Linguistic Botany and "Pseudo-Problems"

I thought, after reading it, and learning more from R. O. Doyle's
s site, that indeed Hare is describing Schlick. I never thought, till I read R. O. Doyle's pages (glossary) that 'pseudo-problem' had such a pedigree and that it had been applied to the 'free will' as per title of the book. This is very important
because it perfectly identifies what members of the Vienna Circle (including
Ayer) were trying to do.

As we've discussed elsewhere Grice ends that "Actions and events" with a
point about something being dissolved (a problem, -- as he sees it in the
phenomenon-noumenon distinction. As we know, Grice was trying to solve the
problem not dissolve it, but he did use that phrase, 'dissolve'.

Hare perhaps published one book too MANY books. To think that he
was starting early enough in Oxford. His dissertation there was on Frege's
dictum and dictor.

Hare became a prominent language analyst with his "Language of Morals" in
the 1950s. His later "Freedom of reason" I consulted then (I recall a
mention of Grice 1961). His 'universal prescriptivism' and emphasis on
'ought'-judgements contrasts with weaker views on morality by Hampshire (who focuses on 'should') or Grice (who focuses on 'must').

This 'Free Will Controversy" essay is a late one, and he is like
apologising for not having considered the problem in more serious terms in his
earlier work. We should recall he succeeded Austin as White's prof. of moral philosophy in Oxford.

By the time he published this 1978 piece, American philosophers had already
developed very sophisticated meta-ethical views, and this may explain why
this piece is seldom quoted.

Incidentally, he retired in Gainesville. His son is a philosopher and his
literary executor.

Richard M. Hare

Originally a member of the so-called "Ordinary Language School of
Philosophy", he succeeded Austin as White's Professor of Moral
Philosophy. He discusses issues of freedom in his earlier "Freedom and reason", and in later essays like "Prediction and Moral appraisal" (originally Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1978, repr. in his "Essays on bioethics", 1993).

Hare writes of the necessity to simplify some of the basic tenets in the
so-called "Free Will controversy", especially when looking for its
application in practical policies.

"Determinism and Libertarianism are still thought by many to be locked in a conflict which philosophers have been unable to resolve, and it is also thought that the conflict is of great practical significance, so that for example, important policy decisions about the punishment of offenders or the education of children hang upon its solution. But in fact I do not think that many of those who have come down decisively on one of what they think are the two sides of the so-called 'Free Will controversy' have been caused thereby to alter their opinions on any important practical question -- or if they have, they have lacked reason. For as soon as we ask, what an extreme determinist or an extreme libertarian would have to say about practical issues as a result of embracing their doctrines, both are faced with the
same dilemma. Either they say that the consequences of their views are something so utterly absurd as to cast doubt on the seriousness of anybody who maintains them; or they say that the consequences are no different from what the rest of us think -- in which case, they are left, in spite of their alleged dispute, in substantial agreement with one another and with the ordinary man. This is, in short, one of the class of puzzles which used to be called 'pseudo-problems' -- a very misleading expression, because if something is a problem for someone, it really is a problem for him and he needs to solve it. What the people who invented this term ought to have said is that there are different kinds of problems, of which some admit a 'yes'-or-'no' answer; others, such as this one, require instead a fuller understanding of
the question itself, to see the pitfalls and ambiguities in it".