test mechanistic hypotheses. Like the ancient Pyrrhonian Skeptics, he did not challenge the immediate reports of our senses; but unlike them he argued that while we cannot have knowledge of the inner essences of things, we can develop a reliable science of the world of appearances. In this he exemplified the mitigated skepticism of modern science that is always open to revision on the basis of empirical evidence. Gassendi’s first book, Exercitationes Paradoxicae Adversis Aristoteleos 1624, is an attack on Aristotle. He is best known as the author of the fifth set of objections to Descartes’s Meditations1641, in which Gassendi proposed that even clear and distinct ideas may represent no objects outside our minds, a possibility that Descartes called the objection of objections, but dismissed as destructive of all reason. Gassendi’s Syntagma Philosophiae Epicuri 1649 contains his development of Epicurean philosophy and science. His elaboration of the mechanistic atomic model and his advocacy of experimental testing of hypotheses were crucially important in the rise of modern science. Gassendi’s career as a Catholic priest, Epicurean atomist, mitigated skeptic, and mechanistic scientist presents a puzzle as do the careers of several other philosopher-priests in the seventeenth century concerning his true beliefs. On the one hand, he professed faith and set aside Christian doctrine as not open to challenge. On the other hand, he utilized an arsenal of skeptical arguments that was beginning to undermine and would eventually destroy the rational foundations of the church. Gassendi thus appears to be of a type almost unknown today, a thinker indifferent to the apparent discrepancy between his belief in Christian doctrine and his advocacy of materialist science.

gay: j. philosopher Grice read quite a lot, who tried to reconcile divine command theory and utilitarianism. The son of a minister, Gay was elected a fellow of Sidney Sussex , Cambridge, where he taught Grecian philosophy. His essay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality” argues that obligation is founded on the will of God, which, because people are destined to be happy, directs us to act to promote the general happiness. Gay offers an associationist psychology according to which we pursue objects that have come to be associated with happiness e.g. money, regardless of whether they now make us happy, and argues, contra Hutcheson, that our moral sense is conditioned rather than natural. Gay’s blend of utilitarianism with associationist psychology gave David Hartley the basis for his moral psychology, which later influenced Bentham in his formulation of classical utilitarianism.

burlæus: Burleigh’s donkey – Grice preferred the spelling “Gualterus Burlaeus.” “One would hardly realise it’s Irish to the backbone!” – Grice. Geach’s donkey: geach, Peter b.6, English philosopher and logician whose main work has been in logic and philosophy of language. A great admirer of McTaggart, he has published a sympathetic exposition of the latter’s work Truth, Love and Immortality, 9, and has always aimed to emulate what he sees as the clarity and rigor of the Scottish idealist’s thought. Greatly influenced by Frege and Vitters, Geach is particularly noted for his powerful use of what he calls “the Frege point,” better called “the Frege-Geach point,” that the same thought may occur as asserted or unasserted and yet retain the same truth-value. The point has been used by Geach to refute ascriptivist theories of responsibility, and can be employed against noncognitivist theories of ethics, which are said to face the Frege-Geach problem of accounting for the sense of moral ascriptions in contexts like ‘If he did wrong, he will be punished’. He is also noted for helping to bring Frege to the English-speaking world, through co-translations with Max Black 9 88. In logic he is known for proving, independently of Quine, a contradiction in Frege’s way out of Russell’s paradox Mind, 6, and for his defense of modern Fregean-Russellian logic against traditional Aristotelian-Scholastic logic. He also has a deep admiration for the Polish logicians. In metaphysics, Geach is known for his defense of relative identity, the thesis that an object a can be the same F where F is a kind-term as an object b while not being the same G, even though a and b are both G’s. His spirited defense of the thesis has been met by equally vigorous attacks, and it has not received wide acceptance. An obvious application of the thesis is to the defense of the doctrine of the Trinity e.g., the Father is the same god as the Son but not the same person, which has caught the attention of some philosophers of religion. Geach’s main works include Mental Acts 8, which attacks dispositional theories of mind, Reference and Generality 2, which contains much important work on logic, and the collection Logic Matters 2. A notable defender of Catholicism despite his animadversions against Scholastic logic, his religious views find their greatest exposure in God and the Soul 9, Providence and Evil 7, and The Virtues 7. He is married to the philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe.

Grice’s genitorial programme – A type of ideal observer theory -- demiurge from Grecian demiourgos, ‘artisan’, ‘craftsman’, a deity who shapes the material world from the preexisting chaos. Plato introduces the demiurge in his Timaeus. Because he is perfectly good, the demiurge wishes to communicate his own goodness. Using the Forms as a model, he shapes the initial chaos into the best possible image of these eternal and immutable archetypes. The visible world is the result. Although the demiurge is the highest god and the best of causes, he should not be identified with the God of theism. His ontological and axiological status is lower than that of the Forms, especially the Form of the Good. He is also limited. The material he employs is not created by him. Furthermore, it is disorderly and indeterminate, and thus partially resists his rational ordering. In gnosticism, the demiurge is the ignorant, weak, and evil or else morally limited cause of the cosmos. In the modern era the term has occasionally been used for a deity who is limited in power or knowledge. Its first occurrence in this sense appears to be in J. S. Mill’s Theism 1874.

gentile: g. idealist philosopher. He taught philosophy at Pisa. Gentile rejects Hegel’s dialectics as the process of an objectified thought. Gentile’s actualism or actual idealism claims that only the pure act of thinking or the transcendental subject can undergo a dialectical process. All reality, such as nature, God, good, and evil, is immanent in the dialectics of the transcendental subject, which is distinct from the empirical subject. Among his major works are “La teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro” and “Sistema di logica come teoria del conoscere.” Gentile sees conversation is a concerted act that overcomes the apparent difficulties of inter-subjectivity and realizes a unity within two transcendental subjects. Actualism was pretty influential. With Croce’s historicism, it influenced two Oxonian idealists discussed by H. P. Grice: Bernard Bosanquet and R. G. Collingwood (vide: H. P. Grice, “Metaphysics,” in D. F. Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics, London, Macmillan).

genus: gender. H. P. Grice calls Austin an artless sexist when referring to the trouser word. We see how after Austin’s death, Grice more and more loses his reverential attitude towards the ‘school master’ and shows Austin for what he is! Gender implicaturum – Most languages have three genders: masculine, feminine, and neuter (or epicene, or common). feminist epistemology, epistemology from a feminist perspective. It investigates the relevance that the gender of the inquirer/knower has to epistemic practices, including the theoretical practice of epistemology. It is typified both by themes that are exclusively feminist in that they could arise only from a critical attention to gender, and by themes that are non-exclusively feminist in that they might arise from other politicizing theoretical perspectives besides feminism. A central, exclusively feminist theme is the relation between philosophical conceptions of reason and cultural conceptions of masculinity. Here a historicist stance must be adopted, so that philosophy is conceived as the product of historically and culturally situated hence gendered authors. This stance brings certain patterns of intellectual association into view patterns, perhaps, of alignment between philosophical conceptions of reason as contrasted with emotion or intuition, and cultural conceptions of masculinity as contrasted with femininity. A central, non-exclusively feminist theme might be called “social-ism” in epistemology. It has two main tributaries: political philosophy, in the form of Marx’s historical materialism; and philosophy of science, in the form of either Quinean naturalism or Kuhnian historicism. The first has resulted in feminist standpoint theory, which adapts and develops the Marxian idea that different social groups have different epistemic standpoints, where the material positioning of one of the groups is said to bestow an epistemic privilege. The second has resulted in feminist work in philosophy of science which tries to show that not only epistemic values but also non-epistemic e.g. gendered values are of necessity sometimes an influence in the generation of scientific theories. If this can be shown, then an important feminist project suggests itself: to work out a rationale for regulating the influence of these values so that science may be more self-transparent and more responsible. By attempting to reveal the epistemological implications of the fact that knowers are diversely situated in social relations of identity and power, feminist epistemology represents a radicalizing innovation in the analytic tradition, which has typically assumed an asocial conception of the epistemic subject, and of the philosopher. -- feminist philosophy, a discussion of philosophical concerns that refuses to identify the human experience with the male experience. Writing from a variety of perspectives, feminist philosophers challenge several areas of traditional philosophy on the grounds that they fail 1 to take seriously women’s interests, identities, and issues; and 2 to recognize women’s ways of being, thinking, and doing as valuable as those of men. Feminist philosophers fault traditional metaphysics for splitting the self from the other and the mind from the body; for wondering whether “other minds” exist and whether personal identity depends more on memories or on physical characteristics. Because feminist philosophers reject all forms of ontological dualism, they stress the ways in which individuals interpenetrate each other’s psyches through empathy, and the ways in which the mind and body coconstitute each other. Because Western culture has associated rationality with “masculinity” and emotionality with “femininity,” traditional epistemologists have often concluded that women are less human than men. For this reason, feminist philosophers argue that reason and emotion are symbiotically related, coequal sources of knowledge. Feminist philosophers also argue that Cartesian knowledge, for all its certainty and clarity, is very limFechner’s law feminist philosophy 305 305 ited. People want to know more than that they exist; they want to know what other people are thinking and feeling. Feminist philosophers also observe that traditional philosophy of science is not as objective as it claims to be. Whereas traditional philosophers of science often associate scientific success with scientists’ ability to control, rule, and otherwise dominate nature, feminist philosophers of science associate scientific success with scientists’ ability to listen to nature’s self-revelations. Since it willingly yields abstract theory to the testimony of concrete fact, a science that listens to what nature says is probably more objective than one that does not. Feminist philosophers also criticize traditional ethics and traditional social and political philosophy. Rules and principles have dominated traditional ethics. Whether agents seek to maximize utility for the aggregate or do their duty for the sake of duty, they measure their conduct against a set of universal, abstract, and impersonal norms. Feminist philosophers often call this traditional view of ethics a “justice” perspective, contrasting it with a “care” perspective that stresses responsibilities and relationships rather than rights and rules, and that attends more to a moral situation’s particular features than to its general implications. Feminist social and political philosophy focus on the political institutions and social practices that perpetuate women’s subordination. The goals of feminist social and political philosophy are 1 to explain why women are suppressed, repressed, and/or oppressed in ways that men are not; and 2 to suggest morally desirable and politically feasible ways to give women the same justice, freedom, and equality that men have. Liberal feminists believe that because women have the same rights as men do, society must provide women with the same educational and occupational opportunities that men have. Marxist feminists believe that women cannot be men’s equals until women enter the work force en masse and domestic work and child care are socialized. Radical feminists believe that the fundamental causes of women’s oppression are sexual. It is women’s reproductive role and/or their sexual role that causes their subordination. Unless women set their own reproductive goals childlessness is a legitimate alternative to motherhood and their own sexual agendas lesbianism, autoeroticism, and celibacy are alternatives to heterosexuality, women will remain less than free. Psychoanalytic feminists believe that women’s subordination is the result of earlychildhood experiences that cause them to overdevelop their abilities to relate to other people on the one hand and to underdevelop their abilities to assert themselves as autonomous agents on the other. Women’s greatest strength, a capacity for deep relationships, may also be their greatest weakness: a tendency to be controlled by the needs and wants of others. Finally, existentialist feminists claim that the ultimate cause of women’s subordination is ontological. Women are the Other; men are the Self. Until women define themselves in terms of themselves, they will continue to be defined in terms of what they are not: men. Recently, socialist feminists have attempted to weave these distinctive strands of feminist social and political thought into a theoretical whole. They argue that women’s condition is overdetermined by the structures of production, reproduction and sexuality, and the socialization of children. Women’s status and function in all of these structures must change if they are to achieve full liberation. Furthermore, women’s psyches must also be transformed. Only then will women be liberated from the kind of patriarchal thoughts that undermine their self-concept and make them always the Other. Interestingly, the socialist feminist effort to establish a specifically feminist standpoint that represents how women see the world has not gone without challenge. Postmodern feminists regard this effort as an instantiation of the kind of typically male thinking that tells only one story about reality, truth, knowledge, ethics, and politics. For postmodern feminists, such a story is neither feasible nor desirable. It is not feasible because women’s experiences differ across class, racial, and cultural lines. It is not desirable because the “One” and the “True” are philosophical myths that traditional philosophy uses to silence the voices of the many. Feminist philosophy must be many and not One because women are many and not One. The more feminist thoughts, the better. By refusing to center, congeal, and cement separate thoughts into a unified and inflexible truth, feminist philosophers can avoid the pitfalls of traditional philosophy. As attractive as the postmodern feminist approach to philosophy may be, some feminist philosophers worry that an overemphasis on difference and a rejection of unity may lead to intellectual as well as political disintegration. If feminist philosophy is to be without any standpoint whatsoever, it becomes difficult to ground claims about what is good for women in particufeminist philosophy feminist philosophy 306 306 lar and for human beings in general. It is a major challenge to contemporary feminist philosophy, therefore, to reconcile the pressures for diversity and difference with those for integration and commonality.

genus generalissimum: “I love a superlative: good, gooder and goodest, my favourites!” a genus that is not a species of some higher genus; a broadest natural kind. One of the ten Aristotelian categories, it is also called summum genus. For Aristotle and many of his followers, the ten categories (twelve in Kant, four in Grice) are *not* species of some higher all-inclusive genus say, being. Otherwise, that alleged over-arching all-inclusive genus would wholly include the differences, say, between conversational quality, conversational quantity, conversational relation, and conversational mode, and would be universally predicable of conversational quality, conversational quantity, conversational relation, and conversational mode. But no genus is predicable of its differences in this manner. Few authors explained this reasoning clearly, but Grice did: “If I appeal to four conversational categories, I know what I am doing. The principle of conversational benevolence cannot float in the air: it needs four categories – informativeness, trustworthiness, connectedness and perspicuity – to make it applicable to our conversational realities. Grice points out that if the difference ‘rational’ just meant ‘rational animal’, to define ‘man’ as ‘rational animal’ would be to define him as ‘rational animal animal’, which would infringe the conversational maxims ‘be brief,’ and ‘do not be repetitive’ – “On toop, man is a rational animal animal is ill formed.” So too generally: no genus can include its differences in this way. Thus there is no all-inclusive genus. Grice’s four conversational categories are the most general conversational genera.

charlier: a. k. a. gerson, j. de, philosopher. He studied in Paris, and succeeded the nominalist Pierre d’Ailly as chancellor of the varsity. Both d’Ailly and Gerson played a prominent part in the work of the Council of Constance. Much of Charlier’s influence on later thinkers arose from his conciliarism, the view that the church is a political society and that a general council, acting on behalf of the church, has the power to depose a pope who fails to promote the church’s welfare, for it seemed that similar arguments could apply to other forms of political society. Gerson’s conciliarism was not constitutionalism in the modern sense, for he appealed to corporate and hierarchical ideas of church government, and did not rest his case on any principle of individual rights. His main writings dealt with mystical theology, which, he thought, brings the believer closer to the beatific vision of God than do other forms of theology. He was influenced by St. Bonaventure and Albertus Magnus, but especially by Pseudo-Dionysius, whom he saw as a disciple of St. Paul and not as a Platonist. He was thus able to adopt an anti-Platonic position in his attacks on the mystic Ruysbroeck and on contemporary followers of Duns Scotus, such as Jean de Ripa. In dismissing Scotist realism, he made use of nominalist positions, particularly those that emphasized divine freedom. He warned theologians against being misled by pride into supposing that natural reason alone could solve metaphysical problems; and he emphasized the importance of a priest’s pastoral duties. Despite his early prominence, he spent the last years of his life in relative obscurity.

gersonides: a leading Aristotelian. His oeuvre includes supercommentaries on commentaries on Aristotle, On the Correct Syllogism, a treatise on the modal syllogism; and a major Scholastic treatise, The Wars of the Lord. In addition, his biblical commentaries rank among the best examples of philosophical scriptural exegesis; especially noteworthy is his interpretation of the Song of Songs as an allegory describing the ascent of the human intellect to the agent intellect. Gersonides’ mentors in the Aristotelian tradition were Maimonides and Averroes. However, more than either of them, Gersonides held philosophical truth and revealed truth to be coextensive: he acknowledged neither the conflict that Averroes saw between reason and revelation nor Maimonides’ critical view of the limitations of the human intellect. Furthermore, while remaining within the Aristotelian framework, Gersonides was not uncritical of it; his independence can be illustrated by two of his most distinctive positions. First, against Maimonides, Gersonides claimed that it is possible to demonstrate both the falsity of the Aristotelian theory of the eternity of the world Averroes’ position and the absurdity of creation ex nihilo, the traditional rabbinic view that Maimonides adopted, though for nondemonstrative reasons. Instead Gersonides advocated the Platonic theory of temporal creation from primordial matter. Second, unlike Maimonides and Averroes, who both held that the alleged contradiction between divine foreknowledge of future contingent particulars and human freedom is spurious, Gersonides took the dilemma to be real. In defense of human freedom, he then argued that it is logically impossible even for God to have knowledge of particulars as particulars, since his knowledge is only of general laws. At the same time, by redefining ‘omniscience’ as knowing everything that is knowable, he showed that this impossibility is no deficiency in God’s knowledge. Although Gersonides’ biblical commentaries received wide immediate acceptance, subsequent medieval Jewish philosophers, e.g., Hasdai Crescas, by and large reacted negatively to his rigorously rationalistic positions. Especially with the decline of Aristotelianism within the philosophical world, both Jewish and Christian, he was either criticized sharply or simply ignored.

get across – A more colloquial way for what Grice later will have as ‘soul-to-soul-transfer,’ used by Grice in Causal: Surely the truth or falsity of Strawson having a beautiful handwriting has no bearing on the truth or falsity of his being hopeless at philosophy (“provided that is what I intended to get across,” implicating, ‘who cares,’ or ‘whatever’). His cavalier attitude shows that Grice is never really concerned with the individuation of the logical form of the implicaturum, just to note that whatever some philosopher thought was part of the sense it ain’t! This is the Austinian in Grice. Austin suggested that Grice analysed or consult with Holdcroft for all ‘forms of indirect communication.’ Grice lists: mean, indicate, suggest, imply, insinuate, hint – ‘get across’.

geulincx: a. philosopher. Born in Antwerp, he was educated at Louvain and there became professor of philosophy and dean. He was forced out of Louvain, perhaps for his Jansenist or Cartesian tendencies, and in 1658 he moved to Leyden and became a Protestant. Though he taught there until his death, he never attained a regular professorship at the varsity. His main philosophical work is his “Ethica; or, De virtute et primis ejus proprietatibus.” Other oeuvre includes “Questiones quodlibeticae”; later editions published as “Saturnalia,” a “Logica” 1661, and a “Methodus inveniendi argumenta,”.”Physica vera,” “Physica peripatetica,” “Metaphysica vera,” “Metaphysica ad mentem peripateticam,” posthumous commentaries on Descartes’s Principia Philosophiae. Geulincx was deeply influenced by Descartes, and had many ideas that closely resemble those of the later Cartesians as well as those of more independent thinkers like Spinoza and Leibniz. Though his grounds were original, like many later Cartesians, Geulincx upholds a version of occasionalism; he argued that someone or something can only do what it knows how to do (in terms of strict physiological laws). From this Geulincx infers (“fallaciously,” according to Grice) from that that he (sc. Geulincx) cannot be the genuine cause of his own bodily movement. In discussing the mind-body relation, Geulincx used a clock analogy similar to one Leibniz used in connection with his preestablished harmony. Geulincx also held a view of mental and material substance reminiscent of that of Spinoza. Finally, he proposed a system of ethics grounded in the idea of a virtuous will. As Grice notes: “Despite the evident similarities between Geulincx’s views and the views of his more renowned contemporaries, it is very difficult to determine exactly what influence Geulincx may have had on them, and they may have had on him – but then who gives?”

colonna – e. giles di roma, ome, original name, a member of the order of the Hermits of St. Augustine, he studied arts at Augustinian house and theology at the varsity in Paris 1260 72 but was censured by the theology faculty 1277 and denied a license to teach as tutor. Owing to the intervention of Pope Honorius IV, he later returned from Italy to Paris to teach theology, was appointed general of his order, and became archbishop of Bourges. Colonna both defends and criticizes views of Aquinas. He held that essence and existence are really distinct in creatures, but described them as “things”; that prime matter cannot exist without some substantial form; and, early in his career, that an eternally created world is possible. He defended only one substantial form in composites, including man. Grice adds: “Colonna supported Pope Boniface VIII in his quarrel with Philip IV of France – and that was a bad choice.”

gilson: É., philosopher, historian, cofounder of the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, and a major figure in Neo-Thomism. Gilson discovered medieval philosophy through his pioneering work on Descartes’s scholastic background. Gilson argues that early modern philosophy was incomprehensible without medieval thought, and that medieval philosophy itself did not represent the unified theory of reality that some Thomists had supposed. His studies of Duns Scotus, Augustine, Bernard, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Dante, and Abelard and Héloïse explore this diversity. But in his Gifford lectures 132, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, Gilson attempts a broad synthesis of medieval teaching on philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology, and employed it in his critique of modern philosophy, The Unity of Philosophical Experience 7. Most of all, Gilson attempted to reestablish Aquinas’s distinction between essence and existence in created being, as in Being and Some Philosophers 9.

gioberti, v. philosopher, He was imprisoned and exiled for advocating unification, and became a central political figure during the Risorgimento. His major political oeuvre, “Del primato morale e civile degli italiani,” argues for a federation of the states. Gioberti’s philosophical theory, ontologism, in contrast to Hegel’s idealism, identifies the dialectics of Being with God’s creation. Gioberti condensed his theory in the formula: “Being creates the existent.” “L’essere crea l’essistente.” The dialectics of Being, which is the only necessary substance, is a “palingenesis,” or a return to its origin, in which the existent first departs from and imitates its creator (“mimesis”) and then returns to its creator (“methexis”). By intuition, the human mind comes in contact with God and discovers truth by retracing the dialectics of Being. However, knowledge of supernatural truths is given only by God’s revelation. His oeuvre also includes “Teorica del soprannaturale” and “Introduzione allo studio della filosofia.” Gioberti criticized modern philosophers such as Descartes for their psychologism seeking truth from the human subject instead of from Being itself and its revelation. His thought is very influential in Italy.

datum: in epistemology, the “brute fact” element to be found or postulated as a component of perceptual experience. Some theorists who endorse the existence of a given element in experience think that we can find this element by careful introspection of what we experience Moore, H. H. Price. Such theorists generally distinguish between those components of ordinary perceptual awareness that constitute what we believe or know about the objects we perceive and those components that we strictly perceive. For example, if we analyze introspectively what we are aware of when we see an apple we find that what we believe of the apple is that it is a three-dimensional object with a soft, white interior; what we see of it, strictly speaking, is just a red-shaped expanse of one of its facing sides. This latter is what is “given” in the intended sense. Other theorists treat the given as postulated rather than introspectively found. For example, some theorists treat cognition as an activity imposing form on some material given in conscious experience. On this view, often attributed to Kant, the given and the conceptual are interdefined and logically inseparable. Sometimes this interdependence is seen as rendering a description of the given as impossible; in this case the given is said to be ineffable C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order. On some theories of knowledge foundationalism the first variant of the given that which is “found” rather than “postulated” provides the empirical foundations of what we might know or justifiably believe. Thus, if I believe on good evidence that there is a red apple in front of me, the evidence is the non-cognitive part of my perceptual awareness of the red appleshaped expanse. Epistemologies postulating the first kind of givenness thus require a single entity-type to explain the sensorial nature of perception and to provide immediate epistemic foundations for empirical knowledge. This requirement is now widely regarded as impossible to satisfy; hence Wilfred Sellars describes the discredited view as the myth of the given.

glanvill: English philosopher who defended the Royal Society against scholasticism. Glanvill believes that certainty is possible in the mathematical but not in the empirical realm. In “The Vanity of Dogmatizing,” he claimed that the human corruption that resulted from Adam’s fall precludes dogmatic knowledge of nature. Using traditional sceptical arguments as well as an analysis of causality that anticipate Hume, Glanvill argues that empirical belief is the probabilistic variety acquired by piece-meal investigation. Despite his scepticism he argues for the existence of witches in Witches and Witchcraft (“Probably he was married to one,” Grice comments).

gnosticism: a philosophical movement, especially important under the leadership of Valentinus and Basilides. They teach that matter was evil, the result of a cosmic disruption in which an evil archon often associated with the god of the Old Testament, Yahweh rebelled against the heavenly pleroma the complete spiritual world. In the process divine sparks were unleashed from the pleroma and lodged in material human bodies. Jesus was a high-ranking archon Logos sent to restore those souls with divine sparks to the pleroma by imparting esoteric knowledge gnosis to them. Gnosticism influenced and threatened the orthodox church from within and without. NonChristian gnostic sects rivaled Christianity, and Christian gnostics threatened orthodoxy by emphasizing salvation by knowledge rather than by faith. Theologians like Clement of Alexandria and his pupil Origen held that there were two roads to salvation, the way of faith for the masses and the way of esoteric or mystical knowledge for the philosophers. Gnosticism profoundly influenced the C. of E., causing it to define its scriptural canon and to develop a set of creeds and an episcopal organization (“My mother, Mabel Fenton Grice, was a bit of a gnostic, if I must say” – Grice).

göckel: goclenius r., philosopher, after holding some minor posts elsewhere, he becomes professor at Marburg. “Though he was well read and knowledgeable of later trends in these disciplines,” Grice ntoes, “you could clearly see his basic sympathies areAristotelian.” Goclenius was very well regarded by his contemporaries, who called him “Plato marburgensis,” the Christian Aristotle, and “TheLight of Europe,” among other things. Göckel published an unusually large number of essays, including “Psychologia, hoc est de hominis perfection,” “Conciliator philosophicus,” “Controversiae logicae et philosophicae,” and numerous other works on logic, rhetoric, physics, metaphysics, and the Latin language. But his most lasting work is his “Lexicon Philosophicum” – “very practical,” Grice notes, “since the entries are alphabetically ordered.” -- together with its companion, the “Lexicon Philosophicum Graecum” – “I gave a copy to Urmson,” Grice recalls, “and the next day he was writing the “Greek Philosopical Lexicon.” Göckel’s “Lexicon philosophicum” provides pretty obscure definitions of the philosophical terminology of late Scholastic philosophy, and “they are deemed so obscure that he is banned from quotation at some varsities.” – Grice.

gödel: cited by Grice. His incompleteness theorems, two theorems formulated and proved by the Austrian logician Kurt Gödel 678 in his famous 1 paper “Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und vervandter Systeme I,” probably the most celebrated results in the whole of logic. They are aptly referred to as “incompleteness” theorems since each shows, for any member of a certain class of formal systems, that there is a sentence formulable in its language that it cannot prove, but that it would be desirable for it to prove. In the case of the first theorem G1, what cannot be proved is a true sentence of the language of the given theory. G1 is thus a disappointment to any theory constructor who wants his theory to tell the whole truth about its subject. In the case of the second theorem G2, what cannot be proved is a sentence of the theory that “expresses” its consistency. G2 is thus a disappointment to those who desire a straightforward execution of Hilbert’s Program. The proofs of the incompleteness theorems can be seen as based on three main ideas. The first is that of a Gödel numbering, i.e., an assignment of natural numbers to each of the various objects i.e., the terms, formulas, axioms, proofs, etc. belonging to the various syntactical categories of the given formal system T referred to here as the “represented theory” whose metamathematics is under consideration. The second is that of a representational scheme. This includes i the use of the Gödel numbering to develop number-theoretic codifications of various of the metamathematical properties pertaining to the represented theory, and ii the selection of a theory S hereafter, the “representing theory” and a family of formulas from that theory the “representing formulas” in terms of which to register as theorems various of the facts concerning the metamathematical properties of the represented theory thus encoded. The basic result of this representational scheme is the weak representation of the set of Gödel numbers of theorems of T, where a set L of numbers is said to be weakly represented in S by a formula ‘Lx’ of S just in case for every number n, n1 L if and only if ‘L[n]’ is a theorem of S, where ‘[n]’ is the standard term of S that, under the intended interpretation of S, designates the number n. Since the set of Gödel numbers of theorems of the represented theory T will typically be recursively enumerable, and the representing theory S must be capable of weakly representing this set, the basic strength requirement on S is that it be capable of weakly representing the recursively enumerable sets of natural numbers. Because basic systems of arithmetic e.g. Robinson’s arithmetic and Peano arithmetic all have this capacity, Gödel’s theorems are often stated using containment of a fragment of arithmetic as the basic strength requirement governing the capacities of the representing theory which, of course, is also often the represented theory. More on this point below. The third main idea behind the incompleteness theorems is that of a diagonal or fixed point construction within S for the notion of unprovability-in-T; i.e., the formulation of a sentence Gödel of S which, under the given Gödel numbering of T, the given representation of T’s metamathematical notions in S, and the intended interpretation of the language of S, says of itself that it is not provable-in-T. Gödel is thus false if provable and unprovable if true. More specifically, if ‘ProvTx’ is a formula of S that weakly represents the set of Gödel numbers of theorems of T in S, then Gödel can be any formula of S that is provably equivalent in S to the formula ‘- ProvT [Gödel]’. Given this background, G1 can be stated as follows: If a the representing theory S is any subtheory of the represented theory T up to and God Gödel’s incompleteness theorems 347 347 including the represented theory itself, b the representing theory S is consistent, c the formula ‘ProvT x’ weakly represents the set of Gödel numbers of theorems of the represented theory T in the representing theory S, and d Gödel is any sentence provably equivalent in the representing theory S to ‘ProvT [Gödel]’, then neither Gödel nor -Gödel is a theorem of the representing theory S. The proof proceeds in two parts. In the first part it is shown that, for any representing theory S up to and including the case where S % T , if S is consistent, then -Gödel is not a theorem of S. To obtain this in its strongest form, we pick the strongest subtheory S of T possible, namely S % T, and construct a reductio. Thus, suppose that 1 -Gödel is a theorem of T. From 1 and d it follows that 2 ‘ProvT[Gödel]’ is a theorem of T. And from 2 and c in the “if” direction it follows that 3 Gödel is a theorem of T. But 1 and 3 together imply that the representing theory T is inconsistent. Hence, if T is consistent, -Gödel cannot be a theorem of T. In the second part of the proof it is argued that if the representing theory S is consistent, then Gödel is not a theorem of it. Again, to obtain the strongest result, we let S be the strongest subtheory of T possible namely T itself and, as before, argue by reductio. Thus we suppose that A Gödel is a theorem of S % T . From this assumption and condition d it follows that B ‘-Provr [Gödel]’ is a theorem of S % T . By A and c in the “only if” direction it follows that C ‘ProvT [Gödel]’ is a theorem of S % T . But from B and C it follows that S % T is inconsistent. Hence, Gödel is not provable in any consistent representing theory S up to and including T itself. The above statement of G1 is, of course, not the usual one. The usual statement suppresses the distinction stressed above between the representing and represented theories and collaterally replaces our condition c with a clause to the effect that T is a recursively axiomatizable extension of some suitably weak system of arithmetic e.g. Robinson’s arithmetic, primitive recursive arithmetic, or Peano arithmetic. This puts into a single clause what, metamathematically speaking, are two separate conditions one pertaining to the representing theory, the other to the represented theory. The requirement that T be an extension of the selected weak arithmetic addresses the question of T’s adequacy as a representing theory, since the crucial fact about extensions of the weak arithmetic chosen is that they are capable of weakly representing all recursively enumerable sets. This constraint on T’s capabilities as a representing theory is in partnership with the usual requirement that, in its capacity as a represented theory, T be recursively axiomatizable. For T’s recursive axiomatizability ensures under ordinary choices of logic for T that its set of theorems will be recursively enumerable and hence weakly representable in the kind of representing theory that it itself by virtue of its being an extension of the weak arithmetic specified is. G1 can, however, be extended to certain theories whose sets of Gödel numbers of theorems are not recursively enumerable. When this is done, the basic capacity required of the representing theory is no longer merely that the recursively enumerable sets of natural numbers be representable in it, but that it also be capable of representing various non-recursively enumerable sets, and hence that it go beyond the weak arithmetics mentioned earlier. G2 is a more demanding result that G1 in that it puts significantly stronger demands on the formula ‘ProvT x’ used to express the notion of provability for the represented theory T. In proving G1 all that is required of ‘ProvT x’ is that it weakly represent θ % the set of Gödel numbers of theorems of T; i.e., that it yield an extensionally accurate registry of the theorems of the represented theory in the representing theory. G2 places additional conditions on ‘ProvT x’; conditions which result from the fact that, to prove G2, we must codify the second part of the proof of G1 in T itself. To do this, ‘ProvT x’ must be a provability predicate for T. That is, it must satisfy the following constraints, commonly referred to as the Derivability Conditions for ‘ProvT x’: I If A is a theorem of the represented theory, then ‘ProvT [A]’ must be a theorem of the representing theory. II Every instance of the formula ‘ProvT [A P B] P ProvT [A] P ProvT [B]’ must be a theorem of T. III Every instance of the formula ‘ProvT [A] P ProvT [ProvT [A]]’ must be a theorem of T. I, of course, is just part of the requirement that ‘ProvT [A]’ weakly represent T’s theoremset in T. So it does not go beyond what is required for the proof of G1. II and III, however, do. They make it possible to “formalize” the second part of the proof of G1 in T itself. II captures, in terms of ‘ProvT X’, the modus ponens inference by which B is derived from A, and III codiGödel’s incompleteness theorems Gödel’s incompleteness theorems 348 348 fies in T the appeal to c used in deriving C from A. The result of this “formalization” process is a proof within T of the formula ‘ConT P Gödel’ where ConT is a formula of the form ‘- ProvT [#]’, with ‘ProvT x’ a provability predicate for T and ‘[#]’ the standard numeral denoting the Gödel number # of some formula refutable in T . From this, and the proof of the second part of G1 itself in which the first Derivability Condition, which is just the “only if” direction of c, figures prominently, we arrive at the following result, which is a generalized form of G2: If S is any consistent representing theory up to and including the represented theory T itself, ‘ProvT x’ any provability predicate for T, and ConT any formula of T of the form ‘- ProvT [#]’, then ConT is not a theorem of S. To the extent that, in being a provability predicate for T, ‘ProvT x’ “expresses” the notion of provability of the represented theory T, it seems fair to say that ConT expresses its consistency. And to the extent that this is true, it is sensible to read G2 as saying that for any representing theory S and any represented theory T extending S, if S is consistent, then the consistency of T is not provable in S.

fontaines: g. philosopher. He taught at Paris. Among his major writings are fifteen Quodlibetal Questions and other disputations. He was strongly Aristotelian in philosophy, with Neoplatonic influences in metaphysics. Fontaines defends the identity of essence and existence in creatures against theories of their real or intentional distinction, and argues for the possibility of demonstrating God’s existence and of some quidditative knowledge of God. He admits divine ideas for species but not for individuals within species. He makes wide applications (“and misapplications,” Grice adds) of Aristotelian act-potency theory e.g., to the distinction between the soul and its powers (this is discussed by Grice in “The power structure of the soul”), to the explanation of intellection and volition, to the general theory of substance and accident, and in unusual fashion to essence-existence “composition” of creatures.

godwin: w. English philosopher. “An Enquiry concerning Political Justice” arises heated debate. Godwin argues for radical forms of determinism, anarchism, and utilitarianism. Godwin thought that government corrupts everyone by encouraging stereotyped thinking that prevents us from seeing each other as unique individuals. His “Caleb Williams” portrays a good man corrupted by prejudice. Once we remove prejudice and artificial inequality we will see that our acts are wholly determined. This obviously makes punishment pointless. Only in a small anarchic society – such as the one he observed outside Oxford -- can people see others as they really are and thus come to feel a ‘sympathetic concern’ for his well-being. (In this he influenced Edward Carpenter of “England Arise” infame). Only so can we be virtuous, because being virtuous is acting from a ‘sympathetic’ (cf. Grice’s principle of conversational sympathy) feeling to bring the greatest happiness to the dyad affected. Godwin takes this principle (relabeled “the principle of conversational sympathy” by Grice) quite literally, and accepts all its consequences. Truthfulness has no claim on us other than the happiness it brings. If keeping a promise causes less good than breaking it, there is no reason (or duty) at all to keep it. If one must choose between saving the life either of a major human benefactor or of one’s distant uncle, one must choose the benefactor. We surely need no ‘rules’ in morals. An alleged ‘moral’ “rule” would prevent us from seeing others properly, thereby impairing the sympathetic feeling that constitutes virtue. Rights, too, are pointless. Sympathetic people will act to help (or cooperate with) others. Later utilitarians like Bentham had difficulty in separating their positions from Godwin’s notorious views. Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Godwin and the ethics of conversation.’

Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen bluhn?: j. w. v. Goethe, a ballad from Mignon that Goethe uses in Book II of his novel, The apprentice. Grice was amused by Searle’s example – “even if it misses its point!” An British soldier in the Second World War is captured by Italian troops. The British soldier wishes to get the Italian troops to believe that he is a *German* officer, in order to get them to release him. What he would like to do is to tell them, in German, or Italian, that he is a German officer (“Sono tedesco,” “Ich bin Deutsche”) but he does not know enough German, or Italian, to do such a simple thing as that. So he, as it were, attempts to put on a show of telling them that he is a German officer by reciting the only line of German that he knows, a line he learned at Clifton, to wit: ‘Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen bluhen?”. The British soldier intends to produce a certain response in his Italian captors, viz. that they should believe him to be a German officer. He intends to produce this response by means of the Italian troops’s recognition of his intention to produce it. Nevertheless, it would seem false that when the British soldier utters, "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen bluhen?” what he means or communicates is that he is a German officer. Searle thinks he can support a claim that something is missing from Grice’s account of meaning. This would (Grice think Searle thinks) be improved if it were supplemented as follows (Grice’s conjecture): "U meant that p by x" means " U intended to produce in A a certain effect by means of the recognition of U's intention to produce that effect, and (if the utterance of x is the utterance of a sentence) U intends A's recognition of U's intention (to produce the effect) to be achieved by means of the recognition that the sentence uttered is conventionally used to produce such an effect." Now even if Grice should be faced with a genuine counterexample, he should be very reluctant to take the way out which Grice suspects is being offered him. Grice finds it difficult to tell whether this is what was being offered, since Searle is primarily concerned with the characterization of something different, not with a general discussion of the nature of meaning or communication. On top he is seems mainly concerned to adapt Grice’s account of meaning to a dissimilar purpose, and hardly, as Schiffer at least tried, to amend Grice’s analysis so as to be better suited to its avowed end. Of course Grice would not want to deny that when the vehicle of meaning is a sentence (or the utterance of a sentence, as in “Mary had a little lamb” – uttered by a German officer in France to have the French believe that he is an English officer) the utterer’s intentions are to be recognized, in the normal case, by virtue of a knowledge of the conventional use of the sentence (indeed Grice’s account of “conversational” or in general "non-conventional implicaturum" depends, in some cases, on something like this idea). But Grice treats meaning something by the utterance of a sentence as being only a SPECIAL case of meaning or communicating that p by an utterance (in Grice’s extended use of ‘utterance’ to include gestures and stuff), and to treat a ‘conventional’ co-relation between a sentence and a specific response as providing only one of the ways (or modes) in which an utterance may be correlated with a response. Is Searle’s “Kennst du das land, wo die Zitronen bluhen?” however, a genuine counterexample? It seems to Grice that the imaginary situation is under-described, and that there are perhaps three different cases to be considered. First, the situation might be such that the only real chance that the Italian soldiers would, on hearing the British soldier recite the line from Goethe suppose him to be a German officer, would be if the Italians were to, as they should not, argue as follows: "The British soldier has just recited the first line from Goethe’s “Faust,” in a surprisingly authoritative tone); He thinks we are silly enough to think he is, with the British uniform and all, a German soldier.” If the situation was such that the Italian soldier were likely to argue like that, and the British soldier knew that to be so, it would be difficult to avoid attributing to him the intention, when he recited the line from “Fuast”, that they should argue like that. One cannot in general intend that some result should be achieved, if one knows that there is no likelihood that it will be achieved. But if the British soldier’s intention is as just described, he certainly would not, by Grice’s account, be meaning that he is a German soldier. For though he would intend the Italian soldier to believe him to be a German soldier, he would not be intending the Italian soldier to believe this on the basis of the Italian soldier’s recognition of his intention. And it seems to Grice that though this is not how Searle wishes the example to be taken, it would be much the most likely situation to have obtained. Second, Grice thinks that Searle wants us to suppose that the British soldier hopes that the Italian soldier will each a belief that the English soldier is a German soldier via a belief that the line from Goethe which he uttered means other than what it does, for why would they NOT know the land where the lemon trees bloom? They are in it! It s not easy to see how to build up the context of utterance so as to give the English soldier any basis for his hope that the Italian soldier thinks that the English soldier thinks that the Italian soldier knows where the lemon trees bloom – his native land! Now it becomes doubtful whether, after all, it is right to say that the English solidier did not mean (unsuccessfully communicate) that he is a German soldier. Communication is not factive. That Geothe’s line translates as "Knowest thou the land where the lemon trees bloom" is totally irrelevant. If the English soldier could be said to have meant or communicated that he was a German soldier, he would have meant that by saying the line, or by saying the line in a particularly authoritative way. It makes a difference whether U merely intends A to think that a particular sentence has a certain meaning which it does not in fact have, or whether he also intends him to think of himself as supposed to make use of his (mistaken) thought that, metabolically, the expression has this ‘meaning’ in reaching a belief about U's intentions. If A is intended to think that U expects A to understand the sentence spoken and is intended to attribute to it, metabolically, a ‘meaning’ which U knows it does not have, he utterer should not be described as meaning, by his utterance, that p. Grice does not see the force of this contention, nor indeed does he find it easy or conceptually clear to apply the distinction which it attempts to make. The general point seems to be as follows. Characteristically, an utterer intends his recipient to recognize (and to think himself intended to recognize) some "crucial" feature F, and to think of F (and to think himself intended to think of F) as co-related in a certain way or mode with some response which the utterer intends the audience to produce. It does not matter so far as the attribution of the utterer’s meaning is concerned, whether F is thought by U to be *really* co-related in that way or mode with the response or not; though of course in the normal case U will think F to be so co-related. Suppose, however, we fill in the detail of the English soldier case, so as to suppose he accompanies "Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen bluhen" with gesticulations, chest-thumping, and so forth; he might then hope to succeed in conveying to the Italian soldier that he intends them to understand what the line ‘means’, to learn from the particular German sentence that the English soldier intends them to think that he is a German officer (whereas really of course the English soldier does not expect them to learn that way, but only by assuming, on the basis of the situation and the character of the English soldier’s performance, that he must be trying to communicate to them, against all reasonable hopes, that he is a German officer. Perhaps in that case, we should be disinclined to say that the English soldier means or communicates that he is a German officer, and ready to say only that the English soldier means, naturally and metabolically, as it were, the Italian solider to think that he was a German officer. Grice goes on to suggest a revised set of conditions for " U meant something by x" (Redefinition III, Version A): Ranges of variables: A: audiences f: features of utterance r: responses c: modes of correlation (for example, iconic, associative, conventional) I63 H. P. GRICE (HA) (if) (3r) (ic): U uttered x intending (i) A to think x possessesf (2) A to think U intends (i) (3) A to think off as correlated in way c with the type to which r belongs (4) A to think U intends (3) (5) A to think on the basis of the fulfillment of (i) and (3) that U intends A to produce r (6) A, on the basis of fulfillment of (5), to produce r (7) A to think U intends (6). In the case of the "little girl" there is a single feature f (that of being an utterance of a particular French sentence) with respect to which A has all the first four intentions. (The only thing wrong is that this feature is not in fact correlated conventionally with the intended responses, and this does not disqualify the utterance from being one by which U means something.) In the English soldier case there is no such single feature. The Italian soldier is intended (i) to recognize, and go by, feature f1 (x's being a bit of German and being uttered with certain gesticulations, and so. forth) but (2) to think that he is intended to recognize x as havingf2 (as being a particular German sentence). So intention (2) on our revised list is absent. And so we do not need the condition previously added to eliminate this example. I think, however, that condition (7) (the old condition [i]) is still needed, unless it can be replaced by a general "anti-deception" clause. It may be that such replacement is possible; it may be that the "backward-looking" subclauses (2), (4), and (7) can be omitted, and replaced by the prohibitive clause which figures in Redefinition II, Version B. We have then to consider the merits of Redefinition III, Version B, the definiens of which will run as follows: (3A) (if) (3r) (ic): (a) U uttered x intending (I) A to think x possessesf (2) A to thinkf correlated in way c with the type to which r belongs (3) A to think, on the basis of the fulfillment of (I) and (3) that U intends A to produce r (4) A, on the basis of the fulfillment of (3) to produce r, and (b) there is no inference-element E such that U intends both (I') A in his determination of r to rely on E (2') A to think Uto intend (I') to be false. Grice would actually often play and sing the ballad. G. writer often considered the leading cultural figure of his age. He wrote lyric poetry, dramas, and fictional, essayistic, and aphoristic prose as well as works in various natural sciences, including anatomy, botany, and optics. A lawyer by training, for most of his life Goethe was a government official at the provincial court of Saxony-Weimar. In his numerous contributions to world literature, such as the novels The Sorrows of Young Werther, Wilhelm Meister’s Years of Apprenticeship, Elective Affinities, and Wilhelm Meister’s Years of Pilgrimage, and the two-part tragedy Faust, Goethe represented the tensions between individual and society as well as between culture and nature, with increased recognition of their tragic opposition and the need to cultivate a resigned self-discipline in artistic and social matters. In his poetic and scientific treatment of nature he was influenced by Spinoza’s pantheist identification of nature and God and maintained that everything in nature is animate and expressive of divine presence. In his theory and practice of science he opposed the quantitative and experimental method and insisted on a description of the phenomena that was to include the intuitive grasp of the archetypal forms or shapes underlying all development in nature.

Tipperary: music-hall cited by Grice. Grice liked the song and would often accompany himself at the piano (“in Eb always”). He especially loved to recite the three verses (“Up to mighty London came an Irishman one day,” “Paddy wrote a letter to his Irish Molly-O,” and “Molly wrote a neat reply to Irish Paddy-O”). Grice devises a possible counter-example to his account of ‘communication,’ or strictly the conditions that have to be met for the state of affairs “Emisor E communicates that p” to hold. In Grice’s scenario, a reminiscence shared by his father, at a musical soirée in 1912, at Harborne, Grice’s grandfather sings "Tipperary” “in a raucous voice” (those are Grice’s father’s words) with the intention of getting his mother-in-law (whom he knew was never too keen on the music-hall) to leave the drawing-room. Grice’s grandfather’s mother-in-law is supposed to recognise (and to know that she is intended to recognise) that Grice’s grandfather wants to get rid of his mother in law – “to put it bluntly,” as Grice’s father has it. Grice’s grandfather, moreover, intends that his mother-in-law shall, in the event, leave because she recognizes Grice’s grandfather’s intention that she shall go. Grice’s grandfather’s scheme is that his mother-in-law should, somewhat wrongly, think that Grice’s grandfather intends his mother-in-law to think that he intends to get rid of her by means of the recognition of his intention that she should go. In other words, the mother-in-law is supposed to argue: "My son-in-law intends me to *think* that he intends to get rid of me by the raucous singing of that awful ditty complete with the three verses – starting with “Up to mighty London came an Irishman one day” -- but of course he, rude as he is, really wants to get rid of me by means of the recognition of his intention to get rid of me. I am really intended to go because he wants me to go, not because I cannot stand the singing – I suppose. I mean, I could possibly stand it, if tied up, or something." The fact that the mother in law, while thinking she is seeing through his son-in-law’s plans, is really *conforming* to them (a situation that would not hold if she is known by her son-in-law to be ‘counter-suggestible’), is suggested as precluding Grice from deeming, here, that his grandfather means by the singing in a raucuous voice the opening line to “Tipperary” in a raucuous voice (“Up to mighty London came an Irishman one day”) that his mother-in-law should go. However, it is clear to Grice that, once one tries to fill in the detail of this description, the example becomes baffling – “even if I myself designed it.” “For, how is my grandfather’s mother-in-law sposed to reach the idea that my grandfather wants her to think that he intends to get rid of her by singing in a raucuous voice “Up to mighty London came an Irishman one day”?” “My father tells me that my grandfather sould sing in a *particular nasal tone*, so common at the music-hall, which he knows *not* necessarily to be displeasing to his mother in law (when put to use to a respectable drawing-room ballad), though it is to most people that visit the Grices.” Grice’s grandfather’s mother in law knows that Grice’s grandfather knows this particular nasa tone not to be displeasing to her, but she thinks, rather wrongly, that Grice’s grandfaather does not know that his mother-in-law knows this (she would never display his tastes in public). The mother-in-law might then be supposed to argue: "My son-in-law cannot want to drive me out of the drawing-room by his singing, awful to most, since he knows that that particularly nasal tone is not really displeasing to me. My son-in-law, however, does not know that I know he knows this. Therefore, maybe my son-in-law is does wantsme to think that he intends to drive me out, on the ground of a mere cause, rather than a reason, *by* his singing." “At this point,” Grice notes, “one would expect my grandfather’s mother-in-law to be completely at a loss to explain my grandfather’s performance.” “I see no reason at all why my grandfather’s mother in-law should then suppose that he *really* wants to get rid of her in some other way.” Whether or not this example could be made to work, its complexity is ennerving. “And the sad thing about it, is that any attempt on my part to introduce yet further restrictions would involve more ennerving complexities still.” “It is in general true that one cannot have intentions to achieve results which one sees no chance of achieving; and the success of intentions of the kind involved in communication requires he to whom communications or near-communications is addressed to be capable in the circumstances of having certain thoughts and drawing certain conclusions.” At some early stage in the attempted regression the calculations required of my grandfather’s mother-in-lawy by my grandfather will be impracticably difficult; and I suspect the limit has now been reached (if not exceeded).” “So my grandfather, is he is a Grice, cannot have the intentions – as reconstructed by my father, this was way back in 1912 -- required of him in order to force the addition of further restrictions. Not only are the calculations my grandfather would be requiring of his mother-in-law too difficult, but it would be impossible for him to find cues to indicate to her that the calculations should be made, even if they were within his mother-in-law’s compass. So one is tempted to conclude that no regress is involved.” But even should this conclusion be correct, we seem to be left with an uncomfortable situation. For though we may know that we do not need an infinite series of backward-looking sub-clauses, we cannot say just how many such sub-clauses are required. “Indeed, it looks as if the definitional expansion of "By uttering x emisor E communicates that p" might have to vary from case to case, depending on such things as the nature of the intended response, the circumstances in which the attempt to elicit the response is made (say, a musical soirée at Harborne in mid-1912), and the intelligence of the utterer (in this case my grandfather) and of the addressee (his mother in law).” It is dubious whether such variation can be acceptable. However, Grice genially finds out that this ennerving difficulty (of the type some of Grice’s tutees trying to outshine him would display) is avoided if we could eliminate potential counter-examples not by requiring the emisor to have certain additional, backward-looking, intentions, but rather by requiring the emisor *not* to have a certain sort of intention or complex of intentions. Potential counterexamples of the kind involves the construction of a situation in which the emisor E intends the sendee S, in the reflection process by which the sendee S is supposed to reach his response, both to rely on some inference-element, i. e., ome premise or some inferential step, E, and also to think that the emisor E intends his sendee S not to rely on E. “What I propose, then, is to uproot such potential counterexamples by a single clause which prohibits the emisor from having this kind of complex intention.” We reach a redefinition: "the emisor E means that p by uttering x" is true iff (for some sendee S and for some response r): (a) the emisor U utters x intending (i) the sendee to produce r (2) the sendee S to think the emisor E to intend (i) (3) the sendee S’s fulfillment of (i) to be based on the sendee S’s fulfillment of (2) (b) there is no inference-element E such that the emsior E utters x intending both (i') that the sendee S’s determination of r should rely on the inference element e and (2') that the sendee S should think the emisor E to intend that (I') be false.”

Goldman: “literally, man of gold” – Grice. philosopher who has made notable contributions to action theory, naturalistic and social epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science. He has persistently urged the relevance of cognitive and social science to problems in epistemology, metaphysics, the philosophy of mind, and ethics. A Theory of Human Action proposes a Griceian causal theory of action, describes the generative structure of basic and non-basic action, and argues for the compatibility of free will and determinism. In “Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition” 8, he argued that traditional epistemology should be replaced by ‘epistemics’, which differs from traditional epistemology in characterizing knowledge, justified belief, and rational belief in light of empirical cognitive science. Traditional epistemology has used a coarse-grained notion of belief, taken too restrictive a view of cognitive methods, offered advice for ideal cognizers rather than for human beings with limited cognitive resources, and ignored flaws in our cognitive system that must be recognized if cognition is to be improved. Epistemologists must attend to the results of cognitive science if they are to remedy these deficiencies in traditional epistemology. Goldman later developed epistemics in Epistemology and Cognition 6, in which he developed a historical, reliabilist theory of knowledge and epistemic justification and employed empirical cognitive science to characterize knowledge, evaluate skepticism, and assess human cognitive resources. In Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences and in Knowledge in a Social World 9, he defended and elaborated a veritistic i.e., truth-oriented evaluation of communal beliefprofiles, social institutions, and social practices e.g., the practice of restricting evidence admissible in a jury trial. He has opposed the widely accepted view that mental states are functional states “The Psychology of Folk Psychology,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 and defended a simulation theory of mental state attribution, on which one attributes mental states to another by imagining what mental state one would be in if one were in the other’s situation “In Defense of the Simulation Theory,” 2. He has also argued that cognitive science bears on ethics by providing information relevant to the nature of moral evaluation, moral choice, and hedonic states associated with the good e.g., happiness “Ethics and Cognitive Science,” 3.

bonum: good-making characteristic, a characteristic that makes whatever is intrinsically or inherently good, good. Hedonists hold that pleasure and conducing to pleasure are the sole good-making characteristics. Pluralists hold that those characteristics are only some among many other goodmaking characteristics, which include, for instance, knowledge, friendship, beauty, and acting from a sense of duty.

Goodman: n. very New-World philosopher who made seminal contributions to metaphysics, epistemology, and aesthetics. Like Quine, Goodman repudiates analyticity and kindred notions. Goodman’s work can be read as a series of investigations into how to do philosophy without them. A central concern is how symbols structure facts and our understanding of them. The Structure of Appearance 2 presents Goodman’s constructionalism. Pretheoretical beliefs are vague and mutually inconsistent. By devising an interpreted formal system that derives them from or explicates them in terms of suitable primitives, we bring them into logical contact, eliminate inconsistencies, and disclose unanticipated logical and theoretical connections. Multiple, divergent systems do justice to the same pretheoretical beliefs. All systems satisfying our criteria of adequacy are equally acceptable. Nothing favors any one of them over the others. Ways of Worldmaking 8 provides a less formal treatment of the same themes. Category schemes dictate criteria of identity for their objects. So mutually irreducible category schemes do not treat of the same things. Since a world consists of the things it comprises, irreducible schemes mark out different worlds. There are, Goodman concludes, many worlds if any. Inasmuch as the categories that define identity onditions on objects are human constructs, we make worlds. Languages of Art 8 argues that art, like science, makes and reveals worlds. Aesthetics is the branch of epistemology that investigates art’s cognitive functions. Goodman analyzes the syntactic and semantic structures of symbol systems, both literal and figurative, and shows how they advance understanding in art and elsewhere. Fact, Fiction, and Forecast4 poses the new riddle of induction. An item is grue if and only if it is examined before future time t and found to be green or is not so examined and is blue. All hitherto examined emeralds are both green and grue. What justifies our expecting future emeralds to be green, not grue? Inductive validity, the riddle demonstrates, depends on the characterization as well as the classification of the evidence class. ‘Green’ is preferable, Goodman maintains, because it is entrenched in inductive practice. This does not guarantee that inferences using ‘green’ will yield truths. Nothing guarantees that. But entrenched predicates are pragmatically advantageous, because they mesh with our habits of thought and other cognitive resources. Goodman’s other works include Problems and Projects 2, Of Mind and Other Matters 4, and Reconceptions 8, written with Catherine Z. Elgin.

gorgias: Grecian Sophist – “never to be confused with a philosopher even if they were oh-so-much cleverer than your average one!” – Grice. A teacher of rhetoric from Leontini in Syracuse, Gorgias came to Athens as an ambassador from his city and caused a sensation with his artful oratory. He is known through references and short quotations in later writers, and through a few surviving texts two speeches and a philosophical treatise. He taught a rhetorical style much imitated in antiquity, by delivering model speeches to paying audiences. Unlike other Sophists he did not give formal instruction in other topics, nor prepare a formal rhetorical manual. He was known to have had views on language, on the nature of reality, and on virtue. Gorgias’s style was remarkable for its use of poetic devices such as rhyme, meter, and elegant words, as well as for its dependence on artificial parallelism and balanced antithesis. His surviving speeches, defenses of Helen and Palamedes, display a range of arguments that rely heavily on what the ancients called eikos ‘likelihood’ or ‘probability’. Gorgias maintained in his “Helen” that a speech can compel its audience to action; elsewhere he remarked that in the theater it is wiser to be deceived than not. Gorgias’s short book On Nature or On What Is Not survives in two paraphrases, one by Sextus Empiricus and the other now considered more reliable in an Aristotelian work, On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias. Gorgias argued for three theses: that nothing exists; that even if it did, it could not be known; and that even if it could be known, it could not be communicated. Although this may be in part a parody, most scholars now take it to be a serious philosophical argument in its own right. In ethics, Plato reports that Gorgias thought there were different virtues for men and for women, a thesis Aristotle defends in the Politics.

Gracián y Morales, Baltasar: moralist, and a leading literary theorist of the baroque. Born in Belmonte, he entered the Jesuit order in 1619 and became rector of the Jesuit at Tarragona and a favorite of King Philip III. Gracián’s most important works are Agudeza y arte de ingenio “The Art of Worldly Wisdom,” 164248 and El criticón “The Critic,” 165157. The first provides philosophical support for conceptismo, a literary movement that sought to create new concepts through the development of an elaborate style, characterized by subtlety agudeza and ingenious literary artifices. El criticón, written in the conceptist style, is a philosophical novel that pessimistically criticizes the evils of civilization. Gracián anticipates Rousseau’s noble savage in claiming that, although human beings are fundamentally good in the state of nature, they are corrupted by civilization. Echoing a common theme of thought at the time, he attributes the nefarious influence of civilization to the confusion it creates between appearance and reality. But Gracián’s pessimism is tempered by faith: man has hope in the afterlife, when reality is finally revealed. Gracián wrote several other influential books. In El héroe “The Hero,” 1637 and El político “The Politician,” 1640, he follows Machiavelli in discussing the attributes of the ideal prince; El discreto “The Man of Discretion,” 1646 explores the ideal gentleman, as judged by society. Most of Gracián’s books were published under pseudonyms to avoid censure by his order. Gorgias Gracián y Morales, Baltasar 351 351 Among authors outside Spain who used his ideas are Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Voltaire, and Rousseau.

grammaticum: Is there a ‘grammar’ of gestures? How loose can an Oxonian use ‘grammar’? Sometimes geography, sometimes botany – “Grammatica” the Romans never cared to translate. Although ‘literature’ is the cognate. – For some reasons, the Greeks were obsessed with the alphabet – It was a trivial ‘art’. Like ‘logic,’ and philosophy is NOT an art or ‘techne.’ A philosopher is not a technician – and hardly an artist like William Morris (his ‘arts and crafts’ is a joke since it translates in Latin to ‘ars et ars,’ and ‘techne kai techne’). The sad thing is that at MIT, as Grice knew, Chomsky is appointed professor of philosophy, and he mainly writes about ‘grammar’! Later, Chomsky tries to get more philosophical, but chooses the wrong paradigm – Cartesianism, the ghost in the machine, in Ryle’s parlance. Odly, Oxonians, who rarely go to grammar schools, see ‘grammar’ as a divinity, and talk of the logical grammar of a Ryleian agitation, say. It sounds high class because there is the irony that an Oxonian philosopher is surely not a common-or-garden grammarian, involved in the grammar of, say, “Die Deutsche Sprache.” The Oxonian is into the logical grammar. It is more of a ‘linguistic turn’ expression than the duller ‘conceptual analysis,’ or ‘linguistic philosophy.’ cf. logical form, and Russell, “grammar is a pretty good guide to logical form.” while philosophers would use grammar jocularly, Chomsky didnt. The problem, as Grice notes, is that Chomsky never tells us where grammar ends (“or begins for that matter.”) “Consider the P, karulising elatically.” When Carnap introduces the P, he talks syntax, not grammar. But philosophers always took semiotics more seriously than others. So Carnap is well aware of Morriss triad of the syntactics, the semantics, and the pragmatics. Philosophers always disliked grammar, because back in the days of Aelfric, philosophia was supposed to embrace dialectica and grammatica, and rhetorica. “It is all part of philosophy.” Truth-conditional semantics and implicatura. grammar, a system of rules specifying a language. The term has often been used synonymously with ‘syntax’, the principles governing the construction of sentences from words perhaps also including the systems of word derivation and inflection case markings, verbal tense markers, and the like. In modern linguistic usage the term more often encompasses other components of the language system such as phonology and semantics as well as syntax. Traditional grammars that we may have encountered in our school days, e.g., the grammars of Latin or English, were typically fragmentary and often prescriptive basically a selective catalog of forms and sentence patterns, together with constructions to be avoided. Contemporary linguistic grammars, on the other hand, aim to be descriptive, and even explanatory, i.e., embedded within a general theory that offers principled reasons for why natural languages are the way they are. This is in accord with the generally accepted view of linguistics as a science that regards human language as a natural phenomenon to be understood, just as physicists attempt to make sense of the world of physical objects. Since the publication of Syntactic Structures 7 and Aspects of the Theory of Syntax 5 by Noam Chomsky, grammars have been almost universally conceived of as generative devices, i.e., precisely formulated deductive systems commonly called generative grammars specifying all and only the well-formed sentences of a language together with a specification of their relevant structural properties. On this view, a grammar of English has the character of a theory of the English language, with the grammatical sentences and their structures as its theorems and the grammar rules playing the role of the rules of inference. Like any empirical theory, it is subject to disconfirmation if its predictions do not agree with the facts if, e.g., the grammar implies that ‘white or snow the is’ is a wellformed sentence or that ‘The snow is white’ is not. The object of this theory construction is to model the system of knowledge possessed by those who are able to speak and understand an unlimited number of novel sentences of the language specified. Thus, a grammar in this sense is a psychological entity a component of the human mind and the task of linguistics avowedly a mentalistic discipline is to determine exactly of what this knowledge consists. Like other mental phenomena, it is not observable directly but only through its effects. Thus, underlying linguistic competence is to be distinguished from actual linguistic performance, which forms part of the evidence for the former but is not necessarily an accurate reflection of it, containing, as it does, errors, false starts, etc. A central problem is how this competence arises in the individual, i.e., how a grammar is inferred by a child on the basis of a finite, variable, and imperfect sample of utterances encountered in the course of normal development. Many sorts of observations strongly suggest that grammars are not constructed de novo entirely on the basis of experience, and the view is widely held that the child brings to the task a significant, genetically determined predisposition to construct grammars according to a well-defined pattern. If this is so, and since apparently no one language has an advantage over any other in the learning process, this inborn component of linguistic competence can be correctly termed a universal grammar. It represents whatever the grammars of all natural languages, actual or potential, necessarily have in common because of the innate linguistic competence of human beings. The apparent diversity of natural languages has often led to a serious underestimation of the scope of universal grammar. One of the most influential proposals concerning the nature of universal grammar was Chomsky’s theory of transformational grammar. In this framework the syntactic structure of a sentence is given not by a single object e.g., a parse tree, as in phrase structure grammar, but rather by a sequence of trees connected by operations called transformations. The initial tree in such a sequence is specified generated by a phrase structure grammar, together with a lexicon, and is known as the deep structure. The final tree in the sequence, the surface structure, contains the morphemes meaningful units of the sentence in the order in which they are written or pronounced. For example, the English sentences ‘John hit the ball’ and its passive counterpart ‘The ball was hit by John’ might be derived from the same deep structure in this case a tree looking very much like the surface structure for the active sentence except that the optional transformational rule of passivization has been applied in the derivation of the latter sentence. This rule rearranges the constituents of the tree in such a way that, among other changes, the direct object ‘the ball’ in deep structure becomes the surface-structure subject of the passive sentence. It is thus an important feature of this theory that grammatical grammar grammar 352 352 relations such as subject, object, etc., of a sentence are not absolute but are relative to the level of structure. This accounts for the fact that many sentences that appear superficially similar in structure e.g., ‘John is easy to please’, ‘John is eager to please’ are nonetheless perceived as having different underlying deep-structure grammatical relations. Indeed, it was argued that any theory of grammar that failed to make a deep-structure/surface-structure distinction could not be adequate. Contemporary linguistic theories have, nonetheless, tended toward minimizing the importance of the transformational rules with corresponding elaboration of the role of the lexicon and the principles that govern the operation of grammars generally. Theories such as generalized phrase-structure grammar and lexical function grammar postulate no transformational rules at all and capture the relatedness of pairs such as active and passive sentences in other ways. Chomsky’s principles and parameters approach 1 reduces the transformational component to a single general movement operation that is controlled by the simultaneous interaction of a number of principles or subtheories: binding, government, control, etc. The universal component of the grammar is thus enlarged and the contribution of languagespecific rules is correspondingly diminished. Proponents point to the advantages this would allow in language acquisition. Presumably a considerable portion of the task of grammar construction would consist merely in setting the values of a small number of parameters that could be readily determined on the basis of a small number of instances of grammatical sentences. A rather different approach that has been influential has arisen from the work of Richard Montague, who applied to natural languages the same techniques of model theory developed for logical languages such as the predicate calculus. This so-called Montague grammar uses a categorial grammar as its syntactic component. In this form of grammar, complex lexical and phrasal categories can be of the form A/B. Typically such categories combine by a kind of “cancellation” rule: A/B ! B P A something of category A/B combines with something of category B to yield something of category A. In addition, there is a close correspondence between the syntactic category of an expression and its semantic type; e.g., common nouns such as ‘book’ and ‘girl’ are of type e/t, and their semantic values are functions from individuals entities, or e-type things to truth-values T-type things, or equivalently, sets of individuals. The result is an explicit, interlocking syntax and semantics specifying not only the syntactic structure of grammatical sentences but also their truth conditions. Montague’s work was embedded in his own view of universal grammar, which has not, by and large, proven persuasive to linguists. A great deal of attention has been given in recent years to merging the undoubted virtues of Montague grammar with a linguistically more palatable view of universal grammar. Refs.: One source is an essay on ‘grammar’ in the H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

gramsci: a. political leader whose imprisonment by the Fascists for his involvement with the Communist Party had the ironical result of sparing him from Stalinism and enabling him to better articulate his distinctive political philosophy. He welcomes the Bolshevik Revolution as a “revolution against Capital” rather than against capitalism: as a revolution refuting the deterministic Marxism according to which socialism could arise only by the gradual evolution of capitalism, and confirming the possibility of the radical transformation of social institutions. In 1 he supported creation of the Communist Party; as its general secretary from 4, he tried to reorganize it along more democratic lines. In 6 the Fascists outlawed all opposition parties. Gramsci spent the rest of his life in various prisons, where he wrote more than a thousand s of notes ranging from a few lines to chapterlength essays. These Prison Notebooks pose a major interpretive challenge, but they reveal a keen, insightful, and open mind grappling with important social and political problems. The most common interpretation stems from Palmiro Togliatti, Gramsci’s successor as leader of grammar, categorial Gramsci, Antonio 353 353 the Communists. After the fall of Fascism and the end of World War II, Togliatti read into Gramsci the so-called road to socialism: a strategy for attaining the traditional Marxist goals of the classless society and the nationalization of the means of production by cultural means, such as education and persuasion. In contrast to Bolshevism, one had to first conquer social institutions, and then their control would yield the desired economic and political changes. This democratic theory of Marxist revolution was long regarded by many as especially relevant to Western industrial societies, and so for this and other reasons Gramsci is a key figure of Western Marxism. The same theory is often called Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, referring to a relationship between two political units where one dominates the other with the consent of that other. This interpretation was a political reconstruction, based primarily on Gramsci’s Communist involvement and on highly selective passages from the Notebooks. It was also based on exaggerating the influence on Gramsci of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Gentile, and minimizing influences like Croce, Mosca, Machiavelli, and Hegel. No new consensus has emerged yet; it would have to be based on analytical and historical spadework barely begun. One main interpretive issue is whether Gramsci, besides questioning the means, was also led to question the ends of traditional Marxism. In one view, his commitment to rational persuasion, political realism, methodological fallibilism, democracy, and pluralism is much deeper than his inclinations toward the classless society, the abolition of private property, the bureaucratically centralized party, and the like; in particular, his pluralism is an aspect of his commitment to the dialectic as a way of thinking, a concept he adapted from Hegel through Croce.

