Helm quotes from Powers:
“Bleikasten stresses the fact that Faulkner was a storyteller in both senses of the term.””
“Bleikasten stresses the fact that Faulkner was a storyteller in both senses of the term.””
I think Powers is confused about ‘story’ and ‘history’. You can be a story-teller and you can be a history-teller, or historian.
Helm quotes from Powers:
“Faulkner loved writing complex stories [sic -- not 'histories'] of ‘the human heat in conflict with itself’ (a phrase Faulkner uses in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech), and he compulsively embroidered the bare 'facts' of his own prosaic life. Writing later about the months he lived in New Orleans, Faulkner claimed that he supported himself by 'working for a bootlegger. He had a launch that I would take down [Lake] Ponchartrain into the Gulf to an island where the rum, the green rum, would be brought up from Cuba and buried, and we would dig it up and bring it back to New Orleans [...] And I would get a hundred dollars a trip for that.’ “Nothing about this story was true, but just as remarkable is where he told it – in an American lit class at West Point [...] Yet bigger *lies* were told about his eventless months with the Air Force; after the war he limped from imaginary machine gun wounds suffered, he claimed, in aerial duels over the fields of France. Faulkner was still in flight school when the war ended, was never sent to France, was never wounded in combat as he claimed, and never even took up a plane alone until years later [...] Bleikasten is blunt about Faulkner’s fabrications and writes that ‘he lied to his parents, his brothers, his friends, and later his son-in-law, his mistresses, his editors, his colleagues in Hollywood, and his doctors.""
“Faulkner loved writing complex stories [sic -- not 'histories'] of ‘the human heat in conflict with itself’ (a phrase Faulkner uses in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech), and he compulsively embroidered the bare 'facts' of his own prosaic life. Writing later about the months he lived in New Orleans, Faulkner claimed that he supported himself by 'working for a bootlegger. He had a launch that I would take down [Lake] Ponchartrain into the Gulf to an island where the rum, the green rum, would be brought up from Cuba and buried, and we would dig it up and bring it back to New Orleans [...] And I would get a hundred dollars a trip for that.’ “Nothing about this story was true, but just as remarkable is where he told it – in an American lit class at West Point [...] Yet bigger *lies* were told about his eventless months with the Air Force; after the war he limped from imaginary machine gun wounds suffered, he claimed, in aerial duels over the fields of France. Faulkner was still in flight school when the war ended, was never sent to France, was never wounded in combat as he claimed, and never even took up a plane alone until years later [...] Bleikasten is blunt about Faulkner’s fabrications and writes that ‘he lied to his parents, his brothers, his friends, and later his son-in-law, his mistresses, his editors, his colleagues in Hollywood, and his doctors.""
Helm wonders: “How judgmental Bleikasten and Powers are being is unclear because immediately following the above, Powers writes: “In time Faulkner told fewer tall tales and had the deeper pleasure of constructing elaborate fictions in prose.””
-- where lying is permitted, as it were.
Helm goes on: “A reader [of Powers's review] might be excused from concluding that if he learns to *lie well enough* perhaps he too can incorporate his *lies* into *stories* and perhaps one day win a Nobel Prize.”
For Literature, not Peace, I hope!
Indeed, Powers's implicature (which he no doubt would hasten to cancel) is that perhaps much of Faulkner's 'material' was a 'tall tale' in the first place.
I wonder how well documented the French original is. Scholarship rigours vary from country to country. And I would expect that, if intended for a Francophone readership, Bleikasten was not required, by this 'small publishing house' to provide TONS of end notes for each of his claims about Faulkner's claims.
Helm then quotes from Anthony Trollope's "Autobiography" -- on which I will concentrate from now on in this posting.
For Literature, not Peace, I hope!
Indeed, Powers's implicature (which he no doubt would hasten to cancel) is that perhaps much of Faulkner's 'material' was a 'tall tale' in the first place.
