Simplifying Chalmers's references on freewill, etc.

---- by JLS
------- for the GC

CHALMERS HAS organised some alphabetical listings on freewill. He systematically fails to refer to Grice.

Since Doyle is concerned in this "Free will scandal" and Information project, I propose to browse on Chalmers's lists to focus on the most Griceian references

---


ALEXANDER Patrick Proctor (1866). Mill and Carlyle: An Examination of Mr. John Stuart Mill's Doctrine of Causation in Relation to Moral Freedom with an Occasional Discourse on Sauerteig by Smelfungus [I.E. P. P. Alexander]. Norwood Editions.

ANSELM (1977). St. Anselm's Treatise on Free Will: The Booke of Seynt Anselme Which Treatith of Free Wylle Translated in to Englysche: A Facsimile of the Complete Text of a Recently Discovered 15th C. Manuscript. Toucan Press. (Google)

AUSTIN, A plea for excuses
AUSTIN, Philosophical papers.
AUSTIN, Ifs and cans.

BAXTER Donald L. M. (1989). Free choice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67 (March):12-24.

Berndtson, Arthur (1942). The Problem of Free-Will in Recent Philosophy. Chicago, Ill..

Blumenfeld, David C. (1988). Freedom and mind control. American Philosophical Quarterly 25 (July):215-27. (Cited by 8 | Google)

Blum, Alex (2000). N. Analysis 60 (3):284-286. (Google)

Bowes, Pratima (1971). Consciousness And Freedom: Three Views. London,: Methuen. (Cited by 2 | Google)

BRADLEY F. H.

Bradley, R. D. (1958). Free will: Problem of pseudo-problem? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):33 – 45. (Google)
Bradley, Raymond (ms). The meaning of life reflections on God, immortality, and free will.
Abstract: Philosophers, and other thinking people, have long pondered three grand questions about the nature of reality and our status and significance within it

BROWNE S. S. S. (1942). Paralogisms of the free-will problem. Journal of Philosophy 39

BROAD C. D. (1919). The notion of a general will. Mind 28 (112):502-504.

BUSS Sarah (online). Personal autonomy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
---- To be autonomous is to be a law to oneself; autonomous agents are self-governing agents. Most of us want to be autonomous because we want to be accountable for what we do, and because it seems that if we are not the ones calling the shots, then we cannot be accountable. More importantly, perhaps, the value of autonomy is tied to the value of self-integration. We don't want to be alien to, or at war with, ourselves; and it seems that when our intentions are not under our own control, we suffer from self-alienation. What conditions must be satisfied in order to ensure that we govern ourselves when we act? Philosophers have offered a wide range of competing answers to this question.

Campbell, C. A. (1967). In Defence of Free Will. London, Allen & Unwin. (Google)
---- (1963). Professor Smart on free-will, praise and blame; a reply. Mind 72 (287):400-405.

Carrier, Leonard S. (1986). Free will and intentional action. Philosophia 16 (December):355-364.

Cherkasova, Evgenia V. (2004). Kant on free will and arbitrariness: A view from Dostoevsky's underground. Philosophy and Literature 28 (2). (Google)

Clarke, Randolph (2007). The appearance of freedom. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):51 – 57.

Collins, Anthony (1976). Determinism and Freewill: Anthony Collins' "A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty: With a Discussion of the Opinions of Hobbes, Locke, Pierre Bayle, William King and Leibniz. Nijhoff.

Costa, Claudio F. (2006). Free will and the soft constraints of reason. Ratio 19

Cover, J. & Hawthorne, John (1996). Free agency and materialism. In Daniel Howard-Snyder & J. Scott Jordan (eds.), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality. Rowman and Littlefield. (Cited by 6 | Google)

Cudworth, Ralph (1838). A Treatise of Freewill and an Introduction to Cudworth's Treatise. Routledge/Thoemmes Press. (Google)

Danto, Arthur C. (1959). The paradigm case argument and the free-will problem. Ethics 69
----- a 'conversational implicature' analsyis of "He married of his own free will".