green: t. h., absolute idealist and social philosopher. The son of a clergyman, Green studied and taught at Oxford. His central concern was to resolve what he saw as the spiritual crisis of his age by analyzing knowledge and morality in ways inspired by Kant and Hegel. In his lengthy introduction to Hume’s Treatise, he argued that Hume had shown knowledge and morality to be impossible on empiricist principles. In his major work, “Prolegomena to Ethics,” Green contended that thought imposed relations on sensory feelings and impulses whose source was an eternal consciousness to constitute objects of knowledge and of desire. Furthermore, in acting on desires, rational agents seek the satisfaction of a self that is realized through their own actions. This requires rational agents to live in harmony among themselves and hence to act morally. In Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation Green transformed classical liberalism by arguing that even though the state has no intrinsic value, its intervention in society is necessary to provide the conditions that enable rational beings to achieve self-satisfaction.

gregorius: I, Saint, called Gregory the Great c.540604, a pope and Roman political leader. Born a patrician, he was educated for public office and became prefect of Rome in 570. In 579, he was appointed papal representative in Constantinople, returning to Rome as counselor to Pope Pelagius II in 586. He was elected Pope Gregory I in 590. When the Lombards attacked Rome in 594, Gregory bought them off. Constantinople would neither cede nor defend Italy, and Gregory stepped in as secular ruler of what became the Papal States. He asserted the universal jurisdiction of the bishop of Rome, and claimed patriarchy of the West. His writings include important letters; the Moralia, an exposition of the Book of Job summarizing Christian theology; Pastoral Care, which defined the duties of the clergy for the Middle Ages; and Dialogues, which deals chiefly with the immortality of the soul, holding it could enter heaven immediately without awaiting the Last Judgment. His thought, largely Augustinian, is unoriginal, but was much quoted in the Middle Ages.

gregory of Nyssa, Saint, Grecian theologian and mystic who tried to reconcile Platonism with Christianity. As bishop of Cappadocia in eastern Asia Minor, he championed orthodoxy and was prominent at the First Council of Constantinople. He related the doctrine of the Trinity to Plato’s ideas of the One and the Many. He followed Origen in believing that man’s material great chain of being Gregory of Nyssa 354 354 nature was due to the fall and in believing in the Apocatastasis, the universal restoration of all souls, including Satan’s, in the kingdom of God.

rimini: gregorio di, philosopher, he studied in Italy, England, and France, and taught at the universities of Bologna, Padua, Perugia, and Paris before becoming prior general of the Hermits of St. Augustine in his native city of Rimini, about eighteen months before he died. Gregory earned the honorific title “the Authentic Doctor” because he was considered by many of his contemporaries to be a faithful interpreter of Augustine, and thus a defender of tradition, in the midst of the scepticism of Occam and his disciples regarding what could be known in natural philosophy and theology. Thus, in his commentary on Books I and II of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, Gregory rejected the view that because of God’s omnipotence he can do anything and is therefore unknowable in his nature and his ways. Gregory also maintained that after Adam’s fall from righteousness, men need, in conjunction with their free will, God’s help grace to perform morally good actions. In non-religious matters Gregory is usually associated with the theory of the complexe significabile, according to which the object of knowledge acquired by scientific proof is neither an object existing outside the mind, nor a word simplex or a proposition complexum, but rather the complexe significabile, that which is totally and adequately signified by the proposition expressed in the conclusion of the proof in question.

grice: as a count noun – “Lots of grice in the fields.” – One Scots to another -- count noun, a noun that can occur syntactically a with quantifiers ‘each’, ‘every’, ‘many’, ‘few’, ‘several’, and numerals; b with the indefinite article, ‘an’; and c in the plural form. The following are examples of count nouns CNs, paired with semantically similar mass nouns MNs: ‘each dollar / silver’, ‘one composition / music’, ‘a bed / furniture’, ‘instructions / advice’. MNs but not CNs can occur with the quantifiers ‘much’ and ‘little’: ‘much poetry / poems’, ‘little bread / loaf’. Both CNs and MNs may occur with ‘all’, ‘most’, and ‘some’. Semantically, CNs but not MNs refer distributively, providing a counting criterion. It makes sense to ask how many CNs?: ‘How many coins / gold?’ MNs but not CNs refer collectively. It makes sense to ask how much MN?: ‘How much gold / coins?’ One problem is that these syntactic and semantic criteria yield different classifications; another problem is to provide logical forms and truth conditions for sentences containing mass nouns.

Grice: English philosopher, born in Harborne, “in the middle of nowhere,” as Strawson put it – (“He was from London, Strawson was”) -- whose work concerns perception and philosophy of language, and whose most influential contribution is the concept of a conversational implicaturum and the associated theoretical machinery of conversational ‘postulates.’ The concept of a conversational implicaturum is first used in his ‘presentation’ on the causal theory of perception and reference. Grice distinguishes between the ‘meaning’ of the words used in a sentence and what is implied by the utterer’s choice of words. If someone says “It looks as if there is a red pillar box in front of me,” the choice of words implies that there is some doubt about the pillar box being red. But, Grice argues, that is a matter of word choice and the sentence itself does not ‘impl’ that there is doubt. The term ‘conversational implicaturum’ was introduced in Grice’s William James lectures published in 8 and used to defend the use of the material implication as a logical translation of ‘if’. With Strawson “In Defence of Dogma”, Grice gives a spirited defense of the analyticsynthetic distinction against Quine’s criticisms. In subsequent systematic papers Grice attempts, among other things, to give a theoretical grounding of the distinction. Grice’s oeuvre is part of the Oxford ordinary language tradition, if formal and theoretical. He also explores metaphysics, especially the concept of absolute value. There is the H. P. Grice Society – Other organisations Grice-related are “The Grice Club,” “The Grice Circle,” and “H. P. Grice’s Playgroup.”

H. P. Grice’s Playgroup: after the death of J. L. Austin, Grice kept the routine of the Saturday morning with a few new rules. 1. Freedom. 2. Freedom, and 3. Freedom.

Griceian. Grice disliked the spelling “Gricean” that some people in the New World use. “Surely my grandmother was right when she said she had become a Griceian by marrying a Grice!”

Brown, S. author of the Dictionary of British Philosophers (“I first thought of writing a dictionary of English philosophers, but then I thought that Russell would be out – he was born in Wales!.”

grice: g. r. – Welsh philosopher who taught at Norwich. Since H. P. Grice and G. R. Grice both wrote on the contract and morality, one has to be careful.

gricese: While Grice presented Gricese as refutation of Vitters’s idea of a private language “I soon found out that my wife and my two children were speaking Gricese, as was my brother Derek!” -- english, being English or the genius of the ordinary. H. P. Grice refers to “The English tongue.” A refusal to rise above the facts of ordinary life is characteristic of classical Eng. Phil. from Ireland-born Berkeley to Scotland-born Hume, Scotland-born Reid, and very English Jeremy Bentham and New-World Phil. , whether in transcendentalism Emerson, Thoreau or in pragmatism from James to Rorty. But this orientation did not become truly explicit until after the linguistic turn carried out by Vienna-born Witters, translated by C. K. Ogden, very English Brighton-born Ryle, and especially J. L. Austin and his best companion at the Play Group, H. P. Grice, when it was radicalized and systematized under the name of a phrase Grice lauged at: “‘ordinary’-language philosophy.” This preponderant recourse to the ordinary seems inseparable from certain peculiar characteristics of the English Midlanders such as H. P. Grice, such as the gerund that often make it difficult if not impossible to translate. It is all the more important to emphasize this paradox because English Midlander philosopher, such as H. P. Grice, claims to be as simple as it is universal, and it established itself as an important philosophical language in the second half of the twentieth century, due mainly to the efforts of H. P. Grice. English, but especially Oxonian Phil. has a specific relationship to ‘ordinary’ language (even though for Grice, “Greek and Latin were always more ordinary to me – and people who came to read Eng. at Oxford were laughed at!”), as well as to the requirements of everyday life, that is not limited to the theories of the Phil. of language, in which an Eng. philosopher such as H. P. Grice appears as a pioneer. It rejects the artificial linguistic constructions of philosophical speculation that is, Met. and always prefers to return to its original home, as Witters puts it: the natural environment of everyday words Philosophical Investigations. Thus we can discern a continuity between the recourse to the ordinary in Scots Hume, Irish Berkeley, Scots Reid, and very English Jeremy Bentham and what will become in Irish London-born G. E. Moore and Witters after he started using English, at least orally and then J. L. Austin’s and H. P. Grice’s ‘ordinary’-language philosophy. This continuity can be seen in several areas. First, in the exploitation of all the resources of the language, which is considered as a source of information and is valid in itself. Second, in the attention given to the specificities—and even the defects, or ‘implicatura,’ as Grice calls them —of the vernacular -- which become so many philosophical characteristics from which one can learn. Finally, in the affirmation of the naturalness of the distinctions made in and by ordinary language, seeking to challenge the superiority of the technical language of Philosophy —the former being the object of an agreement deeper than the latter. Then there’s The Variety of Modes of Action. The passive. There are several modes of agency, and these constitute both part of the genius of the language and a main source of its problems in tr.. Agency is a strange intersection of points of view that makes it possible to designate the person who is acting while at the same time concealing the actor behind the act—and thus locating agency in the passive subject itself v. AGENCY. A classic difficulty is illustrated by the following sentence from J. Stuart Mill’s To gauge the naturalness of the passive construction in English, it suffices to examine a couple of newspaper headlines. “Killer’s Car Found” On a retrouvé la voiture du tueur, “Kennedy Jr. Feared Dead.” On craint la mort du fils Kennedy; or the titles of a philosophical essay, “Epistemology Naturalized,” L’Épistémologie naturalisée; Tr. J. Largeault as L’Épistémologie devenue naturelle; a famous article by Quine that was the origin of the naturalistic turn in American Phil. and “Consciousness Explained” La conscience expliquée by Daniel Dennett. We might then better understand why this PASSIVE VOICE kind of construction—which seems so awkward in Fr. compared with the active voice— is perceived by its Eng. users as a more direct and effective way of speaking. More generally, the ellipsis of the agent seems to be a tendency of Eng. so profound that one can maintain that the phenomenon Lucien Tesnière called diathèse récessive the loss of the agent has become a characteristic of the Eng. language itself, and not only of the passive. Thus, e. g. , a Fr. reader irresistibly gains the impression that a reflexive pronoun is lacking in the following expressions. “This book reads well.” ce livre se lit agréablement. “His poems do not translate well.” ses poèmes se traduisent difficilement. “The door opens.” la porte s’ouvre. “The man will hang.” l’homme sera pendu. In reality, here again, Eng. simply does not need to mark by means of the reflexive pronoun se the presence of an active agent. Do, make, have Eng. has several terms to translate the single Fr. word faire, which it can render by to do, to make, or to have, depending on the type of agency required by the context. Because of its attenuation of the meaning of action, its value as emphasis and repetition, the verb “to do” has become omnipresent in English, and it plays a particularly important role in philosophical texts. We can find a couple of examples of tr. problems in the Oxonian seminars by J. L. Austin. In Sense and Considerations on Representative Government: “I must not be understood to say that” p. To translate such a passive construction, Fr. is forced to resort to the impersonal pronoun on and to put it in the position of an observer of the “I” je as if it were considered from the outside: On ne doit pas comprendre que je dis que p. But at the same time, the network of relations internal to the sentence is modified, and the meaning transformed. Necessity is no longer associated with the subject of the sentence and the author; it is made impersonal. Philosophical language also makes frequent use of the diverse characteristics of the passive. Here we can mention the crucial turning point in the history of linguistics represented by Chomsky’s discovery Syntactic Structures, of the paradigm of the active/ passive relation, which proves the necessity of the transformational component in grammar. A passive utterance is not always a reversal of the active and only rarely describes an undergoing, as is shown by the example She was offered a bunch of flowers. In particular, language makes use of the fact that this kind of construction authorizes the ellipsis of the agent as is shown by the common expression Eng. spoken. For a philosopher, the passive is thus the privileged form of an action when its agent is unknown, indeterminate, unimportant, or, inversely, too obvious. Thus without making his prose too turgid, in Sense and Sensibilia Austin can use five passives in less than a page, and these can be translated in Fr. only by on, an indeterminate subject defined as differentiated from moi. “It is clearly implied, that “Now this, at least if it is taken to mean The expression is here put forward We are given, as examples, familiar objects The expression is not further defined On sous-entend clairement que Quant à cela, du moins si on l’entend au sens de On avance ici l’expression On nous donne, comme exemples, des objets familiers On n’approfondit pas la définition de l’expression . . . 1 Langage, langue, parole: A virtual distinction. Contrary to what is too often believed, the Eng. language does not conflate under the term language what Fr. distinguishes following Saussure with the terms langage, langue, and parole. In reality, Eng. also has a series of three terms whose semantic distribution makes possible exactly the same trichotomy as Fr. : First there’s Grice’s “tongue,”which serves to designate a specific language by opposition to another; speech, which refers more specifically to parole but which is often translated in Fr. by discours; and language in the sense of faculté de langage. Nonetheless, Fr. ’s set of systematic distinctions can only remain fundamentally virtual in English, notably because the latter refuses to radically detach langue from parole. Thus in Chrestomathia, Bentham uses “tongue” (Bentham’s tongue – in Chrestomathia) and language interchangeably and sometimes uses language in the sense of langue: “Of all known languages the Grecian [Griceian] is assuredly, in its structure, the most plastic and most manageable. Bentham even uses speech and language as equivalents, since he speaks of parts of speech. But on the contrary, he sometimes emphasizes differences that he ignores here. And he proceeds exactly like Hume in his essay Of the Standard of Taste, where we find, e. g. , But it must also be allowed, that some part of the seeming harmony in morals may be accounted for from the very nature of language. The word, virtue, with its equivalent in every tongue, implies praise; as that of vice does blame. REFS.: Bentham, Jeremy. ChrestomathiEd. by M. J. Smith and W. H. Burston. Oxford: Clarendon, . Hume, D. . Of the Standard of Taste. In Four Dissertations. London: Thoemmes Continuum, . First published in 175 Saussure, F. de. Course in General Linguistics. Ed. by Bally and Sechehaye. Tr. R. Harris. LaSalle, IL: Open Court, . First published in circulation among these forms. This formal continuity promotes a great methodological inventiveness through the interplay among the various grammatical entities that it enables. The gerund: The form of -ing that is the most difficult to translate Eng. is a nominalizing language. Any verb can be nominalized, and this ability gives the Eng. philosophical language great creative power. “Nominalization,” as Grice calls it, is in fact a substantivization without substantivization: the verb is not substantivized in order to refer to action, to make it an object of discourse which is possible in any language, notably in philosophical Fr. and G. , but rather to nominalize the verb while at the same time preserving its quality as a verb, and even to nominalize whole clauses. Fr. can, of course, nominalize faire, toucher, and sentir le faire, le toucher, even le sentir, and one can do the same, in a still more systematic manner, in G. . However, these forms will not have the naturalness of the Eng. expressions: the making and unmaking the doing and undoing, the feeling, the feeling Byzantine, the meaning. Above all, in these languages it is hard to construct expressions parallel to, e. g. , the making of, the making use of, my doing wrongly, “my meaning this,” (SIGNIFICATUM, COMMUNICATUM), his feeling pain, etc., that is, mixtures of noun and verb having—and this is the grammatical characteristic of the gerund — the external distribution of a nominal expression and the internal distribution of a verbal expression. These forms are so common that they characterize, in addition to a large proportion of book titles e. g. , The Making of the Eng. Working Class, by E. P. Thomson; or, in Phil. , The Taming of Chance, or The taming of the true, by I. Hacking, the language of classical Eng. Phil. . The gerund functions as a sort of general equivalent or exchanger between grammatical forms. In that way, it not only makes the language dynamic by introducing into it a permanent temporal flux, but also helps create, in the language itself, a kind of indeterminacy in the way it is parsed, which the translator finds awkward when he understands the message without being able to retain its lightness. Thus, in A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume speaks, regarding the idea, of the manner of its being conceived, which a Fr. translator might render as sa façon d’être conçue or perhaps, la façon dont il lui appartient d’être conçue, which is not quite the same thing. And we v. agency and the gerund connected in a language like that of Bentham, who minimizes the gaps between subject and object, verb and noun: much regret has been suggested at the thoughts of its never having yet been brought within the reach of the Eng. reader ChrestomathiTranslators often feel obliged to render the act expressed by a gerund by the expression le fait de, but this has a meaning almost contrary to the English. With its gerund, Eng. avoids the discourse of fact by retaining only the event and arguing only on that basis. The inevitable confusion suggested by Fr. when it translates the Eng. gerund is all the more unfortunate in this case because it becomes impossible to distinguish when Eng. uses the fact or the case from when it uses the gerund. The importance of the event, along with the distinction between trial, case, and event, on the one hand and happening on the other, is Sensibilia, he has criticized the claim that we never perceive objects directly and is preparing to criticize its negation as well: I am not going to maintain that we ought to embrace the doctrine that we do perceive material things. Je ne vais pas soutenir que nous devons embrasser la doctrine selon laquelle nous percevons vraiment les choses matérielles. Finally, let us recall Austin’s first example of the performative, which plays simultaneously on the anaphoric value of do and on its sense of action, a duality that v.ms to be at the origin of the theory of the performative, I do take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife—as uttered in the course of the marriage ceremony Oui à savoir: je prends cette femme pour épouse’énoncé lors d’une cérémonie de mariage; How to Do Things with Words. On the other hand, whereas faire is colored by a causative sense, Eng. uses to make and to have—He made Mary open her bags il lui fit ouvrir sa valise; He had Mary pour him a drink il se fit verser un verre—with this difference: that make can indicate, as we v., coercion, whereas have presupposes that there is no resistance, a difference that Fr. can only leave implicit or explain by awkward periphrases. Twentieth-century Eng. philosophers from Austin to Geach and Anscombe have examined these differences and their philosophical implications very closely. Thus, in A Plea for Excuses, Austin emphasizes the elusive meaning of the expression doing something, and the correlative difficulty of determining the limits of the concept of action—Is to sneeze to do an action? There is indeed a vague and comforting idea that doing an action must come down to the making of physical movements. Further, we need to ask what is the detail of the complicated internal machinery we use in acting. Philosophical Papers No matter how partial they may be, these opening remarks show that there is a specific, intimate relation between ordinary language and philosophical language in English language Phil. . This enables us to better understand why the most Oxonian philosophers are so comfortable resorting to idiomatic expressions cf. H. Putnam and even to clearly popular usage: “Meanings ain’t in the head.” It ain’t necessarily so.As for the title of Manx-ancestry Quine’s famous book From a Logical Point of View, which at first seems austere, it is taken from a calypso song: “From a logical point of view, Always marry women uglier than you. The Operator -ing: Properties and Antimetaphysical Consequences -ing: A multifunctional operator Although grammarians think it important to distinguish among the forms of -ing—present participles, adjectives, the progressive, and the gerund—what strikes the reader of scientific and philosophical texts is first of all the free in Phil. , You are v.ing something Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, regarding a stick in water; I really am perceiving the familiar objects Ayer, Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. The passage to the form be + verb + -ing indicates, then, not the progressiveness of the action but rather the transition into the metalanguage peculiar to the philosophical description of phenomena of perception. The sole exception is, curiously, to know, which is practically never used in the progressive: even if we explore the philosophical and epistemological literature, we do not find “I am knowing” or he was knowing, as if knowledge could not be conceived as a process. In English, there is a great variety of what are customarily called aspects, through which the status of the action is marked and differentiated in a more systematic way than in Fr. or G. , once again because of the -ing ending: he is working / he works / he worked / he has been working. Unlike what happens in Slavic languages, aspect is marked at the outset not by a duality of verbal forms but instead by the use of the verb to be with a verb ending in -ing imperfect or progressive, by opposition to the simple present or past perfect. Moreover, Grice mixes several aspects in a single expression: iterativity, progressivity, completion, as in it cannot fail to have been noticed Austin, How to Do Things. These are nuances, or implicate, as Labov and then Pinker recently observed, that are not peculiar to classical or written Eng. but also exist in certain vernaculars that appear to be familiar or allegedly ungrammatical. The vernacular seems particularly sophisticated on this point, distinguishing “he be working” from “he working” —that is, between having a regular job and being engaged in working at a particular moment, standard usage being limited to “he is working” Pinker, Language Instinct. Whether or not the notion of aspect is used, it seems clear that in Eng. there is a particularly subtle distinction between the different degrees of completion, of the iterativity or development of an action, that leads Oxonian philosophers to pay more attention to these questions and even to surprising inventions, such as that of ‘implicaturum,’ or ‘visum,’ or ‘disimplicaturum.’ The linguistic dissolution of the idea of substance Fictive entities Thus the verb + -ing operation simply gives the verb the temporary status of a noun while at the same time preserving some of its syntactic and semantic properties as a verb, that is, by avoiding substantivization. It is no accident that the substantiality of the I think asserted by Descartes was opposed by virtually all the Eng. philosophers of the seventeenth century. If a personal identity can be constituted by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, it does not require positing a substance: the substantivization of making and giving meets the need. We can also consider the way in which Russell Analysis of Matter, ch.27 makes his reader understand far more easily than does Bachelard, and without having to resort to the category of an epistemological obstacle, that one can perfectly well posit an atom as a series of events without according it the status of a substance. crucial in discussions of probability. The very definition of probability with which Bayes operates in An Essay towards Solving a Problem, the first great treatise on subjective probability, is based on this status of the happening, the event conceived not in terms of its realization or accomplishment but in terms of its expectation: The probability of any event is the ratio between the value at which an expectation depending on the happening of the event ought to be computed, and the value of the thing expected upon its happening. The progressive: Tense and aspect If we now pass from the gerund to the progressive, another construction that uses -ing, a new kind of problem appears: that of the aspect and temporality of actions. An interesting case of tr. difficulty is, e. g. , the one posed by Austin precisely when he attempts, in his presentation of performatives, to distinguish between the sentence and the act of saying it, between statement and utterance: there are utterances, such as the uttering of the sentence is, or is part of, the doing of an action How to Do Things. The tr. difficulty here is caused by the combination in the construction in -ing of the syntactical flexibility of the gerund and a progressive meaning. Does the -ing construction indicate the act, or the progressiveness of the act? Similarly, it is hard to choose to translate “On Referring” P. F. Strawson as De la référence rather than as De l’action de référer. Should one translate On Denoting Russell as De la dénotation the usual tr. or as Du dénoter? The progressive in the strict sense—be + verb + -ing— indicates an action at a specific moment, when it has already begun but is not yet finished. A little farther on, Austin allows us to gauge the ease of Eng. in the whole of these operations. “To utter the sentence is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing. The Fr. tr. gives, correctly: Énoncer la phrase, ce n’est pas décrire ce qu’il faut bien reconnaître que je suis en train de faire en parlant ainsi, but this remains unsatisfying at best, because of the awkwardness of en train de. Moreover, in many cases, en train de is simply not suitable insofar as the -ing does not indicate duration: e. g. , in At last I am v.ing . It is interesting to examine from this point of view the famous category of verbs of perception, verbum percipiendi. It is remarkable that these verbs v., hear can be in some cases used with the construction be + verb + -ing, since it is generally said even in grammar books that they can be used only in the present or simple past and not in the progressive. This rule probably is thought to be connected with something like the immediacy of perception, and it can be compared with the fact that the verbs to know and to understand are also almost always in the present or the simple past, as if the operations of the understanding could not be presented in the progressive form and were by definition instantaneous; or as if, on the contrary, they transcended the course of time. In reality, there are counterexamples. “I don’t know if I’m understanding you correctly”; You are hearing voices; and often Oxonian Phil. , which makes their tr. particularly indigestible, especially in Fr. , where -ismes gives a very Scholastic feel to the classifications translated. In addition to the famous term realism, which has been the object of so many contradictory definitions and so many debates over past decades that it has been almost emptied of meaning, we may mention some common but particularly obscure for anyone not familiar with the theoretical context terms: “cognitivism,” noncognitivism, coherentism, eliminativism, consequentialism, connectionism, etSuch terms in which moral Phil. is particularly fertile are in general transposed into Fr. without change in a sort of new, international philosophical language that has almost forgone tr.. More generally, in Eng. as in G. , words can be composed by joining two other words far more easily than in Fr. —without specifying the logical connections between the terms: toothbrush, pickpocket, lowlife, knownothing; or, for more philosophical terms: aspect-blind, language-dependent, rule-following, meaning-holism, observer-relative, which are translatable, of course, but not without considerable awkwardness. Oxonian philosophese. Oxonian Phil. seems to establish a language that is stylistically neutral and appears to be transparently translatable. Certain specific problems—the tr. of compound words and constructions that are more flexible in Eng. and omnipresent in current philosophical discourse, such as the thesis that la thèse selon laquelle, the question whether la question de savoir si, and my saying that le fait que je dise que—make Fr. tr.s of contemporary Eng. philosophical texts very awkward, even when the author writes in a neutral, commonplace style. Instead, these difficulties, along with the ease of construction peculiar to English, tend to encourage non-Oxonian analytical philosophers to write directly in Gricese, following the example of many of their European colleagues, or else to make use of a technical vernacular we have noted the -isms and compounds that is frequently heavy going and not very inventive when transRomang terms which are usually transliterated. This situation is certainly attributable to the paradoxical character of Gricese, which established itself as a philosophical language in the second half of the twentieth century: it is a language that is apparently simple and accessible and that thus claims a kind of universality but that is structured, both linguistically and philosophically, around major stumbling blocks to do, -ing, etthat often make it untranslatable. It is paradoxically this untranslatability, and not its pseudo-transparency, that plays a crucial role in the process of universalization. . IThe Austinian Paradigm: Ordinary Language and Phil. The proximity of ordinary language and philosophical language, which is rooted in classical English-language Phil. , was theorized in the twentieth century by Austin and can be summed up in the expression “‘ordinary’-language philosophy”. Ordinary language Phil. is interested This sort of overall preeminence in Eng. of the verbal and the subjective over the nominal and the objective is clear in the difference in the logic that governs the discourse of affectivity in Fr. and in English. How would something that one is correspond to something that one has, as in the case of fear in Fr. avoir peur? It follows that a Fr. man—who takes it for granted that fear is something that one feels or senses—cannot feel at home with the difference that Eng. naturally makes between something that has no objective correlative because it concerns only feeling like fear; and what is available to sensation, implying that what is felt through it has the status of an object. Thus in Eng. something is immediately grasped that in Fr. v.ms a strange paradox, viz. that passion, as Bentham notes in Deontology, is a fictive entity. Thus what sounds in Fr. like a nominalist provocation is implicated in the folds of the Eng. language. A symbolic theory of affectivity is thus more easily undertaken in Eng. than in Fr. , and if an ontological conception of affectivity had to be formulated in English, symmetrical difficulties would be encountered. Reversible derivations Another particularity of English, which is not without consequences in Phil. , is that its poverty from the point of view of inflectional morphology is compensated for by the freedom and facility it offers for the construction of all sorts of derivatives. Nominal derivatives based on adjectives and using suffixes such as -ity, -hood, -ness, -y. The resulting compounds are very difficult to differentiate in Fr. and to translate in general, which has led, in contemporary Fr. tr.s, to various incoherent makeshifts. To list the most common stumbling blocks: privacy privé-ité, innerness intériorité, not in the same sense as interiority, vagueness caractère vague, goodness bonté, in the sense of caractère bon, rightness justesse, “sameness,” similarité, in the sense of mêmeté, ordinariness, “appropriateness,” caractère ordinaire, approprié, unaccountability caractère de ce dont il est impossible de rendre compte. Adjectival derivatives based on nouns, using numerous suffixes: -ful, -ous, -y, -ic, -ish, -al e.g., meaningful, realistic, holistic, attitudinal, behavioral. Verbal derivatives based on nouns or adjectives, with the suffixes -ize, -ify, -ate naturalize, mentalize, falsify, and even without suffixes when possible e.g., the title of an article “How Not to Russell Carnap’s Aufbau,” i.e., how not to Russell Carnap’s Aufbau. d. Polycategorial derivatives based on verbs, using suffixes such as -able, -er, -age, -ismrefutable, truthmaker. The reversibility of these nominalizations and verbalizations has the essential result of preventing the reification of qualities or acts. The latter is more difficult to avoid in Fr. and G. , where nominalization hardens and freezes notions compare intériorité and innerness, which designates more a quality, or even, paradoxically, an effect, than an entity or a domain. But this kind of ease in making compounds has its flip side: the proliferation of -isms in liberties with the natural uses of the language. The philosophers ask, e. g. , how they can know that there is a real object there, but the question How do I know? can be asked in ordinary language only in certain contexts, that is, where it is always possible, at least in theory, to eliminate doubt. The doubt or question But is it a real one? has always must have a special basis, there must be some reason for suggesting that it isn’t real, in the sense of some specific way in which it is suggested that this experience or item may be phoney. The wile of the metaphysician consists in asking Is it a real table? a kind of object which has no obvious way of being phoney and not specifying or limiting what may be wrong with it, so that I feel at a loss how to prove it is a real one. It is the use of the word real in this manner that leads us on to the supposition that real has a single meaning the real world, material objects, and that a highly profound and puzzling one. Austin, Philosophical Papers This analysis of real is taken up again in Sense and Sensibilia, where Austin criticizes the notion of a sense datum and also a certain way of raising problems supposedly on the basis of common opinion e. g. , the common opinion that we really perceive things—but in reality on the basis of a pure construction. To state the case in this way, Austin says, is simply to soften up the plain man’s alleged views for the subsequent treatment; it is preparing the way for, by practically attributing to him, the so-called philosophers’ view. Phil. ’s frequent recourse to the ordinary is characterized by a certain condescension toward the common man. The error or deception consists in arguing the philosopher’s position against the ordinary position, because if the in what we should say when. It is, in other words, a Phil. of language, but on the condition that we never forget that we are looking not merely at words or ‘meanings,’ whatever they may be but also at the realities we use the words to talk about, as Austin emphasizes A Plea for Excuses, in Philosophical Papers. During the twentieth century or more precisely, between the 1940s and the s, there was a division of the paradigms of the Phil. of language between the logical clarification of ordinary language, on the one hand, and the immanent examination of ordinary language, on the other. The question of ordinary language and the type of treatment that it should be given—a normative clarification or an internal examination—is present in and even constitutive of the legacy of logical positivism. Wittgenstein’s work testifies to this through the movement that it manifests and performs, from the first task of the Phil. of language the creation of an ideal or formal language to clarify everyday language to the second the concern to examine the multiplicity of ordinary language’s uses. The break thus accomplished is such that one can only agree with Rorty’s statement in his preface to The Linguistic Turn that the only difference between Ideal Language Philosophers and Ordinary Language Philosophers is a disagreement about which language is ideal. In the renunciation of the idea of an ideal language, or a norm outside language, there is a radical change in perspective that consists in abandoning the idea of something beyond language: an idea that is omnipresent in the whole philosophical tradition, and even in current analytical Phil. . Critique of language and Phil. More generally, Austin criticizes traditional Phil. for its perverse use of ordinary language. He constantly denounces Phil. ’s abuse of ordinary language—not so much that it forgets it, but rather that it exploits it by taking 2 A defect in the Eng. language? Between according to Bentham Eng. philosophers are not very inclined toward etymology—no doubt because it is often less traceable than it is in G. or even in Fr. and discourages a certain kind of commentary. There are, however, certain exceptions, like Jeremy Bentham’s analysis of the words “in,” “or,” “between,” “and,” etc., -- cf. Grice on “to” and “or” – “Does it make sense to speak of the ‘sense’ of ‘to’?” -- through which Eng. constructs the kinds of space that belong to a very specific topiLet us take the case of between, which Fr. can render only by the word entre. Both the semantics and the etymology of entre imply the number three in Fr. , since what is entre intervenes as a third term between two others which it separates or brings closer in Lat., in-ter; in Fr., en tiers; as a third. This is not the case in English, which constructs between in accord with the number two in conformity with the etymology of this word, by tween, in pairs, to the point that it can imagine an ordering, even when it involves three or more classes, only in the binary mode: comon between three? relation between three?—the hue of selfcontradictoriness presents itself on the very face of the phrase. By one of the words in it, the number of objects is asserted to be three: by another, it is asserted to be no more than two. To the use thus exclusively made of the word between, what could have given rise, but a sort of general, howsoever indistinct, perception, that it is only one to one that objects can, in any continued manner, be commodiously and effectually compared. The Eng. language labours under a defect, which, when it is compared in this particular with other European langues, may perhaps be found peculiar to it. By the derivation, and thence by the inexcludible import, of the word between i.e., by twain, the number of the objects, to which this operation is represented as capable of being applied, is confined to two. By the Roman inter—by its Fr. derivation entre—no such limitation v.ms to be expressed. Chrestomathia REFS.: Bentham, Jeremy. ChrestomathiEd. by M. J. Smith and W. H. Burston. Oxford: Clarendon, To my mind, experience proves amply that we do come to an agreement on what we should say when such and such a thing, though I grant you it is often long and difficult. I should add that too often this is what is missing in Phil. : a preliminary datum on which one might agree at the outset. We do not claim in this way to discover all the truth that exists regarding everything. We discover simply the facts that those who have been using our language for centuries have taken the trouble to notice. Performatif-Constatif Austinian agreement is possible for two reasons: Ordinary language cannot claim to have the last word. Only remember, it is the first word Philosophical Papers. The exploration of language is also an exploration of the inherited experience and acumen of many generations of men ibid.. Ordinary language is a rich treasury of differences and embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connections they have found worth marking, in the lifetimes of many generations. These are certainly more subtle and solid than any that you or I are likely to think up in our arm-chairs of an afternoon ibid.. It is this ability to indicate differences that makes language a common instrument adequate for speaking things in the world. Who is we? Cavell’s question It is clear that analytical Phil. , especially as it has developed in the United States since the 1940s, has moved away from the Austinian paradigm and has at the same time abandoned a certain kind of philosophical writing and linguistic subtlety. But that only makes all the more powerful and surprising the return to Austin advocated by Stanley Cavell and the new sense of ordinary language Phil. that is emerging in his work and in contemporary American Phil. . What right do we have to refer to our uses? And who is this we so crucial for Austin that it constantly recurs in his work? All we have, as we have said, is what we say and our linguistic agreements. We determine the meaning of a given word by its uses, and for Austin, it is nonsensical to ask the question of meaning for instance, in a general way or looking for an entity; v. NONSENSE. The quest for agreement is founded on something quite different from signification or the determination of the common meaning. The agreement Austin is talking about has nothing to do with an intersubjective consensus; it is not founded on a convention or on actual agreements. It is an agreement that is as objective as possible and that bears as much on language as on reality. But what is the precise nature of this agreement? Where does it come from, and why should so much importance be accorded to it? That is the question Cavell asks, first in Must We Mean What We Say? and then in The Claim of Reason: what is it that allows Austin and Witters to say what they say about what we say? A claim is certainly involved here. That is what Witters means by our agreement in judgments, and in language it is based only on itself, on the latter exists, it is not on the same level. The philosopher introduces into the opinion of the common man particular entities, in order then to reject, amend, or explain it. The method of ordinary language: Be your size. Small Men. Austin’s immanent method comes down to examining our ordinary use of ordinary words that have been confiscated by Phil. , such as ‘true’ and ‘real,’ in order to raise the question of truth: Fact that is a phrase designed for use in situations where the distinction between a true statement and the state of affairs about which it is a truth is neglected; as it often is with advantage in ordinary life, though seldom in Phil. . So speaking about the fact that is a compendious way of speaking about a situation involving both words and world. Philosophical Papers We can, of course, maintain along with a whole trend in analytical Phil. from Frege to Quine that these are considerations too small and too trivial from which to draw any conclusions at all. But it is this notion of fact that Austin relies on to determine the nature of truth and thus to indicate the pertinence of ordinary language as a relationship to the world. This is the nature of Austin’s approach: the foot of the letter is the foot of the ladder ibid.. For Austin, ordinary words are part of the world: we use words, and what makes words useful objects is their complexity, their refinement as tools ibid.: We use words to inform ourselves about the things we talk about when we use these words. Or, if that v.ms too naïve: we use words as a way of better understanding the situation in which we find ourselves led to make use of words. What makes this claim possible is the proximity of dimension, of size, between words and ordinary objects. Thus philosophers should, instead of asking whether truth is a substance, a quality, or a relation, take something more nearly their own size to strain at ibid.. The Fr. translators render size by mesure, which v.ms excessively theoretical; the reference is to size in the material, ordinary sense. One cannot know everything, so why not try something else? Advantages of slowness and cooperation. Be your size. Small Men. Conversation cited by Urmson in A Symposium Austin emphasizes that this technique of examining words which he ended up calling linguistic phenomenology (and Grice linguistic botany) is not new and that it has existed since Socrates, producing its slow successes. But Grice is the first to make a systematic application of such a method, which is based, on the one hand, on the manageability and familiarity of the objects concerned and, on the other hand, on the common agreement at which it arrives in each of its stages. The problem is how to agree on a starting point, that is, on a given. This given or datum, for Grice, is Gricese, not as a corpus consisting of utterances or words, but as the site of agreement about what we should say when. Austin regards language as an empirical datum or experimental dat -- Bayes, T. . An Essay towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, with Richard Price’s Foreword and Discussion. In Facsimiles of Two Papers by Bayes. : Hafner, . First published in 176 Bentham, Jeremy. ChrestomathiEd. by M. J. Smith and W. H. Burston. Oxford: Clarendon, . . Deontology. Ed. by Goldworth. Oxford: Clarendon, . . Essay on Language. In The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. by J. Bowring. Edinburgh: W. Tait, 18384 Berkeley, George. Of Infinities. In vol. 2 of The Works, ed. by Luce and T. E. Jessop, 4081 London: Nelson, 19485 Reprint, : Kraus, . . A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge. Ed. by J. Dancy. Oxford: Oxford , . Cavell, Stanley. The Claim of Reason. : Oxford , . . In Quest of the Ordinary. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, . . Must We Mean What We Say? Cambridge: Cambridge , . . This New Yet Unapproachable AmericAlbuquerque: Living Batch Press, . Chomsky, Noam. Syntactic Structures. The Hague: Mouton, . Emerson, Ralph Waldo. Essays, First and Second Series. : Library of America, . Hacking, Jan. Why Does Language Matter to Phil. ? Cambridge: Cambridge , . Hume, D. . Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. Ed. by D. Coleman. Cambridge: Cambridge , . . Essays, Moral, Political and Literary Ed. by E. F. Miller. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Classics, . . A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. by L. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Oxford . 197 Laugier, SandrDu réel à l’ordinaire. : Vrin, . . Recommencer la philosophie. : Presses Universitaires de France, . Locke, J.. An Essay concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Oxford , . Mill, J. Stuart. Considerations on Representative Government. In Essays on Pol. and Society, vol. 19 of Collected Works, ed. by J. M. Robson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, . . Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society. Vol. 10 of Collected Works, ed. by J. M. Robson. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, . . A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, . Nedeljkovic, Maryvonne. D. Hume, approche phénoménologique de l’action et théorie linguistique. : Presses Universitaires de France, . Pinker, Steven. The Language Instinct: The New Science of Language and Mind. London: Penguin, . Putnam, Hilary. Mind, Language and Reality. Vol. 2 of Philosophical Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge , . . Realism with a Human Face. Ed. by J. Conant. , . Quine, Willard V. From a Logical Point of View. , 195 . Word and Object. , . Ricœur, Paul. Memory, History, Forgetting. Tr. K. Blamey and D. Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, . Rorty, Richard, ed. The Linguistic Turn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, . First published . Russell, Bertrand. The Analysis of Matter. London: Allen and Unwin, 195 . An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. : Routledge, . First published in 1950. Tesnière, Lucien. Éléments de syntaxe structural. : Klincksieck, . Urmson, J. O., W.V.O. Quine, and S. Hampshire. A Symposium on Austin’s Method. In Symposium on J. L. Austin, ed. by K. T. Fann. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, . Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Blue and the Brown Books. Ed. by R. Rhees. Oxford: Blackwell, . First published in 195 . Philosophical Investigations. Tr. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 195 we, as Cavell says in a passage that illustrates many of the difficulties of tr. we have discussed up to this point: We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and then we are expected, and expect others, to be able to project them into further contexts. Nothing ensures that this projection will take place in particular, not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of rules, just as nothing ensures that we will make, and understand, the same projections. That we do, on the whole, is a matter of our sharing routes of interest and feeling, modes of response, senses of humor and ‑of significance and of fulfillment, of what is outrageous, of what is similar to what else, what a rebuke, what forgiveness, of when an utterance is an assertion, when an appeal, when an explanation—all the whirl of organism Witterscalls forms of life. Human speech and activity, sanity and community, rest upon nothing more, but nothing less, than this. It is a vision as simple as it is and because it is terrifying. Must We Mean What We Say? The fact that our ordinary language is based only on itself is not only a reason for concern regarding the validity of what we do and say, but also the revelation of a truth about ourselves that we do not always want to recognize: the fact that I am the only possible source of such a validity. That is a new understanding of the fact that language is our form of life, precisely its ordinary form. Cavell’s originality lies in his reinvention of the nature of ordinary language in American thought and in the connection he establishes—notably through his reference to Emerson and Thoreau, American thinkers of the ordinary—between this nature of language and human nature, finitude. It is also in this sense that the question of linguistic agreements reformulates that of the ordinary human condition and that the acceptance of the latter goes hand in hand with the recognition of the former. In Cavell’s Americanization of ordinary language Phil. there thus emerges a radical form of the return to the ordinary. But isn’t this ordinary, e. g. , that of Emerson in his Essays, precisely the one that the whole of Eng. Phil. has been trying to find, or rather to feel or taste, since its origins? Thus we can compare the writing of Emerson or James, in texts like Experience or Essays in Radical Empiricism, with that of the British empiricists when they discuss experience, the given, and the sensible. This is no doubt one of the principal dimensions of philosophical writing in English: always to make the meaning more available to the senses. J.-Pierre Cléro Sandra Laugier REFS.: Austin, J. L. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Clarendon, . . Performatif-Constatif. In La philosophie analytique, ed. by J. Wahl and L. Beck. : Editions du Minuit, . Tr. in Performative-Constative. In Phil. and Ordinary Language, ed. by E. Caton. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, . . Philosophical Papers. Ed. by J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock. Oxford: Clarendon, . . Sense and SensibiliOxford: Clarendon, . Ayer, J. The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge. London: Macmillan, 1940. ENTREPRENEUR 265 form the basis of the kingdom by means of calculated plans; to the legal domain: someone who contravenes the hierarchical order of the professions and subverts their rules; finally, to the economic domain: someone who agrees, on the basis of a prior contract an established price to execute a project collection of taxes, supply of an army, a merchant expedition, construction, production, transaction, assuming the hazards related to exchange and time. This last usage corresponds to practices that became more and more socially prominent starting in the sixteenth century. Let us focus on the term in economics. The engagement of the entrepreneur in his project may be understood in various ways, and the noun entrepreneur translated in various ways into English: by contractor if the stress is placed on the engagement with regard to the client to execute the task according to conditions negotiated in advance a certain time, a fixed price, firm price, tenant farming; by undertaker now rare in this sense when we focus on the engagement in the activity, taking charge of the project, its practical realization, the setting in motion of the transaction; and by adventurer, enterpriser, and projector, to emphasize the risks related to speculation. At the end of the eighteenth century, the Fr. word entreprise acquired the new meaning of an industrial establishment. Entrepreneur accordingly acquired the sense of the head or direction of a business of production superintendent, employer, manager. In France, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the noun entrepreneur had strong political connotations, in particular in the abundant pamphlets containing mazarinades denouncing the entrepreneurs of tax farming. The economist Pierre de Boisguilbert wrote the Factum de la France, the largest trial ever conducted by pen against the big financiers, entrepreneurs of the wealth of the kingdom, who take advantage of its good administration its political economy in the name of the entrepreneurs of commerce and industry, who contribute to the increase in its wealth. Boisguilbert failed in his project of reforming the tax farm, or tax business, and it was left to a clever financier, Richard Cantillon, to create the economic concept of the entrepreneur. Chance in Business: Risk and Uncertainty There is no trace of Boisguilbert’s moral indignation in Cantillon’s Essai sur la nature du commerce en générale Essay on the nature of commerce in general. Having shown that all the classes and all the men of a State live or acquire wealth at the expense of the owners of the land bk. 1, ch.12, he suggests that the circulation and barter of goods and merchandise, like their production, are conducted in Europe by entrepreneurs and haphazardly bk. 1, of ch.1 He then describes in detail what composes the uncertain aspect of the action of an entrepreneur, in which he acts according to his ideas and without being able to predict, in which he conceives and executes his plans surrounded by the hazard of events. The uncertainty related to business profits turns especially on the fact that it is dependent on the forms of consumption of the owners, the only members of society who are independent—naturally independent, Cantillon specified. Entrepreneurs are those who are capable of breaking ÉNONCÉ Énoncé, from the Roman enuntiare to express, divulge; from ex out and nuntiare to make known; a nuntius is a messenger, a nuncio, ranges over the same type of entity as do proposition and phrase: it is a basic unit of syntax, the relevant question being whether or not it is the bearer of truth values. An examination of the differences among these entities, and the networks they constitute in different languages especially in English: sentence, statement, utterance, appears under PROPOSITION. V. also DICTUM and LOGOS, both of which may be acceptably Tr. énoncé. Cf. PRINCIPLE, SACHVERHALT, TRUTH, WORD especially WORD, Box The essential feature of an énoncé is that it is considered to be a singular occurrence and thus is paired with its énonciation: v. SPEECH ACT; cf. ENGLISH, LANGUAGE, SENSE, SIGN, SIGNIFIER/SIGNIFIED, WITTICISM. v. DISCOURSE ENTREPRENEUR FR. ENG. adventurer, contractor, employer, enterpriser, entrepreneur, manager, projector, undertaker, superintendent v. ACT, AGENCY, BERUF, ECONOMY, LIBERAL, OIKONOMIA, PRAXIS, UTILITY. Refs.: G. J. Warnock, “English philosophy,” H. P. Grice, “Gricese,” BANC.

