Grice's Desideratum of Conversational Candour

Speranza

When lecturing on 'philosophicalese,' at Oxford in 1964, Grice introduced the idea of the conversational 'implicature,' as it depended, among other things on what he calls the 'desideratum of candour.' How does this relate to lying? We may start with a simple analysis:

• 
  (L1) 
  
  Utterer U lies =df
  
  Utterer U makes a believed-false statement "p" to addressee A with the intention that Utterer U believe p to be true.

(L1) is the standard conceptual analysis of "lying."

According to (L1) there are FOUR necessary conditions for lying.

Condition 1. Lying requires that utterer U make a statement -- Call this the "stating" condition.

Condition 2. Lying requires that Utterer U believe "p" to be false, i.e., lying requires that p be untruthful. Call this the untruthfulness condition.

Condition 3. Lying requires that the untruthful statement "p" be made to some addressee A. Call this the addressee condition.

Condition 4. Lying requires that utterer U intend that addressee A believe the untruthful statement p to be true -- Call this the utterer's intention to deceive the addressee condition.

These four necessary conditions need to be explained before objections to (L1) can be entertained and alternative conceptual analyses considered.

According to the stating condition (C1), lying requires that utterer U make a statement.

Making a statement requires the use of conventional signs, or  symbols.

Conventional signs, such as “WOMEN” on the door to a restroom, are opposed to 'natural' or causal signs, or indices, such as women coming in and out of a restroom, as well as signs that signify by resemblance, or icons, such as a figure with a triangular dress on the door to a restroom.

Making a statement, p, therefore, requires the use of a language L.

A commonly accepted definition of making a statement is:

Utterer U states that p =df

i. Utterer U believes that there is an expression "p" and a language L, such that one of the standard uses of "p" in L is that of expressing the proposition p.

ii. Utterer U utters "p" with the intention of causing addressee A to believe that utterer U intended to utter "p" in that standard use.

It is possible for utterer U to make a statement using Sign Language, smoke signals, Morse code, semaphore flags, and so forth, as well as by making specific bodily gestures whose meanings have been established by convention (e.g., nodding one's head in response to a question).

Hence, it is possible to lie by these means.

If it is granted that utterer U is not making a statement when he wears a wig, gives a fake smile, affects a limp, and so forth, utterer U can NOT be lying by doing these things.

If it is granted that utterer U is not making a statement when, e.g. he wears a wedding ring when he is not married, or wears a police uniform when he is not a police officer, he cannot be lying by doing these things.

In the case of an utterer U who does not utter a declarative sentence, but who curses, or makes an interjection or an exclamation, or issues a command or an exhortation, or asks a question, or says

Hello!

if it is granted that utterer U is not making a statement when he does any of these things, utterer U cannot be lying by doing these things.

An ironic statement, or a statement made as part of a joke, or a statement made by an actor while acting, or a statement made in a novel by Faulkner, say -- "The weather was lovely at Jefferson." -- is still a statement.

More formally, the statement condition of (L1) obeys the following three constraints:

i. If utterer U makes a statement, this does not entail that utterer U believes the statement to be true.

ii. If utterer U makes a statement, this does not entail that utterer U intends his addressee A to believe the statement to be true.

iii. If utterer U makes a statement, this does not entail that utterer U intends his addressee A to believe that utterer U believes the statement to be true.

The "stating" condition is to be distinguished from a different putative necessary condition for lying, namely, the condition that an assertion be made.

According to (L1), the "asserting" condition is not a necessary condition for lying.

E.g., if Yin, who does not have a girlfriend, but who wants people to believe that he has a girlfriend, makes the ironic statement:

Yeah, right, I have a girlfriend.

in response to a question from his friend, Bolin, who believes that Yin is secretly dating someone, with the intention that Bolin believe that he actually does have a girlfriend, this ‘irony lie’ is a lie according to L1, although it is *not* an assertion.

According to the "stating" condition, it is not possible to lie by *omitting* to make a statement.

So-called ‘lies of omission’ (or ‘passive lying’) are not lies.

All lies are lies of *commission*.

It is possible for an 'utterer' to lie by remaining ‘silent,’ if the ‘silence’ is a previously agreed upon signal with others that is equivalent to making a statement.

However, such a lie would *not* be a ‘lie of omission.'

In People v. Meza, on the basis of Californian Evidence Code that “‘statement’” included

“non-verbal conduct of a
person intended by him
as a substitute for verbal
expression,”

prospective juror’s E. L. Meza’s silence and failure to raise his hand in response to a question is taken for a negative answer, i.e., a negative statement, and Meza is found guilty of perjury. 

Note that the stating condition, all by itself, does not require that the stating be made to addressee A, or even that it be expressed aloud or in writing.

Utterer U's inner statements to oneself *are* statements, and, if other conditions are also met, can be “internal lies."

* * * * * * *

According to the untruthfulness condition, lying requires that utterer U make an untruthful statement "p", i.e. make a statement "p" that utterer U believes to be false.

Note that this condition is to be distinguished from the putative necessary condition for lying that the statement that utterer U makes be false.

According to (L1),, the falsity condition is NOT a necessary condition for lying.

Statements that are truthful may be false (i.e. not true).

If George makes the statement to Hillary (with the intention that Hillary believe that statement to be true):

The enemy has weapons of mass destruction.

and that statement is false, George is not lying if he does NOT believe that statement to be false.

Statements that are untruthful may be true.

In J.-P. Sartre’s short-story, The Wall, set during the Civil War, Ibbieta, a prisoner sentenced to be executed by the Fascists, is interrogated by his guards as to the whereabouts of his comrade Gris.

Mistakenly believing Gris to be hiding with his cousins, Ibbieta makes the untruthful statement:

Gris is hiding in the cemetery.

-- with the intention that they believe this statement to be true.

As it happens, Gris IS hiding in the cemetery, and the statement is true.

Gris is arrested at the cemetery, and Ibbieta is released.

According to L1, Ibbieta lies to his interrogators, although the untruthful statement Ibbieta makes to them is true, and Ibbieta does not deceive them about the whereabouts of Gris.

If utterer U makes a truthful statement with the intention to deceive addressee A, utterer U is not lying, according to the untruthfulness condition.

E.g. if John and Mary are dating, and Valentino is Mary’s ex-boyfriend. One evening John asks Mary:

A: Have you seen Valentino this week?

Mary answers:

B: Valentino’s been sick with mononucleosis for the past two weeks.

Valentino has in fact been sick with mononucleosis for the past two weeks, but it is also the case that Mary did have a date with Valentino the night before.

Mary is thus NOT lying, even if she is attempting to deceive John.

This is what is called a palter (some illegitimately add that a palter must succeed in deceiving), or a false implicature, or an attempt to mislead. 

In addition to palters not being lies, a double bluff is not a lie either according to the untruthfulness condition.

If utterer U makes a truthful statement "p," intending addresee A to believe that the statement is false, utterer U is NOT lying.

