Scalia's essays include:
-- Gutmann, Amy, ed.,
"A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law,"
-- Scalia, Antonin; Garner, Bryan A.
"Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges,"
St. Paul: Thomson West.
-- Scalia, Antonin; Garner, Bryan A.
"Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts", St. Paul: Thomson West,
| Antonin Scalia | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States | |
| In office September 26, 1986 – February 12/13, 2016 | |
| Nominated by | Ronald Reagan |
| Preceded by | William Rehnquist |
| Succeeded by | Vacant |
| Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit | |
| In office August 17, 1982 – September 26, 1986 | |
| Nominated by | Ronald Reagan |
| Preceded by | Roger Robb |
| Succeeded by | David Sentelle |
| United States Assistant Attorney Generalfor the Office of Legal Counsel | |
| In office August 22, 1974 – January 20, 1977 | |
| President | Gerald Ford |
| Preceded by | Roger C. Cramton |
| Succeeded by | John Harmon |
| Personal details | |
| Born | Antonin Gregory Scalia March 11, 1936 Trenton, New Jersey, U.S |
| Died | February 12/13, 2016 (aged 79) Shafter, Texas, U.S. |
| Spouse(s) | Maureen McCarthy (m. 1960) |
| Children | 9, including Eugene |
| Alma mater | Georgetown University Harvard University |
| Religion | Roman Catholicism |
| Signature |  |
Herbert Paul Grice was a philosopher. Antonin Gregory Scalia was an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1986 until his death in 2016.
Appointed to the Court by President Ronald Reagan in 1986, Scalia was described as the intellectual anchor for the originalist and textualist position in the Court's conservative wing.
The keyword here is "originalist" or 'textualist'. By 'text', Grice would use 'expression'. Thus we would have, for Grice, 'expression meaning' and utterer's meaning'.
Scalia was born in Trenton, New Jersey.
Scalia attended public grade school, Xavier High in Manhattan, and then college at Georgetown in Washington, D.C.
Scalia obtained his law degree from Harvard and spent six years in a Cleveland law firm, before he became a law school professor in Virginia.
In the early 1970s, he served in the Nixon and Ford administrations, eventually as an Assistant Attorney General.
Scalia spent most of the Carter years teaching at Chicago, where he became one of the first faculty advisers of the fledgling Federalist Society.
The keyword here is "The Federalist Society".
In 1982, Ronald Reagan appointed him as judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
In 1986, Reagan appointed him to the Supreme Court.
Scalia was asked few difficult questions by the Senate Judiciary Committee, and was unanimously confirmed by the Senate, becoming the first Italian justice (He was not Italian, but his father was; which for most Italians should be enough -- never mind Americans!)
Scalia attended public grade school, Xavier High in Manhattan, and then college at Georgetown in Washington, D.C.
Scalia obtained his law degree from Harvard and spent six years in a Cleveland law firm, before he became a law school professor in Virginia.
In the early 1970s, he served in the Nixon and Ford administrations, eventually as an Assistant Attorney General.
Scalia spent most of the Carter years teaching at Chicago, where he became one of the first faculty advisers of the fledgling Federalist Society.
The keyword here is "The Federalist Society".
In 1982, Ronald Reagan appointed him as judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
In 1986, Reagan appointed him to the Supreme Court.
Scalia was asked few difficult questions by the Senate Judiciary Committee, and was unanimously confirmed by the Senate, becoming the first Italian justice (He was not Italian, but his father was; which for most Italians should be enough -- never mind Americans!)
Scalia served on the Court for nearly 30 years, during which time he espoused a conservative jurisprudence and ideology, advocating textualism in statutory interpretation and originalism in constitutional interpretation.
All these are keywords: notably 'interpretation', a Griceian term. Textualism is emphasis on expression meaning rather than utterer's meaning. Originalism refers to the original intention of the utterer, another Griceian keyword.
Scalia was a strong defender of the powers of the executive branch, believing presidential power should be paramount in many areas.
Scalia opposed affirmative action and other policies that treated minorities as special groups.
He filed separate opinions in many cases and often castigated the Court's majority in his minority opinions using scathing language.
Griice was born in England, and had a younger brother, Derek.
All these are keywords: notably 'interpretation', a Griceian term. Textualism is emphasis on expression meaning rather than utterer's meaning. Originalism refers to the original intention of the utterer, another Griceian keyword.
Scalia was a strong defender of the powers of the executive branch, believing presidential power should be paramount in many areas.
Scalia opposed affirmative action and other policies that treated minorities as special groups.
He filed separate opinions in many cases and often castigated the Court's majority in his minority opinions using scathing language.
Griice was born in England, and had a younger brother, Derek.
Scalia was born in Trenton, New Jersey, and was an only child.
Scalia's father, Salvatore Eugene Scalia, an Italian immigrant from Sommatino, Sicily, was a graduate student at Columbia and clerk at the time of his son's birth.
Grice's father was a businessman.
The elder Scalia would become a professor of Romance languages at Brooklyn, where he was an adherent to the formalist New Criticism school of literary theory.
This may have an influence on Scalia -- since the formalist school emphasised text, rather than utterer's intention.
Grice's mother ran her own prep at the family house. Her son, Paul, was one of her most brilliant students.
Scalia's mother, Catherine Louise Panaro was born in Trenton to Italian immigrant parents and worked as an elementary school teacher.
After Grice's prep, Grice was sent to Clifton, Somerset.
Scalia's father, Salvatore Eugene Scalia, an Italian immigrant from Sommatino, Sicily, was a graduate student at Columbia and clerk at the time of his son's birth.
Grice's father was a businessman.
The elder Scalia would become a professor of Romance languages at Brooklyn, where he was an adherent to the formalist New Criticism school of literary theory.
This may have an influence on Scalia -- since the formalist school emphasised text, rather than utterer's intention.
Grice's mother ran her own prep at the family house. Her son, Paul, was one of her most brilliant students.
Scalia's mother, Catherine Louise Panaro was born in Trenton to Italian immigrant parents and worked as an elementary school teacher.
After Grice's prep, Grice was sent to Clifton, Somerset.
Scalia later stated that he spent much of his time on schoolwork, and admitted he "was never cool." (Scalia is using the word not 'textualistically' but 'impicaturally').
Scalia was also active as a Boy Scout and was part of Scouting's national honour society the Order of the Arrow -- this as opposed to the Order of the Bow.
Classmate and future New York State official William Stern remembered Scalia in his high school days: "This kid [Stern is using the expression not textualistically, but implicaturally) was a conservative when he was 17 years old. An archconservative Catholic."
The implicature of 'arch' seems to be 'more than enough is too much'?
The implicature is that he was not.
(Same things, expept the Curia stuff, but then that was C. of E., were said of Grice at Clifton).
In 1953, Scalia enrolled at Georgetown, where he graduated valedictorian and summa cum laude in 1957 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in history.
This is important, because his originalism may be traced to his recognising the importance of the historical context of an utterance (as when Columbus said, implicating Vespucci), "America!").
While in college, Scalia was a champion collegiate debater in Georgetown's Philodemic Society and a critically praised thespian.
He took his junior year abroad at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland.
Scalia studied law at Harvard, where he was a Notes Editor for the Harvard Law Review.
He graduated magna cum laude from Harvard, becoming a Sheldon Fellow of Harvard.
Grice was a postgraduate fellow at Merton.
The fellowship allowed him to travel throughout Europe during 1960–1961.
This is important, because his originalism may be traced to his recognising the importance of the historical context of an utterance (as when Columbus said, implicating Vespucci), "America!").
While in college, Scalia was a champion collegiate debater in Georgetown's Philodemic Society and a critically praised thespian.
He took his junior year abroad at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland.
Scalia studied law at Harvard, where he was a Notes Editor for the Harvard Law Review.
He graduated magna cum laude from Harvard, becoming a Sheldon Fellow of Harvard.
Grice was a postgraduate fellow at Merton.
The fellowship allowed him to travel throughout Europe during 1960–1961.
Scalia began his legal career at the international law firm Jones, Day, Cockley and Reavis in Cleveland, Ohio, where he worked from 1961 to 1967.
Scalia was highly regarded at the law firm and would most likely have been made a partner, but later stated he had long intended to teach, or 'profess', as Grice prefers ("We hardly teach; we profess.")
He became a Professor of Law at the University of Virginia in 1967, moving his family to Charlottesville.
Scalia was highly regarded at the law firm and would most likely have been made a partner, but later stated he had long intended to teach, or 'profess', as Grice prefers ("We hardly teach; we profess.")
He became a Professor of Law at the University of Virginia in 1967, moving his family to Charlottesville.
After four years in Charlottesville, Scalia entered public service in 1971.
President Richard Nixon appointed him as the General Counsel for the Office of Telecommunications Policy, where one of his principal assignments was to formulate federal policy for the growth of cable television.
From 1972 to 1974, he was the chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States, a small independent agency that sought to improve the functioning of the federal bureaucracy.
In mid-1974, Nixon nominated him as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel.
After Nixon's resignation, the nomination was continued by President Gerald Ford, and Scalia was confirmed by the Senate on August 22, 1974.
