"free to will" in Locke and Grice -- vide "Essay"

by JLS
for the GC

With thanks to R. B. Jones for having this masterpiece, Locke's Essay, so readily available to us at

http://www.rbjones.com/rbjpub/philos/classics/locke/ctb2c21.htm#8

Much of the section on 'freedom' relates to this apt point by Locke as to our tendency to say "free will" when we shouldn't. Odd that Flew, who, like Locke, was a Student at Corpus Christi, would think, without argument, that 'of his own free will' is a phrase in ordinary English (ordinary language philosophy). It is a term of art, invented by Epictetus. If people had been more familiar with books like count (Locke 1690), they wouldn't have popularised "freewill", qua expression. Grice never used it!

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The important question is to challenge libertarianism! Linguistically. There's liberalism. And that's 'free' enough!

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"8. Liberty, what." writes Locke.

"All the actions that we have any idea of reducing themselves, as has been said, to these two, viz. thinking and motion."

"So far as a man has power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a man FREE."

"Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man's power."

"Wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it, there he is NOT FREE, though perhaps the action may be voluntary."

"So that the idea of LIBERTY is, the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other."

"[W]here either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is NOT at liberty."

"That agent is under necessity. So that liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will."

"But there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty."

"A little consideration of an obvious instance or two may make this clear."

"[Liberty] supposes understanding and will."

"A tennis-ball, whether in motion by the stroke of a racket, or lying still at rest, is not by any one taken to be a free agent."

"If we inquire into the reason, we shall find it is because we conceive not a tennis-ball to think, and consequently not to have any volition, or preference of motion to rest, or vice versa."

"And therefore has not liberty, is not a free agent."

"But all its both motion and rest come under our idea of necessary, and are so called."

"Likewise a man falling into the water, (a bridge breaking under him), has not herein liberty, is not a free agent."

"For though he has volition, though he prefers his not falling to falling."

"Yet the forbearance of that motion not being in his power, the stop or cessation of that motion follows not upon his volition."

"And therefore therein he is NOT FREE."

"So a man striking himself, or his friend, by a convulsive motion of his arm, which it is not in his power, by volition or the direction of his mind, to stop or forbear, nobody thinks he has in this liberty."

"Every one pities him, as acting by necessity and constraint."

"[Liberty] belongs not to volition."

"Again: suppose a man be carried, whilst fast asleep, into a room where is a person he longs to see and speak with; and be there locked fast in, beyond his power to get out: he awakes, and is glad to find himself in so desirable company, which he stays willingly in, i.e. prefers his stay to going away."

"I ask, is not this stay voluntary? I think nobody will doubt it: and yet, being locked fast in, it is evident he is not at liberty not to stay, he has not freedom to be gone."

"So that liberty is not an idea belonging to volition, or preferring; but to the person having the power of doing, or forbearing to do, according as the mind shall choose or direct."

"Our idea of liberty reaches as far as that power, and no farther."

"For wherever restraint comes to check that power, or compulsion takes away that indifferency of ability to act, or to forbear acting, there liberty, and our notion of it, presently ceases."

...

"Liberty, what."

"As it is in the motions of the body, so it is in the thoughts of our minds."

"Where any one is such, that we have power to take it up, or lay it by, according to the preference of the mind, there we are at liberty."

"A waking man, being under the necessity of having some ideas constantly in his mind, is not at liberty to think or not to think; no more than he is at liberty, whether his body shall touch any other or no: but whether he will remove his contemplation from one idea to another is many times in his choice; and then he is, in respect of his ideas, as much at liberty as he is in respect of bodies he rests on; he can at pleasure remove himself from one to another. But yet some ideas to the mind, like some motions to the body, are such as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their absence by the utmost effort it can use. A man on the rack is not at liberty to lay by the idea of pain, and divert himself with other contemplations: and sometimes a boisterous passion hurries our thoughts, as a hurricane does our bodies, without leaving us the liberty of thinking on other things, which we would rather choose. But as soon as the mind regains the power to stop or continue, begin or forbear, any of these motions of the body without, or thoughts within, according as it thinks fit to prefer either to the other, we then consider the man as a free agent again."

"Liberty belongs not to the will."

"If this be so, (as I imagine it is,) I leave it to be considered, whether it may not help to put an end to that long agitated, and, I think, unreasonable, because unintelligible question, viz. Whether man's will be free or no?"

"For if I mistake not, it follows from what I have said, that the question itself is altogether improper."

"And it is as insignificant to ask whether man's will be free, as to ask whether his sleep be swift, or his virtue square."

"Liberty being as little applicable to the will, as swiftness of motion is to sleep, or squareness to virtue."

"Every one would laugh at the absurdity of such a question as either of these."

"Because it is obvious that the modifications of motion belong not to sleep, nor the difference of figure to virtue."

Aand when one well considers it, I think he will as plainly perceive that liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the will, which is also but a power."

