Hello,
I'm new to the list and Google. So I'm trying to figure
stuff out, still. Instead of using this as a test or learning
experience only, I'll throw in a philosophical remark.
Russell describes structural similarity of two relations
in terms of a mapping between the relata (or elements
of the field) of that relation under the condition that
order is preserved. Analysis of Matter and PM. vol 2).
Well, this idea of structural similarity is very important
in Russell's later philosophy of science and it is interesting
to think of cases of structural similarity. Let's look at some
possibilities.
Is there a structural isomorphism (we'll call it), between
relations in the world and those of "inner" experience
of "conscious events? If so, contingently so is my quess.
But now take the spectrum; invert it. Structural isomorphism?
I think so. But notice this difference. In the first case the
relation is (or looks) contingent. But in the latter case things
are quite different; for if I know that all I've done is invert
the spectrum, then I know a priori that there will in fact
be structural isomorphism.
This may relate, productively, to issues about functionalism.
(Shoemaker 1966?) But it is interesting in connection with
the issue of the synthetic a priori: for the relation of
structural isomorphism appears to be synthetic a priori
in the color case but not the case where the sought isomorphism
is between world and experience.
Regards
Steve
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Thank you, Steve. Lovely to hear from you. S. R. Bayne writes:
ReplyDelete"(i) Is there a structural isomorphism"
Lovely word.
"(we'll call it), between relations in the world and those of "inner" experience
of "conscious events"? If so, contingently so is my quess."
Your guess is right as the next, as they say. Can we _guess_ on these things? We're talking inner experiences. I guess you are right! It seems merely contingent. I'm a Cartesian at very heart, so I don't trust relata out there in the mis-called 'noumenal' world, anyways (sic).
Bayne's second case concerns the inversion of the spectrum. "Invert" has perhaps various uses. You mean, as in ...?
"In the first case the relation is (or looks) contingent. But in the latter case things are quite different; for if I know that all I've done is invert the spectrum, then I know a priori that there will in fact
be structural isomorphism."
Perhaps we need a word for the opposite of isomorphism. I'll think about it. People don't talk about it too often. Allomorphism?
Bayne goes on to comment on Shoemaker and functionalism. The 'multiple realization' principle, I think it's called. The idea that for a
LOGICAL device
-- to use Grice Club member L. J. Kramer's terminology -- there is more than one
PHYSICAL device
-- the hardware versus the software. It makes a lot of sense in computerese, but I'll be damned if I know or care how MY beliefs that p are hard-wired in MY brain! Bayne: "But it is interesting in connection with the issue of the synthetic a priori: for the relation of structural isomorphism appears to be synthetic a priori in the color case but not the case where the sought isomorphism is between world and experience." I see. I'll have to research more about the spectrum. Or gamut. I think gamut is a lovely word. I think it _is_ related to 'spectrum'. "Spectrum" we use figuratively: "She fails to recognise the whole spectrum of shades of meaning, there".
"She fails to see the gamut of our experiences".
While a Cartesian, I'm a self-confessed Lockean. My mentor in this was a woman, Margartia Costa. She would have me read, while she taught, "History of Modern Philosophy", all the essays in the Oxford Readings in Philosophy for Locke: Yolton, etc.
I learned about Locke's enthusiasm with (Scots) philosophers who -- Boyle? -- had dealt with
'bulk'.
"Bulk" for Locke, as I recall, was the ONLY primary quality. This struck me then as slightly arbitrary, and I wondered if Locke or Boyle would have felt the same had they read a bit more about the Classical Atomists -- "De rerum natura" is a JOY -- or Einstein for that matter! But provided there IS something like a 'primary quality' which is CONNECTED to the 'noumenon' or thing in a, shall we say, 'primary' sense, the issue becomes:
How do we create _secondary_ qualities out of primary ones? Secondary qualities for Locke notably include colour. I recall I was fortunate enough to attend -- with Margarita Costa -- Barry Stroud's Tanner Lectures on Locke -- They went OVER my head, but it was all about scepticism about these properties.
(Stroud incidentally wrote the obit. for Grice along with Strawson for the British Academy). So, I would think that both primary and secondary qualities are matters of contingency, rather than apriorism, even if of the synthetic order! Recall, incidentally, how intrigued was Grice with the synthetic a priori, as he tested his children's playmates with things like "Nothing can be red and green all over". Shoemaker's considerations are best treated when dealing with functionalism in a separate thread. But again, I would warn against the devil of 'scientism', as it were. We _can_ postulate multiple realisation without much caring about it.