John Broome: publications to 2010
Books
The Microeconomics of Capitalism, Academic Press, 1983 (hardback and paperback).
Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time, Blackwell, 1991 (paperback 1995).
Counting the Cost of Global Warming, White Horse Press, 1992 (hardback and paperback).
Ethics Out of Economics, Cambridge University Press, 1999 (hardback and paperback).
Weighing Lives, Oxford University Press, 2004 (paperback 2006).
Papers in academic journals
‘Approximate equilibrium in economies with indivisible commodities’, Journal of Economic Theory, 5 (1972), pp. 224–49.
‘An important theorem on income tax’, Review of Economic Studies, 42 (1975), pp. 649–52.
‘Sraffa’s standard commodity’, Australian Economic Papers, (1977), pp. 231–6.
‘Trying to value a life’, Journal of Public Economics, 9 (1978), pp. 91–100; and ‘A reply’ to comments by Michael Jones–Lee and Alan Williams, Journal of Public Economics, 12 (1979), pp. 259–62. Both reprinted in Economic Theory and the Welfare State, Volume III, edited by Nicholas Barr, Edward Elgar, 2001. ‘Trying to value a life’ reprinted in my Ethics Out of Economics, pp. 177–82.
‘Perverse prices’, Economic Journal, 88 (1978), pp. 778–87.
‘Choice and value in economics’, Oxford Economic Papers, 30 (1978), pp. 313–33. Reprinted in Ethics and Economics, Volume I, edited by Alan P. Hamlin, Edward Elgar, 1996, pp. 65–85.
‘Equity in risk bearing’, Operations Research, 30 (1982), pp. 412–14.
‘Indefiniteness in identity’, Analysis, 44 (1984), pp. 6–12.
‘Uncertainty and fairness’, Economic Journal, 94 (1984), pp. 624–32.
‘Selecting people randomly’, Ethics, 95 (1984), pp. 38–55.
‘The economic value of life’, Economica, 52 (1985), pp. 281–94; and ‘A reply’ to comments by Michael Jones–Lee, Economica, 54 (1987), p. 401.
‘A mistaken argument against the expected utility theory of rationality’, Theory and Decision, 17 (1985), pp. 313–18.
‘The welfare economics of the future’, Social Choice and Welfare, 2 (1985), pp. 221–34.
‘Utilitarianism and expected utility’, Journal of Philosophy, 84 (1987), pp. 405–22.
‘Should social preferences be consistent?’, Economics and Philosophy, 5 (1989), pp. 7–17.
‘An economic Newcomb problem’, Analysis, 49 (1989), pp. 220–2.
‘Bolker–Jeffrey expected utility theory and axiomatic utilitarianism’, Review of Economic Studies, 57 (1990), pp. 477–502. Reprinted in my Ethics Out of Economics, pp. 91–110.
‘Fairness’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 91 (1990–91), pp. 87–102. Reprinted in Ethics and Economics, Volume II, edited by Alan P. Hamlin, Edward Elgar, 1996, pp. 433–47, and in my Ethics Out of Economics, pp. 111–22.
‘Desire, belief and expectation’, Mind, 100 (1991), pp. 265–7.
‘“Utility”’, Economics and Philosophy, 7 (1991), pp. 1–12; and ‘A reply to Sen’, Economics and Philosophy, 7 (1991), pp. 285–7. Both reprinted in Ethics and Economics, Volume I, edited by Alan P. Hamlin, Edward Elgar, 1996, pp. 109–20 and 128–30 respectively, and in Bentham: Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy, Volume 1, edited by Gerald Postema, Ashgate, 2002. ‘“Utility”’ reprinted in Expected Utility, Fair Gambles and Rational Choice, edited by Omar F. Hamouda and J. C. R. Rowley, Edward Elgar, 1997, pp. 116–27, and in my Ethics Out of Economics, pp. 19–28.
‘Deontology and economics’, Economics and Philosophy, 8 (1992), pp. 269–82.
‘The value of living’, Recherches Economiques de Louvain, 58 (1992), pp. 125–42, and ‘Reply to Blackorby and Donaldson, and Drèze’, Recherches Economiques de Louvain, 58 (1992), pp. 167–71. ‘The value of living’ reprinted in my Ethics Out of Economics, pp. 214–27.