...


"How the will, instead of the man, is [mis-]called free."

"However, the name faculty, which men have given to this power called the will, and whereby they have been led into a way of talking of the will as acting, may, by an appropriation that disguises its true sense, serve a little to palliate the absurdity."

"Yet the will, in truth, signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or choose."

"And when the will, under the name of a faculty, is considered as it is, barely as an ability to do something, the absurdity in saying it is FREE, or not free, will easily discover itself."

"For, if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of faculties as distinct beings that can act, (as we do, when we say the will orders, and the will is free,) it is fit that we should make a speaking faculty, and a walking faculty, and a dancing faculty, by which these actions are produced, which are but several modes of motion."

"As well as we make the will and understanding to be faculties, by which the actions of choosing and perceiving are produced, which are but several modes of thinking."

"And we may as properly say that it is the singing faculty sings, and the dancing faculty dances, as that the will chooses, or that the understanding conceives; or, as is usual, that the will directs the understanding, or the understanding obeys or obeys not the will: it being altogether as proper and intelligible to say that the power of speaking directs the power of singing, or the power of singing obeys or disobeys the power of speaking."

"This way of talking ["freewill"] causes confusion of thought."

"This way of talking, nevertheless, has prevailed, and, as I guess, produced great confusion."

"For these being all different powers in the mind, or in the man, to do several actions, he exerts them as he thinks fit."

"But the power to do one action is not operated on by the power of doing another action."

"For the power of thinking operates not on the power of choosing, nor the power of choosing on the power of thinking."

"No more than the power of dancing operates on the power of singing, or the power of singing on the power of dancing, as any one who reflects on it will easily perceive. And yet this is it which we say when we thus speak, that the will operates on the understanding, or the understanding on the will."


"Liberty belongs not to the will."

"The attributing to faculties that which belonged not to them, has given occasion to this way of talking: but the introducing into discourses concerning the mind, with the name of faculties, a notion of their operating, has, I suppose, as little advanced our knowledge in that part of ourselves, as the great use and mention of the like invention of faculties, in the operations of the body, has helped us in the knowledge of physic. Not that I deny there are faculties, both in the body and mind: they both of them have their powers of operating, else neither the one nor the other could operate. For nothing can operate that is not able to operate; and that is not able to operate that has no power to operate. Nor do I deny that those words, and the like, are to have their place in the common use of languages that have made them current. It looks like too much affectation wholly to lay them by: and philosophy itself, though it likes not a gaudy dress, yet, when it appears in public, must have so much complacency as to be clothed in the ordinary fashion and language of the country, so far as it can consist with truth and perspicuity. But the fault has been, that faculties have been spoken of and represented as so many distinct agents. For, it being asked, what it was that digested the meat in our stomachs? it was a ready and very satisfactory answer to say, that it was the digestive faculty. What was it that made anything come out of the body? the expulsive faculty. What moved? the motive faculty. And so in the mind, the intellectual faculty, or the understanding, understood; and the elective faculty, or the will, willed or commanded. This is, in short, to say, that the ability to digest, digested; and the ability to move, moved; and the ability to understand, understood. For faculty, ability, and power, I think, are but different names of the same things: which ways of speaking, when put into more intelligible words, will, I think, amount to thus much;- That digestion is performed by something that is able to digest, motion by something able to move, and understanding by something able to understand. And, in truth, it would be very strange if it should be otherwise; as strange as it would be for a man to be free without being able to be free."

[Liberty belongs] But to the agent, or man.

"To return, then, to the inquiry about liberty, I think the question is not proper, whether the will be free, but whether a man be free."

"Thus, I think,

First, That so far as any one can, by the direction or choice of his mind, preferring the existence of any action to the non-existence of that action, and vice versa, make it to exist or not exist, so far he is free."

"For if I can, by a thought directing the motion of my finger, make it move when it was at rest, or vice versa, it is evident, that in respect of that I am free: and if I can, by a like thought of my mind, preferring one to the other, produce either words or silence, I am at liberty to speak or hold my peace: and as far as this power reaches, of acting or not acting, by the determination of his own thought preferring either, so far is a man free."

"For how can we think any one freer, than to have the power to do what he will?"

"And so far as any one can, by preferring any action to its not being, or rest to any action, produce that action or rest, so far can he do what he will."

"For such a preferring of action to its absence, is the willing of it."

"And we can scarce tell how to imagine any being freer, than to be able to do what he wills."

"So that in respect of actions within the reach of such a power in him, a man seems as free as it is possible for freedom to make him."

"In respect of willing, a man is not free."

"But the inquisitive mind of man, willing to shift off from himself, as far as he can, all thoughts of guilt, though it be by putting himself into a worse state than that of fatal necessity, is not content with this: freedom, unless it reaches further than this, will not serve the turn: and it passes for a good plea, that a man is not free at all, if he be not as free to will as he is to act what he wills. Concerning a man's liberty, there yet, therefore, is raised this further question, Whether a man be free to will? Which I think is what is meant, when it is disputed whether the will be free. And as to that I imagine."