President Richard Nixon appointed him as the General Counsel for the Office of Telecommunications Policy, where one of his principal assignments was to formulate federal policy for the growth of cable television.
From 1972 to 1974, he was the chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States, a small independent agency that sought to improve the functioning of the federal bureaucracy.
In mid-1974, Nixon nominated him as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel.
After Nixon's resignation, the nomination was continued by President Gerald Ford, and Scalia was confirmed by the Senate on August 22, 1974.
In the aftermath of Watergate, the Ford administration was engaged in a number of conflicts with Congress.
Scalia repeatedly testified before congressional committees, defending Ford administration assertions of executive privilege regarding its refusal to turn over documents.
**************************************************************************************************************
Within the administration, Scalia advocated a presidential veto for a bill to amend the Freedom of Information Act, greatly increasing its scope.
Scalia's view prevailed and Ford vetoed the bill, but Congress overrode it.
*****************************************************************************************************
In early 1976, Scalia argued his only case before the Supreme Court, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba.
Scalia, on behalf of the U.S. government, argued in support of Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., and that position was successful.
Following Ford's defeat by President Jimmy Carter, Scalia worked for several months at the American Enterprise Institute.
Scalia then returned to academia, taking up residence in Chicagofrom 1977 to 1982.
He spent one year as a visiting professor at Stanford.
(Grice had by then established the "Hands Across the Bay" programme between Berkeley and Stanford -- but you needed a sailboat that Scalia did not have).
In 1981, Scalia became the first faculty adviser for Chicago's chapter of the newly founded Federalist Society.
When Ronald Reagan was elected President in November 1980, Scalia hoped for a major position in the new administration.
He was interviewed for the position of Solicitor General of the United States, but the position went to Rex E. Lee, to Scalia's great disappointment.
Scalia was offered a seat on the Chicago-based United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in early 1982, but declined it, hoping to be appointed to the highly influential United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit).
Later that year, Reagan offered Scalia a seat on the D.C. Circuit, which Scalia accepted.
He was confirmed by the US Senate on August 5, 1982, and was sworn in on August 17, 1982.
On the D.C. circuit, Scalia built a conservative record, while winning applause in legal circles for powerful, witty legal writing, which was often critical of the Supreme Court precedents he felt bound as a lower-court judge to follow.
Scalia's opinions drew the attention of Reagan administration officials, who, according to The New York Times, liked virtually everything they saw and listed him as a leading Supreme Court prospect.
In 1985, though there was then no vacancy on the Court, Reagan administration officials put Scalia on a shortlist with fellow D.C. Circuit Judge Robert Bork, to be considered if a justice left the Court.
In 1986, Chief Justice Warren Burger informed the White House of his intent to retire.
Reagan first decided to nominate Associate Justice William Rehnquist to become Chief Justice.
This choice meant that Reagan would also have to choose a nominee to fill Rehnquist's seat as associate justice.
Attorney General Edwin Meese, who advised Reagan on the choice, seriously considered only Bork and Scalia.
Feeling that this might well be Reagan's last opportunity to pick a Supreme Court justice, the President and his advisers chose Scalia over Bork.
Many factors influenced this decision.
Reagan wanted to appoint the first Italian justice. (Reagan is, like most Italians, although he is Irish, a Catholic).
Scalia also had the advantage of NOT having Bork's "paper trail".
Bork had written controversial articles about individual rights.
Scalia was called to the White House, and accepted Reagan's nomination.
Scalia's opinions drew the attention of Reagan administration officials, who, according to The New York Times, liked virtually everything they saw and listed him as a leading Supreme Court prospect.
In 1985, though there was then no vacancy on the Court, Reagan administration officials put Scalia on a shortlist with fellow D.C. Circuit Judge Robert Bork, to be considered if a justice left the Court.
In 1986, Chief Justice Warren Burger informed the White House of his intent to retire.
Reagan first decided to nominate Associate Justice William Rehnquist to become Chief Justice.
This choice meant that Reagan would also have to choose a nominee to fill Rehnquist's seat as associate justice.
Attorney General Edwin Meese, who advised Reagan on the choice, seriously considered only Bork and Scalia.
Feeling that this might well be Reagan's last opportunity to pick a Supreme Court justice, the President and his advisers chose Scalia over Bork.
Many factors influenced this decision.
Reagan wanted to appoint the first Italian justice. (Reagan is, like most Italians, although he is Irish, a Catholic).
Scalia also had the advantage of NOT having Bork's "paper trail".
Bork had written controversial articles about individual rights.
Scalia was called to the White House, and accepted Reagan's nomination.
When Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on Scalia's nomination opened in August 1986, he faced a committee that had just argued divisively over the Rehnquist nomination.
Witnesses and Democratic senators contended that, before becoming a judge, Rehnquist had engaged in activities designed to discourage minorities from voting.
Committee members had little taste for a second battle over Scalia and were in any event reluctant to oppose the first Italian Supreme Court nominee.
********************************************
The judge was NOT pressed heavily on controversial issues such as abortion or civil rights.
Scalia, who attended the hearing with his wife and nine children seated behind him, found time for a humorous exchange with Democratic Ohio Senator Howard Metzenbaum, whom he had defeated in a tennis match in, as the nominee put it, "a case of my integrity overcoming my judgment".
Witnesses and Democratic senators contended that, before becoming a judge, Rehnquist had engaged in activities designed to discourage minorities from voting.
Committee members had little taste for a second battle over Scalia and were in any event reluctant to oppose the first Italian Supreme Court nominee.
********************************************
The judge was NOT pressed heavily on controversial issues such as abortion or civil rights.
Scalia, who attended the hearing with his wife and nine children seated behind him, found time for a humorous exchange with Democratic Ohio Senator Howard Metzenbaum, whom he had defeated in a tennis match in, as the nominee put it, "a case of my integrity overcoming my judgment".
Scalia met no opposition from the committee.
The full Senate debated Scalia's nomination only briefly, and confirmed him 98–0 on September 17, 1986, creating the first Italian Justice.
This vote followed Rehnquist's confirmation as Chief Justice by a vote of 65–33 on the same day.
He took his seat on September 26, 1986.
One committee member, Democratic Delaware Senator Joe Biden, later stated that he regretted not having opposed Scalia because he was "so effective" -- that what?
The full Senate debated Scalia's nomination only briefly, and confirmed him 98–0 on September 17, 1986, creating the first Italian Justice.
This vote followed Rehnquist's confirmation as Chief Justice by a vote of 65–33 on the same day.
He took his seat on September 26, 1986.
One committee member, Democratic Delaware Senator Joe Biden, later stated that he regretted not having opposed Scalia because he was "so effective" -- that what?
It was Scalia's view that clear lines of separation among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches follow directly from the Constitution, with no branch allowed to exercise powers granted to another branch.
In his early days on the Court, Scalia authored a powerful—and solitary—dissent in 1988's Morrison v. Olson, in which the Court's majority upheld the Independent Counsel law.
Scalia's thirty-page draft dissent surprised Justice Harry Blackmun for its emotional content.
Blackmun felt it could be cut down to ten pages if Scalia omitted the screaming.
i.e. the implicatures. A good thing about an implicature is that it shortens a text.
Scalia indicates that the law was an unwarranted encroachment on the executive branch by the legislative.
He warned that frequently an issue of this sort will come before the Court clad, so to speak, in sheep's clothing.
"But this wolf comes as a wolf".
The obvious reference is to Grice v. Witters. For Witters, a wolf cannot come as a wolf. For Grice he can.
The 1989 case of Mistretta v. United States challenged the United States Sentencing Commission, an independent body within the judicial branch whose members (some of whom were federal judges) were removable only for good cause.
The petitioner argued that the arrangement violated separation of powers, and that the United States Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the Commission were invalid.
Eight justices joined in the majority opinion written by Blackmun, upholding the Guidelines as constitutional.
In 1996, Congress passed the Line Item Veto Act which allowed the president to cancel items from an appropriations bill (a bill authorizing spending) once passed into law.
The statute was challenged the following year.
The matter rapidly reached the Supreme Court, which struck down the law as violating the presentment clause of the constitution, which governs what the president may do with a bill once it has passed both Houses of Congress.
Scalia dissented, seeing no presentment clause difficulties and feeling that the act did not violate separation of powers.
Scalia indicated that he felt that authorising the president to cancel an appropriation was no different from allowing him to spend an appropriation at his discretion, which had long been accepted as constitutional.
The statute was challenged the following year.
The matter rapidly reached the Supreme Court, which struck down the law as violating the presentment clause of the constitution, which governs what the president may do with a bill once it has passed both Houses of Congress.
Scalia dissented, seeing no presentment clause difficulties and feeling that the act did not violate separation of powers.
Scalia indicated that he felt that authorising the president to cancel an appropriation was no different from allowing him to spend an appropriation at his discretion, which had long been accepted as constitutional.
In 2004, in Rasul v. Bush, the Court held that federal courts had jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions brought by detainees at the Guantanamo Bay detainment camp.
