Speranza
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Mary Midgley
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 |
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Born
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Mary Scrutton
London
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Died
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10 October
2018 (aged 99)
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Residence
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Newcastle,
UK
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Alma mater
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Notable work
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Beast and Man (1978), Animals and Why They
Matter (1983), Evolution as a Religion (1985), Science
as Salvation (1992)
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Spouse(s)
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Geoffrey Midgley (m.
1950, d. 1997)
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Awards
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Honorary D. Litt (1995), Durham University;
Honorary DCL(2008), Newcastle University
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Era
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Region
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Main interests
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Notable ideas
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Humans as ethical primates
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Influences[show]
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Mary
Beatrice Midgley (née Scrutton; 13 September 1919 – 10
October 2018[1]) was a British
philosopher. She was a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at Newcastle University and
was known for her work on science, ethics and animal rights. She wrote her first book, Beast
And Man (1978), when she was in her fifties. She has since written
over 15 other books, including Animals and Why They Matter (1983), Wickedness (1984), The
Ethical Primate (1994), Evolution as a Religion (1985),
and Science as Salvation (1992). She has been awarded honorary
doctorates by Durham and Newcastle universities.
Her autobiography, The Owl of Minerva, was published in 2005.
Midgley
strongly opposed reductionism and scientism, and any attempts to make science a
substitute for the humanities—a role for which it is, she argued, wholly
inadequate. She wrote extensively about what philosophers can learn from
nature, particularly from animals. A number of her books and articles discussed
philosophical ideas appearing in popular science, including those of Richard Dawkins. She also wrote in favour of a
moral interpretation of the Gaia hypothesis. The Guardian described
her as a fiercely combative philosopher and the UK's "foremost scourge of
'scientific pretension.'"[3]
Contents
·
2Career
·
3Awards
·
4Death
·
8Notes
Midgley
was born in London to Lesley and Tom Scrutton.[1] Her father, the son
of the eminent judge Sir Thomas Edward
Scrutton, was a curate in Dulwich and
later chaplain of King's
College, Cambridge. She was raised in Cambridge, Greenford and
Ealing, and educated at Downe House School in Cold Ash, Berkshire,
where she developed her interest in classics and philosophy:
Midgley's father was a King's College chaplain.
[A] new and vigorous
Classics teacher offered to teach a few of us Greek, and that too was somehow slotted into
our timetables. We loved this and worked madly at it, which meant that with
considerable efforts on all sides, it was just possible for us to go to college
on Classics … I had decided to read Classics rather than English – which was
the first choice that occurred to me – because my English teacher, bless her,
pointed out that English literature is something that you read in any case, so
it is better to study something that you otherwise wouldn't. Someone also told
me that, if you did Classics at Oxford, you could do Philosophy as well. I knew
very little about this but, as I had just found Plato, I couldn't resist trying
it.[4]
Midgley read Greats at
Oxford, going up to Somerville in
1938.
She
took the Oxford entrance exam in the autumn of 1937, gaining a place at Somerville College.
During the year before starting university, it was arranged that she would live
in Austria for three months to learn German, but she had to leave after a month
because of the worsening political situation.
At Somerville she studied Mods and Greats alongside Iris Murdoch, graduating with first-class
honours.
Several
of her lasting friendships that began at Oxford were with scientists, and she
credited them with having educated her in a number of scientific disciplines.[5] After a split in
the Labour club at Oxford over the Soviet Union's actions, she was on the
committee of the newly formed Democratic Socialist Club alongside Tony Crosland and Roy Jenkins. She writes that her career in
philosophy may have been affected by women having a greater voice in discussion
at the time, because many male undergraduates left after a year to fight in
the Second World War:
"I think myself that this experience has something to do with the fact
that Elizabeth [Anscombe]
and I and Iris[Murdoch]
and Philippa Foot and Mary Warnock have all made our names in
philosophy... I do think that in normal times a lot of good female thinking is
wasted because it simply doesn't get heard."[6]
Midgley
left Oxford in 1942 and went into the civil service, as "the war put graduate
work right out of the question". Instead, she "spent the rest of the
war doing various kinds of work that were held to be of national
importance".[7]
During
this time she was also a teacher at Downe School and Bedford School. She returned to Oxford in 1947
to do graduate work with Gilbert Murray. She began research on Plotinus's view of the soul, which she has
described as "so unfashionable and so vast that I never finished my
thesis".[7] In retrospect
Midgley has written of her belief that she is "lucky" to have missed
out in having a doctorate. She argues
that one of the main flaws in doctoral training is that, while it "shows
you how to deal with difficult arguments", it does not "help you to
grasp the big questions that provide its context – the background issues out of
which the small problems arose."[7]
In
1949 Midgley went to Reading University,
teaching in the philosophy department there for four terms. In 1950 she
married Geoffrey Midgley (died
1997)[8], also a philosopher.
