Feel Free: Grice on Kantotelian Freedom

Albritton, Rogers (1985). Freedom of the will and freedom of action. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 59:239-51. (Cited by 8 | Google)
Alter, Torin & Daw, Russell (2001). Free acts and robot cats. Philosophical Studies 102 (3):345-57. (Google)
Abstract: (H1) ‘Free action’ is subject to the causal theory of reference and thus that (H2) The essential nature of free actions can be discovered only by empirical investigation, not by conceptual analysis. Heller’s proposal, if true, would have significant philosophical implications. Consider the enduring issue we will call the Compatibility Issue (hereafter CI): whether the thesis of determinism is logically compatible with the claim that..
Ayers, Michael R. (1968). The Refutation of Determinism. Methuen. (Cited by 14 | Google)
Bernstein, Mark H. (2005). Can we ever be really, truly, ultimately, free? Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):1-12. (Google | More links)
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Berofsky, Bernard (ed.) (1966). Free Will and Determinism. Harper and Row. (Cited by 19 | Google)
Cain, James (2005). Fred Berthold, jr God, evil, and human learning: A critique and revision of the free will defense in theodicy. (Albany NY: State university of new York press, 2004). Pp. VIII+108. $32.00 (hbk). ISBN 0 7914 6041 X. Religious Studies 41 (4):480-483. (Google)
Campbell, Charles A. (1951). Is "free will" a pseudoproblem? Mind 60 (240):441-65. (Google | More links)
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http://mind.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/LX/240/441
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Clarke, Randolph (1996). Contrastive rational explanation of free choice. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):185-201. (Cited by 8 | Google | More links)
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http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2956386.pdf

Clarke, Randolph (1995). Freedom and determinism. Philosophical Books 36 (1):9-18. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Clarke, Randolph (2002). Free will. In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Couenhoven, Jesse (2007). Augustine's rejection of the free-will defence: An overview of the late Augustine's theodicy. Religious Studies 43 (3):279-298. (Google)
Coughlan, Michael J. (forthcoming). The free will defence and natural evil. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion. (Google)
D'angelo, Edward (1968). The Problem Of Freedom And Determinism. Columbia: University Of Missouri Press. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Dardis, Anthony (2009). Four views on free will. By John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas. Metaphilosophy 40 (1):147-153. (Google)
Dilman, Ilham (1999). Free Will: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction. Routledge. (Cited by 13 | Google)
Abstract: The debate between free will and its opposing doctrine, determinism, is one of the key issues in philosophy. Ilham Dilman brings together all the dimensions of the problem of free will with examples from literature, ethics and psychoanalysis, and draws out valuable insights from both sides of the freedom-determinism divide. The book provides a comprehensive introduction to this highly important question and examines the contributions made by sixteen of the most outstanding thinkers from the time of early Greece to modern times: Homer, Sophocles, Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer, Freud, Sartre, Weil, Wittgenstein, Moore
Dilley, Frank B. (2004). Robert Kane (ed.), The oxford handbook of free will. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55 (2). (Google)
Double, Richard (1992). How rational must free will be? Metaphilosophy 23 (3):268-78. (Google | More links)
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Double, Richard (1997). Misdirection on the free will problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (3):359-68. (Cited by 1 | Google)
Abstract: The belief that only free will supports assignments of moral responsibility -- deserved praise and blame, punishment and reward, and the expression of reactive attitudes and moral censure -- has fueled most of the historical concern over the existence of free will. Free will's connection to moral responsibility also drives contemporary thinkers as diverse in their substantive positions as Peter Strawson, Thomas Nagel, Peter van Inwagen, Galen Strawson, and Robert Kane. A simple, but powerful, reason for thinking that philosophers are correct in making moral responsibility the prize of the free will problem is this: If we disassociate free will from deserved praise, blame, punishment and reward, reactive attitudes and moral censure, then why care about free will? If free will is not pinned down as that degree of freedom in our choices that we need for moral responsibility, it is difficult to see why anyone would or should care about free will. In this article I argue that some of the most prominent recent writing on free will becomes sidetracked from this key issue. For this reason, a good deal of the literature is so much spilled ink as philosophers misdirect their energies. In section 1 I elaborate just what I believe the key issue in the free will problem is. In section 2 I illustrate what an answer to the key issue requires. In section 3 I suggest motivations for misdirection. In sections 4, 5, and 6 I provide detailed examples of misdirection from compatibilists and libertarians. In sections 7 and 8 I describe some non-misdirected answers to the key question.
Double, Richard (1993). The principle of rational explanation defended. Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):133-142. (Google)
Ekstrom, Laura W. (ed.) (2001). Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom. Westview. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
Abstract: A companion volume to Free Will: A Philosophical Study , this new anthology collects influential essays on free will, including both well-known contemporary classics and exciting recent work. Agency and Responsibility: Essays on the Metaphysics of Freedom is divided into three parts. The essays in the first section address metaphysical issues concerning free will and causal determinism. The second section groups papers presenting a positive account of the nature of free action, including competing compatibilist and incompatibilist analyses. The third section concerns free will and moral responsibility, including theories of moral responsibility and the challenge to an alternative possibilities condition posed by Frankurt-type scenarios. Distinguished by its balance and consistently high quality, the volume presents papers selected for their significance, innovation, and clarity of expression. Contributors include Harry Frankfurt, Peter van Inwagen, David Lewis, Elizabeth Anscombe, John Martin Fischer, Michael Bratman, Roderick Chisholm, Robert Kane, Peter Strawson, and Susan Wolf. The anthology serves as an up-to-date resource for scholars as well as a useful text for courses in ethics, philosophy of religion, or metaphysics. In addition, paired with Free Will: A Philosophical Study, it would form an excellent upper-level undergraduate or graduate-level course in free will, responsibility, motivation, or action theory
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Furlong, F. W. (1981). Determinism and free will: Review of the literature. American Journal of Psychiatry 138:435-39. (Cited by 5 | Google | More links)
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Gale, Richard M. (1990). Freedom and the free will defense. Social Theory and Practice 16 (3):397-423. (Cited by 2 | Google)
Abstract: It is my purpose to explore some of the problems concerning the relation between divine creation and creaturely freedom by criticizing various versions of the Free Will Defense (FWD hereafter).1 The FWD attempts to show how it is possible for God and moral evil to co-exist by describing a possible world in which God is morally justified or exonerated for creating persons who freely go wrong. Each version of the FWD has its own story to tell of how it is possible that God be frustrated in his endeavor to create a universe containing moral good sans moral evil. The value of free will is supposed to be so great that God is morally exonerated under such circumstances for creating the Mr. Rogers type persons you know, the very same people who are good sometimes are bad sometimes. If it is objected that God could not be unlucky in this manner, that it necessarily is within his power to create goody-goody persons, either by supernaturally willing in his own inimitable manner that it be so, which is the theological compatibilist objection, or by a judicious selection of the initial state of the universe and operant causal laws which together entail that every free action be morally right, which is the causal compatibilist objection, the response is that it is logically incompatible that a creaturely free action be determined by God or by anything external to the agent, such as causes outside of the agent
Ginet, Carl & Palmer, David (2010). On Mele and Robb's indeterministic Frankfurt-style case. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):440-446. (Google)
Gregg, John (ms). Free Will. (Google)
Hall, Roland (1965). Free will--a short bibliography. Philosophical Quarterly 15 (59):179-181. (Google | More links)
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http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2218219.pdf