Consider the joke about two travelers on a train from Moscow, reputed to be Freud's favourite joke:

A: Where are you going?
B: To Pinsk.
A: Liar! You say you are going to Pinsk in order to make me believe you are going to Minsk. But I know you are going to Pinsk.

A does not lie, since A's statement is truthful, even if A intends that B be deceived by this double bluff (Cfr. Grice on counter-suggestion). 

One implication of the untruthfulness condition is that if utterer U makes a statement "p" that she believes to be neither true nor false ("The king of France is bald"), utterer U is not lying.

E.g., if an utterer U begging for money says

All my children need medical attention.

but believes that this proposition is neither true nor false (because he has no children), utterer U is not lying, even if utterer U is attempting to deceive.

It is a matter of debate as to whether it is possible to lie using a metaphor, as in Faulkner, or to use Grice's favourite one, "You're the cream in my coffee." (For Grice a metaphor is to be understood in terms of conversational implicature)

For example, a gardener who has had a very bad crop of tomatoes says

We’ve got tomatoes coming out of our ears.

intending to deceive about his having a bumper crop.

This untruthful statement made with an intention to deceive is typically not considered a lie, because the untruthful statement is a "metaphor."

Nevertheless, some argue that it *is* possible to lie using a metaphor.

According to (L1), a literally false metaphorical statement can be a truthful statement, according to the beliefs of utterer U, and hence, can be an untruthful statement, according to the beliefs of utterer U, the deceptive gardener lies.

* * * * *

According to the addressee condition, lying requires that utterer U make an untruthful statement "p" to an addressee A (or, strictly speaking, to a believed addressee, since one might, e.g., mistake a waxed dummy for an addressee, and lie to it).

That is, lying requires that the utterer U address an addressee A.

According to L1, it is not possible for an utterer U to lie to no one whatsoever (i.e., not even the utterer U himself), and it is not possible to lie to someone whom the utterer U is NOT addressing but whom the utterer U believes is listening in on a conversation.

E.g. if Mickey and Danny both believe that the F.B.I. is monitoring their conversation, and Mickey says to Danny,

The pick-up is at midnight tomorrow.

with the intention of deceiving the FBI agents listening in, Mickey does not lie.

This is mere 'bogus disclosure.' 

According to L1, it is possible to lie to a collective addressee.

It is possible for utterer U to lie by publishing an untruthful report about an event, or by making an untruthful statement on a tax return, or by sending an untruthful note to everyone on a mailing list, or by making an untruthful statement in a magazine advertisement or a television commercial.

The readers, hearers, and the watchers are the addressees.

According to the addressee condition, lying necessarily involves addressing an addressee A whom the utterer U believes to be an agent capable of understanding the utterer U's statement and forming beliefs on that basis.

It is not possible to lie to those whom you believe to be non-persons (goldfish, dogs, robots, etc.) or agents whom you believe can NOT understand the statements that are made to them (infants, the insane, etc., as well as those whom you believe cannot understand the language you are speaking in).

It is possible to lie to an addressee via an intermediary which is not an agent, however -- e.g., entering false answers to questions asked by a bank’s ATM.

* * * * *

Finally, according to the intention-to-deceive-the addressee condition, lying requires that utterer U make an untruthful statement to addressee A with the Griceian intention that that addressee A believe that untruthful statement to be true.

Making an ironic statement, telling a joke, writing a fiction alla Faulkner ("The weather was beautiful at Jefferson.") acting in a play, and so forth, without the intention that the addresee A believe these untruthful statements to be true, is not lying.

According to L1, if utterer U makes an untruthful statement to addressee A, without the intention that addressee A believe that untruthful statement to be true, but with the intention that addresee A believe something else to be true that utterer U  believes to be true, U does not lie.

Examples of such non-deceptive untruthful statements include polite untruths. E.g.

Servant Igor makes the untruthful statement to unwelcome visitor Damian:

Madam is not at home.

without the intention that Damian believe it to be true that Madam is not home (that would be lying on Igor’s part), but with the intention that Damian believe it to be true that it is inconvenient for Madam to see Damian now, something that Igor believes to be true, according to L1, Igor does not lie. Cfr.

I'm going to powder my nose.

However, for Igor to intend that Damian believe this, Igor must believe that this is how Damian understands

Madam is not at home.

Polite untruths may be said to be examples of “falsifications but not lies,” since the utterer U utters just what etiquette demands.

As with untruthful-statements situations in which politeness requires some sort of remark and addressee A knows quite well that the statement is false, such a statement is not a lie.

The statement is better considered as a case of speaking in code.

(Grice's example, "We should get together to have lunch some time": "Get lost").

Another example of a non-deceptive untruthful statement is what has been called an “altruistic lie," such as when utterer U makes an untruthful statement to addresee A whom utterer U believes distrusts him, in order that the addressee A will believe something that utterer U believes to be true.

According to L1, this is not a lie.

Such a non-deceptive untruth is not to be confused with a white lie, i.e., a harmless lie, or a prosocial lie (also called a social lie), i.e., a lie that does not harm social life but protects it, or fib, i.e., an inconsequential lie told for selfish reasons (as when Faulkner said he sailed frequently, and that he flew over France).

According to (L1), a white lie, a prosocial lie, and a fib are all intentionally deceptive, and are all lies.

E.g. many would probably consider Jacob’s reply to be a white lie, and hence deceptive, in the following case presented by linguists:

Theresa just bought a new dress.

Upon trying it on for the first time, she asks her husband Jacob,

Does this dress look good on me?

Jacob responds:

Yes.

-- even though he really thinks that the dress is ugly and too tight.

Or, to take another example, some people would call it a white lie to tell a dying addressee whatever he or she needs to hear to die in peace.

Note that both a white lie and a prosocial lie are to be distinguished from a lie which most people would think justified by some higher good achieved but which would not be called a white lie or a prosocial lie, since their informational consequences are too major (however moral), such as to lie to the Gestapo about the location of a Jew.

According to the untruthfulness condition, it is not merely the case that utterer U, who makes the untruthful statement, intends that addressee A believe the untruthful statement to be true.

The utterer U intends that the addressee A believe the untruthful statement to be true.

Also, according to this condition, it is not merely the case that utterer U intends that addressee A believe some statement to be true that utterer U believes to be false.

Utterer U intends that addressee A believe to be true the untruthful statement that is made to addressee A.

According to (L1), if Maximilian is a crime boss, and Alessandro is one of his henchmen, whom he secretly believes is a police informant, and Maximilian makes the untruthful statement:

There are no informants in my organization.

without the intention that Alessandro believe that statement to be true, but with the intention that Alessandro believe that Maximilian believes that statement to be true, Maximilian does not lie.

Maximilian has, of course, attempted to deceive Alessandro.

This conclusion has prompted some to revise (L1) to include more than the utterer U's intention to deceive.

According to the untruthfulness condition, it is sufficient for lying that utterer U, who makes the untruthful statement, intends that addressee A believe the untruthful statement to be true.

It is not necessary that the addressee A believe the untruthful statement to be true.

That is, a lie remains a lie if it is disbelieved.

