Ακρασία and Self-Deception

My marginalia on Chapman:

"Actually, a man does not need to wait to
observe his-self heading for the plate of
spaghetti on the table before he knows
he is hungry"

-- But a woman does!

(when dieting)

Grice was too optimistic about the iteration of judicativeness in volitiveness. Cfr. 'so abstract it hurts', this blog.

For Grice, there's of course not

intention and Uncertainty

but

Intention and INcorrigibility
Intention AND Privileged Access

Chapman -- citing Grice's early "Intention and Disposition" -- discussed at length with Bayne in Jones's site:

"It is simply not possible to say"

-- but people are constantly saying 'contradictory things', literally -- Chapman, other page --

"'I am not sure whether I intend...'
in the way it IS possible to doubt
other psychological states."

Dunno. I mean, I don't know if I mean dunno. Etc.

But anyways (sic) Grice was a genius in thinking that

Moore's paradox

It is storming but I won't believe it

is the _exact_ 'alethikos' (or theoretikos, as I prefer) counterpart to the 'praktikos' akrasia (Grice 2001:8).