By Roger Bishop Jones, for The Grice Club
Grice wants system Q to be extendable with a notion of identity which satisfies an unqualified law of reflexivity: (x) x=x.
From this in Q we obtain by U.I.: Pegasus = Pegasus, but we know that predicates applied to non-existents always give falsehoods, so we must suppose that equality is to be some new primitive notion, not a predicate.
Is there anything in Grice to corroborate this inference, or any discussion of whether Pegasus=Pegasus?
Grice's doubts about system Q strangely enough do not seem to enter into the inability to say anything interesting about fictitious entities.
This is not a problem for those who expect logic to be different from natural language and are happy that it does not deal naturally with fictions.
But Grice is surely in system Q is trying to make standard logical systems accommodate failures of reference better than Russell's theory of descriptions (inter alia), so it is odd that system Q does not provide for more substantive statements about fictions.
It would seem normal in ordinary language to accept the truths that Pegasus has wings and that Sherlock Holmes smoked a pipe.
This connects with the identity question, for the idea that there may be distinct non-existents is of little value if we cannot distinguish between them by predication.
Does Grice discuss his position that all predicates are to be false of non-existents, and its relation to ordinary usage?
RBJ
RBJ
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well they're not identical in terms of substitutability, are they. Reading a Sherlock Holmes tale, you could not simply insert "Pegasus" in the text and keep the meaning--Pegasus does not smoke a pipe or solve crimes. It's more like...fictional entities share an attribute--like being fictional, invented, mythical, metaphorical etc. That doesn't mean anything goes though, does it? Hamlet's not Laertes, either...so a context thing, unless one decides that all fictional/mythological works are...to be banned, because they are not truthful (Plato suggested nearly as much...as did Mao...). It seems like a trivial affair...but at times the description issue arises with...purported individuals, possible or "iffy" situations, say regarding suspects, when evidence is scant (whether historical, legal, scientific, etc). But it usually relates to verification.
ReplyDeleteThanks, J, for your answer. I should provide the excerpt on what Grice calls, I think, 'parasitical' in Vacuous Names -- it's in the "Definite Descriptions" section, and it does refer to 'fictional' entities proper -- it's a very brief, and not truly inspired segment, I hasten to add.
ReplyDeleteI would also add that Grice does seem to be working with this dependence of '=' on the more primitive Leibniz Law. If I find the passage, I'll copy and paste it too.
OK. My point was vaguely Quinean re "the failure of substitutivity," which I consider at least relevant (and also...generally agree with Quine's opposition to modal and/or 'epistemic' logic, specifically in regard to belief... tho' as I've said I don't follow Willard the Wizard in all thangs) In many contexts, Sherlock Holmes might be considered a Pegasus, and a chimera might equal...a unicorn. But not all. Say you use PEGASUS as a password. SHERLOCK would certainly not do, even if you protested via identity of indiscernables or somethin.
ReplyDeleteYes. I discuss this elsewhere -- in a post later than the comment, above by yours truly, I think -- on Grice on
ReplyDeleteINTRODUCTION of "=" and
more importantly, "ELIMINATION" of '='. Grice is wanting to say that, by the 'weak identity law', a = b, then you CAN substitute a by b, and vice versa.
I think sherLOCK should do for ANY password.
well, what are A and B standing for? Fictional entities...Hamlet and Laertes? I would say if F.E.'s then they are only equivalent in the sense that they are both...fictional--they have different meanings, even if both non-referential (as in referring to persons in "real" world).Not identical, whether in terms of "character" (and say their dialogue), or ...syntactical operations (as say passwords). Say they are the names of two chihuahuas, not identical either---Hamlet's the larger of the two--Top Dog; Laertes the meaner but little perro.
ReplyDeleteSo I'll try Grice on this again, but still feel WVOQ's point re substitutivity holds, at least in "ordinary" reality. You could I suppose do "whimsy logic" and say "if Pegasus has wings -> Sherlock Holmes has wings". And..Pegasus (see, a picture right here!) does have wings. So Sherlock does too!--the premise is hardly necessary tho.
Sort of one-way ticket to Atascadero, JLster, like the Georg Cantor wing
Yes -- "The truth about Pegasus", that's what we need to know.
ReplyDeleteyes...but -- if y'all excuse a bit of "meta"-- that seems to be an inductive point, not logical per se EXCEPT when the existence issue creeps in (like with descriptions). Even per...Hume, the existence of a real Pegasus doesn't seem too likely (per the old "uniformity of experience"), anymore than say the 7-headed Beast the...Jezebel rides in the Book of Rev.
ReplyDeleteAs long as arguments treat of real, or even highly probable objects/events/ existing people, then not really an issue...to me, at least (tho I disagree with Meinong-ism).
The status of literary metaphors seems a bit different (tho' I...might listen to some philistinish logician say Shakespeare's meaningless since it has no basis in history, science or...logic. Russell hisself at times suggested as much--tho' much literature does relate to history, obviously).
Yes -- I am trying or was trying to focus on Grice's narrow focus, on "Pegasus". He is not wanting or willing to amuse himself. He is trying to amuse Quine (a different drearier topic altogether). So the obvious axioms are that Pegasus does not exist, etc. What Grice comes up with, M. Reicher, this Swiss philosopheress notes, is not different from Geach's. "there is" and "there exists" are different locutions. He wants to say (Grice and Geach) that "Pegasus" _is_. Or rather that even if we do say that Pegasus does not fly (since Pegasus does not exist), there is something which does not fly. Odd! But true! I may NOT like to say it if it involves me in efficiency-quota preserving variants Z's of Z!
ReplyDelete