Induced to Inductivism, the Griceian Way

Speranza

In "Aspects of reason," the John Locke Lectures, Grice notes that, perhaps 
unlike Popper would note, the philosopher (by 'the' he means 'himself' --
"speak  for thyself," his motto) should start by providing a conceptual
analysis of the  VERB, 'to reason'. As in

i. Then, Sherlock Holmes deduced that the murderer was the butler.

Surely, had Agatha Christie spent more time at Oxford, (i) should  read:

ii. Then, Sherlock Holmes abduced that the murderer was the butler.

while on occasion we should find in her writings:

iii. Sherlock Holmes induced this by all he knew 'before hand'.

-- and such.

After all, "inducere" was a verb in Ancient Rome, from in- "into, in, on, 
upon" + ducere "to lead" -- which philosophers at some point found
convenient to  use for short for "to infer by reasoning". Strictly, to 'reason'
simpliciter.

"deducere" and "abducere" are also items the philosopher should spend some 
time linguistic botanising with. But it seems it's 'inducere' that has
appealed  them most, as the references below might induce you to believe!

Cheers,

Speranza

REFERENCES: "Induction": an annotated bibliography

Achinstein, P. Variety and Analogy in Confirmation Theory, Philosophy of 
Science, 30.
---- Achinstein argued that 'to confirm' is done usually by induction, but 
there is variety.
Adams, E. A Logic of Conditionals, Inquiry, 8.
Alfano,  S, Poll: Majority Reject Evolution,” CBS News.
---- Alfano implicates: but should the majority be right? The majority once
thought the earth is flat.
Ambrose, A. The Problem of Justifying Inductive  Inference, Journal of
Philosophy, 44
Armstrong, D. Universals and Scientific  Realism: Nominalism vs. Realism,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. A Theory  of Universals, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. What is a Law of Nature,  Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility,  Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. What Makes Induction Rational? Dialogue,  30: 503–11. A
World of States of Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University  Press.  Reply to
van Fraassen,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 66(2):  224–229.
---- Armstrong argues for the rationality of induction (which should be 
clear to anyone who attended Grice, Aspects of reason, since 'to induce' can 
replace 'to reason' ANY TIME).
Ayer, A. Probability and Evidence, New York:  Columbia University Press.
Bernoulli, J. Ars Conjectandi, Basel: Impensis  Thurnisiorum, The Art of
Conjecturing, Edith D. Sylla (trans.), Baltimore: Johns  Hopkins Press,
Black, D. The Theory of Committees and Elections, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Brown, M.  Review of Stove, History and Philosophy of  Logic, 8
Campbell, Sc. Fixing a Hole in the Ground of Induction, Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy, 79
--- Campbell argues the fix is one of the easiest things the philosopher 
can do!
Campbell, Scott and James Franklin, Randomness and the Justification of 
Induction, Synthese, 138.
--- Campbell and Franklin argue that since induction is rational, it's 
almost self-justifying!
Carnap, R. The Continuum of Inductive Methods,  Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press. Logical Foundations of Probability,  second edition, Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press.
--- Carnap is using 'continuum' metaphorically, but it's a delight of a 
word!
Cesa-Bianchi, Nicolo and Gabor Lugosi, Prediction, Learning and Games, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Daly, C. Review of A World of States  of Affairs, by D. M. Armstrong,”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy,  76
Dretske, F. Laws of Nature, Philosophy of Science, 44
Edwards, W., H. Lindman, and L. Savage, Bayesian statistical inference for 
psychological research,” Psychological Review, 70
de Finetti, Bruno, 1937, “La prevision: ses lois logiques, ses sources 
subjective”. Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincare, 7. Foresight: Its Logical 
Laws, Its Subjective Sources”. A translation by Henry Kyburg of Finetti 1937,
in  Studies in Subjective Probability, Henry Kyburg and Howard Smokler
(eds.), New  York: John Wiley and Sons. Theory of Probability in two volumes,
New York:  John Wiley a nd Sons, A translation by Antonio Machi and Adrian
Smith of Teoria  delle Probabilita, 1970, Einaudi.
--- de Finetti, or Finetti, as he prefers, induces in Italian.
Fitelson,  B. The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the
Problem of Measure  Sensitivity, Philosophy of Science, 66 .The Logic of
Confirmation,” Philosophy  Compass, 1–––Logical Foundations of Evidential
Support,” Philosophy of Science,  73–––Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and
Relational Confirmation,” Synthese,  156.
Fitelson, Branden and J. Hawthorne, How Bayesian Confirmation Theory 
Handles the Paradox of the Ravens, in E. Eels and J. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of 
Probability in Science, Chicago: Open Court.
--- The Raven's paradox or  implicature, as I prefer, should appeal Hughes
-- his hawk is white; his raven  is black?
Franklin, J. Resurrecting Logical Probability,” Erkenntnis, 55
