Elementary Lessons in Grice, with copious examples and a vocabulary of Gricean terms

--- by JLS
------- for the GC

THIS IS MY LITTLE TRIBUTE TO JEVONS, which is quoted by a few Griceans, well-known and other. (It is quoted by L. Horn, for example.)

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This from:

http://books.google.com/books?id=KngBAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA82&ots=-tO0jV2pp0&dq=%22William+Stanley+Jevons%22++%22Elementary+Lessons+in+Logic%22&ie=ISO-8859-1&output=html_text#c_top

Jevons, or William Stanley Jevons, if you must, writes:

"The reader may well be cautioned, however,

against an ambiguity which has misled some

even of the most eminent logicians."


IMPLYING: "and on account of which we wonder why I still have the cheek or moxie to call them 'eminent'. I hope you are amused by this. And he was a Scots: Hamilton."

"In particular propositions the adjective 'some'

is to be carefully interpreted as 'some, and there

may or may not be more or all.'


REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM OF SCOTS LOGIC:

Jevons continues:

"Were we to interpret

it as 'some, not more nor all', then it

would really give to the proposition

the force of I and 0 combined. If I say



--- i. Some men are sincere.

I must not be

taken as implying [sic that


---- ii. Some men are not sincere


[i.e. as iib. Not all men are sincere].


Jevons goes on:

"I must be understood to predicate

sincerity of some men, leaving the

character of the remainder wholly unaffected.

It follows from this that, when I

deny the truth of a particular, I

must not be understood as implying

[conversationally implying, even. JLS]

the truth of the universal of the same

quality. To deny the truth of


---- iii. Some men are mortal.


might seem very natural, on the ground that

[what Jevons later calls the 'illogical']


----- iv. Not 'some' but all' men are mortal.

----

Jevons:

"but then the proposition denied would

really be

------ v. Some men are not mortal.

"i. e. 0 not E." Hence when I deny that

------ vi. Some men are immortal

I mean that

------ vii. No men are immortal.

"and when I deny that

------- viii. Some men are not mortal.

I mean that

------ ix. All men are mortal.


------

This was the best-selling book in logic for some time. And Jevons was of course a genius. A whole book should be written on the Griceans of the Nineteenth Century Logic in England. Alas, we cannot dub "Jevons" an Oxonian. So, if you are really into stuff that matters: Grice-and-Oxford, you CAN (or may) skip Jevons. But a lot of people take a broader view of Logic -- to include other places, in which case a cursory reference to Jevons is welcomed (If your range includes India, you can include De Morgan who was born in the Province of Madras).


----

Jevons is then distinguishing between 'logical' and 'illogical'.


----

Jevons is pouring scorn on eminentism of the order of a Sir William Hamilton. Jevons spends every two pages some space to pay tribute to his beloved "Mr. Mill" -- and Mill, Oxonian as he wasn't, WAS listed in the required readings for the Wykeham professorship of Logic for some time. Venn, too.


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Jevons uses 'imply' in precisely the way that Grice uses -- and for which Grice prefers "implicate" ONLY to do what Grice calls 'general duty' for 'imply' and two other verbs: 'mean' and 'suggest' (and we can add 'hint', etc.).

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Jevons also uses 'mean' -- and in Grice's particular 'mean-that' collocation that is concordant with utterer's meaning.

BUT:

Jevons is NOT Oxonian. So he feels he has to tell us what we should mean. And worst, we have to endure what he thinks we should LEARN what HE MEANS. We don't care!


----

Thus: we cannot say, with a straight face,


"you imply, by uttering x, that p"


----

and then

"you don't mean, by uttering x, that p"



---

Because 'to imply' IS a variety of 'to mean'. Or rather, BOTH are varieties of 'implicate'. So suppose we replace Jevons's use of 'implying that' and 'mean that' (that he uses) by a common verb -- 'common' to both, not common 'ordinary -- I hate to add these brackets, but I find I have to be jocular if I can -- ha ha --, so we yield a lot of Jevonsian contradictions that are of course avoided by a Grice.


For this is what Jevons writes:

"The reader may well be cautioned, however, against an ambiguity [not such thing -- this is a mere 'scope' thing. JLS] which has misled [not true -- they were 'wicked' -- they had a card under their sleeves] some even of the most eminent logicians. In particular propositions the adjective "some" is to be carefully [he means 'logically' -- care has nothing to do with it. And he means 'explicit content', or logical form -- or the point of 'saying-that', the proposition expressed. JLS] interpreted as "some, and there may or may not be more or all""

-- the addition of 'more' is totally a pleonetetic excrescence. "Some" has never got anything to do with "number"! THAT is totally careless! (But cfr. Altham --: if you do want to do pleonetetic, you need CRITERIA -- what Altham calls a 'threshold' -- "Some Oxonians drive convertibles -- but NOT many").

Jevons:

"Were we to interpret it [i.e. 'some'] as "some, not more nor all," [Again, 'more' has nothing to do with anything but let that be. We won't. JLS], then it would really [as if people were IRREAL speakers? JLS] give to the proposition the force of I and 0 combined. If [rather, "When". JLS] I say "Some men are sincere," I must not be taken as implying that "Some men are not sincere;""

--- but you WILL and so it's best to go and cancel.

"I must be understood to predicate sincerity of some men, leaving the character of the remainder wholly unaffected. It follows from this that, when I deny the truth of a particular, I must not be understood as implying the truth of the universal of the same quality."

But you will. And keep in mind that some reasoners are Gricean -- or 'Oxonian' as I would prefer in this context.

----

"To deny the truth of "Some men are mortal" might seem very natural, on the ground that not some but all men are mortal; but then the proposition denied would really be some men are not mortal, i. e. 0 not E. Hence when I deny that "Some men are immortal" I mean that "no men are immortal' ----"

Grice disagrees. What you do SAY is that. What you mean is what you imply -- especially if you don't cancel. For otherwise, what's the good of having a conversation. Grice was so bored by these misuses of 'mean' and 'imply' and 'use' and 'meaning' that, centuries later, in 1967, he felt he still needed to educate the Harvardites about it -- and right he was! And the Harvardites have not YET swallowed it!

----

Jevons: "and when I deny that" some men are not mortal," I mean that "all men are mortal.""

Of course Jevons -- great man, on the whole -- He was born in Lancashire, of very good English stock -- did not know, really, the first thing about 'mean' and how it connects with 'intention'. He does say that 'mean' is possibly cognate with a Sanskrit word meaning 'think' -- earlier on. So I'm sure he would have applauded Grice's improvements on all the stuff that matters. Etc. Or not.
and so, if we replace,

"