In "Aspects of reason," the John Locke Lectures, Grice notes that, perhaps
unlike Popper would note, the philosopher (by 'the' he means 'himself' --
"speak for thyself," his motto) should start by providing a conceptual
analysis of the VERB, 'to reason'. As in
i. Then, Sherlock Holmes
deduced that the murderer was the butler.
Surely, had Agatha Christie
spent more time at Oxford, (i) should read:
ii. Then, Sherlock Holmes
abduced that the murderer was the butler.
while on occasion we should
find in her writings:
iii. Sherlock Holmes induced this by all he knew
-- and such.
After all, "inducere" was a verb in
Ancient Rome, from in- "into, in, on,
upon" + ducere "to lead" -- which
philosophers at some point found
convenient to use for short for "to infer
by reasoning". Strictly, to 'reason'
"abducere" are also items the philosopher should spend some
botanising with. But it seems it's 'inducere' that has
appealed them most,
as the references below might induce you to
REFERENCES: "Induction": an
Achinstein, P. Variety and Analogy in Confirmation
Theory, Philosophy of
---- Achinstein argued that 'to
confirm' is done usually by induction, but
there is variety.
Adams, E. A
Logic of Conditionals, Inquiry, 8.
Alfano, S, Poll: Majority Reject
Evolution,” CBS News.
---- Alfano implicates: but should the majority be
right? The majority once
thought the earth is flat.
Ambrose, A. The
Problem of Justifying Inductive Inference, Journal of
Armstrong, D. Universals and Scientific Realism: Nominalism vs. Realism,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A Theory of Universals, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. What is a Law of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, Cambridge:
University Press. What Makes Induction Rational? Dialogue, 30:
World of States of Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. Reply to
van Fraassen,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66(2):
---- Armstrong argues for the rationality of induction (which should
clear to anyone who attended Grice, Aspects of reason, since 'to induce'
replace 'to reason' ANY TIME).
Ayer, A. Probability and Evidence,
New York: Columbia University Press.
Bernoulli, J. Ars Conjectandi, Basel:
Impensis Thurnisiorum, The Art of
Conjecturing, Edith D. Sylla (trans.),
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
Black, D. The Theory of Committees and
Elections, Cambridge: Cambridge
Brown, M. Review of
Stove, History and Philosophy of Logic, 8
Campbell, Sc. Fixing a Hole in the
Ground of Induction, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, 79
argues the fix is one of the easiest things the philosopher
Campbell, Scott and James Franklin, Randomness and the Justification of
Induction, Synthese, 138.
--- Campbell and Franklin argue that since
induction is rational, it's
Carnap, R. The
Continuum of Inductive Methods, Chicago: The University of
Logical Foundations of Probability, second edition, Chicago:
of Chicago Press.
--- Carnap is using 'continuum' metaphorically, but it's a
delight of a
Cesa-Bianchi, Nicolo and Gabor Lugosi, Prediction,
Learning and Games,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Review of A World of States of Affairs, by D. M. Armstrong,”
Journal of Philosophy, 76
Dretske, F. Laws of Nature, Philosophy of Science,
Edwards, W., H. Lindman, and L. Savage, Bayesian statistical inference
psychological research,” Psychological Review, 70
de Finetti, Bruno,
1937, “La prevision: ses lois logiques, ses sources
subjective”. Annales de
l'Institut Henri Poincare, 7. Foresight: Its Logical
Laws, Its Subjective
Sources”. A translation by Henry Kyburg of Finetti 1937,
in Studies in
Subjective Probability, Henry Kyburg and Howard Smokler
(eds.), New York:
John Wiley and Sons. Theory of Probability in two volumes,
New York: John
Wiley a nd Sons, A translation by Antonio Machi and Adrian
Smith of Teoria
delle Probabilita, 1970, Einaudi.
--- de Finetti, or Finetti, as he prefers,
induces in Italian.
Fitelson, B. The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of
Confirmation and the
Problem of Measure Sensitivity, Philosophy of Science,
66 .The Logic of
Confirmation,” Philosophy Compass, 1–––Logical Foundations
Support,” Philosophy of Science, 73–––Likelihoodism,
Relational Confirmation,” Synthese, 156.
