Grice and Peacocke on Privileged Access

---- Grice talked repeatedly of 'privileged access' in his "Method" (in philosophical psychology, et al). Peacocke's essay on this is repr. in a book entitled "Privileged Access". It is an important topic for what after archival material in Chapman we know Grice called "rational psychology" (echoing Baumgarten, 'pscyhologia rationalis').

The way to distinguish a Griceian from a mock one, is privileged access and empirical, inductive evidence. If they say that they trust an utterer to say the truth based on 'experience' they are not rationalist enough to count as Griceain. B. Loar is such: He thinks that conversational maxims are just 'contingent generalisations over functional states' -- and he says that in an otherwise excellent book ("Mind and Meaning") and he is NOT a mock-Gricean, so we have to see him as saying that, but not as saying JUST that. Etc.

Grice distinguishes, aptly, between privileged access and INCORRIGIBILITY: they have nothing to do with one another, yet a clumsy philosopher (such as Witters) will merge both distinct things onto one.