Frege, G.  Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete
Formelsprache des reinen  Denkens, Halle.
Friedman, Michael and Richard Creath (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to 
Carnap, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Giere, R. Review: The  Significance Test Controversy, British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science,  23
Good, I. J., 1967, On the Principle of Total Evidence, British Journal for 
the Philosophy of Science, 17 (discussed by Grice as discussed by Davidson
in  "Aspects of reason")
George, A. A Proof of Induction? Philosopher's Imprint, 7
--- A. George argues that this proof is actually meta-inductive. We 
meta-induced induction is right.
Giaquinto, M., Review of The Rationality of  Induction by D.C. Stove,”
Philosophy of Science, 54
--- Giaquinto argues (via implicature) that along with "Paradise  lost",
Stove's Rationality of Induction" is one of the most relevant reads he  ever
read.
Goldman, Alvin L., Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford: Oxford  University
Press.
Goodman, Nelson, Fact, Fiction, & Forecast,  Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Gower, B. Stove on inductive  scepticism, Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 68
--- Gowe argues that should Sextus Empiricus (a sceptic) had read Hume he 
would NOT have been an 'inductive sceptic', which he finds an anachronism.
Grattan, I., Popper and the Problem of Induction, A Fresh Look at the Logic
of Testing Scientific Theories, Erkenntnis, 60
--- Grattan implicates that looks, like lettuce, can be fresh -- then 
there's a fresh look at fresh lettuce.
Hacking, I. M.  Logic of Statistical Inference, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. Review: Likelihood, British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science, 23.
Hajek, A. What Conditional Probability Could not Be, Synthese,  137
Harman, G. The Inference to the Best Explanation, The Philosophical 
Review, 74. Enumerative Induction as Inference to the Best Explanation, The 
Journal of Philosophy, 65.
Helman D. Analogical Reasoning: Perspectives of  Artificial Intelligence,
Cognitive Science, and Philosophy, Dordrecht:  Kluwer.
Hempel, C. Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,” Mind,  54.
Hochberg, H. D.M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs,” Noûs,  33
Hume, D. Hume's Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby Bigge, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press. OEnquiries concerning Human Understanding and 
concerning the Principles of Morals, reprinted from the posthumous edition and 
edited with introduction, comparative table of contents, and analytical index
by  L. A. Selby Bigge, MA. Third edition with text revised and notes by P. H.
Nidditch. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Indurkhya, Bipin, Some Remarks on the  Rationality of Induction, Synthese.
-- a source of inspiration for Armstrong: 'to reason' and 'to induce' can 
be used in the same contexts.
Irzik, Gurol, Armstrong's Account of  Probabilistic Laws, Analysis, 51
Jeffrey, R. Valuation and Acceptance of  Scientific Hypotheses, Philosophy
of Science, 23 The Logic of Decision, second  edition, Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
Johnson, W. E., Logic: in  three volumes, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. Reprinted unchanged by  Dover Publications.
Juhl, C. The Speed-Optimality of Reichenbach's Straight  Rule of Induction,
British Journal for the Philsosophy of Science, 45.
-- Grice noted that Reichenbach's straight rule (allegedly) is "not as 
straight as it seems". Grice spends some time teaching Davidson how to read 
Reichenbach in "Actions and Events" (Pacific Philosophical Quarterly).
Kelly,  Kevin, and Oliver Schulte, Church's Thesis and Hume's Problem,
Logic and  Scientific Methods, M. L. Della Chiara et al. (eds.), Dordrecht:
Kluwer,   ––– and Clark Glymour, Why Probability Does not Capture the Logic of
Scientific  Justification,” Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of
Science, Christopher  Hitchcock (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell.
Kolmogorov, A. N., Foundations of the  Theory of Probability. A translation
and revision by Nathan Morrison of  Grundbegriffe der
Wahrscheinlichskeitrechnung, Ergebnisse Der Mathematik,  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Reprinted unchanged by Dover Publications  in 1964.
Kyburg, H. The Justification of Induction, Journal of Philosophy,  54.
--- One of the sources for Armstrong: if induction is rational (and 
'induce' and 'reason' are interreplaceable, then surely induction is almost 
self-justifying)
–––, The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference,  Dordrecht: D.
Reidel.
Levi, I. Must the Scientist Make Value Judgments?”  Journal of Philosophy,
57 -- Hard Choices: Decision Making under Unresolved  Conflict, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. (Oddly, "Hard Choices" is the  title of Hillary
Clinton's memoirs).
Lewis, D.  Philosophical Papers  (Volume II), Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Lipton, P. Inference to the  Best Explanation, London and New York:
Routledge. Second edition..
Loeb, L.  Psychology, epistemology, and skepticism in Hume's argument about
