Recanati -- razor cut

In an online study on a talk at Amsterdam F. Recanati writes:

"The Literalist presumption is explicit in the writings of so-called
`semantic minimalists', but it is also implicitly at work in a number
of fallacious arguments using Grice's `Modi ed Occam's Razor', or
an equivalent principle of parsimony, to demonstrate that a semantic
analysis in terms of conversational implicature is preferable to
an account in terms of truth-conditional content proper (Recanati,
1994, 2004, pp. 155-58). Classic examples involve the use of Modi ed
Occam's Razor against Strawson's (1952) view of the contextually
varying truth-conditional contributions of `and' (in Introduction to
Logical Theory), or against Donnellan's (1966) view of the contextually
varying truth-conditional contributions of de nite descriptions.
In each case, the possibility that the relevant expression (which seems
to carry di erent contents in di erent contexts) might be contextsensitive
even though it does not belong to the basic set is ignored,
in virtue of the Literalist presumption, and the argument proceeds
as if the only options available to account for the data were lexical
ambiguity, on the one hand, and conversational implicature, on the
other hand (with Modi ed Occam's Razor being used to rule out the
former option)."