I wonder how well documented the French original is. Scholarship rigours vary from country to country. And I would expect that, if intended for a Francophone readership, Bleikasten was not required, by this 'small publishing house' to provide TONS of end notes for each of his claims about Faulkner's claims.
Helm then quotes from Anthony Trollope's "Autobiography" -- on which I will concentrate from now on in this posting.
Trollope:
“Whether the world does or does not become more wicked as years go on is a question which probably has disturbed the minds of thinkers since the world began to think. That men have become less cruel, less violent, less selfish, less brutal, there can be no doubt; -- but have they become LESS HONEST? If so, can a world, retro-grading from day to day in HONESTY, be considered to be in a state of 'progress'? We know the opinion on this subject of our philosopher Thomas Carlyle. If Carlyle be right, we are all going straight away to darkness and the dogs. But then, we do not put very much faith in Carlyle – nor in Ruskin and his followers. The loudness and extravagance of their lamentations, the wailing and gnashing of teeth which comes from them, over a world which is supposed to have gone altogether shoddy-wards, are so contrary to the convictions of men who cannot but see how comfort has been increased, how health has been improved, and education extended – that the general effect of their teaching is the opposite of what they have intended. It is regarding simply as "Carlylism" to say that the English-speaking world is growing worse form day to day. And it is "Carlylism" to opine that the general grand result of increased intelligence is a tendency to deterioration.”
“Whether the world does or does not become more wicked as years go on is a question which probably has disturbed the minds of thinkers since the world began to think. That men have become less cruel, less violent, less selfish, less brutal, there can be no doubt; -- but have they become LESS HONEST? If so, can a world, retro-grading from day to day in HONESTY, be considered to be in a state of 'progress'? We know the opinion on this subject of our philosopher Thomas Carlyle. If Carlyle be right, we are all going straight away to darkness and the dogs. But then, we do not put very much faith in Carlyle – nor in Ruskin and his followers. The loudness and extravagance of their lamentations, the wailing and gnashing of teeth which comes from them, over a world which is supposed to have gone altogether shoddy-wards, are so contrary to the convictions of men who cannot but see how comfort has been increased, how health has been improved, and education extended – that the general effect of their teaching is the opposite of what they have intended. It is regarding simply as "Carlylism" to say that the English-speaking world is growing worse form day to day. And it is "Carlylism" to opine that the general grand result of increased intelligence is a tendency to deterioration.”
Helm comments: “I am apparently [as per Powers's observation] typically American in not liking [or tackling] Faulkner or his novels. Not liking him because his *lies* sound a bit archaic however. Lying has been worked upon by politicians. “Spinning” and “Spin Doctors” are a fact of politics and not considered 'lying.'”
We need indeed a conceptual analysis of 'lying' and how it relates to 'honesty'!
The standard conceptual definition of lying is quite a trick. Faulkner (in "What's wrong about lying?" and "Lying and deceit") does that -- as discussed in "Faulkner and Grice on the desideratum of conversational candour").
Grice makes fun, for once, of Kant, in “Aspects of reason,” which is fun, because in “Logic and Conversation” he is echoing Kant and calling himself ‘enough of a rationalist’ to be ‘echoing Kant’. In “Aspects of Reason” Grice is bringing up the ridicule Kant received in the English-speaking world. Kant’s systematic refutation of lying as regarded as too ‘rigouristic’. It’s, granted, all different with Faulkner’s archaic white lies.
Grice makes fun, for once, of Kant, in “Aspects of reason,” which is fun, because in “Logic and Conversation” he is echoing Kant and calling himself ‘enough of a rationalist’ to be ‘echoing Kant’. In “Aspects of Reason” Grice is bringing up the ridicule Kant received in the English-speaking world. Kant’s systematic refutation of lying as regarded as too ‘rigouristic’. It’s, granted, all different with Faulkner’s archaic white lies.
