Akrasia in Grice

by JLS
for the GC

Video meliora proboque sed deteriora sequor.
Medea, in Ovid, Metamorphose, VII -- Medea

Grice, like Davidson, is concerned with what Grice calls the 'paradox of
akrasia'. With Davidson, Grice uses 'passion', and with Davidson, refers to
akrasia being a case where 'passion [is] the victor over duty' (Grice's example of
the man who one night stays in his warm bed rather than go wash his teeth (as
he had forgotten to do) (Grice/Baker, p.29). Some passionate acting, one would
say -- but this is a technical use of 'passion'.

Grice slightly modifies Davidson's symbolism and logical representation.
Notably, in the conditional judgements we are concerned with the protasis is,
perhaps more naturally, written _before_ (as the name implies) the apodosis
(consequent), so we have the akratic as having in her mind _two_ things:

(i) Prima-Facie (All-Things-Considered, !p)
(ii) !~p

At this point, Grice refers here to his unpublication, 'Probability,
Desirability, & Modal Operators' -- delivered in Performadillo, -- a conference on
performatives at Armadillo, Texas -- cited by Levinson in _Pragmatics_ (Cambridge
Textbooks in Linguistics). By 'modal' operator, Grice is refering to the
_mode_ as what grammarians call the 'mood', i.e. to things, like in the akratic,
like "!". Grice notes that

"Prima-Facie (All-Things-Considered,!p is better than !~p)"

can mean (at least) _two_ things:

(i) that "!p" is _good_.

(ii) that !p is better than any alternative.


At this stage, Grice/Baker propose a 7-step derivation (p.34) that would
cover not just practical akrasia, but something that fascinated his intellect --
'theoretical akrasia' ("it is raining, but I don't want to believe it"):

Boulomaic Version Doxastic Version

1. pf(A,!p) pr(A,p)
2. pf(A&B,!p) pr(A&B,p)
3. pf(A&B&C&D,!p) pr(A&B&C&D,p)
4. pf(all things before me,!p) pr(all things before me,p)
5. pf(ATC,!p) pb(ATC,p)
6. !p |- p
7. R wills !p R judges p


Grice/Baker provide some detail about a 'deontic' interpretation of
Davidson's simple "All-Things-Considered" to read "all which _SHOULD_ be considered", and not merely as 'all things _de facto_ considered: "Surely an account of akrasia should provide for the possibility of a measure of scrupulousness in the
deliberation of the agent who subsequently acts incontently." (p.35). Further,
this fits with the standard definition of 'akratic'; Grice/Baker define the
akratic as the agent who "thinks that what she's doing is something which she
should _not_ be doing".

Grice provides two views of akrasia here: a naive one, and a more
sophisticated one which he endorses. According to the naive view of akrasia, the
incontinent judges that he should do p but does not p. In to the sophisticated view
of akrasia, however, akrasia becomes a "sin of thought" rather than a sin of
agency: the thinker thinks that he should judge that he should do p but does not
actually judge that he should do A.

Grice and Baker write:

"On the face of it, the naive view seems way superior." (p.41)

"Why should our departure from the naive view be thougth to give a
better account of akrasia? First, it seems _easier_ to attribute to people a
failure to act as they fully believe they ought to act than to attribute to them a
failure to believe what they fully believe they ought to believe. Second, what is
there to prevent a person from judging that he should do p, when he judges
that he should judge that he should do p, except his disinclination to do p.
Third, would it not be more natural to suppose that this disinclination
prevents his judgement that he should do p from being followed by his doing p
than to suppose that it prevents his judgement that he should judge that
he should do p from being followed by jis judgement that he should do p?" At
this point, I heartily agree with L. Tapper when he famously wrote:

I fear weakness of the will is [too much]
like hard work.

