Patrick Greengough is lecturing on Grice but I won't believe it

by JLS
for the GC

In his "Pragmatics in thought: The case study of Moore’s Paradox", Patrick Greenough, of the Prince Wiliam's University of St Andrews, asked his audience if there be pragmatic effects in thought. The addressee said, yes.

Then Greengough added, but, more particularly, can thoughts, specifically judgments, generate implicatures which are analogous to Gricean implicatures in speech?

Greengough's goal is two-fold:

(1) Greengough wants to argue that Moore’s paradox can be explained by recognising a kind of implicature akin to, but distinct from, Grice’s notion of conventional implicature (and entirely different from conversational implicature).

And (2) to argue that Moore’s paradox, as it arises in thought, can receive an analogous treatment since thought, specifically judgment, also generates the relevant kind of implicatures.

Hence a uniform solution of the puzzle is in prospect.

Greengough, who likes Grice, also works in the fields of the philosophy of language, logic, and in epistemology. Greengough is particularly interested in vagueness, indeterminacy, relativism, scepticism, self-knowledge, discrimination, truthmaking, the open future, and assertion.