Grice's Player's Navy Cut

By JLS
for the GC

Chapman writes:

"[Grice] had been a heavy smoker throughout his adult life [but his health was now failing and] in response he gave up cigarettes suddenly and completely in 1980. He insisted to his wife that his last, unfinished, packet of one hundred Player's Navy Cut stayed in the house, but he never touched it." (2006, p. 167)

--- Moving.


Akrasia.

In 1985, in collaboration with Judith Baker, H. P. Grice presented his
"Davidson on "weakness of the will"" to Davidson's festschrift ("Essays on
Davidson's Actions and Events", ed. Hintikka & Vermazen, 1985). Of course,
Grice would have been familiar with the topic from his classic background.

Video meliora proboque sed deteriora sequor.
--- Medea, in Ovid, Metamorphose, VII --

Cfr. Urmson reference below. *).

Grice, like Davidson, is concerned
with what Grice calls the 'paradox' of akrasia. With Davidson, Grice uses
'passion', and with Davidson, he refers to 'akrasia' as being a case where
'passion [is] the victor over duty'. Grice's example of the man who one
night stays in his warm bed rather than go wash his teeth (as he had forgotten
to do) (Grice/Baker, p.29). Some passionate acting, one would say -- but
this is the technical use of 'passion' that we should be concerned with.
Grice slightly modifies Davidson's symbolism and logical representation.
Notably, in the conditional judgements we are concerned with the protasis is,
perhaps, more naturally, written _before_ (as the name implies) the apodosis
(consequent), so we have the akratic as having in her mind _two_ things.

(i) Prima-Facie (All-Things-Considered, !p)

(ii) !~p.

At this point, Grice
refers here to his unpublication, 'Probability, Desirability, & Modal
Operators' -- delivered in Performadillo: A Conference on Performatives at
Armadillo, Texas in 1973, but the mimeo dates from 1971 -- cited by Levinson in
_Pragmatics_ (Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics). By 'modal' operator, Grice
is referring to the _mode_ as what grammarians call the 'mood', i.e. to
things, in the akratic, like "!". Grice notes that "Prima-Facie
(All-Things-Considered,!p is better than !~p)" can mean (at least) _two_ things:

(i) "!p" is _good_.

(ii) !p is better than any alternative.

At this
stage, Grice/Baker propose a 7-step derivation (p.34) that would cover not just
practical akrasia, but something that fascinated his intellect:
'theoretical akrasia' ("it is raining, but I don't want to believe it"). In the
Boulomaic Version Doxastic Version the seven steps are as follows:

********************* seven-step resolution of 'akrasia' ********

1. pf(A,!p) pr(A,p).

2. pf(A&B,!p) pr(A&B,p).

3. pf(A&B&C&D,!p) pr(A&B&C&D,p).

4. pf(all things before me,!p) pr(all things before me,p).

5. pf(ATC,!p) pb(ATC,p).

6. !p |- p.

____________________

Therefore,

7. R wills !p R judges p.


Grice/Baker provide some detail about a 'deontic' interpretation of
Davidson's simple "All-Things-Considered" to read --

all which _SHOULD_ be considered

-- and not merely as 'all things _de facto_ considered: "Surely an
account of akrasia should provide for the possibility of a measure of
scrupulousness in the deliberation of the agent who subsequently acts incontently."
(p.35). Further, this fits with the standard definition of 'akratic'.
Grice/Baker define the akratic as the agent who "thinks that what she's doing is
something which she should _not_ be doing". Grice provides two views of
akrasia here: a naive one, and a more sophisticated one which he endorses.
According to the naive view of akrasia, the incontinent judges that he should
do p but does not p. In to the sophisticated view of akrasia, however,
akrasia becomes a "sin of thought" rather than a sin of agency. The thinker
thinks that he should judge that he should do p but does not actually judge that
he should do A. Grice and Baker write:

"On the face of it, the naive view seems way superior." (p.41)

"Why
should our departure from the naive view be thougth to give a better account
of akrasia?"

"First, it seems *easier* to attribute to people a failure to
act as they fully believe they ought to act than to attribute to them a
failure to believe what they fully believe they ought to believe."

"Second, what
is there to prevent a person from judging that he should do p, when he
judges that he should judge that he should do p, except his disinclination to
do p."

"Third, would it not be more natural to suppose that this
disinclination prevents his judgement that he should do p from being followed by his
doing p than to suppose that it prevents his judgement that he should judge
that he should do p from being followed by his judgement that he should do p?"

At this point, one may heartily agree with the famous quote, I fear
weakness of the will is too much like hard work.

Grice/Baker seem to be certain
that, here, it's all about 'pleasure'.