If Sophie makes the untruthful statement to Nicole

I did not get any homework today.

-- with the intention that Nicole believe that statement to be true, and if Nicole does not believe that statement to be true, Sophie lies.

This is because ‘lie’ is not an achievement or success verb, and an act of lying is not a perlocutionary act, to use Austin's jargon that Grice never understood ("I may be mistaken, but I'm not wrong.")

The existence of an act of lying does not depend upon the production of a particular response or state in A.

As it has been said, it is very odd to think that whether U lies hinges upon the persuasiveness of U or the credulity of A.  

Because L1 does not have an assertion condition, however, according to L1 it is possible to lie by making ironic statements, telling jokes, writing fiction alla Faulkner, acting in a play, and so forth, if U, making the untruthful statement (somehow) intends that it be believed to be true, as in the case of the ‘irony lie’ above.

Similarly, if someone intends to deceive using a joke—for example, if con artist David says

Yeah, I am a billionaire. That's why I am in this dive.

-- to his mark, Greg, at a bar, intending that Greg believe that David is a billionaire who is attempting to to pass incognito in a bar— this ‘joke lie’ is a lie according to L1.

If a novelist, say Faulkner, were to write a novel with the intention that A believe that this was a true story disguised as a novel—a pretend roman à clef—this ‘fiction lie’ is a lie according to L1.

If an actor in a play were to deliver an untruthful statement with the intention that his A believe the statement to be true — say, if an an actor delivered a line about his life being too short with the intention that A believed that the actor was actually dying from some disease (“it is possible that the performance is part of an elaborate deception aimed at getting members of the audience to believe that the particular line from the play is actually true”)—, this ‘acting lie’ is a lie according to L1.

Two kinds of alleged counter-examples have been offered to refute L1.

ALLEGED COUNTER-EXAMPLES ADDRESSED TOWARDS THE NECESSITY OF THE FOUR PRONG-ANALYSANS.

First, objections have been made to each necessary condition, on the basis that it is not necessary for lying.

According to these alleged counterexamples as to how Englishmen use 'lie,' (L1) is too narrow.

On top of it, alleged counterexamples (again as to how Englishmen use 'lie') have been made to the four necessary conditions being jointly sufficient for lying, on the basis that some further condition is necessary for lying.

According to these objections, (L1) is too broad.

Let us start with the alleged counterexamples against the necessity of the four-pronged analysans.

The Conditions Are Not Necessary. 

Against the 'stating' condition of (L1), it has been objected that the making of a statement is not necessary for lying.

Lying to others may be defined as any form of behavior the function of which is to provide others with false information or to deprive them of true information, or as a successful or unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in another a belief which the communicator considers to be untrue.

Importantly, this entails that lying can consist of simply withholding information with the intent to deceive, without making any statement at all.

Those who make this objection would make lying the same as intentionally deceiving.

Against the second, the untruthfulness condition of (L1), it has been objected that an untruthful statement is not necessary for lying.

This objection comes in a variety of forms.

There are those who argue any statement made with an intention to deceive is a lie, including a truthful statement that is made with an intention to deceive.

Lying may thus be defined as “any intentionally deceptive message that is stated."

There are also those who, relying upon a Griceian account of conversational implicature (Grice 1989, 39)), as we do in this Club, argue that someone, like Faulkner, who makes a truthful statement but who thereby conversationally implicates a believed-false statement is lying.

Importantly, such an “untruthful implicature” is “directly intended."


Thirdly, there are those who argue for the possibility of “lying ironically," or indirect lying.

If utterer U makes an ironic untruthful statement, through this presentation of himself as insincerely asserting, he presents himself as believing the opposite of what he says, which is a capacity to assert in effect.

If utterer U is insincere in this and actually does believe in the truth of what he states, despite invoking trust in his believing its opposite, this is a lie -- an "indirect lie,"we might say.

E.g. if an utterer who is listening to a sappy pop song at a party is asked if he likes this kind of music U replies, ironically,

Yeah, right, I love this kind of music.

U lies if U actually does love this kind of music.

Against the untruthfulness condition, it has also been objected that it is not necessary for lying that the statement that is made is believed to be false.

It is sufficient that the statement is not believed to be true, or is believed to be probably false.

As it has been claimed, agnostics about the truth of their assertions who nonetheless assert them without qualification tell lies.

Against the addressee condition of (L1), it has been objected that it is sufficient for lying that the untruthful statement is made, even if it is made to no one — not even to oneself.

Lying may thus be defined as a conscious expression of other than what we believe.

It has also been objected that it is possible to lie to a third party who is not the utterer's addressee.

In general, it is possible to distinguish between cases where “A' eavesdrops, unbeknown to the first and second parties” (eavesdropping), cases where utterer U utters p to his addressee A while A', with the awareness of both other parties, listens in and knows that the first- and second-party know he is listening in, although it is for the addressee only that the utterance is intended (kibbitzing), as well as cases similar to "kibbitzing" except that the utterance is also intended for the addressee [who knows that they know that he is listening in]” (disclosure), and cases similar to disclosure “except that although the first and second parties know that the hearer is listening in, the hearer does not know that they are listening in” (bogus disclosure).

Even if it is not possible to lie to eavesdroppers, or to those merely listening in, as in the case of kibbitzing, it may be possible to lie in the cases of bogus disclosure, as in Mickey saying to Danny,

The pick-up is at midnight tomorrow.

with the intention of deceiving the F.B.I. agents listening in.

It may even be possible to lie in the case of disclosure.

In the thriller "Capricorn One" about a Mars landing hoax, during a nationally televised transmission between the astronauts ‘in space’ and their wives at the control centre, which is being monitored closely by NASA handlers, Col. Charles Brubaker asks his wife Kay to tell his son:

When I get back, I am going take our son to Yosemite again, like I did last summer.

In fact, Brubaker brought his son to a different place the previous summer (Flatbush, where a film was being shot), something that the colonel's wife *knows.*

According to this alleged counterexample, Col. Brubaker lies to his NASA handlers about what he did last summer, even if they are not his addressees.

Against the addressee condition, it has also been objected that it is possible to lie to an animal, a robot, etc., as well as to what might be another person — e.g., if a home owner, woken up in the middle of the night and wondering if there are burglars below the stairs, shouts down:

I am bringing my rifle down there.

-- although he has no rifle.

Against the "intention-to-deceive-the addressee" condition of (L1), it has been objected that, even if an intention to deceive the addressee A is required for lying, it is not necessary that it be an intention to deceive the addressee about the content of the untruthful statement.

It may be an intention to deceive the addressee A about the beliefs of the utterer U abut the statement—specifically, the belief that the untruthful statement is true.

There are at least two ways in which (L1) may tweaked in response to this alleged counter-example.

It could be held that what is essential to lying is the utterer's intention to deceive the addressee about the utterer's belief that the untruthful statement is true:

U utters a sentence, ‘p’ where ‘p’ means that p, in doing which either U expresses his belief that p, or U intends the the addressee A to take it that utterer U believes that p” and the utterer U believes [p] to be false.

