Abstract:
"According to a Moorean response to skepticism,
the standards for knowledge are invariantly comparatively
low, and we can know across contexts all that we
ordinarily take ourselves to know. It is incumbent upon
the Moorean to defend his position by explaining how, in
contexts in which S seems to lack knowledge, S can
nevertheless have knowledge. The explanation proposed
here relies on a warranted-assertability maneuver: Because we
are warranted in asserting"
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----- "S doesn't know that p,"
"it can seem that S does in fact lack that piece of knowledge. Moreover,
this warranted-assertability maneuver is unique and better than
similar maneuvers because it makes use of H. P. Grice's general
conversational [maxim] of quantity -- "Do not make your
contribution more informative than is required" -- in explaining
why we are warranted in asserting that S doesn't know that p."
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