‘A cause of preference is not an object of preference’, Social Choice and Welfare, 10 (1993), pp. 57–68; and ‘Reply to Kolm’, Social Choice and Welfare, 11 (1994), pp. 199–201.
‘Qalys’, Journal of Public Economics, 50 (1993), pp. 149–67. Reprinted in Economics Alert, 7 (1994), pp. 1–4, and in my Ethics Out of Economics, pp. 196–213.
‘Fairness versus doing the most good’, Hastings Center Report, 24 (1994), pp. 36–9. Reprinted in Meaning and Medicine: A Reader in the Philosophy of Health Care, edited by James Lindemann Nelson and Hilde Lindemann Nelson, Routledge, 1999.
‘Discounting the future’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 23 (1994), pp. 128–56. Reprinted in my Ethics Out of Economics, pp. 44–67.
‘The value of a person’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 68 (1994), pp. 167–85. Reprinted in my Ethics Out of Economics, pp, 228–42.
‘The mutual determination of wants and benefits’, Theory and Decision, 37 (1994), pp. 333–8.
‘Structured and unstructured valuation’, Analyse & Kritik, 16 (1994), pp. 121–32. Reprinted in my Ethics Out of Economics, pp. 183–95.
‘The two-envelope paradox’, Analysis, 55 (1995), pp. 6–11.
‘Skorupski on agent-neutrality’, Utilitas, 7 (1995), pp. 315–17.
‘More pain or less?’, Analysis, 56 (1996), pp. 116–18.
‘The value of life and the value of population’, Journal of Population Economics, 9 (1996), pp. 3–18.
‘The welfare economics of population’, Oxford Economic Papers, 48 (1996), pp. 177–93.
‘Reason and motivation’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 71 (1997), pp. 131–46. Reprinted in Reason, Emotion, and Will, edited by Jay Wallace, Ashgate, 1999.
‘Kamm on fairness’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58 (1998), pp. 955–961.
‘Normative requirements’, Ratio, 12 (1999), pp. 398–419. Reprinted in Normativity, edited by Jonathan Dancy, Blackwell, 2000, pp. 78–99.
‘Backwards induction in the centipede game’, Analysis, 59 (1999), pp. 237–42. Written with Wlodek Rabinowicz.
‘Cost-benefit analysis and population’, Journal of Legal Studies, 29 (2000), pp. 953–70. Reprinted in Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economics and Philosophical Perspectives, edited by Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, University of Chicago Press, 2000, pp. 117–34.
‘Normative practical reasoning’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 75 (2001), pp. 175–93.
‘Representing an ordering when the population varies’, Social Choice and Welfare, 20 (2003), pp. 243–6.
‘Should we value population?’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 13 (2005), pp. 399–413. Reprinted in Population and Political Theory: Philosophy, Politics and Society 8th Series, edited by James Fishkin and Robert Goodin, Wiley–Blackwell 2010. Also in The Study of Ethics, Southeast University Press, 2007, pp. 3–21.
‘Does rationality give us reasons?’, Philosophical Issues, 15 (2005), pp. 321–37.
‘Have we reason to do as rationality requires?: a comment on Raz’, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 1 (2005).
‘Wide or narrow scope’, Mind, 116 (2007), pp. 359–70.
‘Replies’, Economics and Philosophy, 23 (2007), pp. 115–24. Contribution to a symposium on my book Weighing Lives.
‘Reply to Qizilbash’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 75 (2007), pp. 152–7. Reply to a comment on my book Weighing Lives.
‘Summary’ and ‘Reply to Bradley and McCarthy’, Philosophical Books, 48 (2007), pp. 289–91, 320–8. Contributions to a symposium on my Weighing Lives.
‘Does rationality consist in responding correctly to reasons?’, Journal of Moral Philosophy, 4 (2007), pp. 349–74.
‘Is rationality normative?’, Disputatio, 11 (2008), pp. 153–71.
‘Replies to Southwood, Kearns and Star, and Cullity’, Ethics, 119 (2008), pp. 96–108. Contribution to a symposium on my work.
‘Motivation’, Theoria, 75 (2009), pp. 79–99.
‘Reply to Vallentyne’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 78 (2009), pp. 748–52. Reply to a comment on my book Weighing Lives.