Grice’s handwave. A sort of handwave can mean in a one-off act of communication something. It’s the example he uses. By a sort of handwave, the emissor communicates either that he knows the route or that he is about to leave the addressee. Handwave signals. Code. Cfr. the Beatles’s HELP. Explicatum: We need some body – Implicaturum: Not just Any Body. Why does this matter to the philosopher? The thing is as follows. Grice was provoked by Austin. To defeat Austin, Grice needs a ‘theory of communication.’ This theory applies his early reflections on the intentional side to an act of communication. This allows him to explain the explicatum versus the implicaturum. By analysing each, Grice notes that there is no need to refer to linguistic entities. So, the centrality of the handwave is an offshoot of his theory designed to defeat Austin.

Grice’s creatures: the pirots. The programme he calls ‘creature construction.’ “I could have used the ‘grice,’ which was extinct by the time I was born.”

Grice’s myth. Or Griceian myths – The Handbook of Griceian mythology. At one point Grice suggests that his ‘genitorial programme’ a kind of ideal-observer theory is meant as ‘didactic,’ and for expository purposes. It seems easier, as , as Grice and Plato would agree, to answer a question about the genitorial programme rather than use a first-person approach and appeal to introspection. Grice refers to the social contract as a ‘myth,’ which may still explain, as ‘meaning’ does. G. R. Grice built his career on this myth. This is G. R. Grice, of the social-contract fame. Cf. Strawson and Wiggins comparing Grice’s myth with Plato’s, and they know what they are talking about.

Grice’s predicament. S draws a pic- "one-off predicament"). ... Clarendon, 1976); and Simon Blackburn, Spreading the Word (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984) ... But there is an obvious way of emending the account. Grice points out. ... Blackburn helpfully suggests that we can cut through much of this complexity by ... The above account is intended to capture the notion of one-off meaning. Walking in a forest, having gone some way ahead of the rest of the party, I draw an arrow at a fork of a path, meaning that those who are following me should go straight on. Gricean considerations may be safely ignored. Only when trying to communicate by nonconventional means ("one-off predicament," Blackburn, 1984, chap. Blackburn's mission is to promote the philosophy of language as a pivotal enquiry ... and dismissed; the Gricean model might be suitable to explain one-off acts. The Gricean mechanism with its complex communicative intentions has a clear point in what Blackburn calls “a one-off predicament” - a situation in which an ...

Grice’s shaggy-dog story: While Grice would like to say that it should be in the range of a rational creature to refer and to predicate, what about the hand wave? By his handwave, the emissor means that _HE_ (subject) is a knower of the road (or roate), the predicate after the copula or that he, the emissor, subject, is (the copula) about to leave his emissee – but there is nothing IN THE MATTER (the handwave) that can be ‘de-composed’ like that. The FORM attaches to the communicatum directly. This is strange, but not impossible, and shows Grice’s programme. Because his idea is that a communicatum need not a vehicile which is syntactically structured (as “Fido is shaggy”). This is the story that Grice tells in his lecture. He uses a ‘shaggy-dog’ story to explain TWO main notions: that of ‘reference’ or denotatio, and that of predicatio. He had explored that earlier when discussing, giving an illustration “Smith is happy”, the idea of ‘value,’ as correspondence, where he adds the terms for ‘denote’ and ‘predicatio,’ or actually, ‘designatio’ and ‘indicatio’, need to be “explained within the theory.” In the utterance ‘Smith is happy,’ the utterer DESIGNATES an item, Smith. The utterer also INDICATES some class, ‘being happy.’ Grice introduces a shorthand, ‘assign’, or ‘assignatio,’ previous to the value-satisfaction, to involve both the ‘designatio’ and the ‘indicatio’. U assigns the item Smith to the class ‘being happy.’ U’s intention involves A’s belief that U believes that “the item belongs to the class, or that he ASSIGNS the item to the class. A predicate, such as 'shaggy,' in my shaggy-dog story, is a part of a bottom-up, or top-bottom, as I prefer, analysis of this or that sentences, and a predicate, such as 'shaggy,' is the only indispensable 'part,' or 'element,' as I prefer, since a predicate is the only 'pars orationis,' to use the old phrase, that must appear in every sentence. In a later lecture he ventures with ‘reference.’ Lewis and Short have “rĕferre,” rendered as “to bear, carry, bring, draw, or give back,” in a “transf.” usage, they render as “to make a reference, to refer (class.),” asa in “de rebus et obscuris et incertis ad Apollinem censeo referendum; “ad quem etiam Athenienses publice de majoribus rebus semper rettulerunt,” Cic. Div. 1, 54, 122.” While Grice uses ‘Fido,’ he could have used ‘Pegasus’ (Martin’s cat, as it happens) and apply Quine’s adage: we could have appealed to the ex hypothesi unanalyzable, irreducible attribute of being Pegasus, adopting, for its expression, the verb 'is-Pegasus', or 'pegasizes'. And Grice could have played with ‘predicatio’ and ‘subjectio.’ Grice on subject. Lewis and Short have “sūbĭcĭo,” (less correctly subjĭcĭo ; post-Aug. sometimes sŭb- ), jēci, jectum, 3, v. a. sub-jacio. which they render as “to throw, lay, place, or bring under or near (cf. subdo),” and in philosophy, “subjectum , i, n. (sc. verbum), as “that which is spoken of, the foundation or subject of a proposition;” “omne quicquid dicimus aut subjectum est aut de subjecto aut in subjecto est. Subjectum est prima substantia, quod ipsum nulli accidit alii inseparabiliter, etc.,” Mart. Cap. 4, § 361; App. Dogm. Plat. 3, p. 34, 4 et saep.—.” Note that for Mart. Cap. the ‘subject,’ unlike the ‘predicate’ is not a ‘syntactical category.’ “Subjectum est prima substantia,” The subject is a prote ousia. As for correlation, Grice ends up with a reductive analysis. By uttering utterance-token V, the utterer U correlates predicate P1 with (and only with) each member of P2 ≡ (∃R)(∃R') (1) U effects that (∀x)(R P1x ≡ x ∈ P1) and (2) U intends (1), and (3) U intends that (∀y)(R' P1y ≡ y ∈ P1), where R' P1 is an expression-type such that utterance-token V is a sequence consisting of an expression-token p1 of expression-type P1 and an expression-token p2 of expression-type P2, the R-co-relatum of which is a set of which y is a member. And he is back with ‘denotare. Lewis and Short have “dēnŏtare,” which they render as “to mark, set a mark on, with chalk, color, etc.: “pedes venalium creta,” It is interesting to trace Grice’s earliest investigations on this. Grice and Strawson stage a number of joint seminars on topics related to the notions of meaning, categories, and logical form. Grice and Strawson engage in systematic and unsystematic philosophical exploration. From these discussions springs work on predication and categories, one or two reflections of which are acknowledge at two places (re: the reductive analysis of a ‘particular,’ “the tallest man that did, does, or will exist” --) in Strawson’s “Particular and general” for The Aristotelian Society – and “visible” as Grice puts it, but not acknowledged, in Strawson’s “Individuals: an essay in descriptive metaphysics.””

Grice’s theory-theory: “I am perhaps not too happy with the word ‘theory,’ as applied to this, but that’s Ramsey for you” (WoW: 285). Grice’s theory-theory: A theory of mind concerning how we come to know about the propositional attitudes of others. It tries to explain the nature of ascribing certain thoughts, beliefs, or intentions to other persons in order to explain their actions. The theory-theory holds that in ascribing beliefs to others we are tacitly applying a theory that enables us to make inferences about the beliefs behind the actions of others. The theory that is applied is a set of rules embedded in folk psychology. Hence, to anticipate and predict the behavior of others, one engages in an intellectual process moving by inference from one set of beliefs to another. This position contrasts with another theory of mind, the simulation theory, which holds that we need to make use of our own motivational and emotional resources and capacities for practical reasoning in explaining actions of others. “So called ‘theory-theorists’ maintain that the ability to explain and predict behaviour is underpinned by a folk-psychological theory of the structure and functioning of the mind – where the theory in question may be innate and modularised, learned individually, or acquired through a process of enculturation.” Carruthers and Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Grice needs a theory. For those into implicatura and conversation as rational cooperation, when introducing the implicaturum he mentions ‘pre-theoretical adequacy’ of the model. So he is thinking of the conversational theory as a theory in the strict sense, with ‘explanatory’ and not merely taxonomical power. So one task is to examine in which way the conversational theory is a theory that explains, rather than merely ad hoc ex post facto commentary. Not so much for his approach to mean. He polemises with Rountree, of Somerville, that you dont need a thory to analyse mean. Indeed, you cannot have a theory to analyse mean, because mean is a matter of intuition, not a theoretical concept. But Grice appeals to theory, when dealing with willing. He knows what willing means because he relies on a concept of folk-science. In this folk-science, willing is a theoretical concept. Grice arrived at this conclusion by avoiding the adjective souly, and seeing that there is no word to describe willing other than by saying it is a psychoLOGICAL concept, i.e. part of a law within that theory of folk-science. That law will include, by way of ramsified naming or describing willing as a predicate-constant. Now, this is related to metaphysics. His liberal or ecunmenical metaphysics is best developed in terms of his ontological marxism presented just after he has expanded on this idea of willing as a theoretical concept, within a law involving willing (say, Grices Optimism-cum-Pesimism law), within the folk-science of psychology that explains his behaviour. For Aristotle, a theoria, was quite a different animal, but it had to do with contemplatio, hence the theoretical (vita contemplativa) versus the practical (vita activa). Grices sticking to Aristotle’srare use of theory inspires him to develop his fascinating theory of the theory-theory. Grice realised that there is no way to refer to things like intending except with psychological, which he takes to mean, belonging to a pscyhological theory. Grice was keen to theorise on theorising. He thought that Aristotle’s first philosophy (prote philosophia) is best rendered as Theory-theory. Grice kept using Oxonian English spelling, theorising, except when he did not! Grice calls himself folksy: his theories, even if Subjects to various types of Ramseyfication, are popular in kind! And ceteris paribus! Metaphysical construction is disciplined and the best theorising the philosopher can hope for! The way Grice conceives of his theory-theory is interesting to revisit. A route by which Grice hopes to show the centrality of metaphysics (as prote philosophia) involves taking seriously a few ideas. If any region of enquiry is to be successful as a rational enterprise, its deliverance must be expressable in the shape of one or another of the possibly different types of theory. A characterisation of the nature and range of a possible kind of theory θ is needed. Such a body of characterisation must itself be the outcome of rational enquiry, and so must itself exemplify whatever requirement it lays down for any theory θ in general. The characterisation must itself be expressible as a theory θ, to be called, if you like, Grice politely puts it, theory-theory, or meta-theory, θ2. Now, the specification and justification of the ideas and material presupposed by any theory θ, whether such account falls within the bounds of Theory-theory, θ2 would be properly called prote philosophia (first philosophy) and may turn out to relate to what is generally accepted as belonging to the Subjects matter of metaphysics. It might, for example, turn out to be establishable that any theory θ has to relate to a certain range of this or that Subjects item, has to attribute to each item this or that predicate or attribute, which in turn has to fall within one or another of the range of types or categories. In this way, the enquiry might lead to recognised metaphysical topics, such as the nature of being, its range of application, the nature of predication and a systematic account of categories. Met. , philosophical eschatology, and Platos Republic, Thrasymachus, social justice, Socrates, along with notes on Zeno, and topics for pursuit, repr.in Part II, Explorations in semantics and metaphysics to WOW , metaphysics, philosophical eschatology, Platos Republic, Socrates, Thrasymachus, justice, moral right, legal right, Athenian dialectic. Philosophical eschatology is a sub-discipline of metaphysics concerned with what Grice calls a category shift. Grice, having applied such a technique to Aristotle’s aporia on philos (friend) as alter ego, uses it now to tackle Socratess view, against Thrasymachus, that right applies primarily to morality, and secondarily to legality. Grice has a specific reason to include this in his WOW Grices exegesis of Plato on justice displays Grices take on the fact that metaphysics needs to be subdivided into ontology proper and what he calls philosophical eschatology, for the study of things like category shift and other construction routines. The exploration of Platos Politeia thus becomes an application of Grices philosophically eschatological approach to the item just, as used by Socrates (morally just) and Thrasymachus (legally just). Grice has one specific essay on Aristotle in PPQ. So he thought Plato merited his own essay, too! Grices focus is on Plato’s exploration of dike. Grice is concerned with a neo-Socratic (versus neo-Thrasymachean) account of moral justice as conceptually (or axiologically) prior to legal justice. In the proceeding, he creates philosophical eschatology as the other branch to metaphysics, along with good ol ontology. To say that just crosses a categorial barrier (from the moral to the legal) is to make a metaphysical, strictly eschatological, pronouncement. The Grice Papers locate the Plato essay in s. II, the Socrates essay in s. III, and the Thrasymachus essay, under social justice, in s. V. Grice is well aware that in his account of fairness, Rawls makes use of his ideas on personal identity. The philosophical elucidation of fairness is of great concern for Grice. He had been in touch with such explorations as Nozicks and Nagels along anti-Rawlsian lines. Grices ideas on rationality guide his exploration of social justice. Grice keeps revising the Socrates notes. The Plato essay he actually dates. As it happens, Grices most extensive published account of Socrates is in this commentary on Platos Republic: an eschatological commentary, as he puts it. In an entertaining fashion, Grice has Socrates, and neo-Socrates, exploring the logic and grammar of just against the attack by Thrasymachus and neo-Thrasymachus. Grices point is that, while the legal just may be conceptually prior to the moral just, the moral just is evaluationally or axiologically prior. Refs.: There is a specific essay on ‘theorising’ in the Grice Papers, but there are scattered sources elsewhere, such as “Method” (repr. in “Conception”), BANC.

Grice’s three-year-old’s guide to Russell’s theory of types, with an advice to parents by Strawson: Grice put forward the empirical hypothesis that a three-year old CAN understand Russell’s theory of types. “In more than one way.” This brought confusion in the household, with some members saying they could not – “And I trust few of your tutees do!” Russell’s influential solution to the problem of logical paradoxes. The theory was developed in particular to overcome Russell’s paradox, which seemed to destroy the possibility of Frege’s logicist program of deriving mathematics from logic. Suppose we ask whether the set of all sets which are not members of themselves is a member of itself. If it is, then it is not, but if it is not, then it is. The theory of types suggests classifying objects, properties, relations, and sets into a hierarchy of types. For example, a class of type 0 has members that are ordinary objects; type 1 has members that are properties of objects of type 0; type 2 has members that are properties of the properties in type 1; and so on. What can be true or false of items of one type can not significantly be said about those of another type and is simply nonsense. If we observe the prohibitions against classes containing members of different types, Russell’s paradox and similar paradoxes can be avoided. The theory of types has two variants. The simple theory of types classifies different objects and properties, while the ramified theory of types further sorts types into levels and adds a hierarchy of levels to that of types. By restricting predicates to those that relate to items of lower types or lower levels within their own type, predicates giving rise to paradox are excluded. The simple theory of types is sufficient for solving logical paradoxes, while the ramified theory of type is introduced to solve semantic paradoxes, that is, paradoxes depending on notions such as reference and truth. “Any expression containing an apparent variable is of higher type than that variable. This is the fundamental principles of the doctrines of types.” Russell, Logic and Knowledge. Grice’s commentary in “In defense of a dogma,” The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

villa grice: Grice kept a nice garden in his cottage on Banbury Road, not far from St. John’s. It was more of a villa than his town house at Harborne. While Grice loved Academia, he also loved non-Academia. He would socialize at the Flag and Lamb, at the Bird and Baby, and the cricket club, at the bridge club, etc. In this way, he goes back to Plato’s idea of an ‘academy,’ established by Plato at his villa outside Athens near the public park and gymnasium known by that name. Although it may not have maintained a continuous tradition, the many and varied philosophers of the Academy all considered themselves Plato’s successors, and all of them celebrated and studied his work. The school survived in some form until A.D. 529, when it was dissolved, along with the other pagan schools, by the Eastern Roman emperor Justinian I. The history of the Academy is divided by some authorities into that of the Old Academy Plato, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and their followers and the New Academy the Skeptical Academy of the third and second centuries B.C.. Others speak of five phases in its history: Old as before, Middle Arcesilaus, New Carneades, Fourth Philo of Larisa, and Fifth Antiochus of Ascalon. For most of its history the Academy was devoted to elucidating doctrines associated with Plato that were not entirely explicit in the dialogues. These “unwritten doctrines” were apparently passed down to his immediate successors and are known to us mainly through the work of Aristotle: there are two opposed first principles, the One and the Indefinite Dyad Great and Small; these generate Forms or Ideas which may be identified with numbers, from which in turn come intermediate mathematicals and, at the lowest level, perceptible things Aristotle, Metaphysics I.6. After Plato’s death, the Academy passed to his nephew Speusippus, who led the school until his death. Although his written works have perished, his views on certain main points, along with some quotations, were recorded by surviving authors. Under the influence of late Pythagoreans, Speusippus anticipated Plotinus by holding that the One transcends being, goodness, and even Intellect, and that the Dyad which he identifies with matter is the cause of all beings. To explain the gradations of beings, he posited gradations of matter, and this gave rise to Aristotle’s charge that Speusippus saw the universe as a series of disjointed episodes. Speusippus abandoned the theory of Forms as ideal numbers, and gave heavier emphasis than other Platonists to the mathematicals. Xenocrates who once went with Plato to Sicily, succeeded Speusippus and led the Academy till his own death. Although he was a prolific author, Xenocrates’ works have not survived, and he is known only through the work of other authors. He was induced by Aristotle’s objections to reject Speusippus’s views on some points, and he developed theories that were a major influence on Middle Platonism, as well as on Stoicism. In Xenocrates’ theory the One is Intellect, and the Forms are ideas in the mind of this divine principle; the One is not transcendent, but it resides in an intellectual space above the heavens. While the One is good, the Dyad is evil, and the sublunary world is identified with Hades. Having taken Forms to be mathematical entities, he had no use for intermediate mathematicals. Forms he defined further as paradigmatic causes of regular natural phenomena, and soul as self-moving number. Polemon led the Academy, and was chiefly known for his fine character, which set an example of self-control for his students. The Stoics probably derived their concept of oikeiosis an accommodation to nature from his teaching. After Polemon’s death, his colleague Crates led the Academy until the accession of Arcesilaus. The New Academy arose when Arcesilaus became the leader of the school and turned the dialectical tradition of Plato to the Skeptical aim of suspending belief. The debate between the New Academy and Stoicism dominated philosophical discussion for the next century and a half. On the Academic side the most prominent spokesman was Carneades. In the early years of the first century B.C., Philo of Larisa attempted to reconcile the Old and the New Academy. His pupil, the former Skeptic Antiochus of Ascalon, was enraged by this and broke away to refound the Old Academy. This was the beginning of Middle Platonism. Antiochus’s school was eclectic in combining elements of Platonism, Stoicism, and Aristotelian philosophy, and is known to us mainly through Cicero’s Academica. Middle Platonism revived the main themes of Speusippus and Xenocrates, but often used Stoic or neo-Pythagorean concepts to explain them. The influence of the Stoic Posidonius was strongly felt on the Academy in this period, and Platonism flourished at centers other than the Academy in Athens, most notably in Alexandria, with Eudorus and Philo of Alexandria. After the death of Philo, the center of interest returned to Athens, where Plutarch of Chaeronia studied with Ammonius at the Academy, although Plutarch spent most of his career at his home in nearby Boeotia. His many philosophical treatises, which are rich sources for the history of philosophy, are gathered under the title Moralia; his interest in ethics and moral education led him to write the Parallel Lives paired biographies of famous Romans and Athenians, for which he is best known. After this period, the Academy ceased to be the name for a species of Platonic philosophy, although the school remained a center for Platonism, and was especially prominent under the leadership of the Neoplatonist Proclus.

griceism. Gricese. At Oxford, it was usual to refer to Austin’s idiolect as Austinese. In analogy with Grecism, we have a Gricism, a Griceian cliché. Cf. a ‘grice’ and ‘griceful’ in ‘philosopher’s lexicon.’ Gricese is a Latinism, from -ese, word-forming element, from Old French -eis (Modern French -ois, -ais), from Vulgar Latin, from Latin -ensem, -ensis "belonging to" or "originating in."

grecianism: why was Grice obsessed with Socrates’s convesations? He does not say. But he implicates it. For the Athenian dialecticians, it is all a matter of ta legomena. Ditto for the Oxonian dialecticians. Ta legomena becomes ordinary language. And the task of the philosopher is to provide reductive analysis of this or that concept in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. Cf. Hospers. Grices review of the history of philosophy (Philosophy is but footnotes to Zeno.). Grice enjoyed Zenos answer, What is a friend? Alter ego, Allego. ("Only it was the other Zeno." Grice tried to apply the Socratic method during his tutorials. "Nothing like a heartfelt dedication to the Socratic art of mid-wifery, seeking to bring forth error and to strangle it at birth.” μαιεύομαι (A.“μαῖα”), ‘to serve as a midwife, act a; “ἡ Ἄρτεμις μ.” Luc. D Deor.26.2. 2. cause delivery to take place, “ἱκανὴ ἔκπληξις μαιεύσασθαι πρὸ τῆς ὥρας” Philostr. VA1.5. 3. c. acc., bring to the birth, Marin.Procl.6; ὄρνιθας μ. hatch chickens, Anon. ap. Suid.; αἰετὸν κάνθαρος μαιεύσομαι, prov. of taking vengeance on a powerful enemy, Ar. Lys.695 (cf. Sch.). 4. deliver a woman, esp. metaph. in Pl. of the Socratic method, Tht. 149b. II. Act., Poll. 4.208, Sch. OH.4.506. Pass., τὰ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ μαιευθέντα brought into the world by me, Pl. Tht. 150e, cf. Philostr.VA5.13. Refs.: the obvious references are Grice’s allusions to Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, Zeno, The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

grosseteste: Grice was a member of the Grosseteste Society. Like Grice’s friend, G. J. Warnock, Grosseteste was chancellor of Oxford. Only that by the time of Warnock, the monarch is the chancellor by default, so “Warnock had to allow to be called ‘vice-chancelor’ to Elizabeth II.” “I would never have read Aristotle had it not been by this great head that grosseteste (“Greathead” is a common surname in Suffolk).” – H. P. Grice. English philosopher who began life on the bottom rung of feudal society in Suffolk and became one of the most influential figures in pre-Reformation England. He studied at Oxford, obtaining an “M. A.,” like Grice. Sometime after this period he joined the household of William de Vere, of Hereford. Grosseteste associated with the elite at Hereford, several of whose members were part of an advanced philosophical tradition. It was a centre for the study of liberal arts. This explains his interest in dialectics. After a sojourn in Paris, he becomes the first chancellor of Oxford. He was a secular lecturer in theology to the recently established Franciscan order at Oxford. It was during his tenure with the Franciscans that he studied Grecian an unusual endeavour for an Oxonian schoolman then. He later moved to Lincoln. As a scholar, Grosseteste is an original thinker who used Aristotelian and Augustinian theses as points of departure. Grosseteste (or “Greathead,” as he was called by the town – if not the gown) believes, with Aristotle, that sense is the basis of all knowledge, and that the basis for sense is our discovery of the cause of what is experienced or revealed by experiment. He also believes, with Augustine, that light plays an important role in creation. Thus he maintained that God produced the world by first creating prime matter (“materia prima”) from which issued a point of light lux, the first corporeal form or power, one of whose manifestations is visible light. The diffusion of this light resulted in extension or tri-dimensionality in the form of the nine concentric celestial spheres and the four terrestrial spheres of fire, air, water, and earth. According to Grosseteste, the diffusion of light takes place in accordance with laws of mathematical proportionality geometry. Everything, therefore, is a manifestation of light, and mathematics is consequently indispensable to science and knowledge generally. The principles Grosseteste employs to support his views are presented in, e.g., his commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, the De luce, and the De lineis, angulis et figuris. He worked in areas as seemingly disparate as optics and angelology. Grosseteste is one of the first to take an interest in and introduce into the Oxford curriculum newly recovered Aristotelian texts, along with commentaries on them. His work and interest in natural philosophy, mathematics, the Bible, and languages profoundly influenced Roger Bacon, and the educational goals of the Franciscan order. It also helped to stimulate work in these areas.

groot -- grotius, h., de groot, philosopher, a founder of modern views of international law and a major theorist of natural law. A lawyer and Latinist, Grotius developed a new view of the law of nature in order to combat moral skepticism and to show how there could be rational settlement of moral disputes despite religious disagreements. He argued in The Law of War and Peace 1625 that humans are naturally both competitive and sociable. The laws of nature show us how we can live together despite our propensity to conflict. They can be derived from observation of our nature and situation. These laws reflect the fact that each individual possesses rights, which delimit the social space within which we are free to pursue our own goals. Legitimate government arises when we give up some rights in order to save or improve our lives. The obligations that the laws of nature impose would bind us, Grotius notoriously said, even if God did not exist; but he held that God does enforce the laws. They set the limits on the laws that governments may legitimately impose. The laws of nature reflect our possession of both precise perfect rights of justice, which can be protected by force, and imperfect rights, which are not enforceable, nor even statable very precisely. Grotius’s views on our combative but sociable nature, on the function of the law of nature, and on perfect and imperfect rights were of central importance in later discussions of morality and law.

