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Friday, April 9, 2010

On Piggyback

LJK for the GC.

JL asked about piggybacking, which I believe is a major part of natural language. I said in a comment this morning that Natural English is smooth like a stone in a brook, not like a well-turned bowl. Which got me (doing what I flatter myself to call) thinking.

Suppose it occurs to me that this distinction between the natural smoothness of a stone and the man-made smoothness of whatever it is we choose to make smooth is worth remarking upon more generally through a piece of art. Not being an artist, I’m sure to get what happens next wrong, but this is not about actual artistic process, so bear with me.

So I decide to place side by side on pedestals or in viewing cases or whatever juxtaposed examples of natural beauty and man-made beauty. One set of items is a stone from a brook and a sculpted piece of smooth, angle-less, marble. Brook stones are all pretty much the same shape, but we can make the marble piece any shape we wish. Indeed, that choice is one of the differences between the two pieces. How do I deliver that message?

I could put a placard next to the set, saying:

The marble piece is amorphous, but, of course, it needn’t be. One difference between naturally occurring finds and man-made artifacts is that the latter can be made in any shape we choose.

Or, I could just make the marble piece a sphere. The latter approach seems to me more efficient, although, of course, the point would be lost on some people. For their benefit, a placard could call their attention to the artificiality of the marble’s shape, but that would be a different thing from the original approach.

In this example, the message that man-made stuff can be any shape we wish is “piggy-backed” onto the message that some things are smooth naturally and some things are smooth because we make them so.

But we aren’t done yet. The stone may have a nice mingling of colors. Can we make a point about color in our sphere? Perhaps we can apply the very same colors as we see in the stone, but in an orderly pattern that would not appear in nature. Maybe the viewer sees the similarities in color as a way to focus his attention on the distribution of the colors, or maybe he sees the minor differences in the colors as a comment on how futile our attempts are to mimic mature. Not only messages can be piggybacked - provocations can, too.

Language, I submit, offers similar opportunities for carrying multiple messages efficiently. The very act of U addressing A tells A that U thinks it worth his effort to address A. The manner of address tells us more about U’s view of the social relation between himself and A. The volume or speed tells us something about U’s emotional state or sense of urgency. Level of diction announces U’s educational level and, perhaps, his perception of U’s educational level. Allusion can drag in whole subroutines in a single breath.

And so on. Messages heaped upon messages, some of them way more important than the semantic freight of the utterance itself. In my alleged art work, I am not going to use the sphere at all. I am going to mention it and, thereby invite the viewer to infer things about it’s being mentioned “in the same breath” as the brook stone. The sphere’s attributes that might be analogized to an utterance’s semantic payload – they defy description, at least by me, but I believe it has them – are irrelevant. Only the attributes of the sphere, qua artifact, are relevant to the conversational move.

Efficiency, I think, lies at the heart of this layering. It’s almost Parkinsonian: any utterance will be expanded to deliver as much information as the medium can carry. There does seem to be something Gricean here, in that “informativeness,” globally understood, demands not only that the message be complete, but that the package be full.

11 comments:

  1. "So I decide to place side by side on pedestals or in viewing cases or whatever juxtaposed examples of natural beauty and man-made beauty."

    Strikes me as a false opposition, formed by renaming the supposed second form of beauty. I would contend that there is no difference. Man is natural. The artwork is as natural as the stone from the stream.

    I would go along with the idea, though, that anything that has become normative can be used to carry extra meanings very efficiently, and marketing uses this all the time.

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  2. Of course, I was unable to post my reply here, so I had to proceed and paste it as a post on its own. Sorry about that. I refer in "How would you like to spend eternity?" to various issues:

    --- Grice on natural vs. non-natural meaning, and how it deals or connects with Kramer's and Kennedy's point of the continuum or lack thereof, in this Grecian (rather than Griceain -- necessarily) of "Art imitating nature".

    --- some 'growths' of English being 'natural' -- Grice's "How clever language is!", with a vengeance.

    --- the pathetic fallacy (of 'mean') and what we mean to do about it. Or not.

    --- Etc.

    Thanks.

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  3. Another idea for this artwork would be to find one pebble in a stream and then to produce another identical pebble using a battery of techniques, then display them alongside one another.

    I find the 'man-made' to reveal a common enough view of artworks, that they are 'artificial' 'unnatural' etc, and often this is used in a rather prejudicial way to advance to the ultimate step, that of dismissing art as useless, unnecessary, adornment, decoration, peripheral, and so on.