Scalia accuses the majority of springing a trap on the executive by ruling that it could hear cases involving persons at Guantanamo when no federal court had ever ruled that it had the authority to hear cases involving people there.
Scalia accuses the majority of springing a trap on the executive by ruling that it could hear cases involving persons at Guantanamo when no federal court had ever ruled that it had the authority to hear cases involving people there.
Scalia (joined by Justice John Paul Stevens) also dissented in the 2004 case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, involving Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen detained in the United States on the allegation he was an enemy combatant.
The court held that although congress authorized Hamdi's detention, fifth amendment due process guarantees give a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant, Hamdi, the right to contest that detention before a neutral decision maker.
Scalia wrote that the AUMF could not be read to suspend habeas corpus and that the court, faced with legislation by congress which did not grant the president power to detain Hamdi, was trying to make everything come out right".
The court held that although congress authorized Hamdi's detention, fifth amendment due process guarantees give a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant, Hamdi, the right to contest that detention before a neutral decision maker.
Scalia wrote that the AUMF could not be read to suspend habeas corpus and that the court, faced with legislation by congress which did not grant the president power to detain Hamdi, was trying to make everything come out right".
In March 2006, Scalia gave a talk at the University of Fribourg, in Switzerland, where he was asked about detainee rights.
He responded,
"Give me a break. I had a son on that battlefield and they were shooting at my son, and I'm not about to give this man who was captured in a war a full jury trial. I mean it's crazy."
Though Scalia was not referring to any particular individual, the supreme court was about to consider the case of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, supposed driver to Osama bin Laden, who was challenging the military commissions at Guantanamo Bay.
A group of retired military officers that supported Hamdan's position asked Scalia to recuse himself, or step aside from hearing the case, which he declined to do.
The Court held, 5–3, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, that the federal courts had jurisdiction to consider Hamdan's claims.
Scalia, in dissent, contended that any ability by the Court to consider Hamdan's petition had been eliminated by the jurisdiction stripping Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.
He responded,
"Give me a break. I had a son on that battlefield and they were shooting at my son, and I'm not about to give this man who was captured in a war a full jury trial. I mean it's crazy."
Though Scalia was not referring to any particular individual, the supreme court was about to consider the case of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, supposed driver to Osama bin Laden, who was challenging the military commissions at Guantanamo Bay.
A group of retired military officers that supported Hamdan's position asked Scalia to recuse himself, or step aside from hearing the case, which he declined to do.
The Court held, 5–3, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, that the federal courts had jurisdiction to consider Hamdan's claims.
Scalia, in dissent, contended that any ability by the Court to consider Hamdan's petition had been eliminated by the jurisdiction stripping Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.
In federalism cases, pitting the powers of the federal government against those of the states, Scalia often took the states' positions.
In 1997, the Supreme Court considered the case of Printz v. United States, a challenge to certain provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act which required chief law enforcement officers of localities in states to perform certain duties.
In Printz v United States, Scalia wrote the Court's majority decision.
The Supreme Court ruled the provision which imposed those duties unconstitutional as violating the tenth amendment, which reserves to the states and to the people those powers not granted to the federal government.
********************************************** MEDICINAL USES OF MARIJUANA.
In 2005, Scalia concurred in Gonzales v. Raich, which read the commerce clause to hold that congress could ban the use of marijuana even where states approve its use for medicinal purposes.
Scalia opines that the commerce clause, together with the necessary and proper clause, permit the regulation.
In addition, Scalia feels that Congress may regulate intra-state activities if doing so is a necessary part of a more general regulation of inter-state commerce.
He based this decision on Wickard v. Filburn, which he notes "expanded the commerce clause beyond all reason."
In 1997, the Supreme Court considered the case of Printz v. United States, a challenge to certain provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act which required chief law enforcement officers of localities in states to perform certain duties.
In Printz v United States, Scalia wrote the Court's majority decision.
The Supreme Court ruled the provision which imposed those duties unconstitutional as violating the tenth amendment, which reserves to the states and to the people those powers not granted to the federal government.
********************************************** MEDICINAL USES OF MARIJUANA.
In 2005, Scalia concurred in Gonzales v. Raich, which read the commerce clause to hold that congress could ban the use of marijuana even where states approve its use for medicinal purposes.
Scalia opines that the commerce clause, together with the necessary and proper clause, permit the regulation.
In addition, Scalia feels that Congress may regulate intra-state activities if doing so is a necessary part of a more general regulation of inter-state commerce.
He based this decision on Wickard v. Filburn, which he notes "expanded the commerce clause beyond all reason."
Scalia rejected the existence of the negative commerce clause doctrine, calling it "a judicial fraud".
Scalia took a broad view of the eleventh amendment, which bars certain law-suits against states in the federal courts.
In his 1989 dissent in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., Scalia states that there was no intent on the part of the framers to have the states surrender any sovereign immunity, and that the case that provoked the Eleventh Amendment, Chisholm v. Georgia, came as a surprise to them.
Ralph Rossum, who wrote a survey of Scalia's constitutional views, suggests that the justice's view of the Eleventh Amendment is actually contradictory to the language of the Amendment.
In his 1989 dissent in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., Scalia states that there was no intent on the part of the framers to have the states surrender any sovereign immunity, and that the case that provoked the Eleventh Amendment, Chisholm v. Georgia, came as a surprise to them.
Ralph Rossum, who wrote a survey of Scalia's constitutional views, suggests that the justice's view of the Eleventh Amendment is actually contradictory to the language of the Amendment.
Scalia argued that there is no constitutional right to abortion, and that if the people desire legalised abortion, a law should be passed to accomplish it.
Scalia wrote in his dissenting opinion in the 1992 case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
The States may, if they wish, permit abortion on demand, but the Constitution does not require them to do so.
The permissibility of abortion, and the limitations upon it, are to be resolved like most important questions in our democracy: by citizens trying to persuade one another and then voting.
Scalia wrote in his dissenting opinion in the 1992 case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
The States may, if they wish, permit abortion on demand, but the Constitution does not require them to do so.
The permissibility of abortion, and the limitations upon it, are to be resolved like most important questions in our democracy: by citizens trying to persuade one another and then voting.
Scalia repeatedly called upon his colleagues to strike down Roe v. Wade.
Scalia hoped to find five votes to strike down Roe in the 1989 case of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, but was not successful in doing so.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor authored the decision of the Court, allowing the abortion regulations at issue in the case to stand, but not overriding Roe. Scalia concurred only in part.
Scalia wrote that, Justice O'Connor's assertion, that a fundamental rule of judicial restraint requires us to avoid reconsidering Roe, cannot be taken seriously.
Scalia notes that we can now look forward to at least another.
Term of carts full of mail from the public, and the streets full of demonstrators.
Scalia hoped to find five votes to strike down Roe in the 1989 case of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, but was not successful in doing so.
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor authored the decision of the Court, allowing the abortion regulations at issue in the case to stand, but not overriding Roe. Scalia concurred only in part.
Scalia wrote that, Justice O'Connor's assertion, that a fundamental rule of judicial restraint requires us to avoid reconsidering Roe, cannot be taken seriously.
Scalia notes that we can now look forward to at least another.
Term of carts full of mail from the public, and the streets full of demonstrators.
The Court returned to the issue of abortion in the 2000 case of Stenberg v. Carhart, in which it invalidated a Nebraska statute outlawing partial-birth abortion.
Justice Stephen Breyer wrote for the Court that the law was unconstitutional as it did not allow an exception for the health of the mother.
Scalia dissented, comparing the Stenberg case with two of the most reviled cases in Supreme Court history.
I am optimistic enough to believe that, one day, Stenberg v. Carhart will be assigned its rightful place in the history of this Court's jurisprudence beside Korematsu and Dred Scott.
The method of killing a human child proscribed by this statute is so horrible that the most clinical description of it evokes a shudder of revulsion.
Justice Stephen Breyer wrote for the Court that the law was unconstitutional as it did not allow an exception for the health of the mother.
Scalia dissented, comparing the Stenberg case with two of the most reviled cases in Supreme Court history.
I am optimistic enough to believe that, one day, Stenberg v. Carhart will be assigned its rightful place in the history of this Court's jurisprudence beside Korematsu and Dred Scott.
The method of killing a human child proscribed by this statute is so horrible that the most clinical description of it evokes a shudder of revulsion.
In 2007, the Court upheld a federal statute banning partial-birth abortion in Gonzales v. Carhart.
Geoffrey R. Stone, a former colleague of Scalia's, criticized Gonzales v Carhart, stating that religion had influenced the outcome as all five justices in the majority were Catholic, whereas the dissenters were Protestant.
This angered Scalia to such an extent that he stated he would not speak at the University of Chicago as long as Stone is there.
He didn't.
Scalia generally voted to strike down laws that make distinctions by race, gender, or sexual orientation.
In 1989, he concurred with the Court's judgment in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., in which the Court applied strict scrutiny to a city program requiring a certain percentage of contracts to go to minorities, and struck down the program.
Scalia did not join the majority opinion, however.
He disagreed with O'Connor's opinion, for the Court, that states and localities could institute race-based programs, if they identified past discrimination, and if the program was designed to remedy the past racism.