Grice/Baker seem to be certain that, here, it's all about 'pleasure': "The
incontinent person forms an intention to do ~p to which she is promted by its
prospective pleasantness. In spite of the fact, of which she is aware, that the
conditions fo far taken into acccount (which include the prospective
pleasantness of ~p) so far as they go favour p. It appears to the incontinent person
that the claim of prospective pleasantness of ~p is or is being outweighed, but,
nevertheless, she judges that the pleasant thing is the best thing to do and
so axcts on the judgement". (p.45). Back to 'theoretical akrasia', and ATP in
_probablistic_ reasoning -- fallibilist reasoning, to use Tapper's common
theme: Grice/Baker write: "If I am investigating probabilitistically the
possibility that it is now raining in Timbuctoo, the relevant ideal totality of
evidence should _NOT_ include the fact that it is raining in Timbuctoo." (p.36).
Grice refers at this point L. Carroll's 'Achilles & the Tortoise': "the
incontinent agent is _not_ like the Tortoise, who would accept modus ponens and p, and p -> q, but yet, do not infer "q". Grice approaches akrasia in _Aspects
ofReason_, too:"I am going to be almost exclusively concerned with alethic &
practical arguments, the proximate conclusions of which will be, respectively, of the forms "Acc (|- p)" and "Acc (!p)". E.g. "Acceptable (it is the case that it
snows)", and "Acceptable (let it be that I go home)". We might regard it as
a _sentential_ modifier: to utter "Acceptable (let it be that I go home" will
be to utter "Acceptably, let it be that I go home".

TO ADOPT THIS VIEW WOULD SEEM TO
COMMIT TO THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF
INCONTINENCE;

for since 'accept that let it be that I go home' is to be my rewrite for
'V-accept (will) that I go home', ANYONE x WHO CONCLUDED, BY PRACTICAL
ARGUMENT, THAT 'Acceptable let it be that x go home' would IPSO FACTO will to
go home." It is here that Grice traces the parallel with 'doxastic akrasia':

"Any one who concluded, by alethic argument, 'acceptable it is the case that
it snows', would _ipso facto_ judge that it snows. So, an alternative rading
seems preferable." And the debate may ensue. Some further refs. to 'akrasia'
are listed below, plus a few online links.

From Urmson. The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary:
"AKRASIA: in Aristotle and later writers, lack of self-control, the condition
of being akrates. The verb is akrateuesthai-to lack, or exhibit the lack of
self control. Sometimes translated 'incontinence.' In Plato, except in
spurious Definitions, used more loosely and always written akrateia, as in
Rep. 461b; meta deines akrateias gegonos-was born in terrible
licentiousness. In Aristotle akrasia is the condition of the man who has
right principles but whose appetite leads him to act contrarily to them,
whereas the egrates controls his appetite. Both the egkrates and the akrates
are to be distinguished from the agathos and the kakos who act well or ill
without internal conflict, though Plato does not make this sharp
distinction--Ho akrates epithumon men prattei, proairoumenos d'ou-the
uncontrolled man acts in accordance with his appetite, not with his choice
(Ar. E.N. 1111b 13-14). AKRASIA proper is lack of self control with regard
to the bodily pleasures of touch and taste; if self-control is lacking in
other spheres the term must be qualified: hetton aiskhra akrasia he tou
thumou-an uncontrolled temper is less disgraceful (Ar. E.N.1149a24)"=20

REFERENCES:


Akrill JL. Aristotle. Cited by Grice in _Aspects of Reason_.


Aristotle. Complete Works. Princeton University Press, ed J Barnes.
Nicomachean Ethics. rev by JO Urmson. Nichomachean Ethics.
Classics of Western Philosophy ed S Cahn. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Davidson D. How is weakness of the will possible? In J Feinberg _Moral
concepts_. Repr. in _Essays on Actions & Events. Clarendon.
----- Reply to Grice on weakness of the will. In Hintikka/Vermazen.

Grandy RE. Schiffer's desires. Southern JPhil 17.

Grice GR. Are there reasons for acting? In P French, Essays in ethical
theory 1980.

Grice HP. Intention & uncertainty. PBA.
---- (with J. Baker) Davidson on 'The weakness of the will'. In Hintikka &
Vermazen.
---- Aspects of reason. Clarendon.

Hardie W. Aristotle's ethical theory

Joachim H H On akrasia.

Kenny AJP. The practical syllogism & incontinence
--The anatomy of the soul: historical essays in the philosophy of
the mind. Blackwell.

Peacocke CAB. Intention & akrasia. In Hintikka/Vermazen

Pears DF. Motivated irrationality. Oxford.

Plato. Dialogues. Esp. Protagoras, and Meno.

Urmson JO. Aristotle's Ethics. Blackwell.

Wiggins DGP. On akrasia.