Hawthorne, John (2001). Freedom in context. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):63-79. (Cited by 12 | Google | More links)
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http://www.springerlink.com/index/N21378671M173238.pdf

Himma, Kenneth Einar (2009). The free-will defence: Evil and the moral value of free will. Religious Studies 45 (4):395-415. (Google)
Holton, Richard (2010). Disentangling the Will. In Al Mele, Kathleen Vohs & Roy Baumeister (eds.), Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? (New York: OUP, 2010). OUP. (Google)
Abstract: It is argued that there are at least three things bundled up in the idea of free will: the capacity manifested by agents whenever they act freely; the property possessed by those actions for which an agent in morally responsible; and the ability to do otherwise. This paper attempts some disentangling
Honderich, Ted (1988). A Theory of Determinism. Oxford University Press. (Cited by 56 | Google | More links)
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Honderich, Ted (1993). How Free Are You? Oxford University Press. (Cited by 36 | Google)
Abstract: _Can attitudes like those that have seemed welded to indeterminism and free will_ _actually go with determinism? Is it not a contradiction to suppose so? The little_ _Oxford University Press book_ _How Free Are You?_ _in its first edition, much_ _translated, was a summary of the indigestible or anyway not widely digested_
Honderich, Ted (ms). Manuel R. Vargas: The revisionist's guide to responsibility. (Google)
Abstract: Revisionism in the theory of moral responsibility is, roughly, the idea that some aspect of our responsibility practices, attitudes, or concept is in need of revision. In this paper, I argue that (1) in spite of being an increasingly prevalent thread in discussions of moral responsibility, revisionism is poorly understood, (2) the limited critical discussion there has been of it does not reflect the complexities and nuances of revisionist theories, and (3) at least one species of revisionismmoderate revisionism- has some advantages over conventional compatibilist and incompatibilist theories. If I am right, one result is that the outcome of prominent debates about the compatibility (or not) of determinism and our commonsense thinking about moral responsibility may be less crucial than they seem
Hook, Sidney (ed.) (1958). Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science. Collier-Macmillan. (Cited by 9 | Google)
Janew, Claus (2009). How Consciousness Creates Reality. CreateSpace. (Google)
Abstract: The present text is a very abridged version of a book I wrote out of the desire to examine the structure of our reality from a standpoint unbiased by established teachings, be they academic- scientific, popular- esoteric, or religious in nature. We will begin with seemingly simple interactions in our daily lives, examine how they originate on a deeper level, come to understand the essentials of consciousness, and finally recognize that we create our reality in its entirety. In the course of this quest, we will uncover little-heeded paths to accessing our subconscious, other individuals, and that which can be understood by the term "God". And the solution to the classical problem of free will constitutes the gist of the concepts thus revealed.
Janew, Claus (2009). Omnipresent Consciousness and Free Will. In How Consciousness Creates Reality. CreateSpace. (Google)
Abstract: This article is not an attempt to explain consciousness in terms basically of quantum physics or neuro-biology. Instead I should like to place the term "Consciousness" on a broader footing. I shall therefore proceed from everyday reality, precisely where we experience ourselves as conscious beings. I shall use the term in such a general way as to resolve the question whether only a human being enjoys consciousness, or even a thermostat. Whilst the difference is considerable, it is not fundamental. Every effect exists in the perception of a consciousness. I elaborate on its freedom of choice, in my view the most important source of creativity, in a similarly general way. The problems associated with a really conscious decision do not disappear by mixing determination with a touch of coincidence. Both must enter into a higher unity. In so doing it will emerge that a certain degree of freedom of choice is just as omnipresent as consciousness - an inherent part of reality itself.