Grice’s grue and grellow, -- and bleen: H. P. Grice was fascinated by Goodman’s ‘grue’ paradox and kept looking for the crucial implicaturum. “The paradox is believed to be mainly as arising within the theory of induction, but I’ve seen Strawson struggling with gruesome consequences in his theory of deduction, too.” According to Nelson Goodman, “a philosopher from the New World,” every intuitively acceptable inductive argument, call it A, may be mimicked by indefinitely many other inductive arguments each seemingly quite analogous to A and therefore seemingly as acceptable, yet each nonetheless intuitively *unacceptable*, and each yielding a conclusion contradictory to that of A, given the assumption that sufficiently many and varied of the sort of things induced upon exist as yet unexamined which is the only circumstance in which A is of interest. “Goodman then asks us to suppose an intuitively acceptable inductive argument.”A1 every hitherto observed EMERALD is GREEN; therefore, every emerald is green. Now introduce the totally unnatural colour predicate ‘grue’ – a portmanteau of blue and green – as in Welsh ‘glas’ -- where for some given, as yet wholly future, temporal interval T an object is ‘grue’ provided it has the property of being green and first examined before T OR blue and NOT first examined before T. Then consider the following inductive argument: A2 every hitherto observed EMERALD is GRUE; therefore, every emerald is grue. The premise is true, and A2 is formally analogous to A1. But A2 is intuitively unacceptable. If there is an emerald UNexamined before T, he conclusion of A2 says that this emerald is blue, whereas the conclusion of A1 says that every emerald is green! Granted, other counter-intuitive competing arguments could be given, e.g.: A3. Every hitherto observed emerald is grellow; therefore, every emeralds is grellow. where an object is ‘grellow’ provided it is green and located on the earth or yellow otherwise. It would seem, therefore, that some restriction on induction is required. “Goodman’s alleged of induction offers two challenges. First, state the restriction i.e., demarcate the intuitively acceptable inductions from the unacceptable ones, in some general way, without constant appeal to intuition.”“Second, justify our preference for the one group of inductions over the other.”“These two parts of the paradox are, alas, often conflated.”But it is at least conceivable that one might solve the analytical, demarcative part without solving the justificatory part, and, perhaps, vice versa. It will not do to rule out, a priori gruesome” variances in nature. H2O varies in its physical state along the parameter of temperature. If so, why might not one emerald vary in colour along the parameter of time of first examination? One approach to the problem of restriction is to focus on the conclusions of inductive arguments e.g., every emerald is green, every emerald is grue and to distinguish those which may legitimately so serve called “projectible hypotheses” from those which may not. The question then arises whether only non-gruesome hypotheses those which do not contain gruesome predicates are projectible. Aside from the task of defining ‘gruesome predicate’ which could be done structurally relative to a preferred language, the answer is no. Consider the predicate ‘x is solid and less than 0; C, or liquid and more than 0; C but less than 100; C, or gaseous and more than 100; C.’This is gruesome on any plausible structural account of gruesomeness. Note the similarity to the ‘grue’ equivalent: green and first examined before T, or blue and not first examined before T. Nevertheless, where nontransitional water is pure H2O at one atmosphere of pressure save that which is in a transitional state, i.e., melting/freezing or boiling/condensing, i.e., at 0°C or 100; C, we happily project the hypothesis that all non-transitional water falls under the above gruesome predicate. Perhaps this is because, if we rewrite the projection about non-transitional water as a conjunction of non-gruesome hypotheses i water at less than 0; C is solid, ii water at more than 0; C but less than 100; C is liquid, and iii water at more than 100; C is gaseous we note that iiii are all supported there are known positive instances; whereas if we rewrite the gruesome projection about the emerald as a conjunction of non-gruesome hypotheses i* every emerald first examined before T is green, and ii* every emerald NOT first examined before T is blue we note that ii* is as yet unsupported. It would seem that, whereas a non-gruesome hypothesis is projectible provided it is unviolated and supported, a gruesome hypothesis is projectible provided it is unviolated and equivalent to a conjunction of non-gruesome hypotheses, each of which is supported.

grundnorm: Grice knows about the ground and the common ground – and then there’s the ground norm -- also called basic norm, in a legal system, the norm that determines the legal validity of all other norms. The content of such an ultimate norm may provide, e.g., that norms created by a legislature or by a court are legally valid. The validity of such an ultimate norm cannot be established as a matter of social fact such as the social fact that the norm is accepted by some group within a society. Rather, the validity of the basic norm for any given legal system must be presupposed by the validity of the norms that it legitimates as laws. The idea of a basic norm is associated with the legal philosopher Hans Kelsen.

guise -- Castaneda, H. N., analytical philosopher. Heavily influenced by his own critical reaction to Quine, Chisholm, and his teacher Wilfrid Sellars, Castañeda published four books and more than 175 essays. His work combines originality, rigor, and penetration, together with an unusual comprehensiveness his network of theory and criticism reaches into nearly every area of philosophy, including action theory; deontic logic and practical reason; ethics; history of philosophy; metaphysics and ontology; philosophical methodology; philosophy of language, mind, and perception; and the theory of knowledge. His principal contributions are to metaphysics and ontology, indexical reference, and deontic logic and practical reasoning. In metaphysics and ontology, Castañeda’s chief work is guise theory, first articulated in a 4 essay, a complex and global account of language, mind, ontology, and predication. By holding that ordinary concrete individuals, properties, and propositions all break down or separate into their various aspects or guises, he theorizes that thinking and reference are directed toward the latter. Each guise is a genuine item in the ontological inventory, having properties internally and externally. In addition, guises are related by standing in various sameness relations, only one of which is the familiar relation of strict identity. Since every guise enjoys bona fide ontological standing, whereas only some of these actually exist, Castañeda’s ontology and semantics are Meinongian. With its intricate account of predication, guise theory affords a unified treatment of a wide range of philosophical problems concerning reference to nonexistents, negative existentials, intentional identity, referential opacity, and other matters. Castañeda also played a pivotal role in emphasizing the significance of indexical reference. If, e.g., Paul assertively utters ‘I prefer Chardonnay’, it would obviously be incorrect for Bob to report ‘Paul says that I prefer Chardonnay’, since the last statement expresses Bob’s speaker’s reference, not Paul’s. At the same time, Castañeda contends, it is likewise incorrect for Bob to report Paul’s saying as either ‘Paul says that Paul prefers Chardonnay’ or ‘Paul says that Al’s luncheon guest prefers Chardonnay’ when Paul is Al’s only luncheon guest, since each of these fail to represent the essentially indexical element of Paul’s assertion. Instead, Bob may correctly report ‘Paul says that he himself prefers Chardonnay’, where ‘he himself’ is a quasi-indicator, serving to depict Paul’s reference to himself qua self. For Castañeda and others, quasi-indicators are a person’s irreducible, essential means for describing the thoughts and experiences of others. A complete account of his view of indexicals, together with a full articulation of guise theory and his unorthodox theories of definite descriptions and proper names, is contained in Thinking, Language, and Experience 9. Castañeda’s main views on practical reason and deontic logic turn on his fundamental practitionproposition distinction. A number of valuable essays on these views, together with his important replies, are collected in James E. Tomberlin, ed., Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World 3, and Tomberlin, ed., Hector-Neri Castañeda 6. The latter also includes Castañeda’s revealing intellectual autobiography. guise theory, a system developed by Castañeda to resolve a number of issues concerning the content of thought and experience, including reference, identity statements, intensional contexts, predication, existential claims, perception, and fictional discourse. For example, since i Oedipus believed that he killed the man at the crossroads, and ii the man at the crossroads was his Oedipus’s father, it might seem that iii Oedipus believed that he killed his father. Guise theory blocks this derivation by taking ‘was’ in ii to express, not genuine identity, but a contingent sameness relation betweeen the distinct referents of the descriptions. Definite descriptions are typically treated as referential, contrary to Russell’s theory of descriptions, and their referents are identical in both direct and indirect discourse, contrary to Frege’s semantics. To support this solution, guise theory offers unique accounts of predication and singular referents. The latter are individual guises, which, like Fregean senses and Meinong’s incomplete objects, are thinly individuated aspects or “slices” of ordinary objects at best. Every guise is a structure c{F1 . . . , Fn} where c is an operator expressed by ‘the’ in English transforming a set of properties {F1, . . . , Fn} into a distinct concrete individual, each property being an internal property of the guise. Guises have external properties by standing in various sameness relations to other guises that have these properties internally. There are four such relations, besides genuine identity, each an equivalence relation in its field. If the oldest philosopher happens to be wise, e.g., wisdom is factually predicated of the guise ‘the oldest philosopher’ because it is consubstantiated with ‘the oldest wise philosopher’. Other sameness relations account for fictional predication consociation and necessary external predication conflation. Existence is self-consubstantiation. An ordinary physical object is, at any moment, a cluster of consubstantiated hence, existing guises, while continuants are formed through the transubstantiation of guises within temporally distinct clusters. There are no substrates, and while every guise “subsists,” not all exist, e.g., the Norse God of Thunder. The position thus permits a unified account of singular reference. One task for guise theory is to explain how a “concretized” set of properties differs internally from a mere set. Perhaps guises are façons de penser whose core sets are concretized if their component properties are conceived as coinstantiated, with non-existents analyzable in terms of the failure of the conceived properties to actually be coinstantiated. However, it is questionable whether this approach can achieve all that Castañeda demands of guise theory.

habermas: j. Habermas cites Grice quite extensively,, “but as extensive as he is, the more wishy washy he becomes” – A. M. Kemmerling. J. philosopher and social theorist, a leading representative of the second generation of the Frankfurt School of critical theory. His work has consistently returned to the problem of the normative foundations of social criticism and critical social inquiry not supplied in traditional Marxism and other forms of critical theory, such as postmodernism. His habilitation, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere 1, is an influential historical analysis of the emergence of the ideal of a public sphere in the eighteenth century and its subsequent decline. Habermas turned then to the problems of the foundations and methodology of the social sciences, developing a criticism of positivism and his own interpretive explanatory approach in The Logic of the Social Sciences 3 and his first major systematic work, Knowledge and Human Interests 7. Rejecting the unity of method typical of positivism, Habermas argues that social inquiry is guided by three distinct interests: in control, in understanding, and in emancipation. He is especially concerned to use emancipatory interest to overcome the limitations of the model of inquiry based on understanding and argues against “universality of hermeneutics” defended by hermeneuticists such as Gadamer and for the need to supplement interpretations with explanations in the social sciences. As he came to reject the psychoanalytic vocabulary in which he formulated the interest in emancipation, he turned to finding the basis for understanding and social inquiry in a theory of rationality more generally. In the next phase of his career he developed a comprehensive social theory, culminating in his two-volume The Theory of Communicative Action 2. The goal of this theory is to develop a “critical theory of modernity,” on the basis of a comprehensive theory of communicative as opposed to instrumental rationality. The first volume develops a theory of communicative rationality based on “discourse,” or second-order communication that takes place both in everyday interaction and in institutionalized practices of argumentation in science, law, and criticism. This theory of rationality emerges from a universal or “formal” pragmatics, a speech act theory based on making explicit the rules and norms of the competence to communicate in linguistic interaction. The second volume develops a diagnosis of modern society as suffering from “onesided rationalization,” leading to disruptions of the communicative lifeworld by “systems” such as markets and bureaucracies. Finally, Habermas applies his conception of rationality to issues of normative theory, including ethics, politics, and the law. “Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Moral Justification” 2 argues for an intersubjective notion of practical reason and discursive procedure for the justification of universal norms. This “discourse principle” provides a dialogical version of Kant’s idea of universalization; a norm is justified if and only if it can meet with the reasoned agreement of all those affected. Between Facts and Norms 2 combines his social and normative theories to give a systematic account of law and democracy. His contribution here is an account of deliberative democracy appropriate to the complexity of modern society. His work in all of these phases provides a systematic defense and critique of modern institutions and a vindication of the universal claims of public practical reason.

Bradley’s thatness: :The investing of the content, which is in Bradleian language a `what', with self-existent reality or ‘that-ness'." Athenaeum 24 Dec. 1904’ If thought asserted the existence of any content which was not an actual or possible object of thought—certainly that assertion in my judgment would contradict itself. But the Other which I maintain, is not any such content, nor is it another separated “ what,” nor in any case do I suggest that it lies outside intelligence. Everything, all will and feeling, is an object for thought, and must be called intelligible. This is certain; but, if so, what becomes of the Other? If we fall back on the mere “ that,” thatness itself seems a distinction made by thought. And we have to face this difficulty: If the Other exists, it must be something; and if it is nothing, it certainly does not exist. There is only one way to get rid of contradiction, and that way is by dissolution. Instead of one subject distracted, we get a larger subject with distinctions, and so the tension is removed. We have at first A, which possesses the qualities c and b, inconsistent adjectives which collide; and we go on to produce harmony by making a distinction within this subject. That was really not mere A, but either a complex within A, or (rather here) a wider whole in which A is included. The real subject is A + D; and this subject contains the contradiction made harmless by division, since A is c and D is b. This is the general principle, and I will attempt here to apply it in particular. Let us suppose the reality to be X (abcdefg . . .), and that we are able only to get partial views of this reality. Let us first take such a view as “ X (ab) is b.” This (rightly or wrongly) we should probably call a true view. For the content b does plainly belong to the subject; and, further, the appearance also—in other words, the separation of b in the predicate—can partly be explained. For, answering to this separation, we postulate now another adjective in the subject: let us call it *. The “ thatness,” the psychical existence of the predicate, which at first was neglected, has now also itself been included in the subject. We may hence write the subject as X (ab*); and in this way we seem to avoid contradiction. Let us go further on the same line, and, having dealt with a truth, pass next to an error. Take the subject once more as X (abcde . . .), and let us now say “ X (ab) is d.” To be different from another is to have already transcended one’s own being; and all finite existence is thus incurably relative and ideal. Its quality falls, more or less, outside its particular “ thatness”; and, whether as the same or again as diverse, it is equally made what it is by community with others.

The hic, the hæc, and the hoc – “Scotus was being clever. Since he wanted an abstract noun, and abstract nouns are feminine in both Greek and Latin (‘ippotes, eqquitas’), he chose the feminine ‘haec,’ to turn into a ‘thisness.’ But we should expand his rather sexist view to apply to ‘hic’ and ‘hoc,’ too. In Anglo-Saxon, there is only ‘this,’ with ‘thisness’ first used by Pope George. The OED first registers ‘thisness’ in 1643.” – cf. OED: "It is at its such-&-suchness, at its character -- in other words, at the _universal_ in it -- that we have to look. the first cite in the OED for 'thisness' also
features 'thatness': "thisness,” from "this" + "-ness": rendering ‘haecceitas,’ the quality of being 'this' (as distinct from anything else): = haecceity. First cite: "It is evident that [...] THISness, and THATness belong[...] not to matter by itself, but onely as [matter] is distinguished & individuated by the form." The two further quotes for 'thisness' being: 1837 Whewell Hist Induct Sc 1857 I 244: "Which his school called ‘HAECcceity’ – from the feminine form of the demonstrative masculine ‘hic,’ in Roman, neutre ‘hoc’ (Scotus uses the femine because ‘-ity- is a feminine ending) -- or ‘thisness.’", and 1895 Rashdall Universities II 532: "An individuating form called by the later Scotists its ‘haecceitas’ or its `thisness'"). "The investing of the content, which is in Bradleian language a `what', with self-existent reality or ‘that-ness'." Athenaeum 24 Dec. 1904 868/2. -- OED, 'thatness'. Trudgill writes in _The Dialects of England_ (Oxford: Blackwell), that Grice would often consult (he was from Harborne and had a special interest in this – “I seem to have lost my dialect when I moved to Corpus.” The 'this'-'that' demonstrative system is a two-way system which distinguishes between things which are distant and things which are near. Interestingly, however, a number of traditional dialects in England (if not Oxford) differ from this system in having what Grice called a Griceian _three_-way distinction. The Yorkshire dialect, for example, has ‘this’ (sing., near), ‘thir’ (pl. near), ‘that’ (sing. Medial) ‘tho’ (plural, medial), thon (sing. distal) and ‘thon’ (pl., distal). The Mercian Anglian dialect has ‘these’ (sing. near), ‘theys’ (plural, near), ‘that’ (sing. medial), ‘they’ (pl., medial), ‘thik’ (sing./pl., distal). “The northern dialect is better in that it distinguishes between the singular and the plural form for the distal, unlike the southern dialect which has ‘thik’ for either.” Grice. Still, Grice likes the sound of ‘thik’ and quotes from his friend M. Wakelin, _The Southwest of England_. "When I awoke one May day morn/I found an urge within me born/To see the beauteous countryside/That's all round wher'I do bide./So I set out wi' dog & stick,/ My head were just a trifle thick./But good ole' fresh air had his say/& blowed thik trouble clean away." -- B. Green, in _The Dorset Year Book_. Dorset: Society of Dorset Men. “Some like Russell, but Bradley’s MY man.” – H. P. Grice: Grice: "Russell is pretentious; Bradley, an English angel, is not!" "Bradley can use 'thatness' freely; Russell uses it after Bradley and artificially." all the rest of the watery bulk : but return back those few drops from whence they were taken, and the glass-full that even now had an individuation by itself, loseth that, and groweth one and the same with the other main stock : yet if you fill your glass again, wheresoever you take it up, so it be of the same uniform bulk of water you had before, it is the same glassfuU of water that you had. But as I said before, this example fitteth entirely no more than the other did. In such abstracted speculations, where we must consider matter without form, (which hath no actual being,) we must not expect adequated examples in nature. But enough is said to make a speculative man see, that if God should join the soul of a lately dead man, (even whilst his dead corpse should lie en- tire in his windingsheet here,) unto a body made of earth, taken from some mountain in America; it were most true and certain, that the body he should then live by, were the same identical body he lived with before his death, and late resurrection. It is evident, that sameness, thisness, and that- ness, belongeth not to matter by itself, (for a general indiffer- ence runneth through it all,) but only as it is distinguished and individuated by the form. Which in our case, whensoever the same soul doth, it must be understood always to be the same matter and body.” (Browne, 1643). Grice. Corbin says that English is such a plastic language, “unlike Roman,” but then there’s haec, and hæcceitas -- Duns Scotus, J., Scottish Franciscan metaphysician and philosophical theologian. He lectured at Oxford, Paris, and Cologne, where he died and his remains are still venerated. Modifying Avicenna’s conception of metaphysics as the science of being qua being, but univocally conceived, Duns Scotus showed its goal was to demonstrate God as the Infinite Being revealed to Moses as the “I am who am”, whose creative will is the source of the world’s contingency. Out of love God fashioned each creature with a unique “haecceity” or particularity formally distinct from its individualized nature. Descriptively identical with others of its kind, this nature, conceived in abstraction from haecceity, is both objectively real and potentially universal, and provides the basis for scientific knowledge that Peirce calls “Scotistic realism.” Duns Scotus brought many of Augustine’s insights, treasured by his Franciscan predecessors, into the mainstream of the Aristotelianism of his day. Their notion of the will’s “supersufficient potentiality” for self-determination he showed can be reconciled with Aristotle’s notion of an “active potency,” if one rejects the controDuhem thesis Duns Scotus, John 247 247 versial principle that “whatever is moved is moved by another.” Paradoxically, Aristotle’s criteria for rational and non-rational potencies prove the rationality of the will, not the intellect, for he claimed that only rational faculties are able to act in opposite ways and are thus the source of creativity in the arts. If so, then intellect, with but one mode of acting determined by objective evidence, is non-rational, and so is classed with active potencies called collectively “nature.” Only the will, acting “with reason,” is free to will or nill this or that. Thus “nature” and “will” represent Duns Scotus’s primary division of active potencies, corresponding roughly to Aristotle’s dichotomy of non-rational and rational. Original too is his development of Anselm’s distinction of the will’s twofold inclination or “affection”: one for the advantageous, the other for justice. The first endows the will with an “intellectual appetite” for happiness and actualization of self or species; the second supplies the will’s specific difference from other natural appetites, giving it an innate desire to love goods objectively according to their intrinsic worth. Guided by right reason, this “affection for justice” inclines the will to act ethically, giving it a congenital freedom from the need always to seek the advantageous. Both natural affections can be supernaturalized, the “affection for justice” by charity, inclining us to love God above all and for his own sake; the affection for the advantageous by the virtue of hope, inclining us to love God as our ultimate good and future source of beatitude. Another influential psychological theory is that of intuitive intellectual cognition, or the simple, non-judgmental awareness of a hereand-now existential situation. First developed as a necessary theological condition for the face-toface vision of God in the next life, intellectual intuition is needed to explain our certainty of primary contingent truths, such as “I think,” “I choose,” etc., and our awareness of existence. Unlike Ockham, Duns Scotus never made intellectual intuition the basis for his epistemology, nor believed it puts one in direct contact with any extramental substance material or spiritual, for in this life, at least, our intellect works through the sensory imagination. Intellectual intuition seems to be that indistinct peripheral aura associated with each direct sensory-intellectual cognition. We know of it explicitly only in retrospect when we consider the necessary conditions for intellectual memory. It continued to be a topic of discussion and dispute down to the time of Calvin, who, influenced by the Scotist John Major, used an auditory rather than a visual sense model of intellectual intuition to explain our “experience of God.” haecceity from Latin haec, ‘this’, 1 loosely, thisness; more specifically, an irreducible category of being, the fundamental actuality of an existent entity; or 2 an individual essence, a property an object has necessarily, without which it would not be or would cease to exist as the individual it is, and which, necessarily, no other object has. There are in the history of philosophy two distinct concepts of haecceity. The idea originated with the work of the thirteenthcentury philosopher Duns Scotus, and was discussed in the same period by Aquinas, as a positive perfection that serves as a primitive existence and individuation principle for concrete existents. In the seventeenth century Leibniz transformed the concept of haecceity, which Duns Scotus had explicitly denied to be a form or universal, into the notion of an individual essence, a distinctive nature or set of necessary characteristics uniquely identifying it under the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Duns Scotus’s haecceitas applies only to the being of contingently existent entities in the actual world, but Leibniz extends the principle to individuate particular things not only through the changes they may undergo in the actual world, but in any alternative logically possible world. Leibniz admitted as a consequence the controversial thesis that every object by virtue of its haecceity has each of its properties essentially or necessarily, so that only the counterparts of individuals can inhabit distinct logically possible worlds. A further corollary since the possession of particular parts in a particular arrangement is also a property and hence involved in the individual essence of any complex object is the doctrine of mereological essentialism: every composite is necessarily constituted by a particular configuration of particular proper parts, and loses its self-identity if any parts are removed or replaced. Grice was more familiar with the thatness than the thisness (“Having had to read Bradley for my metaphysics paper!”).

haeckel: an impassioned adherent of Darwin’s theory of evolution. His wrote “Die Welträtsel,” which became a best-seller and was very influential in its time. Lenin is said to have admired it. Haeckel’s philosophy, which he called monism, is characterized negatively by his rejection of free will, immortality, and theism, as well as his criticisms of the traditional forms of materialism and idealism. Positively it is distinguished by passionate arguments for the fundamental unity of organic and inorganic nature and a form of pantheism.

ha-levi, philosopher. His philosophy introduces Arabic forms in Hebrew religious expression. He was traveling to Jerusalem on a pilgrimage when he died. His most important philosophical work is Kuzari: The Book of Proof and Argument of the Despised Faith, which purports to be a discussion of a Christian, a Muslim, and a Jew, each offering the king of the Khazars in southern Russia reasons for adopting his faith. Around 740 the historical king and most of his people converted to Judaism. HaLevi presents the Christian and the Muslim as Aristotelian thinkers, who fail to convince the king. The Jewish spokesman begins by asserting his belief in the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the God of history who is continuously active in history, rather than the God of the philosophers. Jewish history is the inner core of world history. From the revelation at Sinai, the most witnessed divine event claimed by any religion, the Providential history of the Jews is the way God has chosen to make his message clear to all humankind. Ha-Levi’s view is the classical expression of Jewish particularism and nationalism. His ideas have been influential in Judaism and were early printed in Latin and Grecian.

hamann: philosopher. Born and educated in Königsberg, Hamann, known as the Magus of the North, was one of the most important Christian thinkers in G.y during the second half of the eighteenth century. Advocating an irrationalistic theory of faith inspired by Hume, he opposed the prevailing Enlightenment philosophy. He was a mentor of the Sturm und Drang literary movement and had a significant influence on Jacobi, Hegel, and Kierkegaard. As a close acquaintance of Kant, he also had a great impact on the development of Kant’s critical philosophy through his Hume translations. Hamann’s most important works, criticized and admired for their difficult and obscure style, were the Socratic Memorabilia 1759, “Aesthetica in nuce” and several works on language. He suppressed his “metacritical” writings out of respect for Kant. However, they were published after his death and now constitute the bestknown part of his work.

hamilton: “Hamilton and I have many things in common: he went to Balliol, I went to Corpus – but we both have a BA and a MA Lit. Hum.” – H. P. Grice. philosopher, educated at Oxford, he was for most of his life professor at the of Edinburgh 182156. Though hardly an orthodox or uncritical follower of Reid and Stewart, he became one of the most important members of the school of Scottish common sense philosophy. His “philosophy of the conditioned” has a somewhat Kantian flavor. Like Kant, he held that we can have knowledge only of “the relative manifestations of an existence, which in itself it is our highest wisdom to recogHaeckel, Ernst Hamilton, William 360 AM 360 nize as beyond the reach of philosophy.” Unlike Kant, however, he argued for the position of a “natural realism” in the Reidian tradition. The doctrine of the relativity of knowledge has seemed to many including J. S. Mill contradictory to his realism. For Hamilton, the two are held together by a kind of intuitionism that emphasizes certain facts of consciousness that are both primitive and incomprehensible. They are, though constitutive of knowledge, “less forms of cognitions than of beliefs.” In logic he argued for a doctrine involving quantification of predicates and the view that propositions can be reduced to equations.

hampshireism: His second wife was from the New World. His first wife wasn’t. He married Renée Orde-Lees, the daughter of the very English Thomas Orde-Lees, in 1961, and had two children, a son, Julian, and a daughter. To add to the philosophers’ mistakes. There’s Austin (in “Plea for Excuses” and “Other Minds”), Strawson (in “Truth” and “Introduction to Logical Theory,” and “On referring”), Hart (in conversation, on ‘carefully,”), Hare (“To say ‘x is good’ is to recommend x”) and Hampshire (“Intention and certainty”). For Grice, the certainty is merely implicated and on occasion, only. Cited by Grice as a member of the play group. Hampshire would dine once a week with Grice. He would discuss and find very amusing to discuss with Grice on post-war Oxford philosophy. Unlike Grice, Hampshire attended Austin’s Thursday evening meetings at All Souls. Grice wrote “Intention and uncertainty” in part as a response to Hampshire and Hart, Intention and certainty. But Grice brought the issue back to an earlier generation, to a polemic between Stout (who held a certainty-based view) and Prichard.

hare: r. m. cited by H. P. Grice, “Hare’s neustrics”. b.9, English philosopher who is one of the most influential moral philosophers of the twentieth century and the developer of prescriptivism in metaethics. Hare was educated at Rugby and Oxford, then served in the British army during World War II and spent years as a prisoner of war in Burma. In 7 he took a position at Balliol and was appointed White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy at the of Oxford in 6. On retirement from Oxford, he became Graduate Research Professor at the of Florida 393. His major books are Language of Morals 3, Freedom and Reason 3, Moral Thinking 1, and Sorting Out Ethics 7. Many collections of his essays have also appeared, and a collection of other leading philosophers’ articles on his work was published in 8 Hare and Critics, eds. Seanor and Fotion. According to Hare, a careful exploration of the nature of our moral concepts reveals that nonironic judgments about what one morally ought to do are expressions of the will, or commitments to act, that are subject to certain logical constraints. Because moral judgments are prescriptive, we cannot sincerely subscribe to them while refusing to comply with them in the relevant circumstances. Because moral judgments are universal prescriptions, we cannot sincerely subscribe to them unless we are willing for them to be followed were we in other people’s positions with their preferences. Hare later contended that vividly to imagine ourselves completely in other people’s positions involves our acquiring preferences about what should happen to us in those positions that mirror exactly what those people now want for themselves. So, ideally, we decide on a universal prescription on the basis of not only our existing preferences about the actual situation but also the new preferences we would have if we were wholly in other people’s positions. What we can prescribe universally is what maximizes net satisfaction of this amalgamated set of preferences. Hence, Hare concluded that his theory of moral judgment leads to preference-satisfaction act utilitarianism. However, like most other utilitarians, he argued that the best way to maximize utility is to have, and generally to act on, certain not directly utilitarian dispositions such as dispositions not to hurt others or steal, to keep promises and tell the truth, to take special responsibility for one’s own family, and so on.

harris: philosopher of language – classical. Grice adored him, and he was quite happy that few knew about Harris! Cf. Tooke. Cf. Priestley and Hartley – all pre-Griceian philosohers of language that are somehow outside the canon, when they shouldn’t. They are very Old World, and it’s the influence of the New World that has made them sort of disappear! That’s what Grice said!

hart: h. l. a. – cited by Grice, “Hare on ‘carefully.’ Philosopher of European ancestry born in Yorkshire, principally responsible for the revival of legal and political philosophy after World War II. After wartime work with military intelligence, Hart gave up a flourishing law practice to join the Oxford faculty, where he was a brilliant lecturer, a sympathetic and insightful critic, and a generous mentor to many scholars. Like the earlier “legal positivists” Bentham and John Austin, Hart accepted the “separation of law and morals”: moral standards can deliberately be incorporated in law, but there is no automatic or necessary connection between law and sound moral principles. In The Concept of Law 1 he critiqued the Bentham-Austin notion that laws are orders backed by threats from a political community’s “sovereign” some person or persons who enjoy habitual obedience and are habitually obedient to no other human and developed the more complex idea that law is a “union of primary and secondary rules.” Hart agreed that a legal system must contain some “obligation-imposing” “primary” rules, restricting freedom. But he showed that law also includes independent “power-conferring” rules that facilitate choice, and he demonstrated that a legal system requires “secondary” rules that create public offices and authorize official action, such as legislation and adjudication, as well as “rules of recognition” that determine which other rules are valid in the system. Hart held that rules of law are “open-textured,” with a core of determinate meaning and a fringe of indeterminate meaning, and thus capable of answering some but not all legal questions that can arise. He doubted courts’ claims to discover law’s meaning when reasonable competing interpretations are available, and held that courts decide such “hard cases” by first performing the important “legislative” function of filling gaps in the law. Hart’s first book was an influential study with A. M. Honoré of Causation in the Law 9. His inaugural lecture as Professor of Jurisprudence, “Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence” 3, initiated a career-long study of rights, reflected also in Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory 2 and in Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 3. He defended liberal public policies. In Law, Liberty and Morality 3 he refuted Lord Devlin’s contention that a society justifiably enforces the code of its moral majority, whatever it might be. In The Morality of the Criminal Law 5 and in Punishment and Responsibility 8, Hart contributed substantially to both analytic and normative theories of crime and punishment.