They moved to Newcastle,
where he got a job in the philosophy department of Newcastle University.[9] Midgley gave up
teaching for several years while she had three sons (Tom, David and Martin),[3] before also getting
a job in the philosophy department at Newcastle, where she and her husband were
both "much loved".[9] Midgley taught
there between 1962 and 1980.[10] During her time at
Newcastle, she began studying ethology and this led to her first
book, Beast and Man (1978), published when she was 59. "I
wrote no books until I was a good 50, and I'm jolly glad because I didn't know
what I thought before then."[3]
Midgley
was awarded an honorary D.Litt. by Durham University in 1995[11] and an
honorary Doctor of Civil Law by Newcastle University in
2008.[10] She was an honorary
fellow of the Policy, Ethics and Life Sciences Research Centre at Newcastle
University.[10]
Midgley
argued that philosophy is like plumbing, something that nobody notices until
it goes wrong. "Then suddenly we become aware of some bad smells, and we
have to take up the floorboards and look at the concepts of even the most
ordinary piece of thinking. The great philosophers ... noticed how badly things
were going wrong, and made suggestions about how they could be dealt
with."[14] Despite her
upbringing, she did not embrace Christianity herself, because, she says,
"I couldn't make it work. I would try to pray and it didn't seem to get me
anywhere so I stopped after a while. But I think it's a perfectly sensible
world view."[9] She also argues
that the world's religions should not simply be ignored: "It turns out
that the evils which have infested religion are not confined to it, but are
ones that can accompany any successful human institution. Nor is it even clear
that religion itself is something that the human race either can or should be
cured of."[15]
Midgley's
book Wickedness (1984) has been described as coming
"closest to addressing a theological theme: the problem of evil."[16] But, Midgley argues
that we need to understand the human capacity for wickedness, rather than
blaming God for it. Midgley argues that evil arises from aspects of human
nature, not from an external force. She further argues that evil is the absence
of good, with good being described as the positive virtues such as generosity,
courage and kindness. Therefore, evil is the absence of these characteristics,
leading to selfishness, cowardice and similar. She therefore criticises
existentialism and other schools of thought which promote the 'Rational Will'
as a free agent. She also criticises the tendency to demonise those deemed
'wicked', by failing to acknowledge that they also display some measure of some
of the virtues.[16]
Midgley
also expressed her interest in Paul Davies' ideas on the inherent
improbability of the order found in the universe. She argued that "there's
some sort of tendency towards the formation of order", including towards
life and "perceptive life".[9] The best way, she
argued, of talking about this is using the concept of "a life force",
although she acknowledged that this is "vague".[9] She also argued
that "gratitude" is an important part of the motivation for theism. "You go out on a day like this
and you're really grateful. I don't know who to."[9]
This
understanding also links with Midgley's argument that the concept of Gaia has "both a scientific and a
religious aspect."[17] She argued that
people find this hard to grasp because our views on both science and religion
have been narrowed so much that the connections between them are now obscured.[17] This is not,
however, about belief in a personal God, but instead about responding to the
system of life, as revealed by Gaia, with "wonder, awe and gratitude"[18]
Midgley
was supportive of James Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis. This was part of her
"principal passion" of "reviving our reverence for the
earth".[10] Midgley also
described Gaia as a "breakthrough", as it was "the first time a
theory derived from scientific measurements has carried with it an implicit
moral imperative – the need to act in the interests of this living system on
which we all depend.[19]
In
2001 Midgley founded, along with David Midgley and Tom Wakeford, the Gaia
Network, and became its first Chair.[20][21] Their regular
meetings on the implications of Gaia led to the 2007 book Earthy
realism edited by Midgley, which sought to bring together the
scientific and spiritual aspects of Gaia theory.[21]
Midgley's
2001 pamphlet for Demos Gaia:
The next big idea argues for the importance of the idea of Gaia as a
"powerful tool" in science, morality, psychology and politics, to
gain a more holistic understanding of the world.[22] Instead, Midgley
argued that we "must learn how to value various aspects of our
environment, how to structure social relationships and institutions so that we
value social and spiritual life, as well as the natural world, alongside
commercial and economic aspects.[22]
Her
book Science and Poetry, also published in 2001, also includes a
discussion on the idea of Gaia, which she argued "is not a gratuitous,
