A Griceian Phrastic

We've seen that E. Stojanovic, in the ref. in blog post below, online, says she'll say little about Grice, etc.

Here are her references. Recall that we prefer the Greek "phrastic" to the Latinate "dictive" that Grice was amused to use in "Retrospective Epilogue". They say much the same thing. But Greek is a much more florid, and spontaneous language, than Latin as R. M. Hare and H. P. Grice well knew!

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References to 'floral dictiveness'. Floral dictiveness is T. Wharton's and mine ref. to Griceian uses of 'say' as in "Say it with flowers" -- "I love you".

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Bach, K.

Seemingly Semantic Intuitions.

Meaning and Truth. Eds. J. Campbell et
al. New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2002. 21–33.

Borg, Emma -- contributor to Petrus's book on Grice.


Minimal Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Buring, D. Binding Theory. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge UP, 2004.

Cappelen, H. and E. Lepore. Insensitive Semantics. Oxford: Blackwell, 2005.

Cappelen teaches at the posh Vassar.


——. “On an Alleged Connection Between Indirect Speech and the Theory of
Meaning.” Mind and Language 12 (1997): 278–96.

Carston, R. Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication.
Oxford: Blackwell, 2002.
——. “Linguistic Communication and the Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction.”
Synthese
Special Issue on the Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction.
Ed. I. Stojanovic.


Evans, G.

Does Tense Logic Rest Upon a Mistake?

Collected Papers. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1985. 343–63.

Feldman, R.

Saying Different Things.

Philosophical Studies 38 (1980): 79–84.

----- a case Grice considers:

Harold Wilson is a great man,
The British Prime minister is a great man. WoW:II. (case worth discussing. Under one big construal, they say different things. The scenario has to be restricted -- to mutual knowledge -- for us to think they say the same things).


Frege, G. “Logic” (1987). The Frege Reader. Ed. K. Beaney. Oxford: Blackwell,
1997.

Geurts, B. Pronouns and Presuppositions. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1999.
------------ he has a book on "Quantity implicatures" now.

Grice, H. P. Studies in the Ways of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1989.

Kaplan, D. “On Demonstratives” (1977). Themes from Kaplan. Eds. J.Almog et al.
Oxford: Oxford UP, 1989. 481–563.

Lappin, S. “The Interpretation of Ellipsis.” The Handbook of Contemporary
Semantic Theory. Ed. S. Lappin. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996. 145–75.

Lasnik, H. Essays on Anaphora. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989.

Levinson, S. Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational
Implicatures. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000.

Lewis, D. “Index, Context and Content.” Philosophy and Grammar. Eds. S. Kanger
and S. Ohman. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1980: 78–100.

Lewis, D. “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se.” The Philosophical Review 88 (1981):
513-343.

Partee, B. “Some Structural Analogies between Tenses and Pronouns in English.”
The Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 601–9.

Perry, J. Reference and Reflexivity. Stanford, CA: The CSLI Publications, 2001.
Predelli, S. Contexts. Meaning,Truth, and the Use of Language. Oxford: Oxford UP,
2005.

Prior, A. Time and Modality. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1957.

Prior, A. Worlds, Times, and Selves. Ed. K. Fine. London: Duckworth, 1977.

Recanati, F. Literal Meaning. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004.
——. “What is Said.” Synthese 128 (2001): 75–91.

Saul, J. “Speaker Meaning,What is Said, and What is Implicated.” Nous 36 (2002):
228–48.

Stalnaker, R. Context and Content. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999.

Stojanovic, I.“A Different Story about Indexicals.” ILLC Research Report PP-2005-
05.Amsterdam, 2005.

——. “What to Say on What is Said.” Modeling and Using Context. Eds. P.
Blackburn et al. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, LNAI 2680, 2003.

——. “What Is Said, Linguistic Meaning, and Directly Referential Expressions.”
Philosophy Compass 1 (2006).

Ziff, P. “What is Said.” Natural Language Semantics. Eds. D. Davidson and G.
Harman. Dordrecht: Reidel 1972. 709-21.