Davidson, Martin (1937). Free Will or Determinism. London, Watts & Co.. (Google)

Davis, William Hatcher (1971). The Freewill Question. The Hague,Nijhoff. (Google)

Davidson, Martin (1942). The Free Will Controversy. London, Watts. (Google)

Davis, Wayne A. (1991). The world-shift theory of free choice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2):206-211.

Davenport, John J. (2007). Will as Commitment and Resolve: An Existential Account of Creativity, Love, Virtue, and Happiness. Fordham University Press. (Google)
----- In contemporary philosophy, the will is often regarded as a sheer philosophical fiction. In Will as Commitment and Resolve , Davenport argues not only that the will is the central power of human agency that makes decisions and forms intentions but also that it includes the capacity to generate new motivation different in structure from prepurposive desires. The concept of "projective motivation" is the central innovation in Davenport's existential account of the everyday notion of striving will. Beginning with the contrast between "eastern" and "western" attitudes toward assertive willing, Davenport traces the lineage of the idea of projective motivation from NeoPlatonic and Christian conceptions of divine motivation to Scotus, Kant, Marx, Arendt, and Levinas. Rich with historical detail, this book includes an extended examination of Platonic and Aristotelian eudaimonist theories of human motivation. Drawing on contemporary critiques of egoism, Davenport argues that happiness is primarily a byproduct of activities and pursuits aimed at other agent-transcending goods for their own sake. In particular, the motives involved in virtue and in its practice as understood by Alasdair MacIntyre are projective rather than eudaimonist. This theory is supported by analyses of radical evil, accounts of intrinsic motivation in existential psychology, and contemporary theories of identity-forming commitment in analytic moral psychology. Following Viktor Frankl, Joseph Raz, and others, Davenport argues that Harry Frankfurt's conception of caring requires objective values worth caring about, which serve as rational grounds for projecting new final ends. The argument concludes with a taxonomy of values or goods, devotion to which can make life meaningful for us

Daw, Russell & Alter, Torin (2001). Free acts and robot cats. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):345-57. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
----- ‘Free action’ is subject to the causal theory of reference and thus that (H2) The essential nature of free actions can be discovered only by empirical investigation, not by conceptual analysis. Heller’s proposal, if true, would have significant philosophical implications. Consider the enduring issue we will call the Compatibility Issue (hereafter CI): whether the thesis of determinism is logically compatible with the claim that..

Denyer, Nicholas (1981). Time, Action & Necessity: A Proof of Free Will. Duckworth. (Google)

Dewitt, Larry W. (1973). The hidden assumption in MacKay's logical paradox concerning free will. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24

Dilley, Frank B. (1969). Predictability and free will. International Philosophical Quarterly 9 (June):205-213. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Dorschel, Andreas (2002). The authority of the will. Philosophical Forum 33 (3-4):425-442.

Double, Richard (1994). How to frame the free will problem. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):149-72.
---- (1999). In defense of the Smart aleck: A reply to Ted Honderich. Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (January):305-9. (Google)

Dretske, Fred (1992). The metaphysics of freedom. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):1-13. (Cited by 1 | Google)

Duggan, Timothy J. & Gert, Bernard (1979). Free will as the ability to will. Noûs 13:197-217.

Edwards, Jonathan (1797). A Dissertation Concerning Liberty & Necessity. New York,B. Franklin Reprints. (Google)
--- (1984). Freedom of the Will. Franklin Library. (Google)

Enteman, Willard F. (1967). The Problem of Free Will. New York, Scribner. (Google)

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---- (1985). Scotism. Mind 94 (April):231-243. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)

Forrest, Peter (1985). Backwards causation in defense of free will. Mind 94

Freydberg, Bernard (2008). Schelling's Dialogical Freedom Essay: Provocative Philosophy Then and Now. State University of New York Press. (Google)
----- Abstract: The unfolding of the task -- Freedom, pantheism, and idealism -- The account of the possibility of evil -- The account of the actuality of freedom -- The description of the manifestation of evil in man -- God as moral beingthe nature of the whole with respect to freedom -- Indifference and the birth of love.
Galton, Francis (1884). Free-will--observations and inferences. Mind 9 (35):406-413. (Google | More links)
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Garrett, K. Richard (1985). Elbow room in a functional analysis: Freedom and dignity regained. Behaviorism 13:21-36. (Google)