semi-mystical fantasy", but instead is "a useful idea, a cure for
distortions that spoil our current world-view."[23] It is useful both
in finding practical solutions to environmental problems and also in giving us
"a more realistic view of ourselves".[23] Gaia has, Midgely
argued, both scientific and moral importance, which also involves politics.[24] There is also a
religious angle to Gaia.[25]
Beast
and Man was
an examination of human nature and a reaction against the reductionism of sociobiology, and the relativism and behaviorism she saw as prevalent in much
of social science. She argued that human beings are more similar to animals
than many social scientists then acknowledged, while animals are in many ways
more sophisticated than was often accepted.[9] She criticised
existentialists who argued that there was no such thing as human nature and
writers such as Desmond Morris who
she understood as arguing that human nature was "brutal and nasty".[9] Instead, she argued
that human beings and their relationship with animals could be better
understood by using the qualitative methods
of ethology and comparative
psychology, and that this approach showed that "we do have a
nature and it's much more in the middle.[9]
Writing
in the 2002 introduction to the reprint of Evolution as a Religion (1985),
Midgley reported that she wrote both this book, and the later Science
as Salvation (1992) to counter the "quasi-scientific speculation"[26] of "certain
remarkable prophetic and metaphysical passages that appeared
suddenly in scientific books, often in their last chapters."[27] Evolution as a
Religion dealt with the theories of evolutionary biologists,
including Dawkins,
while Science as Salvation dealt with the theories of
physicists and artificial
intelligence researchers. Midgley writes that she still
believes that these theories, "have nothing to do with any reputable
theory of evolution,"[28] and will not solve
the real social and moral problems the world is facing, either through genetic engineering or
the use of machines. She concludes: "These schemes still seem to me to be
just displacement activities proposed in order to avoid facing our real
difficulties."[28] "[I]n exposing
these rhetorical attempts to turn science into a comprehensive ideology,"
she wrote in The myths we live by, "I am not attacking science
but defending it against dangerous misconstructions."[29]
Midgley
argued against reductionism, or the attempt to impose any one approach to
understanding the world. She suggests that there are "many maps, many
windows," arguing that "we need scientific pluralism—the
recognition that there are many independent forms and sources of
knowledge—rather than reductivism, the conviction that one fundamental form
underlies them all and settles everything." She writes that it is helpful
to think of the world as "a huge aquarium. We cannot see it as a whole
from above, so we peer in at it through a number of small windows ... We can
eventually make quite a lot of sense of this habitat if we patiently put
together the data from different angles. But if we insist that our own window
is the only one worth looking through, we shall not get very far."[30]
She
argued that, "acknowledging matter as somehow akin to and penetrated by
mind is not adding a new ... assumption ... it is becoming aware of something
we are doing already." She suggested that "this topic is essentially
the one which caused Einstein often to remark that the really surprising thing
about science is that it works at all ... the simple observation that the laws
of thought turn out to be the laws of things."[31]
Midgley
wrote her 2014 book, Are you an illusion? as a response
to Francis Crick's
argument in his book The Astonishing Hypothesis that a
person's sense of personal identity and free will is no more than the behaviour
of nerve cells. She attacks the understanding inherent in this argument that
everything, including a sense of self, can be understood through its physical
properties.[9] Instead, she argues
that there are different levels of explanation, which need to be studied using
different methods. This means that thoughts and memories are an integral part
of reality for both humans and animals and need to be studied as such.[32]
In
volume 53 (1978) of Philosophy, the journal of the Royal
Institute of Philosophy, J. L. Mackie published an article
entitled The Law of the Jungle: Moral Alternatives and Principles of
Evolution, praising Dawkins's The Selfish Gene, and discussing how its
ideas might be applied to moral philosophy.[33] Midgley responded
in volume 54 (1979) with "Gene-Juggling," arguing that The
Selfish Gene was about psychological egoism,
rather than evolution.[34] The paper
criticised Dawkins' concepts, but was judged by its targets to be intemperate
and personal in tone, and as having misunderstood Dawkins' ideas. Midgley
disputed this view, arguing that while Dawkins purports to be talking about
genes—that is, chemical arrangements—he nonetheless slides over to saying that
"we are born selfish" (The Selfish Gene, p. 3).