‘Reply to Rabinowicz’, Philosophical Issues, 19 (2009) pp. 412–17. Reply to a comment on my book Weighing Lives.
‘Is this truly an idea of justice?’, Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 11 (2010). A comment on Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice.
‘No argument against the continuity of value: reply to Dorsey’, Utilitas, 22 (2010), pp. 494–6.
Papers in books
‘Uncertainty in welfare economics, and the value of life’, in The Value of Life and Safety, edited by M. W. Jones-Lee, North–Holland, 1982, pp. 201–16.
‘Rawlsian principles’, in Reasons and Persons by Derek Parfit, Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 492–3.
‘Some principles of population’, in Economics, Growth and Sustainable Environments, edited by David Collard, David Pearce and David Ulph, Macmillan, 1988, pp. 85–96.
‘Good, fairness and qalys’, in Philosophy and Medical Welfare, edited by Martin Bell and Susan Mendus, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 57–73.
‘What’s the good of equality?’, in Current Issues in Microeconomics, edited by John Hey, Macmillan, 1989, pp. 236–62.
‘Irreducibly social goods: Comment’, in Rationality, Individualism and Public Policy, edited by Geoffrey Brennan and Cliff Walsh, Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, Canberra, 1990, pp. 80–5.
‘Should a rational agent maximize expected utility?’, in The Limits of Rationality, edited by Karen Cook and Margaret Levi, University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 132-45.
‘Utilitarian metaphysics?’, in Interpersonal Comparison of Well-Being, edited by Jon Elster and John Roemer, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 70–97.
‘The structure of good: decision theory and ethics’, in Foundations of Decision Theory: Issues and Advances, edited by Michael Bacharach and Susan Hurley, Blackwell, 1991, pp. 123–46.
‘Rationality and the sure-thing principle’, in Thoughtful Economic Man, edited by Gay Meeks, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 74–102.
‘Bernoulli, Harsanyi, and the Principle of Temporal Good’, in Rational Interaction: Essays in Honor of John Harsanyi, edited by Reinhard Selten, Springer-Verlag, 1992, pp. 353–73.
‘Can a Humean be moderate?’, in Value, Welfare and Morality, edited by R. G. Frey and Christopher Morris, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 51–73. Reprinted in my Ethics Out of Economics, pp. 68–87. Italian translation in the journal Nuova Civiltà delle Macchine, 10 (1992), pp. 113–30.
‘Goodness is reducible to betterness: the evil of death is the value of life’, in The Good and the Economical: Ethical Choices in Economics and Management, edited by Peter Koslowski and Yuichi Shionoya, Springer–Verlag, 1993, pp. 70–84. Reprinted in my Ethics Out of Economics, pp. 162–73.
‘Fairness in the rationing of health care’, in Market Capitalism and Moral Values, edited by Samuel Brittan and Alan Hamlin, Edward Elgar, 1995, pp. 79–87.
‘Economic analysis and the structure of good’, in Ethics, Rationality, Economic Behaviour, edited by Francesco Farina, Frank Hahn and Stefano Vannucci, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 77–91.
‘Value versus justice, and the uses of economics’, in Revelation and the Environment, AD 95–1995, edited by Sarah Hobson and Jane Lubchenco, World Scientific, 1997, pp.81–84.
‘Is incommensurability vagueness?’, in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, edited by Ruth Chang, Harvard University Press, 1998, pp. 67–89. Reprinted in my Ethics Out of Economics, pp.123–44.
‘Extended preferences’, in Preferences, edited by Christoph Fehige and Ulla Wessels, de Gruyter, 1998, pp. 279–96. Reprinted in my Ethics Out of Economics, pp. 29–43.
‘Incommensurable values’, in Well-Being and Morality: Essays for James Griffin, edited by Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 21–38. Reprinted in my Ethics Out of Economics, pp. 145–61.
‘Instrumental reasoning’, in Rationality, Rules and Structure, edited by Julian Nida-Rümelin and Wolfgang Spohn, Kluwer, 2000, pp. 195–207.
‘Greedy neutrality of value’, in Value and Choice, Volume 2, edited by Wlodek Rabinowicz, University of Lund, 2001, pp. 7–16.
‘Are intentions reasons? And how should we cope with incommensurable values?’, in Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier, edited by Christopher Morris and Arthur Ripstein, Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 98–120.
