Constatative/Performative: In Griceian Key

By J. L. Speranza
--- for the Grice Club.

It all started when I tried to say, following Vendler, "I hereby know that
it is raining", and failed to _mean_. Performatives As Constatives. I know
I should not be overwhelming but have compiled these notes about the idea
that performatives _are_ constatives, which may help to shed light on what
my view on the issues are and present some lines of arguments by people
like Warnock, Bach, Stampe, and other 'Griceans'...

From the OED:

constate, v. rare. [a. Fr. constater to
establish as certain, ascertain, certify,
verify, state as certain. In the Dict. of the
Academie only from 1740, and app. of not
much earlier origin. According to Littré f.
L. con- + status state; but more prob. f.
L. constat-, ppl. stem of constare: in
sense, it is a causal derivative of conster
to be established, be certain, ad. L. constare,
whence also the original pr. pple
constant has the sense `certain, established'.]
trans. To establish, ascertain, state.
1773 Alb. Butler Moveable Feasts (1852) II. 17
Its reality was constated to a degree of conviction.
1865 Miss Cobbe Studies New & Old 9
Having constated the peculiar doctrines
of Christ. 1889 J. M. Robertson Ess. Crit. Method 52 We
may perhaps best progress by constating a little more
lucidly the phenomena he seems to have in view.

KEYWORDS:

A Veritable Frankenstein Revisited. Constativism: Explicit Performative
Forms & Truth Conditions. Unmasquerading the Masquerader: the Explicit
Performative Verb Utterances, Implicature, and Truth-Conditions

I distinguish between: (a) performative utterance, such as:

(1) Three no trumps.

(if that's a performative utterance. Warnock says it is, p.110) from (b)
performative verb, e.g. "bid" in (3) or 'promise' in (4)

(3) I bid you farewell.
(4) I promise to go.

A performative utterance, I think, may _not_ contain a performative verb.
Further, there's (c): explicit versus non-explicit performative. I think
this applies to "verb". An utterance is an explicitly performative
utterance if it contains a performative verb.

(5) By uttering "I V that p", U V-s that p.

Is this analytic? No. Cfr.


(6) By uttering "I V that p" U _means_ that p.


Some excerpts.


1. From J. L. Austin's _How to do things with words_: "It seems clear that
to utter the sentence (I hereby V to you that p) (in of course, the
appropriate circumstances) is not to _describe_ my doing of what I should
in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it.
None of the utterances cited is either true or false. HTD, p.6. "We could
distinguish the performative opening part ("I state that...") which makes
clear how the utterance is to be taken that it is a statement (as distinct
from a prediction and c) from the bit in that clause which IS REQUIRED TO
BE TRUE OR FALSE." "The whole apparatus of 'explicit performatives' serves
to obviate disagreements as to the DESCRIPTION of illocutionary acts" HTD,
p.114).


2. Excerpts from G. J. Warnock, 'Some type of performative utterances', in
_Essays on JL Austin_. "A saying which, by convention, counts as doing
something could perfectly well be the saying of something TRUE OR FALSE
(though indeed, in such a case, truth or falsehood might not be the point
mainly at issue) -- so that the happy-unhappy distinction [early introduced
by Austin in dealing with this] does not in any way _exclude_ the
true-false distinction [that Austin calls 'fetish' cfr. 'masquerade']
(though of course it differs from it)(Austin says at first that
performative utterances are 'not true or false' (e.g. 'Performative
Uterances', p.222, 2nd edn, p.235 and How To Do Things with Words, p.5) and
even seems at times to take that as a partial crtierion of
performativeness. HE qualifies this later -- 'Considerations of the type of
_truth_ and falsity may infect performatives (or some performatives)' (How
to do things with words, p.55 -- not, however, as a glance at his text will
show, for anything like the reason I have in mind here." (p.112). Warnock
notes that for Austin, (and as others have said, too") allowing "something
like truth and falsity can 'infect' performatives 'braks down' the
performative/constative distinction. (Performative Utterances, p.238, and
How To Do Things with words, p.149. (Warnock disagrees there). Warnock
asks: if "I V to you that p" is the same type as "Three no trumps". "Is
this the _same_ special case as that of Mark I performative utterance --
the case of 'operative' utterance as roughed out in my first section above?
I gret to say that something of this sort has certainly, very SLOPPILY,
been supposed" (p.116). Who does Warnock have in mind? Himself! He writes:
"Though it pains me to mention this, I myself once wrote as follows: -- in
English Philosophy Since 1900, 2nd edn. p.104. "Austin suppsed at first
that such performative utterances were a special case. There is a
difference. The difference is that, in the cases he had af first
considered, it is made EXPLICIT in the utterance what speech act it is taht
the speaker is performing". Warnock notes that the operative words for
marrying whatever they are, are certainly _not_


(7) I marry thee.