She
wrote that she had previously "not attended to Dawkins, thinking it
unnecessary to 'break
a butterfly upon a wheel'. But Mr Mackie's article is not the only
indication I have lately met of serious attention being paid to his
fantasies."[34] In a rejoinder in
1981, Dawkins retorted that the comment was "hard to match, in reputable
journals, for its patronising condescension toward a fellow academic."[35] He wrote that she
"raises the art of misunderstanding to dizzy heights. My central point had
no connection with what she alleges. I am not even very directly interested in
man, or at least not in his emotional nature. My book is about the evolution of
life, not the ethics of one particular, rather aberrant, species."[35] In volume 58
(1983), Midgley replied again, in "Selfish Genes and Social
Darwinism": "Apology is due, not only for the delay but for the
impatient tone of my article. One should not lose one's temper, and doing so
always makes for confused argument ... [but my] basic objections remain."[36]
The
bad feeling between Dawkins and Midgley appeared not to diminish. In a note to
page 55 in the 2nd edition of The Selfish Gene (1989), Dawkins
refers to her "highly intemperate and vicious paper." Midgley continued
to criticise Dawkins' ideas. In her books Evolution as a Religion (2002)
and The Myths We Live By (2003), she writes about what she
sees as his confused use of language—the sleight of hand involved in using
terms such as "selfish" in different ways without alerting the reader
to the change in meaning—and some of what she regards as his rhetoric ("genes exert ultimate
power over behaviour"), which she argues is more akin to religion than
science. She wrote in a letter to The Guardian in 2005:
[There is] widespread
discontent with the neo-Darwinist—or
Dawkinsist—orthodoxy that claims something which Darwin himself denied, namely
that natural selection is the sole and exclusive cause of evolution, making the
world therefore, in some important sense, entirely random. This is itself a
strange faith which ought not to be taken for granted as part of science.[37]
In
an interview with The Independent in September 2007,
she argued that Dawkins' views on evolution are ideologically driven: "The
ideology Dawkins is selling is the worship of competition. It is projecting
a Thatcherite take on economics on to
evolution. It's not an impartial scientific view; it's a political drama."[38] In April 2009
Midgley reiterated her critical interpretation of The Selfish Gene as
part of a series of articles on Hobbes in The Guardian.[39] In her 2010
book The Solitary Self: Darwin and the Selfish Gene, she argues
that "simple one-sided accounts of human motives, such as the
"selfish gene" tendency in recent neo-Darwinian thought, may be
illuminating but are always unrealistic."[40]
Midgley
is referred to in The Lives of Animals (1999),
an unusual fictional work by the South African novelist J. M. Coetzee. The book has been likened to a
cross between a short story and a philosophical dialogue, as Coetzee's
protagonist, Elizabeth Costello, often speaks at length about philosophical
ideas. Many reviewers expressed bafflement at the text, which has an enigmatic
and riddling style. As one reviewer noted, "the reader is not quite sure
whether he is intended to spot some confusion or contradiction or non-sequitur
in [the protagonist's] arguments."[41] Other critics
however have noted many affinities between The Lives of Animals and
Midgley's philosophy, and have used Midgley's ideas to make sense of Coetzee's
famously confusing work.
The
main character, who also appears in Coetzee's novel Elizabeth Costello,
is concerned with the moral status of animals, a subject Midgley addressed
in Animals and Why They Matter, and discusses at length the idea of
sympathy as an ethical concept, a subject Midgley wrote about in Beast
and Man. Andy Lamey wrote that the result of these and other similarities
is that Coetzee's work "evoke[s] a particular conception of ethics, one
very similar to that of the philosopher Mary Midgley. Such a view affords a
central role to sympathy and is fundamentally opposed to a long-standing rival
view, most clearly exemplified by the social contract tradition, which
prioritizes an instrumental conception of rationality."[42]
Coetzee
and Midgley additionally shared a longstanding fascination with Robinson Crusoe. Coetzee retells the Crusoe
story in his novel Foe, while
Midgley wrote about Crusoe in her essay "Duties Concerning Islands."
Midgley's essay argued for the idea that human beings can have ethical
obligations to non-human entities such as animals and ecosystems, an idea also
found in The Lives of Animals, Foe and many other
works by Coetzee.[43]
Midgley
agreed to sit for sculptor Jon Edgar in Newcastle during 2006, as
part of the Environment Triptych,
along with heads of Richard Mabey and James Lovelock.[44] This was exhibited
at Yorkshire
Sculpture Park in 2013.[45]
Books
·
Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature. Routledge, 1978;
revised edition 1995. ISBN 0-415-28987-4
·
Animals and Why They Matter: A Journey
Around the Species Barrier. University of Georgia Press, 1983. ISBN 0-8203-2041-2
·
with Judith Hughes. Women's
Choices: Philosophical Problems Facing Feminism. Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
1983. ISBN 0-312-88791-4
·
Evolution as a Religion: Strange Hopes and
Stranger Fears. Routledge, 1985; reprinted with new introduction
2002. ISBN 0-415-27832-5 This
is dedicated "to the memory of Charles Darwin who never said these
things."
·
Science As Salvation: A Modern Myth and Its
Meaning.
Routledge, 1992. ISBN 0-415-10773-3 (also available here as a Gifford Lectures series)
·
Utopias, Dolphins and Computers: Problems
of Philosophical Plumbing. Routledge, 1996. ISBN 0-415-13378-5
·
editor. Earthy Realism: The Meaning
of Gaia. Imprint Academic, 2007. ISBN 1-84540-080-1
Pamphlets
·
Biological and Cultural Evolution, Institute for Cultural
Research Monograph Series, No. 20, 1984. ISBN 0-904674-08-8
Selected
articles
·
The Emancipation of Women (1952) The Twentieth
Century CLII, No. 901, pp. 217–25
·
Bishop Butler: A Reply (1952) The Twentieth
Century CLII, No. 905
·
Ou Sont les Neiges de ma Tante (1959) The
Twentieth Century, pp. 168–79
·
The Concept of Beastliness: Philosophy, Ethics and Animal
Behaviour (1973) Philosophy 48, No.