Branden and J. Hawthorne, How Bayesian Confirmation Theory
Paradox of the Ravens, in E. Eels and J. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of
Probability in Science, Chicago: Open Court.
--- The Raven's paradox or
implicature, as I prefer, should appeal Hughes
-- his hawk is white; his
raven is black?
Franklin, J. Resurrecting Logical Probability,” Erkenntnis,
Frege, G. Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete
Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle.
Friedman, Michael and Richard
Creath (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to
Carnap, Cambridge: Cambridge
Giere, R. Review: The Significance Test Controversy,
British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, 23
Good, I. J., 1967, On
the Principle of Total Evidence, British Journal for
the Philosophy of
Science, 17 (discussed by Grice as discussed by Davidson
in "Aspects of
George, A. A Proof of Induction? Philosopher's Imprint, 7
George argues that this proof is actually meta-inductive. We
induction is right.
Giaquinto, M., Review of The Rationality of Induction by
Philosophy of Science, 54
--- Giaquinto argues (via
implicature) that along with "Paradise lost",
Stove's Rationality of
Induction" is one of the most relevant reads he ever
Alvin L., Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford: Oxford University
Goodman, Nelson, Fact, Fiction, & Forecast, Cambridge,
Gower, B. Stove on inductive scepticism,
Australasian Journal of
--- Gowe argues that should Sextus
Empiricus (a sceptic) had read Hume he
would NOT have been an 'inductive
sceptic', which he finds an anachronism.
Grattan, I., Popper and the Problem
of Induction, A Fresh Look at the Logic
of Testing Scientific Theories,
--- Grattan implicates that looks, like lettuce, can be fresh
there's a fresh look at fresh lettuce.
Hacking, I. M. Logic of
Statistical Inference, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. Review:
Likelihood, British Journal for the Philosophy of
What Conditional Probability Could not Be, Synthese, 137
Harman, G. The
Inference to the Best Explanation, The Philosophical
Enumerative Induction as Inference to the Best Explanation, The
Helman D. Analogical Reasoning: Perspectives of Artificial
Cognitive Science, and Philosophy, Dordrecht:
Hempel, C. Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,” Mind,
Hochberg, H. D.M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs,” Noûs,
Hume, D. Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby Bigge,
Oxford, Clarendon Press. OEnquiries concerning Human Understanding and
concerning the Principles of Morals, reprinted from the posthumous edition
edited with introduction, comparative table of contents, and analytical
by L. A. Selby Bigge, MA. Third edition with text revised and notes
by P. H.
Nidditch. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Indurkhya, Bipin, Some
Remarks on the Rationality of Induction, Synthese.
-- a source of
inspiration for Armstrong: 'to reason' and 'to induce' can
be used in the
Irzik, Gurol, Armstrong's Account of Probabilistic Laws,
Jeffrey, R. Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses,
of Science, 23 The Logic of Decision, second edition, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Johnson, W. E., Logic: in three
volumes, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. Reprinted unchanged by
Juhl, C. The Speed-Optimality of Reichenbach's Straight
Rule of Induction,
British Journal for the Philsosophy of Science, 45.
Grice noted that Reichenbach's straight rule (allegedly) is "not as
straight as it seems". Grice spends some time teaching Davidson how to read
Reichenbach in "Actions and Events" (Pacific Philosophical
Kelly, Kevin, and Oliver Schulte, Church's Thesis and Hume's
Logic and Scientific Methods, M. L. Della Chiara et al. (eds.),
Kluwer, ––– and Clark Glymour, Why Probability Does not Capture
the Logic of
Scientific Justification,” Contemporary Debates in the
Science, Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Oxford:
Kolmogorov, A. N., Foundations of the Theory of Probability. A
and revision by Nathan Morrison of Grundbegriffe der
Wahrscheinlichskeitrechnung, Ergebnisse Der Mathematik, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Reprinted unchanged by Dover Publications in
Kyburg, H. The Justification of Induction, Journal of Philosophy,
--- One of the sources for Armstrong: if induction is rational (and
'induce' and 'reason' are interreplaceable, then surely induction is almost
–––, The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference,
Levi, I. Must the Scientist Make Value Judgments?”
