THESAVRVS GRICEIANVUM, in twelve volumes -- vol. V.

exhibitum – Grice contrasts this with the protrepticum – A piece of a communicatum is an exhitibum if it is a communication-device for the emisor to display his psychological attitude. It is protrepticum if the emisor intends the sendee to entertain a state other than the uptake – i. e. form a volition to close the door, for how else will he comply with the order in the imperative mode?

protrepticum: the opposite of the exhibitium.

expositum -- exponible. In dialectica, an exponible proposition is that which needs to be expounded, i.e., elaborated or explicated in order to make clear their true ‘form,’ as opposed to its mere ‘matter.’ ‘Giorgione is so called because of his size.’ ‘Giorgione is so called because of his size’ has a misleading ‘matter’ (implicating at least two forms). It may suggestin a simple predication. In fact, it means, ‘Giorgione is called ‘Giorgione’ because of his size’. Grice’s examples: “An English pillar box is called ‘red’ because it is red,” “Grice is called ‘Grice’ because he is Grice.” “Grice is called ‘Grice’ because his Anglo-Norman ancestors had ‘grey’ in their coat of arms.” “Grice is called ‘Grice’ because his ancestor kept grice, i. e. pigs.” Another example by Grice: ‘Every man except Strawson is running’, expounded as ‘Strawson is not running and every man other than Strawson is running (for Prime Minister)’; and ‘Only Strawson says something true’, uttered by Grice. Grice claims ‘Only Strawson says something true’ should be expounded (or explicated, or explciited, or exposed, or provided ‘what is expositum, or the expositum provided: not only as ‘Strawson says something true and no one other than Strawson says something true’, but needs an implicated third clause, ‘Grice says something false’ for surely Grice is being self-referentially ironic. If only Strawson says something true – that proposition can only be uttered by Strawson. Grice borrowed it from Descartes: “Only Descarets says something ture.” This last example brings out an important aspect of exponible propositions, viz., their use in a sophisma. Sophismatic treatises are a common genre at Oxford in which this or that semantic issue is approached dialectically (what Grice calls “the Oxonian dialectic”) by its application in solving a puzzle case. Another important ingredient of an exponible proposition is its containing a particular term, sometimes called the exponible term (terminus exponibilis in Occam). Attention on such a term is focused in the study of the implicatum of a syncategorematic expression, Note that such an exponible term could only be expounded in context, not by an explicit definition. A syncategorematic term that generates an exponible proposition is one such as: ‘twice’, ‘except’, ‘begins’ and ‘ceases [to eat iron, or ‘beat your wife,’ to use Grice’s example in “Causal Theory of Perception”]’, and ‘insofar as’ e.g. ‘Strawson insofar as he is rational is risible’. 

expressum:  At one time, Oxford was all about the Croceans! It all changed! The oppositum is the impressum, or sense-datum. In a functionalist model, you have perceptual INPUT and behavioural OUTPUT, the expressum. In between, the black box of the soul. Darwin, Eckman. Drawing  a skull meaning there is danger. cf. impressum. Inside out. Expression of Impressions. As an empiricist, Grice was into ‘impress.’ But it’s always good to have a correlatum. Grice liked an abbreviation, especially because he loved subscripts. So, he starts to analyse the ‘ordinary-language’ philosohper’s mistake by using a few symbols: there’s the phrase, or utterance, and there’s the expression, for which Grice uses ‘e’ for a ‘token,’ and ‘E’ for a type. So, suppose we are considering Hart’s use of ‘carefully.’ ‘Carefully’ would be the ‘expression,’ occurring within an utterance. Surely, since Grice uses ‘expression’ in that way, he also uses to say what Hart is doing, Hart is expressing. Grice notes that ‘expressing’ may be too strong. Hart is expressing the belief THAT if you utter an utterance containing the ‘expression’ ‘carefully,’ there is an implicatum to the effect that the agent referred to is taking RATIONAL steps towards something. IRRATIONAL behaviour does not count as ‘careful’ behaviour. Grice uses the same abbreviations in discussing philosophy as the ‘conceptual analysis’ of this or that expression. It is all different with Ogden, Collingwood, and Croce, that Collingwood loved!  "Ideas, we may say generally, are symbols, as serving to express some actual moment or phase of experience and guiding towards fuller actualization of what is, or seems to be, involved in its existence or MEANING . That no idea is ever wholly adequate MEANS that the suggestiveness of experience is inexhaustible" Forsyth, English Philosophy, 1910, . Thus the significance of sound, the meaning of an utterance is here identical with the active response to surroundings and with the natural expression of emotions According to Husserl, the function of expression is only directly and immediately adapted to what is usually described as the meaning (Bedeutung) or the sense (Sinn) of the speech or parts of speech. Only because the meaning associated with a wordsowid expresses something, is that word-sound called 'expres- sion' (Ideen, p. 256 f). "Between the ,nearnng and the what is meant, or what it expresses, there exists an essential relation, because the meaning is the expression of the meant through its own content (Gehalt) What is meant (dieses Bedeutete) lies in the 'object' of the thought or speech. We must therefore distinguish these three-Word, Meaning, Object "1 Geyser, Gp cit p z8 PDF compression, OCR, web optimization using a watermarked evaluation copy of CVISION PDFCompresso These complexities are mentioned here to show how vague are most of the terms which are commonly thought satisfactory in this topic. Such a word as 'understand' is, unless specially treated, far too vague to serve except provisionally or at levels of discourse where a real understanding of the matter (in the reference sense) is not possible. The multiple functions of speech will be classified and discussed in the following chapter. There it will be seen that the expression of the speaker's intention is one of the five regular language functions. Grice hated Austin’s joke, the utteratum, “I use ‘utterance’ only as equivalent to 'utteratum;' for 'utteratio' I use ‘the issue of an utterance,’” so he needed something for ‘what is said’ in general, not just linguistic, ‘what is expressed,’ what is explicitly conveyed,’ ex-prĭmo , pressi, pressum, 3, v. a. premo. express (mostly poet. and in postAug. prose; “freq. in the elder Pliny): (faber) et ungues exprimet et molles imitabitur aere capillos,” Hor. A. P. 33; cf.: “alicujus furorem ... verecundiae ruborem,” Plin. 34, 14, 40, § 140: “expressa in cera ex anulo imago,” Plaut. Ps. 1, 1, 54: “imaginem hominis gypso e facie ipsa,” Plin. 35, 12, 44, § 153; cf.: “effigiem de signis,” id. ib.: “optime Herculem Delphis et Alexandrum, etc.,” id. 34, 8, 19, § 66 et saep.: “vestis stricta et singulos artus exprimens,” exhibiting, showing, Tac. G. 17: “pulcher aspectu sit athleta, cujus lacertos exercitatio expressit,” has well developed, made muscular, Quint. 8, 3, 10.

extensionalism: one of the twelve labours of H. P. Grice -- a family of ontologies and semantic theories restricted to existent entities. Extensionalist ontology denies that the domain of any true theory needs to include non-existents, such as fictional, imaginary, and impossible objects like Pegasus the winged horse or round squares. Extensionalist semantics reduces meaning and truth to set-theoretical relations between terms in a language and the existent objects, standardly spatiotemporal and abstract entities, that belong to the term’s extension. The extension of a name is the particular existent denoted by the name; the extension of a predicate is the set of existent objects that have the property represented by the predicate. The sentence ‘All whales are mammals’ is true in extensionalist semantics provided there are no whales that are not mammals, no existent objects in the extension of the predicate ‘whale’ that are not also in the extension of ‘mammal’. Linguistic contexts are extensional if: i they make reference only to existent objects; ii they support substitution of codesignative terms referring to the same thing, or of logically equivalent propositions, salva veritate without loss of truthvalue; and iii it is logically valid to existentially quantify conclude that There exists an object such that . . . etc. objects referred to within the context. Contexts that do not meet these requirements are intensional, non-extensional, or referentially opaque. The implications of extensionalism, associated with the work of Frege, Russell, Quine, and mainstream analytic philosophy, are to limit its explanations of mind and meaning to existent objects and material-mechanical properties and relations describable in an exclusively extensional idiom. Extensionalist semantics must try to analyze away apparent references to nonexistent objects, or, as in Russell’s extensionalist theory of definite descriptions, to classify all such predications as false. Extensionalist ontology in the philosophy of mind must eliminate or reduce propositional attitudes or de dicto mental states, expressed in an intensional idiom, such as ‘believes that ————’, ‘fears that ————’, and the like, usually in favor of extensional characterizations of neurophysiological states. Whether extensionalist philosophy can satisfy these explanatory obligations, as the thesis of extensionality maintains, is controversial. 

stabilitatum – stabilire -- Establishment – Grice speaks of the Establishment twice. Once re: Gellner: non-Establishment criticizing the English Establishment. Second: to refute Lewis. Something can be ‘established’ and not be conventional. “Surely Lewis should know the Graeco-Roman root of establish to figure that out!” stăbĭlĭo , īvi, ītum (sync. I.imperf. stabilibat, Enn. Ann. 44), 4, v. a. stabilis, to make firm, steadfast, or stable; to fix, stay, establish (class.; esp. in the trop. sense). I. Lit.: semita nulla pedem stabilibat, Enn. ap. Cic. Div. 1, 20, 40 (Ann. v. 44 Vahl.): “eo stabilita magis sunt,” Lucr. 3, 202; cf.: confirmandi et stabiliendi causā singuli ab infimo solo pedes terrā exculcabantur, * Caes. B. G. 7, 73: “vineas,” Col. 4, 33, 1: “loligini pedes duo, quibus se velut ancoris stabiliunt,” Plin. 9, 28, 44, § 83.— II. Trop.: regni stabilita scamna solumque, Enn. ap. Cic. Div. 1, 48 fin. (Ann. v. 99 Vahl.): “alicui regnum suom,” Plaut. Am. 1, 1, 39; cf.: libertatem civibus, Att. ap. Cic. Sest. 58, 123: “rem publicam (opp. evertere),” Cic. Fin. 4, 24, 65; so, “rem publicam,” id. Sest. 68, 143: “leges,” id. Leg. 1, 23, 62: “nisi haec urbs stabilita tuis consiliis erit,” id. Marcell. 9, 29: “matrimonia firmiter,” id. Rep. 6, 2, 2: pacem, concordiam, Pseud.-Sall. Rep. Ordin. 1 fin. (p. 267 Gerl.): “res Capuae stabilitas Romana disciplina,” Liv. 9, 20: “nomen equestre in consulatu (Cicero),” Plin. 33, 2, 8, § 34: “(aegrum) ad retinendam patientiam,” to strengthen, fortify him, Gell. 12, 5, 3. While Grice’s play with ‘estaablished’ is in the second metabolical stage of his programme – where ‘means’ applies to things other than the emissor, surely metaphorically – he is allowing that ‘estabalish’ may be used in the one-off predicament. By drawing a skull, U is establishing a procedure. Grice notably wants to make ‘established’ a weaker variant of ‘conventional.’ So that x, whatever, may be ‘established’ but not ‘conventional.’ In fact, it can be argued that to establish you have to do it at least once. Cfr. ‘settled. ‘Greenwich, Conn., settled in 1639.’ ‘Established’ Surely it would be obtuse to say that Greenwich, Conn. Was “conventionalized”.

farquharsonism – Grice enjoyed reading Cook Wilson, and was grateful to A S L Farquharson for making that possible.

fechner: as a philosophical psychologist, Grice had to read the boring Fechner! Gustav Theodor 180187, G. physicist and philosopher whose Elemente der Psychophysik 1860; English translation, 6 inaugurated experimental psychology. Obsessed with the mindbody problem, Fechner advanced an identity theory in which every object is both mental and physical, and in support invented psychophysics  the “exact science of the functional relations . . . between mind and body.” Fechner began with the concept of the limen, or sensory threshold. The absolute threshold is the stimulus strength R, Reiz needed to create a conscious sensation S, and the relative threshold is the strength that must be added to a stimulus for a just noticeable difference jnd to be perceived. E. H. Weber 17951878 had shown that a constant ratio held between relative threshold and false cause, fallacy of Fechner, Gustav Theodor 304   304 stimulus magnitude, Weber’s law: DR/R % k. By experimentally determining jnd’s for pairs of stimulus magnitudes such as weights, Fechner formulated his “functional relation,” S % k log R, Fechner’s law, an identity equation of mind and matter. Later psychophysicists replaced it with a power law, R % kSn, where n depends on the kind of stimulus. The importance of psychophysics to psychology consisted in its showing that quantification of experience was possible, and its providing a general paradigm for psychological experimentation in which controlled stimulus conditions are systematically varied and effects observed. In his later years, Fechner brought the experimental method to bear on aesthetics Vorschule der Aesthetik, 1876.

ferguson: a. philosopher. His main theme was the rise and fall of virtue in individuals and societies. In his most important work, An Essay on the History of Civil Society Ferguson argues that human happiness of which virtue is a constituent is found in pursuing social goods rather than private ends. Ferguson thought that ignoring social goods not only prevented social progress but led to moral corruption and political despotism. To support this he used classical texts and travelers’ writings to reconstruct the history of society from “rude nations” through barbarism to civilization. This allowed him to express his concern for the danger of corruption inherent in the increasing selfinterest manifested in the incipient commercial civilization of his day. He attempted to systematize his moral philosophy in The Principles of Moral and Social Science 1792. J.W.A. Fermat’s last theorem.

feuerbach: -- G. materialist philosopher and critic of religion. He provided the major link between Hegel’s absolute idealism and such later theories of historical materialism as those of Marx and other “young or new Hegelians.” Feuerbach was born in Bavaria and studied theology, first at Heidelberg and then Berlin, where he came under the philosophical influence of Hegel. He received his doctorate in 1828 and, after an early publication severely critical of Christianity, retired from official G. academic life. In the years between 1836 and 1846, he produced some of his most influential works, which include “Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy” 1839, The Essence of Christianity 1841, Principles of the Philosophy of the Future 1843, and The Essence of Religion 1846. After a brief collaboration with Marx, he emerged as a popular champion of political liberalism in the revolutionary period of 1848. During the reaction that followed, he again left public life and died dependent upon the support of friends. Feuerbach was pivotal in the intellectual history of the nineteenth century in several respects. First, after a half-century of metaphysical system construction by the G. idealists, Feuerbach revived, in a new form, the original Kantian project of philosophical critique. However, whereas Kant had tried “to limit reason in order to make room for faith,” Feuerbach sought to demystify both faith and reason in favor of the concrete and situated existence of embodied human consciousness. Second, his “method” of “transformatory criticism”  directed, in the first instance, at Hegel’s philosophical pronouncements  was adopted by Marx and has retained its philosophical appeal. Briefly, it suggested that “Hegel be stood on his feet” by “inverting” the subject and predicate in Hegel’s idealistic pronouncements. One should, e.g., rewrite “The individual is a function of the Absolute” as “The Absolute is a function of the individual.” Third, Feuerbach asserted that the philosophy of G. idealism was ultimately an extenuation of theology, and that theology was merely religious consciousness systematized. But since religion itself proves to be merely a “dream of the human mind,” metaphysics, theology, and religion can be reduced to “anthropology,” the study of concrete embodied human consciousness and its cultural products. The philosophical influence of Feuerbach flows through Marx into virtually all later historical materialist positions; anticipates the existentialist concern with concrete embodied human existence; and serves as a paradigm for all later approaches to religion on the part of the social sciences. 

fichte: G. philosopher. He was a proponent of an uncompromising system of transcendental idealism, the Wissenschaftslehre, which played a key role in the development of post-Kantian philosophy. Born in Saxony, Fichte studied at Jena and Leipzig. The writings of Kant led him to abandon metaphysical determinism and to embrace transcendental idealism as “the first system of human freedom.” His first book, Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung “Attempt at a Critique of all Revelations,” 1792, earned him a reputation as a brilliant exponent of Kantianism, while his early political writings secured him a reputation as a Jacobin. Inspired by Reinhold, Jacobi, Maimon, and Schulze, Fichte rejected the “letter” of Kantianism and, in the lectures and writings he produced at Jena 179499, advanced a new, rigorously systematic presentation of what he took to be its Ferguson, Adam Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 307   307 “spirit.” He dispensed with Kant’s things-inthemselves, the original duality of faculties, and the distinction between the transcendental aesthetic and the transcendental analytic. By emphasizing the unity of theoretical and practical reason in a way consistent with “the primacy of practical reason,” Fichte sought to establish the unity of the critical philosophy as well as of human experience. In Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre “On the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre,” 1794 he explained his conception of philosophy as “the science of science,” to be presented in a deductive system based on a self-evident first principle. The basic “foundations” of this system, which Fichte called Wissenschaftslehre theory of science, were outlined in his Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre “Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre,” 179495 and Grundriß der Eigentümlichen der Wissenschaftslehre in Rücksicht auf das theoretische Vermögen “Outline of the Distinctive Character of the Wissenschaftslehre with respect to the Theoretical Faculty,” 1795 and then, substantially revised, in his lectures on Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo 179699. The “foundational” portion of the Wissenschaftslehrelinks our affirmation of freedom to our experience of natural necessity. Beginning with the former “the I simply posits itself”, it then demonstrates how a freely self-positing subject must be conscious not only of itself, but also of “representations accompanied by a feeling of necessity” and hence of an objective world. Fichte insisted that the essence of selfhood lies in an active positing of its own self-identity and hence that self-consciousness is an auto-productive activity: a Tathandlung or “fact/act.” However, the I can posit itself only as limited; in order for the originally posited act of “sheer self-positing” to occur, certain other mental acts must occur as well, acts through which the I posits for itself an objective, spatiotemporal world, as well as a moral realm of free, rational beings. The I first posits its own limited condition in the form of “feeling” occasioned by an inexplicable Anstob or “check” upon its own practical striving, then as a “sensation,” then as an “intuition” of a thing, and finally as a “concept.” The distinction between the I and the not-I arises only in these reiterated acts of self-positing, a complete description of which thus amounts to a “genetic deduction” of the necessary conditions of experience. Freedom is thereby shown to be possible only in the context of natural necessity, where it is limited and finite. At the same time “our freedom is a theoretical determining principle of our world.” Though it must posit its freedom “absolutely”  i.e., schlechthin or “for no reason”  a genuinely free agent can exist only as a finite individual endlessly striving to overcome its own limits. After establishing its “foundations,” Fichte extended his Wissenschaftslehre into social and political philosophy and ethics. Subjectivity itself is essentially intersubjective, inasmuch as one can be empirically conscious of oneself only as one individual among many and must thus posit the freedom of others in order to posit one’s own freedom. But for this to occur, the freedom of each individual must be limited; indeed, “the concept of right or justice Recht is nothing other than the concept of the coexistence of the freedom of several rational/sensuous beings.” The Grundlage des Naturrechts “Foundations of Natural Right,” 179697 examines how individual freedom must be externally limited if a community of free individuals is to be possible, and demonstrates that a just political order is a demand of reason itself, since “the concept of justice or right is a condition of self-consciousness.” “Natural rights” are thus entirely independent of moral duties. Unlike political philosophy, which purely concerns the public realm, ethics, which is the subject of Das System der Sittenlehre “The System of Ethical Theory,” 1798, concerns the inner realm of conscience. It views objects not as given to consciousness but as produced by free action, and concerns not what is, but what ought to be. The task of ethics is to indicate the particular duties that follow from the general obligation to determine oneself freely the categorical imperative. Before Fichte could extend the Wissenschaftslehre into the philosophy of religion, he was accused of atheism and forced to leave Jena. The celebrated controversy over his alleged atheism the Atheismusstreit was provoked by “Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens in einer göttliche Weltregierung” “On the Basis of our Belief in a Divine Governance of the World,” 1798, in which he sharply distinguished between philosophical and religious questions. While defending our right to posit a “moral world order,” Fichte insisted that this order does not require a personal deity or “moral lawgiver.” After moving to Berlin, Fichte’s first concern was to rebut the charge of atheism and to reply to the indictment of philosophy as “nihilism” advanced in Jacobi’s Open Letter to Fichte 1799. This was the task of Die Bestimmung des Menschen “The Vocation of Man,” 1800. During the  occupation, he delivered Reden an die deutsche Nation “Addresses to the G. Nation,” 1808, which proposed a program of national education and attempted to kindle G. patriotism. The other publications of his Berlin years include a foray into political economy, Der geschlossene Handelstaat “The Closed Commercial State,” 1800; a speculative interpretation of human history, Die Grundzüge des gegenwärtiges Zeitalters “The Characteristics of the Present Age,” 1806; and a mystically tinged treatise on salvation, Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben “Guide to the Blessed Life,” 1806. In unpublished private lectures he continued to develop radically new versions of the Wissenschaftslehre. Fichte’s substantial influence was not limited to his well-known influence on Schelling and Hegel both of whom criticized the “subjectivism” of the early Wissenschaftslehre. He is also important in the history of G. nationalism and profoundly influenced the early Romantics, especially Novalis and Schlegel. Recent decades have seen renewed interest in Fichte’s transcendental philosophy, expecially the later, unpublished versions of the Wissenschaftslehre. This century’s most significant contribution to Fichte studies, however, is the ongoing publication of the first critical edition of his complete works. 

Italian philosophy. Grice loved it and could recite an Italian philosopher for each letter of the alphabet, including the famous Alessandro Speranza, from Milano!

ficino: neoplatonic philosopher who played a leading role in the cultural life of Florence. Ordained a priest in 1473, he hoped to draw people to Christ by means of Platonism. It was through Ficino’s translation and commentaries that the works of Plato first became accessible to the Latin-speaking West, but the impact of Plato’s work was considerably affected by Ficino’s other interests. He accepted Neoplatonic interpretations of Plato, including those of Plotinus, whom he tr.; and he saw Plato as the heir of Hermes Trismegistus, a mythical Egyptian sage and supposed author of the hermetic corpus, which he tr. early in his career. He embraced the notion of a prisca theologia, an ancient wisdom that encapsulated philosophic and religious truth, was handed on to Plato, and was later validated by the Christian revelation. The most popular of his original works was Three Books on Life 1489, which contains the fullest Renaissance exposition of a theory of magic, based mainly on Neoplatonic sources. He postulated a living cosmos in which the World-Soul is linked to the world-body by spirit. This relationship is mirrored in man, whose spirit or astral body links his body and soul, and the resulting correspondence between microcosm and macrocosm allows both man’s control of natural objects through magic and his ascent to knowledge of God. Other popular works were his commentary on Plato’s Symposium 1469, which presents a theory of Platonic love; and his Platonic Theology 1474, in which he argues for the immortality of the soul. 

fictum: in the widest usage, whatever contrasts with what is a matter of fact. As applied to works of fiction, however, this is not the appropriate contrast. For a work of fiction, such as a historical novel, might turn out to be true regarding its historical subject, without ceasing to be fiction. The correct contrast of fiction is to non-fiction. If a work of fiction might turn out to be true, how is ‘fiction’ best defined? According to some philosophers, such as Searle, the writer of nonfiction performs illocutionary speech acts, such as asserting that such-and-such occurred, whereas the writer of fiction characteristically only pretends to perform these illocutionary acts. Others hold that the core idea to which appeal should be made is that of making-believe or imagining certain states of affairs. Kendall Walton Mimesis as Make-Believe, 0, for instance, holds that a work of fiction is to be construed in terms of a prop whose function is to serve in games of make-believe. Both kinds of theory allow for the possibility that a work of fiction might turn out to be true. 

fidanza: Bonaventura, Saint c.122174,  theologian. Born Giovanni di Fidanza in Bagnorea, Tuscany, he was educated at Paris, earning a master’s degree in arts and a doctorate in theology. He joined the Franciscans about 1243, while still a student, and was elected minister general of the order in 1257. Made cardinal bishop of Albano by Pope Gregory X in 1274, Bonaventure helped organize the Second Ecumenical Council of Lyons, during the course of which he died, in July 1274. He was canonized in 1482 and named a doctor of the church in 1587. Bonaventure wrote and preached extensively on the relation between philosophy and theology, the role of reason in spiritual and religious life, and the extent to which knowledge in God is obtainable by the “wayfarer.” His basic position is nicely expressed in De reductione artium ad theologiam “On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology”: “the manifold wisdom of God, which is clearly revealed in sacred scripture, lies hidden in all knowledge and in all nature.” He adds, “all divisions of knowledge are handmaids of theology.” But he is critical of those theologians who wish to sever the connection between faith and reason. As he argues in another famous work, Itinerarium mentis ad deum “The Mind’s Journey unto God,” 1259, “since, relative to our life on earth, the world is itself a ladder for ascending to God, we find here certain traces, certain images” of the divine hand, in which God himself is mirrored. Although Bonaventure’s own philosophical outlook is Augustinian, he was also influenced by Aristotle, whose newly available works he both read and appreciated. Thus, while upholdBonaventure, Saint Bonaventure, Saint 94   94 ing the Aristotelian ideas that knowledge of the external world is based on the senses and that the mind comes into existence as a tabula rasa, he also contends that divine illumination is necessary to explain both the acquisition of universal concepts from sense images, and the certainty of intellectual judgment. His own illuminationist epistemology seeks a middle ground between, on the one hand, those who maintain that the eternal light is the sole reason for human knowing, providing the human intellect with its archetypal and intelligible objects, and, on the other, those holding that the eternal light merely influences human knowing, helping guide it toward truth. He holds that our intellect has certain knowledge when stable; eternal archetypes are “contuited by us [a nobis contuita],” together with intelligible species produced by its own fallible powers. In metaphysics, Bonaventure defends exemplarism, the doctrine that all creation is patterned after exemplar causes or ideas in the mind of God. Like Aquinas, but unlike Duns Scotus, he argues that it is through such ideas that God knows all creatures. He also adopts the emanationist principle that creation proceeds from God’s goodness, which is self-diffusive, but differs from other emanationists, such as al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, in arguing that divine emanation is neither necessary nor indirect i.e., accomplished by secondary agents or intelligences. Indeed, he sees the views of these Islamic philosophers as typical of the errors bound to follow once Aristotelian rationalism is taken to its extreme. He is also well known for his anti-Aristotelian argument that the eternity of the world  something even Aquinas following Maimonides concedes as a theoretical possibility  is demonstrably false. Bonaventure also subscribes to several other doctrines characteristic of medieval Augustinianism: universal hylomorphism, the thesis, defended by Ibn Gabirol and Avicenna among others, that everything other than God is composed of matter and form; the plurality of forms, the view that subjects and predicates in the category of substance are ordered in terms of their metaphysical priority; and the ontological view of truth, according to which truth is a kind of rightness perceived by the mind. In a similar vein, Bonaventure argues that knowledge ultimately consists in perceiving truth directly, without argument or demonstration. Bonaventure also wrote several classic works in the tradition of mystical theology. His bestknown and most popular mystical work is the aforementioned Itinerarium, written in 1259 on a pilgrimage to La Verna, during which he beheld the six-winged seraph that had also appeared to Francis of Assisi when Francis received the stigmata. Bonaventure outlines a seven-stage spiritual journey, in which our mind moves from first considering God’s traces in the perfections of irrational creatures, to a final state of peaceful repose, in which our affections are “transferred and transformed into God.” Central to his writings on spiritual life is the theme of the “three ways”: the purgative way, inspired by conscience, which expels sin; the illuminative way, inspired by the intellect, which imitates Christ; and the unitive way, inspired by wisdom, which unites us to God through love. Bonaventure’s writings most immediately influenced the work of other medieval Augustinians, such as Matthew of Aquasparta and John Peckham, and later, followers of Duns Scotus. But his modern reputation rests on his profound contributions to philosophical theology, Franciscan spirituality, and mystical thought, in all three of which he remains an authoritative source. 

campus -- field theory, a theory that proceeds by assigning values of physical quantities to the points of space, or of space-time, and then lays down laws relating these values. For example, a field theory might suppose a value for matter density, or a temperature for each space-time point, and then relate these values, usually in terms of differential equations. In these examples there is at least the tacit assumption of a physical substance that fills the relevant region of space-time. But no such assumption need be made. For instance, in Ficino, Marsilio field theory 309   309 Maxwell’s theory of the electromagnetic field, each point of space-time carries a value for an electric and a magnetic field, and these values are then governed by Maxwell’s equations. In general relativity, the geometry e.g., the curvature of space-time is itself treated as a field, with lawlike connections with the distribution of energy and matter. Formulation in terms of a field theory resolves the problem of action at a distance that so exercised Newton and his contemporaries. We often take causal connection to require spatial contiguity. That is, for one entity to act causally on another, the two entities need to be contiguous. But in Newton’s description gravitational attraction acts across spatial distances. Similarly, in electrostatics the mutual repulsion of electric charges is described as acting across spatial distances. In the times of both Newton and Maxwell numerous efforts to understand such action at a distance in terms of some space-filling mediating substance produced no viable theory. Field theories resolve the perplexity. By attributing values of physical quantities directly to the space-time points one can describe gravitation, electrical and magnetic forces, and other interactions without action at a distance or any intervening physical medium. One describes the values of physical quantities, attributed directly to the space-time points, as influencing only the values at immediately neighboring points. In this way the influences propagate through space-time, rather than act instantaneously across distances or through a medium. Of course there is a metaphysical price: on such a description the space-time points themselves take on the role of a kind of dematerialized ether. Indeed, some have argued that the pervasive role of field theory in contemporary physics and the need for space-time points for a field-theoretic description constitute a strong argument for the existence of the space-time points. This conclusion contradicts “relationalism,” which claims that there are only spatiotemporal relations, but no space-time points or regions thought of as particulars. Quantum field theory appears to take on a particularly abstract form of field theory, since it associates a quantum mechanical operator with each space-time point. However, since operators correspond to physical magnitudes rather than to values of such magnitudes, it is better to think of the field-theoretic aspect of quantum field theory in terms of the quantum mechanical amplitudes that it also associates with the space-time points. 

