Is Grice Indexical?

In his _Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalised Conversational Implicature_, S. C. Levinson has the following neat picture (simplified here):

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.author .semantic .deictic & .minimal .enriched .additional .
. .representation .reference .proposition.proposition.proposition.
. . . assignment. . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.Grice . . .
. . WHAT IS SAID . IMPLICATURE .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.Sperber/ . semantics . explicature .implicature.
.Wilson . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.Carston . semantics . explicature . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
.implicature.
. . what is said. . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.Recanati . WHAT IS SAID .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . sentence . .
. . meaning . explicature .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.Levinson . what is said . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . the coded . implicature .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.Bach . what is said . implcIture .implicAture.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

which I have yet to analyse since I think Grice's views evolved over the
years on this.

Levinson's ref. to Bach -- the only philosopher other than Grice here. Bach
teaching Philo at SFSU -- is to a ref. by Tapper in "Grice Lessons", THIS
FORUM:

http://userwww.sfsu.edu/~kbach/ci.htm

(Levinson calls Bach an "old-fashioned obstinate Gricean". So much for
faithful exegesis! (I am currently analysing if "old" has that hateful
derogatory presumptive implicature that Levinson attaches!).

Consider just (good ol') Grice's bit here -- and wouldn't have it been
great if Levinson had considered other Oxford philosophers or _any_
philosopher_ on this, and not just linguists -- Bach teaches Philo AND Ling=
!):

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .semantic .deictic & .minimal .enriched .additional .
. .representation .reference .proposition.proposition.proposition.
. . . assignment. . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.Grice . . .
. . WHAT IS SAID . IMPLICATURE .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .


Levinson is focusing on the Grice of 'Logic & Conversation'. Consider how
this applies to the utterance:

1. I am Grice.

A friend of mine is analysing utterances of the form of 1 even as
interpreted metaphorically!). Murphy says that the meaning of "I" changes
when the speaker changes. But is this what Murray would say? (Murray being
the editor of the OED).

How does the OED define "I". I won't go Scots here,
but concentrate on Fowler's concise version in the COED -- Concise Oxford
Dictionary:

"I = subjective case of 1st person pron.
_the I_: the ego, subject or object
of self-consciousness.

Not very illuminating, and I guess I _should_ consult the OED (I did!. See
below). The idea is that we may like to distinguish:

2. What H. P. Grice _means_ when he says/utters "I am Grice".

3. What JL Speranza says (or means) when he says that he means
that he is H. P. Grice (i.e. by uttering "I am Grice")

I would think that the meaning of "I", qua _expression_, is the same in
both Grice's & MY utterances. Actually, I learned to say "I" via people
like Grice, so I hope he taught me well! Murphy, on the other hand, seems
to be identifying the meaning of an expression with the _proposition_ that
it may stand for. But, at least in my view, the meaning of an expression is
_derived_ from various _individual_ cases of _utterer's_ meaning. From most
instances of _utterer's_ meaning, we can conclude that the utterer means,
by uttering "I", to refer to his(self). Therefore, Fowler is right to point
that the _meaning_ of "I" is the Ego... Simple as that!

I know, it sounds old-fashioned & all (and Tapper is wrong in thinking that
I tried to define VOLUNTARY in terms of VOLITIONAL. I defined VOLUNTARY in
terms of the WILL. & I would NOT define The Will in terms of VOLUNTARY.
Actually, I would define "willing" a la Grice of "Method in Philosophical
Psychology" -- repr in his _The Conception of Value_ -- in functionalist
terms which would seem to override the difficulties Murphy righty points
out for a Mentalistic Theory of Will that Ryle so well criticised (Since
Murphy is being our moderator and Rodrigo said we should be nice to him,
I'm adding the occasional explicature here to the effect that he did things
"rightly" and all...).

I actually Went Scots, and found this in the OED re: "I":

I. pers. pron., 1st sing. nom. Cognate with Latin "ego".

I As pronoun.

1

a

The pronoun by which a speaker denotes himself, in the nominative case,
as the subject of predication, or in attributive or predicative agreement
with that subject.

Sometimes qualified by an adj.: 1588 Shaks. Tit. A. ii. iii. 171 Poore I
was slaine, when Bassianus dy'd.

II As substantive. The pronoun regarded as a word.

1599 Broughton's Let. ii. 8 The Cleerer of Diuinitie, the I per se I, and
the belweather of Diuines. 1722 Wollaston Relig. Nat. ix. 185 It would be
the same as to say the soul of the soul, or the body of the body, or the I
of me. 1859 Hare Guesses Ser. i. (ed. 5) 94 The proudest word in English,
to judge by its way of carrying itself, is I. 1874 Helps Soc. Press. v.
(1875) 66 An `egotistical fellow', as you call him..presses forward with
his `I, I, I', simply because, perhaps unjustly, you do not recognise that
`I' sufficiently. 1883 Westcott Ep. John (1886) 220 The unchanged and
unchangeable `I' of the Word.

III. Metaph. The subject or object of self-consciousness; that which is
conscious of itself, as thinking, feeling, and willing; the ego.
1710 Berkeley Princ. Hum. Knowl. §139 What I am myself-that which I denote by the term I-is the same with what is meant by soul or spiritual
substance. 1711 Shaftesb. Charac. vi. iv. i. III. 193 The Question is,
`What constitutes the `we' or `I?' and, `Whether the I of this instant, be
the same with that of any instant preceding, or to come'. 1764 Reid Inquiry
i. §3 How do I know that..the I of this moment is the very individual I of yesterday? 1829 Carlyle Misc. (1857) II. 75 A Manifestation of Power from
something which is not I. 1870 H. Macmillan Bible Teach. viii. 152 Man is
not an independent unit; a self-centred, self-sustaining I. 1874 W. Wallace
Logic Hegel §20. 32 `I', in the abstract, as such, is the mere act of
concentration or reference to self. 1891 E. B. Bax Outlooks fr. New
Standpoint iii. 199 The I which we think of when we say myself..is not the
true I, the I that is thinking, but merely a pseudo-I, a synthesis of
thoughts and feelings reflected in this I, which are immediately or
intuitively identified with that I.

Etc. Not I!