Aristotle: between Carnap and Grice -- "stone-age physics", not "metaphysics"

Speranza

Jones comment on a post on Grice, Carnap and Aristotle.

Jones writes:

"Considering Carnap's attitude towards Grice's work on Aristotle, both the status of Aristotle's metaphysics and that of Grice's analysis are relevant. Considering the former, the question is naturally whether Aristotle in his metaphysics is dealing with what Carnap would call external or internal questions. It may seem natural to think of these "big" questions as "external" and hence as nonesense to Carnap, but I am not convinced it is the case. Aristotle's metaphysics is a successor to the presocratic "metaphysicians", and his "Metaphysics" is an important source of our knowledge of those philosophers. But arguably the questions they addressed (about what substance the world is made of) is just part of physics, and quite meaningful. Aristotle's metaphysics, with its focus on "being qua being", might today be thought to belong to logic, and again to be meaningful. Grice's study of Aristotle quite possibly is purely analytic. So it is possible that there is nothing here in Aristotle or in Grice's treatment which Carnap might not find a meaningful enterprise. I'm not saying that is the case, but just that the question is not an easy one. The kinds of metaphysics which Carnap definitely repudiates are post-empiricism, and are known to be metaphysics because their originators make claims of rational knowledge into transcendent truth, and I don't know whether we see this in the ancient philosophers."

Excellent commentary.

Indeed, it is best to regard the pre-socratics as making PHYSICAL claims, and thus meaningful.

The best quote I can think of about this is Grice requoting Russell.

Russell said words to the effect that Aristotelian metaphysics is stone-age metaphysics.

Grice replied: "Stone-age physics" at best!

So we may throw Russell into the bargain!

Or not!