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Glossop, Ronald J. (1970). Beneath the surface of the free-will problem. Journal of Value Inquiry 5 (1). (Google)

Gómez, Luis O. (1975). Some aspects of the free-will question in the nikāyas. Philosophy East and West 25 (1):81-90. (Google | More links)
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Goldman, A. (1968). Actions, predictions, and books of life. American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (July):135-151. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Goldstick, D. (1979). Why we might still have a choice. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 57 (December):305-308. (Google | More links)
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Gomberg, Paul (1975). Free will as ultimate responsibility. American Philosophical Quarterly 15:205-12. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Goodenough, Daniel W. (1986). Providence and Free Will in Human Actions. Swedenborg Scientific Association. (Google)

Gordon, Jeffrey (1982). Introspective method and human freedom. Southwest Philosophical Studies 8 (October):67-77. (Google)

Grant, C. K. (1952). Free will: A reply to professor Campbell's Is 'Free Will' a Pseudo-Problem?. Mind 61

Greenspan, Patricia S. (1978). Behavior control and freedom of action. Philosophical Review 87

Greenberg, Sean (2006). Review of James A. Harris, Of Liberty and Necessity: The Free Will Debate in Eighteenth-Century British Philosophy. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (3).

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Habermas, Jürgen (2007). Reply to Schroeder, Clarke, Searle, and Quante. Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):85 – 93. (Google)
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Haji, Ishtiyaque (2005). Freedom, obligation, and responsibility: Prospects for a unifying theory. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29
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--- (2000). On responsibility, history and taking responsibility. Journal of Ethics 4 (4):392-400. (Cited by 1 | Google)
---- (2000). Replies to Kane and Fischer. Journal of Ethics 4 (4):364-367. (Google)

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Hodgson, Shadworth H. (1880). Dr. Ward on free-will. Mind 5
---- (1891). Free-will: An analysis. Mind 16
---- (1881). Free-will: A rejoinder to dr. Ward. Mind 6

Hospers, John (1950). Meaning and free will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 10

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Abstract: It used to be widely held by philosophers that God and evil are incompatible.1 Not any longer. Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defense is largely responsible for this shift. Indeed, Robert Adams avers that "it is fair to say that Plantinga has solved this problem. That is, he has argued convincingly for the consistency of [God and evil]."2 And William Alston writes that "Plantinga...has established the possibility that God could not actualize a world containing free creatures that always do the right thing."3 You might expect praise like this from Christian philosophers. You might not expect it from William Rowe, one of the foremost atheistic philosophers of our day, but this is precisely what we find. Rowe writes
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---- Abstract: In this splendid section from his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , Hume's first concern is our ordinary belief that the natural world -- the world leaving our own conscious existence aside -- is a world of determinism, all cause and effect. He gives his account of what this ordinary belief can come to, the fact of the matter. Turning to our own conscious existence, he finds the same fact of the matter. Hence our world too is a world of determinism, all cause and effect. That is the story with the man who comes to dinner and does not rob Hume of his silver standish. The story of Indeterminism, and in particular of the kind of freedom that is origination, must be a mistake

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--------- KENNY CITED by Grice in "Intention and Uncertainty", 1971.

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Lucas, John R. (1970). The Freedom of the Will. Oxford University Press.
---- It might be the case that absence of constraint is the relevant sense of ' freedom' when we are discussing the freedom of the will, but it needs arguing for. ...

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Abstract: Erasmus' preface reviewed (section 1) -- Erasmus' skepticism (sections 2-6) -- The necessity of knowing God and his power (sections 7-8) -- The sovereignty of God (sections 9-27) -- Exordium (sections 28-40) -- Discussion : first part (sections 41-75) -- Discussion : second part (sections 76-134) -- Discussion : third part (sections 135-166) -- Conclusion (sections 167-168).

