Propositions, Fine-Grained

by JLS
for the GC

THERE WAS THIS CARTOON STRIP I came across recently:

Dagwood: I still don't see why it was such a big deal that you were wearing the same outfit that Lindsey Rogers wore at the banquet.

Blondie: That isn't what happened at all, Dagwood... Lindsey Rogers was wearing the same outtif that _I_ was wearing at the banquet!

It may be argued that Blondie, while indeed committing a fallacy, is sticking with the idea of propositions as fine-grained, if you excuse me the metaphor. "Narrow" sounds too bland.

The idea being that, with Grice, a propositional complex is more fine-grained than a proposition. But why?

So,

Blondie was wearing the same dress as Lindsey Rogers.

and

Lindsey Rogers was wearing the same dress as Blondie

are different _propositional complexes_, and via the Category of Modus ("Manner") it is propositional complexes that trigger implicata, not propositions, per se. Or something like that.