Five years later, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña he concurred in the Court's judgment and in part with the opinion which extended strict scrutiny to federal programs.
Scalia noted in that matter his view that government can never have a compelling interest in making up for past discrimination by racial preferences.
To pursue the concept of racial entitlement—even for the most admirable and benign of purposes—is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American.
In 1989, he concurred with the Court's judgment in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., in which the Court applied strict scrutiny to a city program requiring a certain percentage of contracts to go to minorities, and struck down the program.
Scalia did not join the majority opinion, however.
He disagreed with O'Connor's opinion, for the Court, that states and localities could institute race-based programs, if they identified past discrimination, and if the program was designed to remedy the past racism.
Five years later, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña he concurred in the Court's judgment and in part with the opinion which extended strict scrutiny to federal programs.
Scalia noted in that matter his view that government can never have a compelling interest in making up for past discrimination by racial preferences.
To pursue the concept of racial entitlement—even for the most admirable and benign of purposes—is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American.
In the 2003 case of Grutter v. Bollinger, involving racial preferences in the University of Michigan's law school, Scalia mocked the Court majority's finding that the school was entitled to continue using race as a factor in admissions to promote diversity, and to increase "cross-racial understanding".
Scalia noted that his is not, of course, an "educational benefit" on which students will be graded on their Law School transcript (Works and Plays Well with Others: B+) or tested by the bar examiners (Q: Describte in 500 words or less your cross-racial understanding).
For it is a lesson of life rather than law—essentially the same lesson taught to (or rather learned by, for it cannot be "taught" in the usual sense) people three feet shorter and twenty years younger than the full-grown adults at the University of Michigan Law School, in institutions ranging from Boy Scout troops to public-school kindergartens.
Scalia noted that his is not, of course, an "educational benefit" on which students will be graded on their Law School transcript (Works and Plays Well with Others: B+) or tested by the bar examiners (Q: Describte in 500 words or less your cross-racial understanding).
For it is a lesson of life rather than law—essentially the same lesson taught to (or rather learned by, for it cannot be "taught" in the usual sense) people three feet shorter and twenty years younger than the full-grown adults at the University of Michigan Law School, in institutions ranging from Boy Scout troops to public-school kindergartens.
Scalia argued that laws that make distinctions between genders should be subjected to intermediate scrutiny, requiring that the gender classification be substantially related to important government objectives.
When, in 1996, the Court upheld a suit brought by a woman who wished to enter the Virginia Military Institute in the case of United States v. Virginia, Scalia filed a lone, lengthy dissent.
Scalia felt that the Court, in requiring Virginia to show an extremely persuasive justification for the single-sex admissions policy, had redefined intermediate scrutiny in such a way that makes it indistinguishable from strict scrutiny
When, in 1996, the Court upheld a suit brought by a woman who wished to enter the Virginia Military Institute in the case of United States v. Virginia, Scalia filed a lone, lengthy dissent.
Scalia felt that the Court, in requiring Virginia to show an extremely persuasive justification for the single-sex admissions policy, had redefined intermediate scrutiny in such a way that makes it indistinguishable from strict scrutiny
In one of the final decisions of the Burger Court, the Court ruled in 1986 in Bowers v. Hardwick that homosexual sodomy was not protected by the right of privacy and could be criminally prosecuted by the states.
In 1995, however, that ruling was effectively gutted by Romer v. Evans, which struck down a Colorado state constitutional amendment, passed by popular vote, which forbade anti-discrimination laws being extended to sexual orientation.
Scalia dissented from the opinion by Justice Kennedy, believing that Bowers had protected the right of the states to pass such measures, and that the Colorado amendment was not discriminatory, but merely prevented homosexuals from gaining favored status under Colorado law.
Scalia later said of Romer v. Evans:
And the Supreme Court said, 'Yes, it is unconstitutional.' On the basis of—I don't know, the Sexual Preference Clause of the Bill of Rights, presumably.
And the liberals loved it, and the conservatives gnashed their teeth."
In 1995, however, that ruling was effectively gutted by Romer v. Evans, which struck down a Colorado state constitutional amendment, passed by popular vote, which forbade anti-discrimination laws being extended to sexual orientation.
Scalia dissented from the opinion by Justice Kennedy, believing that Bowers had protected the right of the states to pass such measures, and that the Colorado amendment was not discriminatory, but merely prevented homosexuals from gaining favored status under Colorado law.
Scalia later said of Romer v. Evans:
And the Supreme Court said, 'Yes, it is unconstitutional.' On the basis of—I don't know, the Sexual Preference Clause of the Bill of Rights, presumably.
And the liberals loved it, and the conservatives gnashed their teeth."
In 2003, Bowers was formally reversed by Lawrence v. Texas, from which Scalia dissented.
According to Mark V. Tushnet in his survey of the Rehnquist Court, during the oral argument in the case, Scalia seemed so intent on making the state's argument for it that the Chief Justice intervened.[
According to his biographer, Joan Biskupic, Scalia ridiculed the majority in his dissent for being so ready to cast aside Bowers when many of the same justices had refused to overturn Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
In March 2009, openly gay Congressman Barney Frank described him as a homophobe.
Maureen Dowd described Scalia in a 2003 column as Archie Bunker in a high-backed chair.
In an op-ed for The New York Times, federal appeals judge Richard Posner and Eric Segall described as radical Scalia's positions on homosexuality, reflecting an apparent belief that the religious stances supposedly held by the majority of US citizens should take precedence over the Constitution and characterizing Scalia's political ideal as verg[ing] on majoritarian theocracy.
According to Mark V. Tushnet in his survey of the Rehnquist Court, during the oral argument in the case, Scalia seemed so intent on making the state's argument for it that the Chief Justice intervened.[
According to his biographer, Joan Biskupic, Scalia ridiculed the majority in his dissent for being so ready to cast aside Bowers when many of the same justices had refused to overturn Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
In March 2009, openly gay Congressman Barney Frank described him as a homophobe.
Maureen Dowd described Scalia in a 2003 column as Archie Bunker in a high-backed chair.
In an op-ed for The New York Times, federal appeals judge Richard Posner and Eric Segall described as radical Scalia's positions on homosexuality, reflecting an apparent belief that the religious stances supposedly held by the majority of US citizens should take precedence over the Constitution and characterizing Scalia's political ideal as verg[ing] on majoritarian theocracy.
Scalia believes that the death penalty is constitutional.
He dissents in decisions that hold the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to certain groups, such as those who were under the age of 18 at the time of offense. In Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988), he dissented from the Court's ruling that the death penalty could not be applied to those aged 15 at the time of the offense, and the following year authored the Court's opinion inStanford v. Kentucky sustaining the death penalty for those who killed at age 16.
However, in 2005, the Court overturned Stanford in Roper v. Simmons and Scalia again dissented, mocking the majority's claims that a national consensus had emerged against the execution of those who killed while underage, and noted that less than half of the states that permitted the death penalty prohibited it for underage killers.
He castigated the majority for including in their count states that had abolished the death penalty entirely, stating that doing so was "rather like including old-order Amishmen in a consumer-preference poll on the electric car. Of course they don't like it, but that sheds no light whatever on the point at issue."[88]
In 2002, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court ruled the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to the mentally retarded. Scalia dissented, stating that it would not have been considered cruel or unusual to execute the mildly mentally retarded at the time of the 1791 adoption of the Bill of Rights, and that the Court had failed to show that a national consensus had formed against the practice.[89]
Scalia strongly disfavored the Court's ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, which held that a confession by an arrested suspect who had not been advised of his rights was inadmissible in court, and voted to overrule Miranda in the 2000 case of Dickerson v. United States, but was in a minority of two with Justice Clarence Thomas. Calling the Mirandadecision a "milestone of judicial overreaching", Scalia stated that the Court should not fear to correct its mistakes.[90]
Although, in many areas, Scalia's approach was unfavorable to criminal defendants, he took the side of defendants in matters involving the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees defendants the right to confront their accusers. In multiple cases, Scalia wrote against laws that allowed alleged victims of child abuse to testify behind screens or by closed-circuit television.[91] In a 2009 case, Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, holding that defendants must have the opportunity to confront lab technicians in drug cases; a certificate of analysis is not enough to prove a substance was drugs.[92]
Scalia maintained that every element of an offense that helps determine the sentence must be either admitted by the defendant or found by a jury under the Sixth Amendment's jury guarantee. In the 2000 case of Apprendi v. New Jersey, Scalia wrote the Court's majority opinion that struck down a state statute that allowed the trial judge to increase the sentence if he found the offense was a hate crime. Scalia found the procedure impermissible because whether it was a hate crime had not been decided by the jury.[93]
In 2004, he wrote for the Court in Blakely v. Washington, striking down Washington state's sentencing guidelines on similar grounds. The dissenters in Blakely foresaw that Scalia would use the case to attack the federal sentencing guidelines (which he had failed to strike down in Mistretta), and they proved correct, as Scalia led a five-member majority in United States v. Booker, which made those guidelines no longer mandatory for federal judges to follow (they remained advisory).[93]
In 2004, he wrote for the Court in Blakely v. Washington, striking down Washington state's sentencing guidelines on similar grounds. The dissenters in Blakely foresaw that Scalia would use the case to attack the federal sentencing guidelines (which he had failed to strike down in Mistretta), and they proved correct, as Scalia led a five-member majority in United States v. Booker, which made those guidelines no longer mandatory for federal judges to follow (they remained advisory).[93]
In the 2001 case of Kyllo v. United States, Scalia wrote the Court's opinion in a 5–4 decision that cut across ideological lines.[94] That decision found thermal imaging of a home to be an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.