Helm adds: “When a famous politician is caught in flagrante delicto, he doesn’t admit that he did anything wrong, nor does he admit that he was 'lying' about it up until the very time he was caught. He says “I made a mistake.” 'Lying' was not involved. Carlyle and Ruskin were clearly wrong. Modern man spins and makes mistakes. He does not 'lie.'”
Hence Helm's view that Faulkner's 'lies' are a bit 'archaic,' with the attending implicature that Faulkner is not 'modern.'
I don't know what sources by Carlyle and Ruskin Trollope is considering, though! I suppose a search using keyword: "honesty" will give us some good references.
Hence Helm's view that Faulkner's 'lies' are a bit 'archaic,' with the attending implicature that Faulkner is not 'modern.'
I don't know what sources by Carlyle and Ruskin Trollope is considering, though! I suppose a search using keyword: "honesty" will give us some good references.
I would think the Griceian approach to this is complex, and perhaps relying on his “Intention and uncertainty.” It seems ‘intention’ is essential. Violating the maxim pertaining to the category of ‘quantitas’ (“Do not say what you believe to be false”) seems central in communication. Yet of course, most figures of speech (qua conversational impicatures) are a sort of ‘lie’: ‘metaphor,’ ‘hyperbole,’ ‘litotes,’ ‘irony’. If the intention is there on the part of the utterer that the addressee will recognise that the utterer is ‘flouting’ the maxim, things seem okay, even for Kant.
Faulkner, granted, lied. If following philosopher D.F. Pears in “Motivated irrationality,” see see Faulker as believing his lies, a further caveat is needed. Faulkner may have ended up believing his lies. It is obvious that his novels were a way to ‘legitimise’ those lies into ‘fictional narratives’ that perhaps only a die-hard Oxonian (from Oxford, Mississippi) would regard as a lie!
Helm:
"I am apparently [as per Powers's observation] typically American in not liking [or tackling] Faulkner or his novels. Not liking him because his *lies* sound a bit archaic however. Lying has been worked upon by politicians. “Spinning” and “Spin Doctors” are a fact of politics and not considered 'lying.' When a famous politician is caught in flagrante delicto, he does not admit that he did anything wrong, nor does he admit that he was 'lying' about it up until the very time he was caught. He says “I made a mistake.” 'Lying' was not involved. Carlyle and Ruskin were clearly wrong. Modern man spins and makes mistakes. He does not 'lie.'”
Well, one may argue that "I made a mistake" implicates "I made a mistake when I lied"?
Grice curiously made fun of all this. His first example of 'conversational implicature' at Harvard is:
A: How is C getting on at his new job at the bank?
B: Oh, he loves his colleagues and he hasn't been to prison yet.
Grice glosses the implicature are "C is potentially dishonest." I guess Trollope would like that, since he is considering a degradation of dishonesty as seen by Carlyle and Ruskin. It may do to go back to Trollope's wording:
"Men have become less cruel, less violent, less selfish, less brutal, there can be no doubt; -- but have they become LESS HONEST? If so, can a world, retro-grading from day to day in HONESTY, be considered to be in a state of 'progress'?"
His implicature -- or answer to that rhetorical question is "No." By contraposition, then, he negates the premise: man has not become 'less honest.'
I think he is generalising a bit. Note that he uses the plural "men," whereas Grice sticks to one particular "C" as being _potentially_ dishonest.
Helm brings in Trollope on honesty as it relates to 'lying.' Helm seems to be working with a narrow conceptual analysis of 'lying.' "Modern man does not 'lie.'"
I guess some men do. Faulkner apparently did -- but Helm would possibly says that Faulkner is being 'archaic,' not modern. Or something.
Cheers,
Speranza
REFERENCES
Faulkner, What's wrong about lying?
Faulkner, Lying and deceit
Faulkner, What's wrong about lying?
Faulkner, Lying and deceit
Grice, H. P. “Aspects of Reason,” Oxford, Clarendon Press. (On Kant on lying).
Trollope, A. "Autobiography."
Trollope, A. "Autobiography."
Posts
No comments:
Post a Comment