(BUT THEN "MARRY" is NOT a performative verb). Warnock notes the mistake:
there is nothing in Austin to the effect that there performative utterances
"SHOULD BE of the form I V" where "V-ing" is the word for what the speaker
does." (p.117). Warnock offers by way of apology: "But if I got this point
wrong, I do not think Austin himself was perfectly clear about it!" Warnock
complains that Austin should have said "explicitly that there is absolutely
no reason to suppose tht there is a formal criterion for performativeness".
Warnock writes, "I did think that Austin's 'provisional' as he calls it
performative turned out to survive as the _explicit performative'. Indeed
it is not I think certain that Austin did not think so too, though I hope
he did not!" (p.118). Here this relates to Grice's idea of grammatical form
as a pretty good guide to logical form. "Austin says that explicit
performatives of the I V form were "masqueraders" (How to do things with
words, p.4). "they do look like, pose as _statements, whereas in fact, he
held, one who says 'I promise' does not sayt anything that could be _true
or false" p.119. Instead, Warnock says, "I now want to suggest there there
is actually no need to look at it in this way at all -- that explicit
performative utterances are _not_ masqueraders, that they are to be
construed _exactly_ as their form or 'grammar' suggests that they should
be" ... "conventions do not (necessarily anyway) come in at all here... In
saying, for example,


(8) I advise you to resign


I do indeed [as Austim claimed] make it explicitly clear that I am offering
you advice, but [and contra what Austin thought] that I do so just by
saying, TRULY OR FALSELY, that I do." (p.119). Warnock notes that the
suggestion is theoretically important simplifying things. "Austin, and I
myself did _for years and years_ found it _obvious_ that 'I promise', said
in promising, is _not_ true or false,a nd in particular that one who so
says 'I promise' does _not_ say that he promises. But what arguments are
there against the contrary view? Warnock considers:


(9) A: What do you do when your wife complains
of your habitual indolence?
B: I promise to work harder.


Warnock comments:

"From the fact that if, in saying 'I promise' I mean that
I _habitually_ promise, I do not _there and then_ promise, it does _not_
follow that I do _not_ here and now promise when, in saying 'I promise' I
mean that I here and now _do_!" (p.120). Warnock takes side from Lemmon:
"One can well hold, I think, that one _can_ say _falsely that one promises
(and likewise _mutatis mutandi_ for other explicit performatives). For
promising is, not _JUST_ saying that one does so, just producing that
dictum. For it to be the case that one promises, there must (very roughly)
be some envisaged commitment, asked for by, or offered to, some second
party, which in one's utterance one formally undertakes. If I say here and
now 'I promise', OUT OF THE BLUE, I have not -- other necessary
circumstances being absent in this case -- therein promised; so that in
such a case, maybe, I say that I promise, but FALSELY -- I do not. (Of
course, I don't make a false promise -- that's a different matter). ...
Since just saying 'I promise' is not, on any view, the sole and sufficient
element in promising, it is possible to say that one promises when one does
not, just as -- or anyway, somewhat as -- it is possible to say that one
smokes when one does not (I repeat that this is not, obviously, the case of
a false promise, in which case one _does_ promise, not intending to
perform)" (p.122) "explicit performative utterances of the "I V" form have
the peculiarity that, since in these cases what the speaker says that he
does is something that is done in speaking, and indeed is in fact done by
himself (if all goes well) in saying the very thing he says, the
TRUTH-VALUE of what he says is involved (let us say vaguely) in a decidely
unusual way with the fact that he says it. But one can quite well concede,
as clearly one must, that explicit performative utteranes are a rather
peculiar lot in _THIS_ way, wihtout holiding that they are peculiar in _not
having truth-values at all, or in being anomalous, masquerading exceptions
to the comfortable principle that one who says something of the form, 'I X'
therein says that he X-es". (p.122). Warnock recapitulates: "There is a
sub-class of utterances, indentifiable by the purely formal special feature
that, being in the first person present indicative active, they have as
main verb the _WORD FOR_ what (one thing which) a speaker would be said to
do so in issuing them. ... We can well hold here that the peaker, in his
utterance. SAYS THAT he does the thing in question -- so that, such
utterances can be construed as perfectly regular, non-anomalous,
unexceptional, non-masquearing uses of the first person present indicative
active". "Austin had got in his hand two birds of very different feather,
not one bird" "Maybe the _word_ "performative" really has rather broken
down, And might usefully in future be relieved of some of its duties..."
(p.125).