The Court struck down a conviction for marijuana manufacture based on a search warrant issued after such scans were conducted, which showed that the garage was considerably hotter than the rest of the house because of indoor growing lights.[95] Applying that Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure to arrest, Scalia dissented from the Court's 1991 decision in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, allowing a 48-hour delay before a person arrested without a warrant is taken before a magistrate, on the ground that at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, an arrested person was to be taken before a magistrate as quickly as practicable.[96] In a 1990 First Amendment case, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Scalia wrote the Court's opinion striking down a St. Paul, Minnesota, hate speech ordinance in a prosecution for burning a cross.[97] Scalia noted, "Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire."[98]
The Court struck down a conviction for marijuana manufacture based on a search warrant issued after such scans were conducted, which showed that the garage was considerably hotter than the rest of the house because of indoor growing lights.[95] Applying that Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure to arrest, Scalia dissented from the Court's 1991 decision in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, allowing a 48-hour delay before a person arrested without a warrant is taken before a magistrate, on the ground that at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, an arrested person was to be taken before a magistrate as quickly as practicable.[96] In a 1990 First Amendment case, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Scalia wrote the Court's opinion striking down a St. Paul, Minnesota, hate speech ordinance in a prosecution for burning a cross.[97] Scalia noted, "Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire."[98]
Scalia concurred in the 1990 case of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health in which the family of a woman in a vegetative state sought to have her feeding tube removed so she would die, believing that to have been her wish.
The Court found for the State of Missouri, requiring clear and convincing evidence of such a desire. Scalia stated that the Court should have remained away from the dispute, and that the issues "are [not] better known to the nine Justices of this Court any better than they are known to nine people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone directory".[99]
The Court found for the State of Missouri, requiring clear and convincing evidence of such a desire. Scalia stated that the Court should have remained away from the dispute, and that the issues "are [not] better known to the nine Justices of this Court any better than they are known to nine people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone directory".[99]
Scalia joined the majority per curiam opinion in the 2000 case of Bush v. Gore, which effectively ended recounts of ballots in Florida following the 2000 US Presidential election, and also both concurred separately and joined Rehnquist's concurrence.[100] In 2007, he said of the case, "I and my court owe no apology whatever for Bush v. Gore. We did the right thing. So there! ... get over it. It's so old by now."[101] During an interview on the Charlie Rose show, he defended the Court's action.
The decision was not close, it was 7–2 on the principal issue of whether there had been a constitutional violation ... But what if it was unconstitutional to have that recount? You're going to let it continue and come to a conclusion? And then overturn it? The reason to stop it sooner was not, "Ooh, we're worried that it's going to come out the wrong way."... you forget what was going on at the time. We were the laughingstock of the world. The world's greatest democracy that couldn't conduct an election. We didn't know who our next president was going to be. The lengthy transition that has become standard when you change from one president to another could not begin because you didn't know who the new president was going to be. It was becoming a very serious problem. The issue before the United States Supreme Court is: having decided the case, having decided this is unconstitutional, should we nonetheless let the election go on? Or is it time cut it off and let's move on?
The decision was not close, it was 7–2 on the principal issue of whether there had been a constitutional violation ... But what if it was unconstitutional to have that recount? You're going to let it continue and come to a conclusion? And then overturn it? The reason to stop it sooner was not, "Ooh, we're worried that it's going to come out the wrong way."... you forget what was going on at the time. We were the laughingstock of the world. The world's greatest democracy that couldn't conduct an election. We didn't know who our next president was going to be. The lengthy transition that has become standard when you change from one president to another could not begin because you didn't know who the new president was going to be. It was becoming a very serious problem. The issue before the United States Supreme Court is: having decided the case, having decided this is unconstitutional, should we nonetheless let the election go on? Or is it time cut it off and let's move on?
In 2008, the Court considered a challenge to the gun laws in the District of Columbia.
Scalia wrote the majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, which found an individual right to own a firearm under the Second Amendment. Scalia traced the word "militia", found in the Second Amendment, as it would have been understood at the time of its ratification, and stated that it then meant "the body of all citizens".[99] The Court upheld Heller's claim to own a firearm in the District.[99]
Scalia's opinion for the Heller Court was widely criticized by liberals, and applauded by conservatives.
However, Seventh Circuit judge Richard Posnerdisagreed with Scalia's opinion, stating that the Second Amendment "creates no right to the private possession of guns".
Posner called Scalia's opinion faux originalism and a historicising glaze on personal values and policy preferences.
In October 2008 Scalia stated that the court's originalists only needed to show that at the time the Second Amendment was ratified, the right to bear arms did not have an exclusively military context, and that they were successful in so showing.
However, Seventh Circuit judge Richard Posnerdisagreed with Scalia's opinion, stating that the Second Amendment "creates no right to the private possession of guns".
Posner called Scalia's opinion faux originalism and a historicising glaze on personal values and policy preferences.
In October 2008 Scalia stated that the court's originalists only needed to show that at the time the Second Amendment was ratified, the right to bear arms did not have an exclusively military context, and that they were successful in so showing.
During oral argument before the Court, Scalia asked more questions and made more comments than any other justice[106]—and a 2005 study found that he provoked laughter more often than any of his colleagues.[107]
His goal during oral arguments was to get across his position to the other justices.[108] University of Kansas social psychologist Lawrence Wrightsman wrote of Scalia's style, "he communicates a sense of urgency on the bench, and his style is forever forceful".[106] Since Chief Justice John Roberts joined the Court in 2005, he has taken to questioning counsel in a manner similar to Scalia's and sometimes the two questioned counsel in seeming coordination.[108] Dahlia Lithwick of Slate described Scalia's technique:
His goal during oral arguments was to get across his position to the other justices.[108] University of Kansas social psychologist Lawrence Wrightsman wrote of Scalia's style, "he communicates a sense of urgency on the bench, and his style is forever forceful".[106] Since Chief Justice John Roberts joined the Court in 2005, he has taken to questioning counsel in a manner similar to Scalia's and sometimes the two questioned counsel in seeming coordination.[108] Dahlia Lithwick of Slate described Scalia's technique:
Scalia wrote numerous opinions from the start of his career on the Supreme Court.
During his tenure, he wrote more concurring opinions than any other justice, and only two justices have written more dissents.[110] According to Kevin Ring, who compiled a book of Scalia's dissenting and concurring opinions, "His opinions are ... highly readable. His entertaining writing style can make even the most mundane areas of the law interesting."[111] Conor Clarke of Slate comments on Scalia's written opinions, especially his dissents:
During his tenure, he wrote more concurring opinions than any other justice, and only two justices have written more dissents.[110] According to Kevin Ring, who compiled a book of Scalia's dissenting and concurring opinions, "His opinions are ... highly readable. His entertaining writing style can make even the most mundane areas of the law interesting."[111] Conor Clarke of Slate comments on Scalia's written opinions, especially his dissents:
At the Supreme Court, justices meet after the case is briefed and argued, and vote on the result. The task of writing the opinion is assigned by the Chief Justice, or if they are in the minority or not participating, by the senior justice in the majority. After the assignment, the justices generally communicate about a case by sending notes and draft opinions to each other's chambers.[113] In the give and take of opinion writing, Scalia did not compromise his views in order to attract five votes for a majority (unlike the late Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. who would accept less than he wanted in order to gain a partial victory).[114] Scalia, known to his friends and colleagues as "Nino",[115] attempted to influence his colleagues by sending them "Ninograms"—short memoranda aimed at trying to get them to include his views in their opinions.[110][115]
In an October 2013 issue of New York magazine, Scalia revealed that he scanned the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Times, got most of his news from talk radio and did not read The New York Times or The Washington Post.
The latter he described as shrilly liberal.
The latter he described as shrilly liberal.
Scalia was a textualist in statutory interpretation, believing that the ordinary meaning of the statute should govern.
In 1998, Scalia vociferously had opposed the idea of a living constitution, or the power of the judiciary to modify the meaning of constitutional provisions to adapt them to changing times.
Scalia warned that if one accepted that constitutional standards should evolve with a maturing society, "the risk of assessing evolving standards is that it is all too easy to believe that evolution has culminated in one's own views."
He compared the Constitution with statutes, which he contended were not understood to change their meaning through time.
Constitutional amendments, such as the 1868 Fourteenth Amendment, according to Scalia, were to be interpreted based on their meaning at the time of ratification.[119] Scalia was often asked how this approach justified the result in the 1954 case of Brown v. Board of Education, which held that segregated schools were unconstitutional, and which relied on the Fourteenth Amendment for the result.[120]
In interpreting statutes, Scalia did not look to legislative history.
