"Determinism and Libertarianism are still thought by many to be locked in a conflict which philosophers have been unable to resolve, and it is also thought that the conflict is of great practical significance, so that for example, important policy decisions about the punishment of offenders or the education of children hang upon its solution. But in fact I do not think that many of those who have come down decisively on one of what they think are the two sides of the so-called 'Free Will controversy' have been caused thereby to alter their opinions on any important practical question -- or if they have, they have lacked reason. For as soon as we ask, what an extreme determinist or an extreme libertarian would have to say about practical issues as a result of embracing their doctrines, both are faced with the same dilemma. Either they say that the consequences of their views are something
so utterly absurd as to cast doubt on the seriousness of anybody who maintains them; or they say that the consequences are no different from what the rest of us think -- in which case, they are left, in spite of their alleged dispute, in substantial agreement with one another and with the ordinary man. This is, in short, one of the class of puzzles which used to be called 'pseudo-problems' -- a very misleading expression, because if something is a problem for someone, it really is a problem
for him and he needs to solve it. What the people who invented this term ought to have said is that there are different kinds of problems, of which some admit a 'yes'-or-'no' answer; others, such as this one, require instead a fuller understanding
of the question itself, to see the pitfalls and ambiguities in it".
Saturday, April 16, 2011
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