Brian Robinson on Griceian morality

From his website, we learn of

"MORALITY AND MEANING – DISSERTATION OUTLINE" by
Brian Robinson – Philosophy Program, The Graduate Center, CUNY

TIMELINE

"To date, I have completed three of my four main chapters (approximately 140 pages),
including revisions based on feedback from my committee members. The fourth chapter is near completion, and I expect to be finished in December. Stephen Neale, my advisor, and my committee are very satisfied with my progress and speed. The defense has been scheduled for Feb. 18, 2011. This will conclude my dissertation in less than one year from my prospectus defense on March 22, 2010.

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Robinson, B. Grice on morality.

"The aim of B. Robinson's study is to develop a Gricean theory of moral psychology and demonstrate that the motivation for adherence to Grice’s Cooperative Principle and conversation maxims derives from the moral psychology that the theory articulates."

"The project consists of four parts."

"Part 1 is a critical review of the literature left by Grice on philosophical
psychology and happiness."

"Grice suggests that intelligent and rational creatures who can set their
own ends are capable of producing a set of principles for behaviour."

"If followed, these principles should maximize the creatures’ likelihood of realizing their ends."

"Grice turns to happiness to provide guidance as to what ends are rational."

"Happiness, Grice says, is an inclusive end, i.e., a collection with many constituent ends."

"To aim at happiness is to select ends from that set (which becomes one’s life plan) and work towards realizing them."

"The coordination of ends in a personal happiness set is also critical."


Part II begins to compile a “manual,” Grice’s label for a collection of
principles for behaviour."

"Robinson proposes various means for formulating the moral principles."

"The
resultant theory provides a new theory of moral psychology very much in the spirit of Grice’s conception of what such a theory should be, which Robinson terms " Rational Virtue Theory"".

"According to Rational Virtue theory, it is rational to possess certain virtues, for being virtuous is the optimal strategy for achieving one’s goals and being happy."

"The manual contains ceteris paribus principles and maxims for behavior, for the adoption of final and instrumental ends, and the balancing of ends."

"This
part concludes with brief responses to the challenges of egoism and situationism."


"The third part focuses on cooperation, both in general and in the use of language."

"Robinson argues that cooperation is a ceteris paribus behavioral principle that should be included in the
manual."

"This chapter builds upon Cristina Bicchieri’s work on social norms and Brian Skyrms’s work in evolutionary game theory."

"Cooperation is a social norm, something we expect of one
another to various degrees depending on circumstances."

"Social norms are ceteris paribus preferable
to follow."

"But cooperation is fairly distinct, I argue, in that it is a necessarily positive social norm."

"The norm of cooperation is preferable because, if adhered to, it typically increases the likelihood
or realizing one’s ends."

"This is opposed to the social norm (or, for that matter, convention) of
driving on the right (where having some norm is good, but which one is irrelevant) or a purely
conditional norm such as fashion (where adhering to the norm is only rational given that the
norm already exists, but the norm itself is not necessary)."


Part IV applies this connection between moral psychology and language to
Grice’s well-known theory of the pragmatics of utterance interpretation.

"Though Grice predicted
this connection and made a tentative exploration, some elements of his pragmatic theory now
require correction."

"Robinson works out a new taxonomy of implicature and implicature generation, which
forces a refinement of what constitutes a conversational implicature."

"Robinson then presents a new analysis
of classic, Gricean examples of implicature, such as the notorious letter of recommendation and
supposed violations of the maxim of Manner."

"With this revised picture of implicature, Robinson responds
to some of Grice’s critics, including Wayne Davis, Jerrold Sadock, Deirdre Wilson, and Dan Sperber."

"Finally, Robinson applies Grice’s theory of implicature to solve the is-ought problem, arguing that condemning the is-ought fallacy carries a normative implicature, which commits this same fallacy
that is simultaneously disparaged."

"The study concludes with three points about where the Gricean research can lead."

"First, Robinson considers how the use of language can inform theoretical work in moral psychology."

"Second, Robinson analyzes jokes relying on implicature and compare them to cases of lying by implicature.

Third, Robinson outlines a future virtue-theoretic semantics, according to which all communication is ethically charged, such that the optimal communicative contribution for any stage of a talk exchange is in
part determined normatively.


MORE SPECIFIC OUTLINE OF B. ROBINSON'S STUDY OF GRICE:


1. Introduction and Motivation

2. Grice’s Legacy of Moral Psychology

1. Philosophical Psychology

1.1. The Methodology of Creature Construction

1.2. Self-Genitorial Position and the Manual

2. Ends and Happiness

3 Rational Virtue Theory

3. 1. Selection of Ends

1.1. Happiness-in-general

1.2. Selection of Personal Happiness Ends

2. Guide for Life

2.1. Instrumental Ends

2.2. Balance of Ends

3. Principles for Behaviour

3.1 Definition of Behavioural Principles

3.2. Types of Behavioral Principles

4. Conclusion and Responses to Future Criticism

4.1. Pragmatic Proviso

4.2. Response to Potential Objections

4 Cooperation, Game-theoretically Derived

1. Norms and Stability

1.1. Necessary and Contingent Norms

1.2. Evolutionary Stability

2. Interpreting Cooperation

2.1. Expanding Grice’s Cooperative Principle

2.2. Stable Cooperative Principle

2.3. Cooperation in Conversation

3. Cooperative Normativity

3.1. Non-normative Interpretations of the Cooperative Principle

3.2. The Demand for Normativity

3.3. The Limits of Cooperative Normativity

4. Cooperation and Other Moral Principles