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---- Wegner’s argument on the illusory nature of conscious will, as developed in The Illusion of Conscious Will ( 2002 ) and other publications, has had major impact. Based on empirical data, he develops a theory of apparent mental causation in order to explain the occurrence of the illusion of conscious will. Part of the evidence for his argument is derived from a specific interpretation of the phenomenon of auditory verbal hallucinations as they may occur in schizophrenia. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the validity of the evidence on auditory verbal hallucinations as employed by Wegner. I conclude that auditory hallucinations do not provide solid evidence for Wegner’s theory. Moreover, the phenomena in schizophrenia provide, in fact, an argument against part of Wegner’s theory of apparent mental causation

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----- The opening paragraphs of Nagel's book_ _The View from Nowhere_ _(the first five_ _paragraphs below) indicate the general distinction he proposes between an_ _individual's subjective view of things or subjective standpoint as against an objective_ _or external view of things that is nobody's in particular._
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----- Introduction -- The nature of free will -- Requirements of freedom : preeminently deliberation -- Free will requires the absence of thought-external -- Determination over choices and decisions -- Choice and decision are crucial -- Doing and trying -- Free action and agent causality -- Modes of freedom -- Metaphysical and moral freedom -- Moral freedom is removed by manipulation and especially -- Compulsion -- Intention and moral standing -- Moral freedom of the will involves agent intent and motivation -- Ramifications of freedom -- Free will requires up-to-the-end revisability but this does not gainsay probabilistic predictability -- Issues of revision and control -- The counterfactual dimension : "could have done otherwise" -- Problem cases : machines and lunatics -- Free will as outside causality but compatible with it -- Averting the zenonic fallacy of casual regression -- Averting predetermination (contrasting pre-determination with precedence determination) -- The crucial contrast between events and eventuations -- Choices and decisions as terminating eventuations -- Free will stands outside the stream of natural causality -- On freedom and causality -- Free will excludes pre-determinism but not motive determinism -- Motivational determinism vs. casual necessitation -- Motivations and motives -- Freedom from what? : certainly not from one's own motives -- And reasons: freedom demands motivational determination -- Free will requires motivational determinism -- Determination by one's autonomous motives is the crux of moral freedom -- Compulsion is impulsion -- Objections to motive determinism can be met -- Freedom and motivation -- Must an agent choose his motives for a decision to qualify (morally) as free? -- Freedom does not require motivational self-construction -- Does freedom require self-understanding? -- Willing to will : does freedom require the will to be self-endorsing? -- Does freedom require the approval of intellect and reason? -- Does freedom require self-approved motives? -- Buridan's ass : a random willfulness is not freedom -- Compatibilism regains : what free will excludes is not agent -- Determination but gant-bypassing nature determination -- The explanation of free acts via agent determination -- Freedom, responsibility, and "could have done otherwise" -- Reasons and motives impel but do not compel -- Compatibilism again -- Mind-matter partnership -- A two-sided coin -- The issue of initiative -- A salient duality -- Mind-brain interaction works by coordination not by causality -- Does free will exist? deliberations -- Pro and con -- On evidentiating free will -- Is free will unscientific? -- So does science counter-indicate free will -- Free-will naturalism and evolution.

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Sloman, Aaron (1993). How to dispose of the free will issue. AISB Quarterlye 82:31-2. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Additional links for this entry:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/cogaff/Aaron.Sloman_freewill.pdf
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/Aaron.Sloman_freewill.pdf

Smilansky, Saul (1993). Does the free will debate rest on a mistake? Philosophical Papers 22 (3):173-88. (Cited by 3 | Google)
---- (1997). Egalitarian justice and the importance of the free will problem. Philosophia 25 (1-4). (Google)
---- (2003). Free will and the mystery of modesty. American Philosophical Quarterly 40 (2):105-118. (Cited by 2 | Google)
---- (2003). Free will, egalitarianism and Rawls. Philosophia 31 (1-2). (Google)
---- Is justice binary?: A free-will-related exploration. (Google)
---------- This article asks whether justice is binary, whether matters are either-or with respect to it. This question has been inexplicably neglected, and the elementary conceptual work has not been done. We consider this question through exploring the implications of free-will-related justice. We see that there are actually two questions of very different scope here, and that two distinct notions of binarity need to be distinguished. In the process, the plausibility of considering justice as a binary notion is evaluated