figura: figure-ground, the discrimination of an object or figure from the context or background against which it is set. Even when a connected region is grouped together properly, as in the famous figure that can be seen either as a pair of faces or as a vase, it is possible to interpret the region alternately as figure and as ground. This fact was originally elaborated in 1 by Edgar Rubin 6 1. Figureground effects and the existence of other ambiguous figures such as the Necker cube and the duck-rabbit challenged the prevailing assumption, Vitters thought, in classical theories of perception  maintained, e.g., by H. P. Grice and J. S. Mill and H. von Helmholtz  that complex perceptions could be understood in terms of primitive sensations constituting them. The underdetermination of perception by the visual stimulus, noted by Berkeley in his Essay of 1709, takes account of the fact that the retinal image is impoverished with respect to threedimensional information. Identical stimulation at the retina can result from radically different distal sources. Within Gestalt psychology, the Gestalt, or pattern, was recognized to be underdetermined by constituent parts available in proximal stimuli. M. Wertheimer 03 observed in 2 that apparent motion could be induced by viewing a series of still pictures in rapid succession. He concluded that perception of the whole, as involving movement, was fundamentally different from the perception of the static images of which it is composed. W. Köhler An example of visual reversal from Edgar Rubin: the object depicted can be seen alternately as a vase or as a pair of faces. The reversal occurs whether there is a black ground and white figure or white figure and black ground. figure figure  ground 310   310 77 observed that there was no figure ground articulation in the retinal image, and concluded that inherently ambiguous stimuli required some autonomous selective principles of perceptual organization. As subsequently developed by Gestalt psychologists, form is taken as the primitive unit of perception. In philosophical treatments, figureground effects are used to enforce the conclusion that interpretation is central to perception, and that perceptions are no more than hypotheses based on sensory data. Refs.: Grice, “You can’t see a knife as a knife,” “The Causal Theory of Perception,” Vitters on ‘seeing-as’”.

filmer: r. English political writer who produced, most importantly, the posthumous Patriarcha 1680. It is remembered because Locke attacked it in the first of his Two Treatises of Government 1690. Filmer argued that God gave complete authority over the world to Adam, and that from him it descended to his eldest son when he became the head of the family. Thereafter only fathers directly descended from Adam could properly be rulers. Just as Adam’s rule was not derived from the consent of his family, so the king’s inherited authority is not dependent on popular consent. He rightly makes laws and imposes taxes at his own good pleasure, though like a good father he has the welfare of his subjects in view. Filmer’s patriarchalism, intended to bolster the absolute power of the king, is the classic English statement of the doctrine. 

find play – where Grice’s implicature finds play Strawson Wiggins p. 523

fludd: r. English physician and writer. Influenced by Paracelsus, hermetism, and the cabala, Fludd defended a Neoplatonic worldview on the eve of its supersession by the new mechanistic philosophy. He produced improvements in the manufacture of steel and invented a thermometer, though he also used magnets to cure disease and devised a salve to be applied to a weapon to cure the wound it had inflicted. He held that science got its ideas from Scripture allegorically interpreted, when they were of any value. His works combine theology with an occult, Neoplatonic reading of the Bible, and contain numerous fine diagrams illustrating the mutual sympathy of human beings, the natural world, and the supernatural world, each reflecting the others in parallel harmonic structures. In controversy with Kepler, Fludd claimed to uncover essential natural processes rooted in natural sympathies and the operation of God’s light, rather than merely describing the external movements of the heavens. Creation is the extension of divine light into matter. Evil arises from a darkness in God, his failure to will. Matter is uncreated, but this poses no problem for orthodoxy, since matter is nothing, a mere possibility without the least actuality, not something Filmer, Robert Fludd, Robert 311   311 coeternal with the Creator. 

fodor: j. a. – Griceian philosophical psychologis from the New World (Old World, originally)t, known for his energetic and often witty defense of intensional realism, a computationalrepresentational model of thought, and an atomistic, externalist theory of content determination for mental states. Fodor’s philosophical writings fall under three headings. First, he has defended the theory of mind implicit in contemporary cognitive psychology, that the cognitive mind-brain is both a representational/computational device and, ultimately, physical. He has taken on behaviorists Ryle, psychologists in the tradition of J. J. Gibson, and eliminative materialists P. A. Churchland. Second, he has engaged in various theoretical disputes within cognitive psychology, arguing for the modularity of the perceptual and language systems roughly, the view that they are domain-specific, mandatory, limited-access, innately specified, hardwired, and informationally encapsulated The Modularity of Mind, 3; for a strong form of nativism that virtually all of our concepts are innate; and for the existence of a “language of thought” The Language of Thought, 5. The latter has led him to argue against connectionism as a psychological theory as opposed to an implementation theory. Finally, he has defended the views of ordinary propositional attitude psychology that our mental states 1 are semantically evaluable intentional, 2 have causal powers, and 3 are such that the implicit generalizations of folk psychology are largely true of them. His defense is twofold. Folk psychology is unsurpassed in explanatory power; furthermore, it is vindicated by contemporary cognitive psychology insofar as ordinary propositional attitude states can be identified with information-processing states, those that consist in a computational relation to a representation. The representational component of such states allows us to explain the semantic evaluability of the attitudes; the computational component, their causal efficacy. Both sorts of accounts raise difficulties. The first is satisfactory only if supplemented by a naturalistic account of representational content. Here Fodor has argued for an atomistic, externalist causal theory Psychosemantics, 7 and against holism the view that no mental representation has content unless many other non-synonymous mental representations also have content Holism: A Shopper’s Guide, 2, against conceptual role theories the view that the content of a representation is determined by its conceptual role N. Block (who quotes Grice’s Method), B. F. Loar (DPhil Oxon under Grice’s collaborator G. J. Warnock) and against teleofunctional theories teleofunctionalism is the view that the content of a representation is determined, at least in part, by the biological functions of the representations themselves or systems that produce or use those representations Ruth Millikan, David Papineau. The second sort is satisfactory only if it does not imply epiphenomenalism with respect to content properties. To avoid such epiphenomenalism, Fodor has argued that not only strict laws but also ceteris paribus laws can be causal. In addition, he has sought to reconcile his externalism vis-à-vis content with the view that causal efficacy requires an individualistic individuation of states. Two solutions have been explored: the supplementation of broad externally determined content with narrow content, where the latter supervenes on what is “in the head” Psychosemantics, 7, and its supplementation with modes of presentation identical to sentences of the language of thought The Elm and the Expert, 5. 

Grice’s folksy psychology: Grice loved Ramsey, “But Ramsey was born before folk-psychology, so his ‘Theories’ is very dense.”” one sense, a putative network of principles constituting a commonsense theory that allegedly underlies everyday explanations of human behavior; the theory assigns a central role to mental states like belief, desire, and intention. Consider an example of an everyday commonsense psychological explanation: Jane went to the refrigerator because she wanted a beer and she believed there was beer in the refrigerator. Like many such explanations, this adverts to a so-called propositional attitude  a mental state, expressed by a verb ‘believe’ plus a that-clause, whose intentional content is propositional. It also adverts to a mental state, expressed by a verb ‘want’ plus a direct-object phrase, whose intentional content appears not to be propositional. In another, related sense, folk psychology is a network of social practices that includes ascribing such mental states to ourselves and others, and proffering explanations of human behavior that advert to these states. The two senses need distinguishing because some philosophers who acknowledge the existence of folk psychology in the second sense hold that commonsense psychological explanations do not employ empirical generalizations, and hence that there is no such theory as folk psychology. Henceforth, ‘FP’ will abbreviate ‘folk psychology’ in the first sense; the unabbreviated phrase will be used in the second sense. Eliminativism in philosophy of mind asserts that FP is an empirical theory; that FP is therefore subject to potential scientific falsification; and that mature science very probably will establish that FP is so radically false that humans simply do not undergo mental states like beliefs, desires, and intentions. One kind of eliminativist argument first sets forth certain methodological strictures about how FP would have to integrate with mature science in order to be true e.g., being smoothly reducible to neuroscience, or being absorbed into mature cognitive science, and then contends that these strictures are unlikely to be met. Another kind of argument first claims that FP embodies certain strong empirical commitments e.g., to mental representations with languagelike syntactic structure, and then contends that such empirical presuppositions are likely to turn out false. One influential version of folk psychological realism largely agrees with eliminativism about what is required to vindicate folk psychology, but also holds that mature science is likely to provide such vindication. Realists of this persuasion typically argue, for instance, that mature cognitive science will very likely incorporate FP, and also will very likely treat beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes as states with languagelike syntactic structure. Other versions of folkpsychological realism take issue, in one way or another, with either i the eliminativists’ claims about FP’s empirical commitments, or ii the eliminativists’ strictures about how FP must mesh with mature science in order to be true, or both. Concerning i, for instance, some philosophers maintain that FP per se is not committed to the existence of languagelike mental representations. If mature cognitive science turns out not to posit a “language of thought,” they contend, this would not necessarily show that FP is radically false; instead it might only show that propositional attitudes are subserved in some other way than via languagelike representational structures. Concerning ii, some philosophers hold that FP can be true without being as tightly connected to mature scientific theories as the eliminativists require. For instance, the demand that the special sciences be smoothly reducible to the fundamental natural sciences is widely considered an excessively stringent criterion of intertheoretic compatibility; so perhaps FP could be true without being smoothly reducible to neuroscience. Similarly, the demand that FP be directly absorbable into empirical cognitive science is sometimes considered too stringent as a criterion either of FP’s truth, or of the soundness of its ontology of beliefs, desires, and other propositional attitudes, or of the legitimacy of FP-based explanations of behavior. Perhaps FP is a true theory, and explanatorily legitimate, even if it is not destined to become a part of science. Even if FP’s ontological categories are not scientific natural kinds, perhaps its generalizations are like generalizations about clothing: true, explanatorily usable, and ontologically sound. No one doubts the existence of hats, coats, or scarves. No one doubts the truth or explanatory utility of generalizations like ‘Coats made of heavy material tend to keep the body warm in cold weather’, even though these generalizations are not laws of any science. Yet another approach to folk psychology, often wedded to realism about beliefs and desires although sometimes wedded to instrumentalism, maintains that folk psychology does not employ empirical generalizations, and hence is not a theory at all. One variant denies that folk psychology employs any generalizations, empirical or otherwise. Another variant concedes that there are folk-psychological generalizations, but denies that they are empirical; instead they are held to be analytic truths, or norms of rationality, or both at once. Advocates of non-theory views typically regard folk psychology as a hermeneutic, or interpretive, enterprise. They often claim too that the attribution of propositional attitudes, and also the proffering and grasping of folk-psychological explanations, is a matter of imaginatively projecting oneself into another person’s situation, and then experiencing a kind of empathic understanding, or Verstehen, of the person’s actions and the motives behind them. A more recent, hi-tech, formulation of this idea is that the interpreter “runs a cognitive simulation” of the person whose actions are to be explained. Philosophers who defend folk-psychological realism, in one or another of the ways just canvassed, also sometimes employ arguments based on the allegedly self-stultifying nature of eliminativism. One such argument begins from the premise that the notion of action is folk-psychological  that a behavioral event counts as an action only if it is caused by propositional attitudes that rationalize it under some suitable actdescription. If so, and if humans never really undergo propositional attitudes, then they never really act either. In particular, they never really assert anything, or argue for anything since asserting and arguing are species of action. So if eliminativism is true, the argument concludes, then eliminativists can neither assert it nor argue for it  an allegedly intolerable pragmatic paradox. Eliminativists generally react to such arguments with breathtaking equanimity. A typical reply is that although our present concept of action might well be folk-psychological, this does not preclude the possibility of a future successor concept, purged of any commitment to beliefs and desires, that could inherit much of the role of our current, folk-psychologically tainted, concept of action. 

Fonseca, Pedro da,  philosopher and logician. He entered the Jesuit order in 1548. Apart from a period in Rome, he lived in Portugal, teaching philosophy and theology at the universities of Evora and Coimbra and performing various administrative duties for his order. He was responsible for the idea of a published course on Aristotelian philosophy, and the resulting series of Coimbra commentaries, the Cursus Conimbricensis, was widely used in the seventeenth century. His own logic text, the Institutes of Dialectic 1564, went into many editions. It is a good example of Renaissance Aristotelianism, with its emphasis on Aristotle’s syllogistic, but it retains some material on medieval developments, notably consequences, exponibles, and supposition theory. Fonseca also wrote a commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics published in parts from 1577 on, which contains the Grecian text, a corrected Latin translation, comments on textual matters, and an extensive exploration of selected philosophical problems. He cites a wide range of medieval philosophers, both Christian and Arab, as well as the newly published Grecian commentators on Aristotle. His own position is sympathetic to Aquinas, but generally independent. Fonseca is important not so much for any particular doctrines, though he did hold original views on such matters as analogy, but for his provision of fully documented, carefully written and carefully argued books that, along with others in the same tradition, were read at universities, both Catholic and Protestant, well into the seventeenth century. He represents what is often called the Second Scholasticism.

Fontenelle, Bernard Le Bovier de: writer who heralded the age of the philosophes. A product of Jesuit education, he was a versatile freethinker with skeptical inclinations. Dialogues of the Dead 1683 showed off his analytical mind and elegant style. In 1699, he was appointed secretary of the Academy of Sciences. He composed famous eulogies of scientists; defended the superiority of modern science over tradition in Digression on Ancients and Moderns 1688; popularized Copernican astronomy in Conversations on the Plurality of Worlds 1686  famous for postulating the inhabitation of planets; stigmatized superstition and credulity in History of Oracles 1687 and The Origin of Fables 1724; promoted Cartesian physics in The Theory of Cartesian Vortices 1752; and wrote Elements of Infinitesimal Calculus 1727 in the wake of Newton and Leibniz. J.-L.S. Foot, Philippa b.0, British philosopher who exerted a lasting influence on the development of moral philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century. Her persisting, intertwined themes are opposition to all forms of subjectivism in ethics, the significance of the virtues and vices, and the connection between morality and rationality. In her earlier papers, particularly “Moral Beliefs” 8 and “Goodness and Choice” 1, reprinted in Virtues and Vices 8, she undermines the subjectivist accounts of moral “judgment” derived from C. L. Stevenson and Hare by arguing for many logical or conceptual connections between evaluations and the factual statements on which they must be based. Lately she has developed this kind of thought into the naturalistic claim that moral evaluations are determined by facts about our life and our nature, as evaluations of features of plants and animals as good or defective specimens of their kind are determined by facts about their nature and their life. Foot’s opposition to subjectivism has remained constant, but her views on the virtues in relation to rationality have undergone several changes. In “Moral Beliefs” she relates them to self-interest, maintaining that a virtue must benefit its possessor; in the subsequently repudiated “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives” 2 she went as far as to deny that there was necessarily anything contrary to reason in being uncharitable or unjust. In “Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 5 the virtues themselves appear as forms of practical rationality. Her most recent work, soon to be published as The Grammar of Goodness, preserves and develops the latter claim and reinstates ancient connections between virtue, rationality, and happiness. 

forcing: a method introduced by Paul J. Cohen  see his Set Theory and the Continuum Hypothesis 6  to prove independence results in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory ZF. Cohen proved the independence of the axiom of choice AC from ZF, and of the continuum hypothesis CH from ZF ! AC. The consistency of AC with ZF and of CH with ZF ! AC had previously been proved by Gödel by the method of constructible sets. A model of ZF consists of layers, with the elements of a set at one layer always belonging to lower layers. Starting with a model M, Cohen’s method produces an “outer model” N with no more levels but with more sets at each level whereas Gödel’s method produces an ‘inner model’ L: much of what will become true in N can be “forced” from within M. The method is applicable only to hypotheses in the more “abstract” branches of mathematics infinitary combinatorics, general topology, measure theory, universal algebra, model theory, etc.; but there it is ubiquitous. Applications include the proof by Robert M. Solovay of the consistency of the measurability of all sets of all projective sets with ZF with ZF ! AC; also the proof by Solovay and Donald A. Martin of the consistency of Martin’s axiom MA plus the negation of the continuum hypothesis -CH with ZF ! AC. CH implies MA; and of known consequences of CH about half are implied by MA, about half refutable by MA ! -CH. Numerous simplifications, extensions, and variants e.g. Boolean-valued models of Cohen’s method have been introduced. 

fordyce: d., philosopher and educational theorist whose writings were influential in the eighteenth century. His lectures formed the basis of his Elements of Moral Philosophy, written originally for The Preceptor 1748, later tr. into G. and , and abridged for the articles on moral philosophy in the first Encylopaedia Britannica 1771. Fordyce combines the preacher’s appeal to the heart in the advocacy of virtue with a moral “scientist’s” appraisal of human psychology. He claims to derive our duties experimentally from a study of the prerequisites of human happiness. M.A.St. foreknowledge, divine.

forma: form, in metaphysics, especially Plato’s and Aristotle’s, the structure or essence of a thing as contrasted with its matter. Plato’s theory of Forms is a realistic ontology of universals. In his elenchus, Socrates sought what is common to, e.g., all chairs. Plato believed there must be an essence  or Form  common to everything falling under one concept, which makes anything what it is. A chair is a chair because it “participates in” the Form of Chair. The Forms are ideal “patterns,” unchanging, timeless, and perfect. They exist in a world of their own cf. the Kantian noumenal realm. Plato speaks of them as self-predicating: the Form of Beauty is perfectly beautiful. This led, as he realized, to the Third Man argument that there must be an infinite number of Forms. The only true understanding is of the Forms. This we attain through anamnesis, “recollection.” 2 Aristotle agreed that forms are closely tied to intelligibility, but denied their separate existence. Aristotle explains change and generation through a distinction between the form and matter of substances. A lump of bronze matter becomes a statue through its being molded into a certain shape form. In his earlier metaphysics, Aristotle identified primary substance with the composite of matter and form, e.g. Socrates. Later, he suggests that primary substance is form  what makes Socrates what he is the form here is his soul. This notion of forms as essences has obvious similarities with the Platonic view. They became the “substantial forms” of Scholasticism, accepted until the seventeenth century. Kant saw form as the a priori aspect of experience. We are presented with phenomenological “matter,” which has no meaning until the mind imposes some form upon it. Grice finds the ‘logical’ in ‘logical form’ otiose. “Unless we contrast it with logical matter.” Refs.: Grice, “Form: logical and other.” A formal fallacy is an invalid inference pattern that is described in terms of a formal logic. There are three main cases: 1 an invalid or otherwise unacceptable argument identified solely by its form or structure, with no reference to the content of the premises and conclusion such as equivocation or to other features, generally of a pragmatic character, of the argumentative discourse such as unsuitability of the argument for the purposes for which it is given, failure to satisfy inductive standards for acceptable argument, etc.; the latter conditions of argument evaluation fall into the purview of informal fallacy; 2 a formal rule of inference, or an argument form, that is not valid in the logical system on which the evaluation is made, instances of which are sufficiently frequent, familiar, or deceptive to merit giving a name to the rule or form; ad 3 an argument that is an instance of a fallacious rule of inference or of a fallacious argument form and that is not itself valid. The criterion of satisfactory argument typically taken as relevant in discussing formal fallacies is validity. In this regard, it is important to observe that rules of inference and argument forms that are not valid may have instances which may be another rule or argument form, or may be a specific argument that are valid. Thus, whereas the argument form i P, Q; therefore R a form that every argument, including every valid argument, consisting of two premises shares is not valid, the argument form ii, obtained from i by substituting P&Q for R, is a valid instance of i: ii P, Q; therefore P&Q. Since ii is not invalid, ii is not a formal fallacy though it is an instance of i. Thus, some instances of formally fallacious rules of inference or argument-forms may be valid and therefore not be formal fallacies. Examples of formal fallacies follow below, presented according to the system of logic appropriate to the level of description of the fallacy. There are no standard names for some of the fallacies listed below. Fallacies of sentential propositional logic. Affirming the consequent: If p then q; q / , p. ‘If Richard had his nephews murdered, then Richard was an evil man; Richard was an evil man. Therefore, Richard had his nephews murdered.’ Denying the antecedent: If p then q; not-p / , not-q. ‘If North was found guilty by the courts, then North committed the crimes charged of him; North was not found guilty by the courts. Therefore, North did not commit the crimes charged of him.’ Commutation of conditionals: If p then q / , If q then p. ‘If Reagan was a great leader, then so was Thatcher. Therefore, if Thatcher was a great leader, then so was Reagan.” Improper transposition: If p then q / , If not-p then not-q. ‘If the nations of the Middle East disarm, there will be peace in the region. Therefore, if the nations of the Middle East do not disarm, there will not be peace in the region.’ Improper disjunctive syllogism affirming one disjunct: p or q; p / ,, not-q. ‘Either John is an alderman or a ward committeeman; John is an alderman. Therefore, John is not a ward committeeman.’ This rule of inference would be valid if ‘or’ were interpreted exclusively, where ‘p or EXq’ is true if exactly one constituent is true and is false otherwise. In standard systems of logic, however, ‘or’ is interpreted inclusively. Fallacies of syllogistic logic. Fallacies of distribution where M is the middle term, P is the major term, and S is the minor term. Undistributed middle term: the middle term is not distributed in either premise roughly, nothing is said of all members of the class it designates, as in form, grammatical formal fallacy 316   316 Some P are M ‘Some politicians are crooks. Some M are S Some crooks are thieves. ,Some S are P. ,Some politicians are thieves.’ Illicit major undistributed major term: the major term is distributed in the conclusion but not in the major premise, as in All M are P ‘All radicals are communists. No S are M No socialists are radicals. ,Some S are ,Some socialists are not not P. communists.’ Illicit minor undistributed minor term: the minor term is distributed in the conclusion but not in the minor premise, as in All P are M ‘All neo-Nazis are radicals. All M are S All radicals are terrorists. ,All S are P. ,All terrorists are neoNazis.’ Fallacies of negation. Two negative premises exclusive premises: the syllogism has two negative premises, as in No M are P ‘No racist is just. Some M are not S Some racists are not police. ,Some S are not P. ,Some police are not just. Illicit negative/affirmative: the syllogism has a negative premise conclusion but no negative conclusion premise, as in All M are P ‘All liars are deceivers. Some M are not S Some liars are not aldermen. ,Some S are P. ,Some aldermen are deceivers.’ and All P are M ‘All vampires are monsters. All M are S All monsters are creatures. ,Some S are not P. ,Some creatures are not vampires.’ Fallacy of existential import: the syllogism has two universal premises and a particular conclusion, as in All P are M ‘All horses are animals. No S are M No unicorns are animals. ,Some S are not P. ,Some unicorns are not horses.’ A syllogism can commit more than one fallacy. For example, the syllogism Some P are M Some M are S ,No S are P commits the fallacies of undistributed middle, illicit minor, illicit major, and illicit negative/affirmative. Fallacies of predicate logic. Illicit quantifier shift: inferring from a universally quantified existential proposition to an existentially quantified universal proposition, as in Ex Dy Fxy / , Dy Ex Fxy ‘Everyone is irrational at some time or other /, At some time, everyone is irrational.’ Some are/some are not unwarranted contrast: inferring from ‘Some S are P’ that ‘Some S are not P’ or inferring from ‘Some S are not P’ that ‘Some S are P’, as in Dx Sx & Px / , Dx Sx & -Px ‘Some people are left-handed / , Some people are not left-handed.’ Illicit substitution of identicals: where f is an opaque oblique context and a and b are singular terms, to infer from fa; a = b / , fb, as in ‘The Inspector believes Hyde is Hyde; Hyde is Jekyll / , The Inspector believes Hyde is Jekyll.’  Forma gives rise to formalism (or the formalists), which Grice contrasts with Ryle and Strawson’s informalism (the informalists). Formalism is described by Grice as the the view that mathematics concerns manipulations of symbols according to prescribed structural rules. It is cousin to nominalism, the older and more general metaphysical view that denies the existence of all abstract objects and is often contrasted with Platonism, which takes mathematics to be the study of a special class of non-linguistic, non-mental objects, and intuitionism, which takes it to be the study of certain mental constructions. In sophisticated versions, mathematical activity can comprise the study of possible formal manipulations within a system as well as the manipulations themselves, and the “symbols” need not be regarded as either linguistic or concrete. Formalism is often associated with the mathematician formalism formalism 317   317 David Hilbert. But Hilbert held that the “finitary” part of mathematics, including, for example, simple truths of arithmetic, describes indubitable facts about real objects and that the “ideal” objects that feature elsewhere in mathematics are introduced to facilitate research about the real objects. Hilbert’s formalism is the view that the foundations of mathematics can be secured by proving the consistency of formal systems to which mathematical theories are reduced. Gödel’s two incompleteness theorems establish important limitations on the success of such a project. And then there’s “formalization,” an abstract representation of a theory that must satisfy requirements sharper than those imposed on the structure of theories by the axiomatic-deductive method. That method can be traced back to Euclid’s Elements. The crucial additional requirement is the regimentation of inferential steps in proofs: not only do axioms have to be given in advance, but the rules representing argumentative steps must also be taken from a predetermined list. To avoid a regress in the definition of proof and to achieve intersubjectivity on a minimal basis, the rules are to be “formal” or “mechanical” and must take into account only the form of statements. Thus, to exclude any ambiguity, a precise and effectively described language is needed to formalize particular theories. The general kind of requirements was clear to Aristotle and explicit in Leibniz; but it was only Frege who, in his Begriffsschrift 1879, presented, in addition to an expressively rich language with relations and quantifiers, an adequate logical calculus. Indeed, Frege’s calculus, when restricted to the language of predicate logic, turned out to be semantically complete. He provided for the first time the means to formalize mathematical proofs. Frege pursued a clear philosophical aim, namely, to recognize the “epistemological nature” of theorems. In the introduction to his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik 3, Frege wrote: “By insisting that the chains of inference do not have any gaps we succeed in bringing to light every axiom, assumption, hypothesis or whatever else you want to call it on which a proof rests; in this way we obtain a basis for judging the epistemological nature of the theorem.” The Fregean frame was used in the later development of mathematical logic, in particular, in proof theory. Gödel established through his incompleteness theorems fundamental limits of formalizations of particular theories, like the system of Principia Mathematica or axiomatic set theories. The general notion of formal theory emerged from the subsequent investigations of Church and Turing clarifying the concept of ‘mechanical procedure’ or ‘algorithm.’ Only then was it possible to state and prove the incompleteness theorems for all formal theories satisfying certain very basic representability and derivability conditions. Gödel emphasized repeatedly that these results do not establish “any bounds for the powers of human reason, but rather for the potentialities of pure formalism in mathematics.”  As Grice notes, to ormalize: narrowly construed, to formulate a subject as a theory in first-order predicate logic; broadly construed, to describe the essentials of the subject in some formal language for which a notion of consequence is defined. For Hilbert, formalizing mathematics requires at least that there be finite means of checking purported proofs.  The formalists speak of a ‘formal’ language, “but is it a language?” – Grice. formal language: H. P. Grice, “Bergmann on ideal language versus ordinary language,” a language in which an expression’s grammaticality and interpretation if any are determined by precisely defined rules that appeal only to the form or shape of the symbols that constitute it rather than, for example, to the intention of the speaker. It is usually understood that the rules are finite and effective so that there is an algorithm for determining whether an expression is a formula and that the grammatical expressions are uniquely readable, i.e., they are generated by the rules in only one way. A paradigm example is the language of firstorder predicate logic, deriving principally from the Begriffsschrift of Frege. The grammatical formulas of this language can be delineated by an inductive definition: 1 a capital letter ‘F’, ‘G’, or ‘H’, with or without a numerical subscript, folformalism, aesthetic formal language 318   318 lowed by a string of lowercase letters ‘a’, ‘b’, or ‘c’, with or without numerical subscripts, is a formula; 2 if A is a formula, so is -A; 3 if A and B are formulas, so are A & B, A P B, and A 7 B; 4 if A is a formula and v is a lowercase letter ‘x’, ‘y’, or ‘z’, with or without numerical subscripts, then DvA' and EvA' are formulas where A' is obtained by replacing one or more occurrences of some lowercase letter in A together with its subscripts if any by v; 5 nothing is a formula unless it can be shown to be one by finitely many applications of the clauses 14. The definition uses the device of metalinguistic variables: clauses with ‘A’ and ‘B’ are to be regarded as abbreviations of all the clauses that would result by replacing these letters uniformly by names of expressions. It also uses several naming conventions: a string of symbols is named by enclosing it within single quotes and also by replacing each symbol in the string by its name; the symbols ‘7’, ‘‘,’’, ‘&’, ‘P’, ‘-’ are considered names of themselves. The interpretation of predicate logic is spelled out by a similar inductive definition of truth in a model. With appropriate conventions and stipulations, alternative definitions of formulas can be given that make expressions like ‘P 7 Q’ the names of formulas rather than formulas themselves. On this approach, formulas need not be written symbols at all and form cannot be identified with shape in any narrow sense. For Tarski, Carnap, and others a formal language also included rules of “transformation” specifying when one expression can be regarded as a consequence of others. Today it is more common to view the language and its consequence relation as distinct. Formal languages are often contrasted with natural languages, like English or Swahili. Richard Montague, however, has tried to show that English is itself a formal language, whose rules of grammar and interpretation are similar to  though much more complex than  predicate logic.  Then there’s formal learnability theory, the study of human language learning through explicit formal models typically employing artifical languages and simplified learning strategies. The fundamental problem is how a learner is able to arrive at a grammar of a language on the basis of a finite sample of presented sentences and perhaps other kinds of information as well. The seminal work is by E. Gold 7, who showed, roughly, that learnability of certain types of grammars from the Chomsky hierarchy by an unbiased learner required the presentation of ungrammatical strings, identified as such, along with grammatical strings. Recent studies have concentrated on other types of grammar e.g., generative transformational grammars, modes of presentation, and assumptions about learning strategies in an attempt to approximate the actual situation more closely. If Strawson and Ryle are into ‘informal logic,’ Hilbert isn’t. Formal logic, versus ‘material logic,’ is the science of correct reasoning, going back to Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, based upon the premise that the validity of an argument is a function of its structure or logical form. The modern embodiment of formal logic is symbolic mathematical logic. This is the study of valid inference in artificial, precisely formulated languages, the grammatical structure of whose sentences or well-formed formulas is intended to mirror, or be a regimentation of, the logical forms of their natural language counterparts. These formal languages can thus be viewed as mathematical models of fragments of natural language. Like models generally, these models are idealizations, typically leaving out of account such phenomena as vagueness, ambiguity, and tense. But the idea underlying symbolic logic is that to the extent that they reflect certain structural features of natural language arguments, the study of valid inference in formal languages can yield insight into the workings of those arguments. The standard course of study for anyone interested in symbolic logic begins with the classical propositional calculus sentential calculus, or PC. Here one constructs a theory of valid inference for a formal language built up from a stock of propositional variables sentence letters and an expressively complete set of connectives. In the propositional calculus, one is therefore concerned with arguments whose validity turns upon the presence of two-valued truth-functional sentence-forming operators on sentences such as classical negation, conjunction, disjunction, and the like. The next step is the predicate calculus lower functional calculus, first-order logic, elementary quantification theory, the study of valid inference in first-order languages. These are languages built up from an expressively complete set of connectives, first-order universal or existential quantifiers, individual variables, names, predicates relational symbols, and perhaps function symbols. Further, and more specialized, work in symbolic logic might involve looking at fragments of the language of the propositional or predicate calculus, changing the semantics that the language is standardly given e.g., by allowing truth-value gaps or more than two truth-values, further embellishing the language e.g., by adding modal or other non-truth-functional connectives, or higher-order quantifiers, or liberalizing the grammar or syntax of the language e.g., by permitting infinitely long well-formed formulas. In some of these cases, of course, symbolic logic remains only marginally connected with natural language arguments as the interest shades off into one in formal languages for their own sake, a mark of the most advanced work being done in formal logic today.  Some philosophers (“me included” – Grice) speak of “formal semantics,” as opposed to Austin’s informal linguistic botanising -- the study of the interpretations of formal languages. A formal language can be defined apart from any interpretation of it. This is done by specifying a set of its symbols and a set of formation rules that determine which strings of symbols are grammatical or well formed. When rules of inference transformation rules are added and/or certain sentences are designated as axioms a logical system also known as a logistic system is formed. An interpretation of a formal language is roughly an assignment of meanings to its symbols and truth conditions to its sentences. Typically a distinction is made between a standard interpretation of a formal language and a non-standard interpretation. Consider a formal language in which arithmetic is formulable. In addition to the symbols of logic variables, quantifiers, brackets, and connectives, this language will contain ‘0’, ‘!’, ‘•’, and ‘s’. A standard interpretation of it assigns the set of natural numbers as the domain of discourse, zero to ‘0’, addition to ‘!’, multiplication to ‘•’, and the successor function to ‘s’. Other standard interpretations are isomorphic to the one just given. In particular, standard interpretations are numeral-complete in that they correlate the numerals one-to-one with the domain elements. A result due to Gödel and Rosser is that there are universal quantifications xAx that are not deducible from the Peano axioms if those axioms are consistent even though each An is provable. The Peano axioms if consistent are true on each standard interpretation. Thus each An is true on such an interpretation. Thus xAx is true on such an interpretation since a standard interpretation is numeral-complete. However, there are non-standard interpretations that do not correlate the numerals one-to-one with domain elements. On some of these interpretations each An is true but xAx is false. In constructing and interpreting a formal language we use a language already known to us, say, English. English then becomes our metalanguage, which we use to talk about the formal language, which is our object language. Theorems proven within the object language must be distinguished from those proven in the metalanguage. The latter are metatheorems. One goal of a semantical theory of a formal language is to characterize the consequence relation as expressed in that language and prove semantical metatheorems about that relation. A sentence S is said to be a consequence of a set of sentences K provided S is true on every interpretation on which each sentence in K is true. This notion has to be kept distinct from the notion of deduction. The latter concept can be defined only by reference to a logical system associated with a formal language. Consequence, however, can be characterized independently of a logical system, as was just done. 