Hartley, British philosopher. Although the notion of association of ideas is ancient, he is generally regarded as the founder of associationism as a self-sufficient psychology. Despite similarities between his association psychology and Hume’s, Hartley developed his system independently, acknowledging only the writings of clergyman John Gay 1699 1745. Hartley was one of many Enlightenment thinkers aspiring to be “Newtons of the mind,” in Peter Gay’s phrase. In Hartley, this took the form of uniting association philosophy with physiology, a project later brought to fruition by Bain. His major work, Observations on Man 1749, pictured mental events and neural events as operating on parallel tracks in which neural events cause mental events. On the mental side, Hartley distinguished like Hume between sensation and idea. On the physiological side, Hartley adopted Newton’s conception of nervous transmission by vibrations of a fine granular substance within nerve-tubes. Vibrations within sensory nerves peripheral to the brain corresponded to the sensations they caused, while small vibrations in the brain, vibratiuncles, corresponded to ideas. Hartley proposed a single law of association, contiguity modified by frequency, which took two forms, one for the mental side and one for the neural: ideas, or vibratiuncles, occurring together regularly become associated. Hartley distinguished between simultaneous association, the link between ideas that occur at the same harmony, preestablished Hartley, David 362 AM 362 moment, and successive association, between ideas that closely succeed one another. Successive associations occur only in a forward direction; there are no backward associations, a thesis generating much controversy in the later experimental study of memory.

Hartley, Joseph – philosopher.

Hartmann: philosopher who sought to synthesize the thought of Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer. The most important of his essays is “Philosophie des Unbewussten.” For Hartmann both will and idea are interrelated and are expressions of an absolute “thing-in-itself,” the unconscious. The unconscious is the active essence in natural and psychic processes and is the teleological dynamic in organic life. Paradoxically, he claimed that the teleology immanent in the world order and the life process leads to insight into the irrationality of the “will-to-live.” The maturation of rational consciousness would, he held, lead to the negation of the total volitional process and the entire world process would cease. Ideas indicate the “what” of existence and constitute, along with will and the unconscious, the three modes of being. Despite its pessimism, this work enjoyed considerable popularity. Hartmann was an unusual combination of speculative idealist and philosopher of science defending vitalism and attacking mechanistic materialism; his pessimistic ethics was part of a cosmic drama of redemption. Some of his later works dealt with a critical form of Darwinism that led him to adopt a positive evolutionary stance that undermined his earlier pessimism. His general philosophical position was selfdescribed as “transcendental realism.” His Philosophy of the Unconscious was tr. into English by W. C. Coupland in three volumes in 4. There is little doubt that his metaphysics of the unconscious prepared the way for Freud’s later theory of the unconscious mind.

hartmann, n. philosopher (“Not to be confused with Hartmann – but then neither am I to be confused with [G. R.] Grice.” – Grice. He taught at the universities of Marburg, Cologne, Berlin, and Göttingen, and wrote more than a dozen major works on the history of philosophy, ontology, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. A realist in epistemology and ontology, Hartmann held that cognition is the apprehension of something independent of the act of apprehension or any other mental events. An accurate phenomenology, such as Husserl’s, would acknowledge, according to him, that we apprehend not only particular, spatiotemporal objects, but also “ideal objects,” “essences,” which Hartmann explicitly identified with Platonic Forms. Among these are ethical values and the objects of mathematics and logic. Our apprehension of values is emotional in character, as Scheler had held. This point is compatible with their objectivity and their mindindependence, since the emotions are just another mode of apprehension. The point applies, however, only to ethical values. Aesthetic values are essentially subjective; they exist only for the subject experiencing them. The number of ethical values is far greater than usually supposed, nor are they derivable from a single fundamental value. At best we only glimpse some of them, and even these may not be simultaneously realizable. This explains and to some extent justifies the existence of moral disagreement, between persons as well as between whole cultures. Hartmann was most obviously influenced by Plato, Husserl, and Scheler. But he was a major, original philosopher in his own right. He has received less recognition than he deserves probably because his views were quite different from those dominant in recent Anglo- philosophy or in recent Continental philosophy. What is perhaps his most important work, Ethics, was published in G. in 6, one year before Heidegger’s Being and Time, and appeared in English in 2.

hartshorne: chief exponent of process philosophy. After receiving the Ph.D. at Harvard in 3 he came under the influence of Whitehead, and later, with Paul Weiss, edited The Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce 135. In The Philosophy and Psychology of Sensation 4 Hartshorne argued that all sensations are feelings on an affective continuum. These ideas were later incorporated into a neoclassical metaphysic that is panpsychist, indeterministic, and theistic. Nature is a theater of interactions among ephemeral centers of creative activity, each of which becomes objectively immortal in the memory of God. In Man’s Vision of God 1 Hartshorne chastised philosophers for being insufficiently attentive to the varieties of theism. His alternative, called dipolar theism, also defended in The Divine Hartmann, Eduard von Hartshorne, Charles 363 AM 363 Relativity 8, pictures God as supremely related to and perfectly responding to every actuality. The universe is God’s body. The divine is, in different respects, infinite and finite, eternal and temporal, necessary and contingent. Establishing God’s existence is a metaphysical project, which Hartshorne characterizes in Creative Synthesis 0 as the search for necessary truths about existence. The central element in his cumulative case for God’s existence, called the global argument, is a modal version of the ontological argument, which Hartshorne was instrumental in rehabilitating in The Logic of Perfection 2 and Anselm’s Discovery 5. Creative Synthesis also articulated the theory that aesthetic values are the most universal and that beauty is a mean between the twin extremes of order/disorder and simplicity/complexity. The Zero Fallacy 7, Hartshorne’s twentieth book, summarized his assessment of the history of philosophy also found in Insights and Oversights of Great Thinkers 3 and Creativity in Philosophy 4 and introduced important refinements of his metaphysics.

hazzing: under conjunctum, we see that the terminology is varied. There is the copulatum. But Grice prefers to restrict to use of the copulatum to izzing and hazzing. Oddly Grice sees hazzing as a predicate which he formalizes as Hxy. To be read x hazzes y, although sometimes he uses ‘x hazz y.’ Vide ‘accidentia.’ For Grice the role of métier is basic since it shows finality in nature. Homo sapiens, qua pirot, is to be rational.

hedonism, the view that pleasure including the absence of pain is the sole intrinsic good in life. The hedonist may hold that, questions of morality aside, persons inevitably do seek pleasure psychological hedonism; that, questions of psychology aside, morally we should seek pleasure ethical hedonism; or that we inevitably do, and ought to, seek pleasure ethical and psychological hedonism combined. Psychological hedonism itself admits of a variety of possible forms. One may hold, e.g., that all motivation is based on the prospect of present or future pleasure. More plausibly, some philosophers have held that all choices of future actions are based on one’s presently taking greater pleasure in the thought of doing one act rather than another. Still a third type of hedonism with roots in empirical psychology is that the attainment of pleasure is the primary drive of a wide range of organisms including human beings and is responsible, through some form of conditioning, for all acquired motivations. Ethical hedonists may, but need not, appeal to some form of psychological hedonism to buttress their case. For, at worst, the truth of some form of psychological hedonism makes ethical hedonism empty or inescapable but not false. As a value theory a theory of what is ultimately good, ethical hedonism has typically led to one or the other of two conceptions of morally correct action. Both of these are expressions of moral consequentialism in that they judge actions strictly by their consequences. On standard formulations of utilitarianism, actions are judged by the amount of pleasure they produce for all sentient beings; on some formulations of egoist views, actions are judged by their consequences for one’s own pleasure. Neither egoism nor utilitarianism, however, must be wedded to a hedonistic value theory. A hedonistic value theory admits of a variety of claims about the characteristic sources and types of pleasure. One contentious issue has been what activities yield the greatest quantity of pleasure with prominent candidates including philosophical and other forms of intellectual discourse, the contemplation of beauty, and activities productive of “the pleasures of the senses.” Most philosophical hedonists, despite the popular associations of the word, have not espoused sensual pleasure. Another issue, famously raised by J. S. Mill, is whether such different varieties of pleasure admit of differences of quality as well as quantity. Even supposing them to be equal in quantity, can we say, e.g., that the pleasures of intellectual activity are superior in quality to those of watching sports on television? And if we do say such things, are we departing from strict hedonism by introducing a value distinction not really based on pleasure at all? Most philosophers have found hedonism both psychological and ethical exaggerated in its claims. One difficulty for both sorts of hedonism is the hedonistic paradox, which may be put as follows. Many of the deepest and best pleasures of life of love, of child rearing, of work seem to come most often to those who are engaging in an activity for reasons other than pleasure seeking. Hence, not only is it dubious that we always in fact seek or value only pleasure, but also dubious that the best way to achieve pleasure is to seek it. Another area of difficulty concerns happiness and its relation to pleasure. In the tradition of Aristotle, happiness is broadly understood as something like well-being and has been viewed, not implausibly, as a kind of natural end of all human activities. But ‘happiness’ in this sense is broader than ‘pleasure’, insofar as the latter designates a particular kind of feeling, whereas ‘well-being’ does not. Attributions of happiness, moreover, appear to be normative in a way in which attributions of pleasure are not. It is thought that a truly happy person has achieved, is achieving, or stands to achieve, certain things respecting the “truly important” concerns of human life. Of course, such achievements will characteristically produce pleasant feelings; but, just as characteristically, they will involve states of active enjoyment of activities where, as Aristotle first pointed out, there are no distinctive feelings of pleasure apart from the doing of the activity itself. In short, the Aristotelian thesis that happiness is the natural end of all human activities, even if it is true, does not seem to lend much support to hedonism psychological or ethical.

plathegel and ariskant – Hegel, “one of the most influential and systematic of the idealists” (Grice), also well known for his philosophy of history and philosophy of religion. Life and works. Hegel, the eldest of three children, was born in Stuttgart, the son of a minor financial official in the court of the Duchy of Württemberg. His mother died when he was eleven. At eighteen, he began attending the theology seminary or Stift attached to the at Tübingen; he studied theology and classical languages and literature and became friendly with his future colleague and adversary, Schelling, as well as the great genius of G. Romantic poetry, Hölderlin. In 1793, upon graduation, he accepted a job as a tutor for a family in Bern, and moved to Frankfurt in 1797 for a similar post. In 1799 his father bequeathed him a modest income and the freedom to resign his tutoring job, pursue his own work, and attempt to establish himself in a position. In 1801, with the help of Schelling, he moved to the town of Jena, already widely known as the home of Schiller, Fichte, and the Schlegel brothers. After lecturing for a few years, he became a professor in 1805. Prior to the move to Jena, Hegel’s essays had been chiefly concerned with problems in morality, the theory of culture, and the philosophy of religion. Hegel shared with Rousseau and the G. Romantics many doubts about the political and moral implications of the European Enlightenment and modern philosophy in general, even while he still enthusiastically championed what he termed the principle of modernity, “absolute freedom.” Like many, he feared that the modern attack on feudal political and religious authority would merely issue in the reformulation of new internalized and still repressive forms of authority. And he was among that legion of G. intellectuals infatuated with ancient Greece and the superiority of their supposedly harmonious social life, compared with the authoritarian and legalistic character of the Jewish and later Christian religions. At Jena, however, he coedited a journal with Schelling, The Critical Journal of Philosophy, and came to work much more on the philosophic issues created by the critical philosophy or “transcendental idealism” of Kant, and its legacy in the work of Rheinhold, Fichte, and Schelling. His written work became much more influenced by these theoretical projects and their attempt to extend Kant’s search for the basic categories necessary for experience to be discriminated and evaluated, and for a theory of the subject that, in some non-empirical way, was responsible for such categories. Problems concerning the completeness, interrelation, and ontological status of such a categorial structure were quite prominent, along with a continuing interest in the relation between a free, self-determining agent and the supposed constraints of moral principles and other agents. In his early years at Jena especially before Schelling left in 1803, he was particularly preoccupied with this problem of a systematic philosophy, a way of accounting for the basic categories of the natural world and for human practical activity that would ground all such categories on commonly presupposed and logically interrelated, even interdeducible, principles. In Hegel’s terms, this was the problem of the relation between a “Logic” and a “Philosophy of Nature” and “Philosophy of Spirit.” After 1803, however, while he was preparing his own systematic philosophy for publication, what had been planned as a short introduction to this system took on a life of its own and grew into one of Hegel’s most provocative and influential books. Working at a furious pace, he finished hedonistic paradox Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 365 AM 365 what would be eventually called The Phenomenology of Spirit in a period of great personal and political turmoil. During the final writing of the book, he had learned that Christina Burkhard would give birth to his illegitimate son. Ludwig was born in February 1807. And he is supposed to have completed the text on October 13, 1807, the day Napoleon’s armies captured Jena. It was certainly an unprecedented work. In conception, it is about the human race itself as a developing, progressively more self-conscious subject, but its content seems to take in a vast, heterogeneous range of topics, from technical issues in empiricist epistemology to the significance of burial rituals. Its range is so heterogeneous that there is controversy to this day about whether it has any overall unity, or whether it was pieced together at the last minute. Adding to the interpretive problem, Hegel often invented his own striking language of “inverted worlds,” “struggles to the death for recognition,” “unhappy consciousness,” “spiritual animal kingdoms,” and “beautiful souls.” Continuing his career at Jena in those times looked out of the question, so Hegel accepted a job at Bamberg editing a newspaper, and in the following year began an eight-year stint 180816 as headmaster and philosophy teacher at a Gymnasium or secondary school at Nürnberg. During this period, at forty-one, he married the twenty-year-old Marie von Tucher. He also wrote what is easily his most difficult work, and the one he often referred to as his most important, a magisterial two-volume Science of Logic, which attempts to be a philosophical account of the concepts necessary in all possible kinds of account-givings. Finally, in 1816, Hegel was offered a chair in philosophy at the of Heidelberg, where he published the first of several versions of his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, his own systematic account of the relation between the “logic” of human thought and the “real” expression of such interrelated categories in our understanding of the natural world and in our understanding and evaluation of our own activities. In 1818, he accepted the much more prestigious post in philosophy at Berlin, where he remained until his death in 1831. Soon after his arrival in Berlin, he began to exert a powerful influence over G. letters and intellectual life. In 1821, in the midst of a growing political and nationalist crisis in Prussia, he published his controversial book on political philosophy, The Philosophy of Right. His lectures at the were later published as his philosophy of history, of aesthetics, and of religion, and as his history of philosophy. Philosophy. Hegel’s most important ideas were formed gradually, in response to a number of issues in philosophy and often in response to historical events. Moreover, his language and approach were so heterodox that he has inspired as much controversy about the meaning of his position as about its adequacy. Hence any summary will be as much a summary of the controversies as of the basic position. His dissatisfactions with the absence of a public realm, or any forms of genuine social solidarity in the G. states and in modernity generally, and his distaste with what he called the “positivity” of the orthodox religions of the day their reliance on law, scripture, and abstract claims to authority, led him to various attempts to make use of the Grecian polis and classical art, as well as the early Christian understanding of love and a renewed “folk religion,” as critical foils to such tendencies. For some time, he also regarded much traditional and modern philosophy as itself a kind of lifeless classifying that only contributed to contemporary fragmentation, myopia, and confusion. These concerns remained with him throughout his life, and he is thus rightly known as one of the first modern thinkers to argue that what had come to be accepted as the central problem of modern social and political life, the legitimacy of state power, had been too narrowly conceived. There are now all sorts of circumstances, he argued, in which people might satisfy the modern criterion of legitimacy and “consent” to the use of some power, but not fully understand the terms within which such issues are posed, or assent in an attenuated, resentful, manipulated, or confused way. In such cases they would experience no connection between their individual will and the actual content of the institutions they are supposed to have sanctioned. The modern problem is as much alienation Entfremdung as sovereignty, an exercise of will in which the product of one’s will appears “strange” or “alien,” “other,” and which results in much of modern life, however chosen or willed, being fundamentally unsatisfying. However, during the Jena years, his views on this issue changed. Most importantly, philosophical issues moved closer to center stage in the Hegelian drama. He no longer regarded philosophy as some sort of self-undermining activity that merely prepared one for some leap into genuine “speculation” roughly Schelling’s position and began to champion a unique kind of comprehensive, very determinate reflection on the interrelations among all the various classical alternatives in philosophy. Much more controversially, he also attempted to understand the way in which such relations and transitions were also reflected in the history of the art, politics, and religions of various historical communities. He thus came to think that philosophy should be some sort of recollection of its past history, a realization of the mere partiality, rather than falsity, of its past attempts at a comprehensive teaching, and an account of the centrality of these continuously developing attempts in the development of other human practices.Through understanding the “logic” of such a development, a reconciliation of sorts with the implications of such a rational process in contemporary life, or at least with the potentialities inherent in contemporary life, would be possible. In all such influences and developments, one revolutionary aspect of Hegel’s position became clearer. For while Hegel still frequently argued that the subject matter of philosophy was “reason,” or “the Absolute,” the unconditioned presupposition of all human account-giving and evaluation, and thereby an understanding of the “whole” within which the natural world and human deeds were “parts,” he also always construed this claim to mean that the subject matter of philosophy was the history of human experience itself. Philosophy was about the real world of human change and development, understood by Hegel to be the collective self-education of the human species about itself. It could be this, and satisfy the more traditional ideals because, in one of his most famous phrases, “what is actual is rational,” or because some full account could be given of the logic or teleological order, even the necessity, for the great conceptual and political changes in human history. We could thereby finally reassure ourselves that the way our species had come to conceptualize and evaluate is not finite or contingent, but is “identical” with “what there is, in truth.” This identity theory or Absolute Knowledgemeans that we will then be able to be “at home” in the world and so will have understood what philosophers have always tried to understand, “how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term.” The way it all hangs together is, finally, “due to us,” in some collective and historical and “logical” sense. In a much disputed passage in his Philosophy of Religion lectures, Hegel even suggested that with such an understanding, history itself would be over. Several elements in this general position have inspired a good deal of excitement and controversy. To advance claims such as these Hegel had to argue against a powerful, deeply influential assumption in modern thought: the priority of the individual, self-conscious subject. Such an assumption means, for example, that almost all social relations, almost all our bonds to other human beings, exist because and only because they are made, willed into existence by individuals otherwise naturally unattached to each other. With respect to knowledge claims, while there may be many beliefs in a common tradition that we unreflectively share with others, such shared beliefs are also taken primarily to be the result of individuals continuously affirming such beliefs, however implicitly or unreflectively. Their being shared is simply a consequence of their being simultaneously affirmed or assented to by individuals. Hegel’s account requires a different picture, an insistence on the priority of some kind of collective subject, which he called human “spirit” or Geist. His general theory of conceptual and historical change requires the assumption of such a collective subject, one that even can be said to be “coming to self-consciousness” about itself, and this required that he argue against the view that so much could be understood as the result of individual will and reflection. Rather, he tried in many different ways to show that the formation of what might appear to an individual to be his or her own particular intention or desire or belief already reflected a complex social inheritance that could itself be said to be evolving, even evolving progressively, with a “logic” of its own. The completion of such collective attempts at self-knowledge resulted in what Hegel called the realization of Absolute Spirit, by which he either meant the absolute completion of the human attempt to know itself, or the realization in human affairs of some sort of extrahuman transcendence, or full expression of an infinite God. Hegel tried to advance all such claims about social subjectivity without in some way hypostatizing or reifying such a subject, as if it existed independently of the actions and thoughts of individuals. This claim about the deep dependence of individuals on one another even for their very identity, even while they maintain their independence, is one of the best-known examples of Hegel’s attempt at a dialectical resolution of many of the traditional oppositions and antinomies of past thought. Hegel often argued that what appeared to be contraries in philosophy, such as mind/body, freedom/determinism, idealism/materialism, universal/particular, the state/the individual, or even God/man, appeared such incompatible alternatives only because of the undeveloped and so incomplete perspective within which the oppositions were formulated. So, in one of his more famous attacks on such dualisms, human freedom according to Hegel could not be understood coherently as some purely rational self-determination, independent of heteronomous impulses, nor the human being as a perpetual opposition between reason and sensibility. In his moral theory, Kant had argued for the latter view and Hegel regularly returned to such Kantian claims about the opposition of duty and inclination as deeply typical of modern dualism. Hegel claimed that Kant’s version of a rational principle, the “categorical imperative,” was so formal and devoid of content as not to be action-guiding it could not coherently rule in or rule out the appropriate actions, and that the “moral point of view” rigoristically demanded a pure or dutiful motivation to which no human agent could conform. By contrast, Hegel claimed that the dualisms of morality could be overcome in ethical life Sittlichkeit, those modern social institutions which, it was claimed, provided the content or true “objects” of a rational will. These institutions, the family, civil society, and the state, did not require duties in potential conflict with our own substantive ends, but were rather experienced as the “realization” of our individual free will. It has remained controversial what for Hegel a truly free, rational self-determination, continuous with, rather than constraining, our desire for happiness and self-actualization, amounted to. Many commentators have noted that, among modern philosophers, only Spinoza, whom Hegel greatly admired, was as insistent on such a thoroughgoing compatibilism, and on a refusal to adopt the Christian view of human beings as permanently divided against themselves. In his most ambitious analysis of such oppositions Hegel went so far as to claim that, not only could alternatives be shown to be ultimately compatible when thought together within some higher-order “Notion” Begriff that resolved or “sublated” the opposition, but that one term in such opposition could actually be said to imply or require its contrary, that a “positing” of such a notion would, to maintain consistency, require its own “negating,” and that it was this sort of dialectical opposition that could be shown to require a sublation, or Aufhebung a term of art in Hegel that simultaneously means in G. ‘to cancel’, ‘to preserve’, and ‘to raise up’. This claim for a dialectical development of our fundamental notions has been the most severely criticized in Hegel’s philosophy. Many critics have doubted that so much basic conceptual change can be accounted for by an internal critique, one that merely develops the presuppositions inherent in the affirmation of some notion or position or related practice. This issue has especially attracted critics of Hegel’s Science of Logic, where he tries first to show that the attempt to categorize anything that is, simply and immediately, as “Being,” is an attempt that both “negates itself,” or ends up categorizing everything as “Nothing,” and then that this self-negation requires a resolution in the higher-order category of “Becoming.” This analysis continues into an extended argument that purports to show that any attempt to categorize anything at all must ultimately make use of the distinctions of “essence” and “appearance,” and elements of syllogistic and finally Hegel’s own dialectical logic, and both the details and the grand design of that project have been the subject of a good deal of controversy. Unfortunately, much of this controversy has been greatly confused by the popular association of the terms “thesis,” “antithesis,” and “synthesis” with Hegel’s theory of dialectic. These crude, mechanical notions were invented in 1837 by a less-than-sensitive Hegel expositor, Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus, and were never used as terms of art by Hegel. Others have argued that the tensions Hegel does identify in various positions and practices require a much broader analysis of the historical, especially economic, context within which positions are formulated and become important, or some more detailed attention to the empirical discoveries or paradoxes that, at the very least, contribute to basic conceptual change. Those worried about the latter problem have also raised questions about the logical relation between universal and particular implied in Hegel’s account. Hegel, following Fichte, radicalizes a Kantian claim about the inaccessibility of pure particularity in sensations Kant had written that “intuitions without concepts are blind”. Hegel charges that Kant did not draw sufficiently radical conclusions from such an antiempiricist claim, that he should have completely rethought the traditional distinction between “what was given to the mind” and “what the mind did with the given.” By contrast Hegel is confident that he has a theory of a “concrete universal,” concepts that cannot be understood as pale generalizations or abstract representations of given particulars, because they are required for particulars to Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 368 AM 368 be apprehended in the first place. They are not originally dependent on an immediate acquaintance with particulars; there is no such acquaintance. Critics wonder if Hegel has much of a theory of particularity left, if he does not claim rather that particulars, or whatever now corresponds to them, are only interrelations of concepts, and in which the actual details of the organization of the natural world and human history are deduced as conceptual necessities in Hegel’s Encyclopedia. This interpretation of Hegel, that he believes all entities are really the thoughts, expressions, or modes of a single underlying mental substance, and that this mind develops and posits itself with some sort of conceptual necessity, has been termed a panlogicism, a term of art coined by Hermann Glockner, a Hegel commentator in the first half of the twentieth century. It is a much-disputed reading. Such critics are especially concerned with the implications of this issue in Hegel’s political theory, where the great modern opposition between the state and the individual seems subjected to this same logic, and the individual’s true individuality is said to reside in and only in the political universal, the State. Thus, on the one hand, Hegel’s political philosophy is often praised for its early identification and analysis of a fundamental, new aspect of contemporary life the categorically distinct realm of political life in modernity, or the independence of the “State” from the social world of private individuals engaged in competition and private association “civil society”. But, on the other hand, his attempt to argue for a completion of these domains in the State, or that individuals could only be said to be free in allegiance to a State, has been, at least since Marx, one of the most criticized aspects of his philosophy. Finally, criticisms also frequently target the underlying intention behind such claims: Hegel’s career-long insistence on finding some basic unity among the many fragmented spheres of modern thought and existence, and his demand that this unity be articulated in a discursive account, that it not be merely felt, or gestured at, or celebrated in edifying speculation. PostHegelian thinkers have tended to be suspicious of any such intimations of a whole for modern experience, and have argued that, with the destruction of the premodern world, we simply have to content ourselves with the disconnected, autonomous spheres of modern interests. In his lecture courses these basic themes are treated in wide-ranging accounts of the basic institutions of cultural history. History itself is treated as fundamentally political history, and, in typically Hegelian fashion, the major epochs of political history are claimed to be as they were because of the internal inadequacies of past epochs, all until some final political semiconsciousness is achieved and realized. Art is treated equally developmentally, evolving from symbolic, through “classical,” to the most intensely self-conscious form of aesthetic subjectivity, romantic art. The Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion embody these themes in some of the most controversial ways, since Hegel often treats religion and its development as a kind of picture or accessible “representation” of his own views about the relation of thought to being, the proper understanding of human finitude and “infinity,” and the essentially social or communal nature of religious life. This has inspired a characteristic debate among Hegel scholars, with some arguing that Hegel’s appropriation of religion shows that his own themes are essentially religious if an odd, pantheistic version of Christianity, while others argue that he has so Hegelianized religious issues that there is little distinctively religious left. Influence. This last debate is typical of that prominent in the post-Hegelian tradition. Although, in the decades following his death, there was a great deal of work by self-described Hegelians on the history of law, on political philosophy, and on aesthetics, most of the prominent academic defenders of Hegel were interested in theology, and many of these were interested in defending an interpretation of Hegel consistent with traditional Christian views of a personal God and personal immortality. This began to change with the work of “young Hegelians” such as D. F. Strauss 180874, Feuerbach 180472, Bruno Bauer 180982, and Arnold Ruge 180380, who emphasized the humanistic and historical dimensions of Hegel’s account of religion, rejected the Old Hegelian tendencies toward a reconciliation with contemporary political life, and began to reinterpret and expand Hegel’s account of the productive activity of human spirit eventually focusing on labor rather than intellectual and cultural life. Strauss himself characterized the fight as between “left,” “center,” and “right” Hegelians, depending on whether one was critical or conservative politically, or had a theistic or a humanistic view of Hegelian Geist. The most famous young or left Hegelian was Marx, especially during his days in Paris as coeditor, with Ruge, of the Deutsch-französischen Jahrbücher 1844. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 369 AM 369 In Great Britain, with its long skeptical, empiricist, and utilitarian tradition, Hegel’s work had little influence until the latter part of the nineteenth century, when philosophers such as Green and Caird took up some of the holistic themes in Hegel and developed a neo-Hegelian reading of issues in politics and religion that began to have influence in the academy. The most prominent of the British neo-Hegelians of the next generation were Bosanquet, McTaggart, and especially Bradley, all of whom were interested in many of the metaphysical implications of Hegel’s idealism, what they took to be a Hegelian claim for the “internally related” interconnection of all particulars within one single, ideal or mental, substance. Moore and Russell waged a hugely successful counterattack in the name of traditional empiricism and what would be called “analytic philosophy” against such an enterprise and in this tradition largely finished off the influence of Hegel or what was left of the historical Hegel in these neo-Hegelian versions. In G.y, Hegel has continued to influence a number of different schools of neo-Marxism, sometimes itself simply called “Hegelian Marxism,” especially the Frankfurt School, or “critical theory” group especially Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse. And he has been extremely influential in France, particularly thanks to the lectures of a brilliant if idiosyncratic Russian émigré, Alexander Kojève, who taught Hegel in the 0s at the École Pratique des Hautes Études to the likes of Merleau-Ponty and Lacan. Kojève was as much influenced by Marx and Heidegger as Hegel, but his lectures inspired many thinkers to turn again to Hegel’s account of human selfdefinition in time and to the historicity of all institutions and practices and so forged an unusual link between Hegel and postwar existentialism. Hegelian themes continue to resurface in contemporary hermeneutics, in “communitarianism” in ethics, and in the increasing attention given to conceptual change and history in the philosophy of science. This has meant for many that Hegel should now be regarded not only as the origin of a distinctive tradition in European philosophy that emphasizes the historical and social nature of human existence, but as a potential contributor to many new and often interdisciplinary approaches to philosophy.