In the 2006 case of Zedner v. United States, he joined the majority opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito—all except one paragraph of the opinion, in which Alito cited legislative history.
In a concurring opinion in that case, Scalia noted, "The use of legislative history is illegitimate and ill advised in the interpretation of any statute."[121]
His dislike of legislative history may have been a reason why other justices have become more cautious in its use.[122]
Gregory Maggs wrote in the Public Interest Law Review in 1995 that by the early 1990s, legislative history was being cited in only about forty percent of Supreme Court cases involving the interpretation of statutes, and no case of that era used legislative history as an essential reason for the outcome. Maggs suggested that With Justice Scalia breathing down the necks of anyone who peeks into the Congressional Record or Senate reports, the other members of the Court may have concluded that the benefit of citing legislative history does not outweigh its costs. It is likely for this reason that the percentage of cases citing it has decreased dramatically. No one likes an unnecessary fight, especially not one with as formidable an opponent as Justice Scalia.[122]
In the 2006 case of Zedner v. United States, he joined the majority opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito—all except one paragraph of the opinion, in which Alito cited legislative history.
In a concurring opinion in that case, Scalia noted, "The use of legislative history is illegitimate and ill advised in the interpretation of any statute."[121]
His dislike of legislative history may have been a reason why other justices have become more cautious in its use.[122]
Gregory Maggs wrote in the Public Interest Law Review in 1995 that by the early 1990s, legislative history was being cited in only about forty percent of Supreme Court cases involving the interpretation of statutes, and no case of that era used legislative history as an essential reason for the outcome. Maggs suggested that With Justice Scalia breathing down the necks of anyone who peeks into the Congressional Record or Senate reports, the other members of the Court may have concluded that the benefit of citing legislative history does not outweigh its costs. It is likely for this reason that the percentage of cases citing it has decreased dramatically. No one likes an unnecessary fight, especially not one with as formidable an opponent as Justice Scalia.[122]
Scalia described himself as an originalist, meaning that he interpreted the Constitution of the United States as it would have been understood when it was adopted.
According to Scalia in 2008, "It's what did the words mean to the people who ratified the Bill of Rights or who ratified the Constitution."[21] In 2006, before George W. Bush appointees Roberts and Alito had time to make an impact, Rossum, wrote that Scalia had failed to win converts among his conservative colleagues for his use of originalism,[123] whereas Roberts and Alito, as younger men with an originalist approach greatly admired Scalia battling for what he believed in.
According to Scalia in 2008, "It's what did the words mean to the people who ratified the Bill of Rights or who ratified the Constitution."[21] In 2006, before George W. Bush appointees Roberts and Alito had time to make an impact, Rossum, wrote that Scalia had failed to win converts among his conservative colleagues for his use of originalism,[123] whereas Roberts and Alito, as younger men with an originalist approach greatly admired Scalia battling for what he believed in.
In a 2009 public conversation, Justice Stephen Breyer questioned Scalia, indicating that those who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to end school segregation. Scalia called this argument "waving the bloody shirt of Brown", and indicated that he would have joined the first Justice Harlan's solitary dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, the 1896 case that Brown overruled.[125]
Scalia's originalist approach came under attack from critics, who viewed it as a cover for what they see as Scalia's real intention: to turn back some pivotal court decisions of the 1960s and 70s", reached by the Warren and Burger Courts.
Ralph Nader argued in 2008 that Scalia's originalist philosophy was inconsistent with the justice's acceptance of the extension of certain constitutional rights to corporations when at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, corporations were not commonly understood to possess constitutional rights.[126]
Nader's view preceded the Court's 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. Scalia, in his concurrence in that case, traced his understanding of the rights of groups of individuals at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights. His argument was based on the lack of an exception for groups such as corporations in the free speech guarantee in the Bill of Rights, and on several examples of corporate political speech from the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights.[127] Professor Thomas Colby of The George Washington University National Law Center argued that Scalia's votes in Establishment Clause cases do not stem from originalist views, but simply from conservative political convictions.[128] Scalia responded to his critics that his originalism "has occasionally led him to decisions he deplores, like his upholding the constitutionality of flag burning", which according to Scalia was protected by the First Amendment.[21]
Ralph Nader argued in 2008 that Scalia's originalist philosophy was inconsistent with the justice's acceptance of the extension of certain constitutional rights to corporations when at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, corporations were not commonly understood to possess constitutional rights.[126]
Nader's view preceded the Court's 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. Scalia, in his concurrence in that case, traced his understanding of the rights of groups of individuals at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights. His argument was based on the lack of an exception for groups such as corporations in the free speech guarantee in the Bill of Rights, and on several examples of corporate political speech from the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights.[127] Professor Thomas Colby of The George Washington University National Law Center argued that Scalia's votes in Establishment Clause cases do not stem from originalist views, but simply from conservative political convictions.[128] Scalia responded to his critics that his originalism "has occasionally led him to decisions he deplores, like his upholding the constitutionality of flag burning", which according to Scalia was protected by the First Amendment.[21]
In 2009, after nearly a quarter century on the Court, Scalia characterized his victories as damn few.
Writing in The Jewish Daily Forward in 2009, J.J. Goldberg described Scalia as the intellectual anchor of the court's conservative majority.
He traveled to the nation's law schools, giving talks on law and democracy.
His appearances on college campuses were often standing room only.
Ginsburg indicated that Scalia was "very much in tune with the current generation of law students.
Students now put 'Federalist Society' on their resumes."
John Paul Stevens, who served throughout Scalia's tenure until his 2010 retirement, said of Scalia's influence that he's made a huge difference.
Some of it constructive, some of it unfortunate.
Of the nine sitting justices, Scalia was most often the subject of law review articles.[131]
He traveled to the nation's law schools, giving talks on law and democracy.
His appearances on college campuses were often standing room only.
Ginsburg indicated that Scalia was "very much in tune with the current generation of law students.
Students now put 'Federalist Society' on their resumes."
John Paul Stevens, who served throughout Scalia's tenure until his 2010 retirement, said of Scalia's influence that he's made a huge difference.
Some of it constructive, some of it unfortunate.
Of the nine sitting justices, Scalia was most often the subject of law review articles.[131]
Scalia recused himself from Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (2004), a claim brought by atheist Michael Newdow alleging that the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance (including the words "under God") in school classrooms violated the rights of his daughter, who he said was also an atheist. Shortly after the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in Newdow's favor, but before the case came before the Supreme Court, Scalia spoke at a Knights of Columbus event in Fredericksburg, Virginia, stating that the Ninth Circuit decision was an example of how the courts were trying to excise God from public life. The school district requested that the Supreme Court review the case, and Newdow asked that Scalia recuse himself because of this prior statement, which he did without comment.[133]
Scalia refused to recuse himself from Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia (2005), a case concerning whether Vice PresidentDick Cheney could keep secret the membership of an advisory task force on energy policy. Scalia was asked to recuse himself because he had gone on a hunting trip with various persons including Cheney, during which he traveled one way on Air Force Two. Scalia refused to recuse himself, stating that though Cheney was a longtime friend, he was merely being sued in his official capacity, and that were justices to step aside in the cases of officials who are parties because of official capacity, the Supreme Court would cease to function. Scalia indicated that it was far from unusual for justices to socialize with other government officials, recalling that the late Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson played poker with President Harry Truman, and that Justice Byron White went skiing with Attorney GeneralRobert F. Kennedy. Scalia stated that he was never alone with Cheney during the trip, the two had not discussed the case, and the justice had saved no money since he had bought round-trip tickets, the cheapest available.[134] Scalia was part of the 7–2 majority once the case was heard which generally upheld Cheney's position.[135]
Scalia is a devout Roman Catholic, and his son Paul entered the priesthood.
Uncomfortable with the changes brought about following Vatican II, Scalia drove long distances to parishes that he felt were more in accord with his beliefs, such as the Tridentine Latin Mass in both Chicago and Washington and also the Latin version of the Mass of Paul VI at St. Catherine of Siena in Great Falls, Virginia.
In a 2013 interview with Jennifer Senior for New York magazine, Scalia was asked if his beliefs extended to the Devil, and he stated
"Of course! Yeah, he's a real person.
Hey, c'mon, that's standard Catholic doctrine!
Every Catholic believes that".
When asked if he had seen recent evidence of the Devil, Scalia replied,
"You know, it is curious. In the Gospels, the Devil is doing all sorts of things. He's making pigs run off cliffs, he's possessing people and whatnot ...
What he's doing now is getting people not to believe in him or in God.
He's much more successful that way".[116]
In another 2013 interview, Scalia stated that in order for capitalism to work, in order for it to produce a good and stable society, traditional Christian virtues are essential.
Uncomfortable with the changes brought about following Vatican II, Scalia drove long distances to parishes that he felt were more in accord with his beliefs, such as the Tridentine Latin Mass in both Chicago and Washington and also the Latin version of the Mass of Paul VI at St. Catherine of Siena in Great Falls, Virginia.