3. From S. W. Stampe's 'Making Promises' -- mimeo cited in his 'Meaning and
Truth in the Theory of Speech Acts': Note Five: "There is widespread
confusion about the truth value of performatives, baldy expressed by
Harrison: "When Miss Robinson says


(10) I promise not to be late.


she is not saying something which can be intelligibley said to be true, or
intelligibly said to be false". This is quite wrong. She IS saying
something that can be said to be true, to wit, that she will not be late.
The promisee may later reprimand her thus: "You _said_ that you would not
be late" (It is of course _another_ thesis, and a tenable one, that she was
not saying that she was promising). Harrison argues from the observation
that no one could properly reply to Miss Robinson, (11) or (12)


(11) That's true.
(12) That isn't true.


That this fact can't show that the promisor says nothing that could be true
is clear enough from the fact that Miss Robinson could have done the same
thing, made the same promise, by saying just


(13) I won't be late.


Surely THEN she has said something that can be true or false, although
still the response 'That's true' will be peculiar IF she is making a
promise -- as it will also if she is merely expressing an intention, but
_not_ if she is making a prediction. The oddity or felicity of a particular
such evaluating response depends, in very comple ways upon the
illocutionary force of the utterance and by the style of reference made to
the speech act. One could felicitously respond, for instance, to the girl
who says, "I promise not to be late",


(14) Don't _say_ you won't be late. You know it isn't _true_.


It would be absurd for _her_ to reply that she HADN'T SAID she wouldn't be
late, she had instead promised not to be." Stampe acknowledges Grice and
notes that this commonsense remarks follow from Grice's cooperative maxims.


4. Comments from S. R. Schiffer, _Meaning_, Oxford University Press.
(Orginally Oxon DPhil under PF Strawson's supervision). Consider
"constative" in OED. "Austin claims: explicit performatives are not
constative. Such utterances are neither true nor false". In uttering "I V"
U does not mean that he V-s.
"Austin does not argue for this claim; in fact, he thinks this point so
obvious that it needs no argument. How To Do, p.6)".


5. Austin held the distinction was constative/performative. While he _did_
coin "performative" (meaning what lawyers do when they use 'operative'),
'constative' had an early use: From the O.E.D.


constative. Gram. and Philos. [tr. G. konstatierend (K. Brugmann
Griech. Gram. (1900) §537), f. L. type constativus, f. constat- ppl. stem
of constare: see "constate" + -ive.]. Of a use of the aorist tense:
indicating that the action denoted has taken place, rather than emphasizing
its initiation or completion. Second usage:


capable of being true or false.


Thus: a statement that is capable of being true or false.
CITATIONS:


FIRST USAGE:
1901 P. Giles Man. Compar. Philol. (ed. 2) xxxi. 478
The 'constative' use of the Greek aorist, which refers to past actions
simply as having occurred.
1906 J. H. Moulton Gram. N.T. Gr. I. 109
The aorist looks at a whole action simply as having occurred, constative.
SECOND USAGE ("capable of being true or false").
1955 J. L. Austin How to do Things with Words (1962) i. 6
To issue a constative utterance is to make a statement.
1955 J. L. Austin How to do Things with Words vi. 67
Criteria would not distinguish performatives from constatives.


6. Links for Jonathan Harrison. Jonathan Harrison is quoted by Stampe
('Making Promises') as furthering J. L. Austin's idea in 'Other Minds' of
comparing (15) and (16)


(15) I know that p.
(16) I promise that p.


in 'Knowing and promising', repr. in A. P. Griffiths, ed, _Belief and
knowledge_, Oxford Readings in Philosophy, ed by G. J. Warnock.


Further links on J. Harrison:
1. Jonathan Harrison Philosopher's Nightmare & Other Stories
http://www.books-simply.co.uk/Philosophers-Nightmare-and-Other-Storie...
7
2655.html
2. Our Knowledge of Right & Wrong Jonathan Harrison Philosophy
http://www.books-department.co.uk/Our-Knowledge-of-Right-and-Wrong-07...
1
4.html
3. OUP: Classics of Philosophy: Volume III: The Twen
... Knowledge, Necessity, and Contingency; 14 Jonathan Harrison, A Defence
of Empiricism;
Part ... Continental and Post-Modern Philosophy; 32 Edmund Husserl: Ideas .=
..
http://www.oup.co.uk/isbn/0-19-513283-1
4. AddALL.com - browse and compare book price at 40+ Sites!
... TOP > PHILOSOPHY > Ethics and Moral Philosophy > ETHICS, MODERN-20TH
CENTURY. Pages:
1 2 3. ... Hardcover - List Price: $87.95 Author: Jonathan Harrison. ...
http://www.addall.com/Browse/Info/PHILOSOPHY--32/Ethics_and_Moral_Phi...
y
--1656/ ETHICS,_MODERN-20TH_CENTURY--20507
5. Duncan Salkeld - Making sense of differences: postmodern ...
... into truth and interpretation (Oxford 1984); see also Jonathan
Harrison's `The Trouble
with Tarski', The Philosophical Quarterly 48, for a lively critique of
T-sentence logic.
http://www.ucc.ie/chronicon/salknts.htm





