Ceteris Paribus, Grice Is Right

by JLS
for the GC.

Grice loved a 'ceteris paribus'

Fro the OED:

cæteris paribus. Other things being equal, other conditions corresponding. 1601 T. Wright Passions Pref. A 4 b,

Yet my meaning is alwayes cæteris paribus, because [etc.].

1690 Locke Govt. ii. §105. 325

Cæteris paribus, they commonly prefer the Heir of their deceased King.

1751 Chesterfield Lett. (1774) II. 124

And cæteris paribus, a French minister will get the better of an English one, at any third court in Europe.

1887 W. J. Harris in Nat. Rev. Dec. 454

The wonder is that France is not in a far worse state than ourselves. Cæteris paribus, she ought to be, with her unsettled government [etc.].

1964 Economist 29 Aug. 828/2

That comfortable hold-all, ceteris paribus.

----

Grice writes

"I interpret that idea that the psychological theory for a given type is an extension of, and includes, the psychological theory of its predecessor type. The realisation of this idea is at least made possible by the assumption that psychological laws may be of a _ceteris paribus_ form, and so can be modified without emendation."

Seth Sharpless led me to be careful about that.

I use the operator "P ~> Q" to mean "If P, ceteris paribus, Q" which I regard as the principle of "non-monotonicity". See "Conversational Implicature and Non-Monotonicity"

Schiffer, who was Strawson's tutee at Oxford but knew Grice well, and vice versa, wrote about this in _Mind_ (vol. 100, 'Ceteris paribus laws').

Schiffer distinguishes between ceteris paribus laws and what he calls "strict" laws (p.397).

Schiffer quotes Fodor:

"Strict laws and ceteris paribus laws with SATISFIED ceteris paribus conditions operate alike in respect of their roles in covering causal relations. This is as it should be: strict laws are just a special case of ceteris paribus laws, where the ceteris paribus clauses are discharged _vacuously_. They're the ceteris paribus laws for which "all other things" are ALWAYS equal" Fodor, Making Mind Matter More,

Schiffer's concern is: does a ceteris paribus "sentence", to start with,
express a proposition?

His example being,

1. If Jones wants the apple,
ceteris paribus,
he'll take steps to get it.

"But (1) is _deceptive_." Schiffer translates that into English proper!

2. If Jones wants the apple,
all other things being equal,
he'll take steps to get it.

Schiffer's problem is then with the clause, "all other things being equal",
which attributes a property ("being equal") to some referent ("all other
things").

So far so good.

Schiffer writes:

"It _looks_ as tho' (1) is then expressing a determinate proposition, since "all other things" refer to some contextually determinate things, and "equal" is expressing some determinate relation _among them_."

The trouble, Schiffer notes, is to think that (1) is tantamount to, rather, (3)

3. If Jones wants the apple,
AND ...,
he'll take steps to get it.

This, Schiffer notes, "does _not_ express a proposition". Schiffer quotes
from Churchland:

4. For all P and all Q, if a person believes P
& believes that if P, Q
-- barring confusion, distraction, etc,.
-- the person believes Q.

(Larry Tapper discussed a number of these laws. He says we
are all fallibilists --).

Schiffer notes:

"Of course, the little word "etcetera" makes this - at best - a PARTIAL specification of a law -- and not a law proper".

Schiffer expresses Churchland's claim as saying that

"psycho-physical mechanisms are defeasible".

Schiffer is, like Churchland, endorsing materialism here, and notes that it is the ceteris paribus-defender's burden to prove that every physical defeaster determines
a psychological defeater".

Fodor also allows for the materialism:

"On the one hand, the ceteris paribus clauses of folk psychological laws are
IN-ELIMINABLE from the point of view of folk psychology's conceptual
resources. On the OTHER hand, we have NO REASON to doubt taht these clauses
can be _discharged_ in the vocabulary of a lower-level science (neurology,
say)."

Schiffer expresses Fodor's claim as

5. There exists a condition C, such that C is
a condition specifiable in the language
of some more basic science than folk-psychology
(e.g. neurophysiology) & it's a law that P causes
Q when C is satisfied.

Schiffer refines Fodor's claim as:

6. Ms cause Bs ceteris paribus if for each realisation D
of M there is a same-level condition C such that D&C
is nonsuperfluously causally sufficient for a B event.

and - ultimately as

7. Ms cause Bs ceteris paribus iff for each of "sufficiently many"
realisations D of M there is a same-level condition C
such that D&C is nonsuperfluously causally sufficient
for a B event.

Schiffer turns that into syllogistic form:

8. PREMISE:
There exists a D and a C,
such that Dx & Cx & Dx & Cs is nomologically sufficient for Bx
CONCLUSION: Bx.

Schiffer notes that we wouldn't call this a psychological law, because the
basic conjunction C&D is given in the language of physics, not psychology.

He adds:

"I doubt that there is any interesting sense in which ceteris paribus sentences belong to folkpsychology".

Schiffer writes that the craving for generality is at play here:

"General knowledge requires a general proposition, and that, it is reasonable to suppose, will be some proposition that shows how beliefs and desires can be among the determinants of action. At the same time, we know this general proposition
CAN'T be a strict law; whence the default conclusion that it's a ceteris
paribus law, like

9. If x desires p and believes that p if x does A
& x has correct beliefs about how to do A
& x is able to do A
& x has no stronger competing desire,
ceteris paribus,
x does A.

We have a deductive argument whose first premise is the general ceteris
paribus proposition, the second is a conjunction of particular fact
propositions (about, say Odile wanting to go to Lyon to meet her lover) and
what she wants and believes, and whose third premise is the propostion that
"cetera" are paria".

"A pretty picture", Schiffer writes!

Schiffer's own account attempts to provide psychological explanation that does not rely on a law. For which he deals with propositions like:

10. Odile went to Lyons
because she wanted to be with her lover and believed he was there.

11. x F-ed because x G-ed Ee and Ee' scuh that e caused e' and e is a G-ing by x
and e' is an Fing by x and e wouldn't have caused e' if e hadnt been Ging
by x.

12. Hugo became embarrassed because he burped in the presence of
Regina. and

13. X F-ed because x G-ed only if 1. x's G-ing caused x's F-ing
and 2. x's G-ing wouldn't have caused x's F-ing if it hadn't been a G-ing))=

But I still hold it true: Caeteris paribus, Grice is right.

REFERENCES
Cartwright, N: How the laws of physics lie. Oxford. Chapter included in
P.G.R.I.C.E.
Churchland, P. Eliminative materialism and propositional attitudes. JPhil,
vol. 78.
Fodor, J A Making Mind Matter More. Philosophical Topics, 17.
Schiffer, S R Ceteris paribus laws. Mind, vol. 100