Grice on the independence of theories

by JLS
--- for the GC

--- Careful examination by Grice on C and C' (vis a vis physicalist explanations of psychological phenonema).

From "Conception of Value" (1991), appendix:

"Someone who opposed the functionalist programme may at this stage say."

First:

"You explicitly subscribe to the idea of thinking of a concept as
EXPLICABLE in terms of its role in say, a specific law, i.e., in terms of
the concept's potentiality for some explanation E."

Second:

"You also subscribe to the idea that, where there is a concept-based
explanation E of a phenomenon P, there is also a more basic concept-based explanation of the same P."

Third:

"You must admit, though, that the explanation of P, as is drawn from concepts only is, from a THEORETICAL POINT OF VIEW, superior to an explanation E2 based on less primitive concepts."

Fourth:

"And this because a higher concept-based explanation E is drawn from a _more comprehensive theory T_, from which one yields more numerous & more precise predictions."

Fifth:

"Therefore, Occam's Razor dictates, roughly, that the ascription of a lower-type concept should be rejected _en bloc_ as lacking truth."

Grice's caveat:

"It is my view that such an argument be seen as a particular case of CANONICAL
SCEPTICISM, and therefore, to prove his conclusion wrong is just _not_
sufficient."

Grice's constructivist proposal:

"To my mind, to explain a phenomenon P is typically, to explain
P _qua_ exemplifying some particular feature or characteristic."

"And so, one
fact or system S1 may explain P _qua_ exemplifying characteristic C1, while
_another_ fact or system may explain P, but _qua_ exemplifying C2."

1.

"If system S1 is theoretically more adequate for the explanation of P with
respect to a class of characteristics C1 than is system S2, S1 is to be
preferred over S2."

2.

"Even if system S1 is theoretically more adequate for
the explanation of P with respect to C1 than is system S2 for the
explanation of P with respect to C*2*, S2 need _not_ be totally useless."

"If we want to explain P _qua_ exemplifying C2, my interest in such an
explanation E should _not_ be abandoned merely because the kind of
explanation available with respect to _some other class of characteristics_
(C1) is _theoretically superior_ to the kind available with respect to C2".

The sceptic may hold that CLAIM II as it opposes CLAIM I.

Grice notes, though:

"My view is that it's very dubiosu whether an explanation E
involving an A-type concept will always provide a SUFFICIENT CONDITION for
an explanation involving a B-type concept."

And this is not enough:

"Further, a A-concept-based theory T1 may well be _deficient_ as a theory to explain P _qua_ instantiating C2 if, for example, such a theory did _not_ contain a
provision for interests in the predication of B-type concepts OTHERWISE
than as tools for explaining P".

Not as dreary as it may. And the variables for C1 and C2 are interesting, since Grice's reflections appy to areas other than 'physical' and 'psycholological'. They can be transferred to 'semantic' and 'psychological', too, e.g. --.