The Indeterminacy of the Gavagai: Unethical

On pp. 365-66 of "Valediction" Grice pours, once more, some more scorn on Quine -- whom he dubs a 'linguistic sceptic'.

Recall the historical background:

i. Quine learns all he needs to learn about philosophy from Carnap. Quine detects some mistakes or typos in Carnap's writings but won't say (cfr. R. B. J., etc.).

ii. Quine 'defeats' Carnap with "A Dogma of Empiricism": 'analyticity'. He reviews all of Carnap's attempts to define it, from the earliest 'implicit definition' of Carnap's 'axiomatic' period, to the A-postulates.

iii. Grice and Strawson rally to the defense of the underdogma ("In defense of a dogma", 1956).

iv. Quine has an attack. He writes "Word and Object" and claims that 'rabbit' is inscrutably unreferential.


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In 'Valediction' Grice proposes a reductio ad absurdum (i.e. to the 'deaf', literally) for "Lingustic Scepticism". If you are going to doubt meanings, you might just as well go and doubt decency.

Grice writes that it will be 'valuable' NOT ro restrict the 'inferences connected with semantic porperties', but to relate them to 'inferences connected," in general, with 'practical properties' whatsoever.

Why?

Well, "if" linguistic scepticism can NOT be prevented from 'expanding into scepticism about improperties of any kind', that "might be a heavier price than the lingustic sceptic woud be prepared to pay."

Unless he (Quine) won't pay, simpliciter and verbatim