Sommers, Tamler (2010). Experimental philosophy and free will. Philosophy Compass 5 (2):199-212. (Google)
----- This paper develops a sympathetic critique of recent experimental work on free will and moral responsibility. Section 1 offers a brief defense of the relevance of experimental philosophy to the free will debate. Section 2 reviews a series of articles in the experimental literature that probe intuitions about the "compatibility question"—whether we can be free and morally responsible if determinism is true. Section 3 argues that these studies have produced valuable insights on the factors that influence our judgments on the compatibility question, but that their general approach suffers from significant practical and philosophical difficulties. Section 4 reviews experimental work addressing other aspects of the free will/moral responsibility debate, and section 5 concludes with a discussion of avenues for further research

Spezio, Michael L. (2004). Freedom in the body: The physical, the causal, and the possibility of choice. Zygon 39 (3):577-590. (Cited by 3 | Google | More links)
Additional links for this entry:
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9744.2004.t01-1-00602.x
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118781404/PDFSTART
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Stampe, Dennis W. & Gibson, Martha I. (1992). Of one's own free will. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52

Steinvorth, Ulrich (ms). A third concept of freedom of the will. (Google)

Stout, A. K. (1940). Freewill. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 18 (December):212-231. (Google)

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Trakakis, Nick (2003). On the alleged failure of free will theodicies: A reply to Tierno. Sophia 42 (2). (Google)
---- In a recent issue ofSophia Joel Tierno contends that free will theodicies are fundamentally flawed insofar as they claim to provide an adequate explanation for God’s permission of moral evil. Free will, according to Tierno, only accounts for our ability to make certain choices that issue in evil, but fails to account for the fact that we often do make such choices. However, the argument developed by Tierno, despite its initial appeal, embodies an important misunderstanding of the nature of free will theodicies and in particular the libertarian conception of human freedom customarily employed by these theodicies
---- (2004). Second thoughts on the alleged failure of free will theodicies. Sophia 43 (2). (Google)
Abstract: In this paper I further the discussion on the adequacy of free will theodicies initiated by Joel Tierno. Tierno’s principal claim is that free will theodicies fail to account for the wide distribution of moral evil. I attempt to show that, even if Tierno need not rely on a compatibilist conception of free will in order to substantiate the aforementioned claim, there remains good reason to think that free will theodicies are not explanatorily inadequate in the way suggested by Tierno

Turner, Jason (2004). The supervenience argument. Florida Philosophical Review 4 (1):12-24. (Google)

Unger, Peter K. (2002). Free will and scientifiphicalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):1-25. (Google | More links)
Additional links for this entry:
http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(200207)65:1<1:FWAS>2.0.CO;2-T
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3071104.pdf
--- (1977). Impotence and causal determinism. Philosophical Studies 31 (May):289-305. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Additional links for this entry:
http://www.springerlink.com/index/V2022046378308G6.pdf

van Inwagen, Peter (1978). Ability and responsibility. Philosophical Review 87 (April):201-24. (Cited by 29 | Google | More links)
Additional links for this entry:
http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108(197804)87:2<201:AAR>2.0.CO;2-T
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2184752.pdf
---- (2004). Freedom to break the laws. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):334–350. (Google | More links)
Additional links for this entry:
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118780486/PDFSTART
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---- (1989). When is the will free? Philosophical Perspectives 3:399-422. (Cited by 30 | Google | More links)
Additional links for this entry:
http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1989)3<399:WITWF>2.0.CO;2-Y
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Velleman, J. David (1989). Epistemic freedom. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (March):73-97. (Cited by 17 | Google | More links)
---- Epistemic freedom is the freedom to affirm any one of several incompatible propositions without risk of being wrong. We sometimes have this freedom, strange as it seems, and our having it sheds some light on the topic of free will and determinism
Additional links for this entry:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1006906

Velleman, David (1989). Practical Reflection. Princeton University Press. (Cited by 67 | Google | More links)
Abstract: “What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, Practical Reflection develops philosophical accounts of intention, free will, and the foundation of morals. This new edition of Practical Reflection contains the original 1989 text along with a new introduction and is the latest entry in The David Hume Series of Philosophy and Cognitive Science Reissues, which keeps in print previously published indispensable works in the area of cognitive science.
Additional links for this entry:
http://books.google.com/books?id=mwG-AAAACAAJ&dq

