Grice on 'formal' vs. 'informal' implicature (!) (WoW:362)

--- by JLS
------ for the GC

WE ALL KNOW THAT THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A *FORMAL* implicature (the whole point of the manoeuvre, as Dummett writes, in "Should Philosophy be Systematic?", is that the implicature is NO semantic offense).

Yet Gric writes on p. 362 when skipping the Macy's Mezzanine (i.e. when endorsing the American practice of talking 'ground-floor' versus 'non-ground floor' of acts -- sc. 'contrast' versus 'state' or 'direct' (someone to open the door).

"We may note that a ... kind of
NONFORMAL (as [opposed to] FORMAL)
implicature" may obtain in cases like

"p; on the other hand, q".

----

Grice on "so" and 'therefore' as hateful Anglic expressions for 'ergo' ("Cogito; ergo, sum").

Jack is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave" (uttered by Jill).

-----

"It may", Grice writes,

"be the case that U signals himself,
by his use of 'therefore' (or 'so', or 'ergo',
or 'thus') as performing the act
of

EXPLAINING

will be plausible ONLY on the assumption
that U accepts as '1' one or more
UNMENTIONED ground-floor matters
of fact."

------

"U's acceptance of such matters of facts"

-- or epxressions thereof --

"has to be supposed in order"

---- the typical transcendental, abductive, justification, reason-governed, of all things Gricea --

"in order to RATIONALISE the
explanation which U offers."

-- i.e. contra the loose U of "p; on the other hand, q" when no such contrast was MEANT. Semantic offense!

Grice goes on:

"In such a case, we may
perhaps say that the speaker

DOES NOT formally implicate"

--- but does it informally ---

"the matters of fact in question."

Which is back to Kramer's enthymeme with a charming vengeance! We hope friendlily.

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