‘Practical reasoning’, in Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality, edited by José Bermùdez and Alan Millar, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 85–111.
‘Measuring the burden of disease by aggregating wellbeing’, ‘Fairness, goodness and levelling down’, and ‘All goods are relevant’, all in Summary Measures of Population Health: Concepts, Ethics, Measurement and Applications, edited by Christopher J. L. Murray, Joshua A. Salomon, Colin D. Mathers and Alan D. Lopez, World Health Organization, 2002, pp. 91–113, 135–7, and 727–9.
‘Reasons’, in Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, edited by R. Jay Wallace, Michael Smith, Samuel Scheffler, and Philip Pettit, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 28–55.
‘The value of living longer’, in Public Health, Ethics, and Equity, edited by Sudhir Anand, Fabienne Peter and Amartya Sen, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 243–60.
‘Reasoning with preferences?’, in Preference Formation and Well-Being, edited by Serena Olsaretti, Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 183–208.
‘Requirements’, in Homage Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, edited by Toni R nnow-Rasmussen, Björn Petersson, Jonas Josefsson and Dan Egonsson, electronic festschrift
‘Can there be a preference-based utilitarianism?’, in Justice, Political Liberalism and Utilitarianism: Themes from Harsanyi and Rawls, edited by Maurice Salles and John Weymark, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
‘Deciding by reasoning’, in Decision: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, (in Portuguese) edited by Carlos Henggeler Antunes and Luís Cândido Dias, Coimbra University Press, 2007, pp. 219–36.
‘Reasoning to be rational’, in Reasoning, Rationality and Probability, edited by Maria Carla Galavotti, Roberto Scazzieri and Patrick Suppes, CSLI Publications, 2008, pp. 119–38.
‘Comments on Allan Gibbard’s Tanner Lectures’, in Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics, by Allan Gibbard, edited by Barry Stroud, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 102–19.
‘Why economics needs ethical theory’, in Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honour of Amartya Sen. Volume 1, edited by Kaushik Basu and Ravi Kanbur, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 7–14.
‘The unity of reasoning?’, in Spheres of Reason, edited by Simon Robertson, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 62–92.
‘The most important thing about climate change’, in Public Policy: Why Ethics Matters, edited by Jonathan Boston, Andrew Bradstock and David Eng, ANU E Press, 2010, pp. 101–116.
‘Williams on ought’, in Luck, Value and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams, edited by Ulrike Heuer and Gerald Lang, Oxford University Press, 2011.
‘The badness of death and the goodness of life’, in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Death, edited by Fred Feldman, Ben Bradley, and Jens Johansson.
‘Practical reasoning and inference’, in Thinking About Reasons: Essays in Honour of Jonathan Dancy, edited by David Bakhurst, Brad Hooker and Margaret Little, Oxford University Press.
‘Measuring the burden of disease’, ‘Equality versus priority: a useful distinction’ and ‘A comment on Temkin’s trade-offs’, all in ‘Goodness’ and ‘Fairness’: Ethical Issues in Health Resource Allocation, edited by Daniel Wikler and Christopher J.L. Murray, World Health Organization, forthcoming.
Encyclopaedia articles and others
‘Economic analysis’, in Encyclopedia of Ethics, edited by Lawrence and Charlotte Becker, Garland, 1992, pp. 279–86. Also in Second edition, Routledge, 2001, pp. 432–9.
‘Modern utilitarianism’, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, edited by Peter Newman, Macmillan, 1998.
‘Discounting the future’, in Encyclopedia of Ethics, Second Edition, edited by Lawrence and Charlotte Becker, Routledge, 2001, pp. 410–13.
‘Economics and ethics’, in International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behanioral Sciences, Elsevier, 2001, pp. 4146–52.
‘Rationality’, in The Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Action, edited by Timothy O’Connor and Constantine Sandis, Blackwell, 2010, pp. 285–92.
‘Valuing policies in response to climate change: some ethical issues’, Report written for the Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change.
‘What is your life worth?’, Daedalus, 137 (2008), pp. 49–56.
‘The ethics of climate change’, Scientific American, June 2008, pp 69–73. Reprinted in The Best American Science and Nature Writing, 2008, edited by Tim Folger and Elizabeth Kolbert, Houghton Mifflin, 2009.
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Wednesday, May 4, 2011
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