foucault: m., philosopher and historian of thought. Foucault’s earliest writings e.g., Maladie mentale et personnalité [“Mental Illness and Personality”], 4 focused on psychology and developed within the frameworks of Marxism and existential phenomenology. He soon moved beyond these frameworks, in directions suggested by two fundamental influences: formal mode Foucault, Michel 320   320 history and philosophy of science, as practiced by Bachelard and especially Canguilhem, and the modernist literature of, e.g., Raymond Roussel, Bataille, and Maurice Blanchot. In studies of psychiatry Histoire de la folie [“History of Madness in the Classical Age”], 1, clinical medicine The Birth of the Clinic, 3, and the social sciences The Order of Things, 6, Foucault developed an approach to intellectual history, “the archaeology of knowledge,” that treated systems of thought as “discursive formations” independent of the beliefs and intentions of individual thinkers. Like Canguilhem’s history of science and like modernist literature, Foucault’s archaeology displaced the human subject from the central role it played in the humanism dominant in our culture since Kant. He reflected on the historical and philosophical significance of his archaeological method in The Archaeology of Knowledge 9. Foucault recognized that archaeology provided no account of transitions from one system to another. Accordingly, he introduced a “genealogical” approach, which does not replace archaeology but goes beyond it to explain changes in systems of discourse by connecting them to changes in the non-discursive practices of social power structures. Foucault’s genealogy admitted the standard economic, social, and political causes but, in a non-standard, Nietzschean vein, refused any unified teleological explanatory scheme e.g., Whig or Marxist histories. New systems of thought are seen as contingent products of many small, unrelated causes, not fulfillments of grand historical designs. Foucault’s geneaological studies emphasize the essential connection of knowledge and power. Bodies of knowledge are not autonomous intellectual structures that happen to be employed as Baconian instruments of power. Rather, precisely as bodies of knowledge, they are tied but not reducible to systems of social control. This essential connection of power and knowledge reflects Foucault’s later view that power is not merely repressive but a creative, if always dangerous, source of positive values. Discipline and Punish 5 showed how prisons constitute criminals as objects of disciplinary knowledge. The first volume of the History of Sexuality 6 sketched a project for seeing how, through modern biological and psychological sciences of sexuality, individuals are controlled by their own knowledge as self-scrutinizing and self-forming subjects. The second volume was projected as a study of the origins of the modern notion of a subject in practices of Christian confession. Foucault wrote such a study The Confessions of the Flesh but did not publish it because he decided that a proper understanding of the Christian development required a comparison with ancient conceptions of the ethical self. This led to two volumes 4 on Grecian and Roman sexuality: The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self. These final writings make explicit the ethical project that in fact informs all of Foucault’s work: the liberation of human beings from contingent conceptual constraints masked as unsurpassable a priori limits and the adumbration of alternative forms of existence. 

Grice’s foundationalism: the view that knowledge and epistemic knowledge-relevant justification have a two-tier structure: some instances of knowledge and justification are non-inferential, or foundational; and all other instances thereof are inferential, or non-foundational, in that they derive ultimately from foundational knowledge or justification. This structural view originates in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics at least regarding knowledge, receives an extreme formulation in Descartes’s Meditations, and flourishes, with varying details, in the works of such twentieth-century philosophers as Russell, C. I. Lewis, and Chisholm. Versions of foundationalism differ on two main projects: a the precise explanation of the nature of non-inferential, or foundational, knowledge and justification, and b the specific explanation of how foundational knowledge and justification can be transmitted to non-foundational beliefs. Foundationalism allows for differences on these projects, since it is essentially a view about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification. The question whether knowledge has foundations is essentially the question whether the sort of justification pertinent to knowledge has a twotier structure. Some philosophers have construed the former question as asking whether knowledge depends on beliefs that are certain in some sense e.g., indubitable or infallible. This construal bears, however, on only one species of foundationalism: radical foundationalism. Such foundationalism, represented primarily by Descartes, requires that foundational beliefs be certain and able to guarantee the certainty of the non-foundational beliefs they support. Radical foundationalism is currently unpopular for two main reasons. First, very few, if any, of our perceptual beliefs are certain i.e., indubitable; and, second, those of our beliefs that might be candidates for certainty e.g., the belief that I am thinking lack sufficient substance to guarantee the certainty of our rich, highly inferential knowledge of the external world e.g., our knowledge of physics, chemistry, and biology. Contemporary foundationalists typically endorse modest foundationalism, the view that non-inferentially justified, foundational beliefs need not possess or provide certainty and need not deductively support justified non-foundational beliefs. Foundational beliefs or statements are often called basic beliefs or statements, but the precise understanding of ‘basic’ here is controversial among foundationalists. Foundationalists agree, however, in their general understanding of non-inferentially justified, foundational beliefs as beliefs whose justification does not derive from other beliefs, although they leave open whether the causal basis of foundational beliefs includes other beliefs. Epistemic justification comes in degrees, but for simplicity we can restrict discussion to justification sufficient for satisfaction of the justification condition for knowledge; we can also restrict discussion to what it takes for a belief to have justification, omitting issues of what it takes to show that a belief has it. Three prominent accounts of non-inferential justification are available to modest foundationalists: a self-justification, b justification by non-belief, non-propositional experiences, and c justification by a non-belief reliable origin of a belief. Proponents of self-justification including, at one time, Ducasse and Chisholm contend that foundational beliefs can justify themselves, with no evidential support elsewhere. Proponents of foundational justification by non-belief experiences shun literal self-justification; they hold, following C. I. Lewis, that foundational perceptual beliefs can be justified by non-belief sensory or perceptual experiences e.g., seeming to see a dictionary that make true, are best explained by, or otherwise support, those beliefs e.g., the belief that there is, or at least appears to be, a dictionary here. Proponents of foundational justification by reliable origins find the basis of non-inferential justification in belief-forming processes e.g., perception, memory, introspection that are truth-conducive, i.e., that tend to produce true rather than false beliefs. This view thus appeals to the reliability of a belief’s nonbelief origin, whereas the previous view appeals to the particular sensory or perceptual experiences that correspond to e.g., make true or are best explained by a foundational belief. Despite disagreements over the basis of foundational justification, modest foundationalists typically agree that foundational justification is characterized by defeasibility, i.e., can be defeated, undermined, or overridden by a certain sort of expansion of one’s evidence or justified beliefs. For instance, your belief that there is a blue dictionary before you could lose its justification e.g., the justification from your current perceptual experiences if you acquired new evidence that there is a blue light shining on the dictionary before you. Foundational justification, therefore, can vary over time if accompanied by relevant changes in one’s perceptual evidence. It does not follow, however, that foundational justification positively depends, i.e., is based, on grounds for denying that there are defeaters. The relevant dependence can be regarded as negative in that there need only be an absence of genuine defeaters. Critics of foundationalism sometimes neglect that latter distinction regarding epistemic dependence. The second big task for foundationalists is to explain how justification transmits from foundational beliefs to inferentially justified, non-foundational beliefs. Radical foundationalists insist, for such transmission, on entailment relations that guarantee the truth or the certainty of nonfoundational beliefs. Modest foundationalists are more flexible, allowing for merely probabilistic inferential connections that transmit justification. For instance, a modest foundationalist can appeal to explanatory inferential connections, as when a foundational belief e.g., I seem to feel wet is best explained for a person by a particular physical-object belief e.g., the belief that the air conditioner overhead is leaking on me. Various other forms of probabilistic inference are available to modest foundationalists; and nothing in principle requires that they restrict foundational beliefs to what one “seems” to sense or to perceive. The traditional motivation for foundationalism comes largely from an eliminative regress argument, outlined originally regarding knowledge in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics. The argument, in shortest form, is that foundationalism is a correct account of the structure of justification since the alternative accounts all fail. Inferential justification is justification wherein one belief, B1, is justified on the basis of another belief, B2. How, if at all, is B2, the supporting belief, itself justified? Obviously, Aristotle suggests, we cannot have a circle here, where B2 is justified by B1; nor can we allow the chain of support to extend endlessly, with no ultimate basis for justification. We cannot, moreover, allow B2 to remain unjustified, foundationalism foundationalism 322   322 lest it lack what it takes to support B1. If this is right, the structure of justification does not involve circles, endless regresses, or unjustified starter-beliefs. That is, this structure is evidently foundationalist. This is, in skeletal form, the regress argument for foundationalism. Given appropriate flesh, and due attention to skepticism about justification, this argument poses a serious challenge to non-foundationalist accounts of the structure of epistemic justification, such as epistemic coherentism. More significantly, foundationalism will then show forth as one of the most compelling accounts of the structure of knowledge and justification. This explains, at least in part, why foundationalism has been very prominent historically and is still widely held in contemporary epistemology. 

fourier: f.-m.-c. social theorist and radical critic, often called a utopian socialist. His main works were The Theory of Universal Unity 1822 and The New Industrial and Societal World 1829. He argued that since each person has, not an integral soul but only a partial one, personal integrity is possible only in unity with others. Fourier thought that all existing societies were antagonistic. Following Edenism, he believed societies developed through stages of savagery, patriarchalism, barbarianism, and civilization. He believed this antagonism could be transcended only in Harmony. It would be based on twelve kinds of passions. Five were sensual, four affective, and three distributive; and these in turn encouraged the passion for unity. The basic social unit would be a phalanx containing 300 400 families about 1,6001,800 people of scientifically blended characters. As a place of production but also of maximal satisfaction of the passions of every member, Harmony should make labor attractive and pleasurable. The main occupations of its members should be gastronomy, opera, and horticulture. It should also establish a new world of love a form of polygamy where men and women would be equal in rights. Fourier believed that phalanxes would attract members of all other social systems, even the less civilized, and bring about this new world system. Fourier’s vision of cooperation both in theory and experimental practice influenced some anarchists, syndicalists, and the cooperationist movement. His radical social critique was important for the development of political and social thought in France, Europe, and North America. 

frankena: w. philosopher who wrote a series of influential articles and a text, Ethics 3, which was tr. into eight languages and remains in use today. Frankena taught at the  of Michigan 778, where he and his colleagues C. L. Stevenson 879, a leading noncognitivist, and Richard Brandt, an important ethical naturalist, formed for many years one of the most formidable faculties in moral philosophy in the world. Frankena was known for analytical rigor and sharp insight, qualities already evident in his first essay, “The Naturalistic Fallacy” 9, which refuted Moore’s influential claim that ethical naturalism or any other reductionist ethical theory could be convicted of logical error. At best, Frankena showed, reductionists could be said to conflate or misidentify ethical properties with properties of some other kind. Even put this way, such assertions were question-begging, Frankena argued. Where Moore claimed to see properties of two different kinds, naturalists and other reductionists claimed to be able to see only one. Many of Frankena’s most important papers concerned similarly fundamental issues about value and normative judgment. “Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy” 8, for example, is a classic treatment of the debate between internalism, which holds that motivation is essential to obligation or to the belief or perception that one is obligated, and externalism, which holds that motivation is only contingently related to these. In addition to metaethics, Frankena’s published works ranged broadly over normative ethical theory, virtue ethics, moral psychology, religious ethics, moral education, and the philosophy of education. Although relatively few of his works were devoted exclusively to the area, Frankena was also known as the preeminent historian of ethics of his day. More usually, Frankena used the history of ethics as a framework within which to discuss issues of perennial interest. It was, however, for Ethics, one of the most widely used and frequently cited philosophical ethics textbooks of the twentieth century, that Frankena was perhaps best known. Ethics continues to provide an unparalleled introduction to the subject, as useful in a first undergraduate course as it is to graduate students and professional philosophers looking for perspicuous ways to frame issues and categorize alternative solutions. For example, when in the 0s philosophers came to systematically investigate normative ethical theories, it was Frankena’s distinction in Ethics between deontological and teleological theories to which they referred. 

frankfurt school: a group of philosophers, cultural critics, and social scientists associated with the Institute for Social Research, which was founded in Frankfurt. Its prominent members included, among others, the philosophers Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse, as well as the psychoanalyst Erich Fromm and the literary critic Walter Benjamin. Habermas is the leading representative of its second generation. The Frankfurt School is less known for particular theories or doctrines than for its program of a “critical theory of society.” Critical theory represents a sophisticated effort to continue Marx’s transformation of moral philosophy into social and political critique, while rejecting orthodox Marxism as a dogma. Critical theory is primarily a way of doing philosophy, integrating the normative aspects of philosophical reflection with the explanatory achievements of the social sciences. The ultimate goal of its program is to link theory and practice, to provide insight, and to empower subjects to change their oppressive circumstances and achieve human emancipation, a rational society that satisfies human needs and powers. The first generation of the Frankfurt School went through three phases of development. The first, lasting from the beginning of the Institute until the end of the 0s, can be called “interdisciplinary historical materialism” and is best represented in Horkheimer’s programmatic writings. Horkheimer argued that a revised version of historical materialism could organize the results of social research and give it a critical perspective. The second, “critical theory” phase saw the abandonment of Marxism for a more generalized notion of critique. However, with the near-victory of the Nazis in the early 0s, Horkheimer and Adorno entered the third phase of the School, “the critique of instrumental reason.” In their Dialectic of Enlightenment 1 as well as in Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man 4, the process of instrumentally dominating nature leads to dehumanization and the domination of human beings. In their writings after World War II, Adorno and Horkheimer became increasingly pessimistic, seeing around them a “totally administered society” and a manipulated, commodity culture. Horkheimer’s most important essays are from the first phase and focus on the relation of philosophy and social science. Besides providing a clear definition and program for critical social science, he proposes that the normative orientation of philosophy should be combined with the empirical research in the social sciences. This metaphilosophical orientation distinguishes a “critical,” as opposed to “traditional,” theory. For example, such a program demands rethinking the relation of epistemology to the sociology of science. A critical theory seeks to show how the norm of truth is historical and practical, without falling into the skepticism or relativism of traditional sociologies of knowledge such as Mannheim’s. Adorno’s major writings belong primarily to the second and third phases of the development of the Frankfurt School. As the possibilities for criticism appeared to him increasingly narrow, Adorno sought to discover them in aesthetic experience and the mimetic relation to nature. Adorno’s approach was motivated by his view that modern society is a “false totality.” His diagnosis of the causes traced this trend back to the spread of a one-sided, instrumental reason, based on the domination of nature and other human beings. For this reason, he sought a noninstrumental and non-dominating relation to nature and to others, and found it in diverse and fragmentary experiences. Primarily, it is art that preserves this possibility in contemporary society, since in art there is a possibility of mimesis, or the “non-identical” relation to the object. Adorno’s influential attempt to avoid “the logic of identity” gives his posthumous Aesthetic Theory 0 and other later works a paradoxical character. It was in reaction to the third phase that the second generation of the Frankfurt School recast the idea of a critical theory. Habermas argued for a new emphasis on normative foundations as well as a return to an interdisciplinary research program in the social sciences. After first developing such a foundation in a theory of cognitive interests technical, practical, and emancipatory, Habermas turned to a theory of the unavoidable presuppositions of communicative action and an ethics of discourse. The potential for emancipatory change lies in communicative, or discursive, rationality and practices that embody it, such as the democratic public sphere. Habermas’s analysis of communication seeks to provide norms for non-dominating relations to others and a broader notion of reason. 

free: “ “Free” is one of the trickiest adjectives in English. My favourite is ‘alcohol-free’. And then there’s ‘free logic.”” Free logic, a system of quantification theory, with or without identity, that allows for non-denoting singular terms. In classical quantification theory, all singular terms free variables and individual constants are assigned a denotation in all models. But this condition appears counterintuitive when such systems are applied to natural language, where many singular terms seem to be non-denoting ‘Pegasus’, ‘Sherlock Holmes’, and the like. Various solutions of this problem have been proposed, ranging from Frege’s chosen object theory assign an arbitrary denotation to each non-denoting singular term to Russell’s description theory deny singular term status to most expressions used as such in natural language, and eliminate them from the “logical form” of that language to a weakening of the quantifiers’ “existential import,” which allows for denotations to be possible, but not necessarily actual, objects. All these solutions preserve the structure of classical quantification theory and make adjustments at the level of application. Free logic is a more radical solution: it allows for legitimate singular terms to be denotationless, maintains the quantifiers’ existential import, but modifies both the proof theory and the semantics of first-order logic. Within proof theory, the main modification consists of eliminating the rule of existential generalization, which allows one to infer ‘There exists a flying horse’ from ‘Pegasus is a flying horse’. Within semantics, the main problem is giving truth conditions for sentences containing non-denoting singular terms, and there are various ways of accomplishing this. Conventional semantics assigns truth-values to atomic sentences containing non-denoting singular terms by convention, and then determines the truth-values of complex sentences as usual. Outer domain semantics divides the domain of interpretation into an inner and an outer part, using the inner part as the range of quantifiers and the outer part to provide for “denotations” for non-denoting singular terms which are then not literally denotationless, but rather left without an existing denotation. Supervaluational semantics, when considering a sentence A, assigns all possible combinations of truth-values to the atomic components of A containing non-denoting singular terms, evaluates A on the basis of each of those combinations, and then assigns to A the logical product of all such evaluations. Thus both ‘Pegasus flies’ and ‘Pegasus does not fly’ turn out truth-valueless, but ‘Pegasus flies or Pegasus does not fly’ turns out true since whatever truth-value is assigned to its atomic component ‘Pegasus flies’ the truth-value for the whole sentence is true. A free logic is inclusive if it allows for the possibility that the range of quantifiers be empty that there exists nothing at all; it is exclusive otherwise.  Then there’s the free rider, a person who benefits from a social arrangement without bearing an appropriate share of the burdens of maintaining that arrangement, e.g. one who benefits from government services without paying one’s taxes that support them. The arrangements from which a free rider benefits may be either formal or informal. Cooperative arrangements that permit free riders are likely to be unstable; parties to the arrangement are unlikely to continue to bear the burdens of maintaining it if others are able to benefit without doing their part. As a result, it is common for cooperative arrangements to include mechanisms to discourage free riders, e.g. legal punishment, or in cases of informal conventions the mere disapproval of one’s peers. It is a matter of some controversy as to whether it is always morally wrong to benefit from an arrangement without contributing to its maintenance. Then there’s the free will problem, the problem of the nature of free agency and its relation to the origins and conditions of responsible behavior. For those who contrast ‘free’ with ‘determined’, a central question is whether humans are free in what they do or determined by external events beyond their control. A related concern is whether an agent’s responsibility for an action requires that the agent, the act, or the relevant decision be free. This, in turn, directs attention to action, motivation, deliberation, choice, and intention, and to the exact sense, if any, in which our actions are under our control. Use of ‘free will’ is a matter of traditional nomenclature; it is debated whether freedom is properly ascribed to the will or the agent, or to actions, choices, deliberations, etc. Controversy over conditions of responsible behavior forms the predominant historical and conceptual background of the free will problem. Most who ascribe moral responsibility acknowledge some sense in which agents must be free in acting as they do; we are not responsible for what we were forced to do or were unable to avoid no matter how hard we tried. But there are differing accounts of moral responsibility and disagreements about the nature and extent of such practical freedom a notion also important in Kant. Accordingly, the free will problem centers on these questions: Does moral responsibility require any sort of practical freedom? If so, what sort? Are people practically free? Is practical freedom consistent with the antecedent determination of actions, thoughts, and character? There is vivid debate about this last question. Consider a woman deliberating about whom to vote for. From her first-person perspective, she feels free to vote for any candidate and is convinced that the selection is up to her regardless of prior influences. But viewing her eventual behavior as a segment of larger natural and historical processes, many would argue that there are underlying causes determining her choice. With this contrast of intuitions, any attempt to decide whether the voter is free depends on the precise meanings associated with terms like ‘free’, ‘determine’, and ‘up to her’. One thing event, situation determines another if the latter is a consequence of it, or necessitated by it, e.g., the voter’s hand movements by her intention. As usually understood, determinism holds that whatever happens is determined by antecedent conditions, where determination is standardly conceived as causation by antecedent events and circumstances. So construed, determinism implies that at any time the future is already fixed and unique, with no possibility of alternative development. Logical versions of determinism declare each future event to be determined by what is already true, specifically, by the truth that it will occur then. Typical theological variants accept the predestination of all circumstances and events inasmuch as a divine being knows in advance or even from eternity that they will obtain. Two elements are common to most interpretations of ‘free’. First, freedom requires an absence of determination or certain sorts of determination, and second, one acts and chooses freely only if these endeavors are, properly speaking, one’s own. From here, accounts diverge. Some take freedom liberty of indifference or the contingency of alternative courses of action to be critical. Thus, for the woman deliberating about which candidate to select, each choice is an open alternative inasmuch as it is possible but not yet necessitated. Indifference is also construed as motivational equilibrium, a condition some find essential to the idea that a free choice must be rational. Others focus on freedom liberty of spontaneity, where the voter is free if she votes as she chooses or desires, a reading that reflects the popular equation of freedom with “doing what you want.” Associated with both analyses is a third by which the woman acts freely if she exercises her control, implying responsiveness to free rider free will problem 326   326 intent as well as both abilities to perform an act and to refrain. A fourth view identifies freedom with autonomy, the voter being autonomous to the extent that her selection is self-determined, e.g., by her character, deeper self, higher values, or informed reason. Though distinct, these conceptions are not incompatible, and many accounts of practical freedom include elements of each. Determinism poses problems if practical freedom requires contingency alternate possibilities of action. Incompatibilism maintains that determinism precludes freedom, though incompatibilists differ whether everything is determined. Those who accept determinism thereby endorse hard determinism associated with eighteenthcentury thinkers like d’Holbach and, recently, certain behaviorists, according to which freedom is an illusion since behavior is brought about by environmental and genetic factors. Some hard determinists also deny the existence of moral responsibility. At the opposite extreme, metaphysical libertarianism asserts that people are free and responsible and, a fortiori, that the past does not determine a unique future  a position some find enhanced by developments in quantum physics. Among adherents of this sort of incompatibilism are those who advocate a freedom of indifference by describing responsible choices as those that are undetermined by antecedent circumstances Epicureans. To rebut the charge that choices, so construed, are random and not really one’s “own,” it has been suggested that several elements, including an agent’s reasons, delimit the range of possibilities and influence choices without necessitating them a view held by Leibniz and, recently, by Robert Kane. Libertarians who espouse agency causation, on the other hand, blend contingency with autonomy in characterizing a free choice as one that is determined by the agent who, in turn, is not caused to make it a view found in Carneades and Reid. Unwilling to abandon practical freedom yet unable to understand how a lack of determination could be either necessary or desirable for responsibility, many philosophers take practical freedom and responsibility to be consistent with determinism, thereby endorsing compatibilism. Those who also accept determinism advocate what James called soft determinism. Its supporters include some who identify freedom with autonomy the Stoics, Spinoza and others who champion freedom of spontaneity Hobbes, Locke, Hume. The latter speak of liberty as the power of doing or refraining from an action according to what one wills, so that by choosing otherwise one would have done otherwise. An agent fails to have liberty when constrained, that is, when either prevented from acting as one chooses or compelled to act in a manner contrary to what one wills. Extending this model, liberty is also diminished when one is caused to act in a way one would not otherwise prefer, either to avoid a greater danger coercion or because there is deliberate interference with the envisioning of alternatives manipulation. Compatibilists have shown considerable ingenuity in responding to criticisms that they have ignored freedom of choice or the need for open alternatives. Some apply the spontaneity, control, or autonomy models to decisions, so that the voter chooses freely if her decision accords with her desires, is under her control, or conforms to her higher values, deeper character, or informed reason. Others challenge the idea that responsibility requires alternative possibilities of action. The so-called Frankfurt-style cases developed by Harry G. Frankfurt are situations where an agent acts in accord with his desires and choices, but because of the presence of a counterfactual intervener  a mechanism that would have prevented the agent from doing any alternative action had he shown signs of acting differently  the agent could not have done otherwise. Frankfurt’s intuition is that the agent is as responsible as he would have been if there were no intervener, and thus that responsible action does not require alternative possibilities. Critics have challenged the details of the Frankfurt-style cases in attempting to undermine the appeal of the intuition. A different compatibilist tactic recognizes the need for open alternatives and employs versions of the indifference model in describing practical freedom. Choices are free if they are contingent relative to certain subsets of circumstances, e.g. those the agent is or claims to be cognizant of, with the openness of alternatives grounded in what one can choose “for all one knows.” Opponents of compatibilism charge that since these refinements leave agents subject to external determination, even by hidden controllers, compatibilism continues to face an insurmountable challenge. Their objections are sometimes summarized by the consequence argument so called by Peter van Inwagen, who has prominently defended it: if everything were determined by factors beyond one’s control, then one’s acts, choices, and character would also be beyond one’s control, and consequently, agents would never be free and there would be nothing free will problem free will problem 327   327 for which they are responsible. Such reasoning usually employs principles asserting the closure of the practical modalities ability, control, avoidability, inevitability, etc. under consequence relations. However, there is a reason to suppose that the sort of ability and control required by responsibility involve the agent’s sense of what can be accomplished. Since cognitive states are typically not closed under consequence, the closure principles underlying the consequence argument are disputable. 

