Intentions compose

Again, from author of "Horwich contra Davidson" at

http://www.uea.ac.uk/~j108/Horwich.htm

"Davidson (1973a, 1982) rejects the intention based semantics advanced by Grice (1989), Bennett (1976) and others."

"His principal reason for doing so, though, is NOT that intentions do not compose."

"Davidson's complaint, rather, is that the content of an intention is not identifiable independently of linguistic content, so that an intention is not explanatory of linguistic meaning."

What Anita Avramdies's Adventures in Griceland has as "Symmetricalism". Seeing how Avramides dedicates half of her book on "Grice" to Davidson -- as she did half of her lecture on Grice at San Marino (Cozenza, "Grice's Heritage") to Davidson, one wonders about Griceland.

The online author goes on:

"There may or may not be fundamental problems with the very idea of compositional intentions, but Davidson is not committed to the existence of such problems simply because he commends a truth theoretic semantics."