7. Comments from D. W. Stampe, 'Meaning & truth in the theory of speech
acts', in P. Cole & JL Morgan, _Speech Acts. London: Academic Press, pp.
1-39. "It is merely futile to try to discuss these issues without some
effort to sepak precisely about meaning and that requires a lively
awareness of the various senses or usages that 'mean' may bear. And there
is no excuse for equvication by the iew, associated with Grice, that the
relevant concept of meaning may be ANALYSED in terms of intentions.
Needless to say, the proposal is not tht 'mean' just means the same thing
as 'intends'." Section, 'Constativism, or back to truth'. The utterance of
"I V that p" (IFID + S), given that one speaks literally and seriously,
satisfies the truth conditions for the statement that the speaker's
utterance hs the force of an F. e.g. the force of an order. But what
conditions are those. Let us suppose that they include the condition that
the speaker means what he says AS an F, that is, that he intends it to be
taken. If this supposition is correct, then the utterance, serious and
literal, of that sentence, satisfies the truth conditions of the
propoosition that the utterer intends what he says as an F. Re my previous
remark of Japanese, Stampe says, "At an auctin, one's uttering the words )I
bid five dollars' constitutes making a bid, or an offer to buy, whether one
is serious or not and ieven if he doesn't know what he is saying"
"Similarly, recruits are nformed that the REQUEST of a superior officer is
truth conditionally equivalent to (has the force of, or is to be regarded
as) an ORDER, and he may be subject to court-martial if he does not." "The
condition is ncessary for one's having ment what one must mean by a
sentence if he speaks literally, and for his having been serious in so
speaking are either identical with or include conditions that are
SUFFICIENT for the TRUTH of what one says, or more generally, SUFFICIENT
for the truth of some proposition that, in saying what he says, the U
represents as being true. This includes the proposition that the utterer
is, in speaking what he says, intending to perform a certain act. In just
the same way, and for the same reason, one of the conditons necessary for
my SERIOUSLY saying that ANYTHING is thus and so is that I BELIEVE it is
so. ... This covers implicatures too. Thus if I say.


(17) I hereby warn you that, being a philosopher,
John is dangerous.


and speak literally and seriously, I not only mean it, i.e. mean WHAT I
SAY, sc. (a) that John is a philosopher. I must also believe what I
implicate, i.e roughly that his being dangerous follows from his being a
philosopher."). "Here to, the meaning of the sentence I utter makes it the
case that a certain thing is true -- on the assumption that I speak
seriously and literally. Let us say that an utterance of a suitable
sentence "I V that p" has the force of a promise if it is true that the U
intends therein to be making a promise. On the constativist view, it is the
condition that MAKES TRUE that proposition -- that U intends therei to be
making a promise -- that makes it the case that the utterance has the force
of a promise." "When I utter an utterance of the form "I V that p" I have
expressed the proposition that I am promising, and implicate that the
conditions for its truth _obtain_. For Stampe, "I V that p" is an "oratio
obliqua". "It it is true that by uttering "I V that p" U thereby V-s, then
it must be the case that in uttering those words he is doing what that
requires, viz.: saying that he will come. Now that has to do with the
necessary conditions of the truth of various propositions that the utterer
of "I V that p" expresses.
This is a problem identified by Davidson: "As Davidson, discussing this
question , put it, the question is WHY it happens in such explicit
performative sentences that the internal (embedded) sentence S-2 "I will
come" is not INSULATED from being asserted by its being embedded within the
context of "I V that", that being the usual effect of embedding a sentence
in such a 'propositional attitude' context. (Davidson suggests that this is
the major serious question that exercised Austin about performative
utterances, although, as he also remarks, Austin never explicitly stated
this problem)". "Throughout this, we hear crashing towars us throu the
bushes a veritable Frankenstein, the thesis that performatives have no
truth value. How can the consattivist maintain that what makes it the case
that a promise (or more generally an act of V-ing) has been made is that
the truth conditions for "U has performed an act of V-ing" have been
satisfied when the truth of this proposition ("U has performed an act of
V-ing") has not been ASSERTED?" Stampe considers Austin's four examples of
"performative"


(18) I do (take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife).
(19) I name this ship the queen Elizabeth.
(20) I give and bequath my watch to my brother.
(21) I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.


