Notes on Aristotle's Categoriæi -- The Grice Archive (Fourth Series C6F15, BANC MSS 90/135)

-- by JLS
----- for the GC

THIS WOULD BE C6F15. Why are the Categoriae so fascinating? Because they are.

Categoriæ (Κατηγορίαι) is a text from Aristotle's Organon that enumerates all the possible kinds of thing that can be the subject or the predicate of a proposition. The Categories places every object of human apprehension under one of ten categories (known to medieval writers as the praedicamenta). Aristotle intended them to enumerate everything that can be expressed without composition or structure, thus anything that can be either the subject or the predicate of a proposition. The text begins with an explication of what is meant by "synonymous," or univocal words, what is meant by "homonymous," or equivocal words, and what is meant by "paronymous," or denominative (sometimes translated "derivative") words. It then divides forms of speech as being:
Either simple, without composition or structure, such as "man," "horse," "fights," etc.
Or having composition and structure, such as "a man fights," "the horse runs," etc.
Only composite forms of speech can be true or false.
Next, he distinguishes between what is said "of" a subject and what is "in" a subject. What is said "of" a subject describes the kind of thing that it is as a whole, answering the question "what is it?". What is said to be "in" a subject is a predicate that does not describe it as a whole but cannot exist without the subject, such as the shape of something. The latter has come to be known as inherence.
Of all the things that exist,
1. Some may be predicated of a subject, but are in no subject; as man may be predicated of James or John, but is not in any subject.
2. Some are in a subject, but cannot be predicated of any subject. Thus a certain individual point of grammatical knowledge is in me as in a subject, but it cannot be predicated of any subject; because it is an individual thing.
3. Some are both in a subject and able to be predicated of a subject, for example science, which is in the mind as in a subject, and may be predicated of geometry as of a subject.
4. Last, some things neither can be in any subject nor can be predicated of any subject. These are individual substances, which cannot be predicated, because they are individuals; and cannot be in a subject, because they are substances.
Then we come to the categories themselves, whose definitions depend upon these four forms of predication.[1][2] The ten categories, or classes, are:
1. Substance (ousia, "essence” or "substance”). Substance is that which cannot be predicated of anything or be said to be in anything. Hence, this particular man or that particular tree are substances. Later in the text, Aristotle calls these particulars “primary substances”, to distinguish them from secondary substances, which are universals and can be predicated. Hence, Socrates is a primary substance, while man is a secondary substance. Man is predicated of Socrates, and therefore all that is predicated of man is predicated of Socrates.
2. Quantity (poson, “how much”). This is the extension of an object, and may be either discrete or continuous. Further, its parts may or may not have relative positions to each other. All medieval discussions about the nature of the continuum, of the infinite and the infinitely divisible, are a long footnote to this text. It is of great importance in the development of mathematical ideas in the medieval and late Scholastic period.
3. Quality (poion, “of what kind or quality”). This determination characterizes the nature of an object.
4. Relation (pros ti, “toward something”). This is the way one object may be related to another.
5. Place (pou, “where”). Position in relation to the surrounding environment.
6. Time (pote, “when”). Position in relation to the course of events.
7. Position (keisthai, “to lie”). The examples Aristotle gives indicate that he meant a condition of rest resulting from an action: ‘Lying’, ‘sitting’. Thus position may be taken as the end point for the corresponding action. The term is, however, frequently taken to mean the relative position of the parts of an object (usually a living object), given that the position of the parts is inseparable from the state of rest implied.
8. State (echein, “to have”). The examples Aristotle gives indicate that he meant a condition of rest resulting from an affection (i.e. being acted on): ‘shod’, ‘armed’. The term is, however, frequently taken to mean the determination arising from the physical accoutrements of an object: one's shoes, one's arms, etc. Traditionally, this category is also called a habitus (from Latin habere, “to have”).
9. Action (poiein, "to make” or "to do”). The production of change in some other object.
10. Affection (paschein, “to suffer” or “to undergo”). The reception of change from some other object. It is also known as passivity. It is clear from the examples Aristotle gave for action and for affection that action is to affection as the active voice is to the passive. Thus for action he gave the example, ‘to lance’, ‘to cauterize’; for affection, ‘to be lanced’, ‘to be cauterized.’ The term is frequently misinterpreted to refer only or mainly to some kind of emotion or passion.
The first six are given a detailed treatment in four chapters, the last four are passed over lightly, as being clear in themselves. Later texts by scholastic philosophers also reflect this disparity of treatment[citation needed].

"After discussing the categories, four ways are given in which things may be considered contrary to one another. Next, the work discusses five senses wherein a thing may be considered prior to another, followed by a short section on simultaneity. Six forms of movement are then defined: generation, destruction, increase, diminution, alteration, and change of place. The work ends with a brief consideration of the word 'have' and its usage."

See also: Category of being, Categorization, Category (Kant), Schema (Kant), Categories (Stoic), Category (disambiguation), Simplicius of Cilicia.