Chapman slightly patronisingly -- she is writing from a very British perspective -- writes on p. 85 of her _Grice_ then (aptly reviewed online by C. Potts):
"Most of all [Grice] was impressed by the work of ... Chomsky."
"It may seem surprising that the middle-aged British philosopher interested in the role of INDIVIDUAL SPEAKERS [or utterers, as I pedantically prefer] in creating meanign should cite as an influence the young American linguist notorious for dismissing issues of use in his pursuit of a universal theory of language."
And incidentally, it may do to revise Dale's more philosophical remarks on this in his chapter ii, historical, to "Theory of meaning", as he quotes extensively from Chomky's various publications on this and that.
Chapman goes on:
"But Grice was inspired by Chomsky's demonstration in his work
on SYNTAX of how 'a region for long found theoretically intractable
by scholars (like Jesperson) [Chapman does not 'sic' this -- Speranza]
of the highest intelligence could, by discovery and application of the right
kind of apparatus, be brought under control' (note 2)."
"Less formally, [Grice] expressed admiration for an approach that did not offer
'pieceman reflections on language' but rather were 'one got a picture of the whole
thing' (note 3)."
"Chomsky's right and highly influential book _Syntactic Structures_ was well known among Grice's Oxford contemporaries [and Grice his self [sic!] -- Speranza]. The Play Group worked their
SLOW AND METICULOUS
way through it during the autumn of 1959 (note 4)."
"Austin, in particular, was extremely impressed."
"Grice characterised and perhaps parodied [Austin] as revering Chomsky for his sheer audacity in taking on a subject even MORE SACRED than philosophy the subject of grammar (note 5)."
----
I have a marginal note here to the effect that 'Grammatica' was literally 'trivial', though: the trivium: logica (or dialectica) -- grammatica -- rhetorica.
---- So, 'sacred -- and 'trivial' at the same time, if you must!
Chapman goes on:
"Grice's own interest was focused on theory formation"
----- even compositional semantic theory formation, if you must, which will be criticised by Schiffer as this relates to "language understanding" --
"and its philosophical consequences"
--- as Carnap was. It seems Carnap is happy enough with pointing out how 'complex' 'general functions' like those would look -- without caring but with providing one illustration -- "Homo habet canem" -- as he explores the further grounds of his 'logical structure' of the world itself!
Chapman goes on:
"Chomsky was taking a new approach to
the study of syntax by proposing a
general theory where previously
there had been only localised
description and analysis"
--- One may think, on 'negation'. Note that, for all that Whitehead and Russell said on 'not' qua contradiction and "~" in Principia (1917), it was Jesperson [sic] who was read in his work on "Negation in English".
----
Chapman closes that paragraph with: "[Chomsky] claimed, for instance that ideally 'a formalised theory may automatically provide solutions for many problems other than those for which it was explictly designed' (note 6). Grice's aim, it was becoming clear, was to do something similar for the study of language use."
In this respect, the recollections of one Deirdre Susan Moir Wilson are apt. She started as a 'student' with Grice at Oxford, and sort of 'left' him to become an official 'doctoral student' with Chomsky at MIT -- while Grice was lecturing at neighbouring Harvard. She would recollect how she felt that Grice was becoming too much of a behaviourist, as she found all of Grice's colleagues, too, back in Oxford. It was somewhat disappointing (for me at least) to read Chomsky's own cursory remarks on that type of criticism (charge of behaviourism) when Chomsky cared to address the philosophical basis of Grice's programme in his "Reflections on Language". Searle made a similar mistake when he dubs Grice a 'behaviourist' in the opening pages to his "Philosophy of Language" reader for OUP. It seems some authors cannot see a theory of 'use' unless they dub it 'behaviourist' into the bargain. With Chapman, Suppes, and others, we tend to think of Grice as an 'intentionalist' in the old school of La Welby, rather.
Now for the notes.
Note 2 is clear enough: Grice 1986:59-60.
Note 3 -- what Chapman refers a more 'informal' Grice on Chomsky, is a transcription, by Chapman of
"Tape -- 29 January 1983. In conversation with Richard Warner and Judith Baker" -- The Grice papers.
----
For note 4 Chapman indeed quotes from Warnock 1973:36. For some reason, but I love her, she keeps referring to the Vice-Chancelor of Oxford as "Geoffrey C." where he was "G. J", James, if you must. Born in Leeds, and married to Mary Warnock. Dale and I should be fascinated that M. Warnock, as one reads in wiki, cared (I hate the verb but there you are) to include loads of Welby in her "Women philosophers".
---
For note 5 Chapman again quotes from that Tape referred on the previous note above.
---
Finally for note 6, Chapman quotes direct from Chomsky 1957:5.
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Perhaps JLS you've noted some of the recent linguistics research which suggests CHomsky's universal grammar theory may not be as sound as Chomskyites initially thought. It's some Steinford U gal (Boroditsky or something). She asserts the Sapir-whorf hypothesis may be more plausible than originally thought.
ReplyDeleteI respect Chomsky for his criticism of the behaviorists' views of language acquisition (and lets not forget Skinner was Quine's palsie...) but ...IMHE his theory of UG was not completely worked out--and Chomsky may have overemphasized "innateness". Languages (at least western ones Chomsky worked with) may reveal phrase structure, and syntactical complexity--but the "deep structure" was a bit mysterious. That may be the case but they couldn't show how the "traces" function. Or something. That said, the Noamster was not the most evil egghead who ever lived, and Im not convinced Cartesian linguistics has been overthrown (but modified). Searle also supposedly in the anti-behaviorist camp, but he seems to be a reductionist of sorts. Perhaps not Quine-stein , but ...literal and pedantic (and powerful Berkeley landlord to boot).
So. The Nothing nothings ( for Conty. phil Hegel remains more valuable than Heid. IMHE)