Free will, weak will: Grice on freedom and akrasia

by JLS
for the GC

Or rather, a commentary on wiki's references for 'akrasia'.



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Audi, R. (May 1979). "Weakness of Will and Practical Judgment". Noûs 13 (2): 173–196.
Bovens, L. (October 1999). "The Two Faces of Akratics Anonymous". Analysis 59 (4): 230–6. doi:10.1111/1467-8284.00174.
Cameron, M.E. (1997). "Akrasia, AIDS, and Virtue Ethics". Journal of Nursing Law 4 (1): 21–33. PMID 12545981.
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Chan, D.K. (April 1995). "Non-Intentional Actions". American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (2): 139–151.
Davidson, D. (1980) [Essay first published 1969]. "How is Weakness of the Will Possible?". Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 21–42. ISBN 0-19-924626-2.
Gilead, A. (September 1999). "How is Akrasia Possible After All?". Ratio 12 (3): 257–270. doi:10.1111/1467-9329.00091.
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Harwood, Sterling (1992). "For an Amoral, Dispositional Account of Weakness of Will". Auslegung a Graduate Journal of Philosophy 18 (1): 27–38. reprinted in Harwood, Sterling, ed (1996). Business as Ethical and Business as Usual. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing. pp. 378–384.
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Jiang, X.-Y. (April 2000). "What Kind of Knowledge Does a Weak-Willed Person Have? — A Comparative Study of Aristotle and the Ch’eng-Chu School". Philosophy East & West 50 (2): 242–253.
Joyce, R. (1995). "Early Stoicism and Akrasia". Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 40 (3): 315–335. doi:10.1163/156852895321051874.
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Mele, A.R. (April 1986). "Incontinent Believing". Philosophical Quarterly 36 (143): 212–222. doi:10.2307/2219769. http://jstor.org/stable/2219769.
Mele, A.R. (June 1986). "Is Akratic Action Unfree?". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (4): 673–679. doi:10.2307/2107677. http://jstor.org/stable/2107677.
Mele, A.R. (March 1997). "Real Self-Deception". Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1): 91–102. PMID 10096996.
Metcalfe, J., Mischel, W. (January 1999). "A Hot/Cool-System Analysis of Delay of Gratification: Dynamics of Willpower". Psychological Review 106 (1): 3–19. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.106.1.3. PMID 10197361.
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Shand, A.F. (October 1895). "Attention and Will: A Study in Involuntary Action". Mind 4 (16): 450–471. doi:10.1093/mind/os-4.15.450.
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Wegner, D.M. (1994). "Ironic Processes of Mental Control". Psychological Review 101 (1): 44–52.
Wegner, D.M. (2002). The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge: MIT Press. ISBN 0-262-23222-7.
Wegner, D.M., Wheatley, T. (July 1999). "Apparent Mental Causation: Sources of the Experience of Will". American Psychologist 54 (7): 480–492. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.54.7.480. PMID 10424155.
Williams, B. (1990). "Voluntary Acts and Responsible Agents". Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 10 (1): 1–10. doi:10.1093/ojls/10.1.1.
Zheng, Y.J. (June 2001). "Akrasia, Picoeconomics, and a Rational Reconstruction of Judgment Formation in Dynamic Choice". Philosophical Studies 104 (3): 227–251. doi:10.1023/A:1010361710316.
[edit] External links Look up akrasia in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.
Daniel Wegner's site containing links to papers on conscious will and on thought suppression.
"Akrasia" by Seth J. Chandler, The Wolfram Demonstrations Project, 2007: An interactive computer model of akrasia based on Cooter, R., Ulen, T. (2007). Law and Economics (5th ed.). Boston: Addison Wesley.
Akrasia and Self-Binding.