Austin going, "None of these utterances cited is either true or false. I
assert this as obvious and do not argue it. It needs argument no more than
that "Damn" is not true or false" (p.6). Stampe writes: "Now, of these
sentences, only 'I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow' has a SENTENTIAL
COMPLEMENT. THIS IS IMPORTANT. For, whether one who says something of the
form "I (hereby) V that p has therein SAID that something is so depends
upon the nature of the complement C and further on the particular verb it
complements. (In "I do", does the speaker say that he does take this woman
to be his lawful wedded wife? I don't think so). With 'I name this ship',
it seems there is nothing there that might BE true or false. [but isn't it
true that he is naming the ship the Queen Elizabeth? Surely _that_ could be
said to be true or false. JLS]. With 'I bequath my watch to my brother',
does the utterer say that he beaqueats his watch to his brother? I think he
does. And it does seem to me that this last can be said to be 'true': if
the will is properly drawn, etc. his brother is to have his watch, and
further, his watch is bequeathed to, given to his brother. Now, granted,
the utterer is not _saying_ that these things ARE TRUE. He is not in that
way ASSERTING the truth of propositions or reporting facts. But that's
neither here nor there. Austin often does emphasise this last point, that
th utteer is not reporting facts but it is not a TELLING ONE, I must say.
Thus, when Austin says of his performatives that "...they do not describe
or report or constate anything at all, are not true or false" (p.5) he is

RUNNING TWO THINGS TOGETHER.

For, certainly the utterer does not _report_ that his watch is to go to his
brother, as if the fact that it is to go to his brother were there to be
REPORED upon 'prior' to his utterance. But this is quite consistent with
his having said, and truly, too, that the watch is to go to his brother.
The fact that one who says "I V that p" does not _report_ that he V-s that
p is quite consistent with the position that the utterer DOES SAY that he
V-s. And however that may be, the reason the U is _not_ reporting or
_stating_ may be this: What one reports or states is, if what one says is
TRUE, a fact that enters into the


CAUSAL EXPLANATION


of his uttering that sentence. Now, clearly performatives are _not_ related
CAUSALLY to facts in that 'direction of fit'. For surely the idea of a
performative is the idea of an utterance causes the fact to obtain that
would make what the utterer says _true_." Back to the watch bequeathing,
when, having forgotten what the U had said about the watch, we again
consult the will and find that it is to go to Brother Harry, do we not find
that it is so precisely because the dpearted SAID that the watch is to go
to his brother? He did not say that that was -true, of course, and indeed,
it is the fact that he said what the said, in the circumstances, that makes
what he said 'true'. As we've said, only one of Austin's examples conists
of a sentence EMBEDDED in an illocutionary force indicating device. (I bet
you sixpence that it will rain tomorrow). Sometimes, at least, the U of
that sentence DOES SAY that it will rain tomorrow and what he said may be
true -- or false, as I will point out when I came around to collect!" "But,
leaving aside even "betting" which is a tricky case anyway, we come here to
the mass of illocutionary verbs. These are verbs that will form oratio
obliqua sentences ("do", "name", and "bequeath" will not do so), taking as
complements SENTENCES TRANSFORMATIONALLY RELATED TO THE SENTECE UTTERED BY
THE PERSON REFERRED TO BY THE SUBJECT OF THE VERB."


(22) I promise that I will come.
announce
claim
warn
insist
object
etc.


"It is plainly a necessary condition of the TRUTH of these that the subject
should have SAID that he would come. Similarly, the truth conditions of


(23) I ask whether Joe is alive
wonder aloud
inquire


require that the subject should have ASKED whether Joe is alive. And the
truth conditions of


(24) I insist Joe to come
demand
command
order
tell


require that the subject should have SAID THAT Joe was to come. So far,
this is quite clear and in no way controversial. There remains only the
explicit performative form,


(25) I hereby promise that I will come.


