Dale on Stout and Grice

by JLS
for the GC

From Dale's online "Theory of Meaning"

at

http://www.russelldale.com/dissertation/c2n.html

we read:

"Stout's article is an important one in the history of the theory of meaning and a fuller treatment of this history would discuss it and its sources in more detail."

-- which is good as I always love to study sources in more detail. In any case, seeing that I was discussing Stout's views with R. O. Doyle, I am also reminded of Chapman's book on Grice (2006). Chapman is discussing the sources for Grice's 1948 Meaning and relates the rather sudden introduction by Grice of the concept of 'intention' as having Stout in mind.

Dale is quoting from an earlier and more specific essay by Stout on thought and language, but what Chapman says proves of interest then as per the sources for Grice's "Meaning". Chapman notes:

"As a solution to the problems inherent in the notion of conventional behaviour, Grice intrroduces intention, doing so abruptly and without much elaboration."

Chapman goes on to note: "However, the concept would probably not have been much of a surprise to his original audience in 1948."

"Grice later commented that this interest in intention was inspired in part by G. F. Stout's "Voluntary action"."

---

As Chapman notes, Stout was a previous editor of "Mind" and his article was
published there in 1896."

The gist of Stout's "Voluntary Action" (which may relate to Doyle's interest
in William James, etc.) is sort of easy to grasp:

"In ['Voluntary Action', Mind 1896], Chapman notes, "[G. F. Stout] argues that if voluntary action is to be distinguished from involuntary action in terms of
'volition', it is necessary to offer a unique account of volition, distinguishing
it from will or desire."

"Stout suggest[s] that in the case of volition, but not of simple desire,
there is necessarily 'a certain kind of judgement or belief', namely that
'so far as in us lies, we shall bring about the attainment of the desired
end' (p.356)."

"Indeed, if there is any doubt about the outcome of the volition,
expressed in a conditional statement, this must refer to circumstances outside our
control."

"This explains the difference between willing something and merely wishing
for it."

"However, there is another crucial distinction between voluntary and
involuntary action."

"In the case of the former, the action takes place precisely because of
the relevant belief; a voluntary action happens because we judge that we will
do it."

"An involuntary action may be one we judge is going to take place, but
only because other factors have already determined this."

As Chapman goes on to expand on Grice's earlier Stoutianism (or neo-Stoutianism -- he ended up being a neo-Prichardian). In his "Disposition and intention" (written by Grice circa 1950, or circa 1949, as I prefer), "[a] first criterion [for the analysis of intention], familiar from Stout's original paper, is that the speaker's freedom from doubt that the intended action will take place is not dependent on any empirical evidence."

Chapman also makes an interesting point with the Stoutian view that may have motivated Grice, just to provoke, to become a neo-Prichardian: "Hamphsire's and Hart's claims [in the 1958 "Decision, intention, and certainty"] are similar to those of Stout."

But there would be differences in style. In Chapman's wording:

"Stout is representative of an older style of Oxford philosophy, complete
with sweeping generalisations and moralistic musings."

Our quote from his "Manual of psychology" (1899) where he refers to the 'true Self' -- in ways that sort of underestimate what D. F. Pears will later say about Freud's id, ego, and superego -- may testify to this.

As an example, Chapman provides: "In discussing the tendency of voluntary
determination to endure over time and again obstacles, he comments that: 'If we
are weak and vacillating, no one will depend on us; we shall be viewed
with a kind of contempt. Mere vanity may go far to give fixity to the will'
(p.359 ).

In any case, Grice ended up, as we say, developing a neo-Prichardian line to the
alternate, shall we say, neo-Stoutian view he had endorsed in his early
"Disposition and intention" and which he perceived in Hampshire's and Hart's
"Decision, intention, and certainty", and which will have him providing a yet
different analysis of 'intention' in his own "Intention and Uncertainty".

The Stout connection is incidentally mentioned by Harman, too, who has
studied these things, in his contribution to the Grice festschrift, "Willing
and intending", in Grandy/Warner, Philosophical Grounds of Rationality:
Intentions, Categories, Ends.

------ Dale's interest is via Lady Welby, a 'genia' in more than one way, and the way she had dealt with some of the points raised by Stout, etc.