heideggerianism: heideggerian implicaturum of “Nothing noths.” Grice thought Heidegger was the greatest philosopher that ever lived. Heideggerianism: Arendt, h. tuteed by Heidegger and Jaspers; fled to France in 3; and emigrated in 1 to the United States, where she taught at various universities. Her major works are The Origins of Totalitarianism 1, The Human Condition 8, Between Past and Future 1, On Revolution 3, Crises of the Republic 2, and The Life of the Mind 8. In Arendt’s view, for reasons established by Kant and deepened by Nietzsche, there is a breach between being and thinking, one that cannot be closed by thought. Understood as philosophizing or contemplation, thinking is a form of egoism that isolates us from one another and our world. Despite Kant, modernity remains mired in egoism, a condition compounded by the emergence of a “mass” that consists of bodies with needs temporarily met by producing and consuming and which demands governments that minister to these needs. In place of thinking, laboring, and the administration of things now called democracy, all of which are instrumental but futile as responses to the “thrown” quality of our condition, Arendt proposed to those capable of it a mode of being, political action, that she found in pronounced form in pre-Socratic Greece and briefly but gloriously at the founding of the Roman and republics. Political action is initiation, the making of beginnings that can be explained neither causally nor teleologically. It is done in the space of appearances constituted by the presence of other political actors whose re-sponses the telling of equally unpredictable stories concerning one another’s actions determine what actions are taken and give character to the acting participants. In addition to the refined discernments already implied, political action requires the courage to initiate one knows not what. Its outcome is power; not over other people or things but mutual empowerment to continue acting in concert and thereby to overcome egoism and achieve positive freedom and humanity. Heidegger, Martin: “the greatest philosopher that ever lived” – H. P. Grice. G. philosopher whose early works contributed to phenomenology and existentialism e.g., Sartre and whose later works paved the way to hermeneutics Gadamer and post-structuralism Derrida and Foucault. Born in Messkirch in the Black Forest region, Heidegger first trained to be a Jesuit, but switched to mathematics and philosophy in 1. As an instructor at Freiburg , he worked with the founder of phenomenology, Husserl. His masterwork, Sein und Zeit Being and Time, 7, was published while he was teaching at Marburg . This work, in opposition to the preoccupation with epistemology dominant at the time, focused on the traditional question of metaphysics: What is the being of entities in general? Rejecting abstract theoretical approaches to this question, Heidegger drew on Kierkegaard’s religious individualism and the influential movement called life-philosophy Lebensphilosophie, then identified with Nietzsche, Bergson, and Dilthey to develop a highly original account of humans as embedded in concrete situations of action. Heidegger accepted Husserl’s chair at Freiburg in 8; in 3, having been elected rector of the , he joined the Nazi party. Although he stepped down as rector one year later, new evidence suggests complicity with the Nazis until the end of the war. Starting in the late thirties, his writings started to shift toward the “antihumanist” and “poetic” form of thinking referred to as “later Heidegger.” Heidegger’s lifelong project was to answer the “question of being” Seinsfrage. This question asks, concerning things in general rocks, tools, people, etc., what is it to be an entity of these sorts? It is the question of ontology first posed by ancient Grecian philosophers from Anaximander to Aristotle. Heidegger holds, however, that philosophers starting with Plato have gone astray in trying to answer this question because they have tended to think of being as a property or essence enduringly present in things. In other words, they have fallen into the “metaphysics of presence,” which thinks of being as substance. What is overlooked in traditional metaphysics is the background conditions that enable entities to show up as counting or mattering in some specific way in the first place. In his early works, Heidegger tries to bring this concealed dimension of things to light by recasting the question of being: What is the meaning of being? Or, put differently, how do entities come to show up as intelligible to us in some determinate way? And this question calls for an analysis of the entity that has some prior understanding of things: human existence or Dasein the G. word for “existence” or “being-there,” used to refer to the structures of humans that make possible an understanding of being. Heidegger’s claim is that Dasein’s pretheoretical or “preontological” understanding of being, embodied in its everyday practices, opens a “clearing” in which entities can show up as, say, tools, protons, numbers, mental events, and so on. This historically unfolding clearing is what the metaphysical tradition has overlooked. In order to clarify the conditions that make possible an understanding of being, then, Being and Time begins with an analytic of Dasein. But Heidegger notes that traditional interpretations of human existence have been one-sided to the extent that they concentrate on our ways of existing when we are engaged in theorizing and detached reflection. It is this narrow focus on the spectator attitude that leads to the picture, found in Descartes, of the self as a mind or subject representing material objects the so-called subjectobject model. In order to bypass this traditional picture, Heidegger sets out to describe Dasein’s “average everydayness,” i.e., our ordinary, prereflective agency when we are caught up in the midst of practical affairs. The “phenomenology of everydayness” is supposed to lead us to see the totality of human existence, including our moods, our capacity for authentic individuality, and our full range of involvements with the world and with others. The analytic of Dasein is also an ontological hermeneutics to the extent that it provides an account of how understanding in general is possible. The result of the analytic is a portrayal of human existence that is in accord with what Heidegger regards as the earliest Grecian experience of being as an emerging-into-presence physis: to be human is to be a temporal event of self-manifestation that lets other sorts of entities first come to “emerge and abide” in the world. From the standpoint of this description, the traditional concept of substance whether mental or physical simply has no role to play in grasping humans. Heidegger’s brilliant diagnoses or “de-structurings” of the tradition suggest that the idea of substance arises only when the conditions making entities possible are forgotten or concealed. Heidegger holds that there is no pregiven human essence. Instead, humans, as self-interpreting beings, just are what they make of themselves in the course of their active lives. Thus, as everyday agency, Dasein is not an object with properties, but is rather the “happening” of a life course “stretched out between birth and death.” Understood as the “historicity” of a temporal movement or “becoming,” Dasein is found to have three main “existentials” or basic structures shared by every “existentiell” i.e., specific and local way of living. First, Dasein finds itself thrown into a world not of its choosing, already delivered over to the task of living out its life in a concrete context. This “facticity” of our lives is revealed in the moods that let things matter to us in some way or other e.g., the burdensome feelings of concern that accompany being a parent in our culture. Second, as projection, Dasein is always already taking some stand on its life by acting in the world. Understood as agency, human existence is “ahead of itself” in two senses: 1 our competent dealings with familiar situations sketch out a range of possibilities for how things may turn out in the future, and 2 each of our actions is contributing to shaping our lives as people of specific sorts. Dasein is futuredirected in the sense that the ongoing fulfillment of possibilities in the course of one’s active life constitutes one’s identity or being. To say that Dasein is “being-toward-death” is to say that the stands we take our “understanding” define our being as a totality. Thus, my actual ways of treating my children throughout my life define my being as a parent in the end, regardless of what good intentions I might have. Finally, Dasein is discourse in the sense that we are always articulating or “addressing and discussing” the entities that show up in our concernful absorption in current situations. These three existentials define human existence as a temporal unfolding. The unity of these dimensions being already in a world, ahead of itself, and engaged with things Heidegger calls care. This is what it means to say that humans are the entities whose being is at issue for them. Taking a stand on our own being, we constitute our identity through what we do. The formal structure of Dasein as temporality is made concrete through one’s specific involvements in the world where ‘world’ is used in the life-world sense in which we talk about the business world or the world of academia. Dasein is the unitary phenomenon of being-in-the-world. A core component of Heidegger’s early works is his description of how Dasein’s practical dealings with equipment define the being of the entities that show up in the world. In hammering in a workshop, e.g., what ordinarily shows up for us is not a hammer-thing with properties, but rather a web of significance relations shaped by Heidegger, Martin Heidegger, Martin 371 AM 371 our projects. Hammering is “in order to” join boards, which is “for” building a bookcase, which is “for the sake of” being a person with a neat study. The hammer is encountered in terms of its place in this holistic context of functionality the “ready-to-hand.” In other words, the being of the equipment its “ontological definition” consists of its relations to other equipment and its actual use within the entire practical context. Seen from this standpoint, the brute, meaningless objects assumed to be basic by the metaphysical tradition the “present-at-hand” can show up only when there is a breakdown in our ordinary dealings with things, e.g., when the hammer breaks or is missing. In this sense, the ready-to-hand is said to be more primordial than the material objects treated as basic by the natural sciences. It follows, then, that the being of entities in the world is constituted by the framework of intelligibility or “disclosedness” opened by Dasein’s practices. This clearing is truth in the original meaning of the Grecian word aletheia, which Heidegger renders as ‘un-concealment’. But it would be wrong to think that what is claimed here is that humans are initially just given, and that they then go on to create a clearing. For, in Heidegger’s view, our own being as agents of specific types is defined by the world into which we are thrown: in my workshop, I can be a craftsman or an amateur, but not a samurai paying court to a daimyo. Our identity as agents is made possible by the context of shared forms of life and linguistic practices of a public life-world. For the most part, we exist as the “they” das Man, participants in the historically constituted “cohappening of a people” Volk. The embeddedness of our existence in a cultural context explains our inveterate tendency toward inauthenticity. As we become initiated into the practices of our community, we are inclined to drift along with the crowd, doing what “one” does, enacting stereotyped roles, and thereby losing our ability to seize on and define our own lives. Such falling into public preoccupations Heidegger sees as a sign that we are fleeing from the fact that we are finite beings who stand before death understood as the culmination of our possibilities. When, through anxiety and hearing the call of conscience, we face up to our being-toward-death, our lives can be transformed. To be authentic is to clear-sightedly face up to one’s responsibility for what one’s life is adding up to as a whole. And because our lives are inseparable from our community’s existence, authenticity involves seizing on the possibilities circulating in our shared “heritage” in order to realize a communal “destiny.” Heidegger’s ideal of resolute “taking action” in the current historical situation no doubt contributed to his leap into politics in the 0s. According to his writings of that period, the ancient Grecians inaugurated a “first beginning” for Western civilization, but centuries of forgetfulness beginning with the Latinization of Grecian words have torn us away from the primal experience of being rooted in that initial setting. Heidegger hoped that, guided by the insights embodied in great works of art especially Hölderlin’s poetry, National Socialism would help bring about a world-rejuvenating “new beginning” comparable to the first beginning in ancient Greece. Heidegger’s later writings attempt to fully escape the subjectivism he sees dominating Western thought from its inception up to Nietzsche. “The Origin of the Work of Art” 5, for example, shows how a great work of art such as a Grecian temple, by shaping the world in which a people live, constitutes the kinds of people that can live in that world. An Introduction to Metaphysics 5 tries to recover the Grecian experience of humans as beings whose activities of gathering and naming logos are above all a response to what is more than human. The later writings emphasize that which resists all human mastery and comprehension. Such terms as ‘nothingness’, ‘earth’, and ‘mystery’ suggest that what shows itself to us always depends on a background of what does not show itself, what remains concealed. Language comes to be understood as the medium through which anything, including the human, first becomes accessible and intelligible. Because language is the source of all intelligibility, Heidegger says that humans do not speak, but rather language speaks us an idea that became central to poststructuralist theories. In his writings after the war, Heidegger replaces the notions of resoluteness and political activism with a new ideal of letting-be or releasement Gelassenheit, a stance characterized by meditative thinking, thankfulness for the “gift” of being, and openness to the silent “call” of language. The technological “enframing” Gestell of our age encountering everything as a standing reserve on hand for our use is treated not as something humans do, but instead as a manifestation of being itself. The “anti-humanism” of these later works is seen in the description of technology the mobilization of everything for the sole purpose of greater efficiency as an epochal event in the “history of being,” a way things have come-into-their-own Ereignis rather than as a human accomplishment. The history or “sending” Geschick of being consists of epochs that have all gone increasingly astray from the original beginning inaugurated by the pre-Socratics. Since human willpower alone cannot bring about a new epoch, technology cannot be ended by our efforts. But a non-technological way of encountering things is hinted at in a description of a jug as a fourfold of earth, sky, mortals, and gods, and Heidegger reflects on forms of poetry that point to a new, non-metaphysical way of experiencing being. Through a transformed relation to language and art, and by abandoning “onto-theology” the attempt to ground all entities in one supreme entity, we might prepare ourselves for a transformed way of understanding being.

hellenistic philosophy: “Once the Romans defeated Greece, at Oxford we stop talking of ‘Greek’ philosophy, but ‘Hellenistic’ philosophy instead – since most Greeks were brought to Rome as slaves to teach philosophy to their children” – Grice. Vide “Roman philosophy” – “Not everybody knows all these Roman philosophers, so that’s a good thing.” – H. P. Grice. Hellenistic philosophy is the philosophical systems of the Hellenistic age 32330 B.C., although 31187 B.C. better defines it as a philosophical era, notably Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Skepticism. These all emerged in the generation after Aristotle’s death 322 B.C., and dominated philosophical debate until the first century B.C., during which there were revivals of traditional Platonism and of Aristotelianism. The age was one in which much of the eastern Mediterranean world absorbed Grecian culture was “Hellenized,” hence “Hellenistic”, and recruits to philosophy flocked from this region to Athens, which remained the center of philosophical activity until 87 B.C. Then the Roman sack of Athens drove many philosophers into exile, and neither the schools nor the styles of philosophy that had grown up there ever fully recovered. Very few philosophical writings survive intact from the period. Our knowledge of Hellenistic philosophers depends mainly on later doxography, on the Roman writers Lucretius and Cicero both mid-first century B.C., and on what we learn from the schools’ critics in later centuries, e.g. Sextus Empiricus and Plutarch. ’Skeptic’, a term not actually current before the very end of the Hellenistic age, serves as a convenient label to characterize two philosophical movements. The first is the New Academy: the school founded by Plato, the Academy, became in this period a largely dialectical one, conducting searching critiques of other schools’ doctrines without declaring any of its own, beyond perhaps the assertion however guarded that nothing could be known and the accompanying recommendation of “suspension of judgment” epoche. The nature and vivacity of Stoicism owed much to its prolonged debates with the New Academy. The founder of this Academic phase was Arcesilaus school head c.268 c.241; its most revered and influential protagonist was Carneades school head in the mid-second century; and its most prestigious voice was that of Cicero 10643 B.C., whose highly influential philosophical works were written mainly from a New Academic stance. But by the early first century B.C. the Academy was drifting back to a more doctrinal stance, and in the later part of the century it was largely eclipsed by a second “skeptic” movement, Pyrrhonism. This was founded by Aenesidemus, a pioneering skeptic despite his claim to be merely reviving the philosophy of Pyrrho, a philosophical guru of the early Hellenistic period. His neo-Pyrrhonism survives today mainly through the writings of Sextus Empiricus second century A.D., an adherent of the school who, strictly speaking, represents its post-Hellenistic phase. The Peripatos, Aristotle’s school, officially survived throughout the era, but it is not regarded as a distinctively “Hellenistic” movement. Despite the eminence of Aristotle’s first successor, Theophrastus school head 322287, it thereafter fell from prominence, its fortunes only reviving around the mid-first century B.C. It is disputed how far the other Hellenistic philosophers were even aware of Aristotle’s treatises, which should not in any case be regarded as a primary influence on them. Each school had a location in Athens to which it could draw pupils. The Epicurean school was a relatively private institution, its “Garden” outside the city walls housing a close-knit philosophical community. The Stoics took their name from the Stoa Poikile, the “Painted Colonnade” in central Athens where they gathered. The Academics were based in the Academy, a public grove just outside the city. Philosophers were public figures, a familiar sight around town. Each school’s philosophical identity was further clarified by its absolute loyalty to the name of its founder respectively Epicurus, Zeno of Citium, and Plato and by the polarities that developed in interschool debates. Epicureanism is diametrically opposed on most issues to Stoicism. Academic Skepticism provides another antithesis to Stoicism, not through any positions of its own it had none, but through its unflagging critical campaign against every Stoic thesis. It is often said that in this age the old Grecian political institution of the city-state had broken down, and that the Hellenistic philosophies were an answer to the resulting crisis of values. Whether or not there is any truth in this, it remains clear that moral concerns were now much less confined to the individual city-state than previously, and that at an extreme the boundaries had been pushed back to include all mankind within the scope of an individual’s moral obligations. Our “affinity” oikeiosis to all mankind is an originally Stoic doctrine that acquired increasing currency with other schools. This attitude partly reflects the weakening of national and cultural boundaries in the Hellenistic period, as also in the Roman imperial period that followed it. The three recognized divisions of philosophy were ethics, logic, and physics. In ethics, the central objective was to state and defend an account of the “end” telos, the moral goal to which all activity was subordinated: the Epicureans named pleasure, the Stoics conformity with nature. Much debate centered on the semimythical figure of the wise man, whose conduct in every conceivable circumstance was debated by all schools. Logic in its modern sense was primarily a Stoic concern, rejected as irrelevant by the Epicureans. But Hellenistic logic included epistemology, where the primary focus of interest was the “criterion of truth,” the ultimate yardstick against which all judgments could be reliably tested. Empiricism was a surprisingly uncontroversial feature of Hellenistic theories: there was little interest in the Platonic-Aristotelian idea that knowledge in the strict sense is non-sensory, and the debate between dogmatists and Skeptics was more concerned with the question whether any proposed sensory criterion was adequate. Both Stoics and Epicureans attached especial importance to prolepsis, the generic notion of a thing, held to be either innate or naturally acquired in a way that gave it a guaranteed veridical status. Physics saw an opposition between Epicurean atomism, with its denial of divine providence, and the Stoic world-continuum, imbued with divine rationality. The issue of determinism was also placed on the philosophical map: Epicurean morality depends on the denial of both physical and logical determinism, whereas Stoic morality is compatible with, indeed actually requires, the deterministic causal nexus through which providence operates.

helmholtz: philosopher known for groundbreaking work in the philosophy of perception. Formally trained as a physician, he distinguished himself in physics in 1848 as a codiscoverer of the law of conservation of energy, and by the end of his life was perhaps the most influential figure in G. physical research. Philosophically, his most important influence was on the study of space. Intuitionist psychologists held that the geometrical structure of three-dimensional space was given directly in sensation by innate physiological mechanisms; Helmholtz brought this theory to severe empirical trials and argued, on the contrary, that our knowledge of space consists of inferences from accumulated experience. On the mathematical side, he attacked Kant’s view that Euclidean geometry is the a priori form of outer intuition by showing that it is possible to have visual experience of non-Euclidean space “On the Origins and Meaning of Geometrical Axioms,” 1870. His crucial insight was that empirical geometry depends on physical assumptions about the behavior of measuring instruments. This inspired the view of Poincaré and logical empiricism that the empirical content of geometry is fixed by physical definitions, and made possible Einstein’s use of non-Euclidean geometry in physics.

helvétius: philosopher prominent in the formative phases of eighteenth-century materialism in France. His De l’esprit 1758 was widely discussed internationally, but condemned by the of Paris and burned by the government. Helvétius attempted to clarify his doctrine in his posthumously published De l’homme. Following Locke’s criticism of the innate ideas, Helvétius stressed the function of experience in our acquisition of knowledge. In accord with the doctrines of d’Holbach, Condillac, and La Mettrie, the materialist Helvétius regarded the sensations as the basis of all our knowledge. Only by comparison, abstraction, and combination of sensations do we reach the level of concepts. Peculiar to Helvétius, however, is the stress on the social determinations of our knowledge. Specific interests and passions are the starting point of all our striving for knowledge. Egoism is the spring of our desires and actions. The civil laws of the enlightened state enabled egoism to be transformed into social competition and thereby diverted toward public benefits. Like his materialist contemporary d’Holbach and later Condorcet, Helvétius sharply criticized the social function of the church. Priests, he claimed, provided society with wrong moral ideas. He demanded a thorough reform of the educational system for the purpose of individual and social emancipation. In contrast to the teachings of Rousseau, Helvétius praised the further development of science, art, and industry as instruments for the historical progress of mankind. The ideal society consists of enlightened because well-educated citizens living in comfortable and even moderately luxurious circumstances. All people should participate in the search for truth, by means of public debates and discussions. Truth is equated with the moral good. Helvétius had some influence on Marxist historical materialism.

hempel: eminent philosopher of science associated with the Vienna Circle of logical empiricist philosophers in the early 0s, before his emigration to the United States; thereafter he became one of the most influential philosophers of science of his time, largely through groundbreaking work on the logical analysis of the concepts of confirmation and scientific explanation. Hempel received his doctorate under Reichenbach at the of Berlin in 4 with a dissertation on the logical analysis of probability. He studied with Carnap at the of Vienna in 930, where he participated in the “protocol-sentence debate” concerning the observational basis of scientific knowledge raging within the Vienna Circle between Moritz Schlick 26 and Otto Neurath 25. Hempel was attracted to the “radical physicalism” articulated by Neurath and Carnap, which denied the foundational role of immediate experience and asserted that all statements of the total language of science including observation reports or protocol-sentences can be revised as science progresses. This led to Hempel’s first major publication, “On the Logical Positivists’ Theory of Truth” 5. He moved to the United States to work with Carnap at the of Chicago in 738. He also taught at Queens and Yale before his long career at Princeton 55. In the 0s he collaborated with his friends Olaf Helmer and Paul Oppenheim on a celebrated series of papers, the most influential of which are “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation” 5 and “Studies in the Logic of Explanation” 8, coauthored with Oppenheim. The latter paper articulated the deductive-nomological model, which characterizes scientific explanations as deductively valid arguments proceeding from general laws and initial conditions to the fact to be explained, and served as the basis for all future work on the subject. Hempel’s papers on explanation and confirmation and also related topics such as concept formation, criteria of meaningfulness, and scientific theories were collected together in Aspects of Scientific Explanation 5, one of the most important works in postwar philosophy of science. He also published a more popular, but extremely influential introduction to the field, Philosophy of Natural Science 6. Hempel and Kuhn became colleagues at Princeton in the 0s. Another fruitful collaboration ensued, as a result of which Hempel moved away from the Carnapian tradition of logical analysis toward a more naturalistic and pragmatic conception of science in his later work. As he himself explains, however, this later turn can also be seen as a return to a similarly naturalistic conception Neurath had earlier defended within the Vienna Circle.

Heno-theism, allegiance to one supreme deity while conceding existence to others; also described as monolatry, incipient monotheism, or practical monotheism. It occupies a middle ground between polytheism and radical monotheism, which denies reality to all gods save one. It has been claimed that early Judaism passed through a henotheistic phase, acknowledging other Middle Eastern deities albeit condemning their worship, en route to exclusive recognition of Yahweh. But the concept of progress from polytheism through henotheism to monotheism is a rationalizing construct, and cannot be supposed to capture the complex development of any historical religion, including that of ancient Israel.

Henry de Ghent: philosopher. After serving as a church official at Tournai and Brugge, he taught theology at Paris from 1276. His major writings were “Summa quaestionum ordinariarum” and “Quodlibeta.” He was the leading representative of the neoAugustinian movement at Paris in the final quarter of the thirteenth century. His theory of knowledge combines Aristotelian elements with Augustinian illuminationism. Heavily dependent on Avicenna for his view of the reality enjoyed by essences of creatures esse essentiae from eternity, he rejected both real distinction and real identity of essence and existence in creatures, and defended their intentional distinction. He also rejected a real distinction between the soul and its powers and rejected the purely potential character of prime matter. He defended the duality of substantial form in man, the unicity of form in other material substances, and the primacy of will in the act of choice.

heraclitus fl. c.500 B.C., Grice on Heraclitus: They told me, Heraclitus, they told me you were dead,/They brought me bitter news to hear and bitter tears to shed./I wept as I remembered how often you and I/Had tired the sun with talking and sent him down the sky./And now that thou art lying, my dear old Carian guest,/A handful of grey ashes, long, long ago at rest,/Still are thy pleasant voices, thy nightingales, awake;/For Death, he taketh all away, but them he cannot take. Grecian philosopher. A transition figure between the Milesian philosophers and the later pluralists, Heraclitus stressed unity in the world of change. He follows the Milesians in positing a series of cyclical transformations of basic stuffs of the world; for instance, he holds that fire changes to water and earth in turn. Moreover, he seems to endorse a single source or arche of natural substances, namely fire. But he also observes that natural transformations necessarily involve contraries such as hot and cold, wet and dry. Indeed, without the one contrary the other would not exist, and without contraries the cosmos would not exist. Hence strife is justice, and war is the father and king of all. In the conflict of opposites there is a hidden harmony that sustains the world, symbolized by the tension of a bow or the attunement of a lyre. Scholars disagree about whether Heraclitus’s chief view is that there is a one in the many or that process is reality. Clearly the underlying unity of phenomena is important for him. But he also stresses the transience of physical substances and the importance of processes and qualities. Moreover, his underlying source of unity seems to be a law of process and opposition; thus he seems to affirm both the unity of phenomena and the reality of process. Criticizing his predecessors such as Pythagoras and Xenophanes for doing research without insight, Heraclitus claims that we should listen to the logos, which teaches that all things are one. The logos, a principle of order and knowledge, is common to all, but the many remain ignorant of it, like sleepwalkers unaware of the reality around them. All things come to pass according to the logos; hence it is the law of change, or at least its expression. Heraclitus wrote a single book, perhaps organized into sections on cosmology, politics and ethics, and theology. Apparently, however, he did not provide a continuous argument but a series of epigrammatic remarks meant to reveal the nature of reality through oracular and riddling language. Although he seems to have been a recluse without immediate disciples, he may have stirred Parmenides to his reaction against contraries. In the late fifth century B.C. Cratylus of Athens preached a radical Heraclitean doctrine according to which everything is in flux and there is accordingly no knowledge of the world. This version of Heracliteanism influenced Plato’s view of the sensible world and caused Plato and Aristotle to attribute a radical doctrine of flux to Heraclitus. Democritus imitated Heraclitus’s ethical sayings, and in Hellenistic times the Stoics appealed to him for their basic principles.

herbart: philosopher who significantly contributed to psychology and the theory of education. Rejecting the idealism of Fichte and Hegel, he attempted to establish a form of psychology founded on experience. The task of philosophy is the analysis of concepts given in ordinary experience. Logic must clarify these concepts, Metaphysics should correct them, while Aesthetics and Ethics are to complement them by an analysis of values. Herbart advocated a form of determinism in psychology and ethics. The laws that govern psychological processes are identical with those that govern the heavens. He subordinated ethics to aesthetics, arguing that our moral values originate from certain immediate and involuntary judgments of like and dislike. The five basic ideas of morality are inner freedom, perfection, benevolence, law, and justice or equity. Herbart’s view of education that it should aim at producing individuals who possess inner freedom and strength of character was highly influential in nineteenth-century Germany.

herder: philosopher, an intellectual and literary figure central to the transition from the G. Enlightenment to Romanticism. He was born in East Prussia and received an early classical education. About 1762, while studying theology at the of Königsberg, he came under the influence of Kant. He also began a lifelong friendship with Hamann, who especially stimulated his interests in the interrelations among language, culture, and history. After ordination as a Lutheran minister in 1765, he began his association with the Berlin Academy, earning its prestigious “prize” for his “Essay on the Origin of Language” 1772. In 1776 he was appointed Generalsuperintendent of the Lutheran clergy at Weimar through the intercession of Goethe. He was then able to focus his intellectual and literary powers on most of the major issues of his time. Of particular note are his contributions to psychology in Of the Cognition and Sensation of the Human Soul 1778; to the philosophy of history and culture in Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of Mankind 178491, perhaps his most influential work; and to philosophy in Understanding and Experience 1799, which contains his extensive Metakritik of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Herder was an intellectual maverick and provocateur, writing when the Enlightenment conception of reason was in decline but before its limited defense by Kant or its total rejection by Romanticism had become entrenched in the G.-speaking world. Rejecting any rational system, Herder’s thought is best viewed as a mosaic of certain ideas that reemerge in various guises throughout his writings. Because of these features, Herder’s thought has been compared with that of Rousseau. Herder’s philosophy can be described as involving elements of naturalism, organicism, and vitalism. He rejected philosophical explanations, appealing to the supernatural or divine, such as the concept of the “immortal soul” in psychology, a “divine origin” of language, or “providence” in history. He sought to discern an underlying primordial force to account for the psychological unity of the various “faculties.” He viewed this natural tendency toward “organic formation” as also operative in language and culture, and as ultimately manifested in the dynamic development of the various cultures in the form of a universal history. Finally, he often wrote in a way that suggested the dynamic process of life itself as the basic metaphor undergirding his thought. His influence can be traced through Humboldt into later linguistics and through Schelling and Hegel in the philosophy of history and later G. historicism. He anticipated elements of vitalism in Schopenhauer and Bergson.

interpretatum: h “While ‘heremneia’ sounds poetic and sweet, ‘interpretatio’ sounds thomistic and rough!” – H. P. Grice. “Plus ‘hermeneia is metaphorical.’ hermeneia: hermeneutics, the art or theory of interpretation, as well as a type of philosophy that starts with questions of interpretation. Originally concerned more narrowly with interpreting sacred texts, the term acquired a much broader significance in its historical development and finally became a philosophical position in twentieth-century G. philosophy. There are two competing positions in hermeneutics: whereas the first follows Dilthey and sees interpretation or Verstehen as a method for the historical and human sciences, the second follows Heidegger and sees it as an “ontological event,” an interaction between interpreter and text that is part of the history of what is understood. Providing rules or criteria for understanding what an author or native “really” meant is a typical problem for the first approach. The interpretation of the law provides an example for the second view, since the process of applying the law inevitably transforms it. In general, hermeneutics is the analysis of this process and its conditions of possibility. It has typically focused on the interpretation of ancient texts and distant peoples, cases where the unproblematic everyday understanding and communication cannot be assumed. Schleiermacher’s analysis of understanding and expression related to texts and speech marks the beginning of hermeneutics in the modern sense of a scientific methodology. This emphasis on methodology continues in nineteenth-century historicism and culminates in Dilthey’s attempt to ground the human sciences in a theory of interpretation, understood as the imaginative but publicly verifiable reenactment of the subjective experiences of others. Such a method of interpretation reveals the possibility of an objective knowledge of human beings not accessible to empiricist inquiry and thus of a distinct methodology for the human sciences. One result of the analysis of interpretation in the nineteenth century was the recognition of “the hermeneutic circle,” first developed by SchleierHerder, Johann Gottfried von hermeneutics 377 AM 377 macher. The circularity of interpretation concerns the relation of parts to the whole: the interpretation of each part is dependent on the interpretation of the whole. But interpretation is circular in a stronger sense: if every interpretation is itself based on interpretation, then the circle of interpretation, even if it is not vicious, cannot be escaped. Twentieth-century hermeneutics advanced by Heidegger and Gadamer radicalize this notion of the hermeneutic circle, seeing it as a feature of all knowledge and activity. Hermeneutics is then no longer the method of the human sciences but “universal,” and interpretation is part of the finite and situated character of all human knowing. “Philosophical hermeneutics” therefore criticizes Cartesian foundationalism in epistemology and Enlightenment universalism in ethics, seeing science as a cultural practice and prejudices or prejudgments as ineliminable in all judgments. Positively, it emphasizes understanding as continuing a historical tradition, as well as dialogical openness, in which prejudices are challenged and horizons broadened.

hermetism, also hermeticism, a philosophical theology whose basic impulse was the gnostic conviction that human salvation depends on revealed knowledge gnosis of God and of the human and natural creations. Texts ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus, a Greco-Egyptian version of the Egyptian god Thoth, may have appeared as early as the fourth century B.C., but the surviving Corpus Hermeticum in Grecian and Latin is a product of the second and third centuries A.D. Fragments of the same literature exist in Grecian, Armenian, and Coptic as well; the Coptic versions are part of a discovery made at Nag Hammadi after World War II. All these Hermetica record hermetism as just described. Other Hermetica traceable to the same period but surviving in later Arabic or Latin versions deal with astrology, alchemy, magic, and other kinds of occultism. Lactantius, Augustine, and other early Christians cited Hermes but disagreed on his value; before Iamblichus, pagan philosophers showed little interest. Muslims connected Hermes with a Koranic figure, Idris, and thereby enlarged the medieval hermetic tradition, which had its first large effects in the Latin West among the twelfth-century Platonists of Chartres. The only ancient hermetic text then available in the West was the Latin Asclepius, but in 1463 Ficino interrupted his epochal translation of Plato to Latinize fourteen of the seventeen Grecian discourses in the main body of the Corpus Hermeticum as distinct from the many Grecian fragments preserved by Stobaeus but unknown to Ficino. Ficino was willing to move so quickly to Hermes because he believed that this Egyptian deity stood at the head of the “ancient theology” prisca theologia, a tradition of pagan revelation that ran parallel to Christian scripture, culminated with Plato, and continued through Plotinus and the later Neoplatonists. Ficino’s Hermes translation, which he called the Pimander, shows no interest in the magic and astrology about which he theorized later in his career. Trinitarian theology was his original motivation. The Pimander was enormously influential in the later Renaissance, when Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Lodovico Lazzarelli, Jacques Lefèvre d’Etaples, Symphorien Champier, Francesco Giorgi, Agostino Steuco, Francesco Patrizi, and others enriched Western appreciation of Hermes. The first printed Grecian Hermetica was the 1554 edition of Adrien Turnebus. The last before the nineteenth century appeared in 1630, a textual hiatus that reflected a decline in the reputation of Hermes after Isaac Casaubon proved philologically in 1614 that the Grecian Hermetica had to be post-Christian, not the remains of primeval Egyptian wisdom. After Casaubon, hermetic ideas fell out of fashion with most Western philosophers of the current canon, but the historiography of the ancient theology remained influential for Newton and for lesser figures even later. The content of the Hermetica was out of tune with the new science, so Casaubon’s redating left Hermes to the theosophical heirs of Robert Fludd, whose opponents Kepler, Mersenne, Gassendi turned away from the Hermetica and similar fascinations of Renaissance humanist culture. By the nineteenth century, only theosophists took Hermes seriously as a prophet of pagan wisdom, but he was then rediscovered by G. students of Christianity and Hellenistic religions, especially Richard Reitzenstein, who published his Poimandres in 4. The ancient Hermetica are now read in the 654 edition of A. D. Nock and A. J. Festugière.