the first person, noncontinuous present idnciative (active or passive)
singular or plural) When I utter this sentence seriously and literally I am
certainly saying that I will come and thus, I do certainly SAY something
that is either true or false. (Austin's later doctrine agrees in this, for
the performance of an illocutionary act requires the performance of a
locutionary act, i.e. an act of saying something in the full normal sense
thereof, consisting of the performance of a 'rhetic' act reported in oratio
obliqua sentences. Now, if "I hereby V that p" is a performative utterance,
then tehre are, indisputably, performative utterances in the issuing of
which something is SAID, and that, i.e. WHAT IS SIAD MAY CERTAINLY HAVE A
TRUTH VALUE. If this leaves it unclear whether performative utterances have
truth value or not, that is only because the meaning of the claim either
that they do or that they do not is simply too unclear to pronounce it true
or false. The foregoing sections have emphasised that it is principally
WHAT IS SAID that is evaluable as to truth, and that if soemthing is SAID,
then THE PRESUMPTION OF TRUTH IS TO BE MADE, and TRUTH CONDITIONS ARE
VARIOUSLY INVOKED. To recognise that something is being said, and what is
being said, requires going beneath the superficial form of the uttered
sentence. In particular an utterer may SAY something, in the sense invoking
considerations of TRUTH, by uttering sentences of moods other than
idnicative.


8. G. J. Warnock, _Object of Morality_: "How can one possibly say that to
promise is to offer a _truth_ about one's future behaviour? For is it not
well known that promise-making utterances are _performative_, and as such
have no truth-value at all? But this, for which Austin's authority is
wrongly claimed is a mere _confusion_. It is true, of course, taht promise
making utterances are perofrmative; namely, to issue such utterances (other
conditions being appropriate for that purpose) _is_ to make promises. But
it is _not_ true ing eneral that performative utterances do _not_ have
truth values. I may, in saying, for instance, 'That was a most interesting
paper' _compliment_ you, and also something which in, in point of fact,
untrue. What is true is that _sometimes_, in such a case, what is said has
no truth-value -- typically, where explicitly performative formulae are
used, as in 'I congratulate you' or I promise to do it'. But this does not
imply that promise making utterances can not have truth-values. It is only
to say that, in one way of making a promise, namely what the promise-maker
SAYS cannot be said to be true or false. This expresses however the
ORTHODOX VIEW but I am not by anymeans confident that it is a correct one.
It has been orthodox to hold that one who says 'I promise' does _not_
therein say THAT he promises or THAT anything else, and so, whatever he may
convey, says nothing true or false. But why would it be wrong to hold that,
in explicitly promising, he says -- truly or falsely -- THAT he promises?
This is a question about the wrokings of language, not promising! In any
case, there is nothing in even the orthodox view that makes it obviously
wrong to say that, if I promise, as I very well may, by saying, I promise
that I will go this is meant (and taken) as a TRUTH about my future
behaviour. So, even if what I say is not true or false, I CONVEY, do I not,
that I WILL do whatever it may be. To do this, I am inclined to say, is
what promising _is_! And that's how promising done, explicitly, in words
that themselves can be tagged as true or false."



9. Holdcroft writes: "If someone asserts, suggests, or conjectures something, he asserts, suggests, or conjecttures that it is true; and to
understand what a person conjectures or suggests by uttering a sentence x,
one must have a grasp of the truth conditions of x just as much as one does
to understand what he assserts by uttering x. Arguably, the expression of
some verdicts is not, strictly speaking, true or false. But since they are
meant to be correct, that is hardly surprising that they are expressed by
sentences that _can_ express something true or false; and one could _not_
understand what verdict was being conveyed by utterance of a sentence x
UNLESS ONE KNEW its truth conditions. Behabitives are a heterogeneous lot,
but again, when a sentence is used to compliment, etc, what is being
complimented is always something that is believed to have happened. Hence,
the appropriateness of a sentence which can express something true or false
in these cases also" (p.58). He considers cases like

(26) I deny that I bit him but admit that I kicked him.
(27) I warn you that he is dangerous, but ask you to see him.


A different range of cases:


(28)*I hint that you are living above your means.


"To utter this is not to hint." "Whatever the function of a performative
prefix is, it is clear that it does _not_ express a truth condition of the
sentence to which it is attached (This does not, of course, exclude the
possibility of a partactic analysis, nor does it rule the possibility that
explicit performatives 'as a whole' are true or false). Someone who utters


(29) I assert that Jill is there.


to assert that Jill is there does not assert something which is true only
if it true tht he asserts it. What he asserts is in no way different from
waht he would have asserted had he uttererd


(30) Jill is there.


instead to make his assertion, viz., that Jill is there. Some might agree
that the same thing would be asserted by uttering (29) and (30), but urge
that would be asserted is not that Jill is there, but that the speaker
asserts that she is. However, it is plain that this view has many
unacceptable consequences. If it were correct, then p would be tantamout to
(i.e. would have the same truth conditions9 as 'I assert that p'. Holcroft
considers parehtheticals:


(31) I warn you that Jill is there.
(32) Jill, I warn you, is there.
(33) Jill is there, I warn you.


CONCATENATIONS: "Often, something of the form


(34) I declare/state/announce that I V that p.