Journal of Philosophy,
57 -- Hard Choices: Decision Making under Unresolved
Cambridge University Press. (Oddly, "Hard Choices" is
the title of Hillary
Lewis, D. Philosophical
Papers (Volume II), Oxford: Oxford University
Inference to the Best Explanation, London and New York:
Loeb, L. Psychology, epistemology, and skepticism in Hume's
induction,” Synthese, 152.
--- Hume's argument about
induction started the thread on the alleged
problem (or 'pseudo-problem',
for Witters) of inducing that all ravens are
Maher, P. The Hole
in the Ground of Induction, Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 74 --
Inductive Logic and the Ravens Paradox,” Philosophy of
Science, 66 -- The
Concept of Inductive Probability, Erkenntnis, 65
--- the hole was NOT created
by the raven. Here it's not the raven's
implicature, as it would in Ted
Hughes, OM, but the paradox of the raven, 'saith
N. Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein versus van Fraassen.
How to Solve the Problem of Induction, British Journal for the
of Science, 44
--- Maxwell should have added, 'in three easy Griceian steps.'
easy and Griceian if you've read "Aspects of reason", where "Prob"
and is the
operator (or sentential modifier) that Grice uses for utterances
should be understood as having arrived via induction.
Donald Williams on Induction, Journal of Thought, 3
-- Donald Williams is a
Mayo, D. Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
–––, and Aris Spanos, Severe Testing as
a Basic Concept in a Neyman–
Pearson Philosophy of Induction. British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science,
--- Neyman's and Pearson's
philosophy of induction is fascinating in that
it combines many different
factors into a unified viable theory.
Mill, J. S. System of Logic,
Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a
Connected View of the Principles of
Evidence and the Methods of Scientific
Investigation, Volume 1, London:
John W. Parker.
--- Mill (vide "Grice to the Mill") classifies logic as being
ratiocinative and inductive. Grice complained that this seems to
wrong implicature that inductive logic is not ratiocinative --
'ratiocinative' is an ugly word," he added.
Professor Donald Williams versus Hume, The Journal of
Nagel, E. Review of The Ground of Induction by Donald Williams, The
of Philosophy, 44
--- E. Nagel, not to be confused with Grice's
pupil, the brilliant T.
Nagel, thinks there should be no holes on that
ground ("Induction is not a golf
course," he utters
Nicod, J. Foundations of Geometry and Induction, P. P.
London: Harcourt Brace.
--- Nicod is a genius.
C.J. and B. Paris, A Note on Binary Inductive Logic, Journal of
Philosophical Logic, 36
Okasha, D. Does Hume's argument against induction
rest on a quantifier–
shift fallacy? Proceedings of the Aristotelean
--- Apparently it does, but Home (as I prefer to spell his
surname) did not
care much for Aristotle's quantificationnal logic (vide
Oliver, A. Review of A World of States of Affairs by D.M.
Journal of Philosophy, 95
Peano, G. Selected Works of
Giuseppe Peano, translated and edited by Hubert
C. Kennedy, Toronto:
University of Toronto Press.
Pearson, E. Statistical concepts in their
relation to reality, Journal of
the Royal Statistical Society 17
K. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, New York: Basic Books. A
by the author with the assistance of Julius Freed and Jan Freed of
Logik der Forschung, Vienna: J. Springer, 1935.
-- The meaning of 'assist'
may require a conceptual analysis. Cf. "Viv
assisted Tom with "The
Wasteland". Incidentally, Julius and Jan are related.
Ramsey, F. P. Truth
and Probability,”in Ramsey [FOM]. The Foundations of
Mathematics and Other
Logical Essays, R.B. Braithwaite (ed.), London,
Routledge and Kegan
Reichenbach, H. The Theory of Probability, Berkeley: University of
California Press, A translation by Ernest R. Hutton and Maria Reichenbach
ofWahrscheinlichkeitslehre. Eine Untersuchung uber die logischen und
Grundlagen der Wahrscheinlichskeitrechnung, Leiden, Revised
by the author.