freges sättigung: Frege’s original Sinn. Fregeian saturation. Grice was once at the Bodleian assisting Austin in his translation of Frege’s Grundlegung – and browsing through the old-style library fiches, Grice exclaims: “All these essays in German journals about Fregeian saturation can surely saturate one!’ Austin was not amused. Neben mathematischen und physikalischen Vorlesungen sowie einer in Philosophie hat Frege in Jena Vorlesungen in Chemie besucht und in diesem Fach auch an einem einsemestrigen Praktikum teilgenommen. In seiner wohlbekannten Rede über Bindung und Sättigung von Ausdrücken klingt davon noch etwas nach.Betrachten wir nun die Konsequenzen der Fregeschen Auffassung der prädikativen Natur der Begriffe. Hierfür ist es zunächst erforderlich, abschließend einige Besonderheiten anzumerken, die daraus folgen, daß auch Begriffsausdrücke bedeutungsvoll sein sollen. Zunächst hatten wir ja mit Hilfe der Analogie festgestellt, daß in einem Satz dasjenige, was Begriffsausdrücke bedeuten, denselben ontologischen Status haben muß wie das, was Eigennamen bedeuten. Insofern scheinen sowohl Eigennamen als auch Begriffsausdrücke jeweils bestimmte (wenn auch hinsichtlich ihrer Sättigung oder Bindungsfähigkeit unterschiedene) Entitäten als Bedeutung zu haben. Und Frege erklärt auch explizit „Begriff ist Bedeutung eines Prädikates“ [BG, 198]. Frege’s distinction between saturated expressions and unsaturated expressions corresponds to the distinction between objects and concepts. A saturated expression refers to an object or argument and has a complete sense in itself, while an unsaturated expression refers to a concept or function and does not have a complete sense. For example, in the sentence “Socrates is the teacher of Plato,” “Socrates” and “Plato” are proper names and are saturated, while “. . . is the teacher of . . .” is unsaturated, for it has empty spaces that must be filled with saturated expressions before it gains a complete sense. “Statements in general . . . can be imagined to be split up into two parts; one complete in itself, and the other in need of supplementation, or ‘unsaturated’.” Frege, “Function and Concept,” Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. -- frege, G., philosopher. A founder of modern mathematical logic, an advocate of logicism, and a major source of twentieth-century analytic philosophy, he directly influenced Russell, Vitters, and Carnap. Frege’s distinction between the sense and the reference of linguistic expressions continues to be debated. His first publication in logic was his strikingly original 1879 Begriffsschrift Concept-notation. Here he devised a formal language whose central innovation is the quantifier-variable notation to express generality; he set forth in this language a version of second-order quantificational logic that he used to develop a logical definition of the ancestral of a relation. Frege invented his Begriffsschrift in order to circumvent drawbacks of the use of colloquial language to state proofs. Colloquial language is irregular, unperspicuous, and ambiguous in its expression of logical relationships. Moreover, logically crucial features of the content of statements may remain tacit and unspoken. It is thus impossible to determine exhaustively the premises on which the conclusion of any proof conducted within ordinary language depends. Frege’s Begriffsschrift is to force the explicit statement of the logically relevant features of any assertion. Proofs in the system are limited to what can be obtained from a body of evidently true logical axioms by means of a small number of truth-preserving notational manipulations inference rules. Here is the first hallmark of Frege’s view of logic: his formulation of logic as a formal system and the ideal of explicitness and rigor that this presentation subserves. Although the formal exactitude with which he formulates logic makes possible the metamathematical investigation of formalized theories, he showed almost no interest in metamathematical questions. He intended the Begriffsschrift to be used. How though does Frege conceive of the subject matter of logic? His orientation in logic is shaped by his anti-psychologism, his conviction that psychology has nothing to do with logic. He took his notation to be a full-fledged language in its own right. The logical axioms do not mention objects or properties whose investigation pertains to some special science; and Frege’s quantifiers are unrestricted. Laws of logic are, as he says, the laws of truth, and these are the most general truths. He envisioned the supplementation of the logical vocabulary of the Begriffsschrift with the basic vocabulary of the special sciences. In this way the Begriffsschrift affords a framework for the completely rigorous deductive development of any science whatsoever. This resolutely nonpsychological universalist view of logic as the most general science is the second hallmark of Frege’s view of logic. This universalist view distinguishes his approach sharply from the coeval algebra of logic approach of George Boole and Ernst Schröder. Vitters, both in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 1 and in later writings, is very critical of Frege’s universalist view. Logical positivism  most notably Carnap in The Logical Syntax of Language 4  rejected it as well. Frege’s universalist view is also distinct from more contemporary views. With his view of quantifiers as intrinsically unrestricted, he saw little point in talking of varying interpretations of a language, believing that such talk is a confused way of getting at what is properly said by means of second-order generalizations. In particular, the semantical conception of logical consequences that becomes prominent in logic after Kurt Gödel’s and Tarski’s work is foreign to Frege. Frege’s work in logic was prompted by an inquiry after the ultimate foundation for arithmetic truths. He criticized J. S. Mill’s empiricist attempt to ground knowledge of the arithmetic of the positive integers inductively in our manipulations of small collections of things. He also rejected crudely formalist views that take pure mathematics to be a sort of notational game. In contrast to these views and Kant’s, he hoped to use his Begriffsschrift to define explicitly the basic notions of arithmetic in logical terms and to deduce the basic principles of arithmetic from logical axioms and these definitions. The explicitness and rigor of his formulation of logic will guarantee that there are no implicit extralogical premises on which the arithmetical conclusions depend. Such proofs, he believed, would show arithmetic to be analytic, not synthetic as Kant had claimed. However, Frege redefined ‘analytic’ to mean ‘provable from  logical laws’ in his rather un-Kantian sense of ‘logic’ and definitions. Frege’s strategy for these proofs rests on an analysis of the concept of cardinal number that he presented in his nontechnical 4 book, The Foundations of Arithmetic. Frege, attending to the use of numerals in statements like ‘Mars has two moons’, argued that it contains an assertion about a concept, that it asserts that there are exactly two things falling under the concept ‘Martian moon’. He also noted that both numerals in these statements and those of pure arithmetic play the logical role of singular terms, his proper names. He concluded that numbers are objects so that a definition of the concept of number must then specify what objects numbers are. He observed that 1 the number of F % the number of G just in case there is a one-to-one correspondence between the objects that are F and those that are G. The right-hand side of 1 is statable in purely logical terms. As Frege recognized, thanks to the definition of the ancestral of a relation, 1 suffices in the second-order setting of the Begriffsschrift for the derivation of elementary arithmetic. The vindication of his logicism requires, however, the logical definition of the expression ‘the number of’. He sharply criticized the use in mathematics of any notion of set or collection that views a set as built up from its elements. However, he assumed that, corresponding to each concept, there is an object, the extension of the concept. He took the notion of an extension to be a logical one, although one to which the notion of a concept is prior. He adopted as a fundamental logical principle the ill-fated biconditional: the extension of F % the extension of G just in case every F is G, and vice versa. If this principle were valid, he could exploit the equivalence relation over concepts that figures in the right-hand side of 1 to identify the number of F with a certain extension and thus obtain 1 as a theorem. In The Basic Laws of Arithmetic vol. 1, 3; vol. 2, 3 he formalized putative proofs of basic arithmetical laws within a modified version of the Begriffsschrift that included a generalization of the law of extensions. However, Frege’s law of extensions, in the context of his logic, is inconsistent, leading to Russell’s paradox, as Russell communicated to Frege in 2. Frege’s attempt to establish logicism was thus, on its own terms, unsuccessful. In Begriffsschrift Frege rejected the thesis that every uncompound sentence is logically segmented into a subject and a predicate. Subsequently, he said that his approach in logic was distinctive in starting not from the synthesis of concepts into judgments, but with the notion of truth and that to which this notion is applicable, the judgeable contents or thoughts that are expressed by statements. Although he said that truth is the goal of logic, he did not think that we have a grasp of the notion of truth that is independent of logic. He eschewed a correspondence theory of truth, embracing instead a redundancy view of the truth-predicate. For Frege, to call truth the goal of logic points toward logic’s concern with inference, with the recognition-of-thetruth judging of one thought on the basis of the recognition-of-the-truth of another. This recognition-of-the-truth-of is not verbally expressed by a predicate, but rather in the assertive force with which a sentence is uttered. The starting point for logic is then reflection on elementary inference patterns that analyze thoughts and reveal a logical segmentation in language. This starting point, and the fusion of logical and ontological categories it engenders, is arguably what Frege is pointing toward by his enigmatic context principle in Foundations: only in the context of a sentence does a word have a meaning. He views sentences as having a function-argument segmentation like that manifest in the terms of arithmetic, e.g., 3 $ 4 ! 2. Truth-functional inference patterns, like modus ponens, isolate sentences as logical units in compound sentences. Leibniz’s law  the substitution of one name for another in a sentence on the basis of an equation  isolates proper names. Proper names designate objects. Predicates, obtainable by removing proper names from sentences, designate concepts. The removal of a predicate from a sentence leaves a higher level predicate that signifies a second-level concept under which first-level concepts fall. An example is the universal quantifier over objects: it designates a second-level concept under which a first-level concept falls, if every object falls under it. Frege takes each first-level concept to be determinately true or false of each object. Vague predicates, like ‘is bald’, thus fail to signify concepts. This requirement of concept determinacy is a product of Frege’s construal of quantification over objects as intrinsically unrestricted. Thus, concept determinacy is simply a form of the law of the excluded middle: for any concept F and any object x, either x is F or x is not F. Frege elaborates and modifies his basic logical ideas in three seminal papers from , “Function and Concept,” “On Concept and Frege, Gottlob Frege, Gottlob 329   329 Object,” and “On Sense and Meaning.” In “Function and Concept,” Frege sharpens his conception of the function-argument structure of language. He introduces the two truth-values, the True and the False, and maintains that sentences are proper names of these objects. Concepts become functions that map objects to either the True or the False. The course-of-values of a function is introduced as a generalization of the notion of an extension. Generally then, an object is anything that might be designated by a proper name. There is nothing more basic to be said by way of elucidating what an object is. Similarly, first-level functions are what are designated by the expressions that result from removing names from compound proper names. Frege calls functions unsaturated or incomplete, in contrast to objects, which are saturated. Proper names and function names are not intersubstitutable so that the distinction between objects and functions is a type-theoretic, categorial distinction. No function is an object; no function name designates an object; there are no quantifiers that simultaneously generalize over both functions and concepts. Just here Frege’s exposition of his views, if not the views themselves, encounter a difficulty. In explaining his views, he uses proper names of the form ‘the concept F’ to talk about concepts; and in contrasting unsaturated functions with saturated objects, apepars to generalize over both with a single quantifier. Benno Kerry, a contemporary of Frege, charged Frege’s views with inconsistency. Since the phrase ‘the concept horse’ is a proper name, it must designate an object. On Frege’s view, it follows that the concept ‘horse’ is not a concept, but an object, an apparent inconsistency. Frege responded to Kerry’s criticism in “On Concept and Object.” He embraced Kerry’s paradox, denying that it represents a genuine inconsistency, while admitting that his remarks about the functionobject distinction are, as the result of an unavoidable awkwardness of language, misleading. Frege maintained that the distinction between function and object is logically simple and so cannot be properly defined. His remarks on the distinction are informal handwaving designed to elucidate what is captured within the Begriffsschrift by the difference between proper names and function names together with their associated distinct quantifiers. Frege’s handling of the function object distinction is a likely source for Vitters’s sayshow distinction in the Tractatus. At the beginning of “On Sense and Meaning,” Frege distinguishes between the reference or meaning Bedeutung of a proper name and its sense Sinn. He observes that the sentence ‘The Morning Star is identical with the Morning Star’ is a trivial instance of the principle of identity. In contrast, the sentence ‘The Morning Star is identical with the Evening Star’ expresses a substantive astronomical discovery. The two sentences thus differ in what Frege called their cognitive value: someone who understood both might believe the first and doubt the second. This difference cannot be explained in terms of any difference in reference between names in these sentences. Frege explained it in terms of a difference between the senses expressed by ‘the Morning Star’ and ‘the Evening Star’. In posthumously published writings, he indicated that the sensereference distinction extends to function names as well. In this distinction, Frege extends to names the notion of the judgeable content expressed by a sentence: the sense of a name is the contribution that the name makes to the thought expressed by sentences in which it occurs. Simultaneously, in classifying sentences as proper names of truth-values, he applies to sentences the notion of a name’s referring to something. Frege’s function-argument view of logical segmentation constrains his view of both the meaning and the sense of compound names: the substitution for any name occurring in a compound expression of a name with the same reference sense yields a new compound expression with the same reference sense as the original. Frege advances several theses about sense that individually and collectively have been a source of debate in philosophy of language. First, the sense of an expression is what is grasped by anyone who understands it. Despite the connection between understanding and sense, Frege provides no account of synonymy, no identity criteria for senses. Second, the sense of an expression is not something psychological. Senses are objective. They exist independently of anyone’s grasping them; their availability to different thinkers is a presupposition for communication in science. Third, the sense expressed by a name is a mode of presentation of the name’s reference. Here Frege’s views contrast with Russell’s. Corresponding to Frege’s thoughts are Russell’s propositions. In The Principles of Mathematics 3, Russell maintained that the meaningful words in a sentence designate things, properties, and relations that are themselves constituents of the proposition expressed by the sentence. For Frege, our access through judgment to objects and functions is via Frege, Gottlob Frege, Gottlob 330   330 the senses that are expressed by names that mean these items. These senses, not the items they present, occur in thoughts. Names expressing different senses may refer to the same item; and some names, while expressing a sense, refer to nothing. Any compound name containing a name that has a sense, but lacks a reference, itself lacks a meaning. A person may fully understand an expression without knowing whether it means anything and without knowing whether it designates what another understood name does. Fourth, the sense ordinarily expressed by a name is the reference of the name, when the name occurs in indirect discourse. Although the Morning Star is identical with the Evening Star, the inference from the sentence ‘Smith believes that the Morning Star is a planet’ to ‘Smith believes that the Evening Star is a planet’ is not sound. Frege, however, accepts Leibniz’s law without restriction. He accordingly takes such seeming failures of Leibniz’s law to expose a pervasive ambiguity in colloquial language: names in indirect discourse do not designate what they designate outside of indirect discourse. The fourth thesis is offered as an explanation of this ambiguity. 

liberatum: liberum arbitrium – vide ‘arbitrium’ How can arbitrium not be free? Oddly this concerns rationality. For Grice, as for almost everyone, a rational agent is an autonomous agent. Freewill is proved grammatically. The Romans had a ‘modus deliberativus’, and even a ‘modus optativus’ (ortike ktesis) “in imitationem Graecis.”If you utter “Close the door!” you rely on free will. It would be otiose for a language or system of communication to have as its goal to inform/get informed, and influence/being influenced if determinism and fatalism were true.  freedom: Like identity, crucial in philosophy in covering everything. E cannot communicate that p, unless E is FREE. An amoeba cannot communicate thatp. End setting, unweighed rationality, rationality about the ends, autonomy. Grice was especially concerned with Kants having brought back the old Greek idea of eleutheria for philosophical discussion. Refs.: the obvious keywords are “freedom” and “free,” but most of the material is in “Actions and events,” in PPQ, and below under ‘kantianism’ – The H. P. Grice Papers, BANC.Bratman, of Stanford, much influenced by Grice (at Berkeley then) thanks to their Hands-Across-the-Bay programme, helps us to understand this Pological progression towards the idea of strong autonomy or freedom. Recall that Grices Ps combine Lockes very intelligent parrots with Russells and Carnaps nonsensical Ps of which nothing we are told other than they karulise elatically. Grices purpose is to give a little thought to a question. What are the general principles exemplified, in creature-construction, in progressing from one type of P to a higher type? What kinds of steps are being made? The kinds of step with which Grice deals are those which culminate in a licence to include, within the specification of the content of the psychological state of this or that type of P, a range of expressions which would be inappropriate with respect to this lower-type P. Such expressions include this or that connective, this or that quantifier, this or that temporal modifier, this or that mode indicator, this or that modal operator, and (importantly) this or that expression to refer to this or that souly state like  … judges that … and … will that … This or that expression, that is, the availability of which leads to the structural enrichment of the specification of content. In general, these steps will be ones by which this or that item or idea which has, initially, a legitimate place outside the scope of this or that souly instantiable (or, if you will, the expressions for which occur legitimately outside the scope of this or that souly predicate) come to have a legitimate place within the scope of such an instantiable, a step by which, one might say, this or that item or ideas comes to be internalised. Grice is disposed to regard as prototypical the sort of natural disposition or propension which Hume attributes to a person, and which is very important to Hume, viz. the tendency of the soul to spread itself upon objects, i.e. to project into the world items which, properly or primitively considered, is a feature of this or that souly state. Grice sets out in stages the application of aspects of the genitorial programme. We then start with a zero-order, with a P equipped to satisfy unnested, or logically amorphous, judging and willing, i.e. whose contents do not involve judging or willing. We soon reach our first P, G₁. It would be advantageous to a P₀ if it could have this or that judging and this or that willing, which relate to its own judging or willing. Such G₁ could be equipped to control or regulate its own judgings and willings. It will presumably be already constituted so as to conform to the law that, cæteris paribus, if it wills that p and judge that ~p, if it can, it makes it the case that p in its soul To give it some control over its judgings and willings, we need only extend the application of this law to the Ps judging and willing. We equip the P so that, cæteris paribus, if it wills that it is not the case that it wills that p and it judges that they do will that p, if it can, it makes it the case that it does not will that p. And we somehow ensure that sometimes it can do this. It may be that the installation of this kind of control would go hand in had with the installation of the capacity for evaluation. Now, unlike it is the case with a G1, a G2s intentional effort depends on the motivational strength of its considered desire at the time of action. There is a process by which this or that conflicting considered desire motivates action as a broadly causal process, a process that reveals motivational strength. But a G2 might itself try to weigh considerations provided by such a conflicting desire B1 and B2 in deliberation about this or that pro and this or that con of various alternatives. In the simplest case, such weighing treats each of the things desired as a prima facie justifying end. In the face of conflict, it weighs this and that desired end, where the weights correspond to the motivational strength of the associated considered desire. The outcome of such deliberation, Aristotle’s prohairesis, matches the outcome of the causal motivational process envisioned in the description of G₂. But, since the weights it invokes in such deliberation correspond to the motivational strength of this or that relevant considered desire (though perhaps not to the motivational strength of this or that relevant considered desire), the resultant activitiy matches those of a corresponding G₂ (each of whose desires, we are assuming, are considered). To be more realistic, we might limit ourselves to saying that a P₂ has the capacity to make the transition from this or that unconsidered desire to this or that considered desire, but does not always do this. But it will keep the discussion more manageable to simplify and to suppose that each desire is considered. We shall not want this G2 to depend, in each will and act in ways that reveal the motivational strength of this or that considered desire at the time of action, but for a G₃ it will also be the case that in this or that, though not each) case, it acts on the basis of how it weights this or that end favoured by this or that conflicting considered desire. This or that considered desire will concern matters that cannot be achieved simply by action at a single time. E. g. G3 may want to nurture a vegetable garden, or build a house. Such matters will require organized and coordinated action that extends over time. What the G3 does now will depend not only on what it now desires but also on what it now expects it will do later given what it does now. It needs a way of settling now what it will do later given what it does now. The point is even clearer when we remind ourselves that G3 is not alone. It is, we may assume, one of some number of G3; and in many cases it needs to coordinate what it does with what other G3 do so as to achieve ends desired by all participants, itself included. These costs are magnified for G4 whose various plans are interwoven so that a change in one element can have significant ripple effects that will need to be considered. Let us suppose that the general strategies G4 has for responding to new information about its circumstances are sensitive to these kinds of costs. Promoting in the long run the satisfaction of its considered desires and preferences. G₄ is a somewhat sophisticated planning agent but it has a problem. It can expect that its desires and preferences may well change over time and undermine its efforts at organizing and coordinating its activities over time. Perhaps in many cases this is due to the kind of temporal discounting. So for example G4 may have a plan to exercise every day but may tend to prefer a sequence of not exercising on the present day but exercising all days in the future, to a uniform sequence the present day included. At the end of the day it returns to its earlier considered preference in favour of exercising on each and every day. Though G₄, unlike G3, has the capacity to settle on prior plans or plaices concerning exercise, this capacity does not yet help in such a case. A creature whose plans were stable in ways in part shaped by such a no-regret principle would be more likely than G4 to resist temporary temptations. So let us build such a principle into the stability of the plans of a G5, whose plans and policies are not derived solely from facts about its limits of time, attention, and the like. It is also grounded in the central concerns of a planning agent with its own future, concerns that lend special significance to anticipated future regret. So let us add to G5 the capacity and disposition to arrive at such hierarchies of higher-order desires concerning its will. This gives us creature G6. There is a problem with G6, one that has been much discussed. It is not clear why a higher-order desire  ‒ even a higher-order desire that a certain desire be ones will  ‒ is not simply one more desire in the pool of desires (Berkeley Gods will problem). Why does it have the authority to constitute or ensure the agents (i. e. the creatures) endorsement or rejection of a first-order desire? Applied to G6 this is the question of whether, by virtue solely of its hierarchies of desires, it really does succeed in taking its own stand of endorsement or rejection of various first-order desires. Since it was the ability to take its own stand that we are trying to provide in the move to P₆, we need some response to this challenge. The basic point is that G₆ is not merely a time-slice agent. It is, rather, and understands itself to be, a temporally persisting planning agent, one who begins, and continues, and completes temporally extended projects. On a broadly Lockean view, its persistence over time consists in relevant psychological continuities (e.g., the persistence of attitudes of belief and intention) and connections (e.g., memory of a past event, or the later intentional execution of an intention formed earlier). Certain attitudes have as a primary role the constitution and support of such Lockean continuities and connections. In particular, policies that favour or reject various desires have it as their role to constitute and support various continuities both of ordinary desires and of the politicos themselves. For this reason such policies are not merely additional wiggles in the psychic stew. Instead, these policies have a claim to help determine where the agent ‒ i.e., the temporally persisting agent ‒ stands with respect to its desires, or so it seems to me reasonable to say. The psychology of G7 continues to have the hierarchical structure of pro-attitudes introduced with G6. The difference is that the higher-order pro-attitudes of G6 were simply characterized as desires in a broad, generic sense, and no appeal was made to the distinctive species of pro-attitude constituted by plan-like attitudes. That is the sense in which the psychology of G7 is an extension of the psychology of G6. Let us then give G7 such higher-order policies with the capacity to take a stand with respect to its desires by arriving at relevant higher-order policies concerning the functioning of those desires over time. G₇ exhibits a merger of hierarchical and planning structures. Appealing to planning theory and ground in connection to the temporally extended structure of agency to be ones will. G7 has higher-order policies that favour or challenge motivational roles of its considered desires. When G7 engages in deliberative weighing of conflicting, desired ends it seems that the assigned weights should reflect the policies that determine where it stands with respect to relevant desires. But the policies we have so far appealed to ‒ policies concerning what desires are to be ones will ‒ do not quite address this concern. The problem is that one can in certain cases have policies concerning which desires are to motivate and yet these not be policies that accord what those desires are for a corresponding justifying role in deliberation. G8. A solution is to give our creature, G_8, the capacity to arrive at policies that express its commitment to be motivated by a desire by way of its treatment of that desire as providing, in deliberation, a justifying end for action. G₈ has policies for treating (or not treating) certain desires as providing justifying ends, as, in this way, reason-providing, in motivationally effective deliberation. Let us call such policies self-governing policies. We will suppose that these policies are mutually compatible and do not challenge each other. In this way G8 involves an extension of structures already present in G7. The grounds on which G8 arrives at (and on occasion revises) such self-governing policies will be many and varied. We can see these policies as crystallizing complex pressures and concerns, some of which are grounded in other policies or desires. These self-governing policies may be tentative and will normally not be immune to change. If we ask what G8 values in this case, the answer seems to be: what it values is constituted in part by its higher-order self-governing policies. In particular, it values exercise over nonexercise even right now, and even given that it has a considered, though temporary, preference to the contrary. Unlike lower Ps, what P₈ now values is not simply a matter of its present, considered desires and preferences. Now this model of P8 seems in relevant aspects to be a partial) model of us, in our better moments, of course. So we arrive at the conjecture that one important kind of valuing of which we are capable involves, in the cited ways, both our first-order desires and our higher order self-governing policies. In an important sub-class of cases our valuing involves reflexive polices that are both first-order policies of action and higher-order policies to treat the first-order policy as reason providing in motivationally effective deliberation. This may seem odd. Valuing seems normally to be a first-order attitude. One values honesty, say. The proposal is that an important kind of valuing involves higher-order policies. Does this mean that, strictly speaking, what one values (in this sense) is itself a desire ‒ not honesty, say, but a desire for honesty? No, it does not. What I value in the present case is honesty; but, on the theory, my valuing honesty in art consists in certain higher-order self-governing policies. An agents reflective valuing involves a kind of higher-order willing. Freud challenged the power structure of the soul in Plato: it is the libido that takes control, not the logos. Grice takes up this polemic. Aristotle takes up Platos challenge, each type of soul is united to the next by the idea of life. The animal soul, between the vegetative and the rational, is not detachable.