148, pp. 111–135 JSTOR 3749836
·
The Neutrality of the Moral Philosopher (1974) Supplementary
Volume of the Aristotelian Society, pp. 211–29 JSTOR 4544857
·
On Trying Out One's New Sword on a Chance Wayfarer (1977) The
Listener (Reprinted in Midgley, Mary Heart and Mind (1981)
and MacKinnon, Barbara Ethics, Theory and Contemporary Issues (Third
Edition 2001))
·
More about Reason, Commitment and Social Anthropology
(1978) Philosophy 53, No. 205, pp. 401–403 JSTOR 3749907
·
Freedom and Heredity (1978) The Listener (Reprinted
in Midgley, Mary Heart and Mind (1981))
·
Gene-Juggling (1979) Philosophy 54,
No. 210, pp. 439–458 JSTOR 3751039
·
The Absence of a Gap between Facts and Values (with
Stephen R. L. Clark) (1980) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
Supplementary Volumes 54, pp. 207–223+225-240 JSTOR 4106784
·
Consequentialism and Common Sense (1980) The
Hastings Center Report 10, No. 5, pp. 43–44 doi:10.2307/3561052
·
Why Knowledge Matters (1981) Animals in Research:
New Perspectives in Animal Experimentation ed. David Sperling
·
Towards a New Understanding of Human Nature: The Limits
of Individualism (1983) How Humans Adapt: A Biocultural Odyssey ed.
Donald J. Ortner
·
Selfish Genes and Social Darwinism (1983) Philosophy 58,
No. 225, pp. 365–377 JSTOR 3750771
·
Duties Concerning Islands (1983) Encounter LX (Reprinted
in People, Penguins and Plastic Trees (1986) ed. Donald
Vandeveer also in Ethics (1994) ed. Peter Singer and Environmental
Ethics (1995) ed. Robert Elliot)
·
De-Dramatizing Darwin (1984) The Monist '67,
No. 2
·
Persons and Non-Persons (1985) In
Defense of Animals, pp. 52–62
·
Can Specialist Damage Your Health? (1987) International
Journal of Moral and Social Studies 2, No. 1
·
Keeping Species on Ice (1987) Beyond the Bars:
the Zoo Dilemma ed.Virginia MacKenna, Will Travers and Jonathan Wray
·
Evolution As A Religion: A Comparison of Prophecies (1987) Zygon 22,
No. 2, pp. 179–194 doi:10.1111/j.1467-9744.1987.tb00845.x
·
Embarrassing Relatives: Changing Perceptions of Animals (1987) The
Trumpter 4, No. 4, pp. 17–19
·
Beasts, Brutes and Monsters (1988) What Is An
Animal? ed. Tim Ingold
·
Teleological Theories of Morality (1988) An
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy ed. G.H.R. Parkinson
·
On Not Being afraid of Natural Sex Differences
(1988) Feminist Perspectives in Philosophy ed. Morwenna Griffiths and
Margaret Whitford
·
Practical Solutions (1988) The Hastings Center
Report 19, No. 6, pp. 44–45 doi:10.2307/3561992
·
Myths of Intellectual Isolation (1988–89) Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society LXXXIX, Part 1
·
The Value of "Useless" Research: Supporting
Scholarship for the Long Run (1989) Report by the Council for Science
and Society
·
Are You an Animal? (1989) Animal Experimentation:
The Consensus Changes ed. Gill Langley
·
Why Smartness is Not Enough (1990) Rethinking the
Curriculum; Towards an Integrated, Interdisciplinary College Education ed.
Mary E. Clark and Sandra A. Wawritko
·
Homunculus Trouble, or, What is Applied Philosophy?
(1990) Journal of Social Philosophy 21, No. 1,
pp. 5–15 doi:10.1111/j.1467-9833.1990.tb00262.x
·
The Use and Uselessness of Learning (1990) European
Journal of Education 25, No.3, pp. 283–294 doi:10.2307/1503318
·
Rights-Talk Will Not Sort Out Child-abuse; Comment on
Archard on Parental Rights (1991) Journal of Applied Philosophy 8,
No. 1 doi:10.1111/j.1468-5930.1991.tb00411.x
·
The Origin of Ethics (1991) A Companion To Ethics ed.
Peter Singer (Available in Spanish here[permanent dead link])
·
Is the Biosphere a Luxury? (1992) The Hastings
Center Report 22, No. 3, pp. 7–12 doi:10.2307/3563291
·
Towards a More Humane View of the Beasts? (1992) The
Environment in Question ed. David E. Cooper and Joy A. Palmer
·
The Significance of Species (1992) The Moral Life ed.
Stephen Luper-Foy and Curtis Brown (Reprinted in The Animal Rights/ Environmental
Ethics Debate, The Environmental Perspective (1992) ed. Eugene C.