Vesey, Godfrey N. A. (1989). Responsibility and free will. Philosophy 24:85-100. (Google)

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Additional links for this entry:
http://taylorandfrancis.metapress.com/index/Q577442744W41G5N.pdf
http://www.informaworld.com/index/739199339.pdf
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---- (1994). Stop me before I kill again. Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):115-148. (Cited by 2 | Google | More links)
Additional links for this entry:
http://www.springerlink.com/index/V1346631271K7G7M.pdf
---& Tomkow, Terrance A. (2006). The dif. Journal of Philosophy 103 (4):183-205. (Google)

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Vos, A. (1993). Buridan on contingency and free will. In Egbert P. Bos & H. A. Krop (eds.), John Buridan, a Master of Arts: Some Aspects of His Philosophy: Acts of the Second Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum on the Occasion of its 15th Anniversary, Leiden-Amsterdam (Vrije Universiteit), 20-21 June, 19. Ingenium Publishers. (Google)

Vossenkuhl, Wilhelm (1981). Free agency: A non-reductionist causal account. Grazer Philosophische Studien 14:113-132. (Google)

Wachtevonr, Daniel (2003). Free Agents As Cause. Ontos.

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Ward, W. G. (1880). Dr. Bain on free will. Mind 5 (18):264-273. (Google | More links)
Additional links for this entry:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2246585.pdf

Wayman, Alex (1975). Discussion of Frederick Streng's "reflections on the attention given to mental construction in the indian buddhist analysis of causality" and Luis O. gómez' "some aspects of the free-will question in the nikāyas". Philosophy East and West 25 (1):91-93. (Google | More links)
Additional links for this entry:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1398437.pdf

Westcott, Malcolm R. (1977). Free will: An exercise in metaphysical truth or psychological consequences. Canadian Psychological Review 18:249-63. (Cited by 2 | Google)

Whittier, Duane H. (1965). Causality and the self. The Monist 49 (April):290-303. (Google)

White, Mary Terrell (1993). The Question of Free Will: A Holistic View. Princeton University Press. (Cited by 4 | Google)

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Willaschek, Marcus (forthcoming). Non-relativist contextualism about free will. European Journal of Philosophy. (Google)
---- Contextualist accounts of free will recently proposed by Hawthorne and Rieber imply that the same action can be both free and unfree (depending on the attributor's context). This paradoxical consequence can be avoided by thinking of contexts not as constituted by arbitrary moves in a conversation, but rather by (relatively stable) social practices (such as the practices of attributing responsibility or of giving scientific explanations). The following two conditions are suggested as each necessary and jointly sufficient for free will: (i) the agent is able to form considered practical judgements and to act accordingly, and (ii) the agent (or some agent-involving event) is the original cause of her actions. A contextualist reformulation of the second condition is developed according to which only contexts in which responsibility is attributed are relevant for the kind of original causation required for free will, which allows for a non-relativist contextualism about free will

Williams, Gardner (1959). The natural causation of human freedom. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 19 (June):529-531. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Additional links for this entry:
http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205(195906)19:4<529:TNCOHF>2.0.CO;2-4
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2105121.pdf
--- (1968). The natural causation of free will. Zygon 3 (March):72-84. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Additional links for this entry:
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119716357/PDFSTART

Xenakis, Jason (1957). Free will, a "negative" concept. Journal of Philosophy 54 (3):70-73. (Google | More links)
Additional links for this entry:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2022193.pdf

Xie, Wenyu (2002). The Concept of Freedom: The Platonic-Augustinian-Lutheran-Kierkegaardian Tradition. University Press of America. (Google)

Yaffe, Gideon (2000). Free will and agency at its best. Philosopical Perspectives 14:203-230. (Cited by 1 | Google | More links)
Additional links for this entry:
http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/119037082/PDFSTART
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/0029-4624.34.s14.11
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/0029-4624.34.s14.11
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/nous/2000/00000034/A0040s14/art00267
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Young, Robert (1975). Freedom, Responsibility, and God. Macmillan. (Google)
5.4a Free Will and Science

Stent, Gunther S. (2002). Paradoxes of Free Will. American Philosophical Society.

