Edwards and Grice on free will

by JLS
for the GC

Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) is Anglo-American philosopher, discussed by J. Harris in his landmark, "Liberty and necessity: the free will debate in eighteenth-century British philosophy" (Oxford, 2005). Edwards presents the eighteenth-century’s most sophisticated case against libertarian freedom. He seeks to show, not merely that there is no experience of such freedom, but that the very notion of such freedom is internally incoherent. It is argued that there are reasons to regard Edwards as a philosopher in the British tradition, but that there are significant differences between his necessitarianism and that of Hobbes.

His essay, An essay on free will' is available online

http://edwards.yale.edu/archive?path=aHR0cDovL2Vkd2FyZHMueWFsZS5lZHUvY2dpLWJpbi9uZXdwaGlsby9uYXZpZ2F0ZS5wbD93amVvLjA=

"An essay on free will" (1754)


Part I.
Wherein Are Explained Various Terms and Things Belonging to the Subject of the Ensuing Discourse

SECTION 1.
CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THE WILL

SECTION 2.
CONCERNING THE DETERMINATION OF THE WILL

SECTION 3.
CONCERNING THE MEANING OF THE TERMS NECESSITY, IMPOSSIBILITY, INABILITY, ETC.; AND OF CONTINGENCE

SECTION 4.
OF THE DISTINCTION OF NATURAL AND MORAL NECESSITY, AND INABILITY

SECTION 5.
CONCERNING THE NOTION OF LIBERTY, AND OF MORAL AGENCY

Part II.
Wherein It Is Considered, whether There Is, or Can Be Any Such Sort Freedom of Will, as That wherein Arminians Place the Essence of the Liberty of All Moral Agents; and Whether Any Such Thing Ever Was, or Can Be Conceived of

SECTION 2.
SEVERAL SUPPOSED WAYS OF EVADING THE FOREGOING REASONING, CONSIDERED

SECTION 3.
WHETHER ANY EVENT WHATSOEVER, AND VOLITION IN PARTICULAR, CAN COME TO PASS WITHOUT A CAUSE OF ITS EXISTENCE

SECTION 4.
WHETHER VOLITION CAN ARISE WITHOUT A CAUSE, THROUGH THE ACTIVITY OF THE NATURE OF THE SOUL

SECTION 5.
SHOWING, THAT IF THE THINGS ASSERTED IN THESE EVASIONS SHOULD BE SUPPOSED TO BE TRUE, THEY ARE ALTOGETHER IMPERTINENT, AND CAN'T HELP THE CAUSE OF ARMINIAN LIBERTY; AND HOW (THIS BEING THE STATE OF THE CASE) ARMINIAN WRITERS ARE OBLIGED TO TALK INCONSISTENTLY

SECTION 6.
CONCERNING THE WILL'S DETERMINING IN THINGS WHICH ARE PERFECTLY INDIFFERENT, IN THE VIEW OF THE MIND

SECTION 7.
CONCERNING THE NOTION OF LIBERTY OF WILL CONSISTING IN INDIFFERENCE

SECTION 8.
CONCERNING THE SUPPOSED LIBERTY OF THE WILL, AS OPPOSITE TO ALL NECESSITY

SECTION 9.
OF THE CONNECTION OF THE ACTS OF THE WILL WITH THE DICTATES OF THE UNDERSTANDING

SECTION 10.
VOLITION NECESSARILY CONNECTED WITH THE INFLUENCE OF MOTIVES; WITH PARTICULAR OBSERVATIONS ON THE GREAT INCONSISTENCE OF MR. CHUBB'S ASSERTIONS AND REASONINGS, ABOUT THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL

SECTION 11.
THE EVIDENCE OF GOD'S CERTAIN FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE VOLITIONS OF MORAL AGENTS

SECTION 12.
GOD'S CERTAIN FOREKNOWLEDGE OF THE FUTURE VOLITIONS OF MORAL AGENTS, INCONSISTENT WITH SUCH A CONTINGENCE OF THOSE VOLITIONS, AS IS WITHOUT ALL NECESSITY

SECTION 13.
WHETHER WE SUPPOSE THE VOLITIONS OF MORAL AGENTS TO BE CONNECTED WITH ANYTHING ANTECEDENT, OR NOT, YET THEY MUST BE NECESSARY IN SUCH A SENSE AS TO OVERTHROW ARMINIAN LIBERTY

Part III.
Wherein Is Inquired, Whether Any Such Liberty of Will as Arminians Hold, Be Necessary to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Praise, and Dispraise, Etc.

