Abstract to Judith Baker's "Rationality without Reasons", in Mind 2008, citing Grice

"Rationality without reasons", Mind, vol. 117

""Ratinality without reasons" "challenges", Baker writes,

"the assumption that reasons are intrinsic

to rational action."

Why?

Well,

"a great many actions are

not best understood as ones in which the

agent acted for reasons — and yet they can be

understood as rational, and as open to rational criticism."


She goes on:

"The relative paucity of explicit reason-giving,

practical arguments in daily life presents

a general philosophical problem."

Why?

Well, because,

"it reflects the existence of a class of ways

in which reason can regulate action, which

goes far beyond producing reasons or

applying principles."

She goes on:

"Much practical reasoning takes the form of
what H. P. Grice called ‘thought-transitions’."

"These are neither in the form of standard

practical arguments, nor can they be so

reconstructed without distorting the ways

in which an agent thinks."

Examples:

"Some actions to which one is led by

a thought transition are rational,

namely when what Grice called

a ‘propension’ towards a given class of

actions"

i.e.

"a standing inclination to act in certain

ways —- would itself stand up to rational evaluation."


----

"Rationality without reasons"

"examines two bases for such endorsement,

one local and limited, and one much more

speculative, due to Grice himself."

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Meanwhile, we await publication of "Reflections on morals"! Congrats, J. Baker.