 (L1) may thus be therefore modified as follows:

• (L2)U lies =df
  
  U makes a statement that p -- where p is believed to be false, to an addressee A, with the intention that the addresee A believe that p is believed to be true. 

Alternatively, (L1) could be modified to incorporate either intention, as follows:

• (L3)U lies =df
  
  U makes a believed-false statement (to addressee A), either with the intention that that statement be believed to be true (by the addressee A), or with the intention that it be believed (by the addressee A) that that statement is believed to be true (by the utterer U making the statement), or with both intentions. 

Against this condition, it has also been argued that it is not necessary that it be an intention to deceive the addressee about either the content of the untruthful statement or about the beliefs of the speaker about the untruthful statement.

It seems sufficient that there is an intention to deceive about some matter—that is, it is sufficient that the utterer U intend that the addresee believe to be true something that the utterer believes to be false.

Note that those who offer these alleged counter-examples would turn lying into any deception involving untruthful statements.

If this objection were combined with the objection that lying could be directed to third parties (as in bogus disclosure, or disclosure), (L1) may be modified into (L4):

• (L4)U lies =df
  
  U makes a believed-false statement, to an addressee A or in the believed hearing of another person, with the intention that the addressee —the person addressed or the other person in the believed hearing—believe some believed-false statement to be true.

Against this condition, it has also been objected that although there is a necessary relationship between lying and deception, nevertheless, this intention should be understood merely as the intention to be deceptive to an addressee, which is the intention “to conceal information” from the addressee A.

According to this objection, concealing evidence, understood as hiding evidence or keeping evidence secret, counts as being deceptive to the addressee.

(L1) may thus be modified to read as (L5):

• (L5)U lies iff
  (i) U states that p to A (ii) U believes that p is false and
   (iii) U intends to be deceptive to A in stating that p.

Against this "intention-to deceive-the-addressee" condition it has been objected that no intention to deceive is required for lying.

If the sworn-in witness in the trial of a violent criminal goes on the record and gives untruthful testimony — in order, e.g., to avoid being killed by the defendant or any of his criminal associates—without any intention that that testimony be believed to be true by any person (not the jury, the judge, the lawyers, the journalists covering the trial, the people in the gallery, the readers of the newspaper reports, etc.), the witness lies.

Such non-deceptive lies are lies according to this objection (but others hold that these lies are intentionally deceptive, or not intentionally deceptive.

But there are other types of objections two. Let us label them:

II. ALLEGED COUNTER-EXAMPLES TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE FOUR-PRONG ANALYSANS:

The Conditions Are Not Jointly Sufficient. 

It has been objected that (L1) is not sufficient for lying because it is also necessary that the untruthful statement be false.

This is the "falsity" condition for lying.

For most objectors, the falsity condition supplements (L1) and makes this definition of lying even narrower.

For other objectors, the falsity condition is part of a different conceptual analysis of lying, and makes that analysis narrower.

It has been objected that (L1) is not sufficient for lying because it is also necessary to intend that that addressee believe that that statement is believed to be true.

If Harry makes the untruthful statement

I have no change in my pocket.

to Michael, but Harry does not intend that Michael believe that Harry believes it to be true, it is not the case that Harry lies, even if Harry intends that Michael believe it to be true.

This additional condition would make (L1) even narrower, since it would have the result that it is not the case that Maximilian lies to Alessandro in our example above.

It has also been objected that (L1) is insufficient, because lying requires that an untruthful assertion be made, and not merely that an untruthful statement be made.

This is the "asserting" condition for lying.

According to these alleged counter-examples, one does not lie when one makes a deceptive untruthful ironic statement (‘irony lie’), or a deceptive untruthful joke (‘joke lie’), or a deceptive untruthful fiction (‘fiction lie’), or deceptive untruthful acting (‘acting life’), since in none of these cases is one making an assertion.

For most objectors, the 'asserting' condition supplements (L1) and makes (L1) even narrower.

For others, the "asserting" condition is part of a different conceptual analysis of lying, and makes that definition narrower.

The most important objection to (L1) is that lying does not require an intention to deceive.

This has led to a division amongst those writing on the conceptual analysis of lying.

There are two positions held by those who philosophise on the conceptual analysis of lying, the deceptionists and the non-deceptionists.

The first group, the Deceptionists, hold that an intention to deceive is necessary for lying.

Deceptionists may be divided further in turn into simple Deceptionists, who hold that lying requires the making of an untruthful statement with an intention to deceive.

Complex Deceptionists, on the other hand, hold that lying requires the making of an untruthful assertion with the intention to deceive by means of a breach of trust or faith.

There are Moral Deceptionists, who hold that lying requires the making of an untruthful statement with the intention to deceive, as well as the violation of a moral right of another or the moral wronging of another.

The non-deceptionists, hold that an intention to deceive is not necessary for lying.

Non-deceptionists see the traditional definition as both incorrect and insufficient.

Non-deceptionists may be further divided into simple Non-Deceptionists, who hold that the making of an untruthful statement is sufficient for lying, and Complex Non-Deceptionists, who hold that a further condition, in addition to making an untruthful statement, is required for lying.

Some complex non-deceptionists hold that lying requires warranting the truth of what is stated.

Other complex non-Deceptionists hold that lying requires the making of an untruthful assertion.

Simple deceptionists include those who defend (L1) as well as those who defend the modified versions of this definition: (L2), (L3), (L4), and (L5).

For simple deceptionists, lying requires the making of an untruthful statement with an intention to deceive, but it does not require the making of an assertion or a breach of trust or faith.

Complex deceptionists hold that, in addition to requiring an intention to deceive, lying requires the making of an untruthful assertion, as well as (or which therefore entails) a breach of trust or faith.

Some hold that the utterer is only making an assertion to an addressee if the utterer makes a statement to the addressee and the utterer believes that the conditions are such that the addressee is justified in believing both that one believes one’s statement to be true and that one intends that the other person believe that one believes one’s statement to be true.

U asserts p to A =df

U states p to A and does so under conditions which, he believes, justify A in believing that he, U, not only accepts p, but also intends to contribute causally to U’s believing that he, U, accepts p."

A lie is an untruthful assertion, that is, the utterer U believes the statement that is made is not true, or is false:

U lies =df  

There is a proposition p such that

(i) either U believes that p is not true or U believes that p is false and

(ii) U asserts p. 

In the case of a lie, U is attempting to get A to believe a falsehood.

Note, however, that this falsehood is not (normally) what the utterer U is stating.

Rather, the falsehood that the utterer U is attempting to get the addressee A to believe is that the utterer U believes the statement to be true.

This is the intention to deceive in lying, although, strictly speaking, deception is foreseen and not intended.

Essentially, under this definition, the utterer U only lies if U expect that U will be successful in deceiving A about what U believes.

The utterer U is also attempting to get the addressee A to have this false belief about what the utterer U believes in a special way—by getting his victim to place his faith in him.

This is the breach of trust or breach of faith in lying.

