my luve’s like a red red rose

Speranza

my luve’s like a red red rose

that’s newly sprung in June

o my luve’s like the melodie

that’s sweetly play'd in tune

There is an online essay by E. J. Lowe (University of Oxford, &c), where he develops a sort of four-categorial framework. It may connect with Roger Bishop Jones's recent characterisation of Grice's replies in fictional dialogues:

Why is an English mail box called 'red'?
Becaut it is red.

Why is that distinguished-looking person called "Grice"?
Because he is Grice.

Lowe sees things as:


entities
|
__________|__________
|                      |
|                      | 
universals             particulars
|                      |
______|______         ______|______ 
|              |        |              |
|              |        |             | 
properties   relations     |             | 
|             | 
|             | 
objects         tropes
|
___________|__________ 
|                       |
|                       | 
abstract objects       concrete objects 
|                       |
______|______           ______|______ 
|              |         |              |
|              |         |              |
sets    propositions    masses      organisms


The distinguishing  features of the four different ontological systems Lowe represents as follows:

____________________________________________
|               |               |               |
|    objects   |  universals   |    tropes     |
_______|______________|______________|______________| 
|        |               |               |               |
|   1    |      R        |     E/R       |      F        |
|_______|______________|______________|______________| 
|        |               |               |               |
|   2    |      F        |      F        |      E        |
|_______|______________|______________|______________|
|        |               |               |               |
|   3    |      F        |     E/R       |      F        |
|_______|______________|______________|______________| 
|        |               |               |               |
|   4    |      F        |      F        |      F        |
|_______|­______________|______________|______________|


There are then four ontological systems

F = Fundamental  
R =  Reduced  
E =  Eliminated

Lowe writes -- (in this online essay whose specific link should be provided soon, perhaps in ps or commentary)

"We should gravitate  towards the fourth system of ontology identified
earlier, the system which  acknowledges three distinct ontological categories
as
being fundamental and  indispensable — the category of objects, or
individual substances; the category  of universals; and the category of tropes,
or,
as I shall henceforth prefer to  call them, modes. It is then but a short
step to my own variant of this system,  which distinguishes between two
fundamental categories of universal, one whose  instances are objects and the
other whose instances are modes. This distinction  is mirrored in language by
the distinction between sortal and adjectival general  terms — that is,
between such general terms as

'planet'

and

'flower'

on the one hand and such general terms as

'red'

and

'round'

on the other."

"The former denote kinds of object, while the latter denote properties of 
objects.".

"The four-category ontology ...provides, I believe, a uniquely satisfactory
metaphysical foundation for natural science."

"The figure that I draw below helps to highlight the main structural 
features of the four-category ontology."

"In this diagram we use the term 'attribute' to denote the category of 
property-universals and, for simplicity of presentation, we are ignoring relational  universals.


Kinds          characterised  by            Attributes                     
                            
instantiated by       exemplified  by        instantiated  by              
                              
Objects          characterised  by              Modes



Lowe is an interesting philosopher, and the way he deals with ontological questions in terms of linguistic botanising, very much alla Grice, even if he (Lowe) would deny the connection -- like Grice, he is an Oxonian, too -- is charming.

Since Jones is a very systematic philosopher, I thought the reference to Lowe and how he distinguishes a 'red' from a 'rose' might be found to be of some interest.

Cheers.



----

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