Grice’s Freudian slip: Grice thought that the idea of a Freudian slip was ‘ridiculous,’ – for Grice ‘mean’ is intentional, unless it is used metaphorically, for ‘dark clouds mean rain.’ Since his interest is in ‘communicate,’ surely the ‘slipper’ (R. lapsus linguae) cannot ‘communicate.’ “What bothers me most is Freudian convoluted attempts to have this, as Lacan will, as the libido saying this or that!” -- Austrian neurologist and psychologist, the founder of psychoanalysis. Starting with the study of hysteria in late nineteenth-century Vienna, Freud developed a theory of the mind that has come to dominate modern thought. His notions of the unconscious, of a mind divided against itself, of the meaningfulness of apparently meaningless activity, of the displacement and transference of feelings, of stages of psychosexual development, of the pervasiveness and importance of sexual motivation, as well as of much else, have helped shape modern consciousness. His language and that of his translators, whether specifying divisions of the mind e.g. id, ego, and superego, types of disorder e.g. obsessional neurosis, or the structure of experience e.g. Oedipus complex, narcissism, has become the language in which we describe and understand ourselves and others. As the poet W. H. Auden wrote on the occasion of Freud’s death, “if often he was wrong and, at times, absurd, / to us he is no more a person / now but a whole climate of opinion / under whom we conduct our different lives. . . .” Hysteria is a disorder involving organic symptoms with no apparent organic cause. Following early work in neurophysiology, Freud in collaboration with Josef Breuer came to the view that “hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences,” in particular buried memories of traumatic experiences, the strangulated affect of which emerged in conversion hysteria in the distorted form of physical symptoms. Treatment involved the recovery of the repressed memories to allow the cathartic discharge or abreaction of the previously displaced and strangulated affect. This provided the background for Freud’s seduction theory, which traced hysterical symptoms to traumatic prepubertal sexual assaults typically by fathers. But Freud later abandoned the seduction theory because the energy assumptions were problematic e.g., if the only energy involved was strangulated affect from long-past external trauma, why didn’t the symptom successfully use up that energy and so clear itself up? and because he came to see that fantasy could have the same effects as memory of actual events: “psychical reality was of more importance than material reality.” What was repressed was not memories, but desires. He came to see the repetition of symptoms as fueled by internal, in particular sexual, energy. While it is certainly true that Freud saw the Frege-Geach point Freud, Sigmund 331   331 working of sexuality almost everywhere, it is not true that he explained everything in terms of sexuality alone. Psychoanalysis is a theory of internal psychic conflict, and conflict requires at least two parties. Despite developments and changes, Freud’s instinct theory was determinedly dualistic from beginning to end  at the beginning, libido versus ego or self-preservative instincts, and at the end Eros versus Thanatos, life against death. Freud’s instinct theory not to be confused with standard biological notions of hereditary behavior patterns in animals places instincts on the borderland between the mental and physical and insists that they are internally complex. In particular, the sexual instinct must be understood as made up of components that vary along a number of dimensions source, aim, and object. Otherwise, as Freud argues in his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality 5, it would be difficult to understand how the various perversions are recognized as “sexual” despite their distance from the “normal” conception of sexuality heterosexual genital intercourse between adults. His broadened concept of sexuality makes intelligible sexual preferences emphasizing different sources erotogenic zones or bodily centers of arousal, aims acts, such as intercourse and looking, designed to achieve pleasure and satisfaction, and objects whether of the same or different gender, or even other than whole living persons. It also allows for the recognition of infantile sexuality. Phenomena that might not on the surface appear sexual e.g. childhood thumbsucking share essential characteristics with obviously sexual activity infantile sensual sucking involves pleasurable stimulation of the same erotogenic zone, the mouth, stimulated in adult sexual activities such as kissing, and can be understood as earlier stages in the development of the same underlying instinct that expresses itself in such various forms in adult sexuality. The standard developmental stages are oral, anal, phallic, and genital. Neuroses, which Freud saw as “the negative of perversions” i.e., the same desires that might in some lead to perverse activity, when repressed, result in neurosis, could often be traced to struggles with the Oedipus complex: the “nucleus of the neuroses.” The Oedipus complex, which in its positive form postulates sexual feelings toward the parent of the opposite sex and ambivalently hostile feelings toward the parent of the same sex, suggests that the universal shape of the human condition is a triangle. The conflict reaches its peak between the ages of three and five, during the phallic stage of psychosexual development. The fundamental structuring of emotions has its roots in the prolonged dependency of the human infant, leading to attachment  a primary form of love  to the primary caregiver, who partly for biological reasons such as lactation is most often the mother, and the experience of others as rivals for the time, attention, and concern of the primary caregiver. Freud’s views of the Oedipus complex should not be oversimplified. The sexual desires involved, e.g., are typically unconscious and necessarily infantile, and infantile sexuality and its associated desires are not expressed in the same form as mature genital sexuality. His efforts to explain the distinctive features of female psychosexual development in particular led to some of his most controversial views, including the postulation of penis envy to explain why girls but not boys standardly experience a shift in gender of their primary love object both starting with the mother as the object. Later love objects, including psychoanalysts as the objects of transference feelings in the analytic setting, the analyst functions as a blank screen onto which the patient projects feelings, are the results of displacement or transference from earlier objects: “The finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it.” Freud used the same structure of explanation for symptoms and for more normal phenomena, such as dreams, jokes, and slips of the tongue. All can be seen as compromise formations between forces pressing for expression localized by Freud’s structural theory in the id, understood as a reservoir of unconscious instinct and forces of repression some also unconscious, seeking to meet the constraints of morality and reality. On Freud’s underlying model, the fundamental process of psychic functioning, the primary process, leads to the uninhibited discharge of psychic energy. Such discharge is experienced as pleasurable, hence the governing principle of the fundamental process is called the pleasure principle. Increase of tension is experienced as unpleasure, and the psychic apparatus aims at a state of equilibrium or constancy sometimes Freud writes as if the state aimed at is one of zero tension, hence the Nirvana principle associated with the death instinct in Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle [0]. But since pleasure can in fact only be achieved under specific conditions, which sometimes require arrangement, planning, and delay, individuals must learn to inhibit discharge, and this secondary process thinking is governed by what Freud came to call the reality principle. The aim is still satisfaction, but the “exigencies of life” require attention, reasoning, and judgment to avoid falling into the fantasy wishfulfillment of the primary process. Sometimes defense mechanisms designed to avoid increased tension or unpleasure can fail, leading to neurosis in general, under the theory, a neurosis is a psychological disorder rooted in unconscious conflict  particular neuroses being correlated with particular phases of development and particular mechanisms of defense. Repression, involving the confining of psychic representations to the unconscious, is the most important of the defense mechanisms. It should be understood that unlike preconscious ideas, which are merely descriptively unconscious though one may not be aware of them at the moment, they are readily accessible to consciousness, unconscious ideas in the strict sense are kept from awareness by forces of repression, they are dynamically unconscious  as evidenced by the resistance to making the unconscious conscious in therapy. Freud’s deep division of the mind between unconscious and conscious goes beyond neurotic symptoms to help make sense of familiar forms of irrationality such as selfdeception, ambivalence, and weakness of the will that are highly problematical on Cartesian models of an indivisible unitary consciousness. Perhaps the best example of the primary process thinking that characterizes the unconscious unconstrained by the realities of time, contradiction, causation, etc. can be found in dreaming. Freud regarded dreams as “the royal road to a knowledge of the unconscious.” Dreams are the disguised fulfillment of unconscious wishes. In extracting the meaning of dreams through a process of interpretation, Freud relied on a central distinction between the manifest content the dream as dreamt or as remembered on waking and the latent content the unconscious dreamthoughts. Freud held that interpretation via association to particular elements of the manifest content reversed the process of dream construction, the dream-work in which various mechanisms of distortion operated on the day’s residues perceptions and thoughts stemming from the day before the dream was dreamt and the latent dream-thoughts to produce the manifest dream. Prominent among the mechanisms are the condensation in which many meanings are represented by a single idea and displacement in which there is a shift of affect from a significant and intense idea to an associated but otherwise insignificant one also typical of neurotic symptoms, as well as considerations of representability and secondary revision more specific to dream formation. Symbolism is less prominent in Freud’s theory of dreams than is often thought; indeed, the section on symbols appeared only as a later addition to The Interpretation of Dreams 0. Freud explicitly rejected the ancient “dream book” mode of interpretation in terms of fixed symbols, and believed one had to recover the hidden meaning of a dream through the dreamer’s not the interpreter’s associations to particular elements. Such associations are a part of the process of free association, in which a patient is obliged to report to the analyst all thoughts without censorship of any kind. The process is crucial to psychoanalysis, which is both a technique of psychotherapy and a method of investigation of the workings of the mind. Freud used the results of his investigations to speculate about the origins of morality, religion, and political authority. He tended to find their historical and psychological roots in early stages of the development of the individual. Morality in particular he traced to the internalization as one part of the resolution of the Oedpius complex of parental prohibitions and demands, producing a conscience or superego which is also the locus of self-observation and the ego-ideal. Such identification by incorporation  introjection  plays an important role in character formation in general. The instinctual renunciation demanded by morality and often achieved by repression Freud regarded as essential to the order society needs to conduct its business. Civilization gets the energy for the achievements of art and science by sublimation of the same instinctual drives. But the costs of society and civilization to the individual in frustration, unhappiness, and neurosis can be too high. Freud’s individual therapy was meant to lead to the liberation of repressed energies which would not by itself guarantee happiness; he hoped it might also provide energy to transform the world and moderate its excess demands for restraint. But just as his individual psychology was founded on the inevitability of internal conflict, in his social thought he saw some limits especially on aggression  the death instinct turned outward as necessary and he remained pessimistic about the apparently endless struggle reason must wage Civilization and Its Discontents, 0.  Freudscher Versprecher Zur Navigation springenZur Suche springen Ein Freudscher Versprecher (nach Sigmund Freud), auch Lapsus Linguae genannt, ist eine sprachliche Fehlleistung, bei der angeblich ein eigentlicher Gedanke oder eine Intention des Sprechers unwillkürlich zutage tritt.   Inhaltsverzeichnis 1               Allgemeine Beschreibung 2 Begründungen der Theorie 3 Akzeptanz und wissenschaftliche Abgrenzung 4 Beispiele 5 Literatur 6 Weblinks 7 Einzelnachweise Allgemeine Beschreibung Bei der Bewertung eines scheinbar sinnvollen Versprechers als einer Freudschen Fehlleistung wird davon ausgegangen, dass in der Bedeutungsabweichung, die durch einen Versprecher entsteht, eine unbewusste Aussage zum Vorschein kommt. Es wird also nicht angenommen, dass solchen Versprechern eine einfache, (neuro-)physiologische oder auch assoziative Beeinflussung der Sprachproduktion zugrunde liegt,[1][2] sondern behauptet, dass es v. a. eine psychische Ursache dafür gibt. Bei den Freudschen Fehlleistungen würde somit anstelle des eigentlich Gemeinten etwas gesagt werden, das dem Gedachten ggf. sogar besser entspräche und in diesem Sinne interpretiert werden könnte.  Die Existenz eines solchen Phänomens wurde durch Freud (1900, 1904) in Zur Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens behauptet. Seit dem allgemeinen Bekanntwerden der auf Freuds Befunde gestützten Theorie der Fehlleistungen hat jemand, dem ein solcher Versprecher unterläuft, einen schlechten Stand, seinem Publikum nachzuweisen, dass es sich gar nicht um einen Lapsus der Freudschen Art handelt, wohingegen vor Freuds Zeit solch ein Versprecher lediglich ein Anlass zur Heiterkeit gewesen wäre, oder eventuell begleitet von völligem Unverständnis, auch empörtem Getuschel.  Ein Beispiel von Freud sei hier berichtet:[3]  „Ein Mann erzählt von irgendwelchen Vorgängen, die er beanstandet, und setzt fort: Dann aber sind Tatsachen zum ‚Vorschwein‘ gekommen. ([…] Auf Anfrage bestätigt er, dass er diese Vorgänge als ‚Schweinereien‘ bezeichnen wollte.) ‚Vorschein und Schweinerei‘ haben zusammen das sonderbare ‚Vorschwein‘ entstehen lassen.“  – Sigmund Freud[4] Diese Bewertung hatte also nicht verbalisiert werden sollen, hatte sich aber Bahn verschafft, indem sie sich in die aktuelle Äußerung als (Freudscher) Versprecher einschob. Aufgrund spezifischer Motivation kann man erst dann, nämlich bei solchen, einen Nebengedanken unterdrückenden Maßnahmen, von einer eigentlichen „Fehl“-Leistung sprechen.  Begründungen der Theorie Freudsche Versprecher sind solche, bei denen eine psychische Motivation angenommen wird, ein „Sinn“, wie es bei Freud heißt, um eine Abgrenzung gegen die Urteile „Zufall“ oder „physiologischer Hintergrund“ als Ursache solcher (Fehl- oder richtigen) Leistungen vorzunehmen. An dieser Bestimmung wird zugleich die Bandbreite des Problemfeldes deutlich: Einerseits handelt es sich um ein Phänomen. Das heißt: Es ist für den Sprecher mindestens potentiell erkennbar, dass seinen Zuhörern etwas zu Ohren kam, was so nicht bewusst beabsichtigt gewesen war; Rosa Ferber hat allerdings festgestellt, dass die meisten Versprecher gar nicht bemerkt werden, weder von den Sendern noch von den Empfängern.[5] Andererseits handelt es sich bei Freuds Aussage, es stecke allgemein ein „Sinn“ hinter allen sog. „Freudschen Fehlleistungen“, um die wissenschaftliche Interpretation eines Phänomens: Unter der Prämisse, dass der Versprecher einen unbewussten oder vorbewussten Beweggrund zur Ursache habe – einen erkennbaren Sinn oder eine Struktur – besteht die erste Aufgabe darin, zu untersuchen, welcher Beweggrund als der wahrscheinlichste angenommen werden kann.  Akzeptanz und wissenschaftliche Abgrenzung Gegenüber dieser Vorgehensweise spaltet sich das wissenschaftliche Lager in mindestens drei Teile auf:  Die einen halten die Frage der Motivierung überhaupt für verfehlt und falsch und wollen nur Untersuchungen zulassen, die sich aus der Sicht der rein physiologischen Prozesse mit der Sprachproduktion und den deren Ablauf störenden Versprechern befassen. Für dieses Lager sind Versprecher wertvolle Fenster, die Einblicke u. a. in die neurologisch gesteuerte Sprachproduktion gestatten. Michael Motley wäre dagegen ein Vertreter des anderen Lagers, der in der Psycholinguistik die Motivierung von Versprechern experimentell nachzuweisen versucht. Motley konnte, indem er bei einem Schnelllesen-Experiment als Kontext sexuell oder neutral geprägte Situationen anbot, zeigen, dass die Frequenz der Freud’schen Versprechern bei sexuellen Kontext-Situationen im Vergleich zu neutralen zunimmt. Damit bestätigte er experimentell die Freudsche Theorie, und Dilger/Bredenkamp kombinieren beide Ansätze. Neurolinguistischen Untersuchungen zufolge existieren organisch bedingte oder zufällig auftretende Störungen des ordentlichen Sprachablaufs. Grund können beispielsweise Zerstörungen oder Fehlbildungen von Arealen des Sprachzentrums im Gehirn sein. Daher ist es nicht sinnvoll, hinter jeder Art von Versprechern eine Freudsche Fehlleistung zu vermuten.  Die Versprecherforschung im Rahmen der kognitiven Linguistik untersucht den Zusammenhang zwischen sprachlichen Strukturen und auftretenden Versprechertypen. Die hierbei gefundenen Erklärungen für unterschiedliche Arten von Versprechern machen in vielen Fällen die Annahme einer psychischen Ursache im Sinne der Freudschen Theorien überflüssig (siehe Linguistische Versprecher-Theorien).  Insbesondere aber ist die Frage der Motivierung bei lexikalischen Versprechern nicht unangebracht. Je nachdem, welche Auffassung man von den psychischen Vorgängen und der „Topologie des psychischen Apparates“ hat, wird man dem Unbewussten mehr oder weniger Wirkungskraft zuschreiben.  Beispiele Freud führt in der Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens an: Der deutschnationale Abgeordnete Lattmann tritt 1908 im Reichstag für eine Ergebenheitsadresse an Wilhelm II. ein, und wenn man das tue, „[…] so wollen wir das auch rückgratlos tun.“ Nach, laut Sitzungsprotokoll, minutenlanger stürmischer Heiterkeit erklärt der Redner, er habe natürlich rückhaltlos gemeint. Otto Rank führt im Zentralblatt für Psychoanalyse eine Stelle aus Shakespeares Der Kaufmann von Venedig an: Porzia ist es eigentlich durch ein Gelübde verboten, Bassanio ihre Liebe zu gestehen, sagt aber „Halb bin ich Euer, die andre Hälfte Euer – mein wollt ich sagen.“ Literatur Sven Staffeldt: Das Drängen der störenden Redeabsicht. Dieter Fladers Kritik an Freuds Theorie der Versprecher, Kümmerle, Göppingen 2004. Sebastiano Timpanaro: Il lapsus freudiano: Psicanalisi e critica testuale (Florenz: La Nuova Italia 1974). Englische Übersetzung: The Freudian Slip: Psychoanalysis and Textual Criticism. Transl. by Kate Soper (London, 1976). Weblinks Sabine Stahl: "Wolker bis heitig" und andere Versprecher, SWR2 – „Wissen“ vom 3. April 2009 Einzelnachweise  Nora Wiedenmann (1998): Versprecher. Phänomene und Daten. Mit Materialien auf Diskette. Wien: Wissenschaftsverlag Edition Praesens.  Nora Wiedenmann (1997): Versprecher – Dissimilation und Similation von Konsonanten. Sprachproduktion unter spatio-temporalem Aspekt. Dissertation. Sprechwissenschaft und Psycholinguistik, Institut für Phonetik und Sprachliche Kommunikation; Philosophische Fakultät für Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaft II; Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München; = 1999: Versprecher: Dissimilation von Konsonanten. Sprachproduktion unter spatio-temporalem Aspekt (Linguistische Arbeiten, 404). Tübingen: Niemeyer.  Hartmann Hinterhuber: Sigmund Freud, Rudolf Meringer und Carl Mayer: Versprechen und Verlesen. In: Neuropsychiatrie. Band 21, Nr. 4, 2007, S. 291–296.  Sigmund Freud: Gesammelte Werke. Band XI, 1916/1917, S. 35.  R. Ferber: Fehlerlinguistik. Eine Sprechfehlersammlung und ihre beschreibende Darstellung. In: Unpublished MA thesis, University of Freiburg. 1986. Kategorien: PsychoanalyseMündliche KommunikationSigmund Freud als NamensgeberFehlleistung. The Signorelli parapraxis represents the first and best known example of a parapraxis and its analysis in Freud's The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. The parapraxis centers on a word-finding problem and the production of substitutes. Freud could not recall the name (Signorelli) of the painter of the Orvieto frescos and produced as substitutes the names of two painters Botticelli and Boltraffio. Freud's analysis shows what associative processes had linked Signorelli to Botticelli and Boltraffio. The analysis has been criticised by linguists and others.   Contents 1 Botticelli – Boltraffio – Trafoi 2  Trafoi in Kraepelin's dream 3 Sebastiano Timpanaro 4 Swales' investigation 5 Freud neglected his own observation 6 See also 7                                             References 8 Sources 9 Further reading Botticelli – Boltraffio – Trafoi One important ingredient in Freud's analysis was the North-Italian village Trafoi where he received the message of the suicide of one of his patients, struggling with sexual problems. Without Trafoi the substitute Boltraffio associated to it would be incomprehensible. Freud links Trafoi to the theme death and sexuality, a theme preceding the word finding problem in a conversation Freud had during a trip by train through Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The second important ingredient in Freud's analysis is the extraction of an Italian word signor from the forgotten name Signorelli. Herr, the German counterpart of Signor, is then linked to (Her)zegovina and the word Herr occurring, as Freud tells us, in the conversation. That country's Turks, he recalled, valued sexual pleasure a lot, and he was told by a colleague that a patient once said to him: "For you know, sir (Herr) if that ceases, life no longer has any charm". Moreover, Freud argued that (Bo)snia linked (Bo)tticelli with (Bo)ltraffio and Trafoi. He concludes by saying: "We shall represent this state of affairs carefully enough if we assert that beside the simple forgetting of proper names there is another forgetting which is motivated by repression".[1]  Freud denies the relevance of the content of the frescos. Nevertheless, psychoanalysts have pursued their investigations particularly into this direction, finding however no new explanation of the parapraxis. Jacques Lacan suggested that the parapraxis may be an act of self-forgetting.  Trafoi in Kraepelin's dream The first critique to Freud came from Emil Kraepelin, who in a postscript to his 1906 monograph on language disturbances in dreams, relates a dream involving Trafoi. The dream centers around a neologism Trafei, which Kraepelin links to Trafoi. The dream may be seen as an implicit critique on Freud's analysis. Italian trofei is associated to Trafei in the same way as Trafoi (cf. van Ooijen, 1996) and clarifies Kraepelin's dream. The meaning of trofei reads in German Siegeszeichen (victory-signs) and this German word together with Latin signum clearly links to Freud's first name (Engels, 2006, p. 22-24).  Sebastiano Timpanaro In The Freudian Slip Sebastiano Timpanaro discusses Freud's analysis in chapter 6 "Love and Death at Orvieto." (p. 63-81). He in fact doubts that the name Boltraffio would have played a major role during the parapraxis, as he states: "Boltraffio is a Schlimbesserung [that is a substitute worse than another substitute]" and adds "the correction goes astray because of incapacity to localize the fault."(p. 71). He calls Botticelli an "involuntary banalization" and Boltraffio "a semi-conscious disimproved correction."(p. 75). As to the Signor-element in Freud's analysis he puts: "The immediate equivalence Signore= Herr is one thing, the extraction of signor from Signorelli and of Her(r) from Herzegowina is another."  Swales' investigation Peter Swales (2003) investigated the historical data and states that Freud probably visited an exposition of Italian masters in Bergamo mid-September 1898, showing paintings of Signorelli, Botticelli and Boltraffio one next to the other. In his view the paintings at the exposition were the source of the substitute names in the parapraxis. Swales dwells largely on the three paintings. The association of the name Boltraffio to the name Da Vinci, another hypothesis formulated by Swales (because Freud might have seen the statue of Boltraffio at the bottom of the Da Vinci monument on Piazza della Scala in Milan some days before his visit to Bergamo), is not further pursued by Swales. Although Freud visited Trafoi on the 8th of August 1898, Swales doubts whether Freud received a message on the suicide of one of his patients.  Freud neglected his own observation  Fresco of the Deeds of the Antichrist Freud in his analysis did not use the fact that he remembered very well a picture of the painter in the lower left corner of one of the frescos. The picture, sort of a signature, was thus a third substitute to the forgotten name Signorelli. The "signature" can be interpreted as a reference to the Latin verb signare and this word, instead of Freud's signore, then leads to a simple analysis of the Signorelli parapraxis (Engels, 2006, p. 66-69). There seems to be no more need for the Bosnia-Herzegovina associations (Bo and Herr) Freud himself introduced. In the alternative to Freud's analysis the suicide message in Trafoi remains an important point to understand the parapraxis (this message being a blow to Freud's self-esteem). The occurrence of the Signorelli parapraxis during Freud's trip from Ragusa to Trebinje (in Herzegovina) is not questioned, as was done by Swales.[citation needed]  See also Dream speech References  Freud, S. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, chapter 1, "Forgetting of Proper Names". Sources Engels, Huub (2006). Emil Kraepelins Traumsprache 1908-1926. ISBN 978-90-6464-060-5 Timpanaro, S. (1976). The Freudian Slip: Psychoanalysis and Textual Criticism. London: NLB. Swales, P. (2003). Freud, Death and Sexual Pleasures. On the Psychical Mechanism of Dr. Sigm. Freud. Arc de Cercle, 1, 4-74. Further reading Molnar, M. (1994). Reading the Look. In Sander, Gilman, Birmele, Geller & Greenberg (ed.): Reading Freud's Reading. pp. 77–90. New York: Oxford. Ooijen, B. van. (1996). Vowel mutability and lexical selection in English: Evidence from a word reconstruction task. Memory & Cognition, 24, 573-583. Ooijen shows that in word reconstruction tasks e.g. the non-word kebra is more readily substituted by cobra than by zebra. This is what is meant by 'vowel mutability.' Owens, M.E. (2004). Forgetting Signorelli: Monstruous Visions of the Resurrection of the Dead. Muse: scholarly journals online. Categories: Psychoanalytic terminologyFreudian psychology.

functionalism: Grice’s functionalism: a response to the dualist challenge -- dualism, the view that reality consists of two disparate parts. The crux of dualism is an apparently unbridgeable gap between two incommensurable orders of being that must be reconciled if our assumption that there is a comprehensible universe is to be justified. Dualism is exhibited in the pre-Socratic division between appearance and reality; Plato’s realm of being containing eternal Ideas and realm of becoming containing changing things; the medieval division between finite man and infinite God; Descartes’s substance dualism of thinking mind and extended matter; Hume’s separation of fact from value; Kant’s division between empirical phenomena and transcendental noumena; the epistemological double-aspect theory of James and Russell, who postulate a neutral substance that can be understood in separate ways either as mind or brain; and Heidegger’s separation of being and time that inspired Sartre’s contrast of being and nothingness. The doctrine of two truths, the sacred and the profane or the religious and the secular, is a dualistic response to the conflict between religion and science. Descartes’s dualism is taken to be the source of the mindbody problem. If the mind is active unextended thinking and the body is passive unthinking extension, how can these essentially unlike and independently existing substances interact causally, and how can mental ideas represent material things? How, in other words, can the mind know and influence the body, and how can the body affect the mind? Descartes said mind and body interact and that ideas represent material things without resembling them, but dream argument dualism 244   244 could not explain how, and concluded merely that God makes these things happen. Proposed dualist solutions to the mindbody problem are Malebranche’s occasionalism mind and body do not interact but God makes them appear to; Leibniz’s preestablished harmony among noninteracting monads; and Spinoza’s property dualism of mutually exclusive but parallel attributes expressing the one substance God. Recent mindbody dualists are Popper and John C. Eccles. Monistic alternatives to dualism include Hobbes’s view that the mental is merely the epiphenomena of the material; Berkeley’s view that material things are collections of mental ideas; and the contemporary materialist view of Smart, Armstrong, and Paul and Patricia Churchland that the mind is the brain. A classic treatment of these matters is Arthur O. Lovejoy’s The Revolt Against Dualism. Dualism is related to binary thinking, i.e., to systems of thought that are two-valued, such as logic in which theorems are valid or invalid, epistemology in which knowledge claims are true or false, and ethics in which individuals are good or bad and their actions are right or wrong. In The Quest for Certainty, Dewey finds that all modern problems of philosophy derive from dualistic oppositions, particularly between spirit and nature. Like Hegel, he proposes a synthesis of oppositions seen as theses versus antitheses. Recent attacks on the view that dualistic divisions can be explicitly described or maintained have been made by Vitters, who offers instead a classification scheme based on overlapping family resemblances; by Quine, who casts doubt on the division between analytic or formal truths based on meanings and synthetic or empirical truths based on facts; and by Derrida, who challenges our ability to distinguish between the subjective and the objective. But despite the extremely difficult problems posed by ontological dualism, and despite the cogency of many arguments against dualistic thinking, Western philosophy continues to be predominantly dualistic, as witnessed by the indispensable use of two-valued matrixes in logic and ethics and by the intractable problem of rendering mental intentions in terms of material mechanisms or vice versa.  functional dependence, a relationship between variable magnitudes especially physical magnitudes and certain properties or processes. In modern physical science there are two types of laws stating such relationships. 1 There are numerical laws stating concomitant variation of certain quantities, where a variation in any one is accompanied by variations in the others. An example is the law for ideal gases: pV % aT, where p is the pressure of the gas, V its volume, T its absolute temperature, and a a constant derived from the mass and the nature of the gas. Such laws say nothing about the temporal order of the variations, and tests of the laws can involve variation of any of the relevant magnitudes. Concomitant variation, not causal sequence, is what is tested for. 2 Other numerical laws state variations of physical magnitudes correlated with times. Galileo’s law of free fall asserts that the change in the unit time of a freely falling body in a vacuum in the direction of the earth is equal to gt, where g is a constant and t is the time of the fall, and where the rate of time changes of g is correlative with the temporal interval t. The law is true of any body in a state of free fall and for any duration. Such laws are also called “dynamical” because they refer to temporal processes usually explained by the postulation of forces acting on the objects in question. functionalism, the view that mental states are defined by their causes and effects. As a metaphysical thesis about the nature of mental states, functionalism holds that what makes an inner state mental is not an intrinsic property of the state, but rather its relations to sensory stimulation input, to other inner states, and to behavior output. For example, what makes an inner state a pain is its being a type of state typically caused by pinpricks, sunburns, and so on, a type that causes other mental states e.g., worry, and a type that causes behavior e.g., saying “ouch”. Propositional attitudes also are identified with functional states: an inner state is a desire for water partly in virtue of its causing a person to pick up a glass and drink its contents when the person believes that the glass contains water. The basic distinction needed for functionalism is that between role in terms of which a type of mental state is defined and occupant the particular thing that occupies a role. Functional states exhibit multiple realizability: in different kinds of beings humans, computers, Martians, a particular kind of causal role may have different occupants  e.g., the causal role definitive of a belief that p, say, may be occupied by a neural state in a human, but occupied perhaps by a hydraulic state in a Martian. Functionalism, like behaviorism, thus entails that mental states may be shared by physically dissimilar systems. Although functionalism does not automatically rule out the existence of immaterial souls, its motivation has been to provide a materialistic account of mentality. The advent of the computer gave impetus to functionalism. First, the distinction between software and hardware suggested the distinction between role function and occupant structure. Second, since computers are automated, they demonstrate how inner states can be causes of output in the absence of a homunculus i.e., a “little person” intelligently directing output. Third, the Turing machine provided a model for one of the earliest versions of functionalism. A Turing machine is defined by a table that specifies transitions from current state and input to next state or to output. According to Turing machine functionalism, any being with pscychological states has a unique best description, and each psychological state is identical to a machine table state relative to that description. To be in mental state type M is to instantiate or realize Turing machine T in state S. Turing machine functionalism, developed largely by Putnam, has been criticized by Putnam, Ned Block, and Fodor. To cite just one serious problem: two machine table states  and hence, according to Turing machine functionalism, two psychological states  are distinct if they are followed by different states or by different outputs. So, if a pinprick causes A to say “Ouch” and causes B to say “Oh,” then, if Turing machine functionalism were true, A’s and B’s states of pain would be different psychological states. But we do not individuate psychological states so finely, nor should we: such fine-grained individuation would be unsuitable for psychology. Moreover, if we assume that there is a path from any state to any other state, Turing machine functionalism has the unacceptable consequence that no two systems have any of their states in common unless they have all their states in common. Perhaps the most prominent version of functionalism is the causal theory of mind. Whereas Turing machine functionalism is based on a technical computational or psychological theory, the causal theory of mind relies on commonsense understanding: according to the causal theory of mind, the concept of a mental state is the concept of a state apt for bringing about certain kinds of behavior Armstrong. Mental state terms are defined by the commonsense platitudes in which they appear David Lewis. Philosophers can determine a priori what mental states are by conceptual analysis or by definition. Then scientists determine what physical states occupy the causal roles definitive of mental states. If it turned out that there was no physical state that occupied the causal role of, say, pain i.e., was caused by pinpricks, etc., and caused worry, etc., it would follow, on the causal theory, that pain does not exist. To be in mental state type M is to be in a physical state N that occupies causal role R. A third version is teleological or “homuncular” functionalism, associated with William G. Lycan and early Dennett. According to homuncular functionalism, a human being is analogous to a large corporation, made up of cooperating departments, each with its own job to perform; these departments interpret stimuli and produce behavioral responses. Each department at the highest subpersonal level is in turn constituted by further units at a sub-subpersonal level and so on down until the neurological level is reached. The roleoccupant distinction is thus relativized to level: an occupant at one level is a role at the next level down. On this view, to be in a mental state type M is to have a sub- . . . subpersonal f-er that is in its characteristic state Sf. All versions of functionalism face problems about the qualitative nature of mental states. The difficulty is that functionalism individuates states in purely relational terms, but the acrid odor of, say, a paper mill seems to have a non-relational, qualitative character that functionalism misses altogether. If two people, on seeing a ripe banana, are in states with the same causes and effects, then, by functionalist definition, they are in the same mental state  say, having a sensation of yellow. But it seems possible that one has an “inverted spectrum” relative to the other, and hence that their states are qualitatively different. Imagine that, on seeing the banana, one of the two is in a state qualitatively indistinguishable from the state that the other would be in on seeing a ripe tomato. Despite widespread intuitions that such inverted spectra are possible, according to functionalism, they are not. A related problem is that of “absent qualia.” The population of China, or even the economy of Bolivia, could be functionally equivalent to a human brain  i.e., there could be a function that mapped the relations between inputs, outputs, and internal states of the population of China onto those of a human brain; yet the population of China, no matter how its members interact with one another and with other nations, intuitively does not have mental states. The status of these arguments remains controversial. 

fundamentum divisionis: a term in Scholastic logic and ontology for the ‘grounds for a distinction’. Some distinctions categorize separately existing things, such as men and beasts. This is a real distinction, and the fundamentum divisionis exists in reality. Some distinctions categorize things that cannot exist separately but can be distinguished mentally, such as the difference between being a human being and having a sense of humor, or the difference between a soul and one of its powers, say, the power of thinking. A mental distinction is also called a formal distinction. Duns Scotus is well known for the idea of formalis distinctio cum fundamento ex parte rei a formal distinction with a foundation in the thing, primarily in order to handle logical problems with functionalism, analytical fundamentum divisionis 335   335 the Christian concept of God. God is supposed to be absolutely simple; i.e., there can be no multiplicity of composition in him. Yet, according to traditional theology, many properties can be truly attributed to him. He is wise, good, and powerful. In order to preserve the simplicity of God, Duns Scotus claimed that the difference between wisdom, goodness, and power was only formal but still had some foundation in God’s own being.

futurum contingens: Grice knew that his obsession with action was an obsession with the uncertainty of a contingent future, alla Aristotle. Futurum -- future contingents, singular events or states of affairs that may come to pass, and also may not come to pass, in the future. There are three traditional problems involving future contingents: the question of universal validity of the principle of bivalence, the question of free will and determinism, and the question of foreknowledge. The debate about future contingents in modern philosophical logic was revived by Lukasiewicz’s work on three-valued logic. He thought that in order to avoid fatalistic consequences, we must admit that the principle of bivalence for any proposition, p, either p is true or not-p is true does not hold good for propositions about future contingents. Many authors have considered this view confused. According to von Wright, e.g., when propositions are said to be true or false and ‘is’ in ‘it is true that’ is tenseless or atemporal, the illusion of determinism does not arise. It has its roots in a tacit oscillation between a temporal and an atemporal reading of the phrase ‘it is true’. In a temporalized reading, or in its tensed variants such as ‘it was/will be/is already true’, one can substitute, for ‘true’, other words like ‘certain’, ‘fixed’, or ‘necessary’. Applying this diachronic necessity to atemporal predications of truth yields the idea of logical determinism. In contemporary discussions of tense and modality, future contingents are often treated with the help of a model of time as a line that breaks up into branches as it moves from left to right i.e., from past to future. Although the conception of truth at a moment has been found philosophically problematic, the model of historical modalities and branching time as such is much used in works on freedom and determination. Aristotle’s On Interpretation IX contains a classic discussion of future contingents with the famous example of tomorrow’s sea battle. Because of various ambiguities in the text and in Aristotle’s modal conceptions in general, the meaning of the passage is in dispute. In the Metaphysics VI.3 and in the Niocmachean Ethics III.5, Aristotle tries to show that not all things are predetermined. The Stoics represented a causally deterministic worldview; an ancient example of logical determinism is Diodorus Cronus’s famous master argument against contingency. Boethius thought that Aristotle’s view can be formulated as follows: the principle of bivalence is universally valid, but propositions about future contingents, unlike those about past and present things, do not obey the stronger principle according to which each proposition is either determinately true or determinately false. A proposition is indeterminately true as long as the conditions that make it true are not yet fixed. This was the standard Latin doctrine from Abelard to Aquinas. Similar discussions occurred in Arabic commentaries on On Interpretation. In the fourteenth century, many thinkers held that Aristotle abandoned bivalence for future contingent propositions. This restriction was usually refuted, but it found some adherents like Peter Aureoli. Duns Scotus and Ockham heavily criticized the Boethian-Thomistic view that God can know future contingents only because the flux of time is present to divine eternity. According to them, God contingently foreknows free acts. Explaining this proved to be a very cumbersome task. Luis de Molina 15351600 suggested that God knows what possible creatures would do in any possible situation. This “middle knowledge” theory about counterfactuals of freedom has remained a living theme in philosophy of religion; analogous questions are treated in theories of subjunctive reasoning. 