Lying, unlike the other types of deception, is essentially a breach of faith.

Their complete definition of a lie may be stated as follows:

• (L6)U lies =df
  (i) U makes a believed-false or believed-not-true statement to another person
  (ii) U believes that the conditions are such that A is justified in believing that the statement is believed to be true by the person making the statement;
  (iii) U believes that the conditions are such that A is justified in believing that the person making the statement intends to contribute causally to the other person believing that the statement is believed to be true by the person making the statement.

According to (L6), it not possible to lie if U believes that the conditions are such that the addressee A is not justified in believing that the utterer U is making a truthful statement.

Some provide an alleged counter-example: a thief grabs a victim by the throat and asks him where he keeps his money.

If the victim were to make the untruthful statement,

I have no money.

the objector says it is not the case that the victim lies, for thief knows that he also has no right whatever to demand the truth from the victim.

Some hold that the victim is not making an assertion, and hence, is not lying, given that the victim believes that the thief is not justified in believing that the victim is being truthful.

Some hold that the thief can believe that the victim is credible, even if not trustworthy, because he is motivated by the threat of violence.

Some hold that lying requires an assertion and a breach of faith, but some reject (L6,) arguing that it is possible for the victim to lie to the thief in the "I have no money" example.

According to these objectors, making an assertion involves making a statement and intending to cause belief in the truth of that statement by giving an implicit warranty or an implicit promise or assurance that the statement is true.

When one asserts, one intends to invite belief, and not belief based on the evidence of the statement so much as on the faith of the statement.

A lie is an untruthful assertion.

The utterer U intends to cause belief in the truth of a statement that the utterer U believes to be false.

Hence, a lie involves an intention to deceive.

And there is more Griceian stuff about the intricacies of analysing 'lying.'

The utterer U also implicitly assures or promises the hearer that the statement that is made is true.

Hence, the utterer U r is giving an insincere assurance, or breaking a promise— in lying the promise is made and broken at the same moment— and every lie involves a breach of trust.

This conceptual analysis of lying may be stated as follows (modified to include cases in which utterers only intend to deceive about their beliefs):

• (L7)U lies =df
  
  (i) U makes a believed-false statement to another person
  (ii) U intend that A believe that the statement is true [and that the statement is believed to be true] or intend that A believe that the statement is believed to be true.
  (iii) U implicitly assure A that the statement is true.
  (iv) U intend that A believe that the statement is true and that the statement is believed to be true] [or intend that the other person believe that the statement is believed to be true on the basis of this implicit assurance. 

Some also hold that lying requires an assertion and a breach of faith.

In asserting, we present ourselves as believing something while and through invoking (although not necessarily gaining) the trust of the on to whom we assert.

This invocation of trust occurs through an act of open sincerity according to which we attempt to establish both that we believe some proposition and that we intend them to realize that we believe it.

Lying is insincere assertion in the sense that the asserter’s requisite belief is missing.

This entails that someone who lies aims to deceive in three ways.

First, we have the intention that someone be in error regarding some matter, as we see the fact of the matter.

This is the primary deceptive intention.

Second, we intend to deceive the other person regarding our belief regarding that matter.

We don’t lie about this belief, but we intend to deceive regarding it.

We intend that they be deceived, about whatever matter it is, on the basis of their being deceived about our belief in this matter.

Finally, someone who lies insincerely invokes trust.

We intend that they be deceived about our belief in this matter on the basis of this insincere invocation of trust.

Other forms of intended deception that are not lies do not attempt to deceive by way of a trust invoked through an open sincerity.

This is what makes lies special.

It involves a certain sort of betrayal.

Since it is possible to lie without having the primary deceptive intention, the conceptual analysis needs to be modified accordingly:

(L8)To lie =df to:

(i) U make a statement to another person;
(ii) U lacks belief in the truth of the statement;
(iii) U intends that A believe:
(a) that the statement is true and that the statement is believed to be true or
(b) that the statement is believed to be true.
(iv) U intends that the other person believe
(c) that it is intended that the other person believe that the statement is true.
(d) that it is intended that the other person believe that the statement is believed to be true.
(v) U invokes trust in the other person that the statement is believed to be true by means of an act of open sincerity.
(vi) U intends that the other person believe (a), or (b), on the basis of (v). 

• 
  

Some hold that lying necessarily involves telling someone something, which necessarily involves invoking trust.

Some distinguish between "telling" and "asserting", and argue that in certain cases the implicature of my assertion is sufficiently clear that I can be said to have told you this, even if I did not assert this.

Some define telling as follows:

U tells A that p if and only if
(i) U intends that A believe that p, and
(ii) U intends that A believe that p because A recognizes that (i).

In telling the addresee A that p, the utterer U intends that the hearer believe what she is stating or implying, but she intends that the hearer believe what she is stating or implying for the reason that the hearer believes the speaker.

It follows that tellings “operate by invoking an audience’s trust.

In lying, the speaker intends that the hearer believe what she is stating or implying on the basis of trust.

In lying, a speaker does not intend his audience accept his lie because of independent evidence but intends his audience accept his lie because of his telling it.

The motivation for presenting his assertion as sincere is to thereby ensure that an audience treats his intention that the audience believe that p as a reason for believing that p.

A lie is an untruthful telling.

The speaker believes that what she asserts or implies is false, she intends that the hearer believe that what she states or implies is true, she intends that the hearer believe that she intends this, and she intends that this be the reason that the hearer believes that what she states or implies is true.

U's utterance "p" to A is a lie if and only if
(i) in uttering "p," U tells A that p, and
(ii) U believes that p is false.

This conceptual analysis of lying also needs to be modified to include cases in which utterers only intend to deceive about their beliefs:

• (L9)U lies=df
  
  (i) U utters some proposition to another person;
  
  (ii) U believes that the proposition is false;
  
  (iii) U intends that A believe that the proposition is true and is believed to be true or intend that the other person believe that the proposition is believed to be true.
  
  (iv) U intends that A believe that it is intended that the other person believe that the proposition is true.
  
  (v) U intends that A believe that the proposition is true and is believed to be true or intend that the other person believe that the proposition is believed to be true for the reason that it is intended that the other person believe that the proposition is true. 

It is an implication of the complex Deceptionist's conceptual analysis of lying that certain cases of putative lies are not lies because no assertion is made.

Consider the following case of an attempted confidence trick double bluff.

Sarah, with collaborator Charlie, wants to play a confidence trick on Andrew.

She wants Andrew to buy shares in Cadbury.

She decides to deceive Andrew into thinking that Kraft is planning a takeover bid for Cadbury.

Sarah knows that Andrew distrusts her.

If she tells him that Kraft is planning a takeover bid for Cadbury, he will not believe her.

If she tells him that there is no takeover bid, in an attempted double bluff, he might believe the opposite of what she says, and so be deceived.

But this simple double bluff is too risky on its own.

So Sarah gets Charlie, whom Andrew trusts, to lie to him that Kraft is about to launch a takeover bid for Cadbury.