    However, all cultures feature art, which would suggest that the impulse to create art is natural, even though then we have this 'nature vs culture' distinction, which, again, I would question, saying - "Culture is natural"

    The same argument covers 'humanity' too, where I personally see it as ludicrous to classify certain human actions as 'crimes against humanity' - they are human actions, therefore they are filled with humanity, like it or not. Better to call it what it is - a crime against a conception of humanity. Unfortunately, that would undermine the basic idea, that there are some natural set of rights that each person or people possess and that are not to be violated, etc.

    As for JLS saying that the stone can't 'mean', etc, can it speak? How much sympathy can the human being have for a stone, a flower, a volcano, etc? Schopenhauer believed that all things contain will, and this will was the same, so why should there not be some means of dialogue between man and the other things of nature. The poetic evidence that just such communion goes on is all there.

    What would reveal what is going on best is perhaps the investigation of what makes poetry breaks down, or what things poetry can't be written about and so on.

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  4. Good points. I don't think there can be an 'identical' pebble to the one you are holding, etc. --- It seems that 'identical' is meant to signify just that: that two stones cannot be identical. Etc. Leibniz's law on the 'identity -- or identicality, if you mustn't -- of indescirnibles -- is pretty trivial to be true, though.

    ----

    I don't think I follow (please note I'm vexing controversial just to keep the minutes of the Grice club counting) you with

    "crime against humanity" to be replaced by the stricter, and truer, you think, 'crime against a conception of humanity".

    I would suggest that, indeed, when an utterer, U, says, 'crime against humanity' he means HIS OWN conception of humanity -- unless he is a French lawyer, who can mean almost anything, eat snails, and get away wit it (to Saint Tropez). Etc.

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  5. Picture, charging somebody with

    "crimes against the conception of humanity"

    rather than the

    "crimes against humanity"

    Would the prior construction not immediately open up a debate over this conception?

    The second phrase really is different, even though it may imply the first.

    ReplyDelete
  6. Thanks. Incidentally, re-reading what I find myself as having written, when I said I don't want to vex controversial I meant wax controversial. Call it a Germanism. (I pronounce German 'v' as a 'w' and vice versa. Plus I never understand or understood what 'wax' has to do with anything). And I can vex alright.

    ----

    Anyway. I think I want to argue with you.

    How can you claim that 'humanity' be replaced by 'conception of humanity. By the same token, for any word that U (utterer) uses, you have to replace his word, 'x' for "the concept of x". This was, once, a favourite move with English philosophers: "The concept of mind" is the title of a book by G. Ryle -- which Grice detested. On the other hand, when Grice was himself of age to lecture, his book (which came out 3 years after his death, in 1991) was entitled, NOT, 'The concept of value' but 'The conceptION of value'. Grice wants to argue that we shouldn't be concerned with 'concepts' but with 'conceptions' by which he means not just the familiar 'act-object' ambiguity as he puts it, but the Humean idea of a 'projection' as he calls it. If we speak of homicide, but not of ovicide (the killing of sheep) it's because we don't speak of a 'crime against our conception of sheep' -- but perhaps we should. Etc.

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  7. I maintain that it is important to use 'conception' because the cause of human rights has arisen. For example, there are those who go back through the history of past events and declare 'X, in 1312, was a crime against humanity' etc. Just as there was an article condemning Eugene O'Neil for one of his plays being 'racist' when what was really meant was that his play offends the present 'conception of racism'.

    Sure, your point about revising the entire language, so you'd sit back and enquire as to your guest's 'conception of the taste of their tea' and 'would this conception be enhanced by more sugar?' etc, but they are not as important as human rights legislation, which attempts to derive its power from the idea that it is enshrining something self-evident, natural and universal that has been revealed by civilisation reaching a particular point in its development, and that, moreover, it will 'bring to justice' those who violate its principles.

    Wikipedia - "Human rights are "basic rights and freedoms to which all humans are entitled." Proponents of the concept usually assert that all humans are endowed with certain entitlements merely by reason of being human."

    I don't think it is that controversial to wish that the conceptual nature of the enterprise be kept in plain view. Clearly, the above is simply a view, and there are equally people who run with it and wish to broaden its scope to include all other animals, too.

    Thank you for arguing.

    Vex/wax - both are good.

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  8. Hhmm... A pleasure to argue. But do make the view you explicitly want to argue more explicit?

    i. Are you concerned just with the use of 'humanity'? I think your initial point WAS that 'conception of humanity' was redundant?

    ii. I take your point about 'rights', and I do defend them! (My thesis advisor for my PhD dissertation was the famous "Sub-secretary of Human Rights" in Argentina! -- Edoardo Antonio Rabossi -- and one whom I found it pleasurable to teach some Grice! --.

    iii. Rabossi was actually a 'naturalist' when it came to human-rights, and I think I subscribe to that. His polemics were with C. S. Nino (Both Rabossi and Nino had studied in Oxford, under H. L. A. Hart, and others).

