Rickaby, Introduction to "Free will and four English philosophers" (1906) -- Hobbes, Locke, Mill, and Grice

Free will and four English philosophers: Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Mill / by the Rev. Joseph Rickaby, S.J. / Rickaby, Joseph, 1845-1932



"The belief in freedom
is at the root of our entire
conception of personality "
Mallock, Rcconstruflionof
Belief


In their original form these pages were written in the years 1871-4. Since then they have been submitted to much castigation and amendment, less perhaps than they deserve, at the hands of the writer, then youthful, now an elderly man. This fact may account for some inequalities of style. Certain "tender memories of the past" have stayed my hand from pruning away all traces of the exuberance of youth.
Meanwhile the importance of the subject has grown
rather than diminished, chiefly, I think, owing to the
prevalence of the Kantian philosophy. I may as well
forewarn the reader that Kant is not discussed here,
except indirectly, in so far as the phenomenalism of
Hume may be considered to have prepared the way
for Kant. I have written elsewhere: "Though men
are slow to see it and loth to own it, from reminis
cences I think of the odium theologicum hanging about
the question, free will still remains the hub and
centre of philosophical speculation."* In this work the
subject is treated entirely on philosophical grounds:
that is to say, there is no reference to grace, predesti
nation, or the Fall. Thus St Augustine stands out of
the controversy: so too Calvin and Jansenius. My
* "Free Will in God and Man," pp. 142-155, in the Second
Series of my Oxford and Cambridge Conferences, 1900-1901 : see also
in my "Political and Moral Essays, 1902, an Essay on "Morality with
out Free Will."
method is to quote a passage from the English philo
sopher under examination, and then discuss it. The
method has its drawbacks, but it ensures definiteness,
and seems about as fair to the philosopher discussed
as any other form of procedure. It is not the writer s
fault if the reader has not his Hobbes, or his Locke,
or his Hume by his side, and does not read round
and study in the context the extract presented to him.
The faff that man has free will is far more certain,
it is a point of Catholic faith, than any explanation
/IOVP he has it. As to how free will works, the Church
has given no explanation: there is much divergence
even of orthodox opinion, and, wherever my reading
has travelled, considerable obscurity. The fact is usually
proved by the indirect method of enlarging upon the
consequences of a denial of free will. That method I
too have frequently employed. But further I offer
some positive view of the precise working of free
will. I have not borrowed it from Locke. I arrived at
the view, or rather was led into it, in the year 1868;
and it has satisfied my mind ever since. It will be
found, however, to approximate to a view put for
ward, on second thoughts, by Locke.* The view I
take is briefly this. To will at all, our will must be
struck by a motive, which raises in us what I have
have called a "spontaneous complacency." As the four
philosophers under review all agree, and I agree with
them, this complacency is a fact of physical sequence,
a necessity, under the circumstances. But it is not yet
a volition. It does not become a volition until it is
* See Extraft 8 from Locke, pp. 100-104.
hugged, embraced, enhanced, under advertence, by
the conscious self. This process takes time, I do not
mean so many seconds measured by the watch, for
thought time goes on other wheels than motion time,
but still it takes time. Free will turns upon the
absence of any need of your making up your mind
at once to accept the particular complacency thus pre
sent in your soul: observe, you cannot here and now
accept any other; you cannot here and now accept
what is not here and now offered; you cannot just at
present fling yourself upon the absent. Thus time is
gained for rival motives to come up, according to the
ordinary laws of association, perception, or personal
intercourse: each of these motives excites its own
necessary complacency, till at last some present com
placency is accepted and endorsed by the person ; and
that is an acl: of free will. Not to have a regressus in in-
finitum, we must further observe that no volition is
requisite simply to hesitate, delay, and withhold your
acceptance of any present complacency, in facl:, to re
main undecided and irresolute. You may, of course, put
forth a positive volition to wait and see more of the
question: all I say is that such a positive volition is
not indispensable; your will may hang fire without
your resolving to be irresolute: which important point
Locke never came clearly to remark.

This explanation may not account for free will in
GOD and in His holy angels; but in so difficult a matter
it is much if we can form some theory which a philo
sopher may debate, and a sound theologian will not
bar as "heretical," "erroneous," or "temerarious."
I may add that while I am much concerned that my
reader should not be a determinist, I am compara
tively indifferent whether he accepts my explanation
of free will, or any other, or regards the process as
inexplicable. J. R.

Tope s Hall, Oxford,

Midsummer, 1906.