She also gets Charlie to tell Andrew that she believes that it is false that Kraft is about to launch a takeover bid for Cadbury.

Sarah then goes to Andrew, and tells him,

“Kraft is about to launch a takeover bid for Cadbury.”

She does not intend that Andrew believe that she believes that Kraft is about to launch a takeover bid for Cadbury.

However, she intends that he believe that she is mistaken, and that in fact Kraft is about to launch a takeover bid for Cadbury.

As a result, he will be deceived.

According to (L6), (L7), (L8), and (L9), it is not the case that Sarah lies, because she is not asserting anything.

According to some, for example, Sarah would only be pretending to invoke trust, and would not be invoking trust.

In such a case, the speaker intends to represent himself as intending to represent himself as believing what he does not.

In order to lie, one must pretend sincerity, but also act on an intention that this sincerity be accepted—otherwise one is pretending to lie, and not lying.

Sarah would be merely pretending to lie to Andrew, in order to deceive him.

Another case of a putative lie that is not a lie according to Complex Deceptionist definitions of lying is a triple bluff.

Imagine an even more devious Pavel, from the example above, telling an openly distrustful Trofim, in response to Trofim's question, that he is going to “Pinsk.”

He is actually going to Minsk, but he answers“Pinsk” in order to have Trofim believe that he is attempting a double bluff.

If it works, Trofim will respond by telling him

“Liar! You say you are going to Pinsk in order to make me believe you are going to Minsk. But I know you are going to Pinsk.”

According to (L6), (L7), (L8), and (L9), it is not the case that Pavel lies.

He is pretending to attempt to deceive him with a double bluff, in order to actually attempt to deceive him with a triple bluff. At no point is he invoking trust, and breaching that trust.

A moral deceptionist holds that in addition to making an untruthful statement with an intention to deceive, lying requires the violation of a moral right of another, or the moral wronging of another.

According to some, every lie is a violation of the right of a hearer, since it is assumed that, if U asserts a proposition p to A, A has the right to expect that U himself believes p.

And it is assumed that U knows, or at least that he ought to know, that, if U asserts p to y, while believing himself that p is not true, he violates the addressee's right.

(This is why Grice speaks of a desideratum of conversational candour and formulates it in terms of 'instrumental' rights)

Nevertheless, it is not part of the moral deceptionist's conceptual analysis of lying that lying involves the violation of the addressee's right.

According to most philosophers, the claim that lying is, either defeasibly or non-defeasibly, *morally* wrong is a synthetic judgment and not an analytic one (Vide Grice and Strawson on the definition of an analytic judgement in "In defense of a dogma.")

However, ‘lie’ is considered by some to be a thick ethical (and not just meta-ethical) term that it both describes a type of action and morally evaluates that type of action negatively.

For some, the wrongfulness of lying is built into the definition of the term.

For these, the claim that lying is, either defeasibly or non-defeasibly, morally wrong is analytic.

According to some, it is part of the meaning of ‘lie’ when it is strictly taken that it involves the Violation of a Real right of the person lied to, namely, the Freedom of him to judge.

One can only lie to someone who possesses this right to exercise liberty of judgment.

The definition of lying is therefore modified accordingly:

• (L10)U lies =df
  
  U makes a believed-false statement to another person, with the intention that that other person believe that statement to be true, or believe that the statement is believed to be true, or both, violating the addressee A's right to exercise liberty of judgment. 

According to (L10), one cannot lie to “children or madmen, e.g. since they lack the right of liberty of judgment.

One cannot lie to someone who has given express Consent to be told untruths, since he has given up the right to exercise his liberty of judgment about these matters.

One cannot lie to someone who by tacit Consent or presumed consent founded upon just Reason has given up the right to exercise his liberty of judgment about some matter, on account of the Advantage, that he shall get by it, such as when a Person comforts his sick Friend, by making him believe what is false, since no Wrong is done to him that is willing.

Furthermore, he who has an absolute Right over all the Rights of another, is not lying when he makes use of that Right, in telling something false, either for his particular Advantage, or for the publick Good.

The right to exercise one’s liberty of judgment can also be taken away in cases when the life of an innocent Person, or something equal to it, is at stake, or when the Execution of a dishonest Act be otherwise prevented.

In such a case, the person has forfeited his right, and speaking falsely to those—like thieves—to whom truthfulness is not owed cannot be called lying.

Some also incorporates moral conditions into his definition of lying (modified to include cases in which speakers only intend to deceive about their beliefs):

• (L11)U lies =df
  
  U freely makes a believed-false statement to another fully responsible and rational person, with the intention that that other person believe that statement to be true or the intention that that other person believe that that statement is believed to be true, or both.

According to (L11), it is not possible to lie to children, madmen, or those whose minds have been impaired by age or illness, since they are not fully responsible and rational persons.

It is also not possible to lie to a would-be murderer who threatens your life if you will not tell him where his quarry has gone, and in general when you are acting under duress in any way (such as a witness in fear of his life on the witness stand, or a victim being robbed by a thief), since statements made in such circumstances are not freely made.

It has been objected that the moral deceptionist's conceptual analysis of lying is unduly narrow and restrictive.

Surely, e.g. it is possible to lie to a would-be murderer, whether it is impermissible, as some absolutist deontologists maintain, or permissible (i.e., either optional or obligatory), as consequentialists and moderate deontologists maintain.

It has also been objected that the moral deceptionist's conceptual analysis of 'lying' is morally lax.

By rendering certain deceptive untruthful statements to others as non-lies, they make it permissible to act in a way that would otherwise be open to moral censure.

In general, even those who hold that all lies have an inherent negative weight, albeit such that it can be overridden, and hence, who hold that lying is defeasibly morally wrong, do not incorporate moral necessary conditions into their definitions of lying.

Non-Deceptionists hold that an intention to deceive is not necessary for lying.

For simple non-deceptionists, there is nothing more to lying than making an untruthful statement.

According to some, e.g., a jocose lie is a lie.

For a complex non-deceptionist, untruthfulness is not sufficient for lying.

In order to differentiate lying from telling jokes, being ironic, acting, etc., a further condition must be met.

For some Complex Non-Deceptionists, that further condition is warranting the truth of the untruthful statement.

For other Complex Non-Deceptionists, that condition is making an assertion.

Some hold that it is possible to lie by making a false and untruthful statement to an addressee without intending to deceive the addressee, so long as the statement is made in a context such that one warrants the truth of the statement (and one does not believe oneself to be not warranting the truth of the statement), or one intends to warrant the truth of the statement:

• (L12)
  
  U lies iff
  
  (i) U makes a false statement p to A,
  (ii) U believes that p is false or probably false (or, alternatively, U does not believe that p is true),
  (iii) U states p in a context in which U thereby warrants the truth of p to A, and
  (iv) U does not take herself to be not warranting the truth of what she says to y.
• (L13)U lies iff
  (i) U makes a false statement p to A (ii) U believes that p is false or probably false, or, alternatively, x does not believe that p is true.
  (iii) U intends to warrant the truth of p to A. 

