Faulkner and Grice on the desideratum of conversational candour

Speranza

Grice, Faulkner, and Faulkner, on the desideratum of conversational candour.

Helm quotes my Griceian approach to lying as a bit of a defence of an "underdogma" -- Faulkner's

[Speranza: “Well, the conceptual analysis of lying is quite a trick […] I would think the Griceian approach to this is complex, and perhaps relying on his “Intention and uncertainty.” It seems ‘intention’ is essential. Violating the maxim pertaining to the conversational category of ‘quantitas’ (“Do not say what you believe to be false”) – of what he has as the desideratum of conversational candour in his earlier Oxford lectures on implicature -- seems central in communication. Yet of course, most figures of speech (qua conversational impicatures) are a sort of ‘lie’: ‘metaphor,’ ‘hyperbole,’ ‘litotes,’ ‘irony’. If the intention is there on the part of the utterer that the addressee will recognise that the utterer is ‘flouting’ the maxim, things seem okay, even for Kant. Faulkner, granted, lied. If following philosopher D. F. Pears in "Motivated irrationality" [section on 'self-deception'], we see Faulker as believing his lies (“self-deceiving,” technically) and a further caveat may be needed. Faulkner may have ended up believing his lies. It is obvious that his novels were a way to ‘legitimise’ those lies into ‘fictional narratives’ that perhaps only a die-hard Oxonian (from Oxford, Mississippi) would regard as a lie!”]

Helm comments (I slightly paraphrase): "Let us say, as I think perhaps Speranza may be implicating, even if he is blatantly flouting Grice's maxim of perspicuity -- under the category of 'modus') that our Faulkner, initially, that is, at time t1, intends to lie, when e.g.. Faulkner describes his rum-smuggling or his aerial combat over France during the war (t1') (and was not really deceiving himself, as Pears might concede). Let us also grant that Faulkner might, however, have become somewhat mixed up in his reasoning, as some do, and begins, at a later time t2, to believe *as truth* what Faulkner originates in the past, at this earlier t1 and t1', as a *lie.* Speranza may be implicating that Faulkner is (at time t2), therefore, *not* a liar. At least not insofar as Faulkner eventually comes to truthfullyy believe as true the lies [or blatant falsehood, if you mustn't] he told (to this effect or other) at this earlier dates t1 and t1', or something."

Yes, this is an excellent exegesis, thanks. We should consider the other 'lies' he later originated, as when he re-named "Oxford" "Jefferson" -- a 'thin disguise,' as Powers calls it -- an implicature that apparently did not go unnoticed by local Oxonians. Strictly, any proposition (to use Grice's jargon) mentioning "Jefferson" would be 'false.' But, provided Faulkner's addressee realises that what he is reading is a *novel* (which he picked up from the 'fiction' section of  his local library -- at 'Jefferson,' as it happens -- Faulkner's proposition would not count, by Faulknerian standards, as a 'lie.'

Helm goes on:

“To take this a bit farther, since Faulkner believes at t2 what in retrospect we might conclude (as we base our reasoning on independent evidence) is a *lie,* to wit, that he could handle a "difficult" horse, perhaps, at t2, his belief system was, on the whole, such that he no longer strictly manage to  *lie* about really anything!”

True. We need *not* rule out the possibility that it was the horse that was lying ("Come ride me! I'm an easy fellow!"). 

 Helm: “And since he died some time ago at Wright's Sanatorium in Byhalia, Miss. [I love the traditional abbreviations -- they are still used by the N. Y. T., of course!], one wonders how Faulkner's defence went, when he stood before St. Peter and God (even if he believed there was no St. Peter, or no God, or even if at least he did not disbelieve this)."


At this point, alla Grice, Helm inserts a colourful eschatological conversation:

God: 

"Thou wert a liar all your life, William Cuthbert!"

WCF:

"I was not! I never did lie, and I can prove it, if perhaps not conclusively by thine standards. Search my soul, I pray, and thou shalt see that I truthfully believed, all-ways, everything I ever said -- or even implicated!

God:

I have already done that, son, and, even if I dismiss your 'fictional fabrications' regarding 'Jefferson' and other non-existent places, thou wilt recall "Romans" (1: 28-31): “Since thou didst not think it worthwhile to retain the knowledge of God, he gave thee over to a depraved mind, to do what ought not to be done. Thou hast become filled with every kind of wickedness, evil, greed and depravity.  Thou art full of envy, murder, strife, deceit and malice!”  