_is_ possible,, but it seems to be only a rhetorical flourish equivalent to
the plain 'I V'. Holdcroft quotes Fraser's examples:


(35) I admit that I concede the election was a fraud.
(36) I announce that I hereby promise to be timely
(37) I insist that I dare you to leave now.


"Vendler notes that occurring in the first person present indicative
without oddity is not a feature peculiar to performative verbs (versus
perlocutioanry verbs:


(38) I convince you that you are wrong
(39) I persuade you that you are wrong
(40) I frighten you that you are in danger)


since "know", "believe", "hope", etc., do also. Moreover the latter are
allergic to continuous tenses, just as performative verbs are, and both are
container 'verbs, i.e. the object of hwich is a noun-clause or, in modern
terminology, a sentence nominalisation of a certain type'. Given these
similarities between for example 'report' and 'know', there does not seem
to be much hope of distinguishing them grammatically. Vendler points out
that there is an important difference. If asked (41) one can answer (42).


(41) How long have you known that they are separated?
(42) For years.


But there is no non-deviant answer to the question,


(43) For how long have you reported that they are separated?


On the other hand, whilst the question (44) has (45) as a possible answer,


(44) When did you report that you saw him
(45) At 5 pm


the question


(46) When did you know that you saw him?


has no comparable answer. It is possible, then, to distinguish state verbs
like 'know' from achievement verbs like 'report' by the fact that the
temporal modifications they admit differ. Unfortunately, however, as
Vendler points out, one cannot define a performative verb as a CONTAINER
VERB which is also an ACHIEVEMENT verb and which can occur in the prsent
indicative active, since this is true also of such verbs as 'decide',
'realise', and 'discover'. However, Vendler goes on to argue that members
of this latter class of verbs Can _not_ occur in the first person present
indicative _without general indications of scope_. Hence,


(47) I decide to go home.


is as it stands somewhat odd, though


(48) I usually decide to go home when he becomes offensive.


is not. Vendler concludes that: "performatives belong to the genus of
propositional verbs, i.e. container verbs corresponding to impoerfect
nominals, all of which show the symptomatic reluctance towards the
progressive form. This genus, however, splits into three main species:


(a) performatives
which achievement time-schema and unmodified first
person singular present occurrence


(b) the _decide_ group, which the same time-schema but no such
present occurrence.


(c) propositional attitude verbs (know, believe, etc) with the
state time-schema.


Clearly, performative verbs are sharply distinguished from perlocutioanry
ones by Vendler's characterisation, just as they are from propositional
attitude verbs. Holdcroft casts doubts:


(49) I notice taht we have strawberries for tea.



Holdcroft writes: (49) is hardly deviant, yet, t ask:


(50) For how long have you noticed?

is no more appropriate than


(51) For how long have you promised that you'd go?


So 'notice' is _not_ a propositional attitude verb. But it is also a pretty
unpromising candidate as a performative verb since noticing IS A PERCEPTUAL
ACHIEVEMENT WHICH DOES NOT INVOLVE A PUBLIC PERFORMANCE" (p.128).


10. From Bach/Harnish. CONSTATE IN OED. "We wish to argue that Austin's
doctrine, that performatve utterances do not constate is mistaken." Def.:
"An explicit performative is the utterance of a sentence with main verb in
the first-person singular, simple present indicative active, this verb
being the name of the kind of illcoutionary act one would ordinarily be
performing by uttering that sentence." An interface with pragmatics/grammar
(Sadock). Bach/Harnish ask, why not call


(52) I state that it is raining


an "explicit CONSTATIVE"? They do! They write: "Imagiine a state of affairs
in which speakers of English did _not_ make performative utterances in
ussing sentence like


(53) I warn you that the ice is thin.


but used them merely to make statements". I can't imagine that because
that's the _current_ state of affairs! "In such a case, there is not reason
to hold that for those speakers a word like "warn" would differ in
_meaning_ from what they mean for us. ... Surely for us 'warn' means the
same as it does in other constructions. (Katz disagrees). They consider the
[paratactic] format


(54) The ice is thin,
and that's a warning.


They claim (p.207) that in uttering


(55) I state that I warn you that the ice is thin


U is _not_ Warn-ing. They also note the self-referential nature of "hereby"
look "hereby" (not used by Grice though). in OED.