Herzen: philosopher, he moved in his philosophy of history from an early Hegelian rationalism to a “philosophy of contingency,” stressing the “whirlwind of chances” in nature and in human life and the “tousled improvisation” of the historical process. He rejected determinism, emphasizing the “phenomenological fact” of the experienced “sense of freedom.” Anticipating the Dostoevsky of the “Legend of the Grand Inquisitor,” he offered an original analysis of the “escape from freedom” and the cleaving to moral and political authority, and sketched a curiously contemporary-sounding “emotivist” ethical theory. After 1848, disillusioned with “bourgeois” Europe and its “selfenclosed individualism,” but equally disillusioned with what he had come to see as the bourgeois ideal of many European socialists, Herzen turned to the Russian peasant and the peasant village commune as offering the best hope for a humane development of society. In this “Russian socialism” he anticipated a central doctrine of the Russian populists of the 1870s. Herzen stood alone in resisting the common tendency of such otherwise different thinkers as Feuerbach, Marx, and J. S. Mill to undervalue the historical present, to overvalue the historical future, and to treat actual persons as means in the service of remote, merely possible historical ends. Herzen’s own central emphasis fell powerfully and consistently on the freedom, independence, and non-instrumentalizable value of living persons. And he saw more clearly than any of his contemporaries that there are no future persons, that it is only in the present that free human individuals live and move and have their being.

heuristics, a rule or solution adopted to reduce the complexity of computational tasks, thereby reducing demands on resources such as time, memory, and attention. If an algorithm is a procedure yielding a correct solution to a problem, then a heuristic procedure may not reach a solution even if there is one, or may provide an incorrect answer. The reliability of heuristics varies between domains; the resulting biases are predictable, and provide information about system design. Chess, for example, is a finite game with a finite number of possible positions, but there is no known algorithm for finding the optimal move. Computers and humans both employ heuristics in evaluating intermediate moves, relying on a few significant cues to game quality, such as safety of the king, material balance, and center control. The use of these criteria simplifies the problem, making it computationally tractable. They are heuristic guides, reliable but limited in success. There is no guarantee that the result will be the best move or even good. They are nonetheless satisfactory for competent chess. Work on human judgment indicates a similar moral. Examples of judgmental infelicities support the view that human reasoning systematically violates standards for statistical reasoning, ignoring base rates, sample size, and correlations. Experimental results suggest that humans utilize judgmental heuristics in gauging probabilities, such as representativeness, or the degree to which an individual or event resembles a prototypical member of a category. Such heuristics produce reasonable judgments in many cases, but are of limited validity when measured by a Bayesian standard. Judgmental heuristics are biased and subject to systemic errors. Experimental support for the importance of these heuristics depends on cases in which subjects deviate from the normative standard.

habitus: hexis Grecian, from hexo, ‘to have’, ‘to be disposed’, a good or bad condition, disposition, or state. The traditional rendering, ‘habit’ Latin habitus, is misleading, for it tends to suggest the idea of an involuntary and merely repetitious pattern of behavior. A hexis is rather a state of character or of mind that disposes us to deliberately choose to act or to think in a certain way. The term acquired a quasi-technical status after Aristotle advanced the view that hexis is the genus of virtue, both moral and intellectual. In the Nicomachean Ethics he distinguishes hexeis from passions pathe and faculties dunamis of the soul. If a man fighting in the front ranks feels afraid when he sees the enemy approaching, he is undergoing an involuntary passion. His capacity to be affected by fear on this or other occasions is part of his makeup, one of his faculties. If he chooses to stay where his commanders placed him, this is due to the hexis or state of character we call courage. Likewise, one who is consistently good at identifying what is best for oneself can be said to possess a hexis called prudence. Not all states and dispositions are commendable. Cowardice and stupidity are also hexeis. Both in the sense of ‘state’ and of ‘possession’ hexis plays a role in Aristotle’s Categories.

tisberi -- Heytesbury: w. also called Hentisberus, Hentisberi, Tisberi before 1313c.1372, English philosopher and chancellor of Oxford . He wrote Sophismata “Sophisms”, Regulae solvendi sophismata “Rules for Solving Sophisms”, and De sensu composito et diviso “On the Composite and Divided Sense”. Other works are doubtfully attributed to him. Heytesbury belonged to the generation immediately after Thomas Bradwardine and Kilvington, and was among the most significant members of the Oxford Calculators, important in the early developemnt of physics. Unlike Kilvington but like Bradwardine, he appealed to mathematical calculations in addition to logical and conceptual analysis in the treatment of change, motion, acceleration, and other physical notions. His Regulae includes perhaps the most influential treatment of the liar paradox in the Middle Ages. Heytesbury’s work makes widespread use of “imaginary” thought experiments assuming physical impossibilities that are yet logically consistent. His influence was especially strong in Italy in the fifteenth century, where his works were studied widely and commented on many times.

hierarchy, a division of mathematical objects into subclasses in accordance with an ordering that reflects their complexity. Around the turn of the century, analysts interested in the “descriptive set theory” of the real numbers defined and studied two systems of classification for sets of reals, the Borel (due to Emil Borel) and the G hierarchies. In the 1940s, logicians interested in recursion and definability (most importantly, Stephen Kleene) introduced and studied other hierarchies (the arithmetic, the hyperarithmetic, and the analytical hierarchies) of reals (identified with sets of natural numbers) and of sets of reals; the relations between this work and the earlier work were made explicit in the 1950s by J. Addison. Other sorts of hierarchies have been introduced in other corners of logic. All these so-called hierarchies have at least this in common: they divide a class of mathematical objects into subclasses subject to a natural well-founded ordering (e.g., by subsethood) that reflects the complexity (in a sense specific to the hierarchy under consideration) of the objects they contain. What follows describes several hierarchies from the study of definability. (For more historical and mathematical information see Descriptive Set Theory by Y. Moschovakis, North-Holland Publishing Co., 1980.) (1) Hierarchies of formulas. Consider a formal language L with quantifiers ‘E’ and ‘D’. Given a set B of formulas in L, we inductively define a hierarchy that treats the members of B as “basic.” Set P0 % S0 % B. Suppose sets Pn and Sn of formulas have been defined. Let Pn!1 % the set of all formulas of the form Q1u1 . . . Qmumw when u1, . . . , um are distinct variables, Q1, . . . , Qm are all ‘E’, m M 1, and w 1 Sn. Let Sn+1 % the set of all formulas of that form for Q1, . . . , Qm all ‘D’, and w 1 Pn. Here are two such hierarchies for languages of arithmetic. Take the logical constants to be truthfunctions, ‘E’ and ‘D’. (i) Let L0 % the first-order language of arithmetic, based on ‘%’, a two-place predicate-constant ‘‹’, an individual-constant for 0, functionconstants for successor, addition, and multiplication; ‘first-order’ means that bound variables are all first-order (ranging over individuals); we’ll allow free second-order variables (ranging over properties or sets of individuals). Let B % the set of bounded formulas, i.e. those formed from atomic formulas using connectives and bounded quantification: if w is bounded so are Eu(u ‹ t / w) and Du(u ‹ t & w). (ii) Let L1 % the second-order language of arithmetic (formed from L0 by allowing bound second-order variables); let B % the set of formulas in which no second-order variable is bound, and take all u1, . . . , um as above to be second-order variables. (2) Hierarchies of definable sets. (i) The Arithmetic Hierarchy. For a set of natural numbers (call such a thing ‘a real’) A : A 1 P0 n [ or S0 n ] if and only if A is defined over the standard model of arithmetic (i.e., with the constant for 0 assigned to 0, etc., and with the first-order variables ranging over the natural numbers) by a formula of L0 in Pn [respectively Sn] as described in (1.i). Set D0 n % P0 n Thus: In fact, all these inclusions are proper. This hierarchy classifies the reals simple enough to be defined by arithmetic formulas. Example: ‘Dy x % y ! y’ defines the set even of even natural numbers; the formula 1 S1, so even 1 S0 1; even is also defined by a formula in P1; so even 1 P0 1, giving even 1 D0 1. In fact, S0 1 % the class of recursively enumerable reals, and D0 1 % the class of recursive reals. The classification of reals under the arithmetic hierarchy reflects complexity of defining formulas; it differs from classification in terms of a notion of degree of unsolvability, that reflecting a notion of comparative computational complexity; but there are connections between these classifications. The Arithmetic Hierarchy extends to sets of reals (using a free second-order variable in defining sentences). Example: ‘Dx (Xx & Dy y % x ! x)’ 1 S1 and defines the set of those reals with an even number; so that set 1 S0 1.The Analytical Hierarchy. Given a real A : A 1 P1 n [S1 1] if and only if A is defined (over the standard model of arithmetic with second-order variables ranging over all sets of natural numbers) by a formula of L1 in Pn (respectively Sn) as described in (1.ii); D1 n % P1 n 3 S1 n. Similarly for a set of reals. The inclusions pictured above carry over, replacing superscripted 0’s by 1’s. This classifies all reals and sets of reals simple enough to have analytical (i.e., second-order arithmetic) definitions.The subscripted ‘n’ in ‘P0 n’, etc., ranged over natural numbers. But the Arithmetic Hierarchy is extended “upward” into the transfinite by the ramified-analytical hierarchy. Let R0 % the class of all arithmetical reals. For an ordinal a let Ra!1 % the class of all sets of reals definable by formulas of L1 in which second-order variables range only over reals in Ra – this constraint imposes ramification. For a limit-ordinal l, let Rl % UaThe above hierarchies arise in arithmetic. Similar hierarchies arise in pure set theory; e.g. by transferring the “process” that produced the ramified analytical hierarchy to pure set theory we obtain the constructible hierarchy, defined by Gödel in his 1939 monograph on the continuum hypothesis.

Grice’s formalists: Hilbert, D. – G. mathematician and philosopher of mathematics. Born in Königsberg, he also studied and served on the faculty there, accepting Weber’s chair in mathematics at Göttingen in 1895. He made important contributions to many different areas of mathematics and was renowned for his grasp of the entire discipline. His more philosophical work was divided into two parts. The focus of the first, which occupied approximately ten years beginning in the early 1890s, was the foundations of geometry and culminated in his celebrated Grundlagen der Geometrie (1899). This is a rich and complex work that pursues a variety of different projects simultaneously. Prominent among these is one whose aim is to determine the role played in geometrical reasoning by principles of continuity. Hilbert’s interest in this project was rooted in Kantian concerns, as is confirmed by the inscription, in the Grundlagen, of Kant’s synopsis of his critical philosophy: “Thus all human knowledge begins with intuition, goes from there to concepts and ends with ideas.” Kant believed that the continuous could not be represented in intuition and must therefore be regarded as an idea of pure reason – i.e., as a device playing a purely regulative role in the development of our geometrical knowledge (i.e., our knowledge of the spatial manifold of sensory experience). Hilbert was deeply influenced by this view of Kant’s and his work in the foundations of geometry can be seen, in large part, as an attempt to test it by determining whether (or to what extent) pure geometry can be developed without appeal to principles concerning the nature of the continuous. To a considerable extent, Hilbert’s work confirmed Kant’s view – showing, in a manner more precise than any Kant had managed, that appeals to the continuous can indeed be eliminated from much of our geometrical reasoning. The same basic Kantian orientation also governed the second phase of Hilbert’s foundational work, where the focus was changed from geometry to arithmetic and analysis. This is the phase during which Hilbert’s Program was developed. This project began to take shape in the 1917 essay “Axiomatisches Denken.” (The 1904 paper “Über die Grundlagen der Logik und Arithmetik,” which turned away from geometry and toward arithmetic, does not yet contain more than a glimmer of the ideas that would later become central to Hilbert’s proof theory.) It reached its philosophically most mature form in the 1925 essay “Über das Unendliche,” the 1926 address “Die Grundlagen der Mathematik,” and the somewhat more popular 1930 paper “Naturerkennen und Logik.” (From a technical as opposed to a philosophical vantage, the classical statement is probably the 1922 essay “Neubegründung der Mathematik. Erste Mitteilung.”) The key elements of the program are (i) a distinction between real and ideal propositions and methods of proof or derivation; (ii) the idea that the so-called ideal methods, though, again, playing the role of Kantian regulative devices (as Hilbert explicitly and emphatically declared in the 1925 paper), are nonetheless indispensable for a reasonably efficient development of our mathematical knowledge; and (iii) the demand that the reliability of the ideal methods be established by real (or finitary) means. As is well known, Hilbert’s Program soon came under heavy attack from Gödel’s incompleteness theorems (especially the second), which have commonly been regarded as showing that the third element of Hilbert’s Program (i.e., the one calling for a finitary proof of the reliability of the ideal systems of classical mathematics) cannot be carried out. Hilbert’s Program, a proposal in the foundations of mathematics, named for its developer, the German mathematician-philosopher David Hilbert, who first formulated it fully in the 1920s. Its aim was to justify classical mathematics (in particular, classical analysis and set theory), though only as a Kantian regulative device and not as descriptive science. The justification thus presupposed a division of classical mathematics into two parts: the part (termed real mathematics by Hilbert) to be regulated, and the part (termed ideal mathematics by Hilbert) serving as regulator. Real mathematics was taken to consist of the meaningful, true propositions of mathematics and their justifying proofs. These proofs – commonly known as finitary proofs – were taken to be of an especially elementary epistemic character, reducing, ultimately, to quasi-perceptual intuitions concerning finite assemblages of perceptually intuitable signs regarded from the point of view of their shapes and sequential arrangement. Ideal mathematics, on the other hand, was taken to consist of sentences that do not express genuine propositions and derivations that do not constitute genuine proofs or justifications. The epistemic utility of ideal sentences (typically referred to as ideal propositions, though, as noted above, they do not express genuine propositions at all) and proofs was taken to derive not from their meaning and/or evidentness, but rather from the role they play in some formal algebraic or calculary scheme intended to identify or locate the real truths. It is thus a metatheoretic function of the formal or algebraic properties induced on those propositions and proofs by their positions in a larger derivational scheme. Hilbert’s ideal mathematics was thus intended to bear the same relation to his real mathematics as Kant’s faculty of pure reason was intended to bear to his faculty of understanding. It was to be a regulative device whose proper function is to guide and facilitate the development of our system of real judgments. Indeed, in his 1925 essay “Über das Unendliche,” Hilbert made just this point, noting that ideal elements do not correspond to anything in reality but serve only as ideas “if, following Kant’s terminology, one understands as an idea a concept of reason which transcends all experience and by means of which the concrete is to be completed into a totality.” The structure of Hilbert’s scheme, however, involves more than just the division of classical mathematics into real and ideal propositions and proofs. It uses, in addition, a subdivision of the real propositions into the problematic and the unproblematic. Indeed, it is this subdivision of the reals that is at bottom responsible for the introduction of the ideals. Unproblematic real propositions, described by Hilbert as the basic equalities and inequalities of arithmetic (e.g., ‘3 ( 2’, ‘2 ‹ 3’, ‘2 ! 3 % 3 ! 2’) together with their sentential (and certain of their bounded quantificational) compounds, are the evidentially most basic judgments of mathematics. They are immediately intelligible and decidable by finitary intuition. More importantly, they can be logically manipulated in all the ways that classical logic allows without leading outside the class of real propositions. The characteristic feature of the problematic reals, on the other hand, is that they cannot be so manipulated. Hilbert gave two kinds of examples of problematic real propositions. One consisted of universal generalizations like ‘for any non-negative integer a, a ! 1 % 1 ! a’, which Hilbert termed hypothetical judgments. Such propositions are problematic because their denials do not bound the search for counterexamples. Hence, the instance of the (classical) law of excluded middle that is obtained by disjoining it with its denial is not itself a real proposition. Consequently, it cannot be manipulated in all the ways permitted by classical logic without going outside the class of real propositions. Similarly for the other kind of problematic real discussed by Hilbert, which was a bounded existential quantification. Every such sentence has as one of its classical consequents an unbounded existential quantification of the same matrix. Hence, since the latter is not a real proposition, the former is not a real proposition that can be fully manipulated by classical logical means without going outside the class of real propositions. It is therefore “problematic.” The question why full classical logical manipulability should be given such weight points up an important element in Hilbert’s thinking: namely, that classical logic is regarded as the preferred logic of human thinking – the logic of the optimally functioning human epistemic engine, the logic according to which the human mind most naturally and efficiently conducts its inferential affairs. It therefore has a special psychological status and it is because of this that the right to its continued use must be preserved. As just indicated, however, preservation of this right requires addition of ideal propositions and proofs to their real counterparts, since applying classical logic to the truths of real mathematics leads to a system that contains ideal as well as real elements. Hilbert believed that to justify such an addition, all that was necessary was to show it to be consistent with real mathematics (i.e., to show that it proves no real proposition that is itself refutable by real means). Moreover, Hilbert believed that this must be done by finitary means. The proof of Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem in 1931 brought considerable pressure to bear on this part of Hilbert’s Program even though it may not have demonstrated its unattainability.

“what-is-hinted” -- hint hinting. Don’t expect Cicero used this. It’s Germanic and related to ‘hunt,’ to ‘seize.’ As if you throw something in the air, and expect your recipient will seize it. Grice spends quite a long section in “Retrospective epilogue” to elucidate “Emissor E communicates that p via a hint,” versus “Emissor E communicates that p via a suggestion.” Some level of explicitness (vide candour) is necessary. If it is too obscure it cannot be held to have been ‘communicated’ in the first place! Cf. Holdcroft, “Some forms of indirect communication” for the Journal of Rhetoric. Grice had to do a bit of linguistic botany for his “E implicates that p”: To do duty for ‘imply,’ suggest, indicate, hint, mean, -- “etc.” indirectly or implicitly convey.

Hintikka, J. Non-Indo-European Finnish philosopher who emigrated Finland early on to become the first Finnish Griceian (vide his contribution in P. G. R. I. C. E.) with contributions to logic, philosophy of mathematics, epistemology, linguistics and philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and history of philosophy. His work on distributive normal forms and model set techniques yielded an improved inductive logic. Model sets differ from Carnap’s state-descriptions in being partial and not complete descriptions of “possible worlds.” The techniques simplified metatheoretical proofs and led to new results in e.g. probability theory and the semantic theory of information. Their main philosophical import nevertheless is in bridging the gap between proof theory and model theory. Model sets that describe several possible “alternative” worlds lead to the possible worlds semantics for modal and intensional logics. Hintikka has used them as a foundation for the logic of propositional attitudes (epistemic logic and the logic of perception), and in studies on individuation, identification, and intentionality. Epistemic logic also provides a basis for Hintikka’s logic of questions, in which conclusiveness conditions for answers can be defined. This has resulted in an interrogative model of inquiry in which knowledge-seeking is viewed as a pursuit of conclusive answers to initial “big” questions by strategically organized series of “small” questions (put to nature or to another source of information). The applications include scientific discovery and explanation. Hintikka’s independence-friendly logic gives the various applications a unified basis. Hintikka’s background philosophy and approach to formal semantics and its applications is broadly Kantian with emphasis on seeking-andfinding methods and the constitutive activity of the inquirer. Apart from a series of studies inspired by Kant, he has written extensively on Aristotle, Plato, Descartes, Leibniz, Frege, and Wittgenstein. Hintikka’s academic career has been not only in Finland, chiefly at the University of Helsinki, but (especially) in the United States, where he has held professorships at Stanford, Florida State, and (currently) Boston University. His students and co-workers in the Finnish school of inductive logic and in other areas include Leila Haaparanta (b.1954), Risto Hilpinen (b.1943), Simo Knuuttila (b.1946), Martin Kusch (b.1959), Ilkka Niiniluoto (b.1946), Juhani Pietarinen (b.1938), Veikko Rantala (b.1933), Gabriel Sandu (b.1954), Matti Sintonen (b.1951), and Raimo Tuomela (b.1940). Hintikka set, also called model set, downward saturated set, a set (of a certain sort) of well-formed formulas that are all true under a single interpretation of their non-logical symbols (named after Jaakko Hintikka). Such a set can be thought of as a (partial) description of a logically possible state of affairs, or possible world, full enough to make evident that the world described is indeed possible. Thus it is required of a Hintikka set G that it contain no atomic formula and its negation, that A, B 1 G if A 8 B 1 G, that A 1 G or B 1 G if A 7 B 1 G, and so forth, for each logical constant.

Hippocrates, philosopher from Cos. Some sixty treatises survive under his name, but it is doubtful whether he was the author of any of them. The Hippocratic corpus contains material from a wide variety of standpoints, ranging from an extreme empiricism that rejected all grand theory (On Ancient Medicine) to highly speculative theoretical physiology (On the Nature of Man, On Regimen). Many treatises were concerned with the accurate observation and classification of diseases (Epidemics) rather than treatment. Some texts (On the Art) defended the claims of medicine to scientific status against those who pointed to its inaccuracies and conjectural status; others (Oath, On Decorum) sketch a code of professional ethics. Almost all his treatises were notable for their materialism and rejection of supernatural “explanations”; their emphasis on observation; and their concern with the isolation of causal factors. A large number of texts are devoted to gynecology. The Hippocratic corpus became the standard against which later doctors measured themselves; and, via Galen’s rehabilitation and extension of Hippocratic method, it became the basis for Western medicine for two millennia.

historicism, the doctrine that knowledge of human affairs has an irreducibly historical character and that there can be no ahistorical perspective for an understanding of human nature and society. What is needed instead is a philosophical explication of historical knowledge that will yield the rationale for all sound knowledge of human activities. So construed, historicism is a philosophical doctrine originating in the methodological and epistemological presuppositions of critical historiography. In the mid-nineteenth century certain German thinkers (Dilthey most centrally), reacting against positivist ideals of science and knowledge, rejected scientistic models of knowledge, replacing them with historical ones. They applied this not only to the discipline of history but to economics, law, political theory, and large areas of philosophy. Initially concerned with methodological issues in particular disciplines, historicism, as it developed, sought to work out a common philosophical doctrine that would inform all these disciplines. What is essential to achieve knowledge in the human sciences is to employ the ways of understanding used in historical studies. There should in the human sciences be no search for natural laws; knowledge there will be interpretive and rooted in concrete historical occurrences. As such it will be inescapably perspectival and contextual (contextualism). This raises the issue of whether historicism is a form of historical relativism. Historicism appears to be committed to the thesis that what for a given people is warrantedly assertible is determined by the distinctive historical perspective in which they view life and society. The stress on uniqueness and concrete specificity and the rejection of any appeal to universal laws of human development reinforce that. But the emphasis on cumulative development into larger contexts of our historical knowledge puts in doubt an identification of historicism and historical relativism. The above account of historicism is that of its main proponents: Meinecke, Croce, Collingwood, Ortega y Gasset, and Mannheim. But in the twentieth century, with Popper and Hayek, a very different conception of historicism gained some currency. For them, to be a historicist is to believe that there are “historical laws,” indeed even a “law of historical development,” such that history has a pattern and even an end, that it is the central task of social science to discover it, and that these laws should determine the direction of political action and social policy. They attributed (incorrectly) this doctrine to Marx but rightly denounced it as pseudo-science. However, some later Marxists (Lukács, Korsch, and Gramsci) were historicists in the original nonPopperian sense as was the critical theorist Adorno and hermeneuticists such as Gadamer.

heterological: Grice and Thomson go heterological. Grice was fascinated by Baron Russell’s remarks on heterological and its implicate. Grice is particularly interested in Russell’s philosophy because of the usual Oxonian antipathy towards his type of philosophising. Being an irreverent conservative rationalist, Grice found in Russell a good point for dissent! If paradoxes were always sets of propositions or arguments or conclusions, they would always be meaningful. But some paradoxes are semantically flawed and some have answers that are backed by a pseudo-argument employing a defective lemma that lacks a truth-value. Grellings paradox, for instance, opens with a distinction between autological and heterological words. An autological word describes itself, e.g., polysyllabic is polysllabic, English is English, noun is a noun, etc. A heterological word does not describe itself, e.g., monosyllabic is not monosyllabic, Chinese is not Chinese, verb is not a verb, etc. Now for the riddle: Is heterological heterological or autological? If heterological is heterological, since it describes itself, it is autological. But if heterological is autological, since it is a word that does not describe itself, it is heterological. The common solution to this puzzle is that heterological, as defined by Grelling, is not what Grice a genuine predicate ‒ Gricing is!In other words, Is heterological heterological? is without meaning. That does not mean that an utterer, such as Baron Russell, may implicate that he is being very witty by uttering the Grelling paradox! There can be no predicate that applies to all and only those predicates it does not apply to for the same reason that there can be no barber who shaves all and only those people who do not shave themselves. Grice seems to be relying on his friend at Christ Church, Thomson in On Some Paradoxes, in the same volume where Grice published his Remarks about the senses, Analytical Philosophy, Butler (ed.), Blackwell, Oxford, 104–119. Grice thought that Thomson was a genius, if ever there is one! Plus, Grice thought that, after St. Johns, Christ Church was the second most beautiful venue in the city of dreaming spires. On top, it is what makes Oxford a city, and not, as villagers call it, a town. Refs.: the main source is Grice’s essay on ‘heterologicality,’ but the keyword ‘paradox’ is useful, too, especially as applied to Grice’s own paradox and to what, after Moore, Grice refers to as the philosopher’s paradoxes. The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.

hobbes: “Hobbes is a Griceian” – Grice. Grice was a member of the Hobbes Society -- Thomas. English philosopher whose writings, especially the English version of Leviathan (1651), strongly influenced all of subsequent English moral and political philosophy. He also wrote a trilogy comprising De Cive (1642; English version, Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society, 1651), De Corpore (On the Body, 1655), and De Homine (On Man, 1658). Together with Leviathan (the revised Latin version of which was published in 1668), these are his major philosophical works. However, an early draft of his thoughts, The Elements of Law, Natural and Political(also known as Human Nature and De Corpore Politico), was published without permission in 1650. Many of the misinterpretations of Hobbes’s views on human nature come from mistaking this early work as representing his mature views. Hobbes was influential not only in England, but also on the Continent. He is the author of the third set of objections to Descartes’s Meditations. Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-politicus was deeply influenced by Hobbes, not only in its political views but also in the way it dealt with Scripture. Hobbes was not merely a philosopher; he was mathematical tutor to Charles II and also a classical scholar. His first published work was a translation of Thucydides (1628), and among his latest, about a half-century later, were translations of Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey. Hobbes’s philosophical views have a remarkably contemporary sound. In metaphysics, he holds a strong materialist view, sometimes viewing mental phenomena as epiphenomenal, but later moving toward a reductive or eliminative view. In epistemology he held a sophisticated empiricism, which emphasized the importance of language for knowledge. If not the originator of the contemporary compatibilist view of the relationship between free will and determinism (see The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity and Chance, 1656), he was one of the primary influences. He also was one of the most important philosophers of language, explicitly noting that language is used not only to describe the world but to express attitudes and, performatively, to make promises and contracts. One of Hobbes’s outstanding characteristics is his intellectual honesty. Though he may have been timid (he himself claims that he was, explaining that his mother gave birth to him because of fright over the coming of the Spanish Armada), his writing shows no trace of it. During more than half his long lifetime he engaged in many philosophical controversies, which required considerably more courage in Hobbes’s day than at present. Both the Roman Catholic church and Oxford University banned the reading of his books and there was talk not only of burning his books but of burning Hobbes himself. An adequate interpretation of Hobbes requires careful attention to his accounts of human nature, reason, morality, and law. Although he was not completely consistent, his moral and political philosophy is remarkably coherent. His political theory is often thought to require an egoistic psychology, whereas it actually requires only that most persons be concerned with their own self-interest, especially their own preservation. It does not require that most not be concerned with other persons as well. All that Hobbes denies is an undifferentiated natural benevolence: “For if by nature one man should love another (that is) as man, there could no reason be returned why every man should not equally love every man, as being equally man.” His argument is that limited benevolence is not an adequate foundation upon which to build a state. Hobbes’s political theory does not require the denial of limited benevolence, he indeed includes benevolence in his list of the passions in Leviathan: “Desire of good to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY. If to man generally, GOOD NATURE.” Psychological egoism not only denies benevolent action, it also denies action done from a moral sense, i.e., action done because one believes it is the morally right thing to do. But Hobbes denies neither kind of action. But when the words [’just’ and ‘unjust’] are applied to persons, to be just signifies as much as to be delighted in just dealing, to study how to do righteousness, or to endeavor in all things to do that which is just; and to be unjust is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it is to be measured not according to my contract, but some present benefit. Hobbes’s pessimism about the number of just people is primarily due to his awareness of the strength of the passions and his conviction that most people have not been properly educated and disciplined. Hobbes is one of the few philosophers to realize that to talk of that part of human nature which involves the passions is to talk about human populations. He says, “though the wicked were fewer than the righteous, yet because we cannot distinguish them, there is a necessity of suspecting, heeding, anticipating, subjugating, self-defending, ever incident to the most honest and fairest conditioned.” Though we may be aware of small communities in which mutual trust and respect make law enforcement unnecessary, this is never the case when we are dealing with a large group of people. Hobbes’s point is that if a large group of people are to live together, there must be a common power set up to enforce the rules of the society. That there is not now, nor has there ever been, any large group of people living together without such a common power is sufficient to establish his point. Often overlooked is Hobbes’s distinction between people considered as if they were simply animals, not modified in any way by education or discipline, and civilized people. Though obviously an abstraction, people as animals are fairly well exemplified by children. “Unless you give children all they ask for, they are peevish, and cry, aye and strike their parents sometimes; and all this they have from nature.” In the state of nature, people have no education or training, so there is “continual fear, and danger of violent death, and the life of man, [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” But real people have been brought up in families; they are, at least to some degree, civilized persons, and how they will behave depends on how they are brought up. Hobbes does not say that society is a collection of misfits and that this is why we have all the trouble that we do – a position congenial to the psychological egoist. But he does acknowledge that “many also (perhaps most men) either through defect of mind, or want of education, remain unfit during the whole course of their lives; yet have they, infants as well as those of riper years, a human nature; wherefore man is made fit for society not by nature, but by education.” Education and training may change people so that they act out of genuine moral motives. That is why it is one of the most important functions of the sovereign to provide for the proper training and education of the citizens. In the current debate between nature and nurture, on the question of behavior Hobbes would come down strongly on the side of nurture. Hobbes’s concept of reason has more in common with the classical philosophical tradition stemming from Plato and Aristotle, where reason sets the ends of behavior, than with the modern tradition stemming from Hume where the only function of reason is to discover the best means to ends set by the passions. For Hobbes, reason is very complex; it has a goal, lasting selfpreservation, and it seeks the way to this goal. It also discovers the means to ends set by the passions, but it governs the passions, or tries to, so that its own goal is not threatened. Since its goal is the same in all people, it is the source of rules applying to all people. All of this is surprisingly close to the generally accepted account of rationality. We generally agree that those who follow their passions when they threaten their life are acting irrationally. We also believe that everyone always ought to act rationally, though we know that few always do so. Perhaps it was just the closeness of Hobbes’s account of reason to the ordinary view of the matter that has led to its being so completely overlooked. The failure to recognize that the avoidance of violent death is the primary goal of reason has distorted almost all accounts of Hobbes’s moral and political philosophy, yet it is a point on which Hobbes is completely clear and consistent. He explicitly says that reason “teaches every man to fly a contra-natural dissolution [mortem violentam] as the greatest mischief that can arrive to nature.” He continually points out that it is a dictate of right reason to seek peace when possible because people cannot “expect any lasting preservation continuing thus in the state of nature, that is, of war.” And he calls temperance and fortitude precepts of reason because they tend to one’s preservation. It has not generally been recognized that Hobbes regarded it as an end of reason to avoid violent death because he often talks of the avoidance of death in a way that makes it seem merely an object of a passion. But it is reason that dictates that one take all those measures necessary for one’s preservation; peace if possible, if not, defense. Reason’s dictates are categorical; it would be a travesty of Hobbes’s view to regard the dictates of reason as hypothetical judgments addressed to those whose desire for their own preservation happens to be greater than any conflicting desire. He explicitly deplores the power of the irrational appetites and expressly declares that it is a dictate of reason that one not scorn others because “most men would rather lose their lives (that I say not, their peace) than suffer slander.” He does not say if you would rather die than suffer slander, it is rational to do so. Hobbes, following Aristotle, regards morality as concerned with character traits or habits. Since morality is objective, it is only those habits that are called good by reason that are moral virtues. “Reason declaring peace to be good, it follows by the same reason, that all the necessary means to peace be good also; and therefore that modesty, equity, trust, humanity, mercy (which we have demonstrated to be necessary to peace), are good manners or habits, that is, virtues.” Moral virtues are those habits of acting that the reason of all people must praise. It is interesting to note that it is only in De Homine that Hobbes explicitly acknowledges that on this account, prudence, temperance, and courage are not moral virtues. In De Cive he distinguishes temperance and fortitude from the other virtues and does not call them moral, but he does not explicitly deny that they are moral virtues. But in De Homine, he explicitly points out that one should not “demand that the courage and prudence of the private man, if useful only to himself, be praised or held as a virtue by states or by any other men whatsoever to whom these same are not useful.” That morality is determined by reason and that reason has as its goal self-preservation seems to lead to the conclusion that morality also has as its goal self-preservation. But it is not the selfpreservation of an individual person that is the goal of morality, but of people as citizens of a state. That is, moral virtues are those habits of persons that make it rational for all other people to praise them. These habits are not those that merely lead to an individual’s own preservation, but to the preservation of all; i.e., to peace and a stable society. Thus, “Good dispositions are those that are suitable for entering into civil society; and good manners (that is, moral virtues) are those whereby what was entered upon can be best preserved.” And in De Cive, when talking of morality, he says, “The goodness of actions consist[s] in this, that it [is] in order to peace, and the evil in this, that it [is] related to discord.” The nature of morality is a complex and vexing question. If, like Hobbes, we regard morality as applying primarily to those manners or habits that lead to peace, then his view seems satisfactory. It yields, as he notes, all of the moral virtues that are ordinarily considered such, and further, it allows one to distinguish courage, prudence, and temperance from the moral virtues. Perhaps most important, it provides, in almost self-evident fashion, the justification of morality. For what is it to justify morality but to show that reason favors it? Reason, seeking self-preservation, must favor morality, which seeks peace and a stable society. For reason knows that peace and a stable society are essential for lasting preservation. This simple and elegant justification of morality does not reduce morality to prudence; rather it is an attempt, in a great philosophical tradition stemming from Plato, to reconcile reason or rational self-interest and morality. In the state of nature every person is and ought to be governed only by their own reason. Reason dictates that they seek peace, which yields the laws of nature, but it also allows them to use any means they believe will best preserve themselves, which is what Hobbes calls The Right of Nature. Hobbes’s insight is to see that, except when one is in clear and present danger, in which case one has an inalienable right to defend oneself, the best way to guarantee one’s longterm preservation is to give up one’s right to act on one’s own decisions about what is the best way to guarantee one’s long-term preservation and agree to act on the decisions of that single person or group who is the sovereign. If all individuals and groups are allowed to act on the decisions they regard as best, not accepting the commands of the sovereign, i.e., the laws, as the overriding guide for their actions, the result is anarchy and civil war. Except in rare and unusual cases, uniformity of action following the decision of the sovereign is more likely to lead to long-term preservation than diverse actions following diverse decisions. And this is true even if each one of the diverse decisions, if accepted by the sovereign as its decision, would have been more likely to lead to long-term preservation than the actual decision that the sovereign made. This argument explains why Hobbes holds that sovereigns cannot commit injustice. Only injustice can properly be punished. Hobbes does not deny that sovereigns can be immoral, but he does deny that the immorality of sovereigns can properly be punished. This is important, for otherwise any immoral act by the sovereign would serve as a pretext for punishing the sovereign, i.e., for civil war. What is just and unjust is determined by the laws of the state, what is moral and immoral is not. Morality is a wider concept than that of justice and is determined by what leads to peace and stability. However, to let justice be determined by what the reason of the people takes to lead to peace and stability, rather than by what the reason of the sovereign decides, would be to invite discord and civil war, which is contrary to the goal of morality: a stable society and peace. One can create an air of paradox by saying that for Hobbes it is immoral to attempt to punish some immoral acts, namely, those of the sovereign. Hobbes is willing to accept this seeming paradox for he never loses sight of the goal of morality, which is peace. To summarize Hobbes’s system: people, insofar as they are rational, want to live out their natural lives in peace and security. To do this, they must come together into cities or states of sufficient size to deter attack by any group. But when people come together in such a large group there will always be some that cannot be trusted, and thus it is necessary to set up a government with the power to make and enforce laws. This government, which gets both its right to govern and its power to do so from the consent of the governed, has as its primary duty the people’s safety. As long as the government provides this safety the citizens are obliged to obey the laws of the state in all things. Thus, the rationality of seeking lasting preservation requires seeking peace; this in turn requires setting up a state with sufficient power to keep the peace. Anything that threatens the stability of the state is to be avoided. As a practical matter, Hobbes took God and religion very seriously, for he thought they provided some of the strongest motives for action. Half of Leviathan is devoted to trying to show that his moral and political views are supported by Scripture, and to discredit those religious views that may lead to civil strife. But accepting the sincerity of Hobbes’s religious views does not require holding that Hobbes regarded God as the foundation of morality. He explicitly denies that atheists and deists are subject to the commands of God, but he never denies that they are subject to the laws of nature or of the civil state. Once one recognizes that, for Hobbes, reason itself provides a guide to conduct to be followed by all people, there is absolutely no need to bring in God. For in his moral and political theory there is nothing that God can do that is not already done by reason. Grice read most of Hobbes, both in Latin (for his Lit. Hum.) and in English. When in “Meaning,” Grice says “this is what people are getting at with their natural versus artificial signs” – he means Hobbes.

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IMPLICATVRA, in 12 volumes; vol. VI

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IMPLICATVRA, in 12 volumes; vol. VI

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