Grice's uncertainties

By J. L. Speranza
for the Grice Club

As R. O. Doyle notes,

http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/heisenberg/

"Indeterminacy (Unbestimmtheit) was Heisenberg's original name for his principle. It is a better name than the more popular uncertainty [Unsicherheit], which connotes lack of knowledge. The Heisenberg principle is an ontological as well as epistemic lack of information."

I'm not sure about Descartes, but this bit from Grice's pretty early "Descartes" essay (1966), repr. in WoW:188ff may connect, especially vis a vis the rather abusive use of 'certainty' in matters of intention and free-will in authors like Hart and Hampshire (1958) (if not Stout). This is what Grice writes:

""Certain" occurs in at least two distinguishable contexts: (i) "it is certain that p" (label this "objective certainty"), (ii) "x is certain that p" (label this "subjective" certainty". Perhaps, then, Descartes is subscribing to two rules (conflated): (1) whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived is objectively certain, (2) whatever is objectively certain is true."

Similarly, I propose
(i) it is uncertain that p.
(ii) x is uncertain that p.
-- and which should (but then perhaps should not) connect with Heisenberg's rather unfortunate change from 'indeterminacy' (Unbestimmtheit) to 'uncertainty' (Unsicherheit).

As Doyle notes, 'Unsicherheit' is more popular but a worse name than "Unbestimmtheit".

Again, as the wiki entry for Undeterminacy Principle reads:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uncertainty_principle

"Throughout the main body of his original 1927 paper, written in German, Heisenberg used the word "Unbestimmtheit" ("indeterminacy") to describe the basic theoretical principle. Only in the endnote did he switch to the word "Unsicherheit" ("uncertainty")"

But then, of course, "Unsicherheit" fares no better. Austin would be VERY AMUSED, in parts, when discussing Ayer's certainties about things, when lecturing on "Sense and Sensibilia". For Ayer was propounding certainty (or 'one's being sure about things') as a criterion for 'knowledge'. The ordinary-language philosophers (Austin, Warnock, Grice) _knew_ much better than that!

Etc.

Cheers

JL Speranza
--- for the HPG Club

Refs.

Grice, H. P. 1948. Meaning -- as intention. Where Grice borrows intention from Stout's 1896 "Voluntary action" as a psychological attitude involving a level of 'knowledge' or certainty about the outcome of the intended action.
--- 1949. Disposition and intention. Where Grice argues that in an ascription of 'intention', the agent's "freedom from doubt that the intended action will take place is not dependent on any empirical evidence." (cited by Chapman, p. 69 -- as Stoutian in nature).
--- 1966. Descartes on clear and distinct perception. In WoW
--- 1967. Logic and conversation --. Implicata as 'indeterminate'.
--- 1971. Intention and uncertainty. His neo-Prichardian weakened thesis for the analysis of intention.
--- 1975. Method in philosophical psychology. Ontological marxims (regarding willings and judgings) as allowing "numerical indeterminacy"
--- 1986. Actions and events, on 'chance and causal indeterminism' and their alternates.
Hampshire/Hart. 1958. Decision, intention, and certainty. Mind