SECTION 2.
THE ACTS OF THE WILL OF THE HUMAN SOUL OF JESUS CHRIST NECESSARILY HOLY, YET TRULY VIRTUOUS, PRAISEWORTHY, REWARDABLE, ETC.

SECTION 3.
THE CASE OF SUCH AS ARE GIVEN UP OF GOD TO SIN, AND OF FALLEN MAN IN GENERAL, PROVES MORAL NECESSITY AND INABILITY TO BE CONSISTENT WITH BLAMEWORTHINESS

SECTION 4.
COMMAND, AND OBLIGATION TO OBEDIENCE, CONSISTENT WITH MORAL INABILITY TO OBEY

SECTION 5. THAT SINCERITY OF DESIRES AND ENDEAVORS, WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO EXCUSE IN THE NONPERFORMANCE OF THINGS IN THEMSELVES GOOD, PARTICULARLY CONSIDERED

SECTION 6.
LIBERTY OF INDIFFERENCE, NOT ONLY NOT NECESSARY TO VIRTUE, BUT UTTERLY INCONSISTENT WITH IT; AND ALL, EITHER VIRTUOUS OR VICIOUS HABITS OR INCLINATIONS, INCONSISTENT WITH ARMINIAN NOTIONS OF LIBERTY AND MORAL AGENCY

SECTION 7.
ARMINIAN NOTIONS OF MORAL AGENCY INCONSISTENT WITH ALL INFLUENCE OF MOTIVE AND INDUCEMENT, IN EITHER VIRTUOUS OR VICIOUS ACTIONS

Part IV.
Wherein the chief Grounds of the Reasonings of Arminians, in Support and defense of Their Notions of Liberty, Moral Agency, etc. and against the Opposite Doctrine, Are Considered

SECTION 1.
THE ESSENCE OF THE VIRTUE AND VICE OF DISPOSITIONS OF THE HEART, AND ACTS OF THE WILL, LIES NOT IN THEIR CAUSE, BUT THEIR NATURE

SECTION 2. THE FALSENESS AND INCONSISTENCE OF THAT METAPHYSICAL NOTION OF ACTION, AND AGENCY, WHICH SEEMS TO BE GENERALLY ENTERTAINED BY THE DEFENDERS OF THE ARMINIAN DOCTRINE CONCERNING LIBERTY, MORAL AGENCY, ETC.

SECTION 3.
THE REASONS WHY SOME THINK IT CONTRARY TO COMMON SENSE, TO SUPPOSE THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NECESSARY, TO BE WORTHY OF EITHER PRAISE OR BLAME

SECTION 4.
IT IS AGREEABLE TO COMMON SENSE, AND THE NATURAL NOTIONS OF MANKIND, TO SUPPOSE MORAL NECESSITY TO BE CONSISTENT WITH PRAISE AND BLAME, REWARD AND PUNISHMENT

SECTION 5.
CONCERNING THOSE OBJECTIONS, THAT THIS SCHEME OF NECESSITY RENDERS ALL MEANS AND ENDEAVORS FOR THE AVOIDING OF SIN, OR THE OBTAINING VIRTUE AND HOLINESS, VAIN, AND TO NO PURPOSE; AND THAT IT MAKES MEN NO MORE THAN MERE MACHINES IN AFFAIRS OF MORALITY AND RELIGION

SECTION 6.
CONCERNING THAT OBJECTION AGAINST THE DOCTRINE WHICH HAS BEEN MAINTAINED, THAT IT AGREES WITH THE STOICAL DOCTRINE OF FATE, AND THE OPINIONS OF MR. HOBBES SECTION 7. CONCERNING THE NECESSITY OF THE DIVINE WILL

SECTION 8.
SOME FURTHER OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE MORAL NECESSITY OF GOD'S VOLITIONS CONSIDERED

SECTION 9.
CONCERNING THAT OBJECTION AGAINST THE DOCTRINE WHICH HAS BEEN MAINTAINED, THAT IT MAKES GOD THE AUTHOR OF SIN

SECTION 10.
CONCERNING SIN'S FIRST ENTRANCE INTO THE WORLD

SECTION 11. OF A SUPPOSED INCONSISTENCE OF THESE PRINCIPLES, WITH GOD'S MORAL CHARACTER

SECTION 12.
OF A SUPPOSED TENDENCY OF THESE PRINCIPLES TO ATHEISM AND LICENTIOUSNESS

SECTION 13.
CONCERNING THAT OBJECTION AGAINST THE REASONING, BY WHICH THE CALVINISTIC DOCTRINE IS SUPPORTED, THAT IT IS METAPHYSICAL AND ABSTRUSE

CONCLUSION