WCF: God! You are just describing my novels! I want to take the fifth. 

"Or, to put it another way, Faulkner originally, at times t1 and t1', *chooses* to lie -- and that's a moral fact.  The fact that Faulkner later, at time t2, comes to believe as true a proposition "p," what Faulkner *originally* chooses to lie about is still, at the time he fell from his horse, t2, the result of his original, and I should say, dishonest, choice.”

Yes, this is a good qualification, too – thanks. St. Augustine would be delighted! (And we haven't even explored Powers's question as what _made_ Faulkner lie -- "woo girls? Sounds naïf). 

Helm goes on: “And also, let us consider someone sitting on death row, Troy Clark, who was convicted of killing Christina Muse, but has been denying the crime for all the years since. He is one day executed. Suppose you could convey this to Greg Abbot (the wheel-chair bound Governor of Texas).”

Is he a Griceian?

Helm: “Might you stand a chance of convincing him that even though Troy Clark may have killed his room-mate Christina Muse, he has protested his innocence so long that he does NOT remember drowning her and stuffing her body in a barrel of lime. Therefore, you tell the governor: ‘Since Clark does not remember killing Christina Muse, he ought not to be given the lethal injection.”

Mmm. While the scenarios compare – they don’t on some fronts. Clark (or his lawyer) may need to argue that it’s the judge who convicted him (Clark, not his lawyer) who ‘lied.’

But back to Faulkner, I found a good of analysis of what Faulkner would think about lying. It is an essay he (Faulkner) published in two different places:

Faulkner, ‘What is Wrong with Lying? -- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75.
-- ‘Lying and Deceit,’ in International Encyclopedia of Ethics, ed. H. Lafollette, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell.

Faulkner holds that lying involves, by conceptual necessity, *telling* some addressee some proposition "p", which involves, again by conceptual necessity, an invocation of trust. 

Faulkner distinguishes, perhaps rather gratuitously, between "telling that p," and "making an assertion to the effect that p," and goes on to argues that, in certain cases, the implicature ("p2," say) of an assertion is sufficiently clear that an utterer U (Faulkner) can be deemed to have *told* his addressee A that p2, even if the utterer (Faulkner) did not assert this (consider Faulkner's implicatures to Oppenheimer: "Television is not my cup of tea."

More formally, Faulkner defines "telling" as involving two conditions:

ANALYSANS: U (Faulkner) tells A (Faulkner's addressee) that p if and only if:

ANALYSANDUM

CONDITION (i) 

U (Faulkner) intends that A (Faulkner's addressee) believe that p.

CONDITION (ii) 

(ii) U (Faulkner) intends, alla Grice, that A (Faulkner's addressee) believe that p because A (Faulkner's addressee) recognises that (i) is the case.

In telling A (Faulkner's addressee) that p, U (Faulkner) intends that A (Faulkner's addressee) believe what U (Faulkner) is explicating or implicating, provided U (Faulkner) intends that A (Faulkner's addressee) believe what U (Faulkner) is explicating or implicating that p *for the reason that* A (Faulkner's addressee) believes U (Faulkner). 

It follows, from Faulkner's subtle and Griceian analysis, that a telling -- as in 'a telling of a tale' -- operate by *invoking* the addressee's trust.

In lying too, for Faulkner, U (Faulkner) intends that the addressee A (Faulkner's addressee) believe what the utterer U (Faulkner) is explicating or implicating on the basis of *trust.* 

But there are some qualifications obviously, that turn Faulkner's 'telling' into a blatant lie:

In lying, the utterer (Faulkner) notably does NOT intend his addressee (Faulkner's addressee) accept his lie *because of independent evidence* -- e.g. no records whatsoever of Faulkner ever being in France during the war, or sailing the Pontchartrain to smuggle rum -- but intends his addressee A accept his lie just because Faulkner is telling it. 

The motivation Faulkner has for presenting his assertion as *sincere* (or 'honest' as Trollope, trying to refute Carlyle and Ruskin, would prefer -- since Helm quotes them) is thereby to *ensure* that Faulkner's addressee A treats the utterer U's (Faulkner's) intention that his addressee A believe that p as the only reason for believing himself that p.

A lie is, briefly, an "untruthful telling" -- of which Faulkner's prose (fictional and other), as any Oxonian (Miss.) schoolboy knows, abounds.