futurum indicativum: The Grecians called it just ‘horistike klesis.’ The Romans transliterated as modus definitivus, inclination anima affectations demonstrans.’ But they had other terms, indicativus, finitus, finitivus, and pronuntiativus. f. H. P. Grice and D. F. Pears, “Predicting and deciding.” The future is essentially involved in “E communicates that p,” i. e. E, the emissor, intends that his addressee, in a time later than t, will come to believe this or that.  Grice is especially concerned with the future for his analysis of the communicatum. “Close the door!” By uttering “Close the door!,” U means that A is to close the door – in the future. So Grice spends HOURS exploring how one can have justification to have an intention about a future event. Grice is aware of the ‘shall.’ Grice uses ‘shall’ in the first person to mean wha the calls ‘futurum indicativum.’ (He considers the case of the ‘shall’ in the second and third persons in his analysis of mode). What are the conditions for the use of “shall” in the first person. “I shall close the door” may be predictable. It is in the indicative mode. “Thou shalt close the door,” and “He shall close the door” are in the imperative mode, or rather they correspond to the ‘futurum intentionale.’  Since Grice is an analytic philosopher, he specifies the analysis in the third person (“U means that…”) one has to be careful. For ‘futurum indicativum’ we have ‘shall’ in the first person, and ‘will’ in the second and third persons. So for the first group, U means that he will go. In the second group, U means that his addressee or a third party shall go. Grice adopts a subscript variant, stick with ‘will,’ but add the mode afterwards: so will-ind. will be ‘futurum indicativum,’ and will-int. will be futurum intentionale. The OED has it as “shall,” and defines as a Germanic preterite-present strong verb. In Old English, it is “sceal,” and which the OED renders as “to owe (money,” 1425 Hoccleve Min. Poems, The leeste ferthyng þat y men shal. To owe (allegiance); 1649 And by that feyth I shal to god and yow; followed by an infinitive, without to. Except for a few instances of shall will, shall may (mowe), "shall conne" in the 15th c., the infinitive after shall is always either that of a principal verb or of have or be; The present tense shall; in general statements of what is right or becoming, = ought, superseded by the past subjunctive should; in OE. the subjunctive present sometimes occurs in this use; 1460 Fortescue Abs. and Lim. Mon. The king shall often times send his judges to punish rioters and risers. 1562 Legh Armory; Whether are Roundells of all suche coloures, as ye haue spoken of here before? or shall they be Namesd Roundelles of those coloures? In OE. and occas. in Middle English used to express necessity of various kinds. For the many shades of meaning in Old English see Bosworth and Toller), = must, "must needs", "have to", "am compelled to", etc.; in stating a necessary condition: = `will have to, `must (if something else is to happen). 1596 Shaks. Merch. V. i. i. 116 You shall seeke all day ere you finde them, & when you haue them they are not worth the search. 1605 Shaks. Lear. He that parts vs, shall bring a Brand from Heauen. c In hypothetical clause, accompanying the statement of a necessary condition: = `is to. 1612 Bacon Ess., Greatn. Kingd., Neither must they be too much broken of it, if they shall be preserued in vigor; ndicating what is appointed or settled to take place = the mod. `is to, `am to, etc. 1600 Shaks. A.Y.L. What is he that shall buy his flocke and pasture? 1625 in Ellis Orig. Lett. Ser. "Tomorrow His Majesty will be present  to begin the Parliament which is thought shall be removed to Oxford; in commands or instructions; n the second person, “shall” is equivalent to an imperative. Chiefly in Biblical language, of divine commandments, rendering the jussive future of the Hebrew and Vulgate. In Old English the imperative mode is used in the ten commandments. 1382 Wyclif Exod. Thow shalt not tak the Names of the Lord thi God in veyn. So Coverdale, etc. b) In expositions: you shall understand, etc. (that). c) In the formula you shall excuse (pardon) me. (now "must"). 1595 Shaks. John. Your Grace shall pardon me, I will not backe. 1630 R. Johnsons Kingd. and Commw. 191 You shall excuse me, for I eat no flesh on Fridayes; n the *third* person. 1744 in Atkyns Chanc. Cases (1782) III. 166 The words shall and may in general acts of parliament, or in private constitutions, are to be construed imperatively, they must remove them; in the second and third persons, expressing the determination by the Griceian utterer to bring about some action, event, or state of things in the future, or (occasionally) to refrain from hindering what is otherwise certain to take place, or is intended by another person; n the second person. 1891 J. S. Winter Lumley. If you would rather not stay then, you shall go down to South Kensington Square then; in third person. 1591 Shaks. Two Gent. Verona shall not hold thee. 1604 Shaks. Oth. If there be any cunning Crueltie, That can torment him much, It shall be his. 1891 J. S. Winter Lumley xiv, `Oh, yes, sir, she shall come back, said the nurse. `Ill take care of that. `I will come back, said Vere; in special interrogative uses, a) in the *first* person, used in questions to which the expected answer is a command, direction, or counsel, or a resolve on the speakers own part. a) in questions introduced by an interrogative pronoun (in oblique case), adverb, or adverbial phrase. 1600 Fairfax Tasso. What shall we doe? shall we be gouernd still, By this false hand? 1865 Kingsley Herew. Where shall we stow the mare? b) in categorical questions, often expressing indignant reprobation of a suggested course of action, the implication (or implicature, or entailment) being that only a negative (or, with negative question an affirmative) answer is conceivable. 1611 Shaks. Wint. T. Shall I draw the Curtaine? 1802 Wordsw. To the Cuckoo i, O Cuckoo! shall I call thee Bird, Or but a wandering Voice? 1891 J. S. Winter Lumley `Are you driving, or shall I call you a cab? `Oh, no; Im driving, thanks. c) In *ironical* affirmative in exclamatory sentence, equivalent to the above interrogative use, cf. Ger. soll. 1741 Richardson Pamela, A pretty thing truly! Here I, a poor helpless Girl, raised from Poverty and Distress, shall put on Lady-airs to a Gentlewoman born. d) to stand shall I, shall I (later shill I, shall I: v. shilly-shally), to be at shall I, shall I (not): to be vacillating, to shilly-shally. 1674 R. Godfrey Inj. and Ab. Physic Such Medicines. that will not stand shall I? shall I? but will fall to work on the Disease presently. b Similarly in the *third* person, where the Subjects represents or includes the utterer, or when the utterer is placing himself at anothers point of view. 1610 Shaks. Temp., Hast thou (which art but aire) a touch, a feeling Of their afflictions, and shall not my selfe, One of their kinde be kindlier moud then thou art? In the second and third person, where the expected answer is a decision on the part of the utterer or of some person OTHER than the Subjects. The question often serves as an impassioned repudiation of a suggestion (or implicature) that something shall be permitted. 1450 Merlin `What shal be his Names? `I will, quod she, `that it haue Names after my fader. 1600 Shaks. A.Y.L.; What shall he haue that kild the Deare? 1737 Alexander Pope, translating Horaces Epistle, And say, to which shall our applause belong, this new court jargon, or the good old song? 1812 Crabbe Tales, Shall a wife complain? In indirect question. 1865 Kingsley Herew, Let her say what shall be done with it; as a mere auxiliary, forming, with present infinitive, the future, and (with perfect infinitive) the future perfect tense. In Old English, the notion of the future tense is ordinarily expressed by the present tense. To prevent ambiguity, wile (will) is not unfrequently used as a future auxiliary, sometimes retaining no trace of its initial usage, connected with the faculty of volition, and cognate indeed with volition. On the other hand, sceal (shall), even when rendering a Latin future, can hardly be said to have been ever a mere future tense-sign in Old English. It always expressed something of its original notion of obligation or necessity, so Hampshire is wrong in saying I shall climb Mt. Everest is predictable. In Middle English, the present early ceases to be commonly employed in futural usage, and the future is expressed by shall or will, the former being much more common. The usage as to the choice between the two auxiliaries, shall and will, has varied from time to time. Since the middle of the seventeenth century, with Wallis, mere predictable futurity is expressed in the *first* person by shall, in the second and third by will, and vice versa. In oratio obliqua, usage allows either the retention of the auxiliary actually used by the original utterer, or the substitution of that which is appropriate to the point of view of the uttering reporting; in Old English, ‘sceal,; while retaining its primary usage, serves as a tense-sign in announcing a future event as fated or divinely decreed, cf. Those spots mean measle. Hence shall has always been the auxiliary used, in all persons, for prophetic or oracular announcements of the future, and for solemn assertions of the certainty of a future event. 1577 in Allen Martyrdom Campion; The queene neither ever was, nor is, nor ever shall be the head of the Church of England. 1601 Shaks. Jul. C. Now do I Prophesie. A Curse shall light vpon the limbes of men. b In the first person, "shall" has, from the early ME. period, been the normal auxiliary for expressing mere futurity, without any adventitious notion. (a) Of events conceived as independent of the volition of the utterer. To use will in these cases is now a mark of, not public-school-educated Oxonian, but Scottish, Irish, provincial, or extra-British idiom. 1595 in Cath. Rec. Soc. Publ. V. 357 My frend, yow and I shall play no more at Tables now. 1605 Shaks. Macb. When shall we three meet againe? 1613 Shaks. Hen. VIII, Then wee shall haue em, Talke vs to silence. 1852 Mrs. Stowe Uncle Toms C.; `But what if you dont hit? `I shall hit, said George coolly; of voluntary action or its intended result. Here I shall or we shall is always admissible except where the notion of a present, as distinguished from a previous, decision or consent is to be expressed, in which case ‘will’ shall be used. Further, I shall often expresses a determination insisted on in spite of opposition. In the 16th c. and earlier, I shall often occurs where I will would now be used. 1559 W. Cunningham Cosmogr. Glasse, This now shall I alway kepe surely in memorye. 1601 Shaks. Alls Well; Informe him so tis our will he should.-I shall my liege. 1885 Ruskin On Old Road, note: Henceforward I shall continue to spell `Ryme without our wrongly added h. c In the *second* person, shall as a mere future auxiliary appears never to have been usual, but in categorical questions it is normal, e.g. Shall you miss your train? I am afraid you will. d In the *third* person, superseded by will, except when anothers statement or expectation respecting himself is reported in the third person, e.g. He conveys that he shall not have time to write. Even in this case will is still not uncommon, but in some contexts leads to serious ambiguity. It might be therefore preferable, to some, to use ‘he shall’ as the indirect rendering of ‘I shall.’ 1489 Caxton Sonnes of Aymon ii. 64 Yf your fader come agayn from the courte, he shall wyll yelde you to the kynge Charlemayne. 1799 J. Robertson Agric. Perth, The effect of the statute labour  has always been, now is, and probably shall continue to be, less productive than it might. Down to the eighteenth century, shall, the auxiliary appropriate to the first person, is sometimes used when the utterer refers to himself in the third person. Cf. the formula: `And your petitioner shall ever pray. 1798 Kemble Let. in Pearsons Catal. Mr. Kemble presents his respectful compliments to the Proprietors of the `Monthly Mirror, and shall have great pleasure at being at all able to aid them; in negative, or virtually negative, and interrogative use, shall often = will be able to. 1600 Shaks. Sonn. lxv: How with this rage shall beautie hold a plea. g) Used after a hypothetical clause or an imperative sentence in a statementsof a result to be expected from some action or occurrence. Now (exc. in the *first* person) usually replaced by will. But shall survives in literary use. 1851 Dasent Jest and Earnest, Visit Rome and you shall find him [the Pope] mere carrion. h) In clause expressing the object of a promise, or of an expectation accompanied by hope or fear, now only where shall is the ordinary future auxiliary, but down to the nineteenth century shall is often preferred to will in the second and third persons. 1628 in Ellis Orig. Lett. Ser., He is confident that the blood of Christ shall wash away his sins. 1654 E. Nicholas in N. Papers, I hope neither your Cosen Wat. Montagu nor  Walsingham shall be permitted to discourse  with  the D. of Gloucester; in impersonal phrases, "it shall be well, needful", etc. (to do so and so). (now "will"). j) shall be, added to a future date in clauses measuring time. 1617 Sir T. Wentworth in Fortescue Papers. To which purpose my late Lord Chancelour gave his direction about the 3. of Decembre shallbe-two-yeares; in the idiomatic use of the future to denote what ordinarily or occasionally occurs under specified conditions, shall was formerly the usual auxiliary. In the *second* and *third* persons, this is now somewhat formal or rhetorical. Ordinary language substitutes will or may. Often in antithetic statements coupled by an adversative conjunction or by and with adversative force. a in the first person. 1712 Steele Spect. In spite of all my Care, I shall every now and then have a saucy Rascal ride by reconnoitring  under my Windows. b) in the *second* person. 1852 Spencer Ess. After knowing him for years, you shall suddenly discover that your friends nose is slightly awry. c) in the *third* person. 1793 W. Roberts Looker-On, One man shall approve the same thing that another man shall condemn. 1870 M. Arnold St. Paul and Prot. It may well happen that a man who lives and thrives under a monarchy shall yet theoretically disapprove the principle of monarchy. Usage No. 10: in hypothetical, relative, and temporal clauses denoting a future contingency, the future auxiliary is shall for all persons alike. Where no ambiguity results, however, the present tense is commonly used for the future, and the perfect for the future-perfect. The use of shall, when not required for clearness, is, Grice grants, apt to sound pedantic by non Oxonians. Formerly sometimes used to express the sense of a present subjunctive. a) in hypothetical clauses. (shall I = if I shall) 1680 New Hampsh. Prov. Papers, If any Christian shall speak contempteously of the Holy Scriptures, such person  shall be punished. b) in relative clauses, where the antecedent denotes an as yet undetermined person or thing: 1811 Southey Let., The minister who shall first become a believer in that book  will obtain a higher reputation than ever statesman did before him. 1874 R. Congreve Ess. We extend our sympathies to the unborn generations which shall follow us on this earth; in temporal clauses: 1830 Laws of Cricket in Nyren Yng. Cricketers Tutor, If in striking, or at any other time, while the ball shall be in play, both his feet be over the popping-crease; in clauses expressing the purposed result of some action, or the object of a desire, intention, command, or request, often admitting of being replaced by may. In Old English, and occasionally as late as the seventeenth century, the present subjunctive was used exactly as in Latin. a) in final clause usually introduced by that. In this use modern idiom prefers should (22 a): see quot. 1611 below, and the appended remarks. 1879 M. Pattison Milton At the age of nine and twenty, Milton has already determined that this lifework shall be an epic poem; in relative clause: 1599 Shaks. Hen. V, ii. iv. 40: As Gardeners doe with Ordure hide those Roots that shall first spring. The choice between should and would follows the same as shall and will as future auxiliaries, except that should must sometimes be avoided on account of liability to be misinterpreted as = `ought to. In present usage, should occurs mainly in the first person. In the other persons it follows the use of shall. III Elliptical and quasi-elliptical uses. Usage No. 24: with ellipsis of verb of motion: = `shall go; he use is common in OHG. and OS., and in later HG., LG., and Du. In the Scandinavian languages it is also common, and instances occur in MSw.] 1596 Shaks. 1 Hen. IV, That with our small coniunction we should on. 1598 Shaks. Merry W. If the bottome were as deepe as hell, I shold down; n questions, what shall = `what shall (it) profit, `what good shall (I) do. Usage No. 26: with the sense `is due, `is proper, `is to be given or applied. Cf. G. soll. Usage No. 27: a) with ellipsis of active infinitive to be supplied from the context. 1892 Mrs. H. Ward David Grieve, `No, indeed, I havnt got all I want, said Lucy `I never shall, neither; if I shall. Now dial. 1390 Gower Conf. II. 96: Doun knelende on mi kne I take leve, and if I schal, I kisse hire. 1390 Gower Conf., II. 96: I wolde kisse hire eftsones if I scholde. 1871 Earle Philol. Engl. Tongue 203: The familiar proposal to carry a basket, I will if I shall, that is, I am willing if you will command me; I will if so required. 1886 W. Somerset Word-bk. Ill warn our Tomll do it vor ee, nif he shall-i.e. if you wish. c) with generalized ellipsis in proverbial phrase: needs must that needs shall = `he must whom fate compels. Usage No. 28: a) with ellipsis of do (not occurring in the context). 1477 Norton Ord. Alch., O King that shall These Workes! b) the place of the inf. is sometimes supplied by that or so placed at the beginning of the sentence. The construction may be regarded as an ellipsis of "do". It is distinct from the use (belonging to 27) in which so has the sense of `thus, `likewise, or `also. In the latter there is usually inversion, as so shall I. 1888 J. S. Winter Bootles Childr. iv: I should like to see her now shes grown up. `So you shall. Usage No. 29: with ellipsis of be or passive inf., or with so in place of this (where the preceding context has is, was, etc.). 1615 J. Chamberlain in Crt. And Times Jas.; He is not yet executed, nor I hear not when he shall. Surely he may not will that he be executed.

futurum intentionale: Surely intention has nothing to do with predictable truth. If Smith promises Jones a job – he intends that Jones get a job. Then the world explodes, so Jones does not get the job. Kant, Austin, or Grice, don’t care. A philosopher is not a scientist. He is into ‘conceptual matters,’ about what is to have a good intention, not whether the intention, in a future scenario, is realised or not. If they are interested in ‘tense,’ as Prior was as Grice was with his time-relative identity, it’s still because in the PRESENT, the emissor emits a future-tense utterance. The future figures more prominently than anything because in “Emissor communicates that p” there is the FUTURE ESSENTIAL. The emissor intends that his addressee in a time later than the present will do this or that. While Grice is always looking to cross the credibility/desirability divide, there is a feature that is difficult to cross in the bridge of asses. This is the shall vs. will. Grice is aware that ‘will,’ in the FIRST person, is not a matter of prediction. When Grice says “I will go to Harborne,” that’s not a prediction. He firmly contrasts it with “I shall go to Harborne” which is a perfect prediction in the indicative mode. “I will go to Harborne” is in the ‘futurum intentionale.’ Grice is also aware that in the SECOND and THIRD persons, ‘will’ reports something that the utterer must judge unpredictable. An utterance like “Thou wilt go to London” and “He will go to London” is in the ‘futurum indicativus.’ This is one nuance that Prichard forgets in the analysis of ‘willing’ that Grice eventually adopts. Prichard uses ‘will’ derivatively, and followed by a ‘that’-clause. Prichard quotes from the New-World, where the dialect is slightly different. For William James had said, “I will that the distant table slides over the floor toward me. And it does not.” Since James is using ‘will’ in the first person, the utterance is indeed NOT in the indicative, but the ‘intentional’ mode. In the case of the ‘communicatum,’ things get complicated, since U intends that A will believe that… In which case, U’s intention (and thus will) is directed towards the ‘will’ of his addressee, too, even if it is merely to adopt a ‘belief.’ So what would be the primary uses of the ‘will.’ In the first person, “I will go to Harborne” is in the futurum intentionale. It is used to report the utterer’s will. In the second and third person – “Thou will go to Harborne” and “He will go to Harborne,” the utterer uses the futurum indicativum and utters a statement which is predictable.  Since analytic philosophers specify the analysis in the third person (“U means that…”) one has to be careful. For ‘futurum intentionale’ we have ‘will’ in the first person, and ‘shall’ in the second and third persons. So for the first group, U means that he SHALL go. In the second group, U means that his addressee or a third party WILL go. Grice adopts a subscript variant, stick with ‘will,’ but add the mode afterwards: so will-ind. will be ‘futurum indicativum,’ and will-int. will be futurum intentionale. Grice distinguishes the ‘futurum imperativum.’ This may be seen as a sub-class of the ‘futurum intentionale,’ as applied to the second and third persons, to avoid the idea that one can issue a ‘self-command.’ Grice has a futurum imperativum, in Latin ending in -tō(te), used to request someone to do something, or if something else happens first. “Sī quid acciderit, scrībitō. If anything happens, write to me' (Cicero). ‘Ubi nōs lāverimus, lavātō.’ 'When*we* have finished washing, *you* get washed.’ (Terence). ‘Crūdam si edēs, in acētum intinguitō.’ ‘If you eat cabbage raw, dip it in vinegar.’ (Cato). ‘Rīdētō multum quī tē, Sextille, cinaedum dīxerit et digitum porrigitō medium.’ 'Laugh loudly at anyone who calls you camp, Sextillus, and stick up your middle finger at him.' (Martial).  In Latin, some verbs have only a futurum imperativum, e. g., scītō 'know', mementō 'remember'. In Latin, there is also a third person imperative also ending in -tō, plural -ntō exists. It is used in very formal contexts such as laws. ‘Iūsta imperia suntō, īsque cīvēs pārentō.’ 'Orders must be just, and citizens must obey them' (Cicero). Other ways of expressing a command or request are made with expressions such as cūrā ut 'take care to...', fac ut 'see to it that...' or cavē nē 'be careful that you don't...' Cūrā ut valeās. 'Make sure you keep well' (Cicero). Oddly, in Roman, the futurum indicativum can be used for a polite commands. ‘Pīliae salūtem dīcēs et Atticae.’  'Will you please give my regards to Pilia and Attica?' (Cicero. The OED has will, would. It is traced to Old English willan, pres.t. wille, willaþ, pa. t. wolde. Grice was especially interested to check Jamess and Prichards use of willing that, Prichards shall will and the will/shall distinction; the present tense will; transitive uses, with simple obj. or obj. clause; occas. intr. 1 trans. with simple obj.: desire, wish for, have a mind to, `want (something); sometimes implying also `intend, purpose. 1601 Shaks. (title) Twelfe Night, Or what you will. 1654 Whitlock Zootomia 44 Will what befalleth, and befall what will. 1734 tr. Rollins Anc. Hist. V. 31 He that can do what ever he will is in great danger of willing what he ought not. b intr. with well or ill, or trans. with sbs. of similar meaning (e.g. good, health), usually with dat. of person: Wish (or intend) well or ill (to some one), feel or cherish good-will or ill-will. Obs. (cf. will v.2 1 b). See also well-willing; to will well that: to be willing that. 1483 Caxton Gold. Leg. I wyl wel that thou say, and yf thou say ony good, thou shalt be pesybly herde. Usage No. 2: trans. with obj. clause (with vb. in pres. subj., or in periphrastic form with should), or acc. and inf.: Desire, wish; sometimes implying also `intend, purpose (that something be done or happen). 1548 Hutten Sum of Diuinitie K viij, God wylle all men to be saued; enoting expression (usually authoritative) of a wish or intention: Determine, decree, ordain, enjoin, give order (that something be done). 1528 Cromwell in Merriman Life and Lett. (1902) I. 320 His grace then wille that thellection of a new Dean shalbe emonges them of the colledge; spec. in a direction or instruction in ones will or testament; hence, to direct by will (that something be done). 1820 Giffords Compl. Engl. Lawyer. I do hereby will and direct that my executrix..do excuse and release the said sum of 100l. to him;  figurative usage. of an abstract thing (e.g. reason, law): Demands, requires. 1597 Shaks. 2 Hen. IV, Our Battaile is more full of Namess then yours Then Reason will, our hearts should be as good. Usage No. 4 transf. (from 2). Intends to express, means; affirms, maintains. 1602 Dolman La Primaud. Fr. Acad. Hee will that this authority should be for a principle of demonstration. 2 With dependent infinitive (normally without "to"); desire to, wish to, have a mind to (do something); often also implying intention. 1697 Ctess DAunoys Trav. I will not write to you often, because I will always have a stock of News to tell you, which..is pretty long in picking up. 1704 Locke Hum. Und.  The great Encomiasts of the Chineses, do all to a man agree and will convince us that the Sect of the Literati are Atheists. 6 In relation to anothers desire or requirement, or to an obligation of some kind: Am (is, are) disposed or willing to, consent to; †in early use sometimes = deign or condescend to.With the (rare and obs.) imper. use, as in quot. 1490, cf. b and the corresponding negative use in 12 b. 1921 Times Lit. Suppl. 10 Feb. 88/3 Literature thrives where people will read what they do not agree with, if it is good. b In 2nd person, interrog., or in a dependent clause after beg or the like, expressing a request (usually courteous; with emphasis, impatient). 1599 Shaks. Hen. V, ii. i. 47 Will you shogge off? 1605 1878 Hardy Ret. Native v. iii, O, O, O,..O, will you have done! Usage No. 7 Expressing voluntary action, or conscious intention directed to the doing of what is expressed by the principal verb (without temporal reference as in 11, and without emphasis as in 10): = choose to (choose v. B. 3 a). The proper word for this idea, which cannot be so precisely expressed by any other. 1685 Baxter Paraphr., When God will tell us we shall know. Usage No. 8 Expressing natural disposition to do something, and hence habitual action: Has the habit, or `a way, of --ing; is addicted or accustomed to --ing; habitually does; sometimes connoting `may be expected to (cf. 15). 1865 Ruskin Sesame, Men, by their nature, are prone to fight; they will fight for any cause, or for none; expressing potentiality, capacity, or sufficiency: Can, may, is able to, is capable of --ing; is (large) enough or sufficient to.†it will not be: it cannot be done or brought to pass; it is all in vain. So, †will it not be? 1833 N. Arnott Physics, The heart will beat after removal from the body. Usage No. 10 As a strengthening of sense 7, expressing determination, persistence, and the like (without temporal reference as in 11); purposes to, is determined to. 1539 Bible (Great) Isa. lxvi. 6, I heare ye voyce of the Lorde, that wyll rewarde, etc; recompence his enemyes; emphatically. Is fully determined to; insists on or persists in --ing: sometimes with mixture of sense 8. (In 1st pers. with implication of futurity, as a strengthening of sense 11 a. Also fig. = must inevitably, is sure to. 1892 E. Reeves Homeward Bound viii. 239, I have spent 6,000 francs to come here..and I will see it! c In phr. of ironical or critical force referring to anothers assertion or opinion. Now arch. exc. in will have it; 1591 Shaks. 1 Hen. VI, This is a Riddling Merchant for the nonce, He will be here, and yet he is not here. 1728 Chambers Cycl., Honey, Some naturalists will have honey to be of a different quality, according to the difference of the flowers..the bees suck it from. Also, as auxiliary of the future tense with implication (entailment rather than cancellable implicatum) of intention, thus distinguished from ‘shall,’ v. B. 8, where see note); in 1st person: sometimes in slightly stronger sense = intend to, mean to. 1600 Shaks. A.Y.L., To morrow will we be married. 1607 Shaks. Cor., Ile run away Till I am bigger, but then Ile fight. 1777 Clara Reeve Champion of Virtue, Never fear it..I will speak to Joseph about it. b In 2nd and 3rd pers., in questions or indirect statements. 1839 Lane Arab. Nts.,  I will cure thee without giving thee to drink any potion When King Yoonán heard his words, he..said.., How wilt thou do this? c will do (with omission of "I"): an expression of willingness to carry out a request. Cf. wilco. colloq. 1967 L. White Crimshaw Memorandum, `And find out where the bastard was `Will do, Jim said. 13 In 1st pers., expressing immediate intention: "I will" = `I am now going to, `I proceed at once to. 1885 Mrs. Alexander At Bay, Very well; I will wish you good-evening. b In 1st pers. pl., expressing a proposal: we will (†wule we) = `let us. 1798 Coleridge Nightingale 4 Come, we will rest on this old mossy bridge!, c figurative, as in It will rain, (in 3rd pers.) of a thing: Is ready to, is on the point of --ing. 1225 Ancr. R. A treou þet wule uallen, me underset hit mid on oðer treou. 14 In 2nd and 3rd pers., as auxiliary expressing mere futurity, forming (with pres. inf.) the future, and (with pf. inf.) the future pf. tense: corresponding to "shall" in the 1st pers. (see note s.v. shall v. B. 8). 1847 Tennyson Princess iii. 12 Rest, rest, on mothers breast, Father will come to thee soon. b As auxiliary of future substituted for the imper. in mild injunctions or requests. 1876 Ruskin St. Marks Rest. That they should use their own balances, weights, and measures; (not by any means false ones, you will please to observe). 15 As auxiliary of future expressing a contingent event, or a result to be expected, in a supposed case or under particular conditions (with the condition expressed by a conditional, temporal, or imper. clause, or otherwise implied). 1861 M. Pattison Ess.  The lover of the Elizabethan drama will readily recal many such allusions; b with pers.sSubjects (usually 1st pers. sing.), expressing a voluntary act or choice in a supposed case, or a conditional promise or undertaking: esp. in asseverations, e.g. I will die sooner than, I’ll be hanged if, etc.). 1898 H. S. Merriman Rodens Corner. But I will be hanged if I see what it all means, now; xpressing a determinate or necessary consequence (without the notion of futurity). 1887 Fowler Deductive Logic, From what has been said it will be seen that I do not agree with Mr. Mill. Mod. If, in a syllogism, the middle term be not distributed in either premiss, there will be no conclusion; ith the notion of futurity obscured or lost: = will prove or turn out to, will be found on inquiry to; may be supposed to, presumably does. Hence (chiefly Sc. and north. dial.) in estimates of amount, or in uncertain or approximate statements, the future becoming equivalent to a present with qualification: e.g. it will be = `I think it is or `it is about; what will that be? = `what do you think that is? 1584 Hornby Priory in Craven Gloss. Where on 40 Acres there will be xiij.s. iv.d. per acre yerely for rent. 1791 Grose Olio (1792) 106, I believe he will be an Irishman. 1791 Grose Olio. C. How far is it to Dumfries? W. It will be twenty miles. 1812 Brackenridge Views Louisiana, The agriculture of this territory will be very similar to that of Kentucky. 1876 Whitby Gloss. sThis word we have only once heard, and that will be twenty years ago. 16 Used where "shall" is now the normal auxiliary, chiefly in expressing mere futurity: since 17th c. almost exclusively in Scottish, Irish, provincial, or extra-British use (see shall. 1602 Shaks. Ham. I will win for him if I can: if not, Ile gaine nothing but my shame, and the odde hits. 1825 Scott in Lockhart Ballantyne-humbug. I expect we will have some good singing. 1875 E. H. Dering Sherborne. `Will I start, sir? asked the Irish groom. Usage No. 3 Elliptical and quasi-elliptical uses; n absol. use, or with ellipsis of obj. clause as in 2: in meaning corresponding to senses 5-7.if you will is sometimes used parenthetically to qualify a word or phrase: = `if you wish it to be so called, `if you choose or prefer to call it so. 1696 Whiston The. Earth. Gravity depends entirely on the constant and efficacious, and, if you will, the supernatural and miraculous Influence of Almighty God. 1876 Ruskin St. Marks Rest. Very savage! monstrous! if you will. b In parenthetic phr. if God will (†also will God, rarely God will), God willing: if it be the will of God, `D.V.In OE. Gode willi&asg.ende (will v.2) = L. Deo volente. 1716 Strype in Thoresbys Lett. Next week, God willing, I take my journey to my Rectory in Sussex; fig. Demands, requires (absol. or ellipt. use of 3 c). 1511 Reg. Privy Seal Scot. That na seculare personis have intrometting with thaim uther wais than law will; I will well: I assent, `I should think so indeed. (Cf. F. je veux bien.) Usage No. 18: with ellipsis of a vb. of motion. 1885 Bridges Eros and Psyche Aug. I will to thee oer the stream afloat. Usage No. 19: with ellipsis of active inf. to be supplied from the context. 1836 Dickens Sk. Boz, Steam Excurs., `Will you go on deck? `No, I will not. This was said with a most determined air. 1853 Dickens Bleak Ho. lii, I cant believe it. Its not that I dont or I wont. I cant! 1885 Mrs. Alexander Valeries Fate vi, `Do you know that all the people in the house will think it very shocking of me to walk with you?.. `The deuce they will!; With generalized ellipsis, esp. in proverbial saying (now usually as in quot. 1562, with will for would). 1639 J. Clarke Paroem. 237 He that may and will not, when he would he shall not. c With so or that substituted for the omitted inf. phr.: now usually placed at the beginning of the sentence. 1596 Shaks. Tam. Shr. Hor. I promist we would beare his charge of wooing Gremio. And so we wil. d Idiomatically used in a qualifying phr. with relative, equivalent to a phr. with indef. relative in -ever; often with a thing as subj., becoming a mere synonym of may: e.g. shout as loud as you will = `however loud you (choose to) shout; come what will = `whatever may come; be that as it will = `however that may be. 1732 Pope Mor. Ess. The ruling Passion, be it what it will, The ruling Passion conquers Reason still. 20 With ellipsis of pass. inf. A. 1774 Goldsm. Surv. Exp. Philos. The airs force is compounded of its swiftness and density, and as these are encreased, so will the force of the wind; in const. where the ellipsis may be either of an obj. clause or of an inf. a In a disjunctive qualifying clause or phr. usually parenthetic, as whether he will or no, will he or not, (with pron. omitted) will or no, (with or omitted) will he will he not, will he nill he (see VI. below and willy-nilly), etc.In quot. 1592 vaguely = `one way or another, `in any case. For the distinction between should and would, v. note s.v. shall; in a noun-clause expressing the object of desire, advice, or request, usually with a person as subj., implying voluntary action as the desired end: thus distinguished from should, which may be used when the persons will is not in view. Also (almost always after wish) with a thing as Subjects, in which case should can never be substituted because it would suggest the idea of command or compulsion instead of mere desire. Cf. shall; will; willest; willeth; wills; willed (wIld); also: willian, willi, wyll, wille, wil, will, willode, will, wyllede, wylled, willyd, ied, -it, -id, willed; wijld, wilde, wild, willid, -yd, wylled,willet, willed; willd(e, wild., OE. willian wk. vb. = German “willen.” f. will sb.1, 1 trans. to wish, desire; sometimes with implication of intention: = will. 1400 Lat. and Eng. Prov. He þt a lytul me 3euyth to me wyllyth optat longe lyffe. 1548 Udall, etc. Erasm. Par. Matt. v. 21-24 Who so euer hath gotten to hymselfe the charitie of the gospell, whyche wylleth wel to them that wylleth yll. 1581 A. Hall Iliad, By Mineruas helpe, who willes you all the ill she may. A. 1875 Tennyson Q. Mary i. iv, A great party in the state Wills me to wed her; To assert, affirm: = will v.1 B. 4. 1614 Selden Titles Hon. None of this excludes Vnction before, but only wils him the first annointed by the Pope. 2 a to direct by ones will or testament (that something be done, or something to be done); to dispose of by will; to bequeath or devise; to determine by the will; to attempt to cause, aim at effecting by exercise of will; to set the mind with conscious intention to the performance or occurrence of something; to choose or decide to do something, or that something shall be done or happen. Const. with simple obj., acc. and inf., simple inf. (now always with to), or obj. clause; also absol. or intr. (with as or so). Nearly coinciding in meaning with will v.1 7, but with more explicit reference to the mental process of volition. 1630 Prynne Anti-Armin. 119 He had onely a power, not to fall into sinne vnlesse he willed it. 1667 Milton P.L. So absolute she seems..that what she wills to do or say, Seems wisest. 1710 J. Clarke tr. Rohaults Nat. Philos. If I will to move my Arm, it is presently moved. 1712 Berkeley Pass. Obed. He that willeth the end, doth will the necessary means conducive to that end. 1837 Carlyle Fr. Rev. All shall be as God wills. 1880 Meredith Tragic Com. So great, heroical, giant-like, that what he wills must be. 1896 Housman Shropsh. Lad xxx, Others, I am not the first, Have willed more mischief than they durst; intr. to exercise the will; to perform the mental act of volition. 1594 Hooker Eccl. Pol. To will, is to bend our soules to the hauing or doing of that which they see to be good. 1830 Mackintosh Eth. Philos. Wks.. But what could induce such a being to will or to act? 1867 A. P. Forbes Explan. Is this infinitely powerful and intelligent Being free? wills He? loves He? c trans. To bring or get (into, out of, etc.) by exercise of will. 1850 L. Hunt Table-t. (1882) 184 Victims of opium have been known to be unable to will themselves out of the chair in which they were sitting. d To control (another person), or induce (another) to do something, by the mere exercise of ones will, as in hypnotism. 1882 Proc. Soc. Psych. Research I. The one to be `willed would go to the other end of the house, if desired, whilst we agreed upon the thing to be done. 1886 19th Cent. They are what is called `willed to do certain things desired by the ladies or gentlemen who have hold of them. 1897 A. Lang Dreams & Ghosts iii. 59 A young lady, who believed that she could play the `willing game successfully without touching the person `willed; to express or communicate ones will or wish with regard to something, with various shades of meaning, cf. will, v.1 3., specifically: a to enjoin, order; to decree, ordain, a) with personal obj., usually with inf. or clause. 1481 Cov. Leet Bk. 496 We desire and also will you that vnto oure seid seruaunt ye yeue your aid. 1547 Edw. VI in Rymer Foedera, We Wyll and Commaunde yowe to Procede in the seid Matters. 1568 Grafton Chron., Their sute was smally regarded, and shortly after they were willed to silence. 1588 Lambarde Eiren. If a man do lie in awaite to rob me, and (drawing his sword upon me) he willeth me to deliver my money. 1591 Shaks. 1 Hen. VI We doe no otherwise then wee are willd. 1596 Nashe Saffron Walden P 4, Vp he was had and.willed to deliuer vp his weapon. 1656 Hales Gold. Rem. The King in the Gospel, that made a Feast, and..willed his servants to go out to the high-ways side. 1799 Nelson in Nicolas Disp., Willing and requiring all Officers and men to obey you; 1565 Cooper Thesaurus s.v. Classicum, By sounde of trumpet to will scilence. 1612 Bacon Ess., Of Empire. It is common with Princes (saith Tacitus) to will contradictories. 1697 Dryden Æneis i. 112 Tis yours, O Queen! to will The Work, which Duty binds me to fulfil. 1877 Tennyson Harold vi. i, Get thou into thy cloister as the king Willd it.; to pray, request, entreat; = desire v. 6. 1454 Paston Lett. Suppl. As for the questyon that ye wylled me to aske my lord, I fond hym yet at no good leyser. 1564 Haward tr. Eutropius. The Romaines sent ambassadoures to him, to wyll him to cease from battayle. 1581 A. Hall Iliad, His errand done, as he was willde, he toke his flight from thence. 1631 [Mabbe] Celestina. Did I not will you I should not be wakened? 1690 Dryden Amphitryon i. i, He has sent me to will and require you to make a swinging long Night for him; fig. of a thing, to require, demand; also, to induce, persuade a person to do something. 1445 in Anglia. Constaunce willeth also that thou doo noughte with weyke corage. Cable and Baugh note that one important s. of prescriptions that now form part of all our grammars -- that governing the use of will and shall -- has its origin in this period. Previous to 1622 no grammar recognized any distinction between will and shall. In 1653 Wallis in his Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae states in Latin and for the benefit of Europeans that Subjectsive intention is expressed by will in the first person, by shall in the second and third, while simple factual indicative predictable futurity is expressed by shall in the first person, by will in the second and third. It is not until the second half of the eighteenth century that the use in questions and subordinate clauses is explicitly defined. In 1755 Johnson, in his Dictionary, states the rule for questions, and in 1765 William Ward, in his Grammar, draws up for the first time the full set of prescriptions that underlies, with individual variations, the rules found in later tracts. Wards pronouncements are not followed generally by other grammarians until Lindley Murray gives them greater currency in 1795. Since about 1825 they have often been repeated in grammars, v. Fries, The periphrastic future with will and shall. Will qua modal auxiliary never had an s. The absence of conjugation is a very old common Germanic phenomenon. OE 3rd person present indicative of willan (and of the preterite-present verbs) is not distinct from the 1st person present indicative. That dates back at least to CGmc, or further if one looks just as the forms and ignore tense and/or mood). Re: Prichard: "Prichard wills that he go to London. This is Prichards example, admired by Grice ("but I expect not pleasing to Maucaulays ears"). The -s is introduced to indicate a difference between the modal and main verb use (as in Prichard and Grice) of will. In fact, will, qua modal, has never been used with a to-infinitive. OE uses present-tense forms to refer to future events as well as willan and sculan. willan would give a volitional nuance; sculan, an obligational nuance. Its difficult to find an example of weorthan used to express the future, but that doesnt mean it didnt happen. In insensitive utterers, will has very little of volition about it, unless one follows Walliss observation for  for I will vs. I shall. Most probably use ll, or be going to for the future.

