Heglato on freedom

Hegel's thinking on freedom can be understood as a constructive development within the broad tradition that includes Plato and Kant.

Or rather, Heglato and Kantotle. Cfr. Ariskant.

To this list one could add Proclus, Meister Eckhart, Leibniz, Plotinus, Jakob Boehme, and Rousseau.

What all these thinkers share, which distinguishes them from materialists like Epicurus, the Stoics, and Thomas Hobbes, and from empiricists like David Hume, is that they regard freedom or self-determination both as real and as having important ontological implications, for soul [PSYCHE], the will, or mind or divinity.

This focus on freedom is what generates Plato's notion (in the Phaedo, Republic, and Timaeus) of the soul as having a higher or fuller kind of reality than inanimate objects possess.

While Aristotle criticizes Plato's "Forms", he preserves Plato's cornerstones of the ontological implications for self-determination.

Ethical reasoning, the soul's pinnacle in the hierarchy of nature, the order of the cosmos, and an assumption with reasoned arguments for a prime mover.

Plato's high esteem of individual sovereignty Kant imports to his considerations of moral and noumenal freedom, and God.

All three find common ground on the unique position of humans in the scheme of things, known by the discussed categorical differences from animals and inanimate objects.

In his discussion of "Spirit" in his Encyclopedia, Hegel praises Aristotle's On the Soul as

"by far the most admirable, perhaps even the sole, work of philosophical value on this topic".[18]

In his Phenomenology of Spirit and his Science of Logic, Hegel's concern with Kantian topics such as freedom and morality, and with their ontological implications, is pervasive.

Rather than simply rejecting Kant's dualism of "freedom" versus "nature", Hegel aims to subsume it within

"true infinity", the "Concept" (or "Notion": Begriff), "Spirit", and "ethical life"
in such a way that the Kantian duality is rendered intelligible, rather than remaining a brute "given."

The reason why this subsumption takes place in a series of concepts is that Hegel's method, in his Science of Logic and his Encyclopedia, is to begin with ultra-basic concepts like Being and Nothing, and to develop these through a long sequence of elaborations, including those mentioned in the previous paragraph.

In this manner, a solution that is reached, in principle, in the account of "true infinity" in the Science of Logic's chapter on "Quality", is repeated in new guises at later stages, all the way to "Spirit" and "ethical life", in the third volume of the Encyclopedia.

In this way, Hegel intends to defend the germ of truth in Kantian dualism against reductive or eliminative programs like those of materialism and empiricism.

Like Plato, with his dualism of soul versus bodily appetites, Kant pursues the mind's ability to question its felt inclinations or appetites and to come up with a standard of "duty" (or, in Plato's case, "good") which transcends bodily restrictiveness.

Hegel preserves this essential Platonic and Kantian concern in the form of infinity going beyond the finite (a process that Hegel in fact relates to "freedom" and the "ought"[19]), the universal going beyond the particular (in the Concept), and Spirit going beyond Nature.

And Hegel renders these dualities intelligible by (ultimately) his argument in the "Quality" chapter of the "Science of Logic."

The finite has to become infinite in order to achieve reality.

The idea of the absolute excludes multiplicity so the subjective and objective must achieve synthesis to become whole.

This is because, as Hegel suggests by his introduction of the concept of "reality",[20] what determines itself--rather than depending on its relations to other things for its essential character--is more fully "real" (following the Latin etymology of "real": more "thing-like") than what does not.

Finite things don't determine themselves, because, as "finite" things, their essential character is determined by their boundaries, over against other finite things.

So, in order to become "real", they must go beyond their finitude ("finitude is only as a transcending of itself"[21]).

The result of this argument is that finite and infinite—and, by extension, particular and universal, "nature" and "freedom" —- don't face one another as two independent realities, but instead the latter (in each case) is the self-transcending of the former.[22]

Rather than stress the distinct singularity of each factor that complements and conflicts with others--without explanation--the relationship between finite and infinite (and particular and universal, and nature and freedom) becomes intelligible as a progressively developing and self-perfecting whole.

Or not.