    -----

    iv. Your point about 'revision' is EXCELLENT. Actually, I was concerned once with R. Norton with discussions on this. It seems that many of the terms we use CANNOT project 'backwards' like that. In any case, there are implicatures that can be cancelled. As when we say, "O'Neill was a racist". It's useless to argue with anti-racists (as we all are) that O'Neill was NOT one, because we CAN use 'racist' to apply to O'Neill even if he did not see himself as one. Etc.

    ----

    Your point about the "Crime against humanity" back in 1322 seems to be on spot. Still, I would take it as per default that whoever says that there was a crime against humanity back in the Crusades (when the witches were burned, say) we HAVE to understand as expressing, "in my view".

    O. T. O. H., to keep adding, "Personally, I think it rains" I find VERY OTIOSE. I DO use it, to provoke my agents -- but that's neither here nor there. It seems that to say, "It rains" is more than enough to express that that's what you personally think or believe. Ditto for 'crass crimes against humanity'.

    ------ One of the jury members in my PhD dissertation, whose views I was v. familiar with, Osvaldo N. Guariglia, is a Kantotelian (He studied Kant in Germany under Kramer, I think). He would say, "I love Aristotle -- of course all he said about 'slaves' doesn't hold water today. But we have to project ourselves into Aristotle's shoes, rather than say he was a plantation owner'. Or perhaps he said Aristotle WAS of the same mind-set as a plantation owner, I forget what Guariglia argued for. There WERE similarities: slaves in Athens were of a special race, etc., or prisoners of war, etc. ---

    Wonder if there's a list of "crimes against humanity". Is 'murder' entailed or implicated? Etc.

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  9. "But do make the view you explicitly want to argue more explicit?"

    With respect, Sir, never!

    "i. Are you concerned just with the use of 'humanity'? I think your initial point WAS that 'conception of humanity' was redundant?"

    My point was the opposite, that omitting 'conception of...' points towards another conception, that of it perhaps not being a conception at all.

    "Your point about the "Crime against humanity" back in 1322 seems to be on spot. Still, I would take it as per default that whoever says that there was a crime against humanity back in the Crusades (when the witches were burned, say) we HAVE to understand as expressing, "in my view"."

    Maybe you are blessed and do not discuss matters with idiots (I don't seek out idiots, more, they reveal themselves as such as the discussion progresses) to quite the same extent as I do, as I have run across this problem more or less constantly, of people trying to argue about past events using present conceptions of morality, indeed, present conceptions of everything. Quite a blow, when one considers that the fact that so many different moralities have existed is one of the most interesting things about the past.

    Maybe we don't live in a moral age, but rather, a moralising age.

    That's the moral.

    "Wonder if there's a list of "crimes against humanity". Is 'murder' entailed or implicated? Etc."

    -- "A United Nations expert has condemned the growing use of crops to produce biofuels as a replacement for petrol as a crime against humanity."

    You sparked the uncovering of a gem there.

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  10. OK. Thanks. Will try and found more about him (or her -- the United Nations expert I mean).

    What ARE the United Nations? Anyway. Is he or she an official FOR 'The United Nations'. I want to ask because I want to know if I can replace it by "Smith", say. (cfr. Grice on "Harold Wilson was a good man", "The British Prime Minister (for 1967) was a good man". --

    Condemnation coming from an officer of "United Nations, Ltd" IS different from it coming just from Smith, -- the world being the silly place it is.

    So we can leave aside the details of the condemnation. And just have his utterance as:

    "It is a crime against humanity to produce biofules (instead of petrol) from crops."

    Sorry, but I'm so bad at agriculture, -- how can you produce petrol from a crop?

    --- I think he is a bit naive. Note that as Kramer would and I hope will (or not) remark, this is analogical and a matter of degree ('growing use'). How can a GROWTH be a crime? Either you are a criminal or you are not, though.

    Are you sure his first lingo was English? Indeed, English is NOT the world-language in the U. N., Ltd. -- and perhaps the idiom made sense in whatever it was the man or woman or person was using?

    --- Etc.

    I agree about other moralities in the past. People forget. But then they DO say, "O tempora, o mores", when they think they can recite Latin with a straight face.

    ----

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  11. From an online source. It was indeed someone who is apparently male but has a name that is female in English, Jean Zeigler. The only Zeigler I knew (till now) was Anne Zeigler, who sang with Webster Booth. What a delight of a voice!

    Jean Zeigler (he) said:

    “The effect of transforming hundreds and hundreds of thousands of tons of maize, of wheat, of beans, of palm oil, into agricultural fuel is absolutely catastrophic for the hungry people. So, it's a crime against humanity to devote agricultural land to biofuel production."

    To formalise, in predicate-logic using constants to be given some sort of good definition. Thanks! (Just joking).

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