"Because he is Paul Grice" -- Minimalism and Extensionalism alla Grice

Speranza

In a post to "THE GRICE CLUB", Jones wrote:

"I'd like to discuss the material recently presented by Speranza on Grice's views on minimalism and extensionalism. I'd like to take this in small chunks, so here is a first question. Speaking of "Reply to Richards" Speranza tell is: "On p. 68, Grice refers to  "Extensionalism" as a ..."

"position imbued with the spirit of
Nominalism [another demon], and
dear both to those who feel that
'Because it is red' is no more
informative as an anser to the question
'Why is an English mail-box called 'red'?'
than would 'Because he is Paul Grice' is an
answer to the question 'Why is that distinguished-looking
philosopher called 'Paul Grice'?', AND
 also to those whe are particularly impressed by the power of set theory."

Jones comments:

"I guess I must be one of the extensionalists to which Grice refers here, for I can't see what distinction is between the two examples cited. So I'm wondering whether Speranza can offer some more elucidation of what Grice is saying here."

OK.

Let us consider the dialogues then:

DIALOGUE 1:

A: Why is an English mail-box called 'red'?
B: Because it is red.

DIALOGUE 2:

A: Why is that distinguished-looking philosopher called 'Paul Grice'?
B: Because he is Paul Grice.

-----

I think one should start with Mill, "System of Logic", and the idea, challenged by Alice (in Alice in Wonderland) that proper names have no meaning.

Variant:

Humpty Dumpty: So, what is YOUR name?
Alice: Alice.
Humpty Dumpty: Funny name. What does it mean?
Alice: Must a name mean anything?

----

So, here Grice seems to be distinguishing, in predicate logic, the distinction between a predicate proper, symbolised by F, G, ... (or as I prefer, "A", "B", ...) and "individuals" symbolised by "a", "b", ...

So when we say

Aa

we mean that the individual "a" has the property "A".

So, an English mail-box is called 'red' because it bears the property 'RED'.

Of course, Quine denies this, and wants to get away with individuals like 'a' -- or 'p' for "Pegasus"  -- which becames "Something pegasises".

In the case of "g" -- for Grice, the question seems slightly more complex.

We may say that

'Something gricises".

Jones is right in that, on the surface of things, there doesn't seem to be much of a difference betweeen the responses.

But then again, let us consider Grice's 'canon' here: "INFORMATIVENESS".

We should recall that Grice came rather late to the idea of informativeness. In "Causal theory of perception" he preferred to speak of 'strength'.

A claim c1 is stronger than claim c2 can thus be defined in terms of entailments.

He found himself in a puzzling position here, for he wanted to say that

"The pillar box seems red" looks like something LESS strong than "The pillar box IS red", yet "neither entails the other".

Since in "Reply to Richards" he speaks of informativeness, we may need to define that notion.

One way is via the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, in a way that relates to Bar-Hillel via Carnap.

From:

Floridi, Luciano, "Semantic Conceptions of Information", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/information-semantic/.


"It might perhaps, at first, seem strange that a self-contradictory sentence, hence one which no ideal receiver would accept, is regarded as carrying with it the most inclusive information. It should, however, be emphasized that semantic information is here not meant as implying truth. A false sentence which happens to say much is thereby highly informative in our sense. Whether the information it carries is true or false, scientifically valuable or not, and so forth, does not concern us. A self-contradictory sentence asserts too much; it is too informative to be true. (p. 229)"

And so now we may proceed to re-read Grice:


"Extensionalism" as a position imbued with the spirit of
Nominalism ..., and
dear both to those who feel that
'Because it is red' is NO MORE INFORMATIVE
 as an answer to the question
'Why is an English mail-box called 'red'?'
than would 'Because he is Paul Grice' is an
answer to the question 'Why is that distinguished-looking
philosopher called 'Paul Grice'?', AND
 also to those whe are particularly impressed by the power of set theory."

It may do to relate this to set theory.

For the set "Paul Grice" contains one single element: "Paul Grice".

Whereas the set "RED" contains, one hopes, more than one.

--- Grice here seems to be underestimating what Kripke calls "the seas of language". For Kripke writes:

"Actually sentences like 'Socrates is called "Socrates" ' are very
interesting and one can spend, strange as it may seem, hours talking
about their analysis. I actually did, once, do that. I won't do that,
however, on this occasion. (See how high the seas of language can rise.
And at the lowest points too.)."

We may re-write Kripe's claim to apply to Grice -- and come up with stuff like what follows:

Actually, sentence like "Paul Grice is called "Paul Grice"" are very
interesting [however uninformative at the surface level] and one
can spend, strange as it seem [to the non-Griceian] LONG hours
talking about their analysis".

For, do we involve ourselves with a commitment to essentialism -- or 'haecceity'?

"I actually did, once, do that. ... See how high the seas of language can rise.
And at the lowest points too".

Oddly, Grice would refer to the deep berths of language, in a slightly different context.

The English mail-box is called red, because it is red.
Paul Grice is called "Paul Grice" because he is Paul Grice.

There may be a distinction to be made here.

Grice's claim is not, exactly,

"Paul Grice is called "Paul Grice"".

Rather, it is

"That distinguished-looking philosopher is called "Paul Grice".

Or rather:

"The reason why that distinguished-looking philosopher is called "Paul Grice" is that he is Paul Grice."

This is different from:

"The reason why Paul Grice is called "Paul Grice" is that he is Paul Grice".

However, it is THIS sort of form that the claim about the English mail box seems to have:

"The reason why an English mail box is called 'red' is that it is red".

Or something.

More later, I hope.

(It may do to double-check if this type of example mentioned by Grice is further discussed in the philosophical literature -- perhaps another exegesis of what Grice might be up to).

Cheers,

Speranza