In a 2013 interview with Jennifer Senior for New York magazine, Scalia was asked if his beliefs extended to the Devil, and he stated
"Of course! Yeah, he's a real person.
Hey, c'mon, that's standard Catholic doctrine!
Every Catholic believes that".
When asked if he had seen recent evidence of the Devil, Scalia replied,
"You know, it is curious. In the Gospels, the Devil is doing all sorts of things. He's making pigs run off cliffs, he's possessing people and whatnot ...
What he's doing now is getting people not to believe in him or in God.
He's much more successful that way".[116]
In another 2013 interview, Scalia stated that in order for capitalism to work, in order for it to produce a good and stable society, traditional Christian virtues are essential.
In 2006, Scalia was asked by a reporter upon leaving church, if being a traditionalist Catholic had caused problems for him and responded by asking,
"You know what I say to those people?"
and with a gesture, cupping his hand under his chin and flicking his fingers out.
The gesture, which was captured by a photographer, was initially reported by the Boston Herald as obscene.
Scalia responded to the reports with a letter to the editor accusing the news staff of watching too many episodes of The Sopranos and stating that the gesture was a strong brush-off.
Roger Axtell, an expert on body language, described the gesture as possibly meaning
"I've had enough, go away" and noted, "It's a fairly strong gesture".
"You know what I say to those people?"
and with a gesture, cupping his hand under his chin and flicking his fingers out.
The gesture, which was captured by a photographer, was initially reported by the Boston Herald as obscene.
Scalia responded to the reports with a letter to the editor accusing the news staff of watching too many episodes of The Sopranos and stating that the gesture was a strong brush-off.
Roger Axtell, an expert on body language, described the gesture as possibly meaning
"I've had enough, go away" and noted, "It's a fairly strong gesture".
According to John Boehner, as chairman of the House Republican Conference, he sought to persuade Scalia to run for election as vice president with Bob Dole in 1996. As related by Boehner, Scalia listened to the proposal and dictated the same reply Justice Charles Evans Hughes had once given to a similar query: "The possibility is too remote to comment upon, given my position." Dole did put Scalia on his list of potential running mates, but eventually settled on Jack Kemp.[141]
On September 10, 1960, Scalia married Maureen McCarthy at St. Pius X church in Yarmouth, Massachusetts.
The two had met on a blind date while he was at Harvard.
Maureen was an undergraduate student at Radcliffe when they met and subsequently obtained a degree in English.
The couple raised nine children, five sons and four daughters.
He resided in McLean, Virginia, a suburb of Washington, D.C.
The two had met on a blind date while he was at Harvard.
Maureen was an undergraduate student at Radcliffe when they met and subsequently obtained a degree in English.
The couple raised nine children, five sons and four daughters.
He resided in McLean, Virginia, a suburb of Washington, D.C.
Scalia enjoyed a warm relationship with fellow Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, considered a member of the court's liberal wing, with the two attending the opera together, and even appearing together onstage as supernumeraries in Washington National Opera's 1994 production of Ariadne auf Naxos.[106]
Ginsburg was a colleague of Scalia's on the D.C. Circuit, and the Scalias and Ginsburgs had dinner together every New Year's Eve.
Ginsburg was a colleague of Scalia's on the D.C. Circuit, and the Scalias and Ginsburgs had dinner together every New Year's Eve.
Scalia died in his sleep from natural causes,[1] on the night of February 12 or the morning of February 13, 2016,[7] following an afternoon of quail hunting and dining at the Cibolo Creek Ranch inShafter, Texas.[147]
According to The Washington Post, "Presidio County Judge Cinderela Guevara pronounced Scalia dead of natural causes without seeing the body — which is permissible under Texas law — and without ordering an autopsy." Another Presidio County justice of the peace, Juanita Bishop, disagreed with the decision not to order an autopsy for Scalia. Guevara, who conferred by telephone with Scalia's physician, stated that she made the determination to pronounce Scalia dead from natural causes after being told by county sheriff officials on the scene that "there were no signs of foul play" and that Scalia "was having health issues";[7][148] Scalia's doctor told her Scalia had a history of heart trouble, including high blood pressure, and was recently deemed too weak to undergo surgery for a torn rotator cuff.[149] Scalia's family also declined to have an autopsy performed after his body was transferred to an El Paso funeral home, prior to its return to Virginia.[150]
The Supreme Court announced that Scalia's chair and the front of the bench where he sat will be draped with black wool crêpe in his memory. Black crêpe will also hang over the doors, a tradition since the death of Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase in 1873. Flags on the Court's front plaza will be flown at half-staff for 30 days.[151] Scalia's body was taken to Fairfax, Virginia, then in repose at the Supreme Court of the United States and finally a Catholic funeral Mass on February 20, 2016 in Washington, D.C..[152]
Scalia's sudden death left eight justices remaining on the Supreme Court, split 4–4 between being fairly conservative and fairly liberal, during a presidential election year.[153][154] PresidentBarack Obama said that he will nominate his successor in "due time".[155] Scalia's death is only the second occasion in sixty years on which a justice has died while serving on the court.[156]
In his 2012 C-SPAN interview Antonin Scalia said that he himself would have preferred Frank H. Easterbrook as his replacement in the Supreme Court: "if I had to pick somebody to replace me on the Supreme Court it would be Frank".[157] Frank H. Easterbrook is currently a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Cases that were not decided before Scalia's death will be decided by the remaining eight members of the Court.[158] If the Court issues a ruling with the remaining eight justices' votes split 4–4, the Court will not publish a written opinion with respect to the merits of the case; the ruling of the lower court will be upheld, but the Supreme Court's vote will have no precedential effect.[158][159]Citing the Court's practices following the death of Justice Robert H. Jackson in 1954, Tom Goldstein argued that the Court is more likely to rehear evenly-divided cases after a new Justice is appointed to the Court. Scalia's essays include:
"A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law,"
"Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges,"
Scalia, Antonin; Garner, Bryan A. (2012),
See also[edit]
- List of federal judges appointed by Ronald Reagan
- List of United States Supreme Court Justices by time in office
References[edit]
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- ^ Smith, David (February 13, 2016), "Antonin Scalia obituary: conservative supreme court justice dies aged 79", The Guardian, retrieved February 14, 2016
- ^ Whitely, Jason (February 14, 2016). "Official: Scalia died of heart attack". USA Today. Retrieved February 14, 2016.
- ^ Bobic, Igor (February 14, 2016). "Antonin Scalia Died Of A Heart Attack: Report". The Huffington Post. RetrievedFebruary 14, 2016.
- ^ Connelly, Eileen (February 13, 2016), "Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia dead at 79", New York Post, retrieved February 13, 2016
- ^ a b c Straub, Lana; Moravec, Eva Ruth; Horwitz, Sari; Markon, Jerry (February 14, 2016). "The death of Antonin Scalia: Chaos, confusion and conflicting reports". The Washington Post. Retrieved February 14, 2016.
- ^ See:[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
- ^ Toobin, Jeffrey (2012), "Lawyers, guns, and money", in Toobin, Jeffrey, The oath: the Obama White House and the Supreme Court, New York: Doubleday, pp. 111–112,ISBN 9780385527200. Details.
- ^ Martin, Gary; Contreras, Guillermo, "Senior U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonin Scalia found dead at West Texas ranch", San Antonio Express-News (Texas), retrieved February 13, 2016
- ^ a b Dautrich, Kenneth; Yalof, David A. (2009), "The judiciary", in Dautrich, Kenneth; Yalof, David A., American government: historical, popular, and global perspectives, Australia United States Boston, Massachusetts: Cengage Learning, p. 241, ISBN 9780495566151. Preview.
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- ^ a b Biskupic 2009, pp. 11–15
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- ^ Murphy, Bruce Allen (2014). A Court of One. New York: Simon & Schuster. p. 10. ISBN 9781451611465.
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- ^ Biskupic 2009, pp. 17–19.
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- ^ Biskupic 2009, pp. 73–74.
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- ^ Toobin 2008, p. 21.
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- ^ a b c Biskupic 2009, pp. 136–38.
- ^ Staab 2006, pp. 74–75.
- ^ Staab 2006, p. 76.
- ^ Staab 2006, pp. 78–79.
- ^ Staab 2006, pp. 80–82.
- ^ Biskupic 2009, pp. 328–29.
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- ^ a b Judge 'rejects Guantanamo rights', BBC News, March 27, 2006, retrieved January 29, 2010
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- ^ Scalia, Antonin, Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland, petitioner v. Brian Wynne et ux. (PDF), p. 33,
The fundamental problem with our negative Commerce Clause cases is that the Constitution does not contain a negative Commerce Clause...The clearest sign that the negative Commerce Clause is a judicial fraud is the utterly illogical holding that congressional consent enables States to enact laws that would otherwise constitute impermissible burdens upon interstate commerce.
- ^ Rossum 2006, pp. 110–12.
- ^ Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (Scalia, J., dissenting), United States Supreme Court, June 29, 1992, archived from the original on January 7, 2010, retrieved January 13, 2010 – via FindLaw
- ^ Biskupic 2009, pp. 193–95.
- ^ Ring 2004, p. 108.
- ^ Ring 2004, p. 109.