Stoica, Ovidiu Cristinel, Convergence and free-will. (Google)
---- If our mind is just an algorithm running on a flesh hardware, then it seems that there is no place for the free-will. An algorithm decides everything based on deterministic computations, or on random inputs, but neither inevitability nor pure hazard is free choice. Hopefully, some day, Science will be able to understand, monitor and simulate all the mind processes. Even then, it will still be a possibility for the free-will to exist, based on the convergence of the initial data. I propose a crucial experiment to test this hypothesis
5.4a.1 Free Will and Genetics

Greenspan, Patricia S. (1993). Free will and the genome project. Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1):31-43. (Cited by 4 | Google | More links)
---- Popular and scientific accounts of the U.S. Human Genome Project often express concern about the implications of the project for the philosophic question of free will and responsibility. However, on its standard construal within philosophy, the question of free will versus determinism poses no special problems in relation to genetic research. The paper identifies a variant version of the free will question, free will versus internal constraint, that might well pose a threat to notions of individual autonomy and virtue in connection with genetic research. Whether it does depends on the extent to which the genetic basis for behavior turns on behavioral incapacities
Additional links for this entry:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11659524&dopt=Citation
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez?db=pubmed&uid=11659524&cmd=showdetailview&indexed=google
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http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2265322.pdf

Greenspan, Patricia S. (ms). Free will and genetic determinism: Locating the problem(s). (Google)
Abstract: I was led to this clarificatory job initially by some puzzlement from a philosopher's standpoint about just why free will questions should come up particularly in connection with the genome project, as opposed to the many other scientific research programs that presuppose determinism. The philosophic concept of determinism involves explanation of all events, including human action, by prior causal factors--so that whether or not human behavior has a genetic basis, it ultimately gets traced back to _something_ true of the world before our birth. The philosophic problem of free will and determinism arises because this seems to undercut moral responsibility: How can we reasonably be held responsible for something whose causes we couldn't control?
---- (2001). Genes, electrotransmitters, and free will. In Patricia S. Greenspan, David Wasserman & Robert Wachbroit (eds.), Genetics and Criminal Behavior: Methods, Meanings, and Morals. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: There seems to be evidence of a genetic component in criminal behavior. It is widely agreed not to be "deterministic"--by which discussions outside philosophy seem to mean that by itself it is not sufficient to determine behavior. Environmental factors make a decisive difference--for that matter, there are nongenetic biological factors--in whether and how genetic
Lipton, Peter (2004). Genetic and Generic Determinism: A New Threat to Free Will? In D. Rees & Steven P. R. Rose (eds.), The New Brain Sciences: Perils and Prospects. Cambridge University Press. (Cited by 2 | Google)
---- We are discovering more and more about the human genotypes and about the connections between genotype and behaviour. Do these advances in genetic information threaten our free will? This paper offers a philosopher’s perspective on the question

Young, Garry (2007). Igniting the flicker of freedom: Revisiting the Frankfurt scenario. Philosophia 35 (2). (Google | More links)
---- This paper aims to challenge the view that the sign present in many Frankfurt-style scenarios is insufficiently robust to constitute evidence for the possibility of an alternate decision, and therefore inadequate as a means of determining moral responsibility. I have amended Frankfurt’s original scenario, so as to allow Jones, as well as Black, the opportunity to monitor his (Jones’s) own inclination towards a particular decision (the sign). Different outcome possibilities are presented, to the effect that Jones’s awareness of his own inclinations leads to the conclusion that the sign must be either (a) a prior determinate of the decision about to be made, (b) prior and indeterminate (therefore allowing for a contra-inclination decision to be made), or (c) constitutive of a decision that Jones has made but is not yet aware of. In effect, this means that, prior to the intervention of Black, Jones must have decided to do otherwise or could have so decided. Either way, although Frankfurt’s conclusion, that Jones could not have done other than he did, is upheld, the idea that he could not have decided otherwise must be rejected, and with it the view that the sign is nothing more than a flicker of freedom insufficient for assigning morally responsibility
Additional links for this entry:
http://www.springerlink.com/index/T4K1475971667806.pdf