Some include the falsity condition in both of his definitions.

However, some are prepared to modify both definitions so that the falsity condition is not required

Some also hold that the untruthfulness condition is not stringent enough, since, if a utterer U simply does “not believe” her statement to be true, but does not believe it to be false, or believes that her statement is probably false, but does not believe it to be false, U lies.

Two alleged counter-examples may be given of non-deceptive lies:

A guilty student tells a college dean that he did not cheat on an examination, without intending that the dean believe him (since “he is really hard-boiled, he may take pleasure in thinking that the Dean knows he is guilty”), because he knows that the dean’s policy is not to punish a student for cheating unless the student admits to cheating.

A witness provides untruthful and false testimony about a defendant, where there is a preponderance of evidence against the defendant, without the intention that the testimony be believed by anyone, in order to avoid suffering retaliation from the defendant and/or his henchmen.

Neither utterer lies according to the definitions of lying of Simple Deceptionists (L1), (L2), (L3), (L4) and (L5) or Complex Deceptionists (L6), (L7), (L8) and (L9) or Moral Deceptionists (L10) and (L11).

Both are lying according to (L12) and (L13), because each warrants the truth of his statement, even though neither intends to deceive his addressee.

It has been argued that the witness and the student do have an intention to deceive.

It has also been argued that they are being deceptive, even if they lack an intention that their untruthful statements be believed to be true.

However, it has also been argued that they fail to warrant the truth of their statements, and hence fail to be lying according to (L12) and (L13).

One argument is that, in the witness example, the statement is coerced, and coerced speech acts are not genuinely assertoric.

In the context of a threat of violent death, the mere fact that he is speaking under oath is not sufficient to institute an ordinary warranting context.

Another argument is that the witness and the student are not warranting the truth of their statements because they believe that their audiences believe that they are being untruthful.

If one warrants the truth of a statement, then one promises or guarantees, ether explicitly or implicitly, that what one says is true.

Warranting the truth of a statement presupposes that the statement is being used to invite or influence belief.

It does not make sense for one to guarantee the truth of something that one is not inviting or influencing others to believe.

The result is that to lie is to breach trust.

To lie is to invite others to trust and rely on what one says by warranting its truth, but, at the same time, to betray that trust by making false statements that one does not believe.

The combination of warranting the truth of one’s statement and breaching trust would appear to make this definition of lying similar to that of Complex Deceptionists.

It would also appear to produce similar results.

For example, the following can be said about negotiators.

It is common and often a matter of course for people to deliberately misstate their bargaining positions during negotiations.

Such statements are lies according to standard dictionary definitions of lying—they are intentional false statements intended to deceive others.

However, given the definition of lying (L12), such cases are not lies unless the negotiator warrants the truth of what he says.

Suppose that two hardened cynical negotiators who routinely misstate their intentions, and do not object when others do this to them, negotiate with each other.

Each person recognizes that the other party is a cynical negotiator, and each is aware of the fact that the other party knows this.

In this sort of case, statements about one’s minimum or maximum price are not warranted to be true.

If a negotiator makes an untruthful statement,

“That is the highest I can go"

to another negotiator, since the negotiator believes that the other negotiator believes that he is making an untruthful statement, he cannot intend to warrant the truth of his statement, and/or the context (of negotiation) is such that he is not warranting the truth of his statement.

As a result, it is not the case that he lies, according to (L12).

He is not lying according to (L13), either, at least if it is true that you cannot intend to do something that you do not expect to succeed at.

It seems that the same thing can be said about the student and the witness.

If the student believes that the dean already knows he is guilty, and if the witness believes that the jury, etc., already knows that the defendant is guilty, it seems that neither can intend to warrant the truth of his statement, and/or the context is such that neither is warranting the truth of his statement.

If this is so, then neither is lying according to L12 and L13.

Some definitions have the very odd and unacceptable result that a notoriously dishonest person cannot lie to people who he knows distrust him.

It does seem, however, that this definition has the same result.

Some hold that it is possible to lie without intending to deceive.

A modified version of (L12) may be provided that combines the warranting context condition, and the not believing that one is not warranting condition, in the single condition of believing that one is in a warranting context:

• (L14)If U is not the victim of linguistic error/malapropism or using metaphor, hyperbole, or irony, then they lie iff
  (i) they say that p(ii) they believe p to be false
  (iii) they take themselves to be in a warranting context. 

According to (L14), it is not possible to lie if one does not believe that one is in a warranting context.

Consider the case of a putative lie told in a totalitarian state, since this is the case of utterances demanded by a totalitarian state.

These utterances of sentences supporting the state are made by people who don’t believe them, to people who don’t believe them.

Everyone knows that false things are being said, and that they are only being said only because they are required by the state.

It seems somewhat reasonable to suggest that, since everyone is forced to make these false utterances, and everyone knows they are false, they cease to be genuine lies.

People living in a totalitarian state, making pro-state utterances, are a trickier case (which they should be).

Whether or not their utterances are made in contexts where a warrant of truth is present is not at all clear.

If a speaker is making an untruthful statement to a hearer, and everyone knows that false things are being said, that is, the speaker knows that the hearer knows that the speaker is being untruthful, then the speaker does not believe that she is in a warranting context.

According to (L14,) it is not the case that U lies.

However, it is arguable that in both the student and the witness cases, everyone knows that false things are being said, and hence, that the speaker does not believe that he is in a warranting context.

If this is so, then according to L14, neither the student nor the witness is lying.

Some agree with Carson that lying does not require an intention to deceive, and that there can be non-deceptive bald-faced lies and knowledge-lies.

However, some reject (L12), since it entails that one cannot lie when the falsity of what one is stating is common knowledge.

This definition of lying does not relieve the narrowness.

The concept of warrant is not broad enough to explain how we can lie in the face of common knowledge.

One can warrant p only if p might be the case.

When the falsehood of p is common knowledge, no party to the common knowledge can warrant p because p is epistemically impossible.

According to some, a negotiator who tells a falsehood that will lead to better coordination between buyer and seller is telling a bald-faced lie.

Some define lying as just asserting what one does not believe.

It is a condition on telling a lie that one makes an assertion.

Some differentiate between assertions and non-assertions according to narrow plausibility.

To qualify as an assertion, a lie must have narrow plausibility.

Thus, someone who only had access to the assertion might believe it.

This is the grain of truth behind the assumption that lying requires the intention to deceive.

Bald-faced lies show that assertions do not need to meet a requirement of wide plausibility, that is, credibility relative to one’s total evidence.

Some provide, as examples of assertions, and hence, lies, the servant of a maestro telling an unwanted female caller that the sounds she hears over the phone are not the maestro and that the servant is merely dusting the piano keys, and a doctor in an Iraqi hospital during the Iraq war telling a journalist who can see patients in the ward in uniforms that “I see no uniforms."

The claim that these are assertions, however, and therefore lies, is controversial.

These statements neither express the speaker’s belief, nor aim to affect the belief of the addressee in any way, since their falsehood is common knowledge.