fuzzy implicatum. Grice loved ‘fuzzy,’ “if only because it’s one of the few non-Graeco-Roman philosophical terms!” -- fuzzy set, a set in which membership is a matter of degree. In classical set theory, for every set S and thing x, either x is a member of S or x is not. In fuzzy set theory, things x can be members of sets S to any degree between 0 and 1, inclusive. Degree 1 corresponds to ‘is a member of’ and 0 corresponds to ‘is not’; the intermediate degrees are degrees of vagueness or uncertainty. Example: Let S be the set of men who are bald at age forty. L. A. Zadeh developed a logic of fuzzy sets as the basis for a logic of vague predicates. A fuzzy set can be represented mathematically as a function from a given universe into the interval [0, 1].  Zadeh tried to interpret Grice alla fuzzy in “Pragmatics”

gadamer: philosopher, the leading proponent of hermeneutics in the second half of the twentieth century. He studied at Marburg in the 0s with Natorp and Heidegger. His first book, Plato’s Dialectical Ethics 1, bears their imprint and reflects his abiding interest in Grecian philosophy. Truth and Method 0 established Gadamer as an original thinker and had an impact on a variety of disciplines outside philosophy, including theology, legal theory, and literary criticism. The three parts of Truth and Method combine to displace the scientific conceptions of truth and method as the model for understanding in the human sciences. In the first part, which presents itself as a critique of the abstraction inherent in aesthetic consciousness, Gadamer argues that artworks make a claim to truth. Later Gadamer draws on the play of art in the experience of the beautiful to offer an analogy to how a text draws its readers into the event of truth by making a claim on them. In the central portion of the book Gadamer presents tradition as a condition of understanding. Tradition is not for him an object of historical knowledge, but part of one’s very being. The final section of Truth and Method is concerned with language as the site of tradition. Gadamer sought to shift the focus of hermeneutics from the problems of obscurity and misunderstanding to the community of understanding that the participants in a dialogue share through language. Gadamer was involved in three debates that define his philosophical contribution. The first was an ongoing debate with Heidegger reflected throughout Gadamer’s corpus. Gadamer did not accept all of the innovations that Heidegger introduced into his thinking in the 0s, particularly his reconstruction of the history of philosophy as the history of being. Gadamer also rejected Heidegger’s elevation of Hölderlin to the status of an authority. Gadamer’s greater accessibility led Habermas to characterize Gadamer’s contribution as that of having “urbanized the Heideggerian province.” The second debate was with Habermas himself. Habermas criticized Gadamer’s rejection of the Enlightenment’s “prejudice against prejudice.” Whereas Habermas objected to the conservatism inherent in Gadamer’s rehabilitation of prejudice, Gadamer explained that he was only setting out the conditions for understanding, conditions that did not exclude the possibility of radical change. The third debate, which formed the basis of Dialogue and Deconstruction 9, was with Derrida. Derridean deconstruction is indebted to Heidegger’s later philosophy and so this debate was in part about the direction philosophy should take after Heidegger. However, many observers concluded that there was no real engagement between Gadamer and Derrida. To some it seemed that Derrida, by refusing to accept the terms on which Gadamer insisted dialogue should take place, had exposed the limits imposed by hermeneutics. To others it was confirmation that any attempt to circumvent the conditions of dialogue specified by Gadamerian hermeneutics is selfdefeating.

galen: philosopher, he traveled extensively in the Greco-Roman world before settling in Rome and becoming court physician to Marcus Aurelius. His philosophical interests lay mainly in the philosophy of science On the Therapeutic Method and nature On the Function of Parts, and in logic Introduction to Logic, in which he develops a crude but pioneering treatment of the logic of relations. Galen espoused an extreme form of directed teleology in natural explanation, and sought to develop a syncretist picture of cause and explanation drawing on Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and preceding medical writers, notably Hippocrates, whose views he attempted to harmonize with those of Plato On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato. He wrote on philosophical psychology On the Passions and Errors of the Soul; his materialist account of mind Mental Characteristics Are Caused by Bodily Conditions is notable for its caution in approaching issues such as the actual nature of the substance of the soul and the age and structure of the universe that he regarded as undecidable. In physiology, he adopted a version of the four-humor theory, that health consists in an appropriate balance of four basic bodily constituents blood, black bile, yellow bile, and phlegm, and disease in a corresponding imbalance a view owed ultimately to Hippocrates. He sided with the rationalist physicians against the empiricists, holding that it was possible to elaborate and to support theories concerning the fundamentals of the human body; but he stressed the importance of observation and experiment, in particular in anatomy he discovered the function of the recurrent laryngeal nerve by dissection and ligation. Via the Arabic tradition, Galen became the most influential doctor of the ancient world; his influence persisted, in spite of the discoveries of the seventeenth century, until the end of the nineteenth century. He also wrote extensively on semantics, but these texts are lost.

galileo galilei: philosopher. His Dialogue concerning the Two Chief World Systems defends Copernicus by arguing against the major tenets of the Aristotelian cosmology. On his view, one kind of motion replaces the multiple distinct celestial and terrestrial motions of Aristotle; mathematics is applicable to the real world; and explanation of natural events appeals to efficient causes alone, not to hypothesized natural ends. Galileo was called before the Inquisition, was made to recant his Copernican views, and spent the last years of his life under house arrest. Discourse concerning Two New Sciences 1638 created the modern science of mechanics: it proved the laws of free fall, thus making it possible to study accelerated motions; asserted the principle of the independence of forces; and proposed a theory of parabolic ballistics. His work was developed by Huygens and Newton. Galileo’s scientific and technological achievements were prodigious. He invented an air thermoscope, a device for raising water, and a computer for calculating quantities in geometry and ballistics. His discoveries in pure science included the isochronism of the pendulum and the hydrostatic balance. His telescopic observations led to the discovery of four of Jupiter’s satellites the Medicean Stars, the moon’s mountains, sunspots, the moon’s libration, and the nature of the Milky Way. In methodology Galileo accepted the ancient Grecian ideal of demonstrative science, and employed the method of retroductive inference, whereby the phenomena under investigation are attributed to remote causes. Much of his work utilizes the hypothetico-deductive method.

gambler’s fallacy: also called Monte Carlo fallacy, the fallacy of supposing, of a sequence of independent events, that the probabilities of later outcomes must increase or decrease to “compensate” for earlier outcomes. For example, since by Bernoulli’s theorem in a long run of tosses of a fair coin it is very probable that the coin will come up heads roughly half the time, one might think that a coin that has not come up heads recently must be “due” to come up heads  must have a probability greater than one-half of doing so. But this is a misunderstanding of the law of large numbers, which requires no such compensating tendencies of the coin. The probability of heads remains one-half for each toss despite the preponderance, so far, of tails. In the sufficiently long run what “compensates” for the presence of improbably long subsequences in which, say, tails strongly predominate, is simply that such subsequences occur rarely and therefore have only a slight effect on the statistical character of the whole. 

conversational game theory: Grice for ‘homo ludens’. In “Logic and conversation,” Grice uses the phrases, “the game of conversation,” “conversational game,” “conversational move,” “the conversational rules,” – so he knew he was echoing Neumann and Morgenstern. J. Hintikka, “Grice and game theory.” the theory of the structure of, and the rational procedures (or strategies) for performing in, games or game-like human interactions. Although there are forerunners, game theory is virtually invented by Neumann and Morgenstern. Its most striking feature is its compact representation of interactions of at least two players; e. g. two players may face two choices each, and in combination these choices produce four possible outcomes. Actual choices are of strategies, not of outcomes, although it is assessments of outcomes that recommend this or that procedure, maxim, imperative, or strategy. To do well in a game, even for each player to do well, as is often possible, generally requires taking the other player’s position, interest, and goal, into account. Hence, to evaluate an imperative or rule or strategiy directly, without reference to the outcomes they might produce in interaction with others, is conspicuously perverse. It is not surprising, therefore, that in meta-ethics, game theory has been preeminently applied to utilitarianianism. As the numbers of players and rational procedure, guideline or strategies rise, the complexity of the game of conversation increases geometrically. If players have *2* strategies each and each ranks the four possible outcomes without ties, there are already *78* strategically distinct conversations. Even minor real-life interactions may have astronomically greater complexity. Grice once complained to Hintikka that this makes game theory ‘useless,’ or ‘otiose.’ Alternatively, one can note that this makes it realistic and helps us understand why real-life choices are at least as complex as they sometimes seem. To complicate matters further, conversationalists can choose over probabilistic combinations of their pure rational guidelines or strategies. Hence, the original 4 outcomes in a simple 2 $ 2 game define a continuum of potential outcomes. After noting the structure of the game of conversation, one might then be struck by an immediate implication of this mere description. A rational agent may be supposed to attempt to maximize his potential or expected outcome in the game of conversation. But as there are at least two players in the game of conversation, in general conversationalists cannot all maximize simultaneously over their expected outcomes while assuming that all others are doing likewise. This is an analytical principle. In general, we cannot maximize over two functions simultaneously. The general notion of the greatest good of the greatest number, e. g., is incoherent. Hence, in inter-active choice contexts, the simple notion of economic rationality is incoherent. Virtually all of early game theory was dedicated to finding an alternative principle for resolving conversational game interactions. There are now many of what Grice calls a “solution theory,” most of which are about this or that outcome rather than this or that rational guideline or strategy they stipulate which outcomes or range of outcomes is game-theoretically “rational.” There is little consensus on how to generalize from the ordinary rationality of merely choosing more rather than less and of displaying consistent preferences to the general choice of strategies in games. A pay-off in early game theory is almost always represented in a cardinal, transferable utility. A transferable utility is an odd notion that is evidently introduced to avoid the disdain with which philosophers then treated interpersonal comparisons of utility. It seems to be analogous to money. One could say that the theory is one of wealth maximization. In the early theory, the “rationality” conditions are as follows.In general, if the sums of the pay-offs to each players in various outcomes differ, it is assumed that a rational player will manage to divide the largest possible payoff with the other player. 2 No rational agent will accept a payoff below the “security level” obtainable even if all the other player or players really form a coalition against the individual. Sometimes it is also assumed that no group of players will rationally accept less than it could get as its group security level  but in some games, no outcome can meet this condition. This is an odd combination of elements. The collective elements are plausibly thought of as merely predictive. If we individually wish to do well, we should combine efforts to help us do best AS A CONVERSATIONAL DYAD. But what we want is a theory that converts two individual preferences into one collective result – Grice’s conversational shared goal of influencing and being influenced by others. Unfortunately, to put a move doing just this in the foundations of the theory is question-begging. Our fundamental burden is to determine whether a theory of subjective rationality MAY produce an inter-subjectively good result, not to stipulate that it must. In the theory with cardinal, additive payoffs, we can divide games. There is the constant-sum game, in which the sum of all players’ payoffs in each outcome is a constant, and variable sum games. A zero-sum games is a special case of a constant sum game. Two-player constant sum games are games of pure conversational ‘conflict.’ Each player’s gain is the other’s loss. In constant sum games with more than two players and in all variable sum games, there is generally reason for coalition formation to improve payoffs to members of the coalition. A game without transferable utility, such as a games in which players have only ordinal preferences, may be characterized as a game of pure conflict or of pure co-ordination (or co-operation) when players’ preference orderings over outcomes are, respectively, opposite or identical, or as games of mixed motive when their orderings are partly the same and partly reversed. Grice’s nalysis of such games is evidently less tractable than that of games with cardinal, additive utility, and their theory is only beginning to be extensively developed by Griceians. Despite the apparent circularity of the rationality assumptions of early game theory, it is the game theorists’ prisoner’s dilemma that makes clear that compelling subjectivistic principles of choice can produce an inter-subjective deficient outcome. This game given its catchy but inapt name. If they play it in isolation from any other interaction between them, two players in this game can each do what seems individually best and reach an outcome that both consider inferior to the outcome that results from making opposite strategy choices. Even with the knowledge that this is the problem they face, the players still have incentive to choose the strategies that jointly produce the inferior outcome. The prisoner’s dilemma involves both coordination (or co-operation) and conflict. It has played a central role in discussions of Griceian conversational pragmatics. Games that predominantly involve coordination (or cooperation), such as when we coordinate in all driving on the right or all on the left, have a similarly central role. The understanding of both classes of games has been read into the philosophy of Hobbes and Hume and into “mutual advantage” theories of justice. 

gassendi: philosopher who advocates a via media to scientific knowledge about the empirically observable material world that avoids both the dogmatism of Cartesians, who claimed to have certain knowledge, and the skepticism of Montaigne and Charron, who doubted that we have knowledge about anything. Gassendi presented Epicurean atomism as a model for explaining how bodies are structured and interact. He advanced a hypothetico-deductive method by proposing that experiments should be used to test mechanistic hypotheses. Like the ancient Pyrrhonian Skeptics, he did not challenge the immediate reports of our senses; but unlike them he argued that while we cannot have knowledge of the inner essences of things, we can develop a reliable science of the world of appearances. In this he exemplified the mitigated skepticism of modern science that is always open to revision on the basis of empirical evidence. Gassendi’s first book, Exercitationes Paradoxicae Adversis Aristoteleos 1624, is an attack on Aristotle. He is best known as the author of the fifth set of objections to Descartes’s Meditations1641, in which Gassendi proposed that even clear and distinct ideas may represent no objects outside our minds, a possibility that Descartes called the objection of objections, but dismissed as destructive of all reason. Gassendi’s Syntagma Philosophiae Epicuri 1649 contains his development of Epicurean philosophy and science. His elaboration of the mechanistic atomic model and his advocacy of experimental testing of hypotheses were crucially important in the rise of modern science. Gassendi’s career as a Catholic priest, Epicurean atomist, mitigated skeptic, and mechanistic scientist presents a puzzle  as do the careers of several other philosopher-priests in the seventeenth century  concerning his true beliefs. On the one hand, he professed faith and set aside Christian doctrine as not open to challenge. On the other hand, he utilized an arsenal of skeptical arguments that was beginning to undermine and would eventually destroy the rational foundations of the church. Gassendi thus appears to be of a type almost unknown today, a thinker indifferent to the apparent discrepancy between his belief in Christian doctrine and his advocacy of materialist science. 

gay: j. philosopher Grice read quite a lot, who tried to reconcile divine command theory and utilitarianism. The son of a minister, Gay was elected a fellow of Sidney Sussex , Cambridge, where he taught Grecian philosophy. His essay, “Dissertation Concerning the Fundamental Principle of Virtue or Morality” argues that obligation is founded on the will of God, which, because people are destined to be happy, directs us to act to promote the general happiness. Gay offers an associationist psychology according to which we pursue objects that have come to be associated with happiness e.g. money, regardless of whether they now make us happy, and argues, contra Hutcheson, that our moral sense is conditioned rather than natural. Gay’s blend of utilitarianism with associationist psychology gave David Hartley the basis for his moral psychology, which later influenced Bentham in his formulation of classical utilitarianism. 

burlæus: Burleigh’s donkey – Grice preferred the spelling “Gualterus Burlaeus.” “One would hardly realise it’s Irish to the backbone!” – Grice. Geach’s donkey: geach, Peter b.6, English philosopher and logician whose main work has been in logic and philosophy of language. A great admirer of McTaggart, he has published a sympathetic exposition of the latter’s work Truth, Love and Immortality, 9, and has always aimed to emulate what he sees as the clarity and rigor of the Scottish idealist’s thought. Greatly influenced by Frege and Vitters, Geach is particularly noted for his powerful use of what he calls “the Frege point,” better called “the Frege-Geach point,” that the same thought may occur as asserted or unasserted and yet retain the same truth-value. The point has been used by Geach to refute ascriptivist theories of responsibility, and can be employed against noncognitivist theories of ethics, which are said to face the Frege-Geach problem of accounting for the sense of moral ascriptions in contexts like ‘If he did wrong, he will be punished’. He is also noted for helping to bring Frege to the English-speaking world, through co-translations with Max Black 9 88. In logic he is known for proving, independently of Quine, a contradiction in Frege’s way out of Russell’s paradox Mind, 6, and for his defense of modern Fregean-Russellian logic against traditional Aristotelian-Scholastic logic. He also has a deep admiration for the Polish logicians. In metaphysics, Geach is known for his defense of relative identity, the thesis that an object a can be the same F where F is a kind-term as an object b while not being the same G, even though a and b are both G’s. His spirited defense of the thesis has been met by equally vigorous attacks, and it has not received wide acceptance. An obvious application of the thesis is to the defense of the doctrine of the Trinity e.g., the Father is the same god as the Son but not the same person, which has caught the attention of some philosophers of religion. Geach’s main works include Mental Acts 8, which attacks dispositional theories of mind, Reference and Generality 2, which contains much important work on logic, and the collection Logic Matters 2. A notable defender of Catholicism despite his animadversions against Scholastic logic, his religious views find their greatest exposure in God and the Soul 9, Providence and Evil 7, and The Virtues 7. He is married to the philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe. 