Hargrove)
·
Strange Contest, Science versus Religion (1992) The
Gospel and Contemporary Culture ed. Hugh Montefiore
·
Philosophical Plumbing (1992) The Impulse to
Philosophise ed. A.
Phillips Griffiths
·
The idea of Salvation Through Science (1992) New
Blackfriars 73, No. 860, pp. 257–265 doi:10.1111/j.1741-2005.1992.tb07240.x
·
Can Science Save its Soul (1992) New
Scientist, pp. 43–6
·
Beasts versus the Biosphere (1992) Environmental
Values 1, No. 1, pp. 113–21
·
The Four-Leggeds, The Two-Leggeds and the Wingeds
(1993) Society and Animals 1, No. 1.
·
Visions, Secular and Sacred (1994) Milltown
Studies 34, pp. 74–93
·
The End of Anthropocentrism? (1994) Philosophy
and the Natural Environment ed. Robin Attfield and Andrew Belsey
·
Darwinism and Ethics (1994) Medicine and Moral
Reasoning ed. K.W.M. Fulford, Grant Gillett and Janet Martin Soskice
·
Bridge-Building at Last (1994) Animals and Human
Society ed. Aubrey Manning and James Serpell
·
Zombies and the Turing Test (1995) Journal of
Consciousness Studies 2, No. 4, pp. 351–2
·
Reductive Megalomania (1995) Nature's
Imagination; The Frontiers of Scientific Vision ed. John Cornwall
·
Trouble with Families? (1995) Introducing Applied
Ethics ed. Brenda Almond (Joint with Judith Hughes)
·
The Challenge of Science, Limited Knowledge, or a New
High Priesthood? (1995) True to this Earth ed. Alan Race and
Roger Williamson
·
The Mixed Community (1995) Earth Ethics,
Environmental Ethics, Animal Rights and Practical Applications ed.
James P. Serba
·
Visions, Secular and Sacred (1995) The Hastings
Center Report 25, No. 5, pp. 20–27 doi:10.2307/3562790
·
Darwin's Central Problems (1995) Science 268,
No. 5214, pp. 1196–1198 doi:10.1126/science.268.5214.1196
·
The Ethical Primate. Anthony Freeman in discussion with
Mary Midgley (1995) Journal of Consciousness Studies 2,
No. 1, pp. 67–75(9) (Joint with Anthony Freeman)
·
Sustainability and Moral Pluralism (1996) Ethics
and The Environment 1, No. 1
·
One World – But a Big One (1996) Journal of
Consciousness Studies 3, No. 5/6
·
Earth Matters; Thinking about the Environment (1996) The
Age of Anxiety ed. Sarah Dunant and Roy Porter
·
The View from Britain: What is Dissolving Families?
(1996) American Philosophical Association, Newsletter on Feminism and
Philosophy 96, No. 1 (Joint with Judith Hughes)
·
Can Education be Moral? (1996) Res Publica II,
No. 1 doi:10.1007/BF02335711 (Reprinted
in Teaching Right and Wrong, Moral Education in the Balance ed
Richard Smith and Paul Standish)
·
Science in the World (1996) Science Studies 9,
No. 2
·
The Myths We Live By (1996) The Values of Science Oxford
Amnesty Lectures ed Wes Williams
·
Visions of Embattled Science (1997) Science
Today: Problem or Crisis? ed Ralph Levinson and Jeff Thomas
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The Soul's Successors: Philosophy and the
"Body" (1997) Religion and the Body ed Sarah Coakley
·
Putting Ourselves Together Again (1998) Consciousness
and Human Human Identity ed John Cornwall
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Monkey business. The Origin of Species changed man's
conception of himself forever. So why, asks Mary Midgley, is Darwinism used to
reinforce the arid individualism of our age? (1999) New Statesman
·
The Problem of Humbug (1998) Media Ethics ed
Matthew Kieram
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Descarte's prisoners (1999) New Statesman
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Being Scientific about Our Selves (1999) Journal
of Consciousness Studies, 6 (Reprinted in Models
of the Self (1999) ed Shaun Gallagher and Jonathan Shear)
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Towards an Ethic of Global Responsibility (1999) Human
Rights in Global Politics ed Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler
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The Origins of Don Giovanni (1999–2000) Philosophy
Now, p. 32
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Alchemy Revived (2000) The Hastings Center Report 30,
No. 2, pp. 41–43 doi:10.2307/3528314
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Biotechnology and Monstrosity: Why We Should Pay
Attention to the "Yuk Factor" (2000) The Hastings Center
Report 30, No. 5, pp. 7–15 doi:10.2307/3527881
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Earth Song (2000) New Statesman
·
Both nice and nasty (2000) New Statesman
·
Individualism and the Concept of Gaia (2000) Review
of International Studies 26, pp. 29–44
·
Consciousness, Fatalism and Science (2000) The
Human Person in Science and Theology ed Niels Hendrik Gregerson,
Willem B. Drees and Ulf Gorman
·
Human Nature, Human Variety, Human Freedom (2000) Being
Humans: Anthropological Universality and Particularity ed Neil
Roughley
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Why Memes? (2000) Alas, Poor Darwin ed Hukary and
Steven Rose
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The Need for Wonder (2000) God
for the 21st Century ed Russell Stannard
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What Gaia Means (2001) The
Guardian
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The bankers' abstract vision of the globe is limited (2001)
The Guardian
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The Problem of Living with Wildness (2001) Wolves
and Human Communities: Biology, Politics and Ethics ed Virginia A.