CONTENTS
HOBBES
Seftion I. Doctrine of free will stated. Not every action free, nor
every free action equally free. Calculability of human action (cf.
Hume, Sedions III, IV; Mill, Seftions I, VIII) Page I X
Seftion II. Spontaneous, Voluntary, Secondarily-automatic 7
Stflion III. Cause and condition 10
Seftisn IV. Sufficient cause 14
Seftion V. Moral character of the Deity on the necessarian hypo
thesis (cf. Hume, Section XI). Predication of GOD and His
creatures analogous, not univocal 1 6
Sfftion VI. Necessarian theory of punishment (cf. Mill, Sections
XI, XII) 22
Seftion VII. Necessarian view of consultation. Neccssarianism re
nounced in practice. Its effects on morality (cf. pp. 195, 225) 24
Seftion VIII. Praise in the absence of free will 28
Seftion IX. Hobbesian piety 31
Seftion X. Hobbesian repentance 34
Seftion XI. Hobbesian prayer 34
Seftion XII. Hobbesian definition of sin. When voluntarincss may
co-exist with necessity 36
Seftion XIII. Compulsion and free will 39
Seftion XIV. Grades of free will. Freedom not to be confounded
with power (cf. Locke, Sections I- 1 1 1) 43
Seftion XV. How far the will can be said to be determined by the
last practical judgement 50
Seftion XVI. The abiding now of eternity (cf. Mill, Section II).
The Heraclitean flux 53
Seftion XVII. Free will other than the absence of impediments to
action 63
Seftion XVIII. A free volition not an entirely new move in the
mind 66
Seftion XIX. Necessarianism not provable by the law of excluded
middle 70

LOCKE
Seflion I. Free will not power to carry out what one wills Page 7 5
Seflion II. The same 77
Seflion III. The same (cf. p. zoo) 78
Seflion IV. Faculty and habit . 8 1
Seflion V. Examination of the argument that man cannot forbear
willing for or against any given proposal, and therefore is not
free. What is irresolution? 82
Seflion VI. Free will not a regressu; in infinitum. Restatement of the
process of free will 87
Seflion VII. Is the will determined by the greatest present uneasi
ness? St Augustine on the uneasiness of this present life and the
peace of the life to come 90
Seflion VIII. Locke s admission in the second edition of his Essay
that man s liberty lies in his power to suspend the execution
and satisfaction of his desires while he examines the value of
them. This suspensory power may operate negatively, without
any positive volition thereto. Volition can be formed only upon
present complacency 100
Seflion IX. It is not true liberty to break loose from the conduct of
reason 105
Seflion X. Recapitulation of the argument with Locke 1 06



MILL
Seflion I. The doctrine called Philosophical Necessity unproven by
experience 165
Seflion II. Free will and divine foreknowledge 1 66
Seflion III. " Mysterious constraint," " magical spell," " mystical
tie " of cause and effect, misconceptions of the phenomenalist
school due to their ignoring of personality. Volition not a mere
phenomenon of physical science I 70
Seflion IV. Necessity as meaning " uncounteradtableness " 178
Seflion V. Mill and the Owenite. Is a man s character formed for
him or by him? 183
Seflion VI. Can we alter our character? 185
Seflion VII. Mill admits free will after all (he revokes his conces
sion, p. 231 : cf. Locke, Section VIII: Hume, Section XI, for simi
lar concessions. Hobbes alone never flinches, but see p. 28) 1 86
Seflion VIII. Why brute agency is necessary agency. Away from
necessity, no induction possible. Calculability of human action.
" Cause " and " explanation " 1 89
Seflion IX. Consciousness of free will 198
Seflion X. Are we conscious of being able to act in opposition to the
strongest present desire or aversion ? (cf. pp. 53, 103) 201
Seflion XI. Utilitarian theory of punishment (cf. Hobbes, Section
VI). New treatment of homicidal mania 205
Seflion XII. Retributive punishment. Connexion of sin and suffer
ing, no mere subjective association. Civil punishment, how retri
butive 216
Seflion XIII. List of actions good and evil unchanged by determi
nism. Intellectual necessity. Brute necessity 225
Seflion XIV. Mill s final protest against fatalism. Modified fatalism.
Roundabout fatalism. Determinism: fatalism in theory, not in
practice 229

GRICE
Section I. Implicatures of 'free'.
Section II. Free for lunch?
Section III. Freewheeling.
Section IV. Alcohol-free
Section V. Implicatures and entailments of 'free'.
Section VI. Why free?
Section VII. Why not?
Section VIII. Free to what?
Section IX. More implicatures
Section X. Disimplicatures of 'free'.
Section XI. Free without will.
Section XII. Will without free
Section XIII. Free lunch?
Section XIV. Free and freedom
Section XV. Liberty and free
Section XVI. Libertarian and liberalis
Section XVI. Cancelling all.

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