- ^ Ring 2004, pp. 137–38.
- ^ Biskupic 2009, pp. 202–03.
- ^ Stone, Geoffrey (April 20, 2007), "Our Faith-Based Justices", The Huffington Post
- ^ Biskupic 2009, pp. 203–04.
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- ^ Ring 2004, p. 194.
- ^ Ring 2004, p. 195.
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- ^ Ring 2004, pp. 280–81.
- ^ Biskupic 2009, p. 283. There is no such clause in the Bill of Rights.
- ^ Tushnet 2005, pp. 170–72.
- ^ Biskupic 2009, pp. 225–27.
- ^ "Rep. Frank calls Scalia a 'homophobe' in interview", ABC News, Associated Press, March 23, 2009, archived from the original on March 27, 2009, retrieved February 18, 2010
- ^ Dowd, Maureen (June 29, 2003), "Nino's Opéra Bouffe",The New York Times, retrieved February 18, 2010
- ^ "Justice Scalia's Majoritarian Theocracy", The New York Times, December 2, 2015
- ^ Ring 2004, p. 144.
- ^ Rossum 2006, pp. 192–93.
- ^ Ring 2004, p. 148.
- ^ Toobin 2008, p. 146.
- ^ Rossum 2006, pp. 182–84.
- ^ Biskupic 2009, p. 354.
- ^ a b Rossum 2006, pp. 184–86.
- ^ Scalia was joined by Justices Thomas, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg.
- ^ Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, United States Supreme Court, June 11, 2001, retrieved January 24, 2010 – via FindLaw
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- ^ Tushnet 2005, pp. 140–42.
- ^ Rossum 2006, p. 2.
- ^ a b c Biskupic 2009, pp. 135–36.
- ^ Biskupic 2009, p. 243.
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- ^ Biskupic 2009, pp. 347–51.
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- ^ McArdle, Elaine (October 3, 2008), In inaugural Vaughan Lecture, Scalia defends the "methodology of originalism", Harvard Law School, archived from the original on January 29, 2010, retrieved January 14, 2010
- ^ a b c Biskupic 2009, pp. 304–05.
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- ^ a b Biskupic 2009, pp. 307–08.
- ^ Lithwick, Dahlia (January 15, 2003), "Scalia hogs the ball", Slate, retrieved September 8, 2011
- ^ a b c Staab 2006, p. 27.
- ^ Ring 2004, p. xi.
- ^ Clarke, Conor (July 5, 2006), "How Scalia lost his mojo",Slate, retrieved January 30, 2010
- ^ Tushnet 2006, pp. 64–65.
- ^ Biskupic 2009, p. 132.
- ^ a b Ward, Artemus (February 2007). "Book review: The Political Thought of Justice Antonin Scalia: A Hamiltonian of the Supreme Court by James B. Stabb". Law & Politics Book Review (American Political Science Association) 17 (2): 96–100.
- ^ a b Senior, Jennifer (October 14, 2013), "In conversation: Antonin Scalia", New York, p. 26
- ^ Rossum, Ralph, The textualist jurisprudence of Justice Scalia, Claremont McKenna College, archived from the original on January 25, 2010, retrieved January 14, 2010
- ^ Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 865 (Scalia, J., dissenting), United States Supreme Court, June 29, 1988, retrieved January 13, 2010 – via FindLaw
- ^ Greenhouse, Linda (May 31, 1990), "Washington talk: High Court still groping to define due process", The New York Times, retrieved February 12, 2010
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- ^ a b Rossum 2006, p. 44.
- ^ Rossum 2006, p. 198.
- ^ Biskupic 2009, p. 275.
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- ^ Biskupic 2009, p. 363.
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- ^ a b Biskupic 2009, p. 276.
- ^ a b Biskupic 2009, p. 362.
- ^ Greenhouse, Linda (October 14, 2003), "Justices take case on Pledge of Allegiance's reference to God", The New York Times, retrieved January 29, 2010
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- ^ Biskupic, Joan (2009), "Passions of his mind", in Biskupic, Joan, American original: the life and constitution of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, New York: Sarah Crichton Books/Farrar, Straus And Giroux, p. 185,ISBN 9780374202897. Preview.
- ^ Collins, Katie (October 27, 2010), "Parish Profile: Great Falls St. Catherine of Siena", Arlington Catholic Herald, retrieved January 5, 2016
- ^ Havill, Adrian (2002), "Mondays are for dead drops", in Havill, Adrian, The spy who stayed out in the cold: the secret life of FBI double agent Robert Hanssen, New York: St. Martin's Paperbacks, p. 120, ISBN 9780312986292. Preview.
- ^ Slevin, Jeremy (September 11, 2013). "Elizabeth Warren slams "pro-corporate" Supremes". NOW with Alex Wagner(MSNBC). Retrieved November 18, 2013.
- ^ Brand, Madeline (March 30, 2006). "Justice Scalia's under-the-chin gesture". Roger Axtell (guest). NPR. RetrievedNovember 18, 2013.
- ^ Boehner, John. "The Time I Tried To Persuade Antonin Scalia To Run For Vice President". Independent Journal. Retrieved 16 February 2016.
- ^ Driscoll, Sean F. (February 14, 2016). "Scalia wed on Cape in 1960". The Cape Cod Times. Retrieved February 15,2016.
- ^ Biskupic 2009, pp. 30–31.
- ^ Biskupic 2009, p. 361.
- ^ Biskupic 2009, p. 211.
- ^ Biskupic 2009, p. 88.
- ^ Abramson, Ben; Bacon, John (February 14, 2016). "Cibolo Creek Ranch: Wildlife, movie sets, luxury". USA Today. Retrieved February 14, 2016.
- ^ Michael, Tom (February 14, 2016). "The Trials Of Pronouncing Antonin Scalia Dead In West Texas". NPR. Retrieved February 14, 2016.
- ^ Hananel, Sam; Warren, David (February 15, 2016). "Texas Judge Disclosed Details About Scalia's Health". Associated Press. Retrieved February 16, 2016.
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- ^ Phelps, Jordyn (February 16, 2016). "Antonin Scalia's Supreme Court Chair and Bench Draped in Black". ABC News. ABC. Retrieved February 16, 2016.
- ^ "Funeral for Scalia Will Be Held Saturday". The New York Times. February 17, 2016.
- ^ "Scalia's death shifts balance of high court, creates major election issue". Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 2016-02-14.
- ^ Chon, Gina (February 14, 2016), "Antonin Scalia's death challenges U.S. leadership.", Reuters, retrievedFebruary 14, 2016
- ^ "Remarks by the President on the Passing of the U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia". The White House. February 13, 2016. Retrieved February 14, 2016.
- ^ Gresko, Jessica (February 14, 2016). "Scalia's death in office a rarity for modern Supreme Court". Associated Press. Retrieved February 15, 2016.
- ^ "Scalia Once Suggested a Name for His Successor". C-SPAN. Retrieved 2016-02-19.
- ^ a b Goldstein, Tom (February 13, 2016). "What happens to this Term’s close cases? (Updated)". SCOTUSblog. Retrieved February 18, 2016.
- ^ Farias, Cristian (February 14, 2016). "Justice Scalia Left Undecided High-Stakes Cases That Could Change The Nation". The Huffington Post. Retrieved February 18, 2016.
- ^ Goldstein, Tom (February 14, 2016). "Tie votes will lead to reargument, not affirmance". SCOTUSblog. RetrievedFebruary 18, 2016.
Bibliography[edit]
- Biskupic, Joan (2009). American original : the life and constitution of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. New York: Sarah Crichton Books/Farrar, Straus And Giroux.ISBN 9780374202897.
- Murphy, Bruce Allen (2014). Scalia: a court of one. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 9780743296496.
- Scalia, Antonin (2004). Ring, Kevin, ed. Scalia dissents : writings of the Supreme Court's wittiest, most outspoken justice. Washington, D.C: Regnery Publishing, Inc. ISBN 9780895260536.
- Rossum, Ralph A. (2006). Antonin Scalia's jurisprudence: text and tradition. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. ISBN 9780700614479.
- Staab, James (2006). The political thought of Justice Antonin Scalia : a Hamiltonian on the Supreme Court. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 9780742543119.
- Toobin, Jeffrey (2008). The nine: inside the secret world of the Supreme Court (revised ed.). New York: Anchor Books. ISBN 9781400096794.
- Toobin, Jeffrey (2012), "Lawyers, guns, and money", in Toobin, Jeffrey, The oath: the Obama White House and the Supreme Court (Hardcover ed.), New York: Doubleday, pp. 111–112,ISBN 9780385527200. Details.
- Tushnet, Mark (2005). A Court divided: the Rehnquist court and the future of constitutional law (revised ed.). New York: W.W. Norton Co. ISBN 9780393058680.
External links[edit]
- Antonin Scalia at the Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, a public domain publication of the Federal Judicial Center.
- Antonin Scalia at Ballotpedia
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|---|---|---|
| Preceded by Roger Robb | Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 1982–1986 | Succeeded by David Sentelle |
| Preceded by William Rehnquist | Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States 1986–2016 | Vacant |
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