More Griceian than Grice

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AN EXPANSION OF GRICEAN CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE
Jonathan P.K. Hallemeier, Department of Philosophy, Valparaiso University, Valparaiso, IN 46383.

Conversational implicature refers to the non-literal meaning of an utterance. Irony, metaphor, and hyperbole are all examples of speech acts that require implicature. We regularly rely on implicature in everyday conversation, using it to augment literal meanings. H. P. Grice gives a characterization of conversational implicature based on the idea that the purpose of conversation is maximally effective information exchange. Grice's characterization is problematic in two important ways. First, it is too reliant on the speaker's perception of the audience, not covering situations in which the speaker wrongly believes the audience will not understand a certain implied meaning. Second, there is too much emphasis on the speaker's own perception of an utterance, consequently allowing implicature to be irrational. Based instead on a conception of the purpose of conversation as successful communication, I attempt to modify Grice's theory to better deal with these flaws. I stipulate that the speaker must believe that the implicature is generally intelligible to some possible audience, not requiring anything from the actual audience or the speaker's perception of the actual audience. Also, instead of the simply requiring that the speaker believe that the implicature is intelligible, I require that the implicature in fact be intelligible. To gauge intelligibility, I introduce the idea of an ideal hearer, who has necessary language skills and background knowledge. For implicature to exist, the intended implied meaning must be rational and understandable by this ideal hearer. In addition, I introduce the idea of strong and weak implicature. Implicature that demands commonly held knowledge is strong, and thus has a high chance of being understood and resulting in successful communication. Implicature that requires very obscure or idiosyncratic beliefs and background knowledge is weak, with a low chance of communication success. Strength of implicature is audience relative, and thus explains why a particular hearer might grasp an implication while another hearer remains confused.