induction,”  Synthese, 152.
--- Hume's argument about induction started the thread on the alleged 
problem (or 'pseudo-problem', for Witters) of inducing that all ravens are 
black).
Maher, P. The Hole in the Ground of Induction, Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, 74 -- Inductive Logic and the Ravens Paradox,” Philosophy of 
Science, 66 -- The Concept of Inductive Probability, Erkenntnis, 65
--- the hole was NOT created by the raven. Here it's not the raven's 
implicature, as it would in Ted Hughes, OM, but the paradox of the raven, 'saith 
nevermore'.
Maxwell, N. Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein versus van Fraassen.
Part One: How to Solve the Problem of Induction, British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, 44
--- Maxwell should have added, 'in three easy Griceian steps.' They are 
easy and Griceian if you've read "Aspects of reason", where "Prob" and is the 
operator (or sentential modifier) that Grice uses for utterances that
should be  understood as having arrived via induction.
Mayberry, T. Donald Williams on  Induction, Journal of Thought, 3
-- Donald Williams is a genius.
Mayo, D. Error and the Growth of  Experimental Knowledge, Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
–––, and  Aris Spanos, Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman–
Pearson Philosophy of  Induction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science,
57
--- Neyman's and Pearson's philosophy of induction is fascinating in that 
it combines many different factors into a unified viable theory.
Mill, J. S.  System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a
Connected View of the  Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific
Investigation, Volume 1,  London: John W. Parker.
--- Mill (vide "Grice to the Mill") classifies logic as being either 
ratiocinative and inductive. Grice complained that this seems to trigger the 
wrong implicature that inductive logic is not ratiocinative -- "but then 
'ratiocinative' is an ugly word," he added.
Miller, D. Professor Donald  Williams versus Hume, The Journal of
Philosophy, 44
Nagel, E. Review of The Ground of Induction by Donald Williams, The Journal
of Philosophy, 44
--- E. Nagel, not to be confused with Grice's pupil, the brilliant T. 
Nagel, thinks there should be no holes on that ground ("Induction is not a golf 
course," he utters metaphorically)
Nicod, J. Foundations of Geometry and  Induction, P. P. Wiener (trans.),
London: Harcourt Brace.
--- Nicod is a genius.
Nix, C.J. and B. Paris, A Note on Binary  Inductive Logic, Journal of
Philosophical Logic, 36
Okasha, D. Does Hume's argument against induction rest on a  quantifier–
shift fallacy? Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society, 105
--- Apparently it does, but Home (as I prefer to spell his surname) did not
care much for Aristotle's quantificationnal logic (vide Polish logic).
Oliver, A. Review of A World of States of Affairs by D.M. Armstrong, The 
Journal of Philosophy, 95
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Der Logik der Forschung, Vienna: J. Springer, 1935.
-- The meaning of 'assist' may require a conceptual analysis. Cf. "Viv 
assisted Tom with "The Wasteland". Incidentally, Julius and Jan are  related.
Ramsey, F. P. Truth and Probability,”in Ramsey [FOM]. The  Foundations of
Mathematics and Other Logical Essays, R.B. Braithwaite (ed.),  London,
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--- Usually, Grice preferred 'uniformity OF NATURE', since he found 
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-- Salmon argues, with Armstrong that, since 'to reason' and 'to  induce'
are interreplaceable, the vindication (figurative use) of induction is 
pretty easy -- 'vindicate' is a nice word to provide a conceptual analysis for, 
too. It usually implicates others. Not all stuff needs a vindication unless
that  stuff has been attacked, but this is implicatural.
––– 1967, Foundations of Scientific Inference, Pittsburgh, University of 
Pittsburgh Press.
Savage, L. The Foundations of Statistics. New York: John  Wiley and Sons.
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Schurz, Gerhard, The Meta-inductivist's Winning  Strategy in the Prediction
Game. A New Approach to Hume's Problem, Philosophy of  Science, 75
--- Schurz uses 'meta-induction' with a straight face!  Congratulations!
Skyrms, B. The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
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-- "Grue" was one of Grice's favourite shades of ... er ... blue ... er ...
green. "Grass is grue?"
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-- Slowik argues that the 'problem of induction' is possible  apocryphal.
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-- Spohn kept ravens as pets, and he enumerated them.
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-- a classic and a source for Armstrong.
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Zabell, S. Symmetry and Its Discontents: Essays on the History of 
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-- The use of 'inductive probability' implicates, for Kneale, that there is
induction which is not probabilistic and that there is probability that is
not  inductive.