"The incontinent person forms an
intention to do ~p to which she is promted by its prospective pleasantness.
In spite of the fact, of which she is aware, that the conditions fo far
taken into acccount (which include the prospective pleasantness of ~p) so far
as they go favour p. It appears to the incontinent person that the claim of
prospective pleasantness of ~p is or is being outweighed, but,
nevertheless, she judges that the pleasant thing is the best thing to do and so acts on the judgement". (p.45).

Back to 'theoretical akrasia', and
All-Things-Considered in _probablistic_ reasoning -- fallibilist reasoning -- Grice/Baker
write:

"If I am investigating probabilistically the possibility that it is
now raining in Timbuctoo, the relevant ideal totality of evidence should
_NOT_ include the fact that it is raining in Timbuctoo." (p.36).

Grice refers
at this point L. Carroll's 'Achilles & the Tortoise'.

"The incontinent
agent is _not_ like the Tortoise, who would accept modus ponens and p, and p
-> q, but yet, do not infer "q".

Grice approaches akrasia in _Aspects of
Reason_, too.

"I am going to be almost exclusively concerned with alethic and
practical arguments, the proximate conclusions of which will be,
respectively, of the forms (below)."

Acc (|- p)
Acc (!p).

E.g.

"Acceptable (it is the case that it snows)"
"Acceptable (let it be that I go home)".

We might
regard it as a _sentential_ modifier: to utter

"Acceptable (let it be that
I go home" will be to utter "Acceptably, let it be that I go home".

Grice
writes:

"To adopt this view would seem to commit to the impossibility of
incontinence; for since 'accept that let it be that I go home' is to be my
rewrite for 'V-accept (will) that I go home', anyone x who concluded, by
practical argument, that 'Acceptable let it be that x go home' would *ipso facto*
will to go home."

It is here that Grice traces the parallel with 'doxastic
akrasia'.

"Any one who concluded, by alethic argument, 'acceptable it is
the case that it snows', would ipso facto judge that it snows. So, an
alternative reading seems preferable." And the debate may ensue. Some further
refs. to 'akrasia' are listed below, plus a few online links.

As per Urmson, The Greek Philosophical Vocabulary: "AKRASIA: in Aristotle and later writers, lack of self-control, the condition of being akrates. The verb is
akrateuesthai-to lack, or exhibit the lack of self control. Sometimes translated
'incontinence.'

In Plato, except in spurious Definitions, used more loosely and always written akrateia, as in Rep. 461b;

meta deines akrateias gegonos-was born in terrible licentiousness.

In Aristotle akrasia is the condition of the man who has right principles but whose appetite leads him to act contrarily to them, whereas the egrates controls his appetite.

Both the "egkrates" and the "akrates" are to be distinguished from the agathos and the kakos who act well or ill without internal conflict, though Plato does not make
this sharp distinction.

Ho akrates epithumon men prattei, proairoumenos d'ou

the uncontrolled man acts in accordance with his appetite, not with his
choice (Ar. E.N. 1111b 13-14).

AKRASIA proper is lack of self control with
regard to the bodily pleasures of touch and taste; if self-control is
lacking in other spheres the term must be qualified:

hetton aiskhra akrasia he tou thumou
-an uncontrolled temper is less disgraceful
Ar. E.N.1149a24)."

A few "Gricean" references on 'akrasia' should include:

ALPHABETICALLY:

Akrill JL.

"Aristotle", cited by Grice in Aspects of Reason", "Complete Works"
(Princeton University Press, ed J Barnes), "Nichomachean Ethics", revised by J.O.
Urmson. Classics of Western Philosophy ed S Cahn. Indianapolis: Hackett.

Davidson D. "How is weakness of the will possible?", in J Feinberg "Moral
concepts", repr. in "Essays on Actions and Events" (Clarendon), "Reply to Grice
and Baker on weakness of the will", in Hintikka/Vermazen.

Grandy, R.
"Schiffer's desires" (Southern Journal of Philosophy", 17).

Grice, G.R. "Are
there reasons for acting?", in P French, Essays in ethical theory (1980),

Grice, H. P. "Intention & uncertainty" (1973) Proceedings of the British
Academy; ---- (with J. Baker) Davidson on 'The weakness of the will'", (1985), in
Hintikka & Vermazen, "Aspects of reason" (2001) (Clarendon),

Hardie WFR,
"Aristotle's ethical theory",

Joachim H H, "Akrasia",

Kenny, AJP. "The
practical syllogism and incontinence" in "The anatomy of the soul: historical
essays in the philosophy of the mind" (Blackwell),

Peacocke CAB. "Intention
and akrasia", in Hintikka and Vermazen.

Pears DF, "Motivated irrationality"
(Oxford).

PLATO, "Dialogues", esp. "Protagoras" and "Meno".

URMSON JO.
"Aristotle's Ethics" (Blackwell),

WIGGINS on akrasia.

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