Some alas does not offer a definition of asserting a proposition (with necessary and sufficient conditions).

To the extent that some do not fully analyze the concept of assertion, their definition of lying is unclear.

 It may be argued against this that the utterances in question are not assertions, and hence, on his own account, fail to be lies.

Some hold that it is possible to lie without intending to deceive.

Some have also defended the assertion condition for lying.

You lie when you assert something that you believe to be false.

Some hold that you assert something when you you make a statement and you believe that you are in a situation in which the Gricean norm of conversation, or desideratum of conversational candour, ‘Do not say what you believe to be false,’ is in effect.

This conceptual analysis of lying is:

U lies if and only if

(i) U state that p to A,

(ii) A believes that U makes this statement in a context where a maxim of conversation is in effect, "Do not make statements that you believe to be false" (Grice's desideratum of conversational candour) 

(iii) U believe that p is false.

Alleged counter0examples to this conceptual analysis have prompted a revision of this definition in order to accommodate these counterexamples:

• (L15)U lies if and only if
  U says that p.U believes that p is false (or at least that p will be false if you succeed in communicating that p), and
  U intends to violate the conversational maxim against communicating something false by communicating that p 
• 
  (L16)
  
  U lies if and only if you say that p, you believe that p is false (or at least that p will be false if you succeed in communicating that p), and you intend to communicate something false by communicating that p. 

Both (L15) and (L16) are able to accommodate the following counterexample to the earlier definition.

When Marc Antony said to the Roman people,

"Brutus is an honorable man."

the citizens of Rome know that

(a) Antony did not believe that Brutus was an honorable man, that
(b) Antony was subject to a norm against saying things that he believed to be false, and that
(c) Antony had been a cooperative participant in the conversation so far.

Thus, they were led to conclude that Antony was flouting the conversational maxim in order to communicate something other than what he explicated.

In fact, the best explanation of his statement was that he wanted to communicate the exact opposite of what he explicated ("It is not the case that Brutus is an honorable man.")

Since Antony does not intend to violate this conversational maxim against communicating something that he believes to be false (that Brutus is an honorable man) by saying

“Brutus is an honorable man,”

or, more simply, since Antony does not intend to communicate something false with his untruthful statement, it follows that Antony is not lying.

However, in the case of a guilty witness, Tony, against whom there is overwhelming evidence, who says

“I did not do it,”

without the intention that anyone believe him, he does intend to violate the norm of conversation against communicating something that he believes to be false (that he did not do it) by saying

“I did not do it,”

or, more simply, he does intend to communicate something believed-false with his untruthful statement, even though he does not intend that anyone believe this.

It has been contended that non-deceptive liars do not intend to communicate anything believed-false with their untruthful statements, and, indeed, may even intend to communicate something believed-true with their untruthful statements.

Some reject the claim that non-deceptive liars do not intend to communicate anything believed-false, even if they intend to communicate something believed-true.

Bald-faced liars might want to communicate something true.

For instance, Tony may be trying to communicate to the police that that they will never convict him.

But that does not mean that he does not also intend to communicate something false in violation of the norm.

He wants what he actually said to be understood and accepted for purposes of the conversation.

It is not as if

“I did not do it”

is simply a euphemism for

“You’ll never take me alive, coppers!” 

However, in the case of polite untruths, such as

“Madam is not at home,”

the untruthful statement is simply a euphemism.

For example, the words

"Madam is not at home,“

delivered by a servant or a relative at the door, have become a mere euphemism for indisposition or disinclination.

In the case of polite untruths, it seems, there is no intention to communicate anything believed-false.

In the case of the servant who tells the female caller,

“I’m dusting the piano keys,”

or the Iraqi doctor who tells the journalist

“I see no uniforms,”

or the negotiator who tells the other negotiator

“That is the highest I can go,”

or the person living in the totalitarian state who makes the pro-state utterance, it is also arguable that there is no intention to communicate anything believed-false.

If this is true, then there is some support for the claim that non-deceptive liars do not intend to communicate anything believed-false with their untruthful statements, and hence, that they are not lying according to (L15) or (L16).

Some hold that it is possible to lie without intending to deceive.

Some have also defended the assertion condition for lying.

Yu lie when you assert something you believe to be false.

To assert that p is to say that p and thereby propose that p become common ground.

A proposition, p, acquires, to use Grice's parlance "common ground status" in a group if all members accept (for the purpose of the conversation) that p, and all believe that all believe that all accept that p, etc.

Lying gets thus analysed as follows

• (L17)U lies to A if and only if
  U says that p to A, and
  U proposes that p become common ground, and
  U believes that p is false. 

In the case of a speaker making an ironic untruthful statement, the speaker does not propose that the believed-false proposition (e.g., “Brutus is an honorable man”) become common ground

However, in the case of a non-deceptive liar, the speaker does propose that the believed-false proposition (e.g., “I did not cheat”) become common ground.

The fact that in the case of a non-deceptive lie it is common knowledge that what the speaker is saying is (believed to be) false does not alter the fact that the speaker is proposing that the believed-falsehood become common ground.

Indeed, even if the (believed) truth is initially common ground, before the speaker proposes that the believed-falsehood become common ground, it is still the case that the non-deceptive liar is proposing to update the common ground with her utterance.

E.g., in the case of the student and the dean,

“The student wants herself and the Dean to mutually accept that she did not plagiarize."

It is possible to argue that this account of assertion, and hence (L17) is faced with a dilemma when it comes to non-deceptive lies.

Either, in the case of a non-deceptive lie, the speaker does propose that the believed-false proposition become common ground, but becoming common ground is too weak to count as asserting, or becoming common ground is strong enough to count as asserting, but, in the case of a non-deceptive lie, the speaker does not propose that the believed-false proposition become common ground.

Consider the alleged counter-example of a guest at a party saying to another guest,

The man drinking a martini is a philosopher.

-- and of the two guests proceeding to talk about the philosopher, when it is common knowledge that the drink in question is not a martini.

Perhaps it is mutually recognized that it is not a martini, but mutually recognized that both parties are accepting that it is a martini.

The pretense will be rational if accepting the false presupposition is an efficient way to communicate something true.

However, if proposing that a believed-false proposition become common ground can mean engaging in and sustaining a “pretence,” possibly in order to communicate truths, then it is not clear that this counts as making an assertion.

Hence, a non-deceptive liar may be proposing that her believed-false proposition become common ground without this being an act of making an assertion.

But this means that she is not lying, according to (L17)

Alternatively, if proposing that a believed-false proposition become common ground means something more than this, such that the speaker intends or wants herself and her hearer “to mutually accept” her believed-false proposition, then it is not clear that a non-deceptive liar intends or wants this.

If this is correct, non-deceptive lies fail to be lies according to (L17).

We will live (L18) and beyond for a longer day!

Cheers,

Speranza

REFERENCES

Grice, H. P. The desideratum of conversational candour.
Grice, H. P. WoW -- Way of Words.
Grice, H. P. The conversational maxim, "Try to make your conversational contribution one that is true."