"How a man cannot be free to will."

"Secondly, That willing, or volition, being an action, and freedom consisting in a power of acting or not acting, a man in respect of willing or the act of volition, when any action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts, as presently to be done, cannot be free. The reason whereof is very manifest. For, it being unavoidable that the action depending on his will should exist or not exist, and its existence or not existence following perfectly the determination and preference of his will, he cannot avoid willing the existence or non-existence of that action; it is absolutely necessary that he will the one or the other; i.e. prefer the one to the other: since one of them must necessarily follow; and that which does follow follows by the choice and determination of his mind; that is, by his willing it: for if he did not will it, it would not be. So that, in respect of the act of willing, a man in such a case is not free: liberty consisting in a power to act or not to act; which, in regard of volition, a man, upon such a proposal has not. For it is unavoidably necessary to prefer the doing or forbearance of an action in a man's power, which is once so proposed to his thoughts; a man must necessarily will the one or the other of them; upon which preference or volition, the action or its forbearance certainly follows, and is truly voluntary. But the act of volition, or preferring one of the two, being that which he cannot avoid, a man, in respect of that act of willing, is under a necessity, and so cannot be free; unless necessity and freedom can consist together, and a man can be free and bound at once. Besides to make a man free after this manner, by making the action of willing to depend on his will, there must be another antecedent will, to determine the acts of this will, and another to determine that, and so in infinitum: for wherever one stops, the actions of the last will cannot be free. Nor is any being, as far I can comprehend beings above me, capable of such a freedom of will, that it can forbear to will, i.e. to prefer the being or not being of anything in its power, which it has once considered as such."

"Liberty is freedom to execute what is willed. This, then, is evident, That a man is not at liberty to will, or not to will, anything in his power that he once considers of: liberty consisting in a power to act or to forbear acting, and in that only. For a man that sits still is said yet to be at liberty; because he can walk if he wills it. A man that walks is at liberty also, not because he walks or moves; but because he can stand still if he wills it. But if a man sitting still has not a power to remove himself, he is not at liberty; so likewise a man falling down a precipice, though in motion, is not at liberty, because he cannot stop that motion if he would. This being so, it is plain that a man that is walking, to whom it is proposed to give off walking, is not at liberty, whether he will determine himself to walk, or give off walking or not: he must necessarily prefer one or the other of them; walking or not walking. And so it is in regard of all other actions in our power so proposed, which are the far greater number. For, considering the vast number of voluntary actions that succeed one another every moment that we are awake in the course of our lives, there are but few of them that are thought on or proposed to the will, till the time they are to be done; and in all such actions, as I have shown, the mind, in respect of willing, has not a power to act or not to act, wherein consists liberty. The mind, in that case, has not a power to forbear willing; it cannot avoid some determination concerning them, let the consideration be as short, the thought as quick as it will, it either leaves the man in the state he was before thinking, or changes it; continues the action, or puts an end to it. Whereby it is manifest, that it orders and directs one, in preference to, or with neglect of the other, and thereby either the continuation or change becomes unavoidably voluntary."

"The ideas of liberty and volition must be defined."

"To avoid these and the like absurdities, nothing can be of greater use than to establish in our minds determined ideas of the things under consideration."

"If the ideas of liberty and volition were well fixed in our understandings, and carried along with us in our minds, as they ought, through all the questions that are raised about them, I suppose a great part of the difficulties that perplex men's thoughts, and entangle their understandings, would be much easier resolved; and we should perceive where the confused signification of terms, or where the nature of the thing caused the obscurity."

"Freedom."

"First, then, it is carefully to be remembered, That freedom consists in the dependence of the existence, or not existence of any action, upon our volition of it."

"And not in the dependence of any action, or its contrary, on our preference."

"A man standing on a cliff, is at liberty to leap twenty yards downwards into the sea, not because he has a power to do the contrary action, which is to leap twenty yards upwards, for that he cannot do; but he is therefore free, because he has a power to leap or not to leap. But if a greater force than his, either holds him fast, or tumbles him down, he is no longer free in that case; because the doing or forbearance of that particular action is no longer in his power. He that is a close prisoner in a room twenty feet square, being at the north side of his chamber, is at liberty to walk twenty feet southward, because he can walk or not walk it; but is not, at the same time, at liberty to do the contrary, i.e. to walk twenty feet northward."

"In this, then, consists freedom, viz. in our being able to act or not to act, according as we shall choose or will."

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Refs.

Grice, H. P. (1941). Personal identity. Mind
Grice, H. P. (1982) Seminar on freedom. The Grice Papers
Locke, J. (1690). Essay concerning human[e] understanding.