Speranza
From
http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/BiographicalNotes.html
Hacker "became a Tutorial Fellow at St John's College in 1966..."
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Herbert Paul Grice became a Tutorial Fellow at St. John's in the 1930s.
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Peter Michael Stephan Hacker was born in London on July 15th 1939.
Herbert Paul Grice was born in 1913 in the Heart of England.
Hacker is, like Grice, an English philosopher.
Hacker's
principal expertise is in the philosophy of mind and philosophy of language.
So was Grice's. Only Grice would go on to say, "Philosophy, like virtue is entire". He dismissed descriptions of philosophical expertise as implicating the contrary ("Mr. Poodle, our man in eighteenth-century German aesthetics" +> "and bad at it").
Hacker
is known for his detailed exegesis of the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein -- cfr. Grice as overhearing Austin, "Some like Witters, but Moore's MY man" --and his
outspoken conceptual critique of cognitive
neuroscience.
This he shares with Grice.
Hacker
studied philosophy, politics and economics (or PPE for short -- vs. Grice who held an old-fashioned Lit. Hum. degree -- at The Queen's College, Oxford from
1960-63.
In 1963-65 Hacker was senior Scholar at St Antony's College, Oxford, where
he began graduate work under the supervision of Professor H. L. A. Hart.
His
D.Phil thesis "Rules and Duties" was completed in 1966 during a Junior Research
Fellowship at Balliol College, Oxford.
Since 1966 Hacker has been a Tutorial Fellow at St John's, Oxford (as was Grice for years) and of the Oxford University philosophy
department.
Hacker's visiting positions at other universities include:
Makerere
College, Uganda (1968)
Swarthmore College, USA (1973 and 1986)
University of
Michigan, USA (1974)
Milton C. Scott visiting professor at Queen's University,
Kingston, Canada (1985)
Visiting Fellow in Humanities at University of Bologna,
Italy (2009).
From 1985 to 1987 Hacker was a British Academy Research Reader in the
Humanities.
In 1991-94 Hacker was a Leverhulme Trust Senior Research Fellow.
Hacker retired in 2006, but he has been appointed an Emeritus Research Fellow of
St John's College, Oxford.
When Grice retired from UC/Berkeley, he joined the University of Seattle.
Hacker is one
of the most powerful contemporary exponents of the linguistic-therapeutic
approach to philosophy pioneered by Ludwig Wittgenstein.
In this approach, the
words and concepts used by the language community are taken as given, and the
role of philosophy is to resolve or dissolve philosophical problems by giving an
overview of the uses of these words and the structural relationships between
these concepts.
Grice criticised Witters for not being clear about key notions like 'meaning' and most notably, 'implication' (or 'implicature', as Grice preferred).
Philosophical inquiry is therefore very different from
scientific inquiry, and Hacker maintains accordingly that there is a sharp
dividing line between the two.
Philosophy is not a contribution to human
knowledge, but to human understanding."
"An Orrery of
Intentionality"
The Irish placename Orrery came from Gaelic Orbhraighe, which was at first the name of a tribe (Orbh-raighe = "Orb's people"), and then of a territory and a barony.
This has led Hacker into direct disagreement with
"neuro-philosophers": neuroscientists or philosophers such as Antonio Damasio
and Oxford-educated D. C. Dennett who think that neuro-science can shed light on philosophical
questions such as the nature of consciousness or the mind-body problem.
Hacker
maintains that these, like all philosophical problems, are not real problems at
all, but mirages arising from conceptual confusion.
It follows that scientific
inquiry (learning more facts about humans or the world) does not help to resolve
them.
His 2003 book "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience", co-authored
with neuro-scientist M. Bennett, contains an exposition of these views, and
critiques of the ideas of many contemporary neuroscientists and philosophers,
including Francis Crick, Antonio Damasio, and Oxford-educated D. C. Dennett, J. R. Searle, and
others.
Hacker in general finds many received components of current
philosophy of mind to be incoherent.
He rejects mind-brain identity theories, as
well as Grice's Functionalism (Grice, "Method in philosophical psychology: from the banal to the bizarre", repr. in Conception of Value, Clarendon, 1991), eliminativism and other forms of reductionism.
Hacker advocates methodological pluralism, denying that standard explanations of human
conduct are causal, and insisting on the irreducibility of explanation in terms
of reasons and goals.
Hacker denies that psychological attributes can be
intelligibly ascribed to the brain, insisting that they are ascribable only to
the human being as a whole.
He has endeavoured to show that the puzzles and
'mysteries' of consciousness dissolve under careful analysis of the various
forms of intransitive and transitive consciousness, and that so-called qualia
are no more than a philosopher's fiction.
Hacker frequently collaborated with
fellow Oxford philosopher and Tutorial Fellow of St. Johns, Gordon P. Baker.
Bibliography
Insight and
Illusion: Wittgenstein on Philosophy and the Metaphysics of Experience
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972)
Insight and Illusion - themes in the
philosophy of Wittgenstein (extensively revised edition) (Clarendon Press,
Oxford, 1986) (ISBN 0-19-824783-4)
Wittgenstein : Understanding and Meaning,
Volume 1 of an analytical commentary on the Philosophical Investigations
(Blackwell, Oxford, and Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1980)(ISBN
0-631-12111-0)(ISBN 1-4051-0176-8)(ISBN 1-4051-1987-X), co-authored with G.P.