From the OED.



hereby (hI@r'baI, 'hI@rbaI), adv. [f. here adv. + by prep. Cf. MDutch
hierbi, MLG. hirbi, Dutch hierbij, MHG. hierbî., Ger. hierbei. The
stress shifts with the position of the word; cf. `I 'hereby promise', `I
promise here'by'.]
1 (here'by&sd.) By or near this place; in this neighbourhood; close by. Obs=
.
1250 Gen. & Ex. 3572 Quat Iosue to moysi, `Ic wene he fi3ten dun her-bi'.
C. 1440 York Myst. xv. 13 Or he be borne in burgh hereby. A. 1533 Ld.
Berners Huon lxiii. 218 Sende fyrst to an abbay that is here by. 1588
Shaks. L.L.L. iv. i. 9 Hereby vpon the edge of yonder Coppice. 1631 Weever
Anc. Fun. Mon. 588 Hereby was a religious House for preaching Friers. 1655
J. Jennings tr. Elise 30 A Tenants daughter of mine, a Gentleman here by.
b Past this place. Obs.
1400 Rom. Rose 6300, I wole nomore of this thing seyne, If I may passen me
herby. C. 1485 Digby Myst. (1882) iv. 277 The pepill that passis here-by.
2 In connexion with this. Obs.
1230 Hali Meid. 23 Loke þenne her bi hwa se of hire meidenhad lihteð in=
to
wedlac. A. 1250 Owl & Night. 127 Her-bi men seggeþ a bispel.
3 By, through, or from this fact or circumstance; as a result of this; by
this means.
1320 R. Brunne Medit. 67 Here by þou mayst lere Þat of o dysshe þey e=
tyn yn
fere. C. 1400 Maundev. (Roxb.) x. 39 Hereby schuld it seme þat haly writt=
e
ware no3t trewe. 1526 Tindale 1 John ii. 3 And herby we knowe that we have
knowen him. 1594 Shaks. Rich. III, i. iv. 94, I will not reason what is
meant heereby. 1665 Hooke Microgr. Table 247 A multitude of Phænomena
explicable hereby. 1756 C. Lucas Ess. Waters III. 105 Hereby, we detect the
errors of those who evaporate..waters. 1843 Bethune Sc. Fireside Stor. 11,
I hereby promise to mend the whole in the most scientific manner. 1875
Jowett Plato (ed. 2) I. 157 Hereby you may know that I am right.

Bach/Harnish refer to Lemmon's class of "sentences verifiable by their
use". Performatives are so, but more: "true IN VIRTUE of their use", unlike
most of Lemmon's _other_ examples." Gricean 'working-out' schema:


(i) The U has has just said,
"I warn you that the ice is thin".


(ii) I.e. U is _stating_ that
he is warning me that the ice is thin.


(iii) If the statement is true,
U must be warning me that the ice is thin.


(iv) If he is warning me that the ice is thin,
it must be his uttering that consitutes the 'warning'


(For, what else could it be?)


(v) Presumably, he is speaking what he thinks is true.


_________________________________________________________


Ergo:


(vi) In stating that he is warning me that the ice is thin,
U is warning me that the ice is thin.


(p.208). "The success of the performative would be vitiated if any of the
steps in the inference were blocked". Searle assumes a similar approach in
"How performatives work". He writes, "To show how my analysis works in more
detail let us go thru a derivation from the addressee's point of view. We
should _en passant_ be able to show how the utterance of a performative
sentence constitutes both a declaration and, by derivation, an assertion:


(i) U utterered the sentence,
"I hereby warn you that the ice is thin"


(ii) The literal meaning of the utterance is such
that by that very utterance U _intends_ to make
it the case that he warns me that the ice is thin.


(iii) Therefore, in making the utterance, U manifested
an intention to make it the case by that utterance that
he warned me that the ice is thin.


(iv) Threfore, in making the utterance U manifested an
intention to _warn_ me that the ice is thin.


(v) Warnings are a class of actions where the manifestation
of the intention to perform the action is sufficient
for its performance, given that certain other
conditions are satisfied.


(vi) I assume those other conditions _are_ satisfied.


(vii) U warned me that the ice is thin, by that utterance


_________________________________________________________


Ergo:


(viii) U both said that he warned me that the ice is thin,
and made it the case that he warned me that the
ice is thin. Therefore, he made a true statement.


Bach uses "regret". Is regret a performative? it's used by Sadock a lot!
And by Grice... Other examples by Fraser:


(56) I must ask you to leave
(57) I can promise you'll be home
(58) I want to thank you for the Beaujolais
(59) I would suggest you try some.


(60) I must forbid you from cutting off your right arm.


cfr.


(61) I am able to promise you I won't squeal


"Unlike (57) would _not_ be normally be taken as a hedged promise, but
simply as an assertion of the speaker's ability". Just occurred to me:


(62) I hereby know that p


does not make sense!


Other examples by Fraser


(63) I can promise but I won't
(64) I would suggest a shot of Irish whiskey, but I won't.
====
==========
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