In lying, the utterer U (Faulkner) believes that what he explicates or implicates is, strictly, false, but he still, for some reason ('woo the girls?' -- Powers) (i) intends that his addressee A believe that what U (Faulkner) explicates or implies is true, (ii) intends that the addressee A will believe that U (Faulkner) intends this, and (iii) intends that this, (ii), be the only reason why Faulkner's addressee A will believe that what the utterer U (Faulkner) explicates or implicates is just true.

Even more formally:

U's (Faulkner's) utterance to his addressee A counts as a "lie" if and only if: 
(i) in uttering "p", U (Faulkner) tells his addressee A that p, even when
(ii) the utterer U (Faulkner) believes that p is plainly false.

A more blatant and unwelcome refutation of Grice's desideratum of candour I cannot think of!

Faulkner’s definition of lying needs a minor tweak, admittedly, to include those cases in which the utterer U (Faulkner) only intend to deceive about his beliefs.

Faulkner's final analysis involves FIVE CONDITIONS:

ANALYSANS: U (Faulkner) lies =_df ('equals, by definition) to:

CONDITION (i) 

U (Faulkner) utters some proposition "p" ("I smuggled rum") to addressee A. 

CONDITION (ii) 

U (Faulkner) believes that the proposition is false.

CONDITION (iii)

U intends that his addressee A (Faulkner's addressee) believe that the proposition is true and is believed to be true, or at least U (Faulkner) intends that his addressee A believe that the proposition is believed (by even Faulkner) to be true.

CONDITION (iv)

U (Faulkner) intends that his addressee A (Faulkner's addressee) believe that it is intended that the addressee A (Faulkner's addressee) believe that the proposition is true. 

CONDITION (v)

U (Faulkner) intends that his addressee A (Faulkner's addressee) will believe that the proposition is true and is believed (by at least Faulkner) to be true, or at least U (Faulkner) intends that his addressee A (Faulkner's addressee) believe that the proposition is believed (by Faulkner) to be true, for the reason that it is intended that his addressee A (Faulkner's addressee) believe that the proposition is true.

Granted, I would not blame the French biographer, but Powers could have used some guardedness before going and describing Faulkner as an incurable liar -- for: what is Purgatory for, otherwise?

Cheers,

Speranza

REFERENCES

Carlyle, T. Works -- 'Honesty'. In Trollope, Autobiography, cited by L. J. Helm.
Faulkner, What is wrong with lying?
Faulkner, Lying and Deceit.
Grice, H. P. WoW [Way of Words]
Helm, L. J. This And That (And Th'Other)
James, King -- The Bible -- cited by L. J. Helm. ("Romans")
Pears, D. F. Motivated Irrationality.
Powers, Review of Faulkner's biography, NYROB. 
Ruskin, J. cited by Trollope, on 'honesty' -- cited by L. J. Helm. 
Speranza, J. L. Join the Grice Club!
Trollope, A. Autobiography (on 'honesty') -- cited by L. J. Helm. 

Powers (slightly adapted) in the NYROB cited by Helm: "Faulkner was fond of writing "complex," difficult, not precisely crystal-clear, stories of “the human heart in conflict with itself” (a phrase Faulkner uses in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech). But, curiously, he compulsively embroiders the bare facts of his own prosaic (rather than versical) history or "life." About the months he lives in New Orleans, Faulkner says that he supported himself by working for a bootlegger. He said he had a launch that he would take down the Ponchartrain into the Gulf to an island where the green rum was brought up from overseas and buried. "We would dig it up and bring it back to New Orleans" ("Hence the phrase, 'bring coal to Newcastle.'). "And I would get $100 a trip for that." -- Alas, nothing about Faulkner's bootlegger story is _historical_ true. And he doesn't seem to mean the thing as a 'fictional' little story, either (Just as remarkable is *where* he recounts the tall tale: at an "_American_ lit class" at West Point! Never trust guest keynote speakers!) Bigger (if not whiter) lies Faulkner tells about his days with the Air Force. Faulkner says, again, not precisely within the context of a 'little (fictional) story) that he limped from "imaginary" (as Grice would call them -- vide his "Causal Theory of Perception") machine gun wounds that he suffered, Faulkner claims, in aerial duels over remote fields in France. But Faulkner is still in school when the war ends. He is never sent to France, never mind wounded in combat (He did not tell this tale at West Point, fortunately)."