Baker.
Frege : Logical Excavations, (Blackwell, Oxford, O.U.P., N.Y., 1984)
(ISBN 0-19-503261-6) co-authored with G.P. Baker.
Language, Sense and
Nonsense, a critical investigation into modern theories of language (Blackwell,
1984) (ISBN 0-631-13519-7) co-authored with G.P. Baker.
Scepticism, Rules and
Language (Blackwell, 1984) (ISBN 0-631-13614-2) co-authored with G.P.
Baker.
Wittgenstein : Rules, Grammar, and Necessity - Volume 2 of an
analytical commentary on the Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, Oxford, UK
and Cambridge, Mass. USA, 1985) (ISBN 0-631-13024-1)(ISBN 0-631-16188-0)
co-authored with G.P. Baker.
Appearance and Reality - a philosophical
investigation into perception and perceptual qualities (Blackwell, 1987) (ISBN
0-631-15704-2)
Wittgenstein : Meaning and Mind, Volume 3 of an Analytical
Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, Oxford and Cambridge,
Mass., 1990) (ISBN 0-631-18739-1)
Wittgenstein: Mind and Will, Volume 4 of an
Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, 1996)
(ISBN 0-631-18739-1)
Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth Century Analytic
Philosophy (Blackwell,Oxford, UK and Cambridge, Mass., USA, 1996) (ISBN
0-631-20098-3)
Wittgenstein on Human Nature (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,
1997) (ISBN 0-7538-0193-0)
Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2001) (ISBN 0-19-924569-X)
Philosophical
Foundations of Neuroscience (Blackwell, Oxford, and Malden, Mass., 2003) (ISBN
1-4051-0855-X), co-authored with M.R. Bennett
Neuroscience and Philosophy:
Brain, Mind, and Language (Columbia University Press, New York, 2007) (ISBN
978-0-231-14044-7), co-authored with M. Bennett, D. Dennett, and J.
Searle
Human Nature: The Categorial Framework (Blackwell, 2007) (ISBN
1405147288)
History of Cognitive Neuroscience (Wiley, Blackwell, 2008) (ISBN
978-1-4051-8182-2), co-authored with M.R. Bennett
Papers available on the
web[edit]
Analytic Philosophy: Beyond the linguistic turn and back again, in
M. Beaney ed. The Analytic Turn: Analysis in Early Analytic Philosophy and
Phenomenology (Routledge, London, 2006)
Passing by the Naturalistic Turn: on
Quine's cul-de-sac, Philosophy 2006
Scott Soames's Philosophical Analysis in
the Twentieth Century, critical notice, Philosophical Quarterly 2006
Of
knowledge and of knowing that someone is in pain, in A. Pichler and S. Säätelä
eds., Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and his Works ((The Wittgenstein Archives at
the University of Bergen, Bergen, 2005)), pp. 203–235.
Substance: Things and
Stuffs, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2004, pp. 41–63.
Of the
ontology of belief, in Mark Siebel and Mark Textor ed. Semantik und Ontologie
(Ontos Verlag, Frankfurt, 2004), pp. 185–222.
The conceptual framework for
the investigation of the emotions, International Review of Psychiatry, Vol.16,
No. 3 (August 2004), pp. 199–208
Is there anything it is like to be a bat?,
Philosophy 77, 2002, pp. 157–74.
Wittgenstein and the Autonomy of Humanistic
Understanding, in R. Allen and M. Turvey eds., Wittgenstein: Theory and the Arts
(Routledge. London, 2001), pp. 39–74.
An Orrery of Intentionality, in
Language and Communication, 21(2001), pp. 119–141.
When the Whistling had to
Stop, in D.O.M. Charles and T.W. Child eds. Wittgensteinian Themes: Essays in
Honour of David Pears (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2001).
Was he Trying to
Whistle it? in A. Crary and R. Read eds. The New Wittgenstein (Routledge,
London, 2000), pp. 353–88.
Wittgenstein, Carnap and the New American
Wittgensteinians, Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003), pp. 1
–23.
References[edit]
Jump up ^ Cf. Philosophical Foundations of
Neuroscience (Blackwell, 2003); Neuroscience and Philosophy (Columbia University
Press, 2007)
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VIAF: 2482807
LCCN: n79055522
ISNI: 0000 0001 1558
182X
GND: 109051084
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Name: Hacker, Peter
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Date of birthJuly 15, 1939
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1939 births
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Sunday, December 15, 2013
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You say: "notably, 'implication' (or 'implicature', as Grice preferred)", implicating that implicature is a mere terminological eccentricity, which presumably you don't believe.
ReplyDeleteIf A implies B then A entails B and "A => B" is analytic, but "A implicates B" implicates that A does not entail B.
There is a terminological awkwardness here, for one does call "A implies B" an implication even though it does not amount to implicature?
Am I right JL, or have I misunderstood Grice here?
RBJ