Grice’s genitorial programme – A type of ideal observer theory -- demiurge from Grecian demiourgos, ‘artisan’, ‘craftsman’, a deity who shapes the material world from the preexisting chaos. Plato introduces the demiurge in his Timaeus. Because he is perfectly good, the demiurge wishes to communicate his own goodness. Using the Forms as a model, he shapes the initial chaos into the best possible image of these eternal and immutable archetypes. The visible world is the result. Although the demiurge is the highest god and the best of causes, he should not be identified with the God of theism. His ontological and axiological status is lower than that of the Forms, especially the Form of the Good. He is also limited. The material he employs is not created by him. Furthermore, it is disorderly and indeterminate, and thus partially resists his rational ordering. In gnosticism, the demiurge is the ignorant, weak, and evil or else morally limited cause of the cosmos. In the modern era the term has occasionally been used for a deity who is limited in power or knowledge. Its first occurrence in this sense appears to be in J. S. Mill’s Theism 1874. 

gentile: g. idealist philosopher. He taught philosophy at Pisa. Gentile rejects Hegel’s dialectics as the process of an objectified thought. Gentile’s actualism or actual idealism claims that only the pure act of thinking or the transcendental subject can undergo a dialectical process. All reality, such as nature, God, good, and evil, is immanent in the dialectics of the transcendental subject, which is distinct from the empirical subject. Among his major works are “La teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro” and “Sistema di logica come teoria del conoscere.” Gentile sees conversation is a concerted act that overcomes the apparent difficulties of inter-subjectivity and realizes a unity within two transcendental subjects. Actualism was pretty influential. With Croce’s historicism, it influenced two Oxonian idealists discussed by H. P. Grice: Bernard Bosanquet and R. G. Collingwood (vide: H. P. Grice, “Metaphysics,” in D. F. Pears, The Nature of Metaphysics, London, Macmillan).

genus: gender. H. P. Grice calls Austin an artless sexist when referring to the trouser word. We see how after Austin’s death, Grice more and more loses his reverential attitude towards the ‘school master’ and shows Austin for what he is! Gender implicatum – Most languages have three genders: masculine, feminine, and neuter (or epicene, or common). feminist epistemology, epistemology from a feminist perspective. It investigates the relevance that the gender of the inquirer/knower has to epistemic practices, including the theoretical practice of epistemology. It is typified both by themes that are exclusively feminist in that they could arise only from a critical attention to gender, and by themes that are non-exclusively feminist in that they might arise from other politicizing theoretical perspectives besides feminism. A central, exclusively feminist theme is the relation between philosophical conceptions of reason and cultural conceptions of masculinity. Here a historicist stance must be adopted, so that philosophy is conceived as the product of historically and culturally situated hence gendered authors. This stance brings certain patterns of intellectual association into view  patterns, perhaps, of alignment between philosophical conceptions of reason as contrasted with emotion or intuition, and cultural conceptions of masculinity as contrasted with femininity. A central, non-exclusively feminist theme might be called “social-ism” in epistemology. It has two main tributaries: political philosophy, in the form of Marx’s historical materialism; and philosophy of science, in the form of either Quinean naturalism or Kuhnian historicism. The first has resulted in feminist standpoint theory, which adapts and develops the Marxian idea that different social groups have different epistemic standpoints, where the material positioning of one of the groups is said to bestow an epistemic privilege. The second has resulted in feminist work in philosophy of science which tries to show that not only epistemic values but also non-epistemic e.g. gendered values are of necessity sometimes an influence in the generation of scientific theories. If this can be shown, then an important feminist project suggests itself: to work out a rationale for regulating the influence of these values so that science may be more self-transparent and more responsible. By attempting to reveal the epistemological implications of the fact that knowers are diversely situated in social relations of identity and power, feminist epistemology represents a radicalizing innovation in the analytic tradition, which has typically assumed an asocial conception of the epistemic subject, and of the philosopher. -- feminist philosophy, a discussion of philosophical concerns that refuses to identify the human experience with the male experience. Writing from a variety of perspectives, feminist philosophers challenge several areas of traditional philosophy on the grounds that they fail 1 to take seriously women’s interests, identities, and issues; and 2 to recognize women’s ways of being, thinking, and doing as valuable as those of men. Feminist philosophers fault traditional metaphysics for splitting the self from the other and the mind from the body; for wondering whether “other minds” exist and whether personal identity depends more on memories or on physical characteristics. Because feminist philosophers reject all forms of ontological dualism, they stress the ways in which individuals interpenetrate each other’s psyches through empathy, and the ways in which the mind and body coconstitute each other. Because Western culture has associated rationality with “masculinity” and emotionality with “femininity,” traditional epistemologists have often concluded that women are less human than men. For this reason, feminist philosophers argue that reason and emotion are symbiotically related, coequal sources of knowledge. Feminist philosophers also argue that Cartesian knowledge, for all its certainty and clarity, is very limFechner’s law feminist philosophy 305   305 ited. People want to know more than that they exist; they want to know what other people are thinking and feeling. Feminist philosophers also observe that traditional philosophy of science is not as objective as it claims to be. Whereas traditional philosophers of science often associate scientific success with scientists’ ability to control, rule, and otherwise dominate nature, feminist philosophers of science associate scientific success with scientists’ ability to listen to nature’s self-revelations. Since it willingly yields abstract theory to the testimony of concrete fact, a science that listens to what nature says is probably more objective than one that does not. Feminist philosophers also criticize traditional ethics and traditional social and political philosophy. Rules and principles have dominated traditional ethics. Whether agents seek to maximize utility for the aggregate or do their duty for the sake of duty, they measure their conduct against a set of universal, abstract, and impersonal norms. Feminist philosophers often call this traditional view of ethics a “justice” perspective, contrasting it with a “care” perspective that stresses responsibilities and relationships rather than rights and rules, and that attends more to a moral situation’s particular features than to its general implications. Feminist social and political philosophy focus on the political institutions and social practices that perpetuate women’s subordination. The goals of feminist social and political philosophy are 1 to explain why women are suppressed, repressed, and/or oppressed in ways that men are not; and 2 to suggest morally desirable and politically feasible ways to give women the same justice, freedom, and equality that men have. Liberal feminists believe that because women have the same rights as men do, society must provide women with the same educational and occupational opportunities that men have. Marxist feminists believe that women cannot be men’s equals until women enter the work force en masse and domestic work and child care are socialized. Radical feminists believe that the fundamental causes of women’s oppression are sexual. It is women’s reproductive role and/or their sexual role that causes their subordination. Unless women set their own reproductive goals childlessness is a legitimate alternative to motherhood and their own sexual agendas lesbianism, autoeroticism, and celibacy are alternatives to heterosexuality, women will remain less than free. Psychoanalytic feminists believe that women’s subordination is the result of earlychildhood experiences that cause them to overdevelop their abilities to relate to other people on the one hand and to underdevelop their abilities to assert themselves as autonomous agents on the other. Women’s greatest strength, a capacity for deep relationships, may also be their greatest weakness: a tendency to be controlled by the needs and wants of others. Finally, existentialist feminists claim that the ultimate cause of women’s subordination is ontological. Women are the Other; men are the Self. Until women define themselves in terms of themselves, they will continue to be defined in terms of what they are not: men. Recently, socialist feminists have attempted to weave these distinctive strands of feminist social and political thought into a theoretical whole. They argue that women’s condition is overdetermined by the structures of production, reproduction and sexuality, and the socialization of children. Women’s status and function in all of these structures must change if they are to achieve full liberation. Furthermore, women’s psyches must also be transformed. Only then will women be liberated from the kind of patriarchal thoughts that undermine their self-concept and make them always the Other. Interestingly, the socialist feminist effort to establish a specifically feminist standpoint that represents how women see the world has not gone without challenge. Postmodern feminists regard this effort as an instantiation of the kind of typically male thinking that tells only one story about reality, truth, knowledge, ethics, and politics. For postmodern feminists, such a story is neither feasible nor desirable. It is not feasible because women’s experiences differ across class, racial, and cultural lines. It is not desirable because the “One” and the “True” are philosophical myths that traditional philosophy uses to silence the voices of the many. Feminist philosophy must be many and not One because women are many and not One. The more feminist thoughts, the better. By refusing to center, congeal, and cement separate thoughts into a unified and inflexible truth, feminist philosophers can avoid the pitfalls of traditional philosophy. As attractive as the postmodern feminist approach to philosophy may be, some feminist philosophers worry that an overemphasis on difference and a rejection of unity may lead to intellectual as well as political disintegration. If feminist philosophy is to be without any standpoint whatsoever, it becomes difficult to ground claims about what is good for women in particufeminist philosophy feminist philosophy 306   306 lar and for human beings in general. It is a major challenge to contemporary feminist philosophy, therefore, to reconcile the pressures for diversity and difference with those for integration and commonality. 

genus generalissimum: “I love a superlative: good, gooder and goodest, my favourites!” a genus that is not a species of some higher genus; a broadest natural kind. One of the ten Aristotelian categories, it is also called summum genus. For Aristotle and many of his followers, the ten categories (twelve in Kant, four in Grice) are *not* species of some higher all-inclusive genus  say, being. Otherwise, that alleged over-arching all-inclusive genus would wholly include the differences, say, between conversational quality, conversational quantity, conversational relation, and conversational mode, and would be universally predicable of conversational quality, conversational quantity, conversational relation, and conversational mode. But no genus is predicable of its differences in this manner. Few authors explained this reasoning clearly, but Grice did: “If I appeal to four conversational categories, I know what I am doing. The principle of conversational benevolence cannot float in the air: it needs four categories – informativeness, trustworthiness, connectedness and perspicuity – to make it applicable to our conversational realities. Grice points out that if the difference ‘rational’ just meant ‘rational animal’, to define ‘man’ as ‘rational animal’ would be to define him as ‘rational animal animal’, which would infringe the conversational maxims ‘be brief,’ and ‘do not be repetitive’ – “On toop, man is a rational animal animal is ill formed.” So too generally: no genus can include its differences in this way. Thus there is no all-inclusive genus. Grice’s four conversational categories are the most general conversational genera. 

charlier: a. k. a. gerson, j. de, philosopher. He studied in Paris, and succeeded the nominalist Pierre d’Ailly as chancellor of the varsity. Both d’Ailly and Gerson played a prominent part in the work of the Council of Constance. Much of Charlier’s influence on later thinkers arose from his conciliarism, the view that the church is a political society and that a general council, acting on behalf of the church, has the power to depose a pope who fails to promote the church’s welfare, for it seemed that similar arguments could apply to other forms of political society. Gerson’s conciliarism was not constitutionalism in the modern sense, for he appealed to corporate and hierarchical ideas of church government, and did not rest his case on any principle of individual rights. His main writings dealt with mystical theology, which, he thought, brings the believer closer to the beatific vision of God than do other forms of theology. He was influenced by St. Bonaventure and Albertus Magnus, but especially by Pseudo-Dionysius, whom he saw as a disciple of St. Paul and not as a Platonist. He was thus able to adopt an anti-Platonic position in his attacks on the mystic Ruysbroeck and on contemporary followers of Duns Scotus, such as Jean de Ripa. In dismissing Scotist realism, he made use of nominalist positions, particularly those that emphasized divine freedom. He warned theologians against being misled by pride into supposing that natural reason alone could solve metaphysical problems; and he emphasized the importance of a priest’s pastoral duties. Despite his early prominence, he spent the last years of his life in relative obscurity.

gersonides: a leading Aristotelian. His oeuvre includes supercommentaries on commentaries on Aristotle, On the Correct Syllogism, a treatise on the modal syllogism; and a major Scholastic treatise, The Wars of the Lord. In addition, his biblical commentaries rank among the best examples of philosophical scriptural exegesis; especially noteworthy is his interpretation of the Song of Songs as an allegory describing the ascent of the human intellect to the agent intellect. Gersonides’ mentors in the Aristotelian tradition were Maimonides and Averroes. However, more than either of them, Gersonides held philosophical truth and revealed truth to be coextensive: he acknowledged neither the conflict that Averroes saw between reason and revelation nor Maimonides’ critical view of the limitations of the human intellect. Furthermore, while remaining within the Aristotelian framework, Gersonides was not uncritical of it; his independence can be illustrated by two of his most distinctive positions. First, against Maimonides, Gersonides claimed that it is possible to demonstrate both the falsity of the Aristotelian theory of the eternity of the world Averroes’ position and the absurdity of creation ex nihilo, the traditional rabbinic view that Maimonides adopted, though for nondemonstrative reasons. Instead Gersonides advocated the Platonic theory of temporal creation from primordial matter. Second, unlike Maimonides and Averroes, who both held that the alleged contradiction between divine foreknowledge of future contingent particulars and human freedom is spurious, Gersonides took the dilemma to be real. In defense of human freedom, he then argued that it is logically impossible even for God to have knowledge of particulars as particulars, since his knowledge is only of general laws. At the same time, by redefining ‘omniscience’ as knowing everything that is knowable, he showed that this impossibility is no deficiency in God’s knowledge. Although Gersonides’ biblical commentaries received wide immediate acceptance, subsequent medieval Jewish philosophers, e.g., Hasdai Crescas, by and large reacted negatively to his rigorously rationalistic positions. Especially with the decline of Aristotelianism within the philosophical world, both Jewish and Christian, he was either criticized sharply or simply ignored. 

get across – A more colloquial way for what Grice later will have as ‘soul-to-soul-transfer,’ used by Grice in Causal: Surely the truth or falsity of Strawson having a beautiful handwriting has no bearing on the truth or falsity of his being hopeless at philosophy (“provided that is what I intended to get across,” implicating, ‘who cares,’ or ‘whatever’). His cavalier attitude shows that Grice is never really concerned with the individuation of the logical form of the implicatum, just to note that whatever some philosopher thought was part of the sense it ain’t! This is the Austinian in Grice. Austin suggested that Grice analysed or consult with Holdcroft for all ‘forms of indirect communication.’ Grice lists: mean, indicate, suggest, imply, insinuate, hint – ‘get across’.

geulincx: a. philosopher. Born in Antwerp, he was educated at Louvain and there became professor of philosophy and dean. He was forced out of Louvain, perhaps for his Jansenist or Cartesian tendencies, and in 1658 he moved to Leyden and became a Protestant. Though he taught there until his death, he never attained a regular professorship at the varsity. His main philosophical work is his “Ethica; or, De virtute et primis ejus proprietatibus.” Other oeuvre includes “Questiones quodlibeticae”; later editions published as “Saturnalia,” a “Logica” 1661, and a “Methodus inveniendi argumenta,”.”Physica vera,” “Physica peripatetica,” “Metaphysica vera,” “Metaphysica ad mentem peripateticam,” posthumous commentaries on Descartes’s Principia Philosophiae. Geulincx was deeply influenced by Descartes, and had many ideas that closely resemble those of the later Cartesians as well as those of more independent thinkers like Spinoza and Leibniz. Though his grounds were original, like many later Cartesians, Geulincx upholds a version of occasionalism; he argued that someone or something can only do what it knows how to do (in terms of strict physiological laws). From this Geulincx infers (“fallaciously,” according to Grice) from that that he (sc. Geulincx) cannot be the genuine cause of his own bodily movement. In discussing the mind-body relation, Geulincx used a clock analogy similar to one Leibniz used in connection with his preestablished harmony. Geulincx also held a view of mental and material substance reminiscent of that of Spinoza. Finally, he proposed a system of ethics grounded in the idea of a virtuous will. As Grice notes: “Despite the evident similarities between Geulincx’s views and the views of his more renowned contemporaries, it is very difficult to determine exactly what influence Geulincx may have had on them, and they may have had on him – but then who gives?”

colonna – e. giles di roma, ome, original name, a member of the order of the Hermits of St. Augustine, he studied arts at Augustinian house and theology at the varsity in Paris 1260 72 but was censured by the theology faculty 1277 and denied a license to teach as tutor. Owing to the intervention of Pope Honorius IV, he later returned from Italy to Paris to teach theology, was appointed general of his order, and became archbishop of Bourges. Colonna both defends and criticizes views of Aquinas. He held that essence and existence are really distinct in creatures, but described them as “things”; that prime matter cannot exist without some substantial form; and, early in his career, that an eternally created world is possible. He defended only one substantial form in composites, including man. Grice adds: “Colonna supported Pope Boniface VIII in his quarrel with Philip IV of France – and that was a bad choice.”

gilson: É., philosopher, historian, cofounder of the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, and a major figure in Neo-Thomism. Gilson discovered medieval philosophy through his pioneering work on Descartes’s scholastic background. Gilson argues that early modern philosophy was incomprehensible without medieval thought, and that medieval philosophy itself did not represent the unified theory of reality that some Thomists had supposed. His studies of Duns Scotus, Augustine, Bernard, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Dante, and Abelard and Héloïse explore this diversity. But in his Gifford lectures 132, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy, Gilson attempts a broad synthesis of medieval teaching on philosophy, metaphysics, ethics, and epistemology, and employed it in his critique of modern philosophy, The Unity of Philosophical Experience 7. Most of all, Gilson attempted to reestablish Aquinas’s distinction between essence and existence in created being, as in Being and Some Philosophers 9. 

gioberti, v. philosopher, He was imprisoned and exiled for advocating  unification, and became a central political figure during the Risorgimento. His major political oeuvre, “Del primato morale e civile degli italiani,” argues for a federation of the  states. Gioberti’s philosophical theory, ontologism, in contrast to Hegel’s idealism, identifies the dialectics of Being with God’s creation. Gioberti condensed his theory in the formula: “Being creates the existent.” “L’essere crea l’essistente.” The dialectics of Being, which is the only necessary substance, is a “palingenesis,” or a return to its origin, in which the existent first departs from and imitates its creator (“mimesis”) and then returns to its creator (“methexis”). By intuition, the human mind comes in contact with God and discovers truth by retracing the dialectics of Being. However, knowledge of supernatural truths is given only by God’s revelation. His oeuvre also includes “Teorica del soprannaturale” and “Introduzione allo studio della filosofia.” Gioberti criticized modern philosophers such as Descartes for their psychologism  seeking truth from the human subject instead of from Being itself and its revelation. His thought is very influential in Italy.

datum: in epistemology, the “brute fact” element to be found or postulated as a component of perceptual experience. Some theorists who endorse the existence of a given element in experience think that we can find this element by careful introspection of what we experience Moore, H. H. Price. Such theorists generally distinguish between those components of ordinary perceptual awareness that constitute what we believe or know about the objects we perceive and those components that we strictly perceive. For example, if we analyze introspectively what we are aware of when we see an apple we find that what we believe of the apple is that it is a three-dimensional object with a soft, white interior; what we see of it, strictly speaking, is just a red-shaped expanse of one of its facing sides. This latter is what is “given” in the intended sense. Other theorists treat the given as postulated rather than introspectively found. For example, some theorists treat cognition as an activity imposing form on some material given in conscious experience. On this view, often attributed to Kant, the given and the conceptual are interdefined and logically inseparable. Sometimes this interdependence is seen as rendering a description of the given as impossible; in this case the given is said to be ineffable C. I. Lewis, Mind and the World Order. On some theories of knowledge foundationalism the first variant of the given  that which is “found” rather than “postulated”  provides the empirical foundations of what we might know or justifiably believe. Thus, if I believe on good evidence that there is a red apple in front of me, the evidence is the non-cognitive part of my perceptual awareness of the red appleshaped expanse. Epistemologies postulating the first kind of givenness thus require a single entity-type to explain the sensorial nature of perception and to provide immediate epistemic foundations for empirical knowledge. This requirement is now widely regarded as impossible to satisfy; hence Wilfred Sellars describes the discredited view as the myth of the given. 

glanvill: English philosopher who defended the Royal Society against scholasticism. Glanvill believes that certainty is possible in the mathematical but not in the empirical realm. In “The Vanity of Dogmatizing,” he claimed that the human corruption that resulted from Adam’s fall precludes dogmatic knowledge of nature. Using traditional sceptical arguments as well as an analysis of causality that anticipate Hume, Glanvill argues that empirical belief is the probabilistic variety acquired by piece-meal investigation. Despite his scepticism he argues for the existence of witches in Witches and Witchcraft (“Probably he was married to one,” Grice comments).

gnosticism: a philosophical movement, especially important under the leadership of Valentinus and Basilides. They teach that matter was evil, the result of a cosmic disruption in which an evil archon often associated with the god of the Old Testament, Yahweh rebelled against the heavenly pleroma the complete spiritual world. In the process divine sparks were unleashed from the pleroma and lodged in material human bodies. Jesus was a high-ranking archon Logos sent to restore those souls with divine sparks to the pleroma by imparting esoteric knowledge gnosis to them. Gnosticism influenced and threatened the orthodox church from within and without. NonChristian gnostic sects rivaled Christianity, and Christian gnostics threatened orthodoxy by emphasizing salvation by knowledge rather than by faith. Theologians like Clement of Alexandria and his pupil Origen held that there were two roads to salvation, the way of faith for the masses and the way of esoteric or mystical knowledge for the philosophers. Gnosticism profoundly influenced the C. of E., causing it to define its scriptural canon and to develop a set of creeds and an episcopal organization (“My mother, Mabel Fenton Grice, was a bit of a gnostic, if I must say” – Grice).

göckel: goclenius r., philosopher, after holding some minor posts elsewhere, he becomes professor at Marburg. “Though he was well read and knowledgeable of later trends in these disciplines,” Grice ntoes, “you could clearly see his basic sympathies areAristotelian.” Goclenius was very well regarded by his contemporaries, who called him “Plato marburgensis,” the Christian Aristotle, and “TheLight of Europe,” among other things. Göckel published an unusually large number of essays, including “Psychologia, hoc est de hominis perfection,” “Conciliator philosophicus,” “Controversiae logicae et philosophicae,” and numerous other works on logic, rhetoric, physics, metaphysics, and the Latin language. But his most lasting work is his “Lexicon Philosophicum” – “very practical,” Grice notes, “since the entries are alphabetically ordered.” -- together with its companion, the “Lexicon Philosophicum Graecum” – “I gave a copy to Urmson,” Grice recalls, “and the next day he was writing the “Greek Philosopical Lexicon.” Göckel’s “Lexicon philosophicum” provides pretty obscure definitions of the philosophical terminology of late Scholastic philosophy, and “they are deemed so obscure that he is banned from quotation at some varsities.” – Grice.

gödel: cited by Grice. His incompleteness theorems, two theorems formulated and proved by the Austrian logician Kurt Gödel 678 in his famous 1 paper “Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und vervandter Systeme I,” probably the most celebrated results in the whole of logic. They are aptly referred to as “incompleteness” theorems since each shows, for any member of a certain class of formal systems, that there is a sentence formulable in its language that it cannot prove, but that it would be desirable for it to prove. In the case of the first theorem G1, what cannot be proved is a true sentence of the language of the given theory. G1 is thus a disappointment to any theory constructor who wants his theory to tell the whole truth about its subject. In the case of the second theorem G2, what cannot be proved is a sentence of the theory that “expresses” its consistency. G2 is thus a disappointment to those who desire a straightforward execution of Hilbert’s Program. The proofs of the incompleteness theorems can be seen as based on three main ideas. The first is that of a Gödel numbering, i.e., an assignment of natural numbers to each of the various objects i.e., the terms, formulas, axioms, proofs, etc. belonging to the various syntactical categories of the given formal system T referred to here as the “represented theory” whose metamathematics is under consideration. The second is that of a representational scheme. This includes i the use of the Gödel numbering to develop number-theoretic codifications of various of the metamathematical properties pertaining to the represented theory, and ii the selection of a theory S hereafter, the “representing theory” and a family of formulas from that theory the “representing formulas” in terms of which to register as theorems various of the facts concerning the metamathematical properties of the represented theory thus encoded. The basic result of this representational scheme is the weak representation of the set of Gödel numbers of theorems of T, where a set L of numbers is said to be weakly represented in S by a formula ‘Lx’ of S just in case for every number n, n1 L if and only if ‘L[n]’ is a theorem of S, where ‘[n]’ is the standard term of S that, under the intended interpretation of S, designates the number n. Since the set of Gödel numbers of theorems of the represented theory T will typically be recursively enumerable, and the representing theory S must be capable of weakly representing this set, the basic strength requirement on S is that it be capable of weakly representing the recursively enumerable sets of natural numbers. Because basic systems of arithmetic e.g. Robinson’s arithmetic and Peano arithmetic all have this capacity, Gödel’s theorems are often stated using containment of a fragment of arithmetic as the basic strength requirement governing the capacities of the representing theory which, of course, is also often the represented theory. More on this point below. The third main idea behind the incompleteness theorems is that of a diagonal or fixed point construction within S for the notion of unprovability-in-T; i.e., the formulation of a sentence Gödel of S which, under the given Gödel numbering of T, the given representation of T’s metamathematical notions in S, and the intended interpretation of the language of S, says of itself that it is not provable-in-T. Gödel is thus false if provable and unprovable if true. More specifically, if ‘ProvTx’ is a formula of S that weakly represents the set of Gödel numbers of theorems of T in S, then Gödel can be any formula of S that is provably equivalent in S to the formula ‘- ProvT [Gödel]’. Given this background, G1 can be stated as follows: If a the representing theory S is any subtheory of the represented theory T up to and God Gödel’s incompleteness theorems 347   347 including the represented theory itself, b the representing theory S is consistent, c the formula ‘ProvT x’ weakly represents the set of Gödel numbers of theorems of the represented theory T in the representing theory S, and d Gödel is any sentence provably equivalent in the representing theory S to ‘ProvT [Gödel]’, then neither Gödel nor -Gödel is a theorem of the representing theory S. The proof proceeds in two parts. In the first part it is shown that, for any representing theory S up to and including the case where S % T , if S is consistent, then -Gödel is not a theorem of S. To obtain this in its strongest form, we pick the strongest subtheory S of T possible, namely S % T, and construct a reductio. Thus, suppose that 1 -Gödel is a theorem of T. From 1 and d it follows that 2 ‘ProvT[Gödel]’ is a theorem of T. And from 2 and c in the “if” direction it follows that 3 Gödel is a theorem of T. But 1 and 3 together imply that the representing theory T is inconsistent. Hence, if T is consistent, -Gödel cannot be a theorem of T. In the second part of the proof it is argued that if the representing theory S is consistent, then Gödel is not a theorem of it. Again, to obtain the strongest result, we let S be the strongest subtheory of T possible namely T itself and, as before, argue by reductio. Thus we suppose that A Gödel is a theorem of S % T . From this assumption and condition d it follows that B ‘-Provr [Gödel]’ is a theorem of S % T . By A and c in the “only if” direction it follows that C ‘ProvT [Gödel]’ is a theorem of S % T . But from B and C it follows that S % T  is inconsistent. Hence, Gödel is not provable in any consistent representing theory S up to and including T itself. The above statement of G1 is, of course, not the usual one. The usual statement suppresses the distinction stressed above between the representing and represented theories and collaterally replaces our condition c with a clause to the effect that T is a recursively axiomatizable extension of some suitably weak system of arithmetic e.g. Robinson’s arithmetic, primitive recursive arithmetic, or Peano arithmetic. This puts into a single clause what, metamathematically speaking, are two separate conditions  one pertaining to the representing theory, the other to the represented theory. The requirement that T be an extension of the selected weak arithmetic addresses the question of T’s adequacy as a representing theory, since the crucial fact about extensions of the weak arithmetic chosen is that they are capable of weakly representing all recursively enumerable sets. This constraint on T’s capabilities as a representing theory is in partnership with the usual requirement that, in its capacity as a represented theory, T be recursively axiomatizable. For T’s recursive axiomatizability ensures under ordinary choices of logic for T  that its set of theorems will be recursively enumerable  and hence weakly representable in the kind of representing theory that it itself by virtue of its being an extension of the weak arithmetic specified is. G1 can, however, be extended to certain theories whose sets of Gödel numbers of theorems are not recursively enumerable. When this is done, the basic capacity required of the representing theory is no longer merely that the recursively enumerable sets of natural numbers be representable in it, but that it also be capable of representing various non-recursively enumerable sets, and hence that it go beyond the weak arithmetics mentioned earlier. G2 is a more demanding result that G1 in that it puts significantly stronger demands on the formula ‘ProvT x’ used to express the notion of provability for the represented theory T. In proving G1 all that is required of ‘ProvT x’ is that it weakly represent θ % the set of Gödel numbers of theorems of T; i.e., that it yield an extensionally accurate registry of the theorems of the represented theory in the representing theory. G2 places additional conditions on ‘ProvT x’; conditions which result from the fact that, to prove G2, we must codify the second part of the proof of G1 in T itself. To do this, ‘ProvT x’ must be a provability predicate for T. That is, it must satisfy the following constraints, commonly referred to as the Derivability Conditions for ‘ProvT x’: I If A is a theorem of the represented theory, then ‘ProvT [A]’ must be a theorem of the representing theory. II Every instance of the formula ‘ProvT [A P B] P ProvT [A] P ProvT [B]’ must be a theorem of T. III Every instance of the formula ‘ProvT [A] P ProvT [ProvT [A]]’ must be a theorem of T. I, of course, is just part of the requirement that ‘ProvT [A]’ weakly represent T’s theoremset in T. So it does not go beyond what is required for the proof of G1. II and III, however, do. They make it possible to “formalize” the second part of the proof of G1 in T itself. II captures, in terms of ‘ProvT X’, the modus ponens inference by which B is derived from A, and III codiGödel’s incompleteness theorems Gödel’s incompleteness theorems 348   348 fies in T the appeal to c used in deriving C from A. The result of this “formalization” process is a proof within T of the formula ‘ConT P Gödel’ where ConT is a formula of the form ‘- ProvT [#]’, with ‘ProvT x’ a provability predicate for T and ‘[#]’ the standard numeral denoting the Gödel number # of some formula refutable in T . From this, and the proof of the second part of G1 itself in which the first Derivability Condition, which is just the “only if” direction of c, figures prominently, we arrive at the following result, which is a generalized form of G2: If S is any consistent representing theory up to and including the represented theory T itself, ‘ProvT x’ any provability predicate for T, and ConT any formula of T of the form ‘- ProvT [#]’, then ConT is not a theorem of S. To the extent that, in being a provability predicate for T, ‘ProvT x’ “expresses” the notion of provability of the represented theory T, it seems fair to say that ConT expresses its consistency. And to the extent that this is true, it is sensible to read G2 as saying that for any representing theory S and any represented theory T extending S, if S is consistent, then the consistency of T is not provable in S. 

fontaines: g. philosopher. He taught at Paris. Among his major writings are fifteen Quodlibetal Questions and other disputations. He was strongly Aristotelian in philosophy, with Neoplatonic influences in metaphysics. Fontaines defends the identity of essence and existence in creatures against theories of their real or intentional distinction, and argues for the possibility of demonstrating God’s existence and of some quidditative knowledge of God. He admits divine ideas for species but not for individuals within species. He makes wide applications (“and misapplications,” Grice adds) of Aristotelian act-potency theory  e.g., to the distinction between the soul and its powers (this is discussed by Grice in “The power structure of the soul”), to the explanation of intellection and volition, to the general theory of substance and accident, and in unusual fashion to essence-existence “composition” of creatures.

godwin: w. English philosopher. “An Enquiry concerning Political Justice” arises heated debate. Godwin argues for radical forms of determinism, anarchism, and utilitarianism. Godwin thought that government corrupts everyone by encouraging stereotyped thinking that prevents us from seeing each other as unique individuals. His “Caleb Williams” portrays a good man corrupted by prejudice. Once we remove prejudice and artificial inequality we will see that our acts are wholly determined. This obviously makes punishment pointless. Only in a small anarchic society – such as the one he observed outside Oxford -- can people see others as they really are and thus come to feel a ‘sympathetic concern’ for his well-being. (In this he influenced Edward Carpenter of “England Arise” infame). Only so can we be virtuous, because being virtuous is acting from a ‘sympathetic’ (cf. Grice’s principle of conversational sympathy) feeling to bring the greatest happiness to the dyad affected. Godwin takes this principle (relabeled “the principle of conversational sympathy” by Grice) quite literally, and accepts all its consequences. Truthfulness has no claim on us other than the happiness it brings. If keeping a promise causes less good than breaking it, there is no reason (or duty) at all to keep it. If one must choose between saving the life either of a major human benefactor or of one’s distant uncle, one must choose the benefactor. We surely need no ‘rules’ in morals. An alleged ‘moral’ “rule” would prevent us from seeing others properly, thereby impairing the sympathetic feeling that constitutes virtue. Rights, too, are pointless. Sympathetic people will act to help (or cooperate with) others. Later utilitarians like Bentham had difficulty in separating their positions from Godwin’s notorious views.  Refs.: H. P. Grice, “Godwin and the ethics of conversation.’