Sharpe, Bryan Norton and Strachan Donelley
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Wickedness (2001) The Philosophers' Magazine pp. 23–5
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Being Objective (2001) Nature 410,
p. 753 doi:10.1038/35071193
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Heaven and Earth, an Awkward History (2001–2002) Philosophy
Now 34 p. 18
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Does the Earth Concern Us? (2001–2002) Gaia
Circular, p. 4
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Choosing the Selectors (2002) Proceedings of the
British Academy 112 published as The Evolution of
Cultural Entities ed Michael Wheeler, John Ziman and Margaret A. Boden
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Pluralism: The Many-Maps Model (2002) Philosophy
Now 35
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Reply to target article: “Inventing the Subject; the
Renewal of ’Psychological’ Psychology” (2002) Journal
of Anthropological Psychology
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Enough is never enough (2002) The
Guardian
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It's all in the mind (2002) The Guardian
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Science and Poetry (2003) Situation
Analysis 2 (edited extract from Chapters 17 Individualism
and the Concept of Gaia and 18 Gods and Goddesses; the Role of Wonder of Science
and Poetry)
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Great Thinkers – James Lovelock (2003)
New Statesman
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Curiouser and curiouser (2003) The
Guardian
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Fate by fluke (2003) The Guardian
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Criticising the Cosmos (2003) Is Nature Ever
Evil? Religion, Science and Value ed Willem B. Drees
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Zombies (2003–2004) Philosophy Now pp. 13–14
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Souls, Minds, Bodies, Planets pt1 and pt2 (2004) Two-part article on the Mind
Body problem Philosophy Now
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Us and Them (2004) New Statesman
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Counting the cost of revenge (2004) The
Guardian
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Mind and Body: The End of Apartheid (2004) Science,
Consciousness and Ultimate Reality ed David Lorimer
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Why Clones? (2004) Scientific and Medical Network
Review, No. 84
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Visions and Values (2005) Resurgence 228
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Proud not to be a doctor (2005) The
Guardian
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Designs on Darwinism (2005) The Guardian
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Review: The God Delusion by Richard Dawkins (2006) New
Scientist Issue 2572 doi:10.1016/S0262-4079(06)60674-X
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Rethinking sex and the selfish gene: why we do it (2006) Heredity 96,
No. 3, pp. 271–2 doi:10.1038/sj.hdy.6800798
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A Plague On Both Their Houses (2007) Philosophy
Now 64
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Mary Midgley on Dawkins (2007) Interlog
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Does Science Make God Obsolete? (2008) John
Templeton Foundation
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^ Jump up to:a b c Motyka,
John (15 October 2018). "Mary Midgley, 99, Moral Philosopher for the General
Reader, Is Dead". The New York Times. Retrieved 16
October 2018. She was born Mary Scrutton on Sept. 13, 1919, in
Dulwich, England, to Lesley (Hay) and Tom Scrutton.
2.
^ Jump up to:a b Mary
Midgley, The Essential Mary Midgley, Routledge, 2005, p. 143.
3.
^ Jump up to:a b c Brown,
Andrew (13 January 2001). "Mary, Mary, quite contrary". The
Guardian.
7.
^ Jump up to:a b c Midgley,
Mary (3 October 2005). "Proud not to be a doctor". The
Guardian. Retrieved 24 March 2014.
9.
^ Jump up to:a b c d e f g h i j Anthony,
Andrew (23 March 2014). "Mary Midgley: a late stand for a philosopher with
soul". The Observer. Retrieved 24 March 2014.
10. ^ Jump up to:a b c d "Honorary Fellow – Mary Midgley".
Archived from the original on 24 March 2014.
Retrieved 24 March 2014.
16. ^ Jump up to:a b McEachran,
Alan (May 2009). "Mary Midgley" (PDF). Erasmus Darwin
Society. Retrieved 27 March 2014.
17. ^ Jump up to:a b Midgley,
Mary (2001). Gaia: The next big idea. Demos publications.
p. 21. ISBN 1-84180-075-9.
Archived from the originalon 30 August 2005.
18. Jump up^ Midgley, Mary
(2001). Gaia: The next big idea. Demos publications.
p. 24. ISBN 1-84180-075-9.
Archived from the originalon 30 August 2005.
19. Jump up^ Wakeford, Tom
(22 September 2000). "In a climate of change". Times
Higher Education. Retrieved 28 March 2014.