Experience and Prediction. Chicago: University of Chicago
Rowan, Michael, Stove on the Rationality of
Induction and the Uniformity
Thesis, The British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science, 44
--- Usually, Grice preferred 'uniformity OF NATURE', since he
"Nature" a fascinating concept to provide an analysis for.
R. Statistical Evidence: A Likelihood Paradigm. London, New York,
Rudner, R. The Scientist qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments,”
of Science, 20
Salmon, W. On Vindicating Induction,”
Philosophy of Science, 30
-- Salmon argues, with Armstrong that, since 'to
reason' and 'to induce'
are interreplaceable, the vindication (figurative
use) of induction is
pretty easy -- 'vindicate' is a nice word to provide a
conceptual analysis for,
too. It usually implicates others. Not all stuff
needs a vindication unless
that stuff has been attacked, but this is
––– 1967, Foundations of Scientific Inference, Pittsburgh,
Savage, L. The Foundations of
Statistics. New York: John Wiley and Sons.
Schulte, O Means–Ends
Epistemology,” British Journal for the Philosophy
Schurz, Gerhard, The Meta-inductivist's Winning Strategy in the
Game. A New Approach to Hume's Problem, Philosophy of Science,
--- Schurz uses 'meta-induction' with a straight face!
Skyrms, B. The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation, Cambridge,
University Press. Choice and Chance. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Bayesian Projectability,” in Douglas Stalker (ed.), Grue:
Essays on the
New Riddle of Induction, Chicago: Open Court.'
was one of Grice's favourite shades of ... er ... blue ... er ...
"Grass is grue?"
Slowik, E. Natural laws, universals and the induction
-- Slowik argues that the 'problem of induction'
is possible apocryphal.
Sober, E. Intelligent Design and Probability
Journal for the Philosophy of Religion,
Spohn, W. Enumerative induction and lawlikeness, Philosophy of Science,
-- Spohn kept ravens as pets, and he enumerated them.
Evidence and Experimental Design in Sequential Trials,
Steel, D. A Bayesian way to make stopping rules matter,
Stove, D. The Rationality of Induction, Oxford and New York:
-- a classic and a source for
Strawson, P. F. Introduction to logical theory. London: Methuen
Suppes, P. Review of Kevin Kelly, The Logic of
Reliable Inquiry, British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 49:
351–354. The primacy of utterer's
meaning. In P.G.R.I.C.E., ed. Grandy
Surowiecki, J. The wisdom of crowds: why the many are
smarter than the few
and how collective wisdom shapes business, economies,
nations, New York: Doubleday.
Tooley, M., Causation,
Oxford: Clarendon Press. The Nature of Laws,
Canadian Journal of
Vnfraassen, Bas, Armstrong on Laws and Probabilities,
of Philosophy, 65
Vickers, J. Chance and Structure:
An Essay on the Logical Foundations of
Probability, Oxford: Clarendon
Vranas, P Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian
Solution, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55.
Hempel's Raven Paradox: A lacuna in the Standard Bayesian
Whitehead, A. N. Science and the Modern World, New
Williams, D. The Ground of Induction, Cambridge, MA, Harvard
Press. Reissued, New York: Russell and Russell Inc.,
Williams, induction is no golf course: no holes please.
--- The Problem of
Probability,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
6(4): 619–622. On
the Derivation of Probabilities from Frequencies,”
Phenomenological Research, 5, “The Challenging Situation in the
of Probability,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 6
Yahya, H. Atlas
of Creation, Hackensack, NJ: Global Publishing Company.
Zabell, S. Symmetry
and Its Discontents: Essays on the History of
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Carnap on probability
induction,” in Friedman and Creath (eds.).
-- The use of 'inductive
probability' implicates, for Kneale, that there is
induction which is not
probabilistic and that there is probability that is