20. Jump up^ Mary Midgley,
ed. (2007). "Contributors". Earthly realism. Societas.
p. vi. ISBN 978-1845400804.
21. ^ Jump up to:a b "About
us – Gaia Network". Retrieved 28 March 2014.
22. ^ Jump up to:a b Midgley,
Mary (2001). Gaia: The next big idea. Demos publications.
p. 11. ISBN 1-84180-075-9.
Archived from the originalon 30 August 2005.
23. ^ Jump up to:a b Midgley,
Mary (2001). Science and poetry. Routledge. p. 172. ISBN 978-0415378482.
28. ^ Jump up to:a b Midgley,
Mary (2002). "New Introduction". Evolution as a Religion.
p. x.
32. Jump up^ Cave, Stephen
(21 March 2014). "Review of Are you an illusion?". Financial
Times. Retrieved 24 March 2014.
34. ^ Jump up to:a b Midgley
1979.
35. ^ Jump up to:a b Dawkins 1981 Archived 1 March 2011 at the Wayback Machine.
41. Jump up^ Lodge, David (November
20, 2003). "Disturbing the Peace - a review of Elizabeth
Costello by J.M. Coetzee". The New York
Review of Books. Retrieved June 15, 2018.
45. Jump up^ Jon Edgar -
Sculpture Series Heads: Terracotta Portraits of Contributors to British
Sculpture (2013) Scott, M., Hall, P., and Pheby, H. ISBN 978-0955867514
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Brown, A., "Mary, Mary, quite contrary", The
Guardian, 13 January 2001.
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Dawkins, Richard. "In Defence of Selfish Genes", Philosophy,
vol 56, 1981, pp. 556–573. JSTOR 3750888
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Edgar, John. Responses: Carvings
and Claywork: Jon Edgar Sculpture 2003–2008. Hesworth Press, 2008.
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Else, L. "Mary, Mary, quite contrary", New
Scientist, 3 November 2001.
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Jackson, Nick. "Against the grain: There are questions that science
cannot answer", The Independent, 3 January 2008.
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Lamey, Andy. "Sympathy and Scapegoating in J. M. Coetzee",
in Anton Leist and Peter Singer (eds.). J. M. Coetzee and Ethics:
Philosophical Perspectives on Literature. Columbia University Press, 2010.
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Lodge, David. "Disturbing the Peace," The
New York Review of Books, undated.
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Mackie, J. L. The Law of the Jungle at the Wayback Machine (archived 31 October
2005), Philosophy, vol. 53, 1978, pp. 455–464. JSTOR 3749875
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Midgley, Mary. "Hobbes's Leviathan, Part 3: What is
selfishness?", The Guardian, 20 April 2009.
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Midgley, Mary. Owl of Minerva: A
Memoir. Routledge, 2005.
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Midgley, Mary. "Designs on Darwinism", The
Guardian, 6 September 2005.
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Midgley, Mary. The Myths We Live By.
Routledge, 2003.
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Midgley, Mary. Science As
Salvation: A Modern Myth and Its Meaning. Routledge 1992.
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Midgley, Mary. Evolution as a
Religion: Strange Hopes and Stranger Fears. Routledge, 1985.
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Midgley, Mary. "Selfish Genes and Social Darwinism" at
the Wayback Machine (archived
31 October 2005), Philosophy, vol 58, 1983, pp. 365–377. JSTOR 3750771
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Midgley, Mary. "Gene Juggling" at the Wayback Machine (archived 31 October
2005), Philosophy, vol 54, no. 210, 1979, pp. 439–458. JSTOR 3751039
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Kidd, Ian James & McKinnell, Liz
(eds.). Science And The Self: Animals, Evolution and Ethics: Essays In
Honour Of Mary Midgley. Routledge, 2015. ISBN 1-138-89838-4
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Midgley, David (ed.). The Essential
Mary Midgley. Routledge, 2005. ISBN 0-415-34642-8
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Biography for her Gifford Lectures.
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Writings in The Guardian
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"Of memes and witchcraft",
contribution to discussion on Journal of Consciousness Studies newsgroup, 1999.
·
Science and Poetry review, Kenan Malik, 2 March 2001.
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Myths We Live By review, The
Guardian, 16 August 2003.
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Myths
We Live By review, Notre
Dame Philosophical Reviews, 6 February 2004.
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Myths
We Live By review, New
Statesman.
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"Mary Midgley: Moral missionary", The
Guardian, 20 September 2005.
·
The Owl of Minerva review, The
Times Literary Supplement, 26 April 2006.
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"Books by and an Interview with: Mary Midgley", Three
Monkeys Online, February 2007.
·
"Mary
Midgley on C. S. Lewis", private letters, published with
permission
·
"Interview with Mary Midgley", by
Sheila Heti in